The María Clara doctrine, also known as the Woman's Honor doctrine, is a legal doctrine applied by

Philippine courts regarding cases that concerns abuse against women.

Etymology

The doctrine was named after María Clara from José Rizal's novel Noli Me Tángere. Clara is characterized
as reserved and shy and was later considered an "ideal" role model for women in Philippine culture.[1]

Legal history

The doctrine became a part of the Supreme Court of the Philippines' jurisprudence sometime in 1960
following the People v. Taño case. The high court through Justice Alejo Labrador has asserted a "well
known fact" that women, especially Filipinos "would not admit that they have been abused unless that
abuse had actually happened."[1] The court said that women's natural instict is to protect their
honor.[2]The case involved three armed robbers who the court found liable for taking turns in raping a
woman.[3]

About 58 years later since the doctrine entered the high court's jurisprudence, the Third Division of the
Supreme Court reverse a ruling on January 17, 2018 by a Davao court on two people convicted of rape.[1]
The 2018 decision was released in late-February.[4] The case involves an alleged rape that happened in
2009 and the two accused were sentenced of reclusión perpetua, or forty years of imprisonment, in 2012.
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 2016. [5]

The court described the doctrine as causing a "travesty of justice" by putting the accused at an "unfair
disadvantage"[1], criticizing the doctrine for assuming that no Filipina woman of "decent repute" would
falsely claim that she was abused. It urged for the acceptance of the "realities of a woman’s dynamic role"
in Philippine society today so one can "evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without
gender bias or cultural misconception". It also stated that the discrepancies in the alleged victim's
testimonies has casted doubt if the rape incident did happen or not.[3]

This has led to concerns and speculations that the high court has abandoned the doctrine.[1] The Gabriela
Women's Party condemned the decision which it viewed made the Maria Clara doctrine invalid saying the
ruling reversal will empower rapists and disagreed with the court's assessment of the societal status of
women.[4]

On February 21, 2018, Supreme Court's spokesperson, Theodore Te has clarified that it was not the case
since the high court can only abandon a doctrine only during a full session.[1]
[ GR No. L-11991, Oct 31, 1960 ]

PEOPLE v. PORFIRIO TAÑO

109 Phil. 912

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Hon. Hilarion Y. Jarencio, presiding, finding
Porfirio Taño, Guillermo Camina and Roman Caldito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery in Band with Rape, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
to indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the amount of P210.00, and also finding Dionisio
Cantong and Maximino Calico guilty of the crime of simple robbery in band and sentencing them also for
said offense. Porfirio Tano and Dionisio Cantong appealed from the judgment, but while the case was
pending in this Court, the latter withdrew his appeal. The present appeal, therefore, refers to that of
Porfirio Taño.

It is not disputed by the appellant, as found in the decision appealed from, that on July 25, 1955, at 8:00
in the evening, some persons called at the house of the spouses Leodegario Domingo and Herminigilda
Domingo in barrio Talacuan, municipality of Loon, province of Iloilo, informing the inmates of the house
that there was a letter for Leodegario. As soon as Leodegario reached the ground, carrying a lamp with
him, Camina struck his hand holding the lamp and the lamp fell down and the light was put out. Then Taño
pointed a rifle at Leodegario, while Camina tied his hands at the back. After giving a blow on the face of
Leodegario, Taño ordered his companions to take Leodegario to the river bank 40 meters away. Then
Taño, Camina and Caldito went up the house, each carrying with him a firearm. They searched the house,
and upon seeing a trunk forced it open and took away some pieces of men's and women's apparel and an
envelope containing P210.00.

The evidence shows that after the money had been taken away Taño dragged Herminigilda, pushing her
down the floor. Taño then placed himself on top of Herminigilda, while his companions held her legs apart.
He gave a blow at her left thigh and tore her "panty" away and then had intercourse with her. After this
Camina also had access to her, while his companions held her down. Caldito also did this. After raping her,
they went down the house and, thereafter, all of them ran away.

Counsel for appellant Taño argues that there is no sufficient evidence to sustain the finding that appellant
had access to the offended party, for the reason that the physician who examined her made no
examination of her private parts. That no such examination was made is true; the physician who examined
Herminigilda found a contusion on the face of her left thigh (Exhibit "M"), but made no mention of having
examined her private parts or having found evidence involving intercourse forced on her.
We have, however, carefully examined the evidence in this respect and we found that Herminigilda
testified that when Taño placed himself on top of her, she scratched his face, but Camina came and took
hold of, and then stretched her legs apart to aid Taño; that Taño hit her on the lap and tore away her
"panty"; that her "panty" had a coloration at the lower part caused by the semen of Taño while on top of
her (t.s.n. pp. 16-18). Her testimony is corroborated by the finding of a contusion on her left thigh and of
a coloration of her "panty" which was produced to the court. Besides, the offended party expressly
declared that Taño was able to have carnal knowledge of her (Id, pp. JS-19). It is a well-known fact that
women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually
happened. This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor. We can not believe that the offended
party would have positively stated that intercourse took place unless it did actually take place.

Another circumstance which supports the claim that rape was committed is the fact that following the
day of the commission of the crime of rape, the offended party stated in her affidavit that the three
accused, including appellant Taño, had taken turns in committing the crime of rape on her. The imputation
of rape is not, therefore, the prpduct of fabrication, because no appreciable time had elapsed between
the commission of the rape and the execution of tile affidavit.

Lastly, the trial judge who heard the offended party testify believed her testimony and found that rape
was actually committed. We find nothing to indicate that the court's findings in this respect are not
correct. We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that the claim of appellant Taño that the rape imputed
to him was not sufficiently proved, is without merit.

We also agree with the trial court that four aggravating circumstances, namely, commission by a band,
taking advantage of nighttime and dwelling, and use of superior strength attended the commission of the
offense. There being no mitigating circumstance in appellant's favor, the penalty should be imposed in its
maximum degree.

The judgment of conviction appealed from should, therefore, be as it hereby affirmed. With costs against
appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angela, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ.,
concur.

Judgment affirmed.
SC: 'Maria Clara' doctrine alone not sufficient for rape conviction

Ina Reformina, ABS-CBN News

Posted at Feb 20 2018 09:57 PM | Updated as of Feb 21 2018 06:26 AM

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Gone were the days when a rape victim's testimony is sufficient to convict the alleged rapist, solely
because of the belief that a typical Filipina, a "Maria Clara," would not testify that she had been raped if
it did not actually happen.

The Supreme Court (SC), in a decision on January 17 penned by Associate Justice Samuel Martires,
acquitted two men previously convicted of rape by a trial court, and affirmed by the appellate court,
because the testimony of alleged victim, alias "AAA," a housemaid, proved incredible.

The so-called ‘Maria Clara’ or “women’s honor” doctrine became part of Philippine jurisprudence in the
1960’s in the case involving the conviction of three armed robbers who toork turns raping Herminigilda
Domingo.

The high court then "hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly
admit that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect
her honor."

In the recent case involving an appeal by Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho, where the two allegedly
raped "AAA" in two separate instances, one after the other, in Davao City in February 2009, the high court
said "today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino
woman" so as to "evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural
misconception."

The high court explained that the times have changed, and with it the Filipina.
"We, should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society
today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful
person, willing to fight for her rights.

"It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused may be convicted solely on
the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things," the high court said in its decision, as it
stressed that for a conviction of rape to rise, the victim's narration and testimony must be believable
beyond reasonable doubt," the SC said.

VICTIM'S TESTIMONY NOT CREDIBLE

In the case of "AAA," the high court ruled that her testimony cast a doubt on its very credibility and she
was not telling the truth in her narration. The following circumstances were pointed out in the decision:
(1) AAA's version of the story in her complaint-affidavit differed materially from her testimony in court;
(2) "AAA" could not have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene was dark and she only saw
him for the first time; (3) her testimony lacked material details on how she was brought under the stage
against her will; and (4) the medical findings did not corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive of
any signs of forced entry.

AAA's complaint-affidavit indicated that Amarela pulled her away from the beauty contest stage to the
daycare center, where the rape occurred. However, in court, "AAA" testified that Amarela grabbed her
when she was on the way to the comfort room.

"[T]he version in AAA's affidavit-complaint is remotely different from her court testimony. At the first
instance, AAA claims that she was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage; later, in court, she says that
she was on her way to the restroom when she was grabbed. By this alone, we are hesitant to believe
AAA's retraction because it goes into whether it was even possible for Amarela to abduct AAA against her
will," the SC said.

As for Racho, the high court said that "[s]ince we doubt AAA's account on how she was raped by Amarela,
we have to consider her testimony against Racho under the same light."

Racho was instructed by his mother to accompany "AAA," after the supposed rape by Amarela, to her
aunt's house against his will. "AAA" alleged that instead of performing the task, Racho took her to a shanty
and raped her.
The high court said it was inclined to believe Racho's narration that he and "AAA" parted ways when she
insisted she wanted to go home instead of going to her aunt's house, since her home was in another town.

"To begin with, Racho did not even want to bring 'AAA' to her aunt's house nearby. If he had the intention
to have sex with 'AAA,' Racho would not have declined her mother's instruction. His reason for leaving
'AAA' to go home alone is supported by the fact that he was able to immediately come home right after
he left with 'AAA,'" the SC said.

Further, the high court noted that 'AAA's' lacerations were only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of
the hymen, and not in various directions which could have established non-consensual sex, according to
studies.

"Considering the locality of these lacerations ('AAA's' case), we cannot completely rule out the probability
that 'AAA' voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence o f bruises on AAA's thighs - when she
said she was punched there twice-reinforces the theory that 'AAA' may have had consensual intercourse,"
the SC said.

Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, against the victim's will, the high
court stressed.

The high court pointed out that it was the prosecution's duty to properly evaluate the evidence against
Amarela or Racho, and what actually happened could not be ascertained based on the testimony alone of
"AAA."
A DIVISION of the Supreme Court (SC) has issued a ruling that set aside the 58-year-old “woman’s honor”
doctrine in resolving rape cases.

In a 20-page decision issued on January 17, 2017, and penned by Associate Justice Samuel Martires, the
Court’s Third Division held that the doctrine which suggests a woman who is a victim of sexual abuse
would not admit she had been abused, unless the incident is true, out of a “natural instinct to protect her
honor” is a “misconception” in this present time.

The Court, in the said ruling, reversed the guilty verdict issued by a Davao court in 2012 against Juvy
Amarela and Junard Racho in a rape that supposedly took place in 2009.

The two were earlier meted to suffer reclusion perpetua, or up to 40 years imprisonment, by the trial
court with the decision also being affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 2016.

In setting aside Amarela and Racho’s conviction, the Court held that the doctrine has put accused in rape
cases at an unfair disadvantage and creates a “travesty of justice.”

The woman’s honor doctrine surfaced in the Court’s jurisprudence sometime in 1960 in the case of People
v. Tana.

In the said case the Court affirmed the conviction of three armed robbers who took turns raping a woman.

The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador, said: “It is a well-known fact that women, especially
Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened.”

It added that it is due to women’s natural instinct to protect their honor.

But the new SC ruling said the doctrine is no longer applicable today and that the Court cannot be stuck
to the “Maria Clara” stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipina.

“More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual depredation, rape cases
are solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In doing so, we
have hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she was
sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor,” the High Court
stated.

“We, should stay away from such mind-set and accept the realities of a woman’s dynamic role in society
today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful
person, willing to fight for her rights. In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant
of rape without gender bias or

cultural misconception,” the Court added.

The SC said that for the Court to affirm a conviction of rape it should be based on credible, natural,
convincing testimony of the victim which should also be consistent with human nature and not merely
rely on the women’s honor doctrine.

In the case of Amarela and Racho, the Court said the prosecution “miserably failed to present a clear story
of what transpired and that whether the victim’s story is true or not.

The Third Division said it found circumstances that cast doubt on the credibility of the testimony of the
victim, including the gaps in her testimony, differences between her affidavit-complaint and court
testimony, a supposed inability for her to have identified one of her assailants because the crime scene
was ark and she allegedly saw him for the first time, a lack of material details on some events in the alleged
rape incident, to medico-legal findings that raised questions on whether she had consented to sex after
all.

“Although we put a premium on the factual findings of the trial court, especially when they are affirmed
by the appellate court, this rule is not absolute and admits exceptions, such as when some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended and misinterpreted,” the
SC declared.