Appellees Brief Asialink V Madriaga

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Court of Appeals - Mindanao Station

Cagayan de Oro City
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ASIALINK FINANCE CORPORATION

REPRESENTED BY RYAN DEL MUNDO,
Plaintiff-Appellant/s,
- versus -
FEBIE BARTOLINE YANO,

SPS. JESUS AND CARLOTA MADRIAGA,
Defendant-Appellee/s.
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CA-G.R. CV-No. 04774
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APPELLEE’S BRIEF
SUBJECT INDEX
Page No.
I. APPELLANT’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 8
II. TIMELINESS OF THE APPELLEE’S BRIEF 8
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 9
IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 10
V. ISSUES 15
VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION 16
VII. PRAYER 44
VIII. AFFIDAVIT OF FILING AND SERVICE 47
A. On the First Assigned Error
Plaintiff-Appellant erred when

it posited “that the Trial Court
committed serious and
reversible error when it
dismissed appellant’s
complaint on purely technical
grounds and disregarded the
policy of liberal construction
of the Rules for failure to
submit pre-trial brief, as well
as to appear during the
preliminary conference and
pre-trial conference.”1
Indeed, technical rules of procedure are not designed to

frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the
prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus
effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter
disregard of these rules cannot justly be rationalized
by harking on the policy of liberal construction.2
1
Kindly see Page 1 of Appellant’s Brief.
2
Daaco v. Yu, G.R. No. 183398, 22 June 2015 citing The Philippine
Appellee’s Brief |2
B. On the Second Assigned Error
Plaintiff-Appellant is incorrect
when it alleged that “the Trial
Court erred in ordering
appellant to return the vehicle
subject of the Writ of Replevin
within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the order otherwise
the bond it has posted in the
amount of P1,100,000.00 shall
be forfeited in favor of the
defendant-appellees Spouses
Jesus and Carlota Madriaga for
having no basis in law and
jurisprudence x x x.”3
With all due respect, Section 9, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules

of Court provides that “after the trial of the issues, the court
shall determine who has the right of possession to and the
value of the property and shall render judgment in the
alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled to
the same, and for its value in case delivery cannot be made,
and also for such damages as either party may prove, with
costs.” In view of the dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant’s
Complaint on May 20, 2017, the Court deemed it just and
proper to order and direct the Plaintiff-Appellant to return the
subject vehicle of the Writ of Replevin to spouses Jesus and
Carlota Madriaga, otherwise, the bond that Plaintiff-Appellant
have posted will be forfeited in favor herein Defendants-
Appellees, which Order is in consonance to the spirit and
letter of the law. The Supreme Court has even held that “the
dismissal of the x x x case x x x results in the restoration of
the parties’ status prior to litigation, as if no complaint was
filed at all. To let the writ of seizure stand after the dismissal
of the complaint would be adjudging x x x as the prevailing
party, when precisely no decision on the merits had been
rendered.4
C. On the Third Assigned Error
Plaintiff-Appellant erred when

American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, 645 Phil. 166,
176-177 (2010)
3
Kindly see Page 1-2 of Appellant’s Brief.
4
Advent Capital and Finance Corporation v. Young, G.R. No. 183018,
August 3, 2011
it asserted that “the Trial
Court disregarded the well-
settled principle and emerging
trend that rules must not be
applied rigidly so as not to
override substantial justice
when it denied for lack of
merit appellant’s Motion for
Reconsideration (with Prayer
to Admit Pre-Trial Brief and
Judicial Affidavit.)”5
With utmost due respect, the dismissal of herein Plaintiff-

Appellant’s case is not for the first time. It has been
dismissed once because of Plaintiff-Appellant’s failure to
comply with the order of the Honorable Court. It has been
dismissed the second time because of its wanton failure to:
first, submit its Pre-trial Brief and Judicial Affidavits of its
witnesses three (3) days before the Scheduled Pre-Trial;
second, attend the scheduled Preliminary Conference; and
third, attend the scheduled Pre-trial Conference, despite due
notice. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules
of procedure should be an effort on the part of the
party invoking liberality to at least promptly explain
its failure to comply with the rules.6 Plaintiff-Appellant
had not justified its failure to comply with the rules, thus, its
Complaint was correctly dismissed by the Honorable Trial
Court.
CASES CITED:
 Daaco v. Yu, G.R. No. 183398, 22 June 2015
 The Philippine American Life & General Insurance

Company v. Enario, 645 Phil. 166, 176-177 (2010)
 Advent Capital and Finance Corporation v. Young, G.R.

No. 183018, August 3, 2011
 Tiu v. Middleton, G.R. No. 134998, July 19 1999
 Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124448, February

1, 2001
5
Kindly see Page 2 of Appellant’s Brief.
6
Daaco v. Yu, Ibid.
 Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-49410, January 26, 1989
 Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, G.R. No. 145911, 433 SCRA

631 (2004)
 Spouses Aquino v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.

109493, July 2, 1999
 Nonato v. Atty. Fudolin, Jr., A.C. No. 10138, June 6, 2015,

Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1876
 Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilaban, A.M. No.

3907 April10, 1997
 Uy v. Tansinsin, A.C. No. 8252, July 21, 2007
 Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 7504, November 23,

2007
 Henry Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.

191972, January 26, 2015
 Bejarasco, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 159781, February 2,

2011
 Barangay Dasmariñas v. Creative Corner School, G.R.

No. 169942, January 24, 2011
 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 221636, July 11, 2016
LAWS AND RULES APPLICABLE:
Rules 18 on Pre-Trial, Revised Rules of Court
Rule 60 on Replevin, Revised Rules of Court
Rule 138 on Attorneys and Admission to Bar, Revised Rules

of Court, as amended by SC Resolutions dated May 20, 1968
and February 13, 1992
Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 3 on Parties to Civil Actions, Revised Rules of Court
ANNEXES:
ANNEX “A” : Order of the Court of Appeals -

Mindanao Station dated October 20,
2017
ANNEX “B” : Order of the Regional Trial Court Branch

8, Malaybalay City dated May 10, 2017
ANNEX “C” : Motion for Reconsideration (with Prayer

to admit Pre-Trial Brief and Judicial
Affidavit) filed by Plaintiff-Appellant
before the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay
City received by herein Defendants-
Appellees on June 16, 2017
ANNEX “D” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

City denying Plaintiff-Appellant’s Motion
for Reconsideration (with Prayer to
Admit Pre-Trial Brief and Judicial
Affidavit) dated July 31, 2017
ANNEX “E” : Motion for Extension of Time to File

Appellant’s Brief filed before the Court
of Appeals - Mindanao Station and
received by herein Defendants-
Appellees on January 4, 2018
ANNEX “F” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

City dated May 19, 2015
ANNEX “G” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

City dated July 22, 2015
ANNEX “H” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

City dated September 30, 2015
ANNEX “I” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

City dated November 11, 2015
ANNEX “J” Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

City dated November 04, 2016
ANNEX “K” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

City dated December 28, 2016
Republic of the Philippines
COURT OF APPEALS - MINDANAO STATION
Cagayan de Oro City
ASIALINK FINANCE CA-G.R. CV-No.:

CORPORATION REPRESENTED 04774
BY RYAN V. DEL MUNDO) RTC BRANCH 8 -
Malaybalay City
Plaintiff-Appellant, RTC Case No. 4771-13
- versus - RE: COLLECTION OF

SUM OF MONEY,
REPLEVIN AND
DAMAGES
FEBIE BARTOLIN YANO AND
JESUS and CARLOTA
MADRIAGA,
Defendants-Appellees.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -//
APPELLEES’ BRIEF
COMES NOW, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, Spouses

JESUS and CARLOTA MADRIAGA, through the undersigned
counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully
submits this Appellee’s Brief with the end in view that the
facts and the circumstances surrounding this case, in
relation to laws and jurisprudence, be analyzed on the
proverbial anvil of scrutiny so that a proper, prudent and
logical verdict can be reached.
APPELLANT’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
(A)
That the Trial Court committed serious and reversible

error when it dismissed appellant’s complaint on purely
technical grounds and disregarded the policy of liberal
construction of the Rules for failure to submit pre-trial brief,
as well as to appear during the preliminary conference and
pre-trial conference.
(B)
That the Trial Court erred in ordering appellant to return

the vehicle subject of the Writ of Replevin within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the order otherwise the bond it has
posted in the amount of P1,100,000.00 shall be forfeited in
favor of the defendant-appellees Spouses Jesus and Carlota
Madriaga for having no basis in law and jurisprudence
because the Order disregards the facts and evidence that
Spouses Madriaga have no possessory right(s) over the
subject vehicle, that they are not indispensable parties in the
instant case, that the vehicle is owned and registered under
the name of defendant-appellee Febie Bartolin Yano who
mortgaged the vehicle to appellant to secure a loan from the
latter.
(C)
That the Trial Court disregarded the well-settled

principle and emerging trend that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice when it
denied for lack of merit appellant’s Motion for
Reconsideration (with Prayer to Admit Pre-Trial Brief and
Judicial Affidavit).
II
TIMELINESS OF APPELLEE’S BRIEF
1. Defendants-Appellees, through the undersigned

counsel, received on October 30, 2017 from the Honorable
Appellate Court an Order7 dated October 20, 2017 directing
the Counsel the Plaintiff-Appellant to file with the same
within forty-five (45) days from notice its Appellant’s Brief
and that the Appellee/s will have the same period from
receipt of the Appellant’s Brief within which to file the
Appellee’s Brief.
2. Defendants-Appellees received on January 04,

2018 Plaintiff-Appellants’ Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appellant’s Brief8 where Plaintiff-Appellant, through their
counsels, requested for an additional period of fifteen (15)
days from December 18, 2017 or until January 03, 2018 to
file their Appellant’s Brief.
3. On January 11, 2018, Defendants-Appellees

received Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief.
4. Considering, however, that the forty-fifth (45 th) day

from receipt of the Appellant’s Brief fell on February 25,
2018, a Sunday, herein Defendants-Appellees, thus have
until the following Monday, or on February 26, 2018 to file
this instant Appellees’ Brief.
III
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
5. Herein Plaintiff-Appellant filed an appeal under

Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set
aside the Order9 of the Regional Trial Court - Branch 8,
Malaybalay City dated May 10, 2017 which ordered the
dismissal of the Complaint and ordered the return of the
vehicle subject of the Writ of Replevin to herein Defendants-
Appellees. A portion of the said Order10 states that:
“x x x the instant Complaint is

DISMISSED for failure of the plaintiff to submit
pre-trial brief, as well as to appear during the
7
Kindly see Annex “A” hereof.
8
Kindly see Annex “B” hereof.
9
10
Id.
preliminary conference and today’s pre-trial
conference despite due notice thereof, in
accordance with Secion 5 and 6 of Rule 18,
Rules of Court.
In view of the dismissal of the Complaint,

plaintiff is DIRECTED to return the vehicle
subject of the Writ of Replevin to spouses Jesus
and Carlota Madriaga within thirty (30) days
from receipt of this Order; otherwise the bond
that it had posted in the amount of
P1,100,000.00 shall be forfeited in favor of the
defendants spouses Madriaga.
SO ORDERED.”
6. Plaintiff-Appellant then filed a Motion for

Reconsideration (with prayer to admit Pre-Trial Brief and
Judicial Affidavit)11, which Motion was received by
Defendants-Appellees on June 16, 2017 but the same was
denied in an Order12 dated July 31, 2017, which was received
by the Defendants-Appellees on August 2, 2017. A Notice of
Appeal was then filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant on August 15,
2017.
7. On October 30, 2017, a copy of the Order13

addressed to Atty. Norman N. Lorenzo, Counsel for the
Plaintiff-Appellant and from the Court of Appeals - Mindanao
Station was received by herein Defendants-Appellees.
8. In the said Order directed to Plaintiff-Appellant,

herein Defendants-Appellees are ordered to submit within
fifteen (45) days after receipt of the Appellant’s Brief to file
this Appellees’ Brief, to wit:
“Pursuant to Rule 44, Sec. 7 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure, in relation to A.M. No.
11-9-4-SC (Efficient Use of Paper Rule), you are
hereby required to file with this court within
forty0five (45) days from notice x x x legibly
printed Appellant’s Brief with legible copies
of the assailed decision of the trial court and
proof of service of a copy upon the appellee/s.
The appellee/s will have the same period from
receipt of the appellant/s brief within which to
file the Appellee’s Brief. x x x”
11
Kindly see Annex “C” hereof.
12
Kindly see Annex “D” hereof.
13
Kindly see Annex “A” hereof.
9. Hence, Herein Defendants-Appellees hereby
respectfully submit this Appellees’ Brief within the said
forty-five (45)-day period.
IV
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
10. On October 24, 2012, long before the alleged

mortgage between Co-defendant Febie Bartolin Yano and
herein Plaintiff-Appellant which was executed in February 28,
2013, Co-defendant Yano obtained a loan from herein
Defendant-Appellant Carlota Madriaga in the amount of
Thirty Six Thousand Pesos (P336,000.00).
11. In fact, co-defendant Yano issued a post-dated

check14 dated April 24, 2013 (one year after the date of the
loan) in favor of Defendant-Appellant Carlota Madriaga.
12. As additional guaranty, Co-defendant Yano

delivered the subject car of this case to herein Defendants-
Appellees Spouses Madriaga together with the machine copy
of the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration.
13. However, when the aforementioned check was

presented by herein Defendant-Appellant Carlota Madriaga
to the drawee bank, the same was returned on the ground
that Co-defendant Yano’s account was closed.
14. Despite repeated demands by Defendant-

Appellant Carlota Madriaga, Co-defendant Yano has failed to
pay the loan. This constrained Defendant-Appellant Carlota
Madriaga to file a case for swindling/estafa and for violation
of BP 22 against Co-defendant Yano before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City.
15. However, the said criminal complaint was archived

for failure to locate Co-defendant Yano despite diligent
efforts exerted by herein Defendants-Appellees Spouses
Madriaga.
16. On December 10, 2013, herein Defendants-

Appellees Spouses Madriaga were surprised to be served
with a Writ of Replevin as they were in possession of the
subject motor vehicle of this case. Thus, upon the Sheriff’s
14
Kindly see Annex “A” of Defendants-Appellees’ Answer with
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim/Cross-claim with Damages
service and enforcement of the Writ of Replevin, herein
Defendants-Appellees immediately turned over possession of
said property subject to the Writ of Replevin.
17. In October 2014, herein Defendants-Appellees

Spouses Madriaga filed their answer with affirmative
defenses and counterclaim/cross-claim with damages.
18. In an Order15 dated May 19, 2015, the Honorable

Regional Trial Court - Branch 8 directed herein Plaintiff-
Appellant to file the necessary motion for the service of
summons by publication to Co-defendant Febie Bartolin
Yano. A portion of the said Order reads:
“x x x The admission of defendants Spouses

Madriaga’s Answer with Affirmative Defense
and Counterclaim/Cross-claim with Damages
STANDS.
On the other hand, plaintiff is directed to file

the necessary motion for the service of
summons by publication in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court within
thirty (30) [days] from receipt of this Order. In
the meantime, the preliminary and pre-trial
conferences are HELD IN ABEYANCE.
SO ORDERED.”
19. On July 22, 2015, the Trial Court granted plaintiff’s

motion for leave of court to serve summons to defendant
Febie Bartolin Yano by publication and plaintiff was further
directed to cause the service of summons on defendant
Febie Barolin Yano by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Bukidnon once a week for two (2) consecutive
weeks.16
20. Consequently, in an Order17 of the Trial Court

dated September 30, 2015, Plaintiff-Appellant still did
not comply with the July 22, 2015 Order. And again,
plaintiff was directed by the Trial Court to comply
with the said directive within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the September 30, 2015 Order with a
warning that this Court would be constrained to
dismiss the instant Complaint for failure to prosecute.
(Underlining supplied for emphasis.)
15
Kindly see Annex “F” hereof.
16
Kindly see Annex “G” hereof.
17
Kindly see Annex “H” hereof.
21. Then herein Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Motion for
Extension to Comply with the September 30, 2015 Order of
the Trial Court which was well taken by the latter and hence,
was granted in an Order18 dated November 11, 2015. Thus,
the Plaintiff-Appellant was then given until December 9,
2015 to comply with the said directive.
22. A year after the November 11, 2015 Order of the

Trial Court, specifically on November 4, 2016, the Trial
Court ordered the DISMISSAL of this case for failure to
prosecute. A portion of the said Order19 reads:
“To recall, on 11 November 2015, the

plaintiff was given until 9 December 2015 to
comply with the Order dated September 30,
2015 directing plaintiff to cause service of
summons on defendant Febie Bartolin Yano by
publication. The records show that said Order
was received by plaintiff’s counsel on 20
November 2015. To date, there has been no
compliance with the said directive.
For plaintiff’s apparent lack of

interest and for failure to obey the Order
of this Court, the case is DISMISSED for
failure to prosecute.
Moreover, plaintiff is DIRECTED to

return the vehicle subject of the writ of
replevin to Spouses Carlota and Jesus
Madriaga within thirty (30) days from receipt
hereof; otherwise the bond that it had
posted in the amount of 1,100,000.00
shall be forfeited in favor of Sps.
Madriaga.
SO ORDERED.” (Underlining supplied for

emphasis.)
23. After the dismissal of the case, herein Plaintiff-

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying,
among others, that the November 4, 2016 Order be
reversed and set aside, which Motion was granted by the
Trial Court on December 28, 2016. A portion of this Order 20
reads:
“After careful consideration of the instant
18
Kindly see Annex “I” hereof.
19
Kindly see Annex “J” hereof.
20
Kindly see Annex “K” hereof.
Motions, the Court resolves to GRANT the
Motion for Reconsideration x x x.
The order dated 4 November 2016 is

hereby RECONSIDERED and the case is
REINSTATED in the dockets of the Court. x x x
Let the preliminary and pre-trial

conferences with respect to answering
defendants and plaintiff be set on 5 April
2017 at 1:30 in the afternoon and 10 May
2017 at 8:30 in the morning, respectively.
Parties are directed to submit their

respective pre-trial briefs three (3) days
before 5 April 2017.
In accordance with A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC

(Judicial Affidavit Rule), Section 2(a), the
parties are directed to submit to the Court and
serve on the adverse party the judicial
affidavits of their respective witnesses, x x x
not later than five (5) days before the
scheduled preliminary conference on 5
April 2017.
Moreover, a party who fails to submit

the required judicial affidavits and
exhibits on time shall be deemed to have
waived their submission and the Court
shall NOT ADMIT as evidence judicial
affidavits that do not conform to Sections
3 and 4 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule.
SO ORDERED.”(Underlining and
capitalization supplied for emphasis.)
24. However, five (5) days before the scheduled

preliminary conference on April 5, 2017, Plaintiff-Appellant,
despite due notice to its Counsel on record, failed to submit
its Pre-Trial Brief.
25. Likewise, Plaintiff-Appellant nor their Counsel on

Record or even their duly authorized representative failed to
appear during the scheduled preliminary conference on April
5, 2017 as well as the scheduled pre-trial conference on May
10, 2017.
26. Hence, the Trial Court was left with no choice but
to dismiss the case for failure of the Plaintiff-Appellant to
submit its pre-trial brief, as well as to appear during the
preliminary conference and pre-trial conference despite due

notice, pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court.21
27. After the dismissal of the Trial Court of the said

complaint, Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (with prayer to admit Pre-Trial Brief and
Judicial Affidavit)22 stating, among others, that the case file
of the instant case was “misplaced and erroneously kept
hidden by the receiving staff,” 23 which receiving staff
was never named nor his/her affidavit submitted to prove
their allegation.
28. In an Order24 dated July 31, 2017, the Trial Court

denied Plaintiff-Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit, ratiocinating that:
“Since plaintiff failed to proffer sufficient

justification for its failure to appear during the
preliminary conference and pre-trial conference
and to file its pre-trial brief, its Motion for
Reconsideration (with prayer to admit Pre-Trial
Brief and Judicial Affidavit) of the 10 May 2017
Order must necessarily fail. The following
pronouncements of the Supreme Court are
instructive:
Indeed, technical rules of

procedure are not designed to
frustrate the ends of justice. These are
provided to effect the prompt, proper
and orderly disposition of cases and
thus effectively prevent the clogging
of court dockets. Utter disregard of
these rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction. 25
ACCORDINGLY, the plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration (with Prayer to Admit Pre-trial
Brief and Judicial Affidavit) is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.”
21
22
Kindly see Annex “C” hereof.
23
Kindly see Paragraph 4, page 2 of Annex “C” hereof.
24
25
Daaco v. Yu, G.R. No. 183398, 22 June 2015 citing The Philippine
American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, 645 Phil. 166,
176-177 (2010)
29. Hence, herein Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Regional Trial Court - Branch 8 of Malaybalay
City.
30. In its Appellant’s Brief, Plaintiff-Appellant assigned

the following errors of the Trial Court:
a. That the Trial Court committed serious and reversible

error when it dismissed appellant’s complaint on
purely technical grounds and disregarded the policy
of liberal construction of the Rules for failure to
submit pre-trial brief, as well as to appear during the
preliminary conference and pre-trial conference;
b. That the Trial Court erred in ordering appellant to

return the vehicle subject of the Writ of Replevin
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order
otherwise the bond it has posted in the amount of
P1,100,000.00 shall be forfeited in favor of the
defendant-appellees Spouses Jesus and Carlota
Madriaga:
1. For having no basis in law and jurisprudence

because the Order disregards the facts and
evidence that Spouses Madriaga have no
possessory right(s) over the subject vehicle, that
they are not indispensable parties in the instant
case,
2. That they are not indispensible parties in the

instant case,
3. That the vehicle is owned and registered under the

name of defendant-appellee Febie Bartolin Yano
who mortgaged the vehicle to appellant to secure
a loan from the latter; and
c. That the Trial Court disregarded the well-settled

principle and emerging trend that rules must not be
applied rigidly so as not to override substantial
justice when it denied for lack of merit appellant’s
Motion for Reconsideration (with Prayer to Admit Pre-
Trial Brief and Judicial Affidavit).
IV
ISSUES

(A)
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DISMISSED APPELLANT’S
COMPLAINT ON TECHNICAL
GROUNDS FOR FAILURE OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELANT TO SUBMIT
ITS PRE-TRIAL BRIEF, AS WELL AS
TO APPEAR DURING THE
PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
(B)

COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
APPELLANT TO RETURN THE
VEHICLE SUBJECT OF THE WRIT OF
REPLEVIN WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS
FROM RECEIPT OF THE ORDER
OTHERWISE THE BOND IT HAS
POSTED IN THE AMOUNT OF
P1,100,000.00 SHALL BE FORFEITED
IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES SPOUSES JESUS AND
CARLOTA MADRIAGA:
(1)
FOR HAVING NO BASIS IN LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE
(2)
THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES ARE NOT
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IN THE INSTANT
CASE
(3)
THAT THE VEHICLE IS OWNED AND
REGISTERED UNDER THE NAME OF
DEFENDANT FEBIE BARTOLIN YANO WHO
MORTGAGED THE VEHICLE TO APPELLANT
TO SECURE A LOAN FROM THE LATTER
(C)

COURT DISREGARDED THE WELL-
SETTLED PRINCIPLE AND EMERGING
TREND THAT RULES MUST NOT BE
APPLIED RIGIDLY SO AS NOT TO
OVERRIDE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE
WHEN IT DENIED FOR LACK OF
MERIT APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION (WITH PRAYER
TO ADMIT PRE-TRIAL BRIEF AND
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT)
VI
ARGUMENTS and DISCUSSION
31. With all due respect, the Regional Trial Court is

CORRECT in dismissing the complaint for failure of herein
Plaintiff-Appellant to submit its Pre-trial Brief, as well as to
appear during the scheduled Preliminary Conference and the
scheduled Pre-Trial Conference despite due notice.
32. Moreover, the Regional Trial Court is CORRECT in

directing herein Plaintiff-Appellant to return the vehicle
subject of the Writ of Replevin to herein Defendants-
Appellees Spouses Jesus and Carlota Madriaga or otherwise,
the bond that the Plaintiff-Appellant has posted will be
forfeited in favor of herein Defendants-Appellees.
33. The following are the grounds why the Regional

Trial Court is CORRECT in its assailed Order dated 10 May
2017:
A. THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT IS CORRECT IN
DISMISSING
APPELLANT’S
COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE
OF THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELANT TO SUBMIT
ITS PRE-TRIAL BRIEF, AS
WELL AS TO APPEAR
DURING THE
PRELIMINARY
CONFERENCE AND PRE-
TRIAL CONFERENCE

“UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE
CANNOT JUSTLY BE RATIONALIZED BY HARKING ON
THE POLICY OF LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION.”
34. With utmost due respect, Plaintiff-Appellant filed

its Complaint some time in October 2013 and it has never
reached the pre-trial stage.
35. Worthy is to note that almost two (2) years after

herein Plaintiff-Appellant filed its Complaint or on May 19,
2015, it (Plaintiff-Appellant) was ordered by the Trial Court to
file the necessary motion for the service of summons by
publication to Defendant Febie Bartolin Yano.
36. In fact, the preliminary and pre-trial

conferences of this case was held in abeyance.
(Underlining supplied for emphasis.) A portion of the said
Order26 dated May 19, 2015 reads:
“x x x The admission of defendants

Spouses Madriaga’s Answer with
Affirmative Defense and
Counterclaim/Cross-claim with
Damages STANDS.
On the other hand plaintiff is

directed to file the necessary
motion for the service of summons
by publication in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court within thirty (30) [days] from
receipt of this Order. In the
meantime, the PRELIMINARY
AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCES
ARE HELD IN ABEYANCE.
SO ORDERED.”
37. Hence, considering that, as early May 19, 2015,

the Preliminary and Pre-Trial Conferences were already held
in abeyance, herein Plaintiff-Appellant have more than
enough time to prepare for their Pre-Trial Brief.
38. However, with all due respect, herein Plaintiff-

Appellant and its Counsel still failed to observe the
26
mandatory requirements of the Rules of Court when this
case was set for preliminary and pre-trial conferences in an
Order27 dated December 28, 2016.
39. A portion of the said Order28 states that:
“Let the preliminary and pre-trial

conferences with respect to answering
defendants and plaintiff be set on 5
April 2017 at 1:30 in the afternoon
and 10 May 2017 at 8:30 in the
morning, respectively.
Parties are directed to submit

their respective pre-trial briefs
three (3) days before 5 April 2017.
In accordance with A.M. 12-8-8-SC

(Judicial Affidavit Rule), Section 2(a), the
parties are directed to submit to
the Court and serve on the adverse
party the judicial affidavits of their
respective witnesses which shall take
the place of such witnesses’ direct
testimonies and the parties
documentary or object evidence, if any,
which shall be attached to the judicial
affidavits marked as Exhibits A, B, C and
so on in case of the complainant or the
plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and so
on in the case of the respondent or the
defendant not later than five (5)
days before the scheduled
preliminary conference on 5 April
2017.
Moreover, a party who fails to

submit the required judicial
affidavits and exhibits on time shall
be deemed to have waived their
submission and the Court shall not
admit as evidence judicial affidavits
that do not conform to Sections 3
and 4 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule.
27
28
Id.
SO ORDERED.” (Underlining ours
for emphasis.)
40. With all due respect, the December 28, 2016

Order29 of the Trial Court could not be anymore clearer to
herein Plaintiff-Appellant. On December 28, 2016, the Trial
Court already set the schedule of the preliminary and pre-
trial conferences. Likewise, it gave a deadline on the
submission of the Pre-Trial Brief and the Judicial Affidavits of
the witnesses of the contending parties.
41. Again, the Trial Court warned not only herein

Plaintiff-Appellant but all the parties, including Defendants-
Appellees, that “a party who fails to submit the
required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time SHALL
be deemed to have waived their submission and the
Court SHALL not admit as evidence judicial affidavits
that do not conform to Sections 3 and 4 of the Judicial
Affidavit Rule.” (Underlining and capitalization supplied for
emphasis.)
42. Notice that the word used by the Trial Court is

“SHALL” which takes the form of a mandatory nature. Yet,
Plaintiff-Appellant failed to follow the simple and clear words
of the Trial Court in the said Order. It (Plaintiff-Appellant)
failed to submit its Pre-Trial Brief and the Judicial Affidavits of
its witnesses three (3) and five (5) days, respectively, before
the scheduled preliminary conference.
43. In fact, during the scheduled preliminary

conference on April 5, 2017, only Defendant-Appellee Carlota
Madriaga and her counsel were present. Defendant-
Appellees proceeded with the marking of their documentary
exhibits and naming of their respective witnesses.
Afterwards, the Trial Court ordered the sending of notices to
herein Plaintiff-Appellant and its counsel for the scheduled
setting for the pre-trial conference on May 10, 2017 at 8:30
o’clock in the morning.30
44. Then, during the scheduled pre-trial conference on

May 10, 2017, the counsel of Defendants-Appellees entered
his appearance and Defendant-Appellee Jesus Madriaga was
likewise present. Neither Plaintiff-Appellant nor its counsel
was present. Thus, the complaint was DISMISSED for failure
29
Id.
30
Kindly see the Minutes dated April 5, 2017 in Records, page 205
of the Plaintif-Appellant to submit its Pre-Trial brief, as well as
to appear during the preliminary and pre-trial conferences. 31
45. With all due respect, the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure is crystal clear when it says that:
“Sec. 4. Appearance of the parties. – It

shall be the duty of the parties and
their counsel to appear at the pre-
trial. The non-appearance of a party
may be excused only if a valid cause is
shown therefor or if a representative
shall appear in his behalf fully
authorized in writing to enter into an
amicable settlement, to submit to
alternative modes of dispute resolution,
and to enter into stipulations or
admissions of facts and of documents.
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. – The

failure of the plaintiff to appear
when so required pursuant to the next
preceding section shall cause for
dismissal of the action. The
dismissal shall be with prejudice,
unless otherwise ordered by the court. x
xx
Sec. 6. Pre-trial brief. – The parties

shall file with the court and serve on
the adverse party, in such manner as
shall ensure their receipt thereof at
least three (3) days before the date
of the pre-trial, their respective
pre-trial briefs x x x.
xxx
Failure to file the pre-trial brief

shall have the same effect as failure
to appear at the pre-trial.
46. In addition to the above-cited provisions of the

Rules of Civil Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 3-99
31
Kindly see Annex B hereof.
dated January 15, 1999 further strengthened and affirmed
the mandatory nature of the Pre-Trial. To wit:
“V. The mandatory continuous trial

system in civil cases contemplated in
Administrative Circular No. 4, dated 22
September 1988, and the guidelines
provided for in Circular No. 1-89, dated
19 January 1989, must be effectively
implemented. For expediency, these
guidelines in civil cases are hereunder
restated with modifications, taking into
account the relevant provisions of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
A. Pre-Trial
xxx
6. Failure of the plaintiff to

appear at the pre-trial shall be a
cause for dismissal of the action. A
similar failure of the defendant shall be
a cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his evidence ex-parte and the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof.
7. Failure to file pre-trial briefs

shall have the same effect as failure
to appear at the pre-trial.”
47. Clearly, pre-trial is an essential device for the

speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties cannot
brush it aside as a mere technicality.32
48. Noteworthy is the fact that the Rules of Court uses

the word “SHALL” which bolsters the mandatory nature of a
Pre-Trial and of the submission of a Pre-Trial.
49. In fact, Plaintiff-Appellant is correct when it cited in

its Brief the case of Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 33 which
stated that:
“It is a basic legal construction that

32
Tiu v. Middleton, G.R. No. 134998, July 19 1999
33
G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001
where words of command such as
“shall,” “must,” or “ought” are
employed, they are generally and
ordinarily regarded as MANDATORY.”
(Underlining and capitalization supplied
for emphasis.)
50. Hence, where as in Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure, the word “shall” is used, a
mandatory duty is imposed, which the courts ought to
enforce.
51. Unfortunately, however, herein Plaintiff-Appellant

failed to understand such mandatory duty.
52. As a consequence, Plaintiff-Appellant believed that

“under the factual antecedents of the instant case as well as
the undesirable consequences and injustice that would result
if the Order of dismissal by the Trial Court would be
sustained warrants the application of liberal construction of
the Rules of Court.34”
53. This is where herein Defendants-Appellees beg to

disagree. The very factual antecedents of this case would
readily suggest that this case has been correctly dismissed.
54. Plaintiff-Appellant even listed a litany of cases to

support its contention that it be exempt from the application
of the Rules.
55. With utmost due respect, THE FACTS OF THIS

CASE DO NOT WARRANT THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
OF THE RULES. (Underlining and capitalization for
emphasis.)
56. As correctly ruled by the Trial Court, the same had

already extended leniency to herein Plaintiff-Appellant on
several occasions as it already explained in its Order 35 dated
July 31, 2017, to wit:
1. In the Order dated 7 July 2014, this Court noted

that plaintiff did not comply with its Order dated
7 April 2014 requiring plaintiff to exert diligent
efforts in locating defendant Febie B. Yano and
to furnish the Court her address for the services
34
Kindly see Paragraph 43 of Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief.
35
of summons by substituted services or to file
the proper pleading to effect summons by
publication as well as to file the necessary
pleading with respect to defendants-spouses
who then had yet to file their responsive
pleading;
2. In the Order dated 19 May 2015, plaintiff was

directed to file the necessary motion for the
service of summons by publication [with respect
to defendant Yano] in accordance with Section
17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court within thirty
(30) days from receipt of said Order;
3. In the Order dated 22 July 2015, plaintiff-s

motion for leave of court was granted and it was
directed to cause service of summons on
defendant Yano by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in Bukidnon once a week
for two (2) consecutive weeks;
4. In the Order dated 30 September 2015, the said

directive was reiterated as there was no
compliance therewith by plaintiff with warning
that the complaint would be dismissed for
failure to prosecute if there was no such
compliance within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the 30 September 2015 Order;
5. In the Order dated 11 November 2015, on its

motion, plaintiff was given until 9 December
2015 within which to comply with the 30
september 2015 Order;
6. Despite the lapse of more than one (1)

year, plaintiff did not comply with the 11
November 2015, 30 September 2015 and
22 July 2015 Orders; thus, in the Order dated
4 November 2016, the present case was
dismissed for failure to prosecute;
7. In the Order dated 28 December 2016, the

Order of dismissal was reconsidered upon
plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration showing
that it had caused the service of summons by
publication on defendant Yano in the 21-28
December 2015 and 4 January 2016 issues of

Bukidnon Today. Notably, in its motion for
reconsideration, plaintiff blamed a “collector”
for failure to file the compliance and explained
that such “excusable negligence or honest
mistake” was due to the fact that “ the legal
department who handles cases for the plaintiff’s
various cases throughout the Philippines holds
office at Ortigas, Pasig City, Metro Manila,
whereas, the lawyer who would appear for
Malaybalay Bukidnon cases has its office in
Davao City”;
8. At any rate, as further stated in the Order dated

28 December 2016, the preliminary conference
and pre-trial conference were set on 5 April
2017 at 1:30 p.m. and 10 May 2017 at 8:30
a.m., respectively, and parties were enjoined to
submit their respective pre-trial briefs three (3)
days before 5 April 2017. Significantly,
defendant-spouses had filed their pre-trial
brief as early as 10 April 2015;
9. Plaintiff’s counsel did not appear during

the said preliminary conference and pre-
trial conference as well as failed to file its
pre-trial brief constraining this Court to issue
the Order dated 10 May 2017, now sought by
plaintiff to be reconsidered.
57. Thus, the Trial Court is correct in finding that

“BASED ON THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES, IT CAN
BE GLEANED THAT PLAINTIFF HAS ADOPTED A
LACKADAISICAL STANCE RELATIVE TO THE
PROSECUTION OF THE CASE. IN ADDITION, IT HAS
SHOWN A PENCHANT FOR BLAMING ITS INACTION OR
OMISSION TO UNNAMED EMPLOYEE(S) WHOSE
36
IDENTITY(IES) COULD NOT BE VERIFIED. ”
58. More so, the Trial Court could not be any more
correct in saying that:
“x x x With respect to counsel’s

non-appearance at the preliminary
conference and pre-trial conference and
failure to file the pre-trial brief, plaintiff
now lays the blame on its “receiving
36
Page 4 of Annex “D” hereof.
staff” who allegedly “misplaced” and
“erroneously kept hidden” the case file
of the present case “among the old
disposed cases” in the main office.
This Court is given the impression

that plaintiff invokes “hones mistake”
and the set-up or arrangement in the
handling of its cases, i.e., that plaintiff’s
main office and legal department are in
Pasig City while the handling lawyer
holds office in Davao City, as
convenient excuses for failure to
comply with the Orders of this
Court as well as basic procedural
rules. x x x”37 (Underlining supplied for
emphasis.)
59. Again, let it be noted to the point of sounding

redundant that PLAINTIFF NOT ONLY FAILED TO FILE
THE PRE-TRIAL BRIEF, IT LIKEWISE FAILED TO APPEAR
DURING BOTH THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE DESPITE NOTICES THEREOF
RECEIVED BY ITS COUNSEL ON RECORD.
60. Noteworthy is the fact that Former Chief Justice

Andres R. Narvasa’s words in the case of Development Bank
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. 38 continue to
resonate, thus:
Everyone knows that A PRE-TRIAL IN

CIVIL ACTIONS IS MANDATORY, and
has been so since January 1, 1964. Yet
to this day its place in the scheme of
things is not fully appreciated, and it
receives but perfunctory treatment in
many courts. Some courts consider it
a mere technicality, serving no
useful purpose save perhaps,
occasionally to furnish ground for
non-suiting the plaintiff, or
declaring a defendant in default, or,
wistfully, to bring about a
compromise. The pre-trial device is
not thus put to full use. Hence it
37
Id.
38
G.R. No. L-49410, January 26, 1989
has failed in the main to accomplish
the chief objective for it: the
simplification, abbreviation and
expedition of the trial, if not indeed
its dispensation. This is a great pity,
because the objective is attainable, and
with not much difficulty, if the device
were more intelligently and extensively
handled. (Underlining supplied for
emphasis.)
61. While Section 4 of Rule 118, Rules of Civil

Procedure, admits of certain exceptions, such as, inter alia,
WHEN A VALID CAUSE IS SHOWN, the instances cited by
herein plaintiff and its counsel, i.e., that the handling
counsel turned over various case files, including the instant
case to Asialink Finance Corporation’s Office and that this
particular case file was misplaced and was erroneously kept
hidden,39 HARDLY CONSTITUTE COMPELLING
EXIGENCIES OR SITUATIONS WHICH WOULD WARRANT
OCCASIONAL FLEXIBILITY OF LITIGATION RULES.
(Underlining and capitalization supplied for emphasis.)
62. A very concrete example which is similar to

Plaintiff-Appellant’s failure submit its pre-trial brief and to
appear during the scheduled preliminary and pre-trial
conferences due to its alleged “unidentified employee’s
mistake of erroneously misplacing the case file of the
present case” is the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, 40
where the counsel for therein petitioner failed to calendar a
scheduled pre-trial in his diary.
63. In that case, the Highest Court of the land held

that:
“The alleged failure of petitioner’s

counsel to record the scheduled pre-trial
in his 1997 diary to justify his absence
at the pre-trial CANNOT AMOUNT TO
EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE. To
constitute excusable negligence,
the absence must be due to
petitioner’s counsel’s failure to
take the proper steps at the proper
39
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration dated June 6, 2017, Paragraph
4, Page 2
40
G.R. No. 145911, 433 SCRA 631 (2004)
time, not in consequence of his
carelessness, inattention or willful
disregard of the process of the
court, but in consequence of some
unexpected or unavoidable
hindrance or accident.” (Underlining
and capitalization supplied for
emphasis.)
64. Applying the above pronouncement of the

Supreme Court to this instant case, herein PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT’S NEGLIGENCE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
EXCUSABLE. (Underlining and capitalization supplied for
emphasis.)
65. Plaintiff-Appellant, in their Motion for

41
Reconsideration, even faults the turn-over of case files for
missing the scheduled conferences of this case. In Paragraph
4, thereof, it alleged, among others, that:
“4. Sometime in February 2017, the

handling counsel Atty. Gerardo
Braganza, who is based in Davao City
and handling cases of Asialink for entire
Mindanao, turned over various case
files covering cases of Asialink
Finance Corporation in Northern
Mindanao, including the instant
case, to Davao City branch of
Asialink Finance Corporation and to
Asialink Finance Corporation in
Main Office. The reason for that is
that said counsel could no longer
handle the volume of cases all over
Mindanao because of health
reasons and so he had to focus on
handling cases in Southern
Mindanao.” (Underlining supplied for
emphasis.)
66. With all due respect, THERE WAS NO

MANIFESTATION FILED IN THE TRIAL COURT TO THE EFFECT
THAT THERE WAS A TURNOVER OF CASE FILES, NOR WAS
THERE ANY MANIFESTATION FILED IN THE SAID COURT
ASKING FOR ENOUGH TIME TO ORGANIZE ALL THE CASES
PENDING BEFORE IT AS THERE WAS A CHANGE OF
41
Id. at 39.
COUNSEL,AS WHAT EVERY PRUDENT COUNSEL SHOULD
HAVE DONE.
67. In fact, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S COUNSEL OF

RECORD DID NOT EVEN MANIFEST NOR MOVE FOR HIS
WITHDRAWAL FROM THIS CASE. AND NEITHER DID
THE COUNSEL WHO PREPARED PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FORMALLY ENTERED HIS APPEARANCE AS THE NEW
COUNSEL WHO WILL REPRESENT HEREIN PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT. (Underlining and capitalization supplied for
emphasis.)
68. At the very least, herein PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED THE TRIAL COURT AND/OR THE
OPPOSING COUNSEL OF A CHANGE OF THEIR COUNSEL.
69. Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states the
proper procedure for the withdrawal of a lawyer as counsel in
a case. It provides that:
“Sec. 26. Change of attorneys. -

An attorney may retire at any time
from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent
of his client filed in court. He may
also retire at any time from an action or
special proceeding, without the consent
of his client, should the court, on notice
to the client and attorney, and on
hearing, determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire. In case of
substitution, the name of the
attorney newly employed shall be
entered on the docket of the court
in place of the former one, and
written notice of the change shall
be given to the adverse party.
A client may at any time dismiss

his attorney or substitute another in his
place, but if the contract between client
and attorney has been reduced to
writing and the dismissal of the attorney
was without justifiable cause, he shall
be entitled to recover from the client the
full compensation stipulated in the

contract. However, the attorney may, in
the discretion of the court, intervene in
the case to protect his rights. For the
payment of his compensation the
attorney shall have a lien upon all
judgments for the payment of money,
and executions issued in pursuance of
such judgment, rendered in the case
wherein his services had been retained
by the client. (Underlining supplied for
emphasis.)
70. Unless the procedure prescribed in the

above mentioned section is complied with, the
attorney of record is regarded as the counsel who
should be served with copies of the judgments, orders
and pleadings and who should be held responsible for
the case.42 (Underlining supplied for emphasis.)
1. In one case,43 where there is failure on the part of the

appellant to file the appellant’s brief because of an alleged
change of counsels without notice to the court nor to
the opposing counsel, the Supreme Court held:
“No proof was present[ed] by

the petitioners to show compliance
with the above procedural
requirements for the withdrawal of
Atty. Barican and the substitution
of Atty. Mala in his stead: no
written application for substitution
or written consent of the client was
filed in court. The Certification made
by Atty. Rosalino C. Barican to the effect
that he was the former counsel of record
of the petitioners but that he withdrew
as their counsel is not controlling in the
absence of compliance with the above
procedural requirements. It is
therefore irrelevant that Atty. Mala
did not receive the copy of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated July 25, 1991 which dismissed
their appeal since he was not the
counsel of record and had never
42
Sps. Aquino v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 109493, July 2, 1999
43
Supra.
entered his appearance as counsel
of the petitioners.
x x x There was an effective

service upon the petitioners for as
far as the Court of Appeals was
concerned, Atty. Barican continued
to be their counsel of record.
The failure of an appellant to

file an appellant's brief is ground
for the dismissal of the appeal. x x
x” (Underlining supplied for emphasis.)
71. Hence, using the same analogy to the case at bar,

herein Plintiff-Appellant duly received the Trial Court’s
Order44 dated December 28, 2016 which set the schedule for
the preliminary and pre-trial conferences as well as the
directive to file the required pre-trial briefs when their
counsel of record, Atty. Gerardo C. Braganza, received the
same.
72. The allegation that the case file was transferred to

another office is IMMATERIAL because the COUNSEL OF
RECORD WAS NEVER SUBSTITUTED AS THERE WAS NO
PROPER SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSELS.
73. It is an elementary principle that it is the counsel’s

duty to inform his client on the status of the case particularly
on the important movements or developments therein.
2. In fact, in the administrative case of Nonato v. Atty.

Fudolin, Jr.,45 where the respondent counsel failed to file the
required position paper to the Municipal Trial Court, the
Supreme Court, by citing a plethora of cases, held that:
“A lawyer is bound to protect

his client’s interests to the best of
his ability and with utmost
diligence. He should serve his client in
a conscientious, diligent, and efficient
manner; and provide the quality of
service at least equal to that which he,
himself, would expect from a competent
lawyer in a similar situation. By
44
45
A.C. No. 10138, June 16, 2015, Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1876
consenting to be his client’s
counsel, a lawyer impliedly
represents that he will exercise
ordinary diligence or that
reasonable degree of care and skill
demanded by his profession, and his
client may reasonably expect him to
perform his obligations diligently. The
failure to meet these standards warrants
the imposition of disciplinary action.
In this case, the record clearly

shows that the respondent has
been remiss in the performance of
his duties as Restituto’s counsel.
His inaction on the matters
entrusted to his care is plainly
obvious. HE FAILED TO FILE HIS
POSITION PAPER DESPITE NOTICE
FROM THE MTC REQUIRING HIM TO
DO SO. HIS OMISSION GREATLY
PREJUDICED HIS CLIENT as the
Court in fact dismissed the
ejectment suit.
In addition, the respondent failed

to inform Restituto and the complainant
of the status of the case. His failure to
file the position paper, and to
inform his client of the status of the
case, not only constituted
INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE; but it
also AMOUNTED TO EVASION OF
DUTY. All these acts violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility warranting
the court’s imposition of disciplinary
action. The pertinent provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
provide:
Canon 17 – A LAWYER OWES

FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF
HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN
HIM.

Canon 18 – A LAWYER SHALL
SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not

neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection
therewith shall render him
liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall

keep the client informed of
the status of his case and
shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s
request for information.
In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc.

v. Saquilabon,46 we considered a
lawyer’s failure to file a brief for his
client to be inexcusable negligence.
We held that the lawyer’s omission
amounted to a serious lapse in the
duty he owed his client and in his
professional obligation not to delay
litigation and to aid the courts in
the speedy administration of
justice.
Similarly in Uy v. Tansinsin, 47 we
ruled that a lawyer’s failure to file
the required pleadings and to
inform his client about the
developments in her case fell below
the standard and amounted to a
violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. We
emphasized the importance of the
lawyers’ duty to keep their clients
adequately and fully informed about the
developments in their cases, and held
that a client should never be left in
the dark, for to do so would be to
46
A.M. No. 3907, April 10, 1997
47
A.C. No. 8252, July 21, 2009
destroy the trust, faith, and
confidence reposed in the retained
lawyer and in the legal profession
as a whole.
We also emphasized in Villaflores v.

Limos48 that the trust and confidence
reposed by a client in his lawyer
impose a high standard that
includes the appreciation of the
lawyer’s duty to his clients, to the
profession, to the courts, and to the
public. Every case a lawyer accepts
deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or
for free.
BECAUSE A LAWYER-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP IS ONE OF TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE, THERE IS A NEED FOR
THE CLIENT TO BE ADEQUATELY AND
FULLY INFORMED ABOUT THE
DEVELOPMENTS IN HIS CASE. A CLIENT
SHOULD NEVER BE LEFT GROPING IN
THE DARK; TO ALLOW THIS SITUATION IS
TO DESTROY THE TRUST, FAITH, AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN THE
RETAINED LAWYER AND IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN GENERAL.49
The respondent has apparently

failed to measure up to these
required standards. He neglected to
file the required position paper, and
did not give his full commitment to
maintain and defend his client’s
interests. Aside from failing to file
the required pleading, the
respondent never exerted any
effort to inform his client of the
dismissal of the ejectment case.
We also find the respondent’s

48
A. C. No. 7504, November 23, 2007
49
Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 5687, February 03, 2005
excuse – that he had an undetected
stroke and was suffering from other
illnesses – UNSATISFACTORY AND
MERELY AN AFTERTHOUGHT. EVEN
ASSUMING THAT HE WAS THEN
SUFFERING FROM NUMEROUS
HEALTH PROBLEMS (as evidenced
by the medical certificates he
attached), HIS MEDICAL CONDITION
CANNOT SERVE AS A VALID REASON
TO EXCUSE THE OMISSION TO FILE
THE NECESSARY COURT PLEADINGS.
THE RESPONDENT COULD HAVE
REQUESTED AN EXTENSION OF TIME
TO FILE THE REQUIRED POSITION
PAPER, OR AT THE VERY LEAST,
INFORMED HIS CLIENT OF HIS
MEDICAL CONDITION; ALL THESE,
THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO DO.
for emphasis.)
74. Applying the above-cited litany of jurisprudence to

this case, herein Plaintiff-Appellant’s counsel of record was
clearly remiss of his duty when he did not file the necessary
pre-trial brief and when he did not inform his client, herein
Plaintiff-Appellant, that he received on February 1, 2017, an
Order dated December 28, 2016 of the Trial Court which set
the schedule for the preliminary and pre-trial conferences as
well as the directive to file the pre-trial brief, and when he
consequently failed to appear during the said preliminary
and pre-trial conferences.
75. Furthermore, even granting arguendo that the

case files were indeed transferred to the main office some
time on February 2017, it should be emphasized that it is
still the sole duty of the counsel of record to notify
his client of the scheduled preliminary and pre-trial
conferences. (Underlining supplied for emphasis.)
76. Plaintiff’s allegation that the counsel of record has

turned over the cases because of health reasons should be
considered as UNSATISFACTORY and merely an
AFTERTHOUGHT, as was the ruling of the Supreme Court in
the case cited above.

77. Even granting for argument’s sake that the
counsel of record could no longer file the necessary pre-trial
brief because of health reasons, the said counsel could have,
at the very least, asked for an extension of time to file the
said pre-trial brief or informed his client of his intent to be
substituted as counsel.
78. In fact, plaintiff’s counsel of record could have

informed this Honorable Court and/or the opposing counsel
that he has transferred all his case files, including this case,
to a new counsel, in order for this Court and the opposing
counsel to have been advised as to where to send or
transmit legal orders, pleadings, and communications.
79. This, the counsel of record has failed to do. And

the Highest Court of the land in the cases already cited has
considered this negligence to be INEXCUSABLE.
80. A CLIENT IS BOUND BY HIS COUNSEL’S

NEGLIGENCE, SAVE IN THE MOST HIGHLY
EXTRAORDINARY CASES.
81. In the case of Henry Ong Lay Hin v. Court of

Appeals, et al.,50 the Supreme Court held:
THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT

THE NEGLIGENCE OF COUNSEL
BINDS THE CLIENT, EVEN MISTAKES
IN THE APPLICATION OF
PROCEDURAL RULES. The exception
to the rule is "when the reckless or gross
negligence of the counsel deprives the
client of due process of law."
The agency created between a

counsel and a client is a highly fiduciary
relationship. A counsel becomes the
eyes and ears in the prosecution or
defense of his or her client’s case. This
is inevitable because a competent
counsel is expected to understand the
law that frames the strategies he or she
employs in a chosen legal remedy.
Counsel carefully lays down the
procedure that will effectively and
efficiently achieve his or her client’s
50
G.R. No. 191972, January 26, 2015
interests. Counsel should also have a
grasp of the facts, and among the
plethora of details, he or she chooses
which are relevant for the legal cause of
action or defense being pursued.
xxx
xxx
x x x finding good counsel is

also the responsibility of the client
especially when he or she can
afford to do so. Upholding client
autonomy in these choices is infinitely a
better policy choice than assuming that
the state is omniscient. Some degree
of error must, therefore, be borne
by the client who does have the
capacity to make choices.
This is one of the bases of the

doctrine that the error of counsel
visits the client. This court will
cease to perform its social
functions if it provides succor to all
who are not satisfied with the
services of their counsel.
But, there is an EXCEPTION TO

THIS DOCTRINE of binding agency
between counsel and client. This is
when the negligence of counsel is so
gross, almost bordering on recklessness
and utter incompetence, that we can
safely conclude that the due process
rights of the client were violated. Even
so, THERE MUST BE A CLEAR AND
CONVINCING SHOWING THAT THE
CLIENT WAS SO MALICIOUSLY
DEPRIVED OF INFORMATION THAT
HE OR SHE COULD NOT HAVE ACTED
TO PROTECT HIS OR HER
INTERESTS. The error of counsel must
have been both palpable yet maliciously
exercised that it should viably be the
basis for disciplinary action.

Thus, in Bejarasco, Jr. v. People, 51
this court reiterated:
For the exception to

apply . . . the gross
negligence should not be
accompanied by the
client’s own negligence or
malice, considering that
the client has the duty to
be vigilant in respect of
his interests by keeping
himself up-to-date on the
status of the case. Failing
in this duty, the client
should suffer whatever
adverse judgment is
rendered against him.
In Bejarasco, Jr., Peter Bejarasco,

Jr., failed to file a Petition for Review
before the Court of Appeals within the
extended period prayed for. The Court of
Appeals then dismissed the Appeal and
issued an Entry of Judgment. His
conviction for grave threats and grave
oral defamation became final, and a
warrant for his arrest was issued.
In his Petition for Review on

Certiorari before this court, Peter
Bejarasco, Jr. argued that his counsel’s
negligence in failing to file the Appeal
deprived him of due process.
This court rejected Peter Bejarasco,

Jr.'s argument, ruling that "[i]t is the
client's duty to be in contact with
his lawyer from time to time in
order to be informed of the
progress and developments of his
case[.] [T]o merely rely on the bare
reassurances of his lawyer that
everything is being taken care of is
not enough." (Underlining supplied for
51
G.R. No. 159781, February 2, 2011
emphasis.)
82. Indeed, applying the above-cited case to this
instant case, herein Plaintiff-Appellant cannot invoke the
exception to the rule that the client is bound by his counsel’s
mistake by saying that they were deprived of due process of
law.
83. To reiterate, for the exception to apply, the gross

negligence of herein Plaintiff-Appellant’s counsel of record
SHOULD NOT BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE PLAINTIFF’S
OWN NEGLIGENCE OR MALICE, considering that THE
PLAINTIFF HAS THE DUTY TO BE VIGILANT IN RESPECT
OF HIS INTERESTS BY KEEPING HIMSELF UP-TO-DATE
ON THE STATUS OF THE CASE. FAILING IN THIS DUTY,
HEREIN PLAINTIFF SHOULD SUFFER WHATEVER
ADVERSE JUDGMENT IS RENDERED AGAINST IT.
(Underlining and capitalization supplied for emphasis.)
84. In fact, herein Plaintiff-Appellant’s first Motion for

Reconsideration filed with the trial Court when this case was
first dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to prosecute was well-
taken by the Trial Court and was granted in an Order dated
December 28, 2017.
85. Herein Plaintiff-Appellant was then given ample

time to prepare and file their pre-trial brief and to prepare for
the preliminary and pre-trial conferences scheduled on April
5, 2017 at 1:30 in the afternoon and May 10, 2017 at 8:30 in
the morning, respectively.
86. Yet, herein Plaintiff-Appellant and/or its counsel did

not appear during the preliminary conference on April 5,
2017 nor did they appear during the pre-trial conference on
May 10, 2017.
87. It cannot be gainsaid that herein Plaintiff-Appellant

was deprived of due process of law when it was the Plaintiff-
Appellant itself who disobeyed the lawful orders of this
Honorable Court, that is, when it did not file its pre-trial brief
and when it did not appear during the preliminary and pre-
trial conferences.
88. Hence, it is the non-appearance and/or

inaction of herein Plaintiff-Appellant which led to the
dismissal of this case. Plaintiff cannot now claim to
exempt itself from the application of the rule that

counsel’s negligence binds his client. (Underlining
supplied for emphasis)
89. In reality, Plaintiff-Appellant can even be faulted

for the dismissal of this case for the second time. As in the
case cited above,52 “[h]iring legal counsel does not
relieve litigants of their duty to "monitor the status of
[their] case[s]," especially if their cases are taking an
"unreasonably long time" to be resolved.” (Underlining
supplied for emphasis.)
3. Again, it should be noted that this case was filed in

court some time on October 2013. Yet, it has not reached
even the pre-trial stage. It should be stressed that it is the
duty of herein plaintiff to monitor the status of its
cases, especially that this case already took an
unreasonable long time to be resolved.
90. Herein Plaintiff-Appellant already knew and should

have realized that it has posted a surety bond in the amount
of P1,100,000.00 for the property subject of the Writ of
Replevin of this case. Hence, Plaintiff-Appellant should have
been more than interested to prosecute this case with the
knowledge that a huge amount of money is in line, should
this case be dismissed, without the plaintiff surrendering the
property subject of the writ.
91. In fine, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT FAILED TO

PROFFER SUFFICIANE JUSTIFICATION FOR ITS FAILURE
TO APPEAR DURING THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE
AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND FOR ITS FAILURE TO
FILE ITS PRE-TRIAL BRIEF.
92. Indeed, technical rules of procedure are not

designed to frustrate the ends of justice. these are
provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly
disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the
clogging of court dockets. UTTER DISREGARD OF
THESE RULES CANNOT JUSTLY BE RATIONALIED BY
HARKING ON THE POLICY OF LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION.
B. THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT IS CORRECT IN
ORDERING APPELLANT
TO RETURN THE VEHICLE
52
Henry Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, et al., Supra.
SUBJECT OF THE WRIT OF
REPLEVIN WITHIN THIRTY
(30) DAYS FROM RECEIPT
OF THE ORDER
OTHERWISE THE BOND IT
HAS POSTED IN THE
AMOUNT OF
P1,100,000.00 SHALL BE
FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF
THE DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES SPOUSES
JESUS AND CARLOTA
MADRIAGA.
(1) SAID ORDER HAS SUFFICIENT

BASIS IN LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE
93. With all due respect, Section 9, Rule 60 on

Replevin of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
“SEC. 9. Judgment – After trial of

the issues, the court shall determine
who has the right of possession and the
value of the property and shall render
judgment in the alternative for the
delivery thereof to the party entitled to
the same, or for its value in case
delivery cannot be made, and also for
such damages as either party may
prove, with costs.”
94. However, in view of the dismissal of Plaintiff-

Appellant’s Complaint on May 20, 2017, the the Trial Court
deemed it just and proper to order and direct the Plaintiff-
Appellant to return the subject vehicle of the Writ of Replevin
to spouses Jesus and Carlota Madriaga, otherwise, the bond
that Plaintiff-Appellant have posted will be forfeited in favor
herein Defendants-Appellees, which Order is in
consonance to the spirit and letter of the law.
95. The Supreme Court, in Advent Capital and Finance

Corporation v. Young,53 held that:
“We agree with the Court of

Appeals in directing the trial court to
53
G.R. No. 183018, August 3, 2011
return the seized car to Young SINCE
THIS IS THE NECESSARY
CONSEQUENCE OF THE DISMISSAL
OF THE REPLEVIN CASE FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. Upon the dismissal of
the replevin case for failure to
prosecute, the writ of seizure,
which is merely ancillary in nature,
became functus officio and should
have been lifted. There was no
adjudication on the merits, which
means that there was no
determination of the issue who has
the better right to possess the
subject car. Advent cannot
therefore retain possession of the
subject car considering that it was
not adjudged as the prevailing
party entitled to the remedy of
replevin.
x x x The dismissal of the replevin

case for failure to prosecute results
in the restoration of the parties’
status prior to litigation, as if no
complaint was filed at all. To let the
writ of seizure stand after the
dismissal of the complaint would be
adjudging Advent as the prevailing
party, when precisely no decision
on the merits had been rendered.
Accordingly, the parties must be
reverted to their status quo ante.
Since Young possessed the subject
car before the filing of the replevin
case, the same must be returned to
him, as if no complaint was filed at
all.”
96. Thus applying the foregoing doctrine enunciated

by no less than the Supreme Court, the TRIAL COURT, in
this case, IS CORRECT TO DIRECT HEREIN PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT TO RETURN THE SEIZED PERSONAL
PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE REPLEVIN CASE TO
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES SPOUSES MADRIAGA IN

VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S
COMPLAINT.
97. Thus, upon the dismissal of the replevin case, the

Writ of Seizure served upon herein Defendants-Appellees,
which is merely ancillary in nature, became functus officio
and should have been lifted.
98. Again, there was no adjudication on the merits,

which means that THERE WAS NO DETERMINATION OF THE
ISSUE WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESS THE
SUBJECT CAR.
99. HEREIN PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT CANNOT,

THEREFORE, RETAIN POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT CAR
CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS NOT ADJUDGED AS THE
PREVAILING PARTY ENTITLED TO THE REMEDY OF
REPLEVIN.
100. Hence, the dismissal of the case necessarily

results in the RESTORATION OF THE PARTIES’ STATUS
PRIOR TO LITIGATION, AS IF NO COMPLAINT WAS
FILED AT ALL. TO LET THE WRIT OF SEIZURE STAND
AFTER THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WOULD BE
ADJUDGING HEREIN PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS THE
PREVAILING PARTY, WHEN PRECISELY NO DECISIONS
ON THE MERITS HAS BEEN RENDERED.
101. ACCORDINGLY, THE HEREIN PARTIES MUST BE

REVERTED BACK TO THEIR STATUS QUO ANTE. THUS,
SINCE HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES POSSESSED
THE SUBJECT CAR BEFORE THE FILING OF THE
REPLEVIN CASE, THE SAME MUST BE RETURNED TO
THEM, AS IF NO COMPLAINT WAS FILED AT ALL.
(2) THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
IN THE INSTANT CASE
102. Significantly, the Trial Court has already ruled and

has stated in its Order54 dated May 19, 2015 that:
“As correctly argued by defendants

spouses Madriaga, plaintiff’s Complaint
expressly named Febie Bartolin
Yano and “John Doe” as defendants
54
even expainin in paragraph 2.1
thereof that “[d]efendant John Doe
is any person who may be in
possession of the subject chattel, in
violation of the rights of herein
Plaintiff.” Thus, defendants SPOUSES
MADRIAGA ARE CLEARLY REFERRED
TO IN THE COMPLAINT SINCE THEY
WERE IN POSSESSION OF THE
CHATTEL SUBJECT THEREOF AND IN
FACT, IT WAS SEIZED FROM THEM
PER SHERIFF’S RETURN OF SERVICE
DATED 17 DECEMBER 2013.
Moreover, defendants spouses

Madriaga likewise CORRECTLY
ASSERTED THAT THEY ARE A “REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST” WHO STANDS
TO BE BENEFITED OR INJURED BY
THE JUDGMENT IN THE SUIT” as
defined under Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. Having been in
possession of the subject chattel and
from whom it was “replevied”, they are
also a “NECESSARY PARTY” x x x.”
for emphasis.)
103. Thus, there is no question that herein Defendants-

Appellees are indispensable, necessary and real party in
interest in this case.
(3) THAT THE VEHICLE IS OWNED

AND REGISTERED UNDER THE
NAME OF DEFENDANT FEBIE
BARTOLIN YANO WHO MORTGAGED
THE VEHICLE TO APPELLANT TO
SECURE A LOAN FROM THE LATTER
104. Herein Plaintiff-Appellant has its arguments

misplaced. This is an Appel from the Order of dismissal of the
Trial Court. That the vehicle is owned and registered under
the name of Defendant-Appellant Febie Bartolin Yano and
was allegedly mortgaged to it is material considering that
Plaintiff-Appellant disregarded simple and basic procedure of
submitting and filing its pre-trial brief within the period to do
so.

C. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DID NOT DISREGARD THE
WELL-SETTLED
PRINCIPLE THAT RULES
MUST NOT BE APPLIED
RIGIDLY SO AS NOT TO
OVERRIDE SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE WHEN IT DENIED
FOR LACK OF MERIT
APPELLANT’S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
(WITH PRAYER TO ADMIT
PRE-TRIAL BRIEF AND
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT)
“THE BARE INVOCATION OF THE INTEREST OF

SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS NOT A MAGIC WANT THAT
WILL AUTOMATICALLY COMPEL THE COURT TO
SUSPEND PROCEDURAL RULES.”
105. With utmost due respect, the dismissal of herein

Plaintiff-Appellant’s case is not for the first time. It has been
dismissed once because of Plaintiff-Appellant’s Failure to
Prosecute.55
106. Then, it has been dismissed the second time

because of its wanton failure to: first, submit its Pre-trial
Brief and Judicial Affidavits of its witnesses three (3) days
before the Scheduled Pre-Trial; second, attend the scheduled
Preliminary Conference; and third, attend the scheduled Pre-
trial Conference, despite due notice.
107. CONCOMITANT TO A LIBERAL APPLICATION

OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE SHOULD BE AN EFFORT
ON THE PART OF THE PARTY INVOKING LIBERALITY TO
AT LEAST PROMPTLY EXPLAIN ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE RULES.56
108. Plaintiff-Appellant had not justified its failure to

comply with the rules, thus, its Complaint was correctly
dismissed by the Honorable Trial Court.
109. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in its decision,

has held that:
55
Kindly see Annex “H” hereof.
56
Daaco v. Yu, Ibid.
“As to petitioner’s invocation of
liberal application of the rules, we
cannot heed the same. It is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities
and that the rules of procedure should
not be strictly followed in the interest of
substantial justice. HOWEVER, IT
DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE RULES
OF COURT MAY BE IGNORED AT
WILL. IT BEARS EMPHASIZING THAT
PROCEDURAL RULES SHOULD NOT
BE BELITTLED OR DISMISSED
SIMPLY BECAUSE THEIR NON-
OBSERVANCE MAY HAVE RESULTED
IN PREJUDICE TO A PARTY’S
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS. LIKE ALL
RULES, THEY ARE REQUIRED TO BE
FOLLOWED EXCEPT ONLY FOR THE
MOST PERSUASIVE OF REASONS."
While petitioner cites several

jurisprudence wherein this Court set
aside procedural rules, an imperative
existed in those cases that warranted a
liberal application of the rules. We have
examined the records of this case,
however, and we are convinced that
the present case is not attended by
such an imperative that justifies
relaxation of the rules. Moreover, as
pointed out by respondents,
petitioner had not only once
transgressed procedural rules. This
Court has previously held that
"[t]echnical rules may be relaxed
only for the furtherance of justice
and to benefit the deserving."
Petitioner’s low regard of
procedural rules only shows that it
is undeserving of their relaxation.”57
110. Indeed, applying the aforementioned ruling of the

Supreme Court the case at bar, herein Plaintiff-Appellant’s
PLEA FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
57
Barangay Dasmariñas v. Creative Play Corner School, G.R. No.
169942, January 24, 2011
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN THEIR FAVOR DESERVES SCANT
CONSIDERATION. It should be reminded that technical
rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and
to benefit the deserving.
111. With utmost due respect, it can be gleaned ever

since the filing of the complaint, that Plaintiff-Appellant has
been remiss of its duty, considering that its complaint has
already been dismissed once for failure to prosecute.
112. THE DISMISSAL OF ITS COMPLAINT FOR THE FIRST

TIME SHOULD HAVE BEEN A WARNING ON THE PART OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT TO PAY CAREFUL AND NECESSARY
ATTENTION TO THE CASES IT FILED IN COURT. IT CANNOT,
AFTER BEING PREJUDICED WITH A DECISION, BE ALLOWED
TO CRY SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE TO RULE IN ITS FAVOR.
113. In fact, the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v.

Court of Appeals,58 the Supreme Court declared that:
“While it is true that we have

applied a liberal application of the rules
of procedure in a number of cases, we
have stressed that this can be invoked
only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. We
agree with petitioner's contention that
the CA and private respondents did not
proffer a reasonable cause to justify
non-compliance with the rules
besides the exhortation of
circumspect leniency in order to
give private respondents a day in
court. Private respondents failed to
specifically cite any justification as
to how and why a normal
application of procedural rules
would frustrate their quest for
justice. x x x The bare invocation of
"the interest of substantial justice"
line is not some magic wand that
will automatically compel us to
suspend procedural rules.
PROCEDURAL RULES ARE NOT TO BE
BELITTLED, LET ALONE DISMISSED
SIMPLY BECAUSE THEIR sNON-
58
G.R. No. 221636, July 11, 2016
OBSERVANCE MAY HAVE RESULTED
IN PREJUDICE TO A PARTY'S
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS. UTTER
DISREGARD OF THE RULES CANNOT
BE JUSTLY RATIONALIZED BY
HARPING ON THE POLICY OF
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION.”
114. In the case at bar, THE TRIAL COURT

CORRECTLY FOUND THAT HEREIN PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT DID NOT PROFFER A REASONABLE CAUSE
TO JUSTIFY NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES
BESIDES THE EXHORTATION OF CIRCUMSPECT
LENIENCY IN ORDER TO GIVE IT A DAY IN COURT.
115. Indeed, Plaintiff-Appellant have not been forthright

in explaining why it was not able to file its Pre-trial Brief
within the time specified by the Trial Court, and why it was
not able to appear during the scheduled preliminary
conference and pre-trial conference despite receiving due
notice.
116. Plaintiff-Appellant did not even try to communicate

with the Court and/or the Opposing Counsel of its intent to
change its counsel.
117. Hence, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S BARE

INVOCATION OF "THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE" LINE IS NOT SOME MAGIC WAND THAT WILL
AUTOMATICALLY COMPEL THE SUSPENSION OF
PROCEDURAL RULES. PROCEDURAL RULES ARE NOT
TO BE BELITTLED, LET ALONE DISMISSED SIMPLY
BECAUSE THEIR NON-OBSERVANCE MAY HAVE
RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO A PARTY'S SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS. UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULES CANNOT BE
JUSTLY RATIONALIZED BY HARPING ON THE POLICY OF
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION.
VII
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most

respectfully prayed of this Most Honorable Court of Appeals
to:

1) UPHOLD the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated May 10,
2017 which DIMISSED herein Plaintiff-Appellant’s complaint;
and
2) DIRECT herein Plaintiff-Appellant to return the subject

vehicle of the Writ of Replevin within thirty (30) days from
receipt of its Resolution; otherwise the bond that it has
posted in the amount of P1,000,000.00 shall be forfeited in
favor of herein Defendants-Appellees Spouses Madriaga.
OTHER RELIEF IN EQUITY IS LIKEWISE PRAYED

FOR.
Malaybalay City, February 23, 2018.
ALBERTO R. LAGAMON
Roll of Attorneys No. 52899
IBP Lifetime Member No. 08176
PTR No. 5436148/11 January 2017/Malaybalay City
MCLE Compliance No. V-0009310
TIN 106-037-743
NOTICE
THE CLERK OF COURT

Court of Appeals-Mindanao Station
Cagayan de Oro City
ATTY. PAOLO ENRIQUE P. FACTORA

Counsel for Asialink Finance Corporation
Unit 9-B 9th Floor Strata 2000 Building
Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center
Pasig City
FEBIE BARTOLIN YANO

Purok 5, South Poblacion
Maramag, Bukidnon
Please submit the foregoing Appellee’s Brief for the consideration

of this Most Honorable Court.
Thank you.
ALBERTO R. LAGAMON

Copy furnished by registered mail:59
ATTY. GERARDO C. BRAGANZA RR:________________

Door 5, 2nd Floor RLG Bldg.
Candelana St. Ecoland
Davao City
ATTY. PAOLO ENRIQUE P. FACTORA RR:________________

Pasig City
FEBIE BARTOLIN YANO RR:________________

Maramag, Bukidnon
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ]
CITY OF MALAYBALAY ] S.S.
VERIFICATION cum CERTIFICATION
We, JESUS MADRIAGA AND CARLOTA MADRIAGA of

legal age, Filipino, married and residents of Malaybalay City,
Philippines, after having been duly sworn to an oath in
accordance with law, hereby depose and say that:
1. We are the defendants-appellees in the above-titled case;
2. We have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing

Appellees’ Brief;
3. We have read the allegations contained therein and certify

that the same are true and correct to the best of my
personal knowledge and based on official and authentic
records;
4. To the best of our knowledge:
4.1 We have not commenced any other action or

proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals or the different divisions
thereof, or in any other courts, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency;
4.2 If we should learn thereafter that a similar action or

proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or the different
59
EXPLANATION. Service hereof to plaintiff-appellant’s counsel and
on defendant-appellant Yano has been made by registered mail due to
impracticability of effecting personal service considering the distance
of the addressees.
divisions thereof, or in any other lower courts, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency, I undertake to promptly
inform this Honorable Court of the fact within five (5)
days from notice.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our

signature this _______________ at Malaybalay City, Philippines.
JESUS MADRIAGA CARLOTA MADRIAGA

Defendant-Appellee Defendant-Appellee
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ____________ at

Malaybalay City, Philippines.
Doc. No.: ___;

Page No.: ___;
Book No.:___;
Series of 2018.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ]

MALAYBALAY CITY, BUKIDNON ] S.S.
AFFIDAVIT OF FILING AND SERVICE
I, ____________________________, of legal age, Filipino, and a

resident of Poblacion, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, after having been
duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law, hereby depose and state
that:
On January 26, 2018, I filed and served copies of the Appellees’

Brief for the Civil Case No. 4471-13 entitled “ASIALINK FINANCE
CORPORATION (REP. BY. RYAN V. DEL MUNDO) vs. FEBRIE
BARTOLIN YANO AND JESUS AND CARLOTA MADRIAGA for
COLLECTION OF SUM OF MONEY, REPLEVIN AND DAMAGES” by
registered mail to the following:
ATTY. GERARDO C. BRAGANZA RR:________________

Door 5, 2nd Floor RLG Bldg.
Candelana St. Ecoland
Davao City
ATTY. PAOLO ENRIQUE P. FACTORA RR:________________

Pasig City

FEBIE BARTOLIN YANO RR:________________
Maramag, Bukidnon
I execute this Affidavit of Filing and Service to attest to the truth

of the foregoing statements and for whatever legal purpose/s this may
best serve.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this

______________________ at Malaybalay City, Philippines.
_______________________________
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

_______________________ at Malaybalay City, Philippines.
Doc. No.: ______;

Page No.: ______;
Book No.:______;
Series of 2018.

Appellees Brief Asialink V Madriaga

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Court of Appeals - Mindanao Station

ASIALINK FINANCE CORPORATION

FEBIE BARTOLINE YANO,

CA-G.R. CV-No. 04774

I. APPELLANT’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 8

II. TIMELINESS OF THE APPELLEE’S BRIEF 8

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 9

IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 10

VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION 16

VIII. AFFIDAVIT OF FILING AND SERVICE 47

A. On the First Assigned Error

Plaintiff-Appellant erred when

Indeed, technical rules of procedure are not designed to

With all due respect, Section 9, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules

C. On the Third Assigned Error

Plaintiff-Appellant erred when

With utmost due respect, the dismissal of herein Plaintiff-

 Daaco v. Yu, G.R. No. 183398, 22 June 2015

 The Philippine American Life & General Insurance

 Advent Capital and Finance Corporation v. Young, G.R.

 Tiu v. Middleton, G.R. No. 134998, July 19 1999

 Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124448, February

 Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, G.R. No. 145911, 433 SCRA

 Spouses Aquino v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.

 Nonato v. Atty. Fudolin, Jr., A.C. No. 10138, June 6, 2015,

 Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilaban, A.M. No.

 Uy v. Tansinsin, A.C. No. 8252, July 21, 2007

 Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No. 7504, November 23,

 Henry Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.

 Bejarasco, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 159781, February 2,

 Barangay Dasmariñas v. Creative Corner School, G.R.

 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R.

LAWS AND RULES APPLICABLE:

Rules 18 on Pre-Trial, Revised Rules of Court

Rule 60 on Replevin, Revised Rules of Court

Rule 138 on Attorneys and Admission to Bar, Revised Rules

Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Rule 3 on Parties to Civil Actions, Revised Rules of Court

ANNEX “A” : Order of the Court of Appeals -

ANNEX “B” : Order of the Regional Trial Court Branch

ANNEX “C” : Motion for Reconsideration (with Prayer

ANNEX “D” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

ANNEX “E” : Motion for Extension of Time to File

ANNEX “F” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

ANNEX “G” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

ANNEX “H” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

ANNEX “I” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

ANNEX “J” Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

ANNEX “K” : Order of the RTC-Branch 8, Malaybalay

ASIALINK FINANCE CA-G.R. CV-No.:

- versus - RE: COLLECTION OF

COMES NOW, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, Spouses

APPELLANT’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

That the Trial Court committed serious and reversible

That the Trial Court erred in ordering appellant to return

That the Trial Court disregarded the well-settled

1. Defendants-Appellees, through the undersigned

2. Defendants-Appellees received on January 04,

3. On January 11, 2018, Defendants-Appellees

4. Considering, however, that the forty-fifth (45 th) day

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5. Herein Plaintiff-Appellant filed an appeal under