doi: 10.1111/1467-8675.
12082
Postcards from the Future: The Greek Debt Crisis, the Struggle
against the EU-IMF Austerity Package and the Open Questions
for Left Strategy
Spyros Sakellaropoulos and Panagiotis Sotiris
Introduction
Since December 2009, Greece has been at the center of
international attention. The revelation of high levels of
public debt, the downgrading by international grading
agencies, the widespread assumption that a Greek de-
fault is highly probable and the consequent extreme rise
in the cost of borrowing have led to draconian packages
of austerity measures, a prolonged recession, a sharp de-
cline in living standards and the imposition of a regime
of limited economic sovereignty under the terms of su-
pervision by the EU – IMF – ECB ‘troika.’1 It also led
to a unique sequence of protest, a crisis of hegemony
and profound changes to the political scene. In what
follows, we attempt to asses this conjuncture, answer
some of the prevailing myths about the Greek crisis and
insist on what all these mean for left-wing politics.
1. Some Myths about the Greek Crisis
Revisited
The extreme measures taken in Greece have been legit-
imized through the appeal to certain characteristics of
Greek economy and society: deviant public borrowing
and spending, constantly rising salaries undermining
the competitiveness of Greek economy, and an unsus-
tainable consumption mode.2 Apart from being used as
justification for the measures, these characteristics have
also been instrumental in creating a sense of collective
guilt in Greek society.
However, a scrutiny of Greek economy shows that
many of the accusations are far from true. The Greek
debt crisis was not unique, since other European
economies also face a heavy debt burden. In addition,
it was not more dramatic in Greece than in other coun-
tries. Wage increases in Greece were not ‘irrational,’
especially if we consider that from 1991 to 2005 they
lagged behind rises in productivity, a fact that indicates
rising rates of exploitation.3 The broadening of the con-
sumption base, mainly through access to cheaper credit,
was necessary to keep high rates of growth, a tendency
observed in most OECD countries.
Missing from this picture are other important as-
pects of the Greek Debt crisis As far as the Greek debt
Constellations Volume 21, No 2, 2014.

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burden is concerned what is missing from the dom-
inant discourse is that capital in Greece has enjoyed
one the most lax tax regimes in Europe. Taxation on
business earnings is one of the lowest; indirect taxes
aimed mainly against households are the most impor-
tant source of tax revenue; tax exemptions of all kinds
are extremely widespread (for example scandalous ex-
emptions of the Shipping Industry in what concerns
VAT in business transactions4 ). At the same time, be-
fore the crisis there was conscious tolerance of on the
part of the Greek government as a means to build class
alliances, especially with small capitalists and the petty
bourgeois strata. It is also important to note that deficits
also reflected the pressure on Greek governments to
accommodate big business, both national and interna-
tional: overpriced public works, extremely high cost of
medical supplies and of course high military spending –
a large part of it openly politically motivated with the
Greek government buying US fighter planes, French
frigates and German inoperable submarines amidst a
recession.
2. The Crisis of the Greek Developmental
Paradigm
It is also worth noting that the recession of the Greek
economy, and consequent debt burden, is not a simple
local manifestation of the global capitalist crisis. It also
reflected a deeper crisis of the whole ‘developmental
paradigm’ of Greek capitalism that was based upon low
labor cost, the exploitation of immigrant labor, the use
of European funds and increased household consump-
tion fueled by debt. Although Greece went through a
phase of deep capitalist restructuring during the past two
decades, it seems as if there is no growth dynamic left.
The dependence of important sectors of the Greek econ-
omy (construction, tourism, and shipping) on the ten-
dencies of the economic cycle and the global economic
conjuncture only made things worse. There was also the
absence of sectors producing high value added goods
that could trigger processes of endogenous growth. As
a result Greek capitalism, after a period of constant
growth entered a prolonged economic downturn.5
 Postcards from the Future: Spyros Sakellaropoulos and Panagiotis Sotiris
3. The Crisis of the Eurozone and the
Strategy of Internal Devaluation
In the discussion of the Greek crisis, the whole ques-
tion of the Eurozone and the consequences of Greece
joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) had
been left outside the discussion for a long time. Yet
this is exactly the problem: The introduction of a
common currency without a common authority and
mechanisms of redistribution was intensifying regional
imbalances, hurting workers in both core and periphery
countries, yet benefiting the capital of the core European
countries.
In our opinion, the Greek case brings forward the
structural contradictions of the Eurozone and the fi-
nancial and monetary architecture of the EMU. The
introduction of the euro as a common currency accen-
tuated the problems caused by the differences in com-
petitiveness and productivity in European economies.
The traditional justification for this structure was the
need to avoid inflationary pressures in an attempt to
guarantee the role of the euro as world money, but,
in terms of the social balance of forces, it has mainly
functioned as a constant pressure for capitalist restruc-
turing. The euro practically meant currency devaluation
for higher productivity and competitive export countries
and a currency overvaluation for lower productivity im-
port countries, making even more obvious the differ-
ences in productivity and competitiveness. In periods of
relative growth this structural imbalance could be toler-
ated or even endorsed and enhanced because it could act
as a pressure for capitalist restructuring, since it could
be seen as a something like an ‘iron cage’ of capitalist
modernization. This helps explain why the bourgeoisies
of countries such as Greece could accept such a strat-
egy of extended pressure upon their productive base,
especially if they could also enjoy the benefit of lower
interest rates. However, in a period of recession all the
contradictions of this strategy are intensified. Therefore,
this partial concession of national monetary sovereignty
could act, in times of growth, as a way to force capital-
ist restructuring (at the same time ideologically using
the reference to Europe as legitimization). In time of
crises and recession, however, pressures can pass the
limit of restructuring and lead to the destruction both of
productive forces and social alliances.
The absence of any mechanism of redistribution and
compensation in the Eurozone and the reluctance par-
ticularly of Germany to consider any such mechanism
(especially since German capital has been a benefactor
of the imbalances within the EMU) means that the com-
petitive pressure on lower productivity and less compet-
itive countries can become destabilizing. Consequently,
the financial and monetary structure of the Eurozone
seems like an economic straightjacket, offering no other

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263
way out than a constant attack on worker’s wages and
rights, even at the cost of endangering social cohesion.
This had already been theorized by Olivier Blanchard,
IMF’s chief economist, in 2007 as a of strategy ‘internal
devaluation’ through reduction of nominal wages as a
way to counter the erosion of competitiveness within a
single currency area such as the Eurozone.6
As even Paul Krugman acknowledges,7 it was pre-
dictable that at some point the establishment of a single
currency by countries with entirely different levels of
productivity would bring to light a host of contradic-
tions. These contradictions have to do with the different
structural characteristics of each country, the uneven
rates of capital accumulation, the unequal contributions
to international competitiveness. All these led not only
to differentiations in the rates of inflation and a spiraling
of public debt but also, and above all, to differences in
international specialization of the national productive
systems.8
The creation of the Eurozone was a successful
race to the bottom for Germany who benefited both
by high initial productivity and competitiveness and
by placing bigger pressure on wages. Current account
deficits in the European South contrasted with the sur-
pluses in Germany point to this structural imbalance in
competitiveness.9 It is also worth noting that the struc-
tural imbalances of the Eurozone were also instrumental
in creating aspects of the debt crisis for countries such
as Greece. Current account deficits and a decline in pri-
vate savings led to an accumulation of external debt. As
Lapavitsas et al. note:
In other words, external indebtedness reflects the bi-
ased integration of the periphery into the Eurozone.
Generalized pressure on wages has allowed the core to
gain competitiveness, thus leading to rising indebted-
ness of the periphery to the core. Far from promoting
convergence among member states, European Mone-
tary Union has been a source of unrelenting pressure
on workers that has produced systematic disparities be-
tween core and periphery resulting in vast accumulation
of debt in the latter. 10
In this context, in conditions of capitalist accumu-
lation, from the moment that the single currency rules
out devaluation, it exerts constant competitive pressure
on less competitive capitals and social formations. This
is, precisely, the reason that Germany, as the econom-
ically most powerful country in the European Union,
supported the introduction of the euro. It judged that its
superior competitiveness, reinforced by the inability of
the individual member states to implement devaluations,
would result in protracted export growth, as indeed oc-
curred. However, the worsening of the financial crisis
had the effect of partially, but not totally, modifying the
existing economic and political context. In conditions
264 Constellations Volume 21, Number 2, 2014
of recession, the competitiveness deficit became ever
more obvious, with the result – among much else – of
greater deficits and a rise in the cost of borrowing. This
occurred because of the fall in consumption, leading to
a cutback in state revenues and a consequent increase
in the deficit. The situation was aggravated by the fact
that the recession also triggered an increase in unem-
ployment, so that there was an even greater shortfall in
public revenues and more frequent resort to borrowing
to cover basic needs. The absence of redistributive poli-
cies with the potential to offset the uneven development
shows that the EU is not a confederation, much less a
federation, but a sui generis institutional conjunction of
national formations competing with each other for the
largest possible appropriation of produced wealth.
In the context of a continuing crisis and the clear
signs of a global recession, the European bourgeoisies
decided to deal with these contradictions through the
continuation of a “fuite en avant” tactic. Thus, on March
25, 2011 they consented to the “Treaty for Establishing
the European Stability Mechanism,” which was signed
in July 11, 2011. Under its terms, each state must present
a long-term plan for securing the confidence of the fi-
nancial markets. An annual “stability and convergence
program” will be drawn up, at the national level, estab-
lishing its goals in relation to deficits, income and ex-
penditures, the strategy by means of which these goals
will be attained and a timetable for its implementation.
For the purposes of achieving the goals each state must
implement a number of structural adjustments. Super-
vision by the EU bureaucracy will be stifling: the draft
budget of every member state will have to be presented
to the European Council prior to its submission to the
national parliament, and the recommendations of the
European Commission inserted into it.
As regards labor costs, these will be subjected to
close monitoring and constant comparison with the cor-
responding figures for other member states of the Eu-
rozone and with those of the EU’s trading partners. If it
is judged that wages are not commensurate with com-
petitiveness, they will be subject to revision. Similarly,
the viability of the pension system will be monitored
continuously and closely through establishment of spe-
cial indicators to correlate them with the levels of debt.
An additional objective is for the retirement age to be
brought into alignment with life expectancy by aban-
doning any provisions for early retirement.
In parallel with all this is the projected creation of a
mechanism for restraining increases in debt. This mech-
anism will be mandatory in character and will come
into operation automatically on each occasion that the
deficit exceeds a prescribed limit. This will be imple-
mented through legally binding commitments (consti-
tutional revision, draft legislation). Also proposed is a
further reduction in employer contributions to insurance

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funds, and one basic priority is development of a com-
mon and uniform base for company taxation.
Finally, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance was signed in March 1, 2012, which intro-
duced mandatory balanced or surplus budgets, increased
supervision of member-States’ economies, processes of
pre-approval of major policy decisions, and a penalty
mechanism for whatever State fails to meet the agreed
budget targets.
All this institutional reform is aimed at solving the
multitude of problems we have just outlined—the con-
tradictions and antagonisms that traverse the EMU—
precisely because it is not a national formation but many
national formations in a relationship of mutual compe-
tition for the most favorable position in the international
division of labor.
Consequently, the structural imbalances of the
Eurozone have forced countries such as Greece towards
a policy of internal devaluation, in the sense of a sharp
reduction of wage costs, in order for the economy to
have a new lower starting equilibrium.11 The problem
is that although processes of internal devaluation can
be extremely violent socially, at the same time they are
either unsuccessful in bringing forward the desired rises
in competitiveness (amongst other reasons because they
tend to put too much stress on labor costs) or they must
take too long.
4. The Crisis of Neoliberalism and the ‘Fuite
En Avant’ Tactic of European Bourgeoisies
From the above it is obvious that in a period of an open
crisis of neoliberal strategy the EU remains fixed to
neoliberal orthodoxy. According to this, ‘structural re-
forms’, such as mass lay-offs, flexible labor relations,
lowering of labor costs, cannot only lead to growth but
also to a solution of the fiscal problems; it is obvi-
ous, though, that, at least in the short term, these mea-
sures will intensify recessionary tendencies and public
deficits. The reason for this strategy is the way the cur-
rent capitalist crisis is perceived. Despite the ambitious
targets set in the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ back in 2000, it is
obvious that European capitalisms did not manage leaps
in productivity and are facing elements of a profitability
crisis. The European sovereign debt crisis is an expres-
sion of this more structural capitalist crisis. ‘Markets,’
that is the ‘organic intellectuals of capital’ employed
in rating agencies and financial firms, are already as-
sessing the future consequences of current economic
contradictions.
With aspects of the European ‘social model’ still in
place and signs of growing militancy and even radical-
ism, European elites opt for a deepening of recession in
order to take advantage of its disciplinary aspects. They
can accept a delay in recovery if this can help them take
 Postcards from the Future: Spyros Sakellaropoulos and Panagiotis Sotiris
advantage of the situation and enforce a change in the
balance of forces against labor. The fact that austerity
measures are being introduced all over Europe regard-
less of actual deficit problems highlights the assump-
tion that we are not dealing with contingent extreme
measures, but with strategic choices on the part of the
European bourgeoisies. This can also explain the differ-
ent strategies between the EU and US. The near total
defeat of the US labor movement, the lack of which
helps explain the absence of a ‘Welfare State’ in the US
in the sense that it has in Europe, can explain why, at
least initially, US elites, faced with a structural capitalist
crisis, were ready to introduce some form of a stimulus
to the economy or why the extent of counter-cyclical
state intervention has been so big. On the contrary, one
can discern a strategic unease on the part of European
elites. The absence of clear bourgeois strategy for the
exit from the economic crisis is evident. A whole set
of strategic assumptions, based upon the ability of the
market to act as a means of rationalization, has been
challenged by the failure of the markets and their in-
herent irrationalism. The attack on workers’ rights can
change the balance of forces and offer capitalists some
room to move, but it does not address the roots of a
structural crisis of over-accumulation. This would need
a new social and technological paradigm. However, it
is obvious that capitalists and their political represen-
tatives tend, at least for the time being, to turn back
on attacking workers rights, than tackle questions of
strategy. Without a plausible strategy for a new wave
of restructuring and technological innovation that will
lead to a leap in productivity, the lowering of labor costs,
labor market flexibility and further liberalization seem
as the only way out for the ‘European Project.’ All of
this induces a ‘race to the bottom’ when it comes to the
condition of labor.
5. Permanent Economic Emergency
as a Class Strategy
Therefore, it is necessary to bring forward the class
rationale behind this strategy of a ‘constant state of eco-
nomic emergency.’ The whole process of Greek Debt
restructuring agreed on at the July 21, 2011 EU Sum-
mit meeting and the conditions associated with the new
prolonged loan package are making this even more ob-
vious. However, the evocation of the need for extreme
measures to tackle the debt crisis cannot account for
the extent of the current Pan-European attack on la-
bor. The adoption of aggressive strategies against labor
rights all over Europe implies that the problem is not
just debt but a more structural capitalist crisis, the re-
sult of a falling profitability in conjunction with the
process of financialization. Without getting into detail
we would like to insist that we consider the current

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265
crisis a crisis of over-accumulation, having its roots,
in the last instance, in structural contradictions at the
heart of capitalist production, even though its ‘form of
appearance’ was that of a crisis of capitalist financial-
ization. We would also like to stress that in our view
even if we take financialization as the causal trigger of
the current capitalist crisis, still a way out of the crisis
would not be possible without capitalist restructuring
in the sphere of production. On this debate see Costas
Lapavitsas’ recent book for the most eloquent version
of the ‘financialization crisis’ thesis12 and the work of
Stavros Mavroudeas as an example of the ‘falling rate of
profit’ position.13 Therefore what we are experiencing
all over Europe is a giant attempt at social engineer-
ing in the sense of imposing a radically altered bal-
ance of forces: capitalist restructuring of unprecedented
scale.
Thus, the strategic calculation behind the austerity
package in Greece is not only fiscal but also political. It
aims at imposing a humiliating defeat upon the working
classes and permanently changing the balance of forces
in favor of capital. What is at stake is not just an emer-
gency package of austerity measures but a profound
change of social paradigm: the unleashing of systemic
capitalist social violence against the forces of labor and
the reversal of whatever is left of workers’ gains in the
20th century. Greece is becoming a testing ground for
a more general strategy of radically deteriorating the
position of workers. It is a test of the ability to impose
a radical ‘shock therapy’ of structural reforms in ad-
vanced capitalist social formations with long traditions
of social struggle. If the ‘Greek experiment’ is success-
ful, one can expect similar attacks on labor in other
European countries, beginning with countries of the
European South. Therefore, a defeat of labor in Greece
will affect the balance of forces between capital and
labor all over Europe.
Current developments show that we are dealing with
a broader tendency. Austerity is now the key word all
over Europe: drastic cuts in public spending, in the
South, in countries of the European core and also in
countries outside the Eurozone such as Britain; attack on
wages; rises in pension ages; acceleration of processes
of commodification of public goods. European policy
planners and national governments seem to agree on an
aggressive neoliberal policy of “creative destruction,”
where the cuts in public spending and a sharp decline
in wages will offer companies both a competitiveness
advantage and a pressure to higher efficiency and pro-
ductivity, plus an incentive to bold new entrepreneurial
endeavors. However, missing from this picture is both
the tremendous social cost and the danger of a vicious
recessionary circle.14
Also important is a growing strategic change in how
European Integration is being conceived. Though the
266 Constellations Volume 21, Number 2, 2014
whole transition towards ‘European Economic Gover-
nance associated with the EFSF mechanism, the hege-
monic formations in the EU are opting for imposing
limited sovereignty upon countries of the European pe-
riphery that are facing debt crisis and need assistance.
This is not only a means to impose prudent public fi-
nance management. It has also to do with an attempt
to impose on these countries a radically different so-
cial model, with the emphasis on low labor cost and the
lifting of any barriers to foreign investment.
6. Greece: A Change in Social Paradigm
The measures introduced by the Greek government as
a part of the agreement with the IMF and the EU ex-
emplify this attempt at a change of social paradigm.
Measures that until recently were aspects of ‘wishful
thinking’ for the forces of capital have been rapidly
introduced in a ‘shock and awe’ tactic of consecutive
legislative coups. Moreover, the whole mechanism of
EU-ECB-IMF ‘supervision,’ in reality something close
to economic and financial occupation, led to succes-
sive waves of measures. Sharp reductions in both public
and private sector wages, along with abolishing exist-
ing legislation on collective bargaining, led to a 25.2%
reduction in real terms of average wages.15 The reform
of the pension system will lead to dramatic increases in
pension age limits and decreases in pensions and, more
importantly, to the change from a redistributive system
based on the solidarity of generations (current workers’
contributions pay for pensioners) to a system where
pensions will be determined by the level of contribu-
tions introduced during the whole work-life. Moreover,
current pensioners are already facing sharp reductions
in the amounts they receive. The changes in the system
of collective bargaining have left extensive parts of the
workforce with no collective contract whatsoever. The
easing of the restrictions to mass firings and the reduc-
tion in severance packages has reinforced workplace
despotism. We are facing a deregulation of the labor
market of historical dimensions and the full unleash-
ing of the disciplinary aspects of capitalist crisis.16 The
rise of the VAT and other indirect taxes combined with
constant increases in the prices of most goods means a
further attack on the income of working families.17 New
taxes have been introduced including extra income tax
and a new property tax. The sharp reduction of public
sector employees, with mass lay-offs not only of public
employees on limited term contracts, but also of civil
servants with permanent positions, will only aggravate
the problem of mass unemployment and intensify the
problem of workplace precariousness. At the same time
it will severely undermine the quality of services pro-
vided. A massive wave of privatizations has increased
commercialization of the access to basic goods and ser-

C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
vices and has led to a pillage of public assets in the name
of repaying the debt. Higher Education Reforms by the
Ministry of education have intensified the move toward
a more ‘entrepreneurial’ Higher Education.
The result of these measures has been a sharp de-
terioration in living standards. If we include the effects
of increased taxation, the purchasing power of the aver-
age wage-earner has been reduced by 30%.18 With the
Greek economy continuously contracting since 2008
many small businesses have been forced to close. The
official unemployment rate was at the 4th quarter of
2013 27.5%, with youth unemployment (15–24) reach-
ing 57% according to the data of the Hellenic Statistic
Authority.19 Most analysts, though, calculate real un-
employment to be much higher, and the trend is rising.
Drastic cuts in public spending have led to reduced
services by public authorities, exemplified in the fact
that on September 12, 2011 the school year started
without textbooks because of a delay in their printing.
Hospitals, public universities and public transportation
systems face extreme budget cuts, areseriously under-
staffed and can no longer function properly. According
to trade union data, there is a deficit of 32,000 teaching
hours per week in Greek secondary education. Budget
cuts that have reduced access to healthcare along with
increased poverty have led to sharp deterioration in
public health.20
Moreover, the whole process of the implementation
of the measures has also been an attack on national
sovereignty and the democratic process. The Greek
government is treating the loan agreements and the
‘Memoranda of Understanding’ with the EU and the
IMF as something above even the Greek constitution,
the supervising EU – ECB – IMF ‘troika’ can always
demand extra measures and dictate important policy
changes which are then implemented by simple minis-
terial decrees. Moreover, the whole process of constant
evaluation of the ‘progress’ made offers ample room for
blackmailing Greek governments into accepting even
harsher measures.
7. Hegemonic Instability
However, this process is facing grave contradictions
both in Greece and in Europe, as the current circle of so-
cial contention shows. Contrary to the ascent of neolib-
eralism, which coincided with a long period of defeat
for the working class and the political left, now we face
an open crisis of neoliberalism as hegemonic ideology.
References to the market and its inherent rationality do
not have the same appeal today as they had back in the
early 1980s. Moreover, both the crisis of neoliberalism
and the alienation of large strata—both middle class and
working class—from the political scene, as the result of
the consequences of the crisis, mark a growing crisis of
 Postcards from the Future: Spyros Sakellaropoulos and Panagiotis Sotiris
hegemony. This introduces an element of instability in
the conjuncture.
There is no doubt that the coalition of forces around
the ‘Stability Program’ is a strong one. Apart from the
open blackmail from the EU, the IMF and the interna-
tional rating agencies, there is the political consensus
of the Greek political and media elite and the open sup-
port of all the segments of the bourgeoisie. They see
these measures as a unique opportunity to lower labor
costs and radically alter the balance of forces in the
workplace – something that in the absence of a viable
developmental strategy seems as the only possible
solution for them.
On the other hand, the hegemonic efficacy of this
strategy is minimal: the popular classes have been reluc-
tant to give their consent. After more than two decades
of attempts at capitalist restructuring and demands for
temporary sacrifices in the name of future prosperity, the
subordinate classes are being told that they will have to
endure austerity without end. Instead of the appeal to
modernization and ‘becoming part of Europe’ as ‘na-
tional goals,’ which was the axis of the ruling ideology
in the past decades, what is being projected is more
an attempt towards collective guilt in sharp contrast to
what most people perceive as a sharp deterioration of
their living conditions. This ‘thin’ basis of legitimiza-
tion, this reliance only on a ‘passive’ form of hegemony,
is something that can turn into a more profound crisis
of hegemony. This can explain the extent of protest and
anger in Greek society. It can also account for the ex-
tremely high rates of disapproval for the measures and a
general disillusionment with the political system. This
can account for the dramatic changes of the political
landscape, exemplified in the electoral earthquake of
the May-June 2012 elections. The dissolution of the
historical ties of PASOK to the subaltern classes, the
losses of New Democracy, the rise of the neo-fascist
Golden Dawn and, above all, the impressive electoral
rise of the Left and in particular SYRIZA: all these re-
flect the extent of the political crisis and the profound
changes in relations of representation.21
The fact that in most European countries we have
not seen an expression of tendencies of such magnitude
in the political scene has more to do with the inability
or absence of a political Left than with a stabilization of
the balance of forces.
Moreover, there are also signs that we have en-
tered a new historical cycle of mass protest. From
December 2008 in Greece, the first such example of
extreme forms of social discontent and contention,22 to
the Arab Spring, the Indignados Movement, the Oc-
cupy! movement in North America, the student revolts
in Britain, Canada and Chile and the 2013 Turkish
protests, we have been witnessing movements that are
not only massive but also go beyond simply articulat-

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267
ing grievances and demands. Facing this situation, the
forces of capital have chosen a very aggressive strat-
egy. One could describe it as being at the same time
post-democratic and post-hegemonic.23 Several pieces
of evidence attest to this tendency: The Schmitian over-
tones of the “state of permanent economic emergency,”
the total disrespect of the democratic and more gener-
ally political procedure, the new forms of international
economic intervention (along with nation-building, we
now have economy-building!). At the same time, there
is a certain ‘fear of the masses,’in both senses suggested
by Balibar in his reading of Spinoza.24 Fear of the pos-
sibility of social explosions, December 2008 being the
closest example, and also fear of the masses themselves
regarding the precariousness of their material condition.
The repressed and disavowed aspect of this con-
juncture of austerity and protest is that of a looming
hegemonic crisis. The erosion of any broad legitimizing
basis after more than two decades of ‘actually existing
neoliberalism,’ the open crisis of neoliberalism after the
current crisis of financialization, the growing class in-
equalities, the growing alienation of large segments of
the population from the political scene and even the end
to high consumption driven by cheap credit: all these
are contributing factors to a crisis of hegemony.
8. The ‘Movement of the Squares’
and its Importance
The mass rallies and assemblies at city squares all over
Greece in May-July 2011 exemplified the looming crisis
of hegemony. This movement was based on the collec-
tive experiences of struggle in the past years, such as the
December 2008 youth explosion, the massive strikes in
2010–2011, the movement of civil disobedience to in-
creased toll prices, and the heroic struggle of the people
of Keratea, a small town in the greater Attica region,
which fought with riot police for months, successfully
opposing plans for an environmentally disastrous land-
fill in their vicinity. At same time, people with no prior
experience of struggle come forward in these protests,
which were not simple imitations of the 15-M protests
in Spain, but a much more widespread form of protest
with deeper roots in Greek society.
These protests were deeply democratic, radical and
profoundly anti-systemic. They represented a strong
desire for political change, the demand for safe em-
ployment, dignity for labor, authentic democracy, and
popular sovereignty against the attempt to implement
measures dictated by the EU, the IMF and the ECB.
Moreover, these protests have brought forward a new
wave of politicization and radicalization of Greek
Society. People begin to question dominant policies,
especially in what concerns the debt and Greece’s par-
ticipation in the Eurozone. A very important aspect of
268 Constellations Volume 21, Number 2, 2014
the movement has been the growing disillusion of peo-
ple with the European Union. Contrary to a traditionally
strong pro-EU popular opinion more and more people
are beginning to question the participation of Greece in
the Eurozone and the withdrawal from the euro is being
openly discussed by people, instead of being rejected in
advance, as was the norm until recently.
It is true that this movement has been extremely
suspicious of traditional party politics, a suspicion also
directed against the parties of the Left. But to pass judg-
ment on this anti-political stance, we must also take
into consideration that for the majority of Greek people
party politics is associated with unjust neoliberal poli-
cies, media manipulation, corruption and close links to
big business and lately an almost servile stance towards
international organizations. In light of the above, one
can say that this ‘anti-political’ stance is exactly the
foundation of an authentic process of radical politiciza-
tion, the beginning for an alternative politics of collec-
tive action, direct democracy and radical social change.
That is why on the squares of Greek cities we wit-
nessed a unique experiment in democracy. The mass
assemblies, with their very strict rules of equal voicing
and collective decision that leave no room for traditional
demagogy, offered an alternative paradigm of the col-
lective processing of political demands and strategies,
and produced demands and political positions going be-
yond a simple refusal of dominant policies. If the forms
of a potential ‘dual power’ must always be the result of a
process of collective inventiveness, then we experienced
the beginning of such a process.
The fact that the Greek government used extreme
forms of police brutality in order to suppress the move-
ment provides further evidence of the absence of le-
gitimization and of the deepening hegemonic crisis. At
the same time it brought forward both the dynamics and
the limits of such forms of protest and contention. On the
one hand, the movement intensified breaks in the rela-
tions of representation and eroded what was left of the
neoliberal hegemony, forging new bonds of solidarity
and common militant experiences. On the other hand, it
made evident that in a situation of limited sovereignty
and post-democratic and post-hegemonic ‘state of per-
manent emergency,’ traditional displays of social anger
and loss of legitimacy, are not enough. What is required
is an escalation of social and political struggles that
should include the articulation of clear alternative polit-
ical goals and not just abstract needs, forms of struggle
that pose actual material obstacles to the implementation
of the measures, and those forms of political represen-
tation and organization that would challenge the actual
balance of forces. This has been the main challenge for
the forces of the Left.
The Movement of the Squares was a turning point
in the development of social and political antagonism

C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
in Greece. It intensified the political crisis and turned
it into something close to a hegemonic crisis and a cri-
sis of state authority. A series of social and political
events followed: the disruption of military parades in
October 2011,25 the fall of the Papandreou government,
the 2011–12 Papademos government, led by a former
central banker, the increased social contestation that led
to the February 12 2012 mass rioting, the elections of
May-June 2012 that led to the impressive rise of the Left
and especially SYRIZA. All of these events exemplify
how forms of mass collective protest and politicization
intensified the political crisis and changed the political
landscape.
9. The Challenge for the Left
That said, the challenge for the political Left is enor-
mous. The total defeat of the governmental Left and
the illusions about a ‘neoliberalism with a human face’
have left a certain political vacuum. A left strategy can-
not be a simple strategy for the movement, although
having strong movements is a most important aspect
of the struggle we have to wage. We cannot miss the
political, the political level, the question of power.
Especially in Greece, this has been an urgent exi-
gency, since SYRIZA came close to gaining govern-
mental power in the June 2012 elections and it is
probable that they will be the first party in the next
legislative elections. Therefore, questions of political
strategy, especially regarding the political program and
how to deal with political power are not theoretical but
have a direct relation to everyday politics.
The problem is that these developments coincide
with a period of strategic crisis for most tendencies of
the European Left. One should not forget that the ba-
sic problem for the European Left has been that, after
its subsequent defeats in the last decades, first by the
mutation of social-democracy and the decline of the
communist Left, and then by the subsequent waves of
capitalist restructuring and neoliberal reforms, it has
not managed to offer a strategic alternative. For the
most part, it has contributed to student and workplace
militancy, with varieties of success, it has acted as an
electoral outlet of protest, and it has offered some form
of ideological defense of socialism. Nevertheless, it has
not managed to offer those concrete political answers
that would transform it into a counter-hegemonic force.
Yet, this is exactly what is currently required: a Left
that can address the whole of society and offer an al-
ternative to ‘actually existing capitalism.’ This means
offering those concrete answers that have to with eco-
nomic and fiscal policy, ownership, foreign relations,
the ways to integrate or not in the international system,
in short the question of power. At the same time, the cri-
sis of the trade union movement, as a result of both the
 Postcards from the Future: Spyros Sakellaropoulos and Panagiotis Sotiris
extensive capitalist restructurings of the past years and
the inability of the trade union bureaucracy to chal-
lenge them, makes rethinking how to organize collective
struggle and resistance an urgent matter.
Therefore, the challenge for the forces of labor and
the Left is twofold. On the one hand, it is necessary not
only to try and organize forms of social resistance and
struggle, but also to contribute to a social mobilization
of such scale that would undermine important aspects of
the hegemonic strategy, induce sharp breaks in the rela-
tions of representation, especially those that attach large
parts of the subordinate classes to social-democratic par-
ties, and create conditions of social unrest that would
make the implementation of the Austerity Programs un-
bearable for the ruling classes. On the other hand, this
requires the articulation of a concrete program of radical
political goals that will offer an alternative.
The question of political power is necessary if we
want to avoid two extremes, between which current
Left strategy vacillates. On the one hand, we have the
strategy of “changing the world without taking power,”
based on the advances and creativity of social move-
ments, especially in areas where the movement implies
not only contention but also building social networks
and forms of self-organization. This strategy misses the
importance of political power and the need to resist the
materiality of political power. One the other hand, we
face a certain immersion in realist politics that leads to
an identification of political intervention with a plau-
sible governance of current capitalism, a strategy that
has led to many defeats, especially in Europe. The par-
ticipation of the French Communist Party to the Jospin
government and of the Party of Communist Refounda-
tion in the Prodi government in Italy are the most recent
examples of such disastrous political choices.
10. From Resistance to Hegemony
The challenge for the Left is not simply to be instru-
mental in the development of social contention or to
be the organizing force of social resistance. The chal-
lenge is to offer a viable alternative to ‘actually existing
capitalism.’ This cannot be a simple evocation of com-
munism, however necessary the search for the ‘traces
of communism’ in current struggles is (the refusal of
commodification, the refusal of capitalist hierarchy, the
demand for spaces that are free of the value form, the
new forms of ‘democracy of the struggle’). It cannot be
a simple list of anti-capitalist demands or the verbalism
of simply appealing to ‘world revolution’ or its coun-
terpart ‘pan-European revolution.’ It cannot be a simple
projection of social needs, but must instead include an
articulation of concrete radical demands. Refusing the
debt, demanding an immediate opt-out of the euro, na-
tionalizing banks, imposing capital controls, and requir-

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269
ing redistribution of income towards labor are urgent
demands . Today, they can be articulated with a demand
for a radical alternative, and they provide a way to think
not simply about left-governance but about the highly
original ways today a broad anti-capitalist social and po-
litical front can pose the question of power, especially
if we see an escalation of contention and a deepening of
the tendencies toward open political crisis.
First, this requires a clear position on the question of
debt. Since the whole mechanism of debt has been used
as a means to impose systemic social violence against
Greek society, it is clear that it presents an unbearable
burden. Trying to find a way to finance it can only lead
to a vicious circle of more austerity and at the same time
greater indebtedness. Even after a large scale debt re-
structuring in 2012 – the cost of which mainly fell upon
public sector institutions – in 2013 the Debt/GDP ratio
was at 175.1%.26 That is why it is necessary to fight
for debt annulment. This is made even more urgent by
the fact that, as it has been shown in many other cases,
debt can be a very powerful mechanism of imposing
aggressive capitalist politics. Furthermore, current lev-
els of debt, especially in countries like Greece, can lead
to various forms of creditor-led ‘restructuring,’ which
could be used as the pretext for yet another round of
attack on labor.
Secondly, a clear position on the question of debt
can support the demand for a complete repeal of the
Greek government’s agreements with the EU, the ECB
and the IMF and of all the measures associated with
these agreements.
Thirdly, the whole project of European Unification
must be questioned. Contrary to a tendency to view
European Unification as a neutral or natural tendency,
it must be viewed as the materialization of a class strat-
egy and as a mechanism for the strengthening of cap-
italist modernization. De-linking European countries
from these processes and reclaiming aspects of national
sovereignty in fiscal and monetary policy, is the only
defense against the systemic social violence of the in-
ternationalization of capital. The architecture of both
the EU and the Eurozone implies that it is not possible
to have European-wide processes of income redistribu-
tion or compensations for regional inequalities or any
other aspect of a ‘progressive monetary union.’27 On the
contrary, one must expect from the part of the EU an
insistence on neoliberal orthodoxy. Today, any possible
solution of the Greek crisis in favor of labor requires the
immediate exit from the eurozone, the rejections of EU
treaties and their constraints, the re-introduction of na-
tional currency and radical policy changes: introduction
of capital controls, nationalization of the banking sys-
tem and public control of crucial sectors of the economy.
It also means the insistence that radical social change
requires full withdrawal from the European Union.
270 Constellations Volume 21, Number 2, 2014
Contrary to a tendency of a great part of the European
Left to take European Union for granted, what is needed
is struggle against the EU. Creating obstacles to the
process of European integration and de-linking social
formations from this process is an internationalist posi-
tion. We think that such a stance is not to be considered
some form of economic nationalism of protectionism,
nor is it a retreat to the supposed ‘safety of the capi-
talist sovereign-state.’28 In Greece, all segments of the
ruling classes and the all the political establishment, in-
cluding the Far Right, are pro-European. De-linking a
social formation, under the pressure of a broad social
and political front of the subaltern classes, from forms
of capitalist transnational market integration and sys-
temic social violence against the subordinate classes is,
in our eyes, a form of true internationalism. Today a
‘united’ Europe is unavoidably a Europe of capitalists
and big banks. Dismantling the financial, economic, and
political architecture of the European Union is the nec-
essary condition of true solidarity between movements
in Europe.
It is true that there has been a great debate within the
Greek Left regarding the question of Greece’s relation
to the EU and particularly its being part of the euro.
There have been strong arguments in favor of Greece’s
exit from the Euro. According to this position, exiting
the euro, along with other measures such as the an-
nulment of debt based on a process of debt audit, the
imposition of capital controls to avoid flight of capitals,
the nationalization of banks and strategic enterprises
and the redistribution of capital in favor of labor, is the
necessary starting point if we want to avoid social dis-
aster. By regaining the possibility of an active monetary
policy, in order to avoid resorting to foreign debt, and
adjusting the exchange rate in order to stop the erosion
of the productive base, monetary sovereignty can in-
deed be progressive change and open up the way for
broader process of social transformation in a socialist
direction.29
Contrary to these positions, there have been other
positions in the Greek Left. There have been strong ar-
guments suggesting that any exit from the Eurozone
would lead to a flight of capitals, a run of the banks
and a catastrophic erosion of working class savings
and income, therefore tactically creating obstacles to
a progressive solution. On a more strategic – ideologi-
cal level emphasis on monetary policy has been associ-
ated with economic nationalism and protectionism and
the identification of left-wing strategy with the fantasy
of a good keynesian capitalism.30 Although we agree
on the need to distance left-wing strategy from any at-
tempt to ‘salvage’ Greek capitalism, at the same time
we think that these positions avoid treating the euro and
the EMU as class strategies and not just ‘objective’ re-
alities. Moreover, equally missing from these positions

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is the fact that politics is always overdetermined and
there are no ‘pure’ class contradictions. Greece’s rela-
tions with the EU, the whole financial, monetary and
political architecture of the EMU, and the debt burden,
over-determine the current conjuncture. These are the
nodal points around which the forces of capital attempt
to maintain their hegemony, by presenting their strategy
as the only way out of the crisis. These relations are not
simply international alliances. They represent the core
aspects of the strategy of the forces of capital
Fourthly, we must insist that this radical challenge
to the Eurozone and this demand for the radical disman-
tling of its political, financial and monetary architecture
can be at the benefit of workers both in ‘peripheral’
countries such as Greece and in ‘core’ countries such
as Germany. Contrary to the prevailing image that the
danger is for German workers to have to pay for the
problems of the Greek economy, the European Mone-
tary Union means that both German and Greek workers
are facing a reduction in their wages and a deterioration
of their working conditions: the core economies need
this in order to keep their competitive advantage and
the peripheral economies need it in order to sustain the
pressure exerted by more competitive core economies.
Fifthly, against the ‘fuite en avant’ tactic of the bour-
geoisie on a pan-European level, the Left must insist on
the necessity and possibility of an anti-capitalist alter-
native. The violence of the attack against workers, the
capitalist crisis as crisis of neoliberalism and ‘actually
existing capitalism,’ the realization of the deeper irra-
tionality of the ‘markets,’ make this alternative much
more plausible and convincing. Radical demands such
the imposition of a ban on mass lay-offs, the national-
ization of the banking system, the decrease of military
spending, the increase of wages and pensions and in
general the redistribution of income toward the subor-
dinate classes, are now more urgent than ever.
All these require dealing with the question of po-
litical power and the possibility of a left wing govern-
ment reversing austerity and opening up the possibility
of social transformation. However, thinking in terms
of political power does not mean thinking simply in
terms of a change of government. Nor does it mean a
smooth transition process strictly within the limits of
existing legality. It means a process of breaks and trans-
formations, and radical reforms, which in some cases
also means a constituent process of changes and radi-
cal reforms in legislation, including the basic aspects of
contemporary constitutions, which increasingly tend to
constitutionalize austerity, private investment and inter-
national trade liberalization agreements. Moreover, if it
is not possible to think of political power simply in terms
of government power, we still need a strong movement.
Without a strong movement from below, without forms
of popular power from below, of self-organization, and
 Postcards from the Future: Spyros Sakellaropoulos and Panagiotis Sotiris
self-defense, any government of the Left will in reality
be weak and unable to answer the pressures and black-
mails from the part of international markets and orga-
nizations. We must never forget that the class character
of contemporary states is deeply rooted in the very ma-
teriality of their institutions, forms of decision making,
knowledge process, however traversed they are by class
struggles. There are going be strong resistances and ob-
stacles from the judicial system, the coercive state ap-
paratuses, segments of the state bureaucracy, especially
the ‘specialists’ and ‘technocrats’ dealing with the facil-
itation of ‘investment.’ Consequently, the Left can never
be a ‘normal’ party of government. It will always be in
a necessarily contradictory relation to the State. That is
why it can never simply have a government policy. It
must always be based upon mass movements and at the
same time trying to impose a profound transformation
of state apparatuses.
We understand that this argument is in contrast to
the dominant line within SYRIZA, which insists on the
possibility of having a break with austerity within the
Eurozone, provided that we have a strong government
of the Left that will be in a position to negotiate. We
disagree with this position because we have tried to
stress the importance of a break with the eurozone and
the EU as a necessary condition for any progressive
solution to the Greek crisis and also the need for a radical
approach to left-wing governance. At the same time,
our argument is in contrast to those positions within
the Greek Left that treat any reference to a government
of the Left as a sign of reformism placing all the hope
upon the movement. It is not that we underestimate the
importance of the movement; in fact we have shown
how the impressive cycle of struggles in Greece has
been a crucial factor in the political crisis and the turn
to the left. However, without an alternative narrative for
Greek society, in the form of a radical program, and a
strategy for political power, reliance upon the force of
the movement cannot suffice to turn social dynamics
into political transformation.
11. Re-inventing the Left
All, these cannot take place without a discussion of how
to reinvent the Left. This could only be a process of re-
composition both of social subjects and of the political
subject. On the one hand, fighting back such an attack,
not only in Greece but also all over Europe, cannot be
done simply by an alliance of social movements. The
fact that large segments of the working class are outside
union representation, the detrimental effect precarious-
ness can have on forms of militancy, the mutation of the
union bureaucracy towards pro-business positions, the
fact that segments of youth (outside higher education)
and unemployed usually lack the means for collective

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271
representation, and, of course, the problem of low par-
ticipation by immigrant labor, exemplify the crisis of
the labor movement. The fact that despite the extensive
forms of solidarity at community level, we still have a
humanitarian crisis to face, implies that we still need to
work upon this. We are also lacking forms of coordi-
nation between different movements. What is needed is
that form of articulated and conscious social combina-
tion of social movement and political struggle. There-
fore, we need on the one hand a broad social front of
struggle that could comprise trade unions, student ac-
tivism, grassroots initiatives, local assemblies and forms
of coordination, and a radical left front. This could be
the actualization of the United Front tactic in our times.
Such a combination of a social and political front
of struggle would have to deal with the very complex-
ity and difficulty of the necessary tactic. The EU, the
IMF and the forces of capital have opted for a tacit
of very aggressive ‘war of maneuver’ that also aims at
preemptively occupying those positions that would en-
able social movements to wage some form of ‘war of
positions.’ Therefore, it is not possible for the forces
of labor simply to wage some sort of social guerrilla
warfare (the ‘bases of struggle’ can be eroded by the
attack), to invest in some form of revolt (the attack is
much deeper), or to wait for a better day since the time –
however difficult this might be – is now (the aggressive-
ness of the attack means that the forces of capital are
trying to accelerate historical process and create societal
points of no return). What is needed is a highly original
combination of a ‘protracted people’s war’31 with the
ability for frontal confrontations, when there is no alter-
native, and the capacity to counterattack. Such a tactic
would lead to well organized sector strikes, combined
with cross-sector reference points (e.g. general strikes),
with a prolonged youth unrest, with ‘small’ battles that
can create social and political landmarks and inspire
confidence (for example forms of solidarity to attempts
at workers self-management at companies that close),
and at the same time, attempt to escalate the confronta-
tion at a point where the pressure of social and political
contention can destabilize the political scene and gov-
ernments, though well organized and persisting forms
of political mobilization making good use of the expe-
rience of the ‘movement of the squares.” Such a devel-
opment can lead not only to important victories against
austerity packages, but also to new opportunities for
the Left.
That is why it is also necessary to reinvent the Left in
the new conditions created by both the counter-attack of
capital and the crisis of hegemony, this combination of
dangers and opportunities. One aspect has to do with the
necessary political program as a concrete set of steps and
radical transformations that can restore the confidence
of people that there is an alternative.
272 Constellations Volume 21, Number 2, 2014
However, there is also the question of the collective
political subject. From the 1990s, after the collapse of
‘actually existing socialism,’ the complete mutation of
social democracy and the crisis of traditional communist
reformism, at least two strategies have shown their lim-
its. The first one is the logic of creating ‘anti-neoliberal’
coalitions aiming at some form of progressive govern-
ment, a strategy that in the 2000s offered nothing more
that left legitimization of capitalist restructuring. The
other is that of the revolutionary or anti-capitalist re-
alignment. Despite the ‘moral high ground’ of such a
position, in the sense of not participating in painful
compromises, there is the danger of sectarianism
and consciously avoiding the challenge of building a
counter-hegemonic block. Contrary to these positions,
what is needed a fresh conception of the Left Front.
This must not be conceived as a right wing turn in order
to come in terms with dissident Social-democrats. Nor
should it be seen as building a broad electoral coali-
tion. What is needed is a Left Front with a radical and
anti-capitalist orientation that could unite in a necessar-
ily contradictory way, forces coming from the various
forms of communist reformism that are now choosing
more radical positions, the anti-capitalist Left, and new
forms of radical militancy in grassroots initiatives. This
Left Front is not to be seen simply as electoral alliance
or an aggregation of political tendencies. It has to be a
democratic political laboratory. The experience of social
movements in Europe in past decades, the experience of
European Social Forums, and the forms of organizing
chosen by successful Left Parties, the very experience
of the Greek movement suggest that more and more
militants demand a open and truly democratic form of
organization, one that could bring together different po-
litical experiences and sensitivities and also help the
emergence of new and original political compositions.
This conception of the Front (and also the Party) as
political laboratory is also imperative if we want to en-
hance those collective forms of political intellectuality32
that could help form strategies and tactics and elements
of a counter-hegemonic appeal.
This also means the opening up of the discussion
of what socialism and a renewal of communist strategy
might mean in the 21st century. What is needed is a col-
lective effort to rethink the possibility of a non-capitalist
organization of social life, beginning from those ‘traces
of communism’ in actual struggles, demands and prac-
tices of solidarity: the refusal of the commodification of
social goods and services, the resistance to the various
forms of ‘enclosures,’ the egalitarian demands of so-
cial security and decent living for all, the various forms
of ‘direct democracy of struggle,’ and the demand to
create social spaces free of the violence of capital. Al-
though this rethinking of strategic questions might seem
like a luxury in times of a full-scale attack on labor, we

C 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
should never forget that unless large masses of workers
regain their confidence in the possibility of radical so-
cial change, the forces of capital will retain a strategic
advantage.
NOTES
1. Ministry of Finance and Bank of Greece, Memoran-
dum of Understanding with the IMF (Athens: Ministry of
Finance, 2010).
2. International Monetary Fund, Greece: Staff Report on
Request for stand in Agreement, 2010.
3. INE-GSEE/ADEDY Greek Economy and Employ-
ment (in Greek), (Annual Report from the Research Institute
of the Greek Trade Union Confederations) (Athens: INE-
GSEE/ADEDY, 2006); INE-GSEE/ADEDY Greek Economy
and Employment (in Greek), (Annual Report from the Research
Institute of the Greek Trade Union Confederations) (Athens:
INE-GSEE/ADEDY, 2008).
4. Ios tis Kyriakis, “The Dark Sea. Scandalous Tax-
exemptions for Ship-owners” (In Greek). Eleytherotypia May
30, 2010. Accessed October 29, 2010. http://www.iospress.gr/
ios2010/ios20100530.htm.
5. INE-GSEE/ADEDY, Greek Economy and Employ-
ment (in Greek), (Annual Report from the Research Insti-
tute of the Greek Trade Union Confederations) (Athens: INE-
GSEE/ADEDY, 2013); Bank of Greece, Governor’s report
2013 (Athens: Bank of Greece, 2014).
6. Ol. Blanchard ‘Adjustment within the euro. The diffi-
cult case of Portugal’, Portuguese Economic Review 6 (2007)
1–21; Il. Ioakeimoglou, Internal Devaluation and Capital Ac-
cumulation. A Critical Approach (Athens: INE GSEE/ADEDY,
2012) (In Greek).
7. Paul Krugman, “The Making of a Euromess”, New
York Times February 15, 2010 (Accessed October 10, 2010)
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/opinion/15krugman.
html?_r=1.
8. Paul de Grauwe, “The Euro at ten: achievements and
challenges”, Emprica 36 (2009) 5–20.
9. Costas Lapavitsas et al., Crisis in the Eurozone
(London: Verso, 2012).
10. ibid., 90–91.
11. INE-GSEE/ADEDY Greek Economy and Employ-
ment (in Greek), (Annual Report from the Research In-
stitute of the Greek Trade Union Confederations) (Athens:
INE-GSEE/ADEDY, 2010), 68–82.
12. Costas Lapavitsas, Profiting without Producing.
How Finance Exploits us All (London: Verso, 2013).
13. Stavros Mavroudeas, “Greece and the EU: capitalist
crisis and imperialist rivalries”, paper presented at the IIPE
and Greek Scientific Association of Political Economy First
International Conference in Political Economy, Rethymnon,
Crete, September 10–12 2010.
14. INE-GSEE/ADEDY, Annual Report 2010, 78–82;
On austerity policies all over Europe see Armin Schäfer
and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Politics in an Age of Austerity
(London: Polity, 2013).
15. Bank of Greece, Governor’s Report, 78.
16. INE-GSEE/ADEDY, Annual Report 2013.
17. In 2010 indirect taxes represent a disproportion-
ally high part of total taxation. In Greece direct taxation is
only 7,7% of GDP compared to 13,1% of GDP in EU-27
(INE-GSEE/ADEDY, Annual Report 2010, 52).
18. INE-GSEE, Annual Report 2013, 65.
19. Hellenic Statistic Authority, Press release. Labor
Force Survey. 4th Quarter 2013, 2014.
 Postcards from the Future: Spyros Sakellaropoulos and Panagiotis Sotiris
20. David Stuckler and Sanjay Basu, The Body Eco-
nomic. Why austerity kills (London: Allen Lane, 2013).
21. On the 2012 elections see Yannis Mavris, “Greece’s
Austerity Election”, New Left Review 76 (2012), 95–107.
22. On December 2008 see Panagiotis Sotiris, “Rebels
with a Cause: The December 2008 Greek Youth movement
as the Condensation of Deeper Social and Political Contradic-
tions”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research
34.1 (2010) 203–9.
23. On the notion of post-democracy see Colin Crouch,
Post-Democracy (London: Polity, 2004).
24. Étienne Balibar, La Crainte de Masses (Paris:
Galilée, 1997).
25. On the political crisis in Greece see Stathis
Kouvelakis, ‘The Greek Cauldron’, New Left Review 72
(2011), 17–32.
26. Hellenic Statistical Authority, ‘Press Release: Fiscal
data for the years 2010–2013’, April 14, 2014.
27. On the contradictions of any left-wing strategy
aiming at ‘another Europe’ see Costas Lapavitsas “Debt,
euro and the positions of the Left”, (In Greek), Avgi July 11
and 13 2010 (Accessed April 30, 2014) http://iskra.gr/index.
phpoption=com_content&view=article&id=480:2010-07-
11-09-21-35&catid=83:aristera&Itemid=200.
28. See for example Slavoj Žižek’s criticism: “This is
why one should avoid the temptation to react to the ongoing
financial crisis with a retreat to fully sovereign nation-states,
easy prey for free-floating international capital, which can play
one state against the other. More than ever, the reply to every
crisis should be more internationalist and universalist than the
universality of global capital.” Slavoj Žižek 2010, “A perma-
nent economic emergency”, New Left Review 64 (2010), 88.
29. Costas Lapavitsas and Stathis Kouvelakis have pre-
sented important arguments in favor of this position. See
Lapavitsas et al., Crisis of the Eurozone . . . and Kouvelakis,
‘The Greek Cauldron’.

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273
30. For positions within the Greek Left that have
been critical of the proposal for an exit from the Eurozone
see John Milios and Spiros Lapatsioras, “The imaginary of
the Left and the exit form the euro”, (In Greek) Avgi July
18 2010 (Accessed April 30, 2014) http://iskra.gr/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=558:2010-
07-20-08-17-49&catid=55:an-oikonomia&Itemid=283; John
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Spyros Sakelaropoulos is Associate Professor at the
Department of Social Policy in Panteion University
Athens - Greece. His research interests are centred on
the theory of the State, the study of the Modern Greek
and Cypriot societies and the theory of development of
the capitalist mode of production.
Panagiotis Sotiris has taught social theory and social
and political philosophy at the University of the Aegean.
He has published widely on Marxist philosophy, the
work of Louis Althusser and social and political devel-
opments in Greece.