ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE PRISCILLA C.

MIJARES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 108, PASAY CITY, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-98-1402 | 1998-04-03

Tagged under keywords

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J:

Through a verified letter-complaint dated 12 September 1995, retired Justice of the Court of
Appeals Onofre A. Villaluz charged Judge Priscilla C. Mijares, incumbent Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, with dishonesty, corrupt practices, grave misconduct and
immorality, allegedly committed as follows:

1. In Consignation Case No. 0940, "Tengco Homeowners' Association vs. Susana Realty, Inc.,"
assigned to and tried in her Branch, Judge, Mijares placed the plaintiff association's rental
deposits in her private bank account, instead of turning them over as she should have done, to the
City Treasurer; only some time in September, 1989 when some members of the association
sought a certification that they had in fact been depositing rentals in Court, did she turn over to
the City Treasurer the accumulated amount of P222,377.18 by way of UCPB Cashier's Check
No. 0996682 dated September 14, 1989; Judge Mijares kept for herself the interests earned by
said deposits while they were in her personal bank account.

2. Judge Mijares took cognizance of and decided Special Proceedings No. 3946, a petition for
correction of entry in the birth record of her grandson, Joshua Anthony M. Gurango, the child of
her daughter Ma. Pilita M. Gurango, notwithstanding such close relationship; and this
notwithstanding the fact that even if said petition had regularly been raffled off to her sala, a
sense of propriety, if not the letter and spirit of the Code of Judicial Ethics, should have made her
refuse the assignment and procure the transfer of the case to any of the five other branches of the
Court equally qualified to take over and decide the case; and to compound and aggravate the
corrupt practice of taking on and deciding the case of a very close relative, she also dispensed
with the required publication of the petition which sought to correct the entry of the subject's
citizenship from the stated "Filipino" to "American."

3. In Special Proceedings No. 90-54652, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, entitled: "In
Re: Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of Primitivo Mijares," where Judge Mijares
was the petitioner, she falsely declared her residence to be at No. 2247 Coral St., San Andres
Bukid, Manila, which in fact is the residence of Teresita Arceo, formerly employed at Branch 7
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, which was at one time presided by her (Judge
Mijares); and this, to illegally vest jurisdiction over the petition in the proper Manila Regional
Trial Court, rather in Quezon City where she actually resides for decades;

4. Judge Mijares made a false declaration of her residence as at No. 869 Pestañas Street, Pasay
City, in her application for Marriage License No. 0572927 accomplished. as of December 20,
1993, on the strength of which she contracted a sham marriage with me, solemnized by Judge
Myrna Lim Verano of Carmona, Cavite, a former trial fiscal in her sala; her purpose in procuring
such sham "marriage" with me, was to use the same as a defense to charges of immorality
brought against her by one Joseph Ligorio Naval before the Supreme Court. 1

In a resolution dated 14 February 1996, the Court directed the respondent to comment on the
letter-complaint.

On 16 May 1996, respondent filed her Comment on the afore-quoted charges in this wise:

On the first charge, respondent denied any participation in the collection of deposits from the
Tengco Homeowners Association claiming. that the accusation was the concoction of her
disgruntled employees, Joseph Ligorio Naval and Anita Domingo, who had a falling-out with
her. Specifically, respondent maintained that:

. . . [I]t is never the duty of a Presiding Judge to collect from litigants any money or amount for
deposit with the court. It is, as always, the duty of the Branch Clerk of Court or the Officer-in-
Charge (OIC) for that matter. The reason why the Branch Clerk or the OIC is provided with a
cabinet-safe vault is to safeguard the loss of properties/evidence, whether money or otherwise, in
his/her custody. Anita Domingo was then the property and records custodian as well as OIC
when the Tengco Homeowners deposited with her. The individual collections were duly
receipted by her as reflected in Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D" & "E" (samplings of receipts Anita
Domingo issued). In no occasion did the respondent receive money and/or issue receipts to any
litigants, and particularly in this case where the Homeowners individually paid their dues
regularly or once in every month with Anita Domingo (as reflected in the Joint Affidavit [See
Annex "F"]). On request of Cris Agtuca, she issued a certification (See Annex "G") that the
deposit was made with her.

Respondent, upon receipt of the copy of the letter complaint of Villaluz, took time out to secure
from the UCPB Holiday Plaza Branch, a certification regarding a Cashier's Check as indicated in
the complaint and UCPB Holiday Plaza Branch obliged and delivered to respondent the
CERTIFICATION requested (See Annex "H"). The certification clearly states as follows:

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

"This is to certify that our branch (nor UCPB) does not issue an instrument named 'CASHIER'S
CHECK.' The name of the instrument we issue is a 'MANAGER'S CHECK.' Moreover, check
number 996682 is not in our branch manager's check (MC) number series.

"We further, certify that our branch has no record of the issuance of a 'Cashier's Check No.
996682 on September 14, 1989.'

"This certification is issued upon the request of (Judge) Priscilla C. Mijares for whatever purpose
it may serve her.

AUTHORIZED SIGNATURES:
(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.)Illegible

FERDINAND C. MUYARGAS RAMON B. HENSON, JR.

Asst. Manager/BOO AVP & Branch Head" 2

On the second charge, respondent asserted that the rule on disqualification of judges under Sec.
1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court does not apply since the proceedings called simply for the
clarification and correction of an erroneous entry in the birth certificate of Joshua Anthony M.
Gurango regarding his father's nationality. Respondent averred that:

The attendant/clerk who testified admitted that she really committed a big mistake when she
placed "Filipino" as the nationality of the father of minor Joshua Anthony Gurango. The passport
(Annex "I") very clearly showed the real nationality, that of a citizen of the "United States of
America." Both in her sworn statement (Annex "J") and her open court testimony, the clerk, Liza
A. Peñano, admitted her mistake. Her apologetic attitude was reflected in both words and action
while testifying as witness in the case.

Regarding the publication, respondent granted the exemption after considering the nature of the
case. The publication fee of from P4,000.00 to P6,000.00 was saved by the spouses (parents of
the minor) who are just starting to have a family. 3

Anent the third accusation, respondent staunchly denied that she made a false declaration
regarding her residence in the proceedings she filed for declaration of presumptive death of her
husband Primitivo Mijares. She explained, thus:

Regarding Coral Street, the same was the former residence of complainant's husband, Primitivo
Mijares. This fact is not known to respondent. And considering too the service of complaint for
the City of Manila from 1957 to 1986, an employee, as Fiscal and later as Judge, including the
services of her own children in PGH, Manila Doctors, Comelec and Manila Hotel, nobody could
refute complaint's statement that she is a Manila resident. It is also a place where complainant
may be served with summons." 4

As to the last imputation, respondent declared that she considers Pasay City her second home for
the following reasons:

Complainant's appointment to RTC Pasay dated as far back as 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.
Add to this fact her stay in the same place since graduation from High School in 1953. Even until
now complainant's letters addressed to 869 Pestañas Street are delivered to her by her cousins as
a lasting arrangement. 5

On 4 September 1996, the Court resolved to refer the instant case to Justice Salvador J. Valdez
of the Court of Appeals for investigation, evaluation, report and recommendation.

On 13 May 1997, Justice Salvador J. Valdez submitted to the Court the results of his
investigation and the following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that JUDGE PRISCILLA C. MIJARES be

found guilty of grave misconduct under Charges No. 1 and No. 2, and that she be DISMISSED
from the service with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits and privileges, and
with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the Government service, whether pertaining to
the national or local Government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations,
instrumentalities and agencies. 6

It is regrettable that the instant case be clothed in so much personal enmity. However, shorn of
its emotional trappings, the Court concurs with the report of Justice Valdez but finds the
recommended penalty of dismissal from service to be too severe.

We shall deal with the imputed misdeeds in seriatim.

Reproduced hereunder are the testimonies and evidence adduced by the parties regarding the first
charge as succinctly summarized by Justice Valdez in his Report and Recommendation:

The parties agreed to the reproduction of the testimony of Anita Domingo in the earlier
administrative complaint initiated by Joseph S. Ligorio Naval, Jr.

Anita Domingo had therein testified that she used to be the "court officer-in-charge" and
"property custodian" of Judge Mijares in Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
She declared that in the consignation case in their court involving the Tengco Homeowners
Association, the petitioners offered to deposit with her office the rentals falling due but she
referred them to the Clerk of Court because she was not tasked with receiving such deposits.
However, the Clerk of Court refused to receive the rental deposits since there was no order to
that effect from the presiding judge. Thereafter, Judge Mijares gave instruction to her (Anita
Domingo), and to other employees in her Branch, like Mrs. Gatdula and Mrs. Villamater, to
receive and receipt for the rental deposits, and turn over the money to her (Judge Mijares). Once
deposits were thus made, they were given to Judge Mijares who, in turn asked Mrs. Villamater to
deposit them, in her (Judge Mijares') personal account with the United Coconut Planters Bank,
Holiday Plaza Branch. Anita Domingo claimed that on February 14, 1990, the rental deposits
accumulated in the aggregate amount of P222,377.18. Judge Mijares turned over the amount to
the Clerk of Court in the form of a check, which the latter, then deposited with the City Treasurer
of Pasay City. In this connection, the complainant presented in evidence these documents, to wit:

Exhibit "E" Official Receipt No. 1204413, dated

February 14, 1990, issued by the

Clerk of Court, RTC, Pasay City, for

the payment of P222,377.18 in the

form of UCPB Check No. FB-11-

014578 dated 2-14-90 (Exhibits "E-

1" and "E-2").

"F" Report of Collections for Fiduciary

Fund Deposited with the City

Treasurer, Pasay City for the Period

from February 13 & 14, 1990 which

includes the P222,377.18 (Exhibit

"E-1").

"G" Cashier/Treasurer's Report of the

Daily Collections & Deposits,

February 14, 1990.

"H" Voucher No. 401-9002-269 dated

February 14, 1990.

"J" Certification issued by Anita Domingo on

August 18, 1989 that the rental deposits in

the total amount of P222,377.18 has been

deposited with the Court.

In the affidavit of respondent Judge Mijares, which the parties stipulated to constitute her direct
testimony, she stated by way of defense, viz:

"That in 1986, November, upon respondent's assumption as Presiding Judge of Branch 108,
RTC, Pasay City, Anita Domingo, who was OIC, continued her designation and worked as
administrative head of the Branch;

"That as OIC and concurrent property custodian, she was the Chief of all employees and keeper
of all evidence and other valuable properties deposited with the Court;
"That the case of Tengco Homeowners Association was one of the cases then pending in Branch
108, and the case being civil in nature, respondent tried to intervene in the hope that the suit will
end in a compromise agreement;

"That the parties' intended compromise was reflected in the Order of then Judge Manuel
Valenzuela dated February 22, 1984 (Annex "C"); the Order of March 29, 1984 (Annex "D"); the
Order of May 24, 1984 (Annex "E"); the Order of Judge Baltazar Dizon dated February 18, 1986
(Annex "F'); the Order dated March 5, 1987 (Annex "G"); the, Order dated September 3, 1987
(Annex "H"); the Order dated October 11, 1988 (Annex "I"); the order dated October 18, 1988
(Annex "I-1");

"That a copy of the Compromise Agreement (Annex "J") was submitted to this Court on October
18, 1988;

"That on October 27, 1988, the officers and members of the Tengco Homeowners Association
were directed to appear to thresh out whatever problem/s there will be in connection with the
proposed Compromise Agreement (Annex "L");

"That the Tengco Homeowners requested that their money be deposited in Court for immediate
turn-over to Susana Realty the moment the compromise agreement is signed.

"That the pleading of the homeowners was granted and Anita Domingo, as OIC and property
custodian, received their money. Receipts were issued to the members duly signed by Anita
Domingo (Annex "K", "K-1" up to "K-4"), and as in all other courts, she kept the money in the
cabinet/safe where she keeps the evidence and other properties of the Branch;

"That on February 14, 1990, Atty. Antonio Rosales submitted a Manifestation Motion (Annex
"M"), but by midday of February 14, 1990, the Court was informed confidentially by one of the
Homeowners that the negotiation failed;

"That on the same day, February 14, 1990, this respondent, also Presiding Judge of Branch 108,
directed Anita Domingo to turn-over the money of the homeowners to the Clerk of Court;

"That on the same day, February 14, 1990, after she counted the money entrusted to her by the
homeowners, Anita Domingo told respondent that there were salary checks included with the
cash;

"That respondent told Anita Domingo that the solution is to have one check delivered to the
Clerk of Court, and respondent issued one check for the amount of P222,377.18 dated February
14, 1990;

"That Anita Domingo delivered respondent's check to the OCC on the same date in exchange for
the cash and check, which circumstance account for the issuance of the voucher, and the
preparation of the Official Receipt (OR) in the name of Tengco Homeowners' Association, and
the Official Receipt (OR) is dated February 14, 1990 (Annex "N");"
Supplementing her affidavit, Judge Mijares testified that she first issued her personal check for
the P222,377.18, but since it was not accepted by the Clerk of Court Mrs. Lucia Villamater, a
social worker in her staff and her liaison with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Libertad
Branch, ran to the bank and purchased a manager's check with the Judge's personal check. It was
this manager's check that was used to cover the P222,377.18.

Lucia Villamater corroborated Judge Mijares.

The parties further stipulated on the truth of the contents of the affidavit of Isabel Gabriel, a
member of the Tengco Homeowners Association, that during the negotiations for the amicable
settlement of the consignation case, they requested that they be allowed to deposit the rentals due
from them with the court presided over by the respondent Judge and that Anita Domingo had
since been receiving their deposits.

By way of rebuttal, Anita Domingo deposed that Judge Mijares' order for her to accept the
subject rental deposits was verbal and never reduced into writing; that she never kept the rental
deposits in her safety cabinet because that was not intended for money but only for evidence
such as titles, guns and other, documents; that she never changed any salary checks of her co-
employees as she did not keep cash from any source, whether "in trust" or otherwise; and that
she never delivered Judge Mijares' personal check for P222,377.18 to the office, of the Clerk of
Court but the said check passed through her when their cashier, Mrs. Marina Garcia, returned it
because they do not accept a personal check and, besides, the Clerk of Court was demanding
payment of the commission due on the rental deposits, plus legal research fees, which deposits
she had all turned over to Judge Mijares on the very same days that she had received them.

But on sur-rebuttal, Felicisima Gatdula, a court stenographer of Judge Mijares, insisted that
Anita Domingo presumably kept the rental deposits in her safety cabinet and that she had never
seen Anita giving the rentals to Judge Mijares. 7

On the basis of the foregoing, Justice Valdez did not find credence in respondent's evidence that
she did not take possession of the rental deposits and used them for her personal benefit. He
pertinently pointed out the following:

1. There was a "marked variance" between respondent's comment and rejoinder on one hand, and
her affidavit which served as her direct testimony during cross-examination, on the other. In the
former, respondent denied any involvement in the rentals deposited by the Tengco Homeowners
Association with Anita Domingo. Particularly in her rejoinder, respondent stated that "she never
had the chance to order Anita Domingo to receive or issue receipt for the deposits made by the
members of Tengco Homeowners." However, in her affidavit and during her cross-examination,
respondent admitted that she ordered Domingo to receive and issue receipts for said rental
deposits. Further in her affidavit, respondent disclosed that it was her personal check for
P222,377.18, representing the accumulated rental deposits, that was first transmitted to the Clerk
of Court and when it was refused, respondent had it replaced with a manager's check; 8 . It was
highly irregular for respondent to have issued her own check for the rental deposits. Assuming
arguendo that salary checks of the other court employees got mixed with the deposits, respondent
should have issued her check only for the amount of said salary checks; 9

3. The safety cabinets provided the Branch Clerks of Court are meant for exhibits and other
important documents and are not fit for keeping cash, especially big sums of money. 10

4. There was no justification for respondent in not requiring the Clerk of Court to collect the
rental deposits and in allowing instead her OIC Branch Clerk of Court to make the collection.
She explained that if the rentals were deposited with the Clerk of Court, who would in turn
deposit them with the City. Treasurer, it would take 21 signatures to have the deposits withdrawn
in the event a settlement would be reached by the parties who were then in the process of
negotiation. However, her motive cannot be rationalized in the face of the strict requirement of a
Supreme Court Circular relative to the optimum protection of deposits which are fiduciary funds.

We quote the relevant portion of Justice Valdez's conclusions on the matter:

Truly, except for the testimony of Anita Domingo, there is no direct and hard evidence that
Judge Mijares got and made personal use of the rental deposits before they were turned over to
the Clerk of Court. However, the proofs on hand produce a moral certainty that she did so. For
why did she issue her personal check for the deposits? Her explanation that that was the solution
she had thought of when Anita Domingo disclosed that there were salary checks of her co-
employees that were included in the cash deposits in her possession, won't wash for if that were
the situation she (Judge Mijares) could have issued her check only for the amount of the salary
checks. After all, Lucia Villamater, her social worker, bank liaison and witness, testified that
Anita Domingo encashed the salary checks of her co-employees but once and that could have
amounted to only about P15,000.00 to P20,000.00, or, the salary checks could have easily been
encashed with the drawee bank, instead of Villamater buying a manager's check for P222,377.18,
the aggregate amount of the rental deposits. Besides, the so-called safety cabinets provided the
Branch Clerks of Court are not really fit for keeping cash, especially such big sums as hundreds
of thousands of pesos; these cabinets are meant only for exhibits and other important papers and
documents. So, it is more likely that Anita Domingo had really been turning over her collections
to Judge Mijares, following the latter's instruction. Then, too, Judge Mijares' initial false claim
that "she never had the chance to order Anita Domingo to receive or issue receipt for the
deposits," can not but bring to light her lack of sincerity to tell the truth, if not an insidious ploy
to conceal her hand that had been in the cookie jar. Had not the complainant been able to track
down her manager's check, in all probability she would have forever kept mum about the matter.

In other words, the alleged bias of Anita Domingo, assuming it to be true, can not alter the fact
that it was the manager's check which Judge Mijares caused to be bought with her own personal
check that was turned over to the Clerk of Court instead of the cash rental deposits. Where had
the cash been all along? Why did she have to buy the manager's check with her own personal
check? 11

In any case, Justice Valdez opined that respondent violated certain circulars of this Court
specifically, Circular No. 9 dated March 29, 1977 and Circular No. 5 dated November 25, 1982:

What is more, under Supreme Court Circular No. 9, dated March 29, 1977, it is the Clerk of
Court who has been constituted as cashier and disbursing officer; and as such, he/she receives by
himself/herself, or through a duly appointed cashier, deposits, fines, and dues. Judge Mijares
violated Circular No. 9 in ordering Anita Domingo, who was then merely her Branch Clerk of
Court OIC, to collect and receipt for the rental deposits. She tried to cover this up by not
reducing her order into writing although the case was for consignation.

Also, before the revocation of Circular No. 5 dated November 25, 1982 by Circular No. 13-92
dated March 1, 1992, all collections of funds of fiduciary character, including rental deposits,
were to be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof by the Clerk of Court concerned with the
City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his/her Court is located. There was, therefore no
justification for Judge Mijares in not ordering the Clerk of Court to do the collection and in
allowing instead her OIC Branch Clerk of Court to collect and, worse, keep the rental deposits in
her safety cabinet, if this is true, for such a long period of time from 1986 or 1987 to February
14, 1990. She offered the explanation that the parties were then in the thick of negotiations for an
amicable settlement and if the rentals were deposited with the Clerk of Court who would, in turn,
deposit them with the City Treasurer, it would take 21 signatures to have the deposits withdrawn
in the event that settlement was reached; and so to help the parties cut the red tape, she ordered
her OIC Branch Clerk of Court to accept and keep the rental deposits. But the explanation flies in
the face of the rationale behind the Supreme Court Circular which was to provide the optimum
protection to the integrity of the deposits as fiduciary funds. 12

We affirm the above findings of Justice Valdez which, after an exhausting review, we find to be
amply supported by the evidence on record. However, we take note of Justice Valdez's own
admission that "except for the testimony of Anita Domingo, there is no direct and hard evidence
that Judge Mijares got and made personal use of the rental deposits before they were turned over
to the Clerk of Court." 13 Despite the foregoing statement, his conclusion that respondent
deposited the rentals in her private bank account and kept for herself the interests earned is
based, nonetheless, on circumstantial evidence. In Dia-Añonuevo v. Bercallo, 14 we made a
pronouncement that:

While the court does not make a categorical finding that respondent made use of the money
deposited with him, nonetheless, We hold that by his actuations, respondent placed his honesty
and integrity under serious doubt

and consequently penalized the erring judge.

In addition, we find Anita Domingo to have been remiss in her duties as acting Branch Clerk of
Court. She should have strictly adhered to the clear and mandatory procedure provided under
Circular No. 5 (before it was replaced by Circular No. 13-92) regarding the collection and
deposit of rentals with the court. Being a responsible officer of the court she should not have
been swayed to do otherwise.

II

Relative to Special Proceedings No. 3946 involving a petition for correction of entry in the birth
record of her grandson, respondent claims that she was not disqualified under Section 1, Rule
137 of the Rules of Court from taking cognizance of and deciding said case ratiocinating that: (a)
she, her daughter, son-in-law and grandson do not have pecuniary interest in the case; (b) the
case was not controversial in nature and; (c) with respect to respondent's dispensing with the
requirement of publication of the petition which would have cost P4,000.000 to P6,000.00, the
amount was "unnecessary expense on the part of the petitioner that will not inure to the benefit of
the government, anyway." 15

Respondent's conduct is inexcusable.

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court Provides:

SEC. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge, may, in the exercise of his sound, discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Respondent is clearly disqualified from trying the case under aforequoted section and also under
Rule 3.12 (d), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 16 Being related within the sixth degree
of consanguinity to one of the parties (petitioner) in Special Proceedings No. 9346, it was
mandatory for respondent to have inhibited herself from hearing the case. While respondent or
her daughter may not have pecuniary interest in the case as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise,
which is her contention for her exculpation, what is violated in Section 1 of Rule 137 was her
taking cognizance of the case despite her relationship to a party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity.

Apart from the rules already cited, respondent violated Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of Code of Judicial
Conduct which states that: "A Judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge."

In Garcia v. De La Peña, 17 we expounded on the rationable behind the rule on compulsory

disqualification of judges in this wise:

The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case,
the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity
rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and
as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially
sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide
it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the
people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.

Respondent contends that the petition for correction of entry of the birth record of her grandson
does not involve controversial matters such as those relating to civil status, citizenship or
nationality, but merely pertain to innocuous or clerical errors and, therefore, the correction can
be done through summary proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code 18 in relation to Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.

Even on the assumption that the petition for correction of entry of respondent's grandson is not
controversial in nature, this does not detract from the fact that she cannot be free from bias or
partiality in resolving the case by reason of her close blood relationship to him. In fact, bias was
clearly demonstrated when she waived the requirement of publication of the petition on the
dubious ground of enabling the parents of the minor (her daughter and son-in-law) to save the
publication fee as they were then just "starting to have a family."

In any case, notice and publication of the hearing of the petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandatory and cannot be waived, particularly Sections 3, 4 and 5 thereof:

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claimed any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place of the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the person named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Even if the proceedings contemplated in Rule 108 are not controversial in nature, they are still
essentially adversarial, hence, the need of notice and publication of the hearing. As the Court in
Republic v. Valencia 19 elucidated:

The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the Civil Registry is to
ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein. Under our system of administering justice,
truth is best ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary system.

Being properly an adversary proceeding, respondent's flawed logic that her relationship to the
petitioner does not disqualify her from deciding the case because there are no opposing parties is
untenable.

Respondent has neither the authority nor the discretion to dispense with the publication of the
notice of hearing of the petition as provided in the aforequoted Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. Respondent knows or ought to know that said requisite is mandatory, without which
the court acquires no jurisdiction over the case. How the case was raffled to the sala of
respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City when the petition should have been filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, where the civil registry involved is located is baffling
enough. But for the respondent to waive with the required publication to enable the parents of the
minor "who are just starting to have a family" to save the publication fee does not speak well of
respondent's grasp of the law. We agree with Justice Valdez in his observation that:

The relationship could account for the alacrity of Judge Mijares in favorably acting on the
petition although the civil registrar was not impleaded who, in this case, should have been the
Civil Registrar of Manila since the minor Joshua Anthony M. Gurango, whose birth certificate
was sought to be corrected, was born and registered in Manila, and although the petition was
erroneously filed with her court as it should have filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 108 which directs that such a petition shall be filed "with the Court
of First Instance (now RTC) of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located."
The relationship furthermore led her to dispense with the publication requirement, which is
jurisdictional, just to enable the parents of the minor (her daughter and son-in-law), "who are just
starting to have a family" to save the publication fee of P4,000.00 to P6,000.00. Any of these
flaws should have, instead, caused the outright dismissal of the petition.

"The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party
and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the
proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for
lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter." 20

The Court, once again, earnestly reminds judges to be extra prudent and circumspect in the
performance of their duties for "(a) judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to
know the factual basis of the complaint and the very law he is supposed to apply to a given
controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. Party litigants will have greater faith in the administration of justice if judges
are not cursorily excused of apparent deficiency in the analysis of the facts of the case and in the
grasp of the legal principles. For service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research
on the law from beginning to end (Roa vs. Imbing, 231 SCRA 58 [1994]; Wingarts vs. Mejia,
242 SCRA 436 [1995]). A member of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal
and jurisprudential developments because the learning process in law never ceases."21

III

Alleging that Quezon City is respondent's actual residence, complainant accused respondent of
falsely declaring her residence (in the latter's petition for declaration of presumptive death of her
husband Primitivo Mijares) to be at No. 2247 Coral St., San Andres Bukid, Manila, in order,
allegedly, to lay the venue over said petition in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, instead of
Quezon City.

Complainant's charge has not been sufficiently substantiated. We find adequate respondent's
testimony that it was at this address that her husband Primitivo Mijares resided and this was
where respondent and her husband established their family residence after getting married and
before the latter's unfortunate disappearance.

IV

Finally, we find to be similarly baseless complainant's last charge that respondent falsely stated
in her application for marriage license (with herein complainant) filed on 20 December 1993 that
her residence was at No. 869 Pestañas St., Pasay City. We adopt in toto the findings of Justice
Valdez, thus:

On the other hand, when she testified, Judge Mijares maintained that she has three places of
residence, to wit: No. 869 Pestañas St., Pasay City, the house of the older sister of her mother,
where she had resided for more than 20 years since graduation from high school in 1953; and
No. 72, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, where she migrated. But she went to Pasay City in
November 1986, when she assumed office as RTC Judge in the City. She also considered No.
2447 Coral Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila, as her third place of residence because it was the
residence of her husband, Primitivo Mijares, and he brought her there. However, in 1990, when
she filed her petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of her husband, she was no
longer residing there. In fact, the place has already been demolished but before that, Teresita
Arceo, a member of her (Judge Mijares') staff when she was yet a Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, had also resided there.

Through Wilfredo Rejano, chairman of Barangay 69, Zone 09, which encompasses Pestañas
Street in Pasay City, the complainant endeavored to show that No. 869 Pestañas Street and, for
that matter, No. 185 T. Pestañas Street, are non-existent.

However, Virginia Pestañas-Victa belied the claim of Rejano. She said that T. Pestañas St.,
Pasay City, was named after her grandfather Tomas Pestañas, the father of her father. She was
born on October 20, 1928 at No. 185 T. Pestañas, as indicated in her marriage contract dated
October 30, 1955. Her oldest son Virgilio Pestañas, was born there. Her mother Emilia de Villa
Pestañas, and her sister, Victoria Pestañas, likewise lived them. Subsequently, the place was re-
numbered 163 T. Pestañas, then 169 T. Pestañas , but that she had mistakenly told Judge Mijares
that the number is 869 T. Pestañas. So, that explain why Judge Mijares indicated No. 869
Pestañas Street, Pasay City, as her residence both in her application for a marriage license and in
her marriage contract with the complainant.

As between Wilfredo Rejano, who claimed that there is no such address as No. 869 or No. 185 T.
Pestañas Street, Pasay City, and Virginia Pestañas, who declared that there had been No. 185 T.
Pestañas Street but subsequently re-numbered No. 163 and, presently, 169 T. Pestañas Street;
and that No. 869 T. Pestañas Street was just her honest mistake, the undersigned readily gives
credence to the latter. The former was only 31 years old when he testified on January 8, 1997, so
he must have been born in 1966, and could not be familiar with the full history of Pestañas
Street, Pasay City. On the other hand, the latter was 68 years old and was born at 185 T. Pestañas
Street on October 20, 1928, an address which she maintained up to her marriage on October 30,
1955, and even thereafter. She claimed, without contradiction, that the street was named after her
grandfather, Tomas Pestañas, and that Judge Mijares, her niece, used to live with them there.

The falsities attributed to Judge Mijares in these charges have not, therefore, been substantiated.
The complainant has not refuted her assertion that she considered Manila as her residence at one
time because that was where her husband established their family residence. She treats Pasay
City and Quezon City as her present places of residence since the former is where she has been
working up to now as a judge and where she had lived when still a student, and the latter is
where she goes home after her work. In this connection, in distinguishing domicile from
residence, it has been held that, "It is . . . quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
different residence in various places." So, she could have acted in utmost good faith in filing her
petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of her husband with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for it was in Manila where her husband established their conjugal residence.
After her husband was declared presumptively dead, she could no longer consider Manila as a
place of residence; hence, when she applied for a marriage license to marry the complainant, she
filed it with Pasay City where she works and which she presently treats as a place of residence
aside from Quezon City. 22

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of grave misconduct
and resolves that:

(1) Under the first charge, respondent Judge Priscilla C. Mijares is hereby FINED in the amount
of P20,000.00.

(2) Under the second charge, respondent Judge Mijares is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for
violating Section 1, Rule 137 of Rules of Court.

(3) Respondent Judge is further WARNED that the commission of the, same or a similar offense
shall be dealt with more, severely.

Further, the OCA is instructed to institute appropriate administrative charges against Anita
Domingo, former Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 108.

SO ORDERED.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.

G.R. No. 132922 | 1998-04-21

Tagged under keywords

View Summary

Discussions citing this case or law are available.

Locus Standi, Standing jus tertii
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Concepts; Judicial Review

DECISION

MENDOZA, J:

In Osmeña v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 132231, decided March 31, 1998, 1 we upheld the validity of §11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646 which prohibits the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads, except to
the Commission on Elections under §90, of B.P. No. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, with respect to
print media, and §92, with respect to broadcast media. In the present case, we consider the validity of
§92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 against claims that the requirement that radio and television time be given free
takes property without due process of law; that it violates the eminent domain clause of the
Constitution which provides for the payment of just compensation; that it denies broadcast media the
equal protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates the terms of the franchise of petitioner
GMA Network, Inc.

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of

lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and
registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting
stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress.

Petitioners challenge the validity of §92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of
law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise
or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the period of election.

The Question of Standing

At the threshold of this suit is the question of standing of petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP). As already noted, its members assert an interest as lawyers
of radio and television broadcasting companies and as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters.

In those cases 2 in which citizens were authorized to sue, this Court upheld their standing in view of the
"transcendental importance" of the constitutional question raised which justified the granting of relief.
In contrast, in the case at bar, as will presently be shown, petitioners' substantive claim is without merit.
To the extent, therefore, that a party's standing is determined by the substantive merit of his case or a
preliminary estimate thereof, petitioner TELEBAP must be held to be without standing. Indeed, a citizen
will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
3 Members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of
§92 of B.P. Blg. 881.

Nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as registered voters since this case does not
concern their right of suffrage. Their interest in §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 should be precisely in upholding its
validity.

Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. 4 A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he
has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute.

Nor indeed as a corporate entity does TELEBAP have standing to assert the rights of radio and television
broadcasting companies. Standing jus tertii will be recognized only if it can be shown that the party
suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the third party cannot assert his
constitutional right, or that the right of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court is allowed
to espouse the third party's constitutional claim. None of these circumstances is here present. The mere
fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this
suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies.

Nevertheless, we have decided to take this case since the other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears
to have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and
television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881
requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use
of candidates for campaign and other political purposes.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to
suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioner's allegation that it will suffer
losses again because it is required to provide free air time is sufficient to give it standing to question the
validity of §92. 5

Airing of COMELEC Time, a Reasonable Condition for Grant of Petitioner's Franchise

As pointed out in our decision in Osmeña v. COMELEC , §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 and §90 and §92 of B.P.
Blg. 881 are part and parcel of a regulatory scheme designed to equalize the opportunity of candidates
in an election in regard to the use of mass media for political campaigns. These statutory provisions
state in relevant parts:

R.A. No. 6646

SEC. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. - In addition to the forms of election propaganda
prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or any person
making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or
other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a
candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the
campaign period.

B.P. Blg. 881, (Omnibus Election Code)

SEC. 90. Comelec space. - The Commission shall procure space in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That
in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine
or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space"
wherein candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated,
free of charge, equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates
within the area in which the newspaper is circulated. (Sec. 45. 1978 EC).

SEC. 92. Comelec time. - The Commission shall procure radio and television time to
be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially
among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television
stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television
stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of
charge, during the period of the campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC)

Thus, the law prohibits mass media from selling or donating print space and air time to the candidates
and requires the COMELEC instead to procure print space and air time for allocation to the candidates. It
will be noted that while §90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the COMELEC to procure print space which, as we
have held, should be paid for, §92 states that air time shall be procured by the COMELEC free of charge.

Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process clause 6 and the eminent domain
provision 7 of the Constitution by taking air time from radio and television broadcasting stations without
payment of just compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and
television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free
air time is to authorize a taking which is not "a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use
of private property." According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost P22,498,560.00 in
providing free air time of one (1) hour every morning from Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on
Tuesdays and Thursdays from 7:00 to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in this year's elections, it stands to
lose P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC's requirement that radio and television stations provide at
least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC Time. 8

Petitioners' argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is
licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject,
among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that
"any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
Congress when the common good so requires." 10

The idea that broadcast stations may be required to provide COMELEC Time free of charge is not new. It
goes back to the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388), which provided:

SEC. 49. Regulation of election propaganda through mass media. - (a) The franchises of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to require each such station to furnish
free of charge, upon request of the Commission [on Elections], during the period of sixty days before the
election not more than fifteen minutes of prime time once a week which shall be known as "Comelec
Time" and which shall be used exclusively by the Commission to disseminate vital election information.
Said "Comelec Time" shall be considered as part of the public service time said stations are required to
furnish the Government for the dissemination of public information and education under their
respective franchises or permits.

This provision was carried over with slight modification by the 1978 Election Code (P.D. No. 1296), which
provided:

SEC. 46. COMELEC Time. - The Commission [on Elections] shall procure radio and television time to be
known as "COMELEC Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within
the area of coverage of said radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchises of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to require such stations to furnish the
Commission radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign, at least once but
not oftener than every other day.

Substantially the same provision is now embodied in §92 of B.P. Blg. 881.

Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and
television broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been
thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the Constitution authorizes the
amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the
common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the
public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 11
Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give
free air time. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government
controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention
to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be
required to give free air time to candidates in an election. 12 Thus, Professor Cass R. Sunstein of the
University of Chicago Law School, in urging reforms in regulations affecting the broadcast industry,
writes:

Elections. We could do a lot to improve coverage of electoral campaigns. Most important, government
should ensure free media time for candidates. Almost all European nations make such provision; the
United States does not. Perhaps government should pay for such time on its own. Perhaps broadcasters
should have to offer it as a condition for receiving a license. Perhaps a commitment to provide free time
would count in favor of the grant of a license in the first instance. Steps of this sort would
simultaneously promote attention to public affairs and greater diversity of view. They would also help
overcome the distorting effects of "soundbites" and the corrosive financial pressures faced by
candidates in seeking time on the media. 13

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely
given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public
service. Thus, in De Villata v. Stanley, 14 a regulation requiring interisland vessels licensed to engage in
the interisland trade to carry mail and, for this purpose, to give advance notice to postal authorities of
date and hour of sailings of vessels and of changes of sailing hours to enable them to tender mail for
transportation at the last practicable hour prior to the vessel's departure, was held to be a reasonable
condition for the state grant of license. Although the question of compensation for the carriage of mail
was not in issue, the Court strongly implied that such service could be without compensation, as in fact
under Spanish sovereignty the mail was carried free. 15

In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. NTC , 16 the Court ordered the PLDT to allow the
interconnection of its domestic telephone system with the international gateway facility of Eastern
Telecom. The Court cited (1) the provisions of the legislative franchise allowing such interconnection; (2)
the absence of any physical, technical, or economic basis for restricting the linking up of two separate
telephone systems; and (3) the possibility of increase in the volume of international traffic and more
efficient service, at more moderate cost, as a result of interconnection.
Similarly, in the earlier case of PLDT v. NTC , 17 it was held:

Such regulation of the use and ownership of telecommunications systems is in the exercise of the
plenary police power of the State for the promotion of the general welfare. The 1987 Constitution
recognizes the existence of that power when it provides:

"Sec. 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises,
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good
so demands" (Article XII).

The interconnection which has been required of PLDT is a form of "intervention" with property rights
dictated by "the objective of government to promote the rapid expansion of telecommunications
services in all areas of the Philippines, . . . to maximize the use of telecommunications facilities available,
. . . in recognition of the vital role of communications in nation building . . . and to ensure that all users
of the public telecommunications service have access to all other users of the service wherever they
may be within the Philippines at an acceptable standard of service and at reasonable cost" (DOTC
Circular No. 90-248). Undoubtedly, the encompassing objective is the common good. The NTC, as the
regulatory agency of the State, merely exercised its delegated authority to regulate the use of
telecommunications networks when it decreed interconnection.

In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio and
television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations.
18 It would be strange if it cannot even require the licensees to render public service by giving free air
time.

Considerable effort is made in the dissent of Mr. Justice Panganiban to show that the production of
television programs involves large expenditure and requires the use of equipment for which huge
investments have to be made. The dissent cites the claim of GMA Network that the grant of free air time
to the COMELEC for the duration of the 1998 campaign period would cost the company P52,380,000,
representing revenue it would otherwise earn if the air time were sold to advertisers, and the amount of
P6,600,850, representing the cost of producing a program for the COMELEC Time, or the total amount of
P58,980,850.

The claim that petitioner would be losing P52,380,000 in unrealized revenue from advertising is based
on the assumption that air time is "finished product" which, it is said, become the property of the
company, like oil produced from refining or similar natural resources after undergoing a process for their
production. But air time is not owned by broadcast companies. As held in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F
.C .C ., 19 which upheld the right of a party personally attacked to reply, "licenses to broadcast do not
confer ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary privilege of using them."
Consequently, "a license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one
who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is
nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his
frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those
views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity,
be barred from the airwaves." 20 As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no
private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

Justice Panganiban's dissent quotes from Tolentino on the Civil Code which says that "the air lanes
themselves 'are not property because they cannot be appropriated for the benefit of any individual.'" (p.
5) That means neither the State nor the stations own the air lanes. Yet the dissent also says that "The
franchise holders can recover their huge investments only by selling air time to advertisers." (p. 13) If air
lanes cannot be appropriated, how can they be used to produce air time which the franchise holders can
sell to recover their investment? There is a contradiction here.

As to the additional amount of P6,600,850, it is claimed that this is the cost of producing a program and
it is for such items as "sets and props," "video tapes," "miscellaneous (other rental, supplies,
transportation, etc.)," and "technical facilities (technical crew such as director and cameraman as well as
'on air plugs')." There is no basis for this claim. Expenses for these items will be for the account of the
candidates. COMELEC Resolution No. 2983, §6(d) specifically provides in this connection:

(d) Additional services such as tape-recording or video-taping of programs, the preparation of visual
aids, terms and condition thereof, and the consideration to be paid therefor may be arranged by the
candidates with the radio/television station concerned. However, no radio/television station shall make
any discrimination among candidates relative to charges, terms, practices or facilities for in connection
with the services rendered.
It is unfortunate that in the effort to show that there is taking of private property worth millions of
pesos, the unsubstantiated charge is made that by its decision the Court permits the "grand larceny of
precious time," and allows itself to become "the people's unwitting oppressor." The charge is really
unfortunate. In Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 21 Justice Holmes was so incensed by the resistance of
property owners to the erection of party walls that he was led to say in his original draft, "a statute,
which embodies the community's understanding of the reciprocal rights and duties of neighboring
landowners, does not need to invoke the petty larceny of the police power in its justification." Holmes's
brethren corrected his taste, and Holmes had to amend the passage so that in the end it spoke only of
invoking "the police power." 22 Justice Holmes spoke of the "petty larceny" of the police power. Now
we are being told of the "grand larceny [by means of the police power] of precious air time."

Giving Free Air Time a Duty Assumed by Petitioner

Petitioners claim that §92 is an invalid amendment of R.A. No. 7252 which granted GMA Network, Inc. a
franchise for the operation of radio and television broadcasting stations. They argue that although §5 of
R.A. No. 7252 gives the government the power to temporarily use and operate the stations of petitioner
GMA Network or to authorize such use and operation, the exercise of this right must be compensated.

The cited provision of R.A. No. 7252 states:

SEC. 5. Right of Government. - A special right is hereby reserved to the President of the Philippines, in
times of rebellion, public peril, calamity, emergency, disaster or disturbance of peace and order, to
temporarily take over and operate the stations of the grantee, to temporarily suspend the operation of
any station in the interest of public safety, security and public welfare, or to authorize the temporary
use and operation thereof by any agency of the Government, upon due compensation to the grantee,
for the use of said stations during the period when they shall be so operated.

The basic flaw in petitioner's argument is that it assumes that the provision for COMELEC Time
constitutes the use and operation of the stations of the GMA Network, Inc. This is not so. Under §92 of
B.P. Blg. 881, the COMELEC does not take over the operation of radio and television stations but only
the allocation of air time to the candidates for the purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal
opportunity, time, and the right to reply as mandated by the Constitution. 23
Indeed, it is wrong to claim an amendment of petitioner's franchise for the reason that B.P. Blg. 881,
which is said to have amended R.A. No. 7252, actually antedated it. 24 The provision of §92 of B.P. Blg.
881 must be deemed instead to be incorporated in R.A. No. 7252. And, indeed, §4 of the latter statute
does.

For the fact is that the duty imposed on the GMA Network, Inc. by its franchise to render "adequate
public service time" implements §92 of B.P. Blg. 881. Undoubtedly, its purpose is to enable the
government to communicate with the people on matters of public interest. Thus, R.A. No. 7252
provides:

SEC. 4. Responsibility to the Public. - The grantee shall provide adequate public service time to enable
the Government, through the said broadcasting stations, to reach the population on important public
issues; provide at all times sound and balanced programming; promote public participation such as in
community programming; assist in the functions of public information and education; conform to the
ethics of honest enterprise; and not use its station for the broadcasting of obscene and indecent
language, speech, act or scene, or for the dissemination of deliberately false information or willful
misrepresentation, or to the detriment of the public interest, or to incite, encourage, or assist in
subversive or treasonable acts. (Emphasis added)

It is noteworthy that §49 of R.A. No. 6388, from which §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 was taken, expressly provided
that the COMELEC Time should "be considered as part of the public service time said stations are
required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of public information and education under
their respective franchises or permits." There is no reason to suppose that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 considers
the COMELEC Time therein provided to be otherwise than as a public service which petitioner is
required to render under §4 of its charter (R.A. No. 7252). In sum, B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an invalid
amendment of petitioner's franchise but the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in
accepting a public grant of privilege.

Thus far, we have confined the discussion to the provision of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 for free air time
without taking into account COMELEC Resolution No. 2983-A, §2 of which states:

SEC. 2. Grant of "Comelec Time". - Every radio broadcasting and television station operating under
franchise shall grant the Commission, upon payment of just compensation, at least thirty (30) minutes of
prime time daily, to be known as "Comelec Time", effective February 10, 1998 for candidates for
President, Vice-President and Senators, and effective March 27, 1998, for candidates for local elective
offices, until May 9, 1998. (Emphasis added)

This is because the amendment providing for the payment of "just compensation" is invalid, being in
contravention of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 that radio and television time given during the period of the
campaign shall be "free of charge." Indeed, Resolution No. 2983 originally provided that the time
allocation shall be "free of charge," just as §92 requires such time to be given "free of charge." The
amendment appears to be a reaction to petitioners' claim in this case that the original provision was
unconstitutional because it allegedly authorized the taking of property without just compensation.

The Solicitor General, relying on the amendment, claims that there should be no more dispute because
the payment of compensation is now provided for. It is basic, however, that an administrative agency
cannot, in the exercise of lawmaking, amend a statute of Congress. Since §2 of Resolution No. 2983-A is
invalid, it cannot be invoked by the parties.

Law Allows Flextime for Programming by Stations, Not Confiscation of Air Time by COMELEC

It is claimed that there is no standard in the law to guide the COMELEC in procuring free air time and
that "theoretically the COMELEC can demand all of the air time of such stations." 25 Petitioners do not
claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2983-A arbitrarily sequesters radio and television time. What they
claim is that because of the breadth of the statutory language, the provision in question is susceptible of
"unbridled, arbitrary and oppressive exercise." 26

The contention has no basis. For one, the COMELEC is required to procure free air time for candidates
"within the area of coverage" of a particular radio or television broadcaster so that it cannot, for
example, procure such time for candidates outside that area. At what time of the day and how much
time the COMELEC may procure will have to be determined by it in relation to the overall objective of
informing the public about the candidates, their qualifications and their programs of government. As
stated in Osmeña v. COMELEC , the COMELEC Time provided for in §92, as well as the COMELEC Space
provided for in §90, is in lieu of paid ads which candidates are prohibited to have under §11(b) of R.A.
No. 6646. Accordingly, this objective must be kept in mind in determining the details of the COMELEC
Time as well as those of the COMELEC Space.
There would indeed be objection to the grant of power to the COMELEC if §92 were so detailed as to
leave no room for accommodation of the demands of radio and television programming. For were that
the case, there could be an intrusion into the editorial prerogatives of radio and television stations.

Differential Treatment of Broadcast Media Justified

Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air
time. They contend that newspapers and magazines are not similarly required as, in fact, in Philippine
Press Institute v. COMELEC 27 we upheld their right to the payment of just compensation for the print
space they may provide under §90.

The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the same
treatment under the free speech guarantee of the Constitution as the print media. There are important
differences in the characteristics of the two media, however, which justify their differential treatment
for free speech purposes. Because of the physical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the
government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them. There is no
similar justification for government allocation and regulation of the print media. 28

In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be imposed on the grantees or
licensees. The reason for this is that, as already noted, the government spends public funds for the
allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print media.
To require the radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a
fair exchange for what the industry gets.

From another point of view, this Court has also held that because of the unique and pervasive influence
of the broadcast media, "[n]ecessarily . . . the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat
lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media." 29

The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos.
Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of
municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses
who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like
food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming
universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners
including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set.
The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying
susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions
to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant
speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser
opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance. 30

Petitioners' assertion therefore that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 denies them the equal protection of the law has
no basis. In addition, their plea that §92 (free air time) and §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on paid political
ads) should be invalidated would pave the way for a return to the old regime where moneyed
candidates could monopolize media advertising to the disadvantage of candidates with less resources.
That is what Congress tried to reform in 1987 with the enactment of R.A. No. 6646. We are not free to
set aside the judgment of Congress, especially in light of the recent failure of interested parties to have
the law repealed or at least modified.

Requirement of COMELEC Time, a Reasonable Exercise of the State's Power to Regulate Use of
Franchises

Finally, it is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of
the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit. In the first place, what the COMELEC is
authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, 31 among other things, is the use
by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC)
prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of
supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for
petitioners to contend that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. This may have
force if the object of the power were the same.

In the second place, the prohibition in §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is only half of the regulatory provision in
the statute. The other half is the mandate to the COMELEC to procure print space and air time for
allocation to candidates. As we said in Osmeña v. COMELEC .
The term political "ad ban," when used to describe §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading, for even as
§11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates, it mandates the
COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. There is no
suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the time and manner of advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . What is involved here is simply regulation of this nature. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise
freely in the mass media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC of print space and air time to
give all candidates equal time and space for the purpose of ensuring "free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections."

With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC
Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and
program of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of
broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the government would clearly deprive the people
of their right to know. Art. III, §7 of the Constitution provides that "the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized," while Art. XII, §6 states that "the use of
property bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is]
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good
so demands."

To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it
that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast
media are not mere common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees
charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political
issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity
of §92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of public concern.
The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's duty to intervene for the
common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever
altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Ramon A. Gonzales vs. Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, et al

G.R. No. 140835 | 2000-08-14

Tagged under keywords

View Summary

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, petition
Ramon A Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
(PCCR) and of the positions of president consultants, advisers and assistant. Petitioner
asks this Court to enjoin the PPCR and the presidential consultant, advisers and
assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora
from enforcing their advice and recommendations in additional, petitioners seeks to
enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and
the presidential consultant, advisers and assistant. Finally, petitioner prays for an order
compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain
matters.

On January 28, 2000, respondents Hon. Andres R. Narvaca, impleaded in his capacity
as Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the Petition. The rest of the
respondents, who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor General, filed their
Comment with this Court on March 7, 2000. Petitioner then filed a Consolidated Reply
on April 24, 2000., whereupon this case was considered submitted for decision.

I. Preparatory Commission on Constitution Reform

The Preparatory Commission on Constitution Reform (PCCR) was created by President

Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E. O. No. 43) in
order "to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987
Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same". Petitioner dispute the
constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contents that it is a public office
which only the legislature can create by way of a law. Secondly, petitioner asserts that
by creating such a body the President is intervening a process form which he is totally
excluded by the Constitution-the amendment of the fundamental charter.

It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot
and academic. We agree.

An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy

because the issues involved have become academic or dead. Under E.O. No. 43, the
PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30. 1999. however, on
February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which
extended the time frame for the completion of the commission's work, viz.-
SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

TIME frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and
complete the same on or before 31 December 1999. The Commission shall submit its
report and recommendations to the President within fifteen (15) working days from 31
December 1999.

The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the Presidents on December 20, 1999 and
was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds
allotted to it. Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison d'etre.
Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to
resolve.

The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of
granting the relief prayed for the petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks his Court to
enjoin the PCCR from acting as such. Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy
since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that
prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is a already
fait accompli. At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature
of an advisory opinion, which us definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial
power.

The question in standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 43 and
70, petitioner asserts his interest as citizen and taxpayer. A citizen acquires standing
only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by favorable action. In
Kilosbayan. Incorporated v. Morato, we denied standing to petitioners who were
assailing a lease agreement between the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes Office and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation, stating that,

....In Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept.
22,1987, standing was denied to a petitioner who sought to declare a form of lottery
known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid because, as the Court held,

Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor
children. But nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim that his rights and privileges
as a lawyer or citizen have been directly and personal injured by the operation of the
Instant Sweepstakes. The interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a
statue must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcements and not merely that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to subjected to some burdens or penalties reason of the statute
complained of.
We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the president
petitioners. Petitioners so not in fact show what particularized interest they have for
bringing this suit. It does nor detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic
leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under
Rule 3, 2.

Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. Of at
all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any "injury" in this case since,
according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature's powers to
create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR.
Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim
that his rights or privilege have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he
shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR's activities.
Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so to enable him to seek
judicial redress as a citizen.

A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is

establish that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or
the Constitution. Thus, a taxpayer's action is properly brought only when there is an
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. This was our ruling in a recent
case wherein petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcasters Attorneys of the
Philippines (TELEBSP) and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of Section 92 of
B.P. No. 881 ( otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code") requiring radio and
television stations to give free air time to the Commission of Elections during the
campaign period. The Court held that petitioners TELEBAP did not have any interest as
a taxpayer since the assailed law did not involved the taxing or spending power of
Congress.

Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to taxpayers upon
whether or not the case involved a disbursement of public funds by the legislative. In
Sanidad v. Commissions on Election, the petitioners therein were allowed to bring a
taxpayers' suit to question several president decrees promulgated by the President
Marcos in his legislative capacity calling for a national referendum, with the Court
explaining that-

...[i]t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statue Presidential Decrees are of
such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of
public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by
an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds. The breadth of Presidential Decree No.991 carries an
appropriation pf Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purpose.
President Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its
provisions. The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful
expenditure of personality to litigate the validity of the Decree appropriating said
funds....

In still another case, the Court held that petitioners-the Philippines Constitution
Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization-had standing as taxpayers to question
the constitution the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as it provides for
retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leaves to Senators and
Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of Congress. And in Pascual
v. Secretary of Public Works, the Court allowed petitioner maintain a taxpayer's suit
assailing the constitutional soundness of Republic Act No. 920 appropriating P85, 000
for the construction, repair and improvement pf feeder reads within private property.
All these cases involved the disbursement of public funds by means of a law.

Meanwhile, in Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, the Court

declared that the trial court was wrong in allowing respondent Ravanzo to bring an
action for injunction in his capacity as a taxpayer in order to question the legality of the
contract of lease covering the public market entered into between the City of Dagupan
and petitioner. The Court declared that Ravanzo did not possess the requisite standing
to bring such taxpayer's suit since "[o]n its face, and there is no evidence to the
contrary, the lease contract entered into between petitioner and the City shies that no
public funds have been or will be used in the constriction of the market building."

Coming now the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by
virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under Section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the
amount of P3 million is "appropriated" for its operational expenses "to be sourced form
the funds of the Office of the President. The relevant provision states-

The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In
fact, there was no appropriation at all. "In a strict sense, appropriation has been
defined 'as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the
Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury,' while appropriation made by
law refers to 'the act of the legislative setting apart or assigning to a particular use a
certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors'.
The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the
President, in the exercise of the chief Executive's power to transfers funds pursuant to
Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution.

In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide
whether or not will entertain a taxpayer's suit. In the case at bar, there being no
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to
question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather, in the case
and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury show that he is a real party in
interest-that he will stand to be the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does
petitioner presume to make such a representation.

II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants

The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential consultants. Petitioner
alleges that in 1995 and 1996, the President created seventy (70) positions in the
Office of the President and appointed to said positions twenty (20) presidential
consultants, twenty-two(22) presidential advisers, and twenty-eight (28) presidential
assistants. Petitioner asserts that, as in the case of the PCCR, the President does not
have the power to create these positions.
Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does not have
the personality to raise this issue before the Court. First of all, he has not proven that
he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment
of such presidential advisers. Secondly, petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts
so a s to enable the Court to determine if he posses a taxpayer's interest in this
particular issue. Unlike the PCCR which was created by virtue of an executive order,
petitioner does not allege by what official act, whether it be by means of an executive
order, administrative order, memorandum order, or otherwise, the President attempted
to "create" the positions of presidential advisers, consultants and assistants. Thus, it is
unclear what act of the President petitioner is assailing. In support of his allegation,
petitioner merely annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex "C")
listing the names and positions of such presidential consultants, advisers and assistants
to his petition. However, appointment is obviously not synonymous with creation. It
would be improvident for his Court to entertain this issue given the insufficient nature
of the allegations in the Petition.

III. Right to Information

Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive Secretary

Ronaldo B. Zamora to answer his letter (Annex "D") dated October 4, 1999 requesting
for the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of
their appointments,a nd a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau
of Customs and turned over to Malacañang.

The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which provides
that-

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to ooficial acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitaitons as may be
provided by law.

Under both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision which can
be invoked by any citizen before the courts. This was our ruling in Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, wherein the Court classified the right to information as a public
right and "when a [m]andamus proceeding invoves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen and therefore, aprt of the general 'public' which possess the righ." However,
copngress may provide for reasonalbe conditions upon the access to information. Such
limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," which took effect on
March 25, 1999. This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public
officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen
(15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public
documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the
reasonable claims of confidentiality.

Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v.
Dimaano that "[t}he incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no
realistic perception by the public of the naiton's problems, nor a meaningful democratic
decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest.
Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
the times." The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning
"matters of public concern," a term which "embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because there directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen, in the
final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the
matter at issue is of interes or importance, as it relatese to or affects the public."

Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as
Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer petitioner's
concern-that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public
property. with regard to petitioner's request for copies of the appointment papers of
certain officials, respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of
the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of
official business.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is
ordered to furnish petitioner with the information requested.

SO ORDERED.

BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR

VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE
NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents..

G.R. No. 127685 | 1998-07-23

Tagged under keywords

A discussion citing this case or law is available.

Right to Privacy

Separate Opinions

ROMERO, J ., concurring:
What marks off a man from a beast?

Aside from the distinguishing physical characteristics, man is a rational being, one who is endowed with
intellect which allows him to apply reasoned judgment to problems at hand; he has the innate spiritual
faculty which can tell, not only what is right but, as well, what is moral and ethical. Because of his
sensibilities, emotions and feelings, he likewise possesses a sense of shame. In varying degrees as
dictated by diverse cultures, he erects a wall between himself and the outside world wherein he can
retreat in solitude, protecting himself from prying eyes and ears and their extensions, whether from
individuals, or much later, from authoritarian intrusions.

Piercing through the mists of time, we find the original Man and Woman defying the injunction of God
by eating of the forbidden fruit in the Garden. And when their eyes were "opened," forthwith "they
sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons." 1 Down the corridors of time, we find man
fashioning "fig leaves" of sorts or setting up figurative walls, the better to insulate themselves from the
rest of humanity.

Such vague stirrings of the desire "to be left alone," considered "anti-social" by some, led to the
development of the concept of "privacy," unheard of among beasts. Different branches of science, have
made their own studies of this craving of the human spirit - psychological, anthropological, sociological
and philosophical, with the legal finally giving its imprimatur by elevating it to the status of a right,
specifically a private right.

Initially recognized as an aspect of tort law, it created giant waves in legal circles with the publication in
the Harvard Law Review 2 of the trail-blazing article, "The Right to Privacy," by Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis.

Whether viewed as a personal or a property right, it found its way in Philippine Constitutions and
statutes; this, in spite of the fact that Philippine culture can hardly be said to provide a fertile field for
the burgeoning of said right. In fact, our lexicographers have yet to coin a word for it in the Filipino
language. Customs and practices, being what they have always been, Filipinos think it perfectly natural
and in good taste to inquire into each other's intimate affairs.
One has only to sit through a televised talk show to be convinced that what passes for wholesome
entertainment is actually an invasion into one's private life, leaving the interviewee embarrassed and
outraged by turns.

With the overarching influence of common law and the recent advent of the Information Age with its
high-tech devices, the right to privacy has expanded to embrace its public law aspect. The Bill of Rights
of our evolving Charters, a direct transplant from that of the United States, contains in essence facets of
the right to privacy which constitute limitations on the far-reaching powers of government.

So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as Administrative Order No. 308 in making inroads into
the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother looking over our shoulders, that it must, without
delay, be "slain upon sight" before our society turns totalitarian with each of us, a mindless robot.

I, therefore, VOTE for the nullification of A.O. No. 308.

JAVIER A. ARIOSA, complainant, vs. JUDGE CAMILO TAMIN RTC BRANCH 23,
MOLAVE, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-798 | 2000-11-15

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

The administrative matter before us is an incident and offshoot of a sworn letter complaint,[1]
dated 15 January 1992, filed by complainant Javier Ariosa, then Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga Del Sur, charging respondent Judge Camilo Tamin of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Molave, Zamboanga City, Branch 23, with Gross Ignorance of the Law, involving the
dismissal of two informations for libel,[2] on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

In an Order dated 05 December 1991, respondent RTC Judge dismissed Criminal Case No. 91-
10-212 and Criminal Case No. 91-10-213, both for Libel and entitled "People vs. Billy Yu, et
al.," where then Provincial Governor Ariosa stood as complainant, alleging in said Order that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, of which respondent acted as Presiding Judge, had no
jurisdiction over the subject libel cases inasmuch as the crime of libel carries only an imposable
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine of P2,000.00 or both.[3]

Acting on the sworn-letter complaint of then Governor Ariosa, this Court in a Resolution dated
02 June 1992, required respondent judge to file Comment within (10) days from notice.
On 17 August 1992, respondent filed his Comment[4] alleging that the dismissal of the subject
libel cases was proper considering that the Regional Trial Court had "no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the information," invoking the provisions of Article 357 of the Revised Penal
Code.

In a Resolution dated 03 September 1992, this Court ordered the referral of the instant
administrative matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

In a Memorandum dated 04 November 1992, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be
imposed a fine of P5,000.00 for ignorance of the law, which recommendation the Supreme Court
resolved to adopt in an En Banc Resolution[5] dated 19 November 1992, the decretal portion of
which reads:

"Accordingly, the Court resolved to hold respondent Judge Camilo E. Tamin GUILTY of
ignorance of the law and to impose on him a FINE of P5,000.00 with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be
attached to the personal records of respondent judge."

On 11 January 1993, respondent judge filed a Motion for Reconsideration[6] of the En Banc
Resolution, dated 19 November 1992.

In a Manifestation dated 07 December 1992, respondent judge asked "for leave to withdraw the
ill-considered Motion for Reconsideration."

In a Resolution dated 21 January 1993, the Supreme Court En Banc resolved to note the
Manifestation and granted the request of respondent judge to withdraw the Motion for
Reconsideration.

In a Manifestation dated 17 May 2000,[7] respondent judge assailed the En Banc Resolution
dated 19 November 1992 and "submitted that the Supreme Court has no constitutional
jurisdiction over the above-entitled case, and therefore the decision rendered by the High Court
in November 1992, in the above-entitled case is a patent nullity, because the same is contrary to
the provisions of the Constitution and the laws which this Honorable Court has sworn to uphold
and protect."[8]

Likewise in the same Manifestation, respondent judge alleged that "the Office of the Court
Administrator, in directly filing the above-entitled case before this Honorable Court, illegally
usurped the judicial appellate power of review over the judicial work of the court of respondent,
which is clearly against the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 828, and the Constitution."[9]

In its Prayer,[10] respondent judge asked that "the patently null and void decision of this High
Court in the above-entitled case, dated November 19, 1992, which is roughly an equivalent to a
skull offering before the jurisprudential banquet of history, be set aside and ordered removed
from the annals of this Honorable Court."
In an En Banc Resolution, dated 08 August 2000, this Court resolved to note the Manifestation
dated 17 May 2000, and further required respondent Judge Tamin to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with for using intemperate language in said Manifestation.

On 07 September 2000, respondent judge filed his Compliance,[11] alleging therein that he
"wholly acknowledges, deeply regrets and is full of contrition" for having used "intemperate
language in his Manifestation." Respondent judge explained that his Manifestation was written
and prepared by him "in a state of deep depression and despair which darkened his sense of
propriety in dealing with this Honorable Court."

Moreover in said Compliance, respondent judge prayed that the Supreme Court grant amnesty,
"as a gift of benevolence," to all lower court judges found guilty of administrative charges which
"do not involve immorality, dishonesty, and graft and corruption, or any acts which would cause
dishonor and disrepute to the judiciary," "to inaugurate the commencement of the new era of the
highest standard of excellence in the jurisprudential craftsmanship, judicial statesmanship and
wisdom for the Philippine Judiciary in the new century and millenium."

Stripped of rhetoric, we find respondent judge guilty of using intemperate, abrasive and abject
language against the High Court. Certainly, the ill-suited actuation and scabrous language of
respondent judge demand the sternest rebuke from this Court, if we were to preserve the integrity
and hallowed image of the Supreme Court as the bastion of justice and unflappable refuge of the
oppressed. By using such vindictive tone and acrimony in his Manifestation, respondent judge
clearly engaged in an act so undignified, repulsive and unbecoming a man of his stature as a
magistrate of the law and a distinguished member of the Bench.

From the standpoint of conduct and demeanor expected of a judge, resorting to intemperate
language only detracts from the respect due a member of the judiciary and becomes self-
destructive.[12] High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government service where
the personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times.[13] Applying this
aphorism to the solemn realm of the judicial arm of government, it is apt for us to reiterate that
"an overspeaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal."[14]

Notably, by occupying an exalted seat in the judiciary, judges, in effect, undertake to embrace a
profession and lead lives that demand stringent ethical norms. Being in the forefront of the noble
task of dispensing justice, respondent judge should have demonstrated finesse in his choice of
words, as normally expected of men of his stature. Verily, the use of vulgar and curt language -
especially against the Highest Tribunal - does not befit the person of a judge who is viewed by
the public as men and women of wisdom and scruples.[15] To put it differently, a judge should
be temperate[16] in all his dealings - official or otherwise - more so when the subject of
comment and criticism is no less than the Highest Court of the land - the Supreme Court.

To this end, this Court, in dissecting the language employed in respondent's Manifestation, is of
the firm view that respondent Judge Tamin has undeniably transgressed the permissible limits
and bounds of constructive criticism and fair comment so as to render him liable for
administrative liability and penalty. Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to
satisfy one's irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and
their members.[17]

Under these circumstances, we can neither overemphasize nor underestimate the significance of
according utmost premium to the integrity and image of the Courts of justice - most especially
that of the Supreme Court - considering that appearance is an essential manifestation of reality.
As the final bastion of justice, the Supreme Court cannot sanction any act, or omission, that
shatters the faith of every law-abiding citizen in the judiciary and puts the judicial arm of
government in shameful light and chagrin. This rubric grasps deeper relevance when the ravisher
of the image of the court of justice, so to speak, is one within its distinguished ranks - a
magistrate supposedly sworn to protect, uphold and perpetuate the rule of law and reign of
justice.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent Judge Camilo Tamin guilty
of using intemperate and undignified language against the Supreme Court, in clear violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby imposes upon respondent judge a fine of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) and further sternly warns respondent that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Mendoza, J., on leave.

RE: INHIBITION OF JUDGE EDDIE R. ROJAS, RTC -Branch 39, Polomolok, South
Cotabato in Crim. Case No. 09-5668

A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC | 1998-10-30

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This refers to the order of inhibition, dated April 13, 1998, which respondent Judge Eddie R.
Rojas of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Polomolok, South Cotabato issued in Criminal
Case No. 09-5668, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rosalina Tauro, et al., a copy of which
was furnished this Court on May 8, 1998. It appears that the case was initially tried in the RTC,
with Judge Rojas as public prosecutor. While the case was pending, respondent was appointed
judge of the trial court on November 12, 1996. As the original counsel for the accused did not
interpose any objection, Judge Rojas tried the case. On April 13, 1998, however, Judge Rojas
decided to inhibit himself from the case. In inhibiting himself, respondent judge explained:1
[Rollo, p. 2.]

When this case is (sic) called for the turn of the defense to present their evidence with their new
counsel Atty. Yolanda Ogena of the PAO, who manifested that she is not ready and she is
requesting for (the) postponement of this case, but the Presiding Judge (Rojas) after closed (sic)
reflection of the records, although the previous counsel for the accused, Atty. Rosalie Cariño,
was confronted by the Presiding Judge whether (s)he will interpose objection to the continuous
sitting of this Judge in this case considering that years back when this case was initially tried, the
Presiding Judge was the prosecutor in this case, to avoid legal implications and/or any doubt, the
Presiding Judge has to voluntarily inhibit himself in this case.

Taking note of the aforesaid order of inhibition, this Court on July 7, 1998 required Judge Rojas
to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for sitting in a case in
which he had previously acted as counsel for one of the parties.

In his letter dated July 28, 1998,2 [Id., pp. 5-6.] Judge Rojas explains:

The above-mentioned criminal case was inherited by the undersigned upon assumption to office
as Presiding Judge of this sala last November 12, 1996. On February 18, 1997, he issued an
Order addressed to the Stenographic Reporter concerned of Branch 22, Regional Trial Court,
General Santos City (where this case originated) directing said employee to transmit a copy of
the transcript of the stenographic notes (TSN) to this sala (Annex A).

Despite the lapse of four (4) months from the said Order, the TSN was not forwarded to this
Court (Annex B).

In her letter-explanation to the undersigned, Stenographic Reporter Asuncion A. Denaga,

informed the former that her failure to transmit said TSN was due to the fact that the same were
not sent back to her by this Court's personnel for transcription (Annex C).

It was only after a close scrutiny of the transcribed TSN when herein undersigned discovered and
remembered that he handled the aforecited criminal case as public prosecutor years back. Thus,
the aforementioned Order emanating from this Court dated April 13, 1998 declaring the
undersigned's inhibition from this case (Annex D).

To clarify matters, there was never a full-blown trial conducted by the undersigned in this case
since the time he assumed as Presiding Judge of this sala up to the present, as the scheduled
hearings of this case were always postponed (the same not being attributable to this Court) (see
Annexes E, F, G, and H).

Hence, for all intents and purposes, from the time he discovered his previous participation in the
above-cited criminal case, up to the present, the undersigned never heard nor tried nor conducted
any full-blown trial in the same.
Thus, Judge Rojas tries to justify his failure to inhibit himself from the beginning by the flimsy
excuse that it was only after a close scrutiny of the TSN that he discovered and remembered that
he had handled the criminal case as public prosecutor years ago and tries to minimize the
seriousness of his breach of judicial ethics by claiming that anyway he did not conduct a "full-
blown trial."

In his order of April 13, 1998, Judge Rojas stated that he had not inhibited himself because the
previous counsel of the accused, Atty. Rosalie Cariño, did not object to his sitting in the case as
the judge. Certainly, he would not have asked Atty. Cariño for any objection if he had not known
that he could not sit in the case as judge because he had previously acted as public prosecutor
therein. Indeed, the Court is at a loss how Judge Rojas could have missed noticing that the case
was one in which he had appeared as public prosecutor considering that the records indicate the
appearances of counsels.

Judge Rojas contends that, in any case, he never conducted any full-blown trial in the case, and,
therefore, there was no need for his immediate inhibition from the case. Rule 137, §1 of the
Rules of Court expressly states, however, that "no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he ...has been counsel [for a party] without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record." According to Black's Law Dictionary,3 [Black's
Law Dictionary 1387 (1990)] to "sit" in a case means "to hold court; to do any act of a judicial
nature. To hold a session, as of a court, grand jury, legislative body, etc. To be formally
organized and proceeding with the transaction of business." The prohibition is thus not limited to
cases in which a judge hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases where he acts
by resolving motions, issuing orders and the like as Judge Rojas has done in the criminal case.
The purpose of the rule is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of
impropriety on the part of the judge.4 [Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2.] A judge should take
no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.5 [Canon 3, Rule
3.12.] He should administer justice impartially and without delay.6 [Canon 1, Rule 1.02.] In
violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a judge in Criminal Case No. 09-5668 from
November 12, 1996 to April 13, 1998 without securing the written consent of both the
prosecution and the defense and entering the same upon the record of the case. For almost one
and a half years, he issued various orders resetting the dates of the hearing and of the reception
of additional evidence for the prosecution7 [Rollo, p. 12; Annex F, Letter of Judge Rojas.] and
for the defense.8 [Id., p. 14; Annex H, supra.] Undoubtedly, by these acts, he sat in and acted on
the case. The failure of Judge Rojas to observe these elementary rules of judicial conduct betrays
his interest in the case which he allowed to prevail over his sworn duty to administer the law
impartially without any fear or favor.

In Lorenzo v. Marquez,9 [162 SCRA 546 (1988)] a judge was dismissed from the service for
sitting in a case in which he had previously acted as counsel for the plaintiff without the written
consent of all the parties in interest, in violation of Rule 137, §1, and for illegally issuing a
subpoena for the appearance of a prison inmate at the trial of a criminal case before him. In the
instant case, the Office of the Court Administrator recommends that Judge Rojas be fined in the
amount of P10,000.00 for violating Rule 137, §1. The Court believes that the penalty
recommended is appropriate, given the fact that unlike the judge in Lorenzo v. Marquez, Judge
Rojas' breach of judicial ethics is confined to his failure to inhibit himself from the case in which
he had previously acted as public prosecutor.

WHEREFORE, a fine of P10,000.00 is hereby imposed on Judge Eddie R. Rojas for violation of
Rule 137, §1. He is WARNED that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Martinez,
Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., on leave.

GLORITO V. MATURAN, petitioner, vs. ATTY. CONRADO S. GONZALES, respondent.

A.C. No. 2597 | 1998-03-12

Tagged under keywords

View Summary

R E S O L U T I O N:

A complaint for disbarment was filed with this Court on October 25, 1983, by Glorito V.
Maturan against his counsel, Atty. Conrado S. Gonzales, charging him with immoral, unethical,
and anomalous acts. The respondent filed his comment thereto on February 6, 1984. On
November 11, 1997, or after thirteen (13) years, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines submitted their report and recommendation on the instant case.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Spouses Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V. Maturan (herein
petitioner), as their attorney-in-fact, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated November
6, 1981. Said SPA authorized Maturan to file ejectment cases against squatters occupying Lot
1350-A, Psd-50375, located in General Santos City, as well as criminal cases against the latter
for violation of P.D. 772, again in connection with said lot. Respondent, Atty. Conrado
Gonzales, prepared and notarized said Special Power of Attorney.

Subsequently, Glorito Maturan engaged the services of respondent in ejecting several squatters
occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-50735. While said lot was registered in the name of Celestino
Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had, however, instituted a case for reconveyance of property and
declaration of nullity against the former, docketed as Civil Case No. 2067.

As a consequence of his engagement by petitioner, respondent Gonzales filed Civil Case No.
1783-11 for Forcible Entry and Damages against several individuals. On February 18, 1983, a
judgment was rendered in favor of petitioner. Petitioner, through respondent, filed a motion for
issuance of a writ of execution on March 10, 1983.

In the Interim, the parties to Civil Case No. 2067 entered into a compromise agreement, which
was judicially approved in a judgment dated March 28, 1983.

On June 22, 1983, while the motion for issuance of a writ of execution was pending, and without
withdrawing as counsel for petitioner, respondent filed, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al.,
Civil Case No. 2746, an action to annul the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 2067. The
action was predicated on the lack of authority on the part of petitioner to represent Antonio and
Gloria Casquejo, as no such authorization was shown to be on record in Civil Case No. 2067. On
August 24, 1983, respondent, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., also filed Special Civil
Case No. 161 for injunction with a prayer for preliminary injunction, with damages, against
petitioner.

Aggrieved by respondent's acceptance of professional employment from their adversary in Civil

Case No. 2067, and alleging that privileged matters relating to the land in question had been
transmitted by petitioner to respondent in Civil Case 1783-11, petitioner filed an administrative
complaint against the former for immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his
disbarment.

Respondent, in a comment dated January 25, 1984, denied having committed any malicious,
unethical, unbecoming, immoral, or anomalous act against his client. Respondent declared that
he was of the belief that filing a motion for issuance of a writ of execution was the last and final
act in the lawyer-client relationship between himself and petitioner, and that his formal
withdrawal as counsel for the Casquejos was unnecessary in order to sever the lawyer-client
relationship between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his acceptance of employment from
Yokingco was for an opportunity to honestly earn a little more for his children's sustenance.

The investigating commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in his report dated
August 21, 1997, found respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and recommended
that he be suspended for three (3) years. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating commissioner but recommended
that the suspension be reduced from three (3) years to one (1) year.

This Court adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner finding respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party
against the adverse party who is his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from
representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that
of his present or former client. 1 That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith
and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected
with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong
ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be
given him to take advantage of the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of
his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. 2

This Court finds respondent's actuations violative of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which provide in part:

"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose."

Moreover, respondent's justification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance of the fiduciary
obligations which a lawyer owes to his client. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by
the filing of a motion for a writ of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will
prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the same
to the prejudice of his client.

As to the recommendation that the term of suspension be reduced from three years to one year,
we find the same to be unwarranted. In similar cases decided by the Supreme Court, the penalty
of two or three years suspension has been imposed where respondent was found guilty of
representing conflicting interests. In Vda. De Alisbo vs. Jalandoon, Sr., 3 the respondent, who
appeared for complainant in a case for revival of judgment, even though he had been the counsel
of the adverse party in the case sought to be revived, was suspended for a period of two years. In
Bautista vs. Barrios, 4 a suspension of two years was imposed on respondent Barrios, who had
drafted a deed of partition for petitioner, but who appeared for the other party therein, when the
same was sought to be enforced by petitioner. In PNB vs. Cedo, 5 the Court even suspended the
respondent therein for three years, but only because respondent not only represented conflicting
interests, but also deliberately intended to attract clients with interests adverse to his former
employer. Finally, in Natan vs. Capule, 6 respondent was suspended for two years after he
accepted professional employment in the very case in which his former client was the adverse
party.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to MODIFY the IBP recommendation to suspend

respondent for one year and modifies it to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for TWO (2)
YEARS, effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Martinez and Quisumbing, JJ ., concur.
Panganiban and Purisima, JJ ., took no part.
FERNANDO DELA CRUZ, complainant, vs. Judge JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, RTC,
Branch 166, Pasig City, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1567 | 2000-07-24

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a Verified Complaint[1] filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by
complainant who identified himself as a "concerned citizen", respondent was charged with the
Violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and the Code of Judicial Conduct
The case stemmed from three (3) criminal cases assigned to respondent, namely:

a.] Criminal Case No. 11309 against Roberto Agana y Borja, for violation of Section 16, Article
III, R.A. 6425, as amended;

b.] Criminal Case No. 4275-D against Roberto Agana y Borja for violation of P.D. No. 1866;
and

c.] Criminal Case No. 4276-D against Sarah Resula y Puga for violation of Section 16, Article III
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

The complaint, in sum, alleges that respondent as the presiding judge in whose sala the above-
enumerated cases are pending, gravely abused his discretion and exhibited evident partiality by:
1.] socializing in posh restaurants particularly in Mario's Restaurant, Quezon City and the
Shangri-la EDSA Plaza with then Congresswoman Venice Agana, mother of the accused
Roberto Agana, together with their counsel, Atty. Narciso Cruz; 2.] issuing unreasonable orders
for postponement which unjustly delay the administration of justice; and 3.] allowing the two
accused, Roberto Agana and his live-in partner, Sarah Resula, to submit to a drug test thereby
postponing the trial of the cases indefinitely.

The OCA thereafter recommended that the case be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals or to any OCA consultant for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty
(60) days from notice.[2]

In a Resolution dated February 16, 2000,[3] the Court designated Associate Appellate Court
Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis to conduct an investigation, report and recommendation on
charges against the respondent within ninety (90) days from notice.

Pursuant thereto, Justice Vidallon-Magtolis thereafter proceeded with the investigation of the
case. The complainant did not appear at the hearing. Despite this, Justice Vidallon-Magtolis,
bearing in mind that even a desistance of the complainant is of no moment in an administrative
case such as this, proceeded with the investigation by examining the records of the criminal cases
involved which respondent had brought along. She subsequently submitted a Report containing
the following findings and recommendations:

At this point it must be pointed out that, had the supposed complainant appeared to substantiate
his charges, his testimony could only have been admitted as to the alleged socializing acts of the
respondent with the congresswoman-mother of the male accused - granting that he was an
eyewitness thereto and was familiar with the judge and the congresswoman as well as the
defense counsel, Atty. Cruz. However, as to the alleged partiality of the respondent in granting
postponements, his testimony could only be in the form of opinions which would have been
inadmissible, considering that he is not party to the criminal cases, neither does he appear to be
involved therein in any other capacity. As a matter of fact, his real identity remains to be a
question, since he did not actually furnish his real address in his complaints, both with the
Ombudsman and with the Court Administrator.

At any rate, lest the undersigned be perceived as one shirking from responsibility, she opted not
to dismiss the case outright, in view of settled rules that only the Supreme Court can dismiss
administrative cases against judges,[4] and considering further that the bulk of the allegations in
the complaint are verifiable from the records. Thus, she proceeded on with her investigation,
giving the respondent an opportunity to clear his name

From the documentary evidence submitted by the respondent and the record of the three criminal
cases as well as the respondent's answers to the clarificatory questionings of this investigator, the
following facts appear:

1. The arraignment of both accused were postponed for three (3) times, all upon motion of the
defense counsel, formerly Atty. Joel Aguilar, the reason being:

(a) unexplained absence of the accused in Court[5]

(b) the intended attendance of Atty. Aguilar at the 6th National Convention for Lawyers[6]

(c) absence of both accused who were reportedly in Tagbilaran City[7]

2. After the arraignment, the accused appeared but once in the three (3) successive settings for
trial on the merits. Their counsel, now Atty. Narciso Cruz, never appeared at all, but only filed
motions for postponement which were invariably granted even over the objection of the
prosecution.[8]

3. Despite the successive absences of the accused, the respondent never issued a warrant of
arrest, nor even asked them to explain their absences. According to the respondent, he considered
their absences as waiver of appearance. Yet, in the two instances that the prosecution was
ready,[9] he (respondent) did not proceed with the hearing - which should have been done if
there was a waiver of appearance.

4. When the respondent acted on the "Voluntary Submission to Confinement, Treatment and
Rehabilitation" of both accused, he did not give the prosecution an opportunity to file comment
or opposition thereto.[10]
5. The respondent's order of January 26, 1998, allowing the confinement, treatment and
rehabilitation of the accused was not officially sent to the Dangerous Drugs Board. His directive
in the second paragraph of the order, to wit: "The pertinent report must be submitted to the Court
soonest"[11] is rather vague in that it did not state who should make the report nor the limit of
the period given for its submission.

6. The respondent never checked with the Dangerous Drugs Board whether or not the two
accused had indeed submitted themselves for confinement, treatment and rehabilitation with said
office. This gives the impression that the respondent's order of January 26, 1998 was made
merely to enable him to suspend the proceedings, including the case for violation of P.D. [No.]
1866, which is not subject to such suspension under R.A. [No.] 6425, as amended.

7. When the respondent issued the order of September 18, 1998,[12] where he appears to have
motu proprio set the case anew for hearing on November 12, 1998, there was already a case filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman[13] on January 30, 1998.[14] Likewise, this
administrative complaint was already filed on February 2, 1998 with the Office of the Court
Administrator, and the latter had already directed the respondent on September 9, 1998, to file
his comment to such complaint.[15] Obviously, he was stirred to action by the filing of such
complaints and not because of his diligent performance of his duties and responsibilities.

8. The respondent denied that he knew of the fact that accused Roberto Agana is the son of then
Congresswoman Venice Agana of Bohol. According to him, he learned about it when Atty.
Narciso Cruz "entered his appearance and then he said it was pro bono basis and the accused is
the son of a congresswoman".[16] When asked by this investigator whether that information was
made in open court or in chambers, he answered that "he came to my chambers."[17]

9. Subsequently, after realizing through the statements of this investigator that a judge should not
allow lawyers and parties litigants with pending cases to see him in chambers,[18] the
respondent tried to redeem himself after resting his case on May 9, 2000, by explaining that
when Atty. Cruz saw him in chambers, the latter had not yet entered his appearance as defense
counsel. He did not, however, ask for the correction of the transcript of stenographic notes of
April 7, 2000.

10. The order of inhibition[19] was issued by the respondent long after this administrative case
had been filed against him. Hence, it could not be taken as a voluntary inhibition to show lack of
interest on the criminal cases.

Justice Vidallon-Magtolis thus found that:

All the foregoing are indications that the respondent's official conduct had not been entirely free
from the appearance of impropriety, neither has the respondent remained above suspicion in his
official actuations in connection with the criminal cases involving Agana and Resula. He has
fallen short of the requirements of probity and independence.[20] A judge's conduct should be
above reproach, and in the discharge of his official duties, he should be conscientious, thorough,
courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial.[21]
Thus, in the case of Garcia vs. Burgood,[22] the Supreme Court held:

We deem it important to point out that a judge must preserve the trust and faith reposed on him
by the parties as an impartial and objective administrator of justice. When he exhibits actions that
rise fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded xxx.

Justice Vidallon-Magtolis recommended that respondent be fined the sum of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos with a stern warning that a repetition of the acts complained of will be dealt
with more severely.

The Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that respondent's conduct was hardly exemplary
in this case.

The Court in a litany of cases has reminded members of the bench that the unreasonable delay of
a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and
constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate.[23] Indeed, the
Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied.[24]

In the case at bench, the fact that respondent tarried too long in acting on the pending incidents in
the Criminal Cases Nos. 11309, 4275-D and 4276-D, hardly becomes open to question. If at all,
respondent judge's foot-dragging in acting on the incidents in the said cases, which stopped only
when administrative complaints were filed against him with the Ombudsman and the OCA, is a
strong indicia of his lack of diligence in the performance of his official duties and
responsibilities.

It must be remembered in this regard that a "speedy trial" is defined as one "conducted according
to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays."[25] The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to prevent the
oppression of the accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time.[26]
This purpose works both ways, however, because it, likewise, is intended to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the
trial of criminal prosecutions.[27]

At the risk of sounding trite, it must again be stated that "Judges are bound to dispose of the
court's business promptly and to decide cases within the required period.[28] We have held in
numerous cases that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.[29] If they
cannot do so, they should seek extensions from this Court to avoid administrative liability."[30]
Indeed, judges ought to remember that they should be prompt in disposing of all matters
submitted to them, for justice delayed is often justice denied.

Certainly, "Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the people's faith in the judiciary.[31] It is for
this reason that this Court has time and again reminded judges of their duty to decide cases
expeditiously. Delay in the disposition of even one case constitutes gross inefficiency[32] which
this Court will not tolerate."[33]

With regard to the charge of partiality, the Court pointed out in Dawa v. De Asa[34] that the
people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of
integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess.[35] It is towards this sacrosanct
goal of ensuring the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates the following:

RULE 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF

IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.

RULE 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.

CANON 3. - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.

By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people
not only through his official acts but also through his private morals as reflected in his external
behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge's personal behavior both in the performance of
his duties and his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach.[36] Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr.,[37] the Court
pointedly stated that:

While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.
Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial conduct and with
existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of the people in the administration
of justice.[38]

Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.[39] A judge's conduct must be above reproach.[40]
Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion.[41] A judge's private as
well as official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be
beyond reproach.[42]

In Vedana vs. Valencia,[43] the Court held:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times. As we have recently explained, a judge's official life can not simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.

As stated earlier, in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.[44] A judge is not only required to be
impartial; he must also appear to be impartial.[45] Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.[46] Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this
appearance.[47] It was, thus, held that it is improper for a judge to meet privately with the
accused without the presence of the complainant.[48] Be that as it may, credence can not be
accorded to the indictment that respondent judge had been socializing with the congresswoman-
mother of one of the accused as well as accused's counsel considering that complainant neither
testified nor produced any witness to corroborate this charge.

Viewed vis-á -vis the factual landscape of this case, it is clear that respondent judge violated
Rule 1.02,[49] as well as Canon 2,[50] Rule 2.01[51] and Canon 3.[52] He must, thus, be
sanctioned.[53] In this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo
Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City,[54] that:

Well-known is the judicial norm that 'judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial.' Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing,
would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge.
Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free
of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court
judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with
the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the people's sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond
reproach.[55]

A review of past decisions reveals a wide range of penalties for cases of similar nature. These
penalties include mere reprimand,[56] withholding of salary,[57] fine,[58] suspension[59] and
even dismissal.[60]

This is not the first time respondent has been sanctioned by the Court. In Cecilio Wycoco v.
Judge Jesus G. Bersamira,[61] respondent was initially admonished for absenteesim by the
Court. Subsequently, in Jose Oscar M. Salazar v. Judge Jesus G. Bersamira,[62] respondent was
again sanctioned and fined Five Thousand (P5,000.00) with the warning that a repetition of the
same act would be dealt with more severely for violating Administrative Order No. 3, series of
1983. Specifically, respondent intervened in a case which he could not properly take cognizance
of causing the complainant great prejudice resulting from the delay of the execution of a decision
in his favor in Civil Case No. 39608 of the MeTC of Makati.

It appears, however, that being chastised twice has not reformed the respondent with the filing of
the instant administrative complaint against him. Needless to state, such acts of respondent only
further erode the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members of
the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the
judiciary, which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.[63]

While the Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that respondent's conduct warrants the
imposition of sanctions against him, the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the
misdeed committed. Given the prevailing facts of the case, a fine of P10,000.00 accompanied by
a reprimand, with a stern warning that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely, is a more appropriate penalty.[64]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED in the amount of
Ten Thousand (P10,000.00). Further, he is REPRIMANDED and sternly warned that a repetition
of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman) no part due to close relationship to a party.
Puno, J., no part due to close association with a party.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

BENALFRE J. GALANG, complainant, vs. JUDGE ABELARDO H. SANTOS,

respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1197 | 1999-05-26

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

The case before the Court is a letter-complaint filed by Pampanga Provincial Attorney Benalfre
J. Galang charging Judge Abelardo H. Santos, presiding judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Angeles City, Pampanga, with acts unbecoming of a judge.

On December 10, 1996, Benalfre J. Galang filed with this Court a complaint[1] seeking
administrative action for the reprehensible conduct of respondent judge in engaging in the
publication of a gossip tabloid, The Mirror, as editor and legal adviser, and as a gossip-
mongering columnist of a local newspaper, Sun Star Clark.

Complainant alleged that respondent used his newspaper column to ventilate his biases or
personal anger at people or institutions. For instance, when respondent failed to receive payment
from the Office of the Governor for advertisement in exchange for a congratulatory message in
the maiden issue of the The Mirror, respondent placed a blank space purportedly for the
governor's message, and expressed contempt with a few lines underneath a picture of the
governor.[2] Complainant believes that respondent judge should not engage in active,
sensational, and free-for-all journalistic writing because such act degrades the judicial system
and compromises his impartiality as an administrator of justice.

When required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed a Motion for
Bill of Particulars and to Require Complainant to Verify his Letter-Complaint.[3] The Court
granted the motion in its Resolution dated June 16, 1997.[4]

On September 29, 1997, Benalfre J. Galang filed a Verified Complaint with Bill of
Particulars.[5] Complainant alleged that respondent wrote articles to display his personal
prejudices and personal anger toward people and institutions, which constitute improper
interference and meddling in purely administrative matters that are of no material concern to his
office or sala. Moreover, complainant alleged that respondent used the print media to promote
the interests of one political party against another, which showed his political bias for one party,
in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.[6]

On October 8, 1997, respondent filed his answer, which is reproduced here in full, to wit:

"Res Ipsa Loquitur! Complainant's verified complaint speaks for itself. It is an ENTIRELY NEW
Complaint. If complainant is a lawyer worth his salt and if he truly understood respondent's
Motion for a Bill of Particulars AND TO REQUIRE COMPLAINANT TO VERIFY HIS
LETTER-COMPLAINT, then he should have known (even a mediocre lawyer will) that it was
the original complaint dated December 9, 1996 which should have been verified.

"As to the alleged Bill of Particulars, Complainant, in blatant or ignorant defiance of the June 16,
1997 Resolution of this Honorable Court, filed a BILL OF GENERALITIES! Respondent
moved for a more definite and clear statements on several matters contained in his motion.
NONE, of these were "particularized" by said Complainant. It is, therefore, clear that
Complainant miserably failed to comply with the Resolution of this Honorable Court. A Bill of
Generalities is the exact opposite of a Bill of Particulars. But then, Complainant seems unable to
distinguish between the two?

"As an act of Obedience to the June 16, 1997 Resolution of this Court requiring respondent to
Comment within ten (10) days on the Complaint, suffice it to say that he invokes his
constitutional right of Freedom of Speech and of the Press enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for
which the Honorable Supreme Court is a staunch defender. As a brief backgrounder, respondent
has been a member of the 4th Estate since 1971. He covered, together with Vicente B. Foz, a fine
lawyer and a writer, the 1987 Con-Con for the Pre-Martial Law Manila Times, with the late Jose
Luna Castro as editor. In 1987, he resumed his writing career for local newspapers, up to the
present.

Respondent admits the dare he hurled against the Complainant which appeared in the December
9, 1996 issue of the Sun-Star Clark. Unfortunately, the Complainant TURNED DOWN the
challenge for what reasons only he can fathom. One of these days respondent will file a case with
the proper forum against Gov. Lito Lapid so as to clear once and for all the issues I raised anent
Section 90 (a) of RA 7160 which respondent quoted in paragraph 2 of this new complaint.

"Paragraph 3 of the Complaint speaks of a column, The Capital Mole which I deny having
written. It has no by-line. How can I be the MOLE when the last time I was at the Capitol was on
June 30, 1995? Complainant seems to be suffering from astigmatism.

"Paragraph 4 of the Complaint has NO basis. Respondent is neither promoter nor a member of
any political party. He has no intention whatsoever to join any. As to the fact that the late
Governor Bren Z. Guiao LOST to Lapid is neither here nor there. It is immaterial, irrelevant,
stupid and most of all, unfortunate."[7]

The Office of the Court Administrator, in a Memorandum dated April 13, 1998, recommended
the dismissal of respondent judge from the service, for conduct unbecoming a member of the
bench and for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

We agree.

A judge is viewed as the visible representation of law and justice from whom the people draw
their will and inclination to obey the law.[8] Thus, his official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.[9] Rule
2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct also provides that a judge should so behave at all times as
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.[10]

In this case, respondent judge has displayed conduct that falls short of the standards expected of
a magistrate of the law. A perusal of the newspaper articles and the pleadings filed by respondent
betrays a lack of judicial decorum which requires the use of temperate language at all times.[11]
Samples of such articles are as follows:

"I did not see Mayor ED (not the crook as in CROOKED) and Mayor Boking during former
Gov. BREN Z. GUIAO's birthday bash last July 9, lumipat na ba kayo ng kampo?" [The Mirror,
Aug. 19-Sept. 4, 1996, p. 3]

"To all those who, supported this maiden issue of the Mirror, Salamat po! To those who did not,
like PROVINCIAL LAWYER BENJIE GALANG, mas maraming salamat!!!" [The Mirror,
Aug. 19-Sept. 4, 1996, p. 3]

"I will not seek the annointment of Lito Lapid. Who is he anyway? A nice book with nothing in
between the covers? May pride yata ako." ["If I were Bren Z. Guiao", Sun Star Clark, Dec. 2,
1996, p. 5]

"I will not support LEVY LAUS in his intended bid to run for Mayor of San Fernando. Akala ko
sincere sa pagganap niya sa Save San Fernando Movement; yun' pala may ulterior motive!" ["If I
were Bren Z. Guiao", Sun Star Clark, Dec. 2, 1996, p. 5]

"As Chief Legal Counsel of Pampanga's Chief Executive, I challenge, katuwaan lang, Atty.
BENJIE GALANG, my successor, to an open, public and friendly debate on the following
issue... May a governor, who is at the same time an actor, still make films?"

"This writer will take the NEGATIVE side (it would be highly illogical for Benjie to be on this
side. I know he does not have the brain of a gun.)"

From the looks of it, this side believes that Gov. Lito is not getting the proper legal advice from
his Provincial Attorney?"

"Lapid fans will abhor me for bringing up this issue but the rule is - DURA LEX SED LEX!! I
can not, in conscience, allow a patently, clear and blatant, to my belief, violation of Sec. 90 (a) of
RA # 7160."

"As a clincher, I will RESIGN from my position as a judge if Benjie wins. If he loses, will he
resign as Provincial Attorney of Pampanga?" ["Livewire", Sun Star Clark, Dec. 9, 1996, p. 5]

Although such statements were not given in relation to his official duties as judge, the code of
Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.[12] The personal behavior of a judge not only upon the bench but
also in his everyday life should be above reproach and free from the appearance of
impropriety.[13] In this case, respondent displayed a lack of respect toward the Provincial
Prosecutor through the insults he hurled in his articles and pleadings submitted to the Court.
Respondent degraded the capabilities of complainant as legal adviser of the Provincial
Government, and challenged the governor with disqualification for allegedly practicing a
different profession aside from public office. In his pleadings, respondent also belittled
complainant as a public officer through unnecessary and injurious descriptions.

There is a difference between freedom of expression and compromising the dignity of the Court
through publications of emotional outbursts and destructive criticisms. Respondent's writing of
active and vicious editorials compromises his duties as judge in the impartial administration of
justice, for his views printed on newspapers reflect on his office as well as on the public officers
that he challenges. From the standpoint of conduct and demeanor expected of a judge, resort to
intemperate language only detracts from the respect due a member of the judiciary and becomes
self-destructive.[14]

Moreover, in persistently attacking the movie-making activities of the provincial governor and
repeatedly threatening to file an action against a public officer, respondent encourages litigation
and causes dissension against the public officer concerned. As a judge, respondent's role is to
maintain equanimity and not instigate litigation. This is not to say that one can not question the
improper activities of government officials if there are any. However, it is not proper for a judge
to write publications of carelessly-worded editorials in local newspapers.

Also worth noting is the fact that respondent judge holds sensitive and demanding positions at
The Mirror. Not only does he act as its contributor or columnist, he is also its publisher, editor
and legal adviser. Although the Code of Judicial Conduct allows a judge to engage in certain
lawful activities, they should not interfere with the performance of judicial duties nor detract
from the dignity of the court.[15]

The judicial office circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of
restrictions thereon, which he has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the
administration of justice.[16] The irresponsible or improper conduct of a judge erodes public
confidence in the judiciary.[17] It is thus the duty of the members of the bench to avoid any
impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.[18]

Respondent judge's conduct has failed to measure up to what is expected of a member of the
bench, and has demonstrated his unfitness to be or to remain in office.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DISMISSES respondent Abelardo H. Santos, Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Angeles City, Pampanga, from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to
reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Purisima, J., on leave.

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR,

respondent.

A.C. No. 4148 | 1998-07-30

View Summary
DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought
the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly
immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances. 1

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11,
1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months
suspension without pay, 2 while in Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI,
which were consolidated, 3 this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from the
service of respondent. 4

Now he faces disbarment.

The records reveal the following facts:

From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that
complainant and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman
Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where eight
of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas,
Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced
his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.

In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a
certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena gave
birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña.

In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint
against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for
a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. 5

Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another
charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer of
the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation,
this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. 6

But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with
Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella
Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her.

Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along
Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena
in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was
done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the
dissolution thereof.

Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement
from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept
her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father's acts, including
deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case
which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment under
the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and
cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty.
Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.

Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding
sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued
the illicit liaison with Elena. 7

In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against
him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as
when he said:

"I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for
having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Peña, now my wife. Being ordered separated
in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena
Peña will constitute triple jeopardy. If that's the law so be it." 8

Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on
May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner's recommendation, as follows:

"RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Adm. Case No. 4148

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the
roll of attorneys."

We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted
by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing
Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to
Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in agreement that respondent's
actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission
to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good standing in
that exclusive and honored fraternity. 9 There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred
ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law. 10 The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. *

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency,
as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject
to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those
whose conduct - both public and private - fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and,
after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.

Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact
that aggravates his professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the
Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be free from any appearance of impropriety. 11 For
a judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. Ordinary
citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law. 12 Indeed, a
judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations, lest it be a
demoralizing example to others. 13 Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of
Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. 14

Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, 15 an attorney-at-
law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice.
Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public
that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral integrity is expected
of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency
in an orderly society.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 16 Exacted
from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in
the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility
that have been compendiously described as "moral character." To achieve such end, every lawyer
needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve
not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.

On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. 17

The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case
of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court and member of the bar. 18 For disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the
parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to
assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering justice are
competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the clients may
repose full confidence.

In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 19 a complaint for disbarment was filed against a member
of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and
that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman. Respondent was not able to
overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In
another case, 20 a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another woman who had borne him a child. The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.

In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by this
Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-wedded wife.
The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found
respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance, in
the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he
still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter
against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not
be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still
subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his
disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross
misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his
moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms.
All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.

IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

JIMMY GARCIA, ROMIE GARCIA, RODOLFO GARCIA, FEDERICO GARCIA,

PABLO CATCHAPERO, CONRADO CATCHAPERO, NESTOR CATCHAPERO,
JAIME CATCHAPERO, REGIE CATCHAPERO, SIMPLICIO GUIANG, ALBERTO
GUIANG, VICTORIANO MARIANO, RAMON GAETOS and EFREN REYES,
petitioners, vs. JUDGE PANFILO V. VALDEZ, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-98-1156 | 1998-07-13

DECISION

ROMERO, J:

For the Court's resolution is a joint affidavit-complaint dated September 23, 1996, filed against
respondent Judge Panfilo V. Valdez by the following complainants: Jimmy, Romie, Rodolfo, and
Federico, all surnamed Garcia, Pablo, Conrado, Nestor, Jaime, and Regie, all surnamed
Catchapero; Simplicio and Alberto Guiang; Victoriano Mariano; Ramon Gaetos; and Efren
Reyes. Judge Valdez of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, allegedly duly
interfered in DARAB Cases No. 282-T-93, Blg. III-T-1384-96, and Blg. III-T-1397-96, a land
case involving herein complainants as plaintiffs against a certain Raul Valdez and other heirs of
the late Dr. Cosme T. Valdez, Sr., brother of respondent Judge.

The records show that Cosme owned a 59-hectare farmland which he sold to the Land Bank of
the Philippines during his lifetime. The LBP, in turn, distributed said farmland to herein
complainants, but Raul and the other heirs of Cosme refused to recognize these transfers and
proceeded to take possession of the land.

In their joint affidavit, complainants alleged that, even though not a party therein, Judge Valdez
appeared during office hours in the three DARAB cases on April 10 and September 9, 1996, and
in a conference before Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Teofilo Q. Inocencio in
Tarlac. They are apprehensive that they might lose these cases and, consequently, their land, with
the tremendous influence wielded by Judge Valdez and his alleged promises to those who helped
his relatives. By resolution dated July 21, 1997, Judge Valdez was required to file his comment
to the complaint.

In his comment dated September 8, 1997, Judge Valdez denied the charges but admitted that on
the dates in question, he was present in said hearings and conference, albeit for different reasons.
On April 10, 1996, he went with Atty. Yolanda Castro, counsel for the Valdezes, supposedly to
attend a hearing on a motion for contempt of court. He "did not address the Board, (but) only
talked to the persons cited for contempt (and) why they sabotage(d) the implementation of the
Writ of Execution issued by the Board." During the conference before PARO Inocencio, he
merely requested a review of the land coverage considering that there was already a land
valuation, but this was denied. On September 9, 1996, he returned to the DARAB hearing to pick
up his aunt, the representative of the heirs of Cosme. He arrived when the Board was still in
session. After its adjournment, Presiding Adjudicator Yambao asked for his comment, and he
said the heirs of Cosme were "not opposed to land reform." 1

On April 20, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a memorandum
recommending that Judge Valdez be reprimanded for misconduct. It was observed thus:
"We note that if the respondent judge did not have any relationship with the Valdezes involved
in the DARAB cases at hand, his presence at the proceedings on April 10 and September 9, 1996
would not have been misinterpreted. Absent such relationship, he would have been considered
merely as a disinterested third party or observer. However, such relationship colored his
presence. Owing to his position as a judge, the presence alone of the respondent judge provided
the intended or unintended insinuation of influence and intimation of pressure.

The respondent judge actively participated in the proceedings need not be belabored. The
documents attached to the record of this case indicate that he was given the floor during the
meeting and he suggested the review of the land reform coverage; and that he 'talked to the
persons cited for contempt' and inquired as to the reasons 'why they sabotage(d) the
implementation of the Writ of Execution' issued by the DARAB. These acts at least constitute
interference in the proceedings before the DARAB. Note should be taken that the said
respondent judge was not a counsel with the appropriate authorization, a party or a witness in the
cases involving the Valdezes being handled by the DARAB.

As a member of the bench, the respondent judge should realize that his presence, opinion and
participation in any proceeding could slant the evaluation and resolution of the case in favor of
(the) party he identifies 'himself with. A judge need not utter any word for his sheer presence - as
a member of the Judiciary - would be sufficient suggestion of persuasion and influence. In this
case, the respondent judge's presence and participation in the proceedings were to the advantage
of his relatives, the heirs of Dr. Cosme T. Valdez, Sr. That his efforts failed to influence the
DARAB, for the motion filed by the Valdez heirs in DARAB Case No. 282-T-93 for contempt
was dismissed, has no relevance.

Aside from the acts of interference, the respondent judge can be faulted with unauthorized
practice of law. Clearly, his interest in the administrative cases before the DARAB cannot be
considered as merely cursory or that of a disinterested third party or observer as he purported to
be. He spoke in behalf of the defendants and he advanced their cause, making him in effect as
their legal advocate.

The use of court hours for matters or business falling outside the ambit of judicial concerns can
also be imputed to the respondent judge. Under extant premises, the respondent judge utilized
improperly the resources of the court. When a lawyer accepts an appointment as a member of the
Judiciary, he embraces all the responsibilities attached to that office. One of these responsibilities
is 'to render eight (8) hours of service every working . . .. As a judge and also as a public officer
duty-bound to render public service, nothing less is expected of [a judge]." (Medina v. De Guia,
219 SCRA 153, 185 [1993]). A judge can always find tasks to do in court, all connected with
judicial business. That he finished the court's business for the day does not constitute an excuse
that could justify his leaving his station, much less, to go elsewhere to attend administrative
proceedings involving relatives.

'The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. . . . . The Code dictates that a judge, in order
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times.' (Castillo v. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75, 83 [1991]) '[O]ne who occupies a
position of such grave responsibility in the administration of justice must conduct himself in a
manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office. A judge's private as well as official conduct
must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach.' (Dysico
v. Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275, 283 [1996]). In the case at hand, the respondent judge has failed to
conduct himself in the manner prescribed by the provisions of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which Canon 2 directs the avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities. (Arcenio v. Pagorogon, 224 SCRA 247, 255 [1993])."

The Court sees no plausible reason why this recommendation should not be honored.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to REPRIMAND respondent Judge Panfilo V. Valdez

for the commission of acts constituting misconduct with the WARNING that a repetition of
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant vs. DANILO F. SERRANO, SR.,

accused-appellee.
In re: Judge Pepe P. Domael, Presiding Judge, Branch 37, Regional Trial Court, Naval,
Biliran, for disciplinary action for gross ignorance of the law.

G.R. No. 135451 | 1999-09-30

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

The Court, in the exercise of supervision over judges and court employees, has initiated this
action in consequence of the palpably erroneous ruling of Judge Pepe P. Domael of the Regional
Trial Court, Naval, Biliran, in Criminal Case No. N-1648, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Danilo F. Serrano, Sr.", allowing an appeal filed by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal.

On August 1, 1993, Maribel D. Visbal filed with the Regional Trial Court, Naval, Biliran, a
sworn complaint charging Danilo F. Serrano, Sr., with rape.1 [Rollo, p. 4.]

At the arraignment on January 14, 1994, accused Serrano pleaded not guilty.2 [Original Record,
p. 47.] Trial ensued.

After due trial, on March 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran, rendered
decision acquitting the accused on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The decision was promulgated on July 28, 1998.3 [Rollo, pp. 28-38.]
On August 11, 1998, Assistant Public Prosecutor Federico R. Huñamayor filed a notice of appeal
to the Supreme Court from the decision acquitting the accused for being "contrary to the facts
and the law".4 [Rollo, p. 39.]

On August 24, 1998, Judge Pepe P. Domael, presiding judge of Branch 37, Regional Trial Court,
Naval Biliran, issued an order5 [Rollo, p. 40.] giving due course to the appeal filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor.

Consequently, Clerk III Rey S. Morillo of Branch 37, Regional Trial Court, Naval, Biliran,
forwarded the original record of the case to this Court.

In a resolution dated March 15, 1999,6 [Rollo, pp. 41-42.] we dismissed the appeal for violation
of the rule on double jeopardy and required Judge Pepe P. Domael to explain why he should not
be dismissed from office for gross ignorance of the law.

On March 29, 1999, Judge Pepe P. Domael submitted an explanation,7 [Rollo, pp. 43-45.]
stating that he gave due course to the appeal because the prosecution cited Memorandum
Circular No. 3 dated April 1, 1997 of the Department of Justice pertaining to appeals of decisions
of acquittal by the trial court.

Judge Domael further admitted that he was "caught off-handed" by the "novel action taken by
the prosecution in appealing a decision of acquittal in a criminal case."8 [Comment, Rollo, p.
43.] After noting that the accused did not file any opposition to the manifestation of the
prosecution, Judge Domael assumed such inaction to be a waiver of any objection to such
appeal.

We find explanation unacceptable.

The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a magistrate be the embodiment of judicial
competence. As a judge, Judge Domael must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he
is expected to maintain professional competence at all times.9 [Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial
Conduct.]

It is elementary that the rule against double jeopardy proscribes an appeal from a judgment of
acquittal on the merits.10 [People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128986, June 21, 1999; People
vs. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil. 475 (1954)] A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-
examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in an appellate court, will put him a second
time in jeopardy for the same offense.11 [Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
171 SCRA 49 (1989); People vs. Laggui, 171 SCRA 305 (1989)]

The Constitution itself provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense.12 [Section 21, Article III, 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.] Such a
constitutional guarantee prohibits an appeal from a judgment of acquittal, and the law does not
provide for exceptions other than deprivation of due process or grave abuse of discretion under
exceptional circumstances.13 [People vs. Gomez, 126 Phil. 640 (1967); People vs. Bocar, 138
SCRA 166 (1985); People vs. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264 (1975); People vs. Court of Appeals, 101
SCRA 450 (1980); Aquino vs. Sison, 179 SCRA 648 (1989); Gorion vs. RTC Cebu, 213 SCRA
138 (1992); Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 (1986); People vs. Court of Appeals,
supra.]

It is true that the Department of Justice in Memorandum Circular No. 3 dated April 1, 1997,
enunciated the proposition that acquittals may be appealed as long as a second trial will not be
required and will not place the accused in second jeopardy, in the event the appeal succeeds.

However, such rule is not shown to be applicable to the case at bar. To use the Memorandum
Circular of the Department of Justice to overthrow a constitutional guarantee deeply ingrained to
protect the rights of an accused would require more than just a mere statement that the decision
was "contrary to the facts and to the law", as stated by the prosecution in its notice of appeal.

The preclusion against appeal by the government from judgments of acquittal applies even
though the accused did not raise the question of double jeopardy.14 [People vs. Balisacan, 17
SCRA 1119 (1966), citing People vs. Ferrer, 100 Phil. 124 (1956); People vs. Bao, 106 Phil. 243
(1959); People vs. Golez, 108 Phil. 855 (1960)] Although the accused Danilo F. Serrano, Sr. did
not object to the appeal interposed by the prosecution, Judge Domael should have known that
granting such appeal would constitute double jeopardy. Fundamental knowledge of the law and
jurisprudence must alert him against any misinterpretation or misuse of doctrines by any party in
the case before him.

It is imperative that judges be studious of and conversant with basic legal principles.15 [Canon 4,
Canons of Judicial Ethics; Bernabe vs. Memoracion, 277 SCRA 1 (1997), citing Ajeno vs.
Inserto, 71 SCRA 166 (1976), Ubongen vs. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 (1980), Lim vs. Domagas, 227
SCRA 258 (1993)] When the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes ignorance of
the law.16 [Cortes vs. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423 (1998), citing Agcaoili vs. Ramos, 229 SCRA
705 (1994)] In granting the appeal filed by the prosecution despite theacquittal of the accused,
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of the law.

Judge Domael's claim that he was led to believe that he had taken a correct course of action17
[Comment, Rollo, pp. 44-45.] only reinforced the fact that he did not know the fundamental
doctrines of the law, and evinced his weakness and his lack of knowledge of the basic precepts of
the law.

However, the acts in question were not shown to be tainted with bad faith, fraud, or malice on
the part of Judge Pepe P. Domael. Thus, although the error committed constitutes ignorance of
the law, such is not so gross as to warrant the dismissal of the judge from service.18 [Domingo
vs. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1165, June 21, 1999.]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds Judge Pepe P. Domael, Regional Trial Court, Naval,
Biliran, guilty of ignorance of the law and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for two (2)
months without pay, to be served during the court's vacation period in April and May, 2000, with
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
The Court further requires Judge Pepe P. Domael to acquaint himself with the basic rules on
Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

PARALUMAN B. AFURONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANGEL G. AQUINO, respondent.

A.C. No. 1571 | 1999-09-23

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is a verified letter-complaint for disbarment, filed on December 22,
1975, by Paraluman B. Afurong against Atty. Angel G. Aquino, for filing frivolous harassment
cases to delay the execution of a final decision, committing falsehood in an Urgent Motion for
Postponement, and misrepresenting himself as an attorney for the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office.

The antecedent facts show that on April 2, 1974, Paraluman Afurong filed a complaint for
ejectment with the City Court of Manila for non-payment of rentals against Victorino Flores.1
[Docketed as Civil Case No. 231552.] The court rendered judgment on May 27, 1974 in favor of
petitioner Paraluman Afurong. The court then issued a writ of execution on February 17, 1975,
which was served on Victorino Flores in March 1975.

Facing eviction from the land he was occupying, Victorino Flores sought the assistance of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office. His case was assigned to Atty. Angel G. Aquino, an employee
of said office at the time.

On April 3, 1975, Atty. Angel G. Aquino filed with the City Court of Manila a Petition for Relief
from Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order.2 [Docketed as Civil Case No.
97265.] On May 9, 1975, the petition, after due hearing, was dismissed for having been filed out
of time.

Atty. Aquino subsequently filed on May 29, 1975, with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.3 [Docketed as Civil Case No. 97976.] The court set the
pre-trial conference on December 12, 1975.

Notwithstanding the fact that he was separated from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office on
October 1, 1975, Atty. Angel G. Aquino filed on December 11, 1975, an Urgent Motion for
Postponement, signing his name as counsel for Victorino Flores and indicating the address of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office at 715 Gastambide, Sampaloc, Manila, as his office address.

In the aforesaid Urgent Motion for Postponement, Atty. Aquino stated that he would be unable to
attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on December 12, 1975, at 9:00 a.m., of Civil Case No.
97976 because he needed to attend the hearing of a Habeas Corpus Case4 [Special Proceedings
No. D-00326 entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
of Lordeliza Sohnrey, Federico Teves, Petitioner".] before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court that same day and hour.

However, a certification from the Clerk of Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
stated that a decision had been rendered on the aforementioned special proceedings case, and that
there was no hearing in connection with the case on December 12, 1975, for there was nothing
more to be done in the proceedings and the same was declared closed and terminated.5 [Decision
in Contempt Proceeding of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 97976 dated
February 26, 1976, Records, pp. 62-64.]

Thus, on December 22, 1975, Paraluman Afurong filed a complaint6 [Records, pp. 1-2.] with
this Court for disbarment against Atty. Angel G. Aquino.

According to complainant, appropriate punitive sanction should be meted to Atty. Angel G.

Aquino for filing frivolous harassment cases in the form of Civil Case Nos. 97265 and 97976,
and for giving false allegations in his Urgent Motion for Postponement.

Complainant emphasized that when Civil Case No. 97976 was set for pre-trial on December 12,
1975, at 9:00 a.m., respondent falsely represented that on the same date and hour, he would
attend the hearing also on said date and time of Special Proceedings No. D-00326, entitled "In
the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Lordeliza V. Sohnrey".

Complainant further contended that Atty. Angel G. Aquino misrepresented himself as an

attorney of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, using the name and address of said Office to
postpone the pre-trial hearing of Civil Case No. 97976, on December 12, 1975, despite the fact
that he had been separated from office at the time.

On February 13, 1976, respondent filed with this Court his Answer7 [Records, pp. 5-9.] to the
complaint denying the charges against him, contending that such acts had been done without
malice.

He admitted, however, that at the time of the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 97976 set on December
12, 1975, he was no longer connected with the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, for he was
"included as one of the employees purged by the President in a list published in the newspapers
last October 1, 1975."8 [Answer, Records, pp. 7-8.] Yet, he reasoned, "Not wanting to remove
the case from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office by appearing as private counsel for the
petitioner and still unable to wait for my reinstatement which I was informed was forthcoming, I
decided to file a motion to postpone the pre-trial conference of the case."
He also conceded that, "In order to give more 'force' to my motion for postponement, I indicated
therein that I had to attend the hearing of another case before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court."9 [Ibid., p. 8.]

He further admitted that the filing of the motion with the facts so stated "might have caused some
delay", but justifies such act by stating that "such filing was prompted by some circumstances
which we can consider as inevitable and unavoidable at the moment." He adds, "If I shall be
given another chance to continue handling the case, I promise that this mistake shall never be
repeated."10 [Ibid., p. 8.]

In a Reply filed on April 6, 1976,11 [Records, pp. 37-52.] complainant asserted that Atty. Angel
G. Aquino was declared guilty of contempt of court and correspondingly fined by this Court in a
Decision12 [Records, pp. 62-64.] dated February 26, 1976, for making false allegations in his
Urgent Motion for Postponement.

On May 3, 1976, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. The parties agreed, however, to hold the case in abeyance until the termination
of Civil Case No. 97976.13 [Order dated July 8, 1977.]

Effective June 1, 1988, all cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General
were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation
and disposition as provided in the Revised Rules of Court.14 [Section 20, Rule 139-B, Rules of
Court.]

On May 22, 1997, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted a Report,15 [Report, Annex
"A", Records, pp. 108-112.] finding that respondent Atty. Angel G. Aquino failed to perform his
duties expected of an attorney as provided under the existing Canons of Professional Ethics and
Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court in force at the time of the commission of the acts in
question. Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose recommended that respondent be
penalized with six (6) months suspension.

On July 26, 1997, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the report
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.16 [Notice of Resolution, Records, p.
106.]

We agree.

The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of an attorney to counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to
be honestly debatable under the law.17 [Section 20(c), Rule 138, Rules of Court.] The decision
in Civil Case No. 231552 had reached finality and execution of such decision was being effected.
Respondent Atty. Aquino should not have filed a petition for certiorari considering that there was
no apparent purpose for it than to delay the execution of a valid judgment.

Furthermore, respondent committed falsehood when he stated in his Urgent Motion for
Postponement that he had to attend the hearing of a special proceedings case the same day as the
pre-trial of Civil Case No. 97976. Respondent himself admitted that he only included such
statement "in order to give more 'force'" to the Urgent Motion for Postponement. Such act
violates the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges an attorney to avoid the concealment of
the truth from the court. A lawyer is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.

In this case, Atty. Aquino stated false allegations in his motion for postponement which delayed
the execution of a valid decision. It is worthy to note that the lower court correctly declared
respondent in contempt of court for conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice, in violation of Section 3 (d), Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court.18 [See Decision in Contempt Proceedings of Civil Case No. 97976 of Court of
First Instance, Manila, Branch 40 dated February 26, 1976, Records, pp. 62-64.]

Moreover, Atty. Aquino purposely allowed the court to believe that he was still employed with
the Citizens Legal Assistance Office when in fact he had been purged from said office. That he
was awaiting reinstatement to the same position at the time does not remove the fact that he was
misrepresenting himself to the court. By doing so, he has violated his duty to employ, for the
purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth
and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law.19 [Section 20(d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court.] He could have
delegated the case to another lawyer in the same office.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Angel G. Aquino guilty of malpractice
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for six (6) months commencing upon receipt of
notice hereof.

Let this decision be spread in the personal record of respondent in this Court and copies thereof
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall provide all its chapters with copies
thereof, and the Office of the Court Administrator which shall forthwith provide with copies
thereof all other courts through their respective presiding Justices and Executive Judges.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

SARAH B. VEDANA, complainant, vs. JUDGE EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-96-1351 | 1998-09-03

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Respondent Judge Eudarlio B. Valencia, Presiding Judge of Branch 222 (Quezon City) of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, was charged with gross misconduct and
immoral acts by complainant Sarah B. Vedaña in a sworn letter dated 15 May 1996 addressed to
the Chief Justice through then Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis.

Complainant serves as the court interpreter in respondent's court, and at the same time, is
distantly related to respondent as their maternal grandmothers are first cousins.

Complainant narrated the factual basis of her charge thus:

On May 8, 1996 on or about 2:00 p.m. before the start of the scheduled hearing of cases, the
undersigned complainant in her capacity as a court employee, being a Court Interpreter knocked
at the door of the chamber of the respondent, opened the door to inform the respondent that the
cases scheduled for hearing are ready. At this juncture, respondent directed the undersigned to
come in said chamber. Being a subordinate and thinking that instructions will be given, I did
[sic] complied and went inside the chamber. When I was standing beside his table awaiting for
instructions, respondent held my hands. Bearing in mind that the respondent is a relative and the
holding of my hand was without malice, I did not make any reaction. It was only when my hand
was held for quite sometime and sensing ulterior motive, I pulled my hand. Respondent stood up
from his chair, hugged me and tried to kiss me on the lips which I was able to evade and his lips
landed on my cheek.

Feeling totally shocked by the actuation of the respondent and considering that he is a relative, I
ran out from the chamber and went to my office table to have a relief [sic]. With the dastardly
acts committed in the person of the herein complainant that caused mental anguish, a request was
made on my co-employee, Mr. Eduard Lorenzo to take my place in the court hearing.

In the resolution of 15 July 1996, we required respondent to comment on the complaint and,
upon recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, placed him under preventive
suspension and referred the case to Associate Justice Delilah V. Magtolis of the Court of Appeals
for investigation, report and recommendation.

On 13 August 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of his preventive
suspension and asked to have it lifted as he was entitled to: (a) the "presumption of innocence
against a false and fabricated administrative complaint;" and (b) "due process of law." Moreover,
"the lifting of [the] suspension order will not affect the impartial investigation of [the] case;" and
the suspension order "will create a false impression of guilt."

On 15 August 1996, respondent filed his Comment (cum Motion to Dismiss) wherein, as his
defense, he alleged that: (a) the commission of the alleged misconduct "is inherently and highly
improbable;" and (b) the complaint "is motivated by [a] personal grudge." He then prayed once
more that the suspension order be lifted.

In the resolution of 2 September 1996, we noted the motion for reconsideration and referred the
comment to the designated investigating Justice, Mme. Justice Magtolis, who was directed to
conduct the investigation and submit her report and recommendation within ninety (90) days.

On 19 September 1996, complainant filed her reply to respondent's comment. She asserted that
the denial of respondent could not prevail over her clear and positive assertion and that she could
have never been motivated by a personal grudge; if, indeed, respondent had not committed the
imputed acts, he would not have requested immediate common relatives, such as the Mayor of
Masbate, together with Fiscal Narciso Resero, Jr., to mediate and seek her forgiveness.

On 7 October 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Second Motion to Lift Indefinite Preventive
Suspension.

On 14 October 1996, we granted the inhibition of Mme. Justice Magtolis because her daughter
and respondent's son were batchmates in law school and re-assigned the case to Mme. Justice
Portia A. Hormachuelos for investigation, report and recommendation. However, the latter
requested that she be allowed to inhibit herself to avoid being "misinterpreted" in view of her
recommendation in another case involving sexual harassment by a judge which resulted in the
latter's dismissal from the service. On 22 January 1997, we granted the request and designated
Mr. Justice Romeo A. Brawner of the Court of Appeals the investigating Justice.

On 7 March 1997, we required Mr. Justice Brawner to furnish a report and recommendation on
respondent's Urgent Second Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension; and in his Report and
Recommendation filed on 2 April 1997, Justice Brawner recommended that the motion be
granted.

On 28 April 1997, we approved Justice Brawner's recommendation and lifted respondent's

preventive suspension.

Justice Brawner conducted hearings and received the evidence for the parties. Thereafter, on 13
May 1998, he submitted his Report and Recommendation, wherein he disclosed that the "tedious
hearing[s] starting on March 5, 1997 and ending on December 10, 1997 piled up 2,432 pages of
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the eleven (11) trial dates" when complainant and
her witnesses Marife Opulencia, Joselito Bacolod and Vife Legaspi, and respondent and his
witnesses Bernardo Mortel and Neri G. Loi testified; and made the following findings of fact and
conclusions:

The complainant is the Court Interpreter while the respondent is the Presiding Judge, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 222 at Quezon City.

On May 8, 1996 at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, as was her want to do, the complainant
went to the respondent Judge's chamber to inform him that the cases were ready for trial. She
knocked on the door and upon being told to enter, she poked her head inside the room and told
the respondent that the parties were all present. The respondent however, called her inside the
chamber and bidding to the request, she went in and stood beside his table. The respondent then
held her right hand and tried to kiss her on the lips. However, she evaded the kiss and it landed
on her cheek. The respondent then held her left breast. In her struggle to beak free of the
respondent's hold, the pen she held in her hand fell to the floor. She was able to free herself,
hence she picked up the pen and left the room in a hurry. No one was in the staff room when she
went out and she went straight to the courtroom to perform her duties as Court Interpreter. The
rest of the staff were already at their respective stations awaiting the Judge's entrance. Feeling
shocked at what happened, the complainant approached Eduardo Lorenzo who was then on
apprenticeship training in the court and asked him to help her do the interpreting just in case the
need would arise. Eduardo Lorenzo acceded to her request. The complainant, however, remained
in the courtroom during the entire session except for a few minutes when she went out to the
staff room to get a needed record.

During the whole time that she was inside the courtroom, the complainant never revealed what
happened. When the court session was over however at around 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, she
approached the court stenographer, Vife Legaspi, and asked her if she was going somewhere.
Receiving a negative answer, the complainant requested her to accompany her (complainant) to
Shoemart Shopping Mall (SM). They took a cab and while inside and on their way to SM, the
complainant could not hold it any longer and the dam broke. The complainant was hysterical,
trembling and crying at the same time when she told Vife Legaspi that something terrible
happened. She narrated what the respondent Judge did to her inside the chamber. Upon reaching
SM, the two ladies stayed at a fast food restaurant where they sat conversing for around 3 hours
on what the complainant should do about the incident.

While at SM, the complainant called her best friend and classmate at the Manuel Luis Quezon
University College of Law, Marife Opulencia.

Marife Opulencia recalls receiving a call from the complainant at around 6:00 o'clock in the
evening of May 8, 1996. She was then in her office working overtime when a distraught
complainant who could hardly speak called her up. She then told the complainant to calm down,
take a deep breath and relate what happened. Crying over the phone, the complainant narrated
what the respondent Judge did to her. Marife Opulencia advised the complainant to go home to
her parents and tell them what happened as it was a family matter, the respondent Judge being a
distant relative of the complainant.

The complainant then went home to Dagupan City and informed her parents who were both
shocked at what happened considering that the respondent Judge was a distant relative on
complainant's maternal side and a colleague, complainant's father being a Judge in Dagupan
City.

The following day, May 9, 1996, the complainant's mother went with her back to Manila as the
former wanted to talk to the respondent Judge about what happened. However, that day was the
sports festival of the RTCs in Quezon City and thus it was not a working day. The respondent
Judge was not around and hence there was no occasion for complainant's mother to talk to him.

Because of the incident, the complainant could not face going back to work at Branch 222 and
hence she went on leave from May 10, to June 10, 1996. She subsequently requested that she be
detailed elsewhere, which letter-request, although citing a different cause for the detail, was
approved and thus she was detailed in the office of Judge Amelia R. Andrade of the RTC,
Branch 5 in Manila.
Wanting the respondent Judge to face sanction[s] for his unbecoming behavior, the complainant
instituted the present charges for "Gross Misconduct and Immoral Acts".

In her complaint, complainant stated that the respondent Judge made attempts to try to dissuade
her from continuing with her charges. She presented a common relative, Joselito Bacolod, to
prove this.

Joselito Bacolod testified that respondent Judge is a grandson of his mother while complainant is
his niece, complainant's mother being his older sister. Sometime during the last week of June,
1996, the respondent Judge paid a visit to Joselito Bacolod's mother. His mother then called for
him and his elder brother. The respondent Judge then requested all of them to go to Dagupan
City and try to persuade the complainant and her parents to drop the case against him as he was
retiring from the service in two years time. When asked why he would do such a thing to a
relative, the respondent Judge stated that it was only a fatherly kiss and besides, it was
complainant's hair that he kissed as her perfume smelled good. The respondent Judge gave
Joselito Bacolod P1,000.00 for the use of his taxi to go to Dagupan City.

Respondent Judge absolutely denied all charges against him. He categorically asserted that on
that day at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was inside his chamber waiting to be called if the
cases were ready. The complainant then came and knocked on his door and entered informing
him that the cases were ready for trial. He then prepared himself and stood up and got his robe
which was hanging on the wall and as soon as the complainant went out of his chamber, he
followed, entered the courtroom and heard the cases that day.

He recalls that the complainant applied and was appointed as Court Stenographer in 1995 but she
never did any courtroom duty as such causing him to believe that she was not proficient at
stenography. She then transferred to the position of Court Interpreter sometime in October, 1995.

The respondent admits that indeed he and the complainant are distant relatives as their maternal
grandmothers are first cousins and that they visit each other's families.

The respondent further declares that the complainant came to him and requested that she be
detailed somewhere near Manuel Luis Quezon University where she is a law student as she has
difficulty commuting from the office to school. However, the respondent did not agree to a detail
as the position would not be vacant and his court would be without an Interpreter. He did agree
to a transfer so he could fill in the vacancy and not unduly paralyze the operations of his office.

As he denied the request for detail, he surmised that this might have prompted the complainant to
file this false and malicious charges [sic] against him.

The complainant did not report for work after May 8, 1996 and he was informed by the Clerk of
Court that she was on leave until June 10, 1996. However, after the said date, the complainant
did not yet put in an appearance so he recommended that she be declared absent without official
leave (AWOL).
He only found out about the case against him on August 9, 1996 when he was required by the
Supreme Court to comment on the complaint at the same time putting him on preventive
suspension.

Coming to his defense are two of his staff, Bernardo Mortel, the Process Server and Neri G. Loi,
the Sheriff IV. Both executive an affidavit stating that "because the Chamber's door remained
open, we saw Ms. Sarah Vedana and the Judge conversing and we did not see any untoward
incident happening inside the chamber, much less the Judge allegedly hugging and kissing Ms.
Sarah Vedana" (Joint Affidavit, Exhibit "23"). Further, both claimed that they voluntarily
executed the affidavit without any prodding nor pressure from the respondent.

With these facts presented, the Investigating Justice has thoroughly sifted through the
voluminous transcript of records to separate the material from the immaterial facts, the true [sic]
from the fiction. Amidst all the complainant's assertions and the respondent's counter-statements,
one thing stands out: that the incident did happen the way the complainant said it be [sic].

First, the complainant narrated her story complete with details. She narrated basically the same
story without any change to her best friend and to the stenographer as soon as she was able to.
Although the respondent questions the time lapse between the actual happening of the incident to
the time the complainant narrated her story to the stenographer, this cannot be taken against her.
She was aware that she had duties to attend to considering the absence of the Clerk of Court and
the Legal Researcher. She could not have left right after the incident nor go blurting it out as
there were cases ready for trial. Thus, as soon as it was possible, she revealed it to the
stenographer, Vife Legaspi, who claimed that the complainant was hysterical, crying and angry
at the time that she relayed the incident. She did not even wait for them to reach their destination
as she vent [sic] it out during their taxi ride to SM.

Again when she called her friend Marife Opulencia, the latter manifested that she was crying and
was not able to talk such that she (Marife) advised her to take a deep breath and calm down. If it
is true that she was just making up the story, then she must have been the consummate actress as
she could even fake her emotions and her hysteria.

Second, the respondent claims that the reason for the filing of the charges against him is his
refusal to grant complainant's request that she be detailed in some other office nearer her school.
There is something wrong with this reasoning. The complainant lodged her complaint against the
respondent on May 15, 1996 with the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently because of what happened, she could no longer report back to her workplace and
hence she made the letter-request asking that she be detailed elsewhere using the difficulty of
commuting as her excuse. The respondent Judge recommended the denial of the request in his
2nd Indorsement dated July 18, 1996, which is more than 2 months after the incident on May 8,
1996.

If we follow the reasoning of the respondent that the charges were an offshoot of the denial of
complainant's request, how come the denial came long after the incident happened and long after
the charges were already filed? It would appear that the complainant is psychic as she knew her
request would be denied and so to get even, she filed the complaint way ahead of the yet-to-come
denial. The respondent Judge's reasoning defies logic.

Third, both complainant and respondent agree that they are distant relatives who maintain
friendly and close relations and who exchange favors with each other. Filipino families are close-
knit and would rather keep skeletons in the closet than air dirty linen in public. However, in this
instance, complainant disregarded the close family ties, disregarded the relationship and went on
to denounce the respondent for his act. Why would she go to the extent of breaking up friendly
relations between relatives for no apparent reason? Unless, of course, that her charges against the
respondent are true that she feels she has to right a wrong against her committed by the very
person who she should look up to as her protector.

Her act of revealing what happened to her despite the tension it may create between their
families, despite the break-up of family relations, bespeaks the truth that indeed the respondent
Judge committed such a dastardly act upon her person.

Amidst this unfazed accusation hurdled against the respondent, he denies it all. But his denial is a
feeble attempt to exculpate him from the wrongdoing he is accused of. The clear assertion of the
complainant and that of her witnesses prevails over the denial of the respondent.

What must have possessed the respondent Judge to commit such an act against his very own
relative is difficult to comprehend. Was his lust too great that he would take it out on his helpless
female relative in the hope that being a relative, it would not leak out as some things are better
kept within the family? He did not reckon that the complainant would defy family relations and
bare all if only to put a stop to respondent's shenanigan [sic], isolated though it may be.

Being a person cloaked with authority to uphold the law, the respondent Judge should be the first
to be circumspect in his behavior. As held in Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. V.[sic]
Tapucar, 102 SCRA 494:

"The personal and official actuations of every member of the Bench must be beyond reproach
and above suspicion. The faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice
cannot be maintained if a Judge who dispenses it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue
of moral integrity, and if he obtusely continues to commit an affront to public decency. In fact,
moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the Judiciary. x x x"

This Investigation [sic] Justice believes that based on the facts and the law, the respondent Judge
should be meted out a punishment.

Justice Brawner then recommended:

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent GUILTY of the complaint [sic] filed against him, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that respondent Judge EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA be
suspended from office for sixty (60) days without pay.

The main issue in this case is factual and depends on the assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses, a function which is primarily lodged in the investigating Justice. The rule which
concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial
judges in civil and criminal cases where preponderance of evidence1 [Sec. 1, Rule 133, Rules of
Court.] and proof beyond reasonable doubt,2 [Sec. 2, id., id.] respectively, are required, applies,
a fortiori, in administrative cases where the quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence.3 [Sec. 5, id., id.] The trial judge is in a better position to determine whether the
witnesses are telling the truth or lying considering that the latter are in his immediate presence
and can thus hear the witnesses themselves and observe their deportment and manner of
testifying. Unless it be shown that the judge has plainly overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if otherwise taken into
account, would alter the result, or it be clearly shown to be arbitrary, his evaluation of the
credibility of a witness should be upheld.4 [People v. Pama, 216 SCRA 385 (1992); People v.
Taneo, 218 SCRA 494 (1993); People v. Jumamoy, 221 SCRA 339 (1993); National Power
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 649 (1993); People v. Quijada, 223 SCRA 77
(1993)] We find no room to accommodate the exception to the rule in the case of Justice
Brawner's assessment, which we find to be a meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the
testimonies of the complainant, the respondent and their respective witnesses.

While we concur, without reservation, with Justice Brawner's factual findings, we are, however,
unable to adopt his recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed, which we find too light in
view of the gravity, nature and import of the offense as to complainant and the Judiciary.

It is truly beyond us what possessed respondent Judge to commit acts which may be deemed
deplorable, to say the least, against complainant, who, although a distant relative in legal
contemplation, was from a family with whom respondent admittedly maintained friendly and
close relations. If this were a criminal prosecution and assuming that the procedural and
evidentiary requirements had been complied with, respondent would be found guilty of, at least,
unjust vexation, as defined by and penalized in Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.

As it stands, respondent's violation of complainant's personhood, coupled with his being a public
official, holding a position in the Judiciary and specifically entrusted with the sacred duty of
administering justice, breached Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandate, respectively, that "a judge should avoid impropriety
and appearance of impropriety in all activities," and that "a judge's official conduct should be
free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and
in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
These most exacting standards of decorum are demanded from magistrates if only, in the
language of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to "promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."

The spirit and philosophy underlying these Canons is best expressed in Castillo v. Calanog5 [199
SCRA 75, 83 [1991] thus:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life can not simply be detached
or separated from his personal existence: Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.6 [See also Junio v. Rivera, Jr., 225 SCRA 688, 706 (1993); Imbing v. Tiongson, 229
SCRA 690, 697 (1994)

Verily, no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any
individual than a seat on the Bench. Within the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an
important and visible symbol of government, especially considering that as opposed to appellate
courts, trial court judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the
communities which the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in
the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him.
Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome
of integrity and justice.7 [Jugueta v. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27, 31 (1974); Dia-Añonuevo v.
Beracio, 68 SCRA 81, 89 (1975); Association of Court Employees of Panabo, Davao v. Tupas,
175 SCRA 292, 296 (1989); National Intelligence and Security Authority v. Tablang, 199 SCRA
766, 776 (1991); Imbing v. Tiongson, supra note 6.] In insulating the Bench from unwarranted
criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar's
wife, should be above suspicion.

That the acts complained of were committed within respondent's sanctum in his court and
without any third party to witness the commission likewise compounded the reprehensible nature
of respondent's malfeasance. By daring to violate complainant within the sanctity and secrecy of
his chambers, respondent did the utmost violence to complainant within a place which, properly
viewed, is an integral part of a temple of justice -- in his court.

Respondent judge likewise violated Canon 22 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which exhorts a
judge to be "studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be
a demoralizing example to others." In De la Paz v. Inutan,8 [64 SCRA 540, 548-549 (1975)] we
held that the judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. From
him, people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of
justice between two conflicting interests. Thus, for the judge to earn and reciprocate the respect,
he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow. As such, he
should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law.

Indeed, when a judge himself becomes a transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply in
appropriate cases before him, or before any court for that matter, as where he commits any crime
punished by the Revised Penal Code or special laws, he places his office in disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary itself, as
well as the legal system.

Before closing, it is apropos to discuss the implications of the enactment of R.A. No. 78779 [An
Act Declaring Sexual Harassment Unlawful in the Employment, Education or Training
Environment, and for Other Purposes, approved 14 February 1995, 91 O.G. No. 15 2144.] or the
Anti-Sexual Harassment Law to the Judiciary. Under our system of governance, the very tenets
of our republican democracy presuppose that the will of the people is expressed, in large part,
through the statutes passed by the Legislature. Thus, the Court, in instances such as these, may
take judicial notice of the heightened sensitivity of the people to gender-related issues as
manifested through legislative issuances. It would not be remiss to point out that no less than the
Constitution itself has expressly recognized the invaluable contributions of the women's sector to
national development,10 [Art. II, Section 14, which reads: "The State recognizes the role of
women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men."] thus the need to provide women with a working environment conducive to
productivity and befitting their dignity.11 [Art. XIII, Section 14 provides: "The State shall
protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account
their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and
enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation."]

In the community of nations, there was a time when discrimination was institutionalized through
the legalization of now prohibited practices. Indeed, even within this century, persons were
discriminated against merely because of gender, creed or the color of their skin, to the extent that
the validity of human beings being treated as mere chattel was judicially upheld in other
jurisdictions. But in humanity's march towards a more refined sense of civilization, the law has
stepped in and seen it fit to condemn this type of conduct for, at bottom, history reveals that the
moving force of civilization has been to realize and secure a more humane existence. Ultimately,
this is what humanity as a whole seeks to attain as we strive for a better quality of life or higher
standard of living. Thus, in our nation's very recent history, the people have spoken, through
Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of sexual harassment or hazing,12 [R.A. No. 8049, An
Act Regulating Hazing and Other Forms of Initiation Rites in Fraternities, Sororities and
Organizations and Providing Penalties Therefor, approved 7 June 1995, 91 O.G. No. 33, 5204.]
acts previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal. In disciplining erring judges and
personnel of the Judiciary then, this Court can do no less.

Plainly, respondent's conduct against complainant, a woman young enough to be his daughter or
niece, violated numerous Canons of judicial decorum. Respondent's indiscretions may be
deemed, for the lack of more forceful and emphatic words, grave misconduct, conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the Judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the
service. The penalty of suspension from office, without pay, for one (1) year is in order, this
being his first offense.

If only to underscore respondent's temerity, he even attempted to insult the intelligence of this
Court and its Members by claiming ill motive on the part of complainant in filing this suit, but
the folly of his charge was so readily exposed by Justice Brawner.
WHEREFORE, for violations of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons 3 and 22
of the Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct becoming an officer
of the Judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, respondent Judge
EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA, Presiding Judge, Branch 222 (Quezon City), National Capital
Judicial Region, is SUSPENDED from the office, without pay, for ONE (1) YEAR, with the
period of preventive suspension he has thus served so far being credited to him in the service of
said penalty.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug, and Panganiban JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., no part.

LEOPOLDO G. DACERA, JR., complainant, vs. Judge TEODORO A. DIZON, JR., RTC,
Branch 37, General Santos City, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573 | 2000-08-02

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For allegedly persuading complainant to execute an affidavit of desistance, a "Verified Motion to

Disqualify Trial Judge"1 [Rollo, p. 12.] was filed in Criminal Case No. 11298 pending before
Judge Teodoro A. Dizon, Jr. A copy of the motion was furnished the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), who recommended that the case be investigated by an Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals.

In a Resolution dated June 23, 1997,2 [Ibid., p. 22.] the Court designated Associate Justice
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis to investigate the charges against the respondent.

After investigating the matter, Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis made the following factual
findings:

1.)....The herein complainant, Leopoldo Dacera, Jr. is also the private complainant in Criminal
Case No. 11982 for Qualified Theft against accused GARYO TOLOMONG, NILDA
TOLOMONG, NILO APAD, BAIN APAD, MINA COLONG, ROSITA COLONG, and
TAWAYA GIBAN. Said case was initially assigned to the sala of respondent judge (Branch 37,
RTC, General Santos City). The said accused, members of the B'laan tribe plus one (1)
Indonesian, were suspected of stealing coconuts from the Dacera plantation formerly belonging
to the estate of the father of Leopoldo Dacera, Jr. the case was filed on August 29, 1996.

2.)....Bail was set at P40,000.00 for each of the accused. The accused were arrested on
September 18, 1996, they filed a Joint Motion for Reduction of Bail from P40,000.00 to P10,000
(Exhibit "C").

3.)....On October 1, 1996, Judge Dizon issued an order granting the motion for reduction of bail
to P10,000.00.

4.)....On October 3, 1996, the accused filed a Joint Motion to Admit Property Bond in lieu of
cash bond. The motion was granted by Judge Dizon on October 7, 1996, whereby he authorized
the accused to file a property bond with a market value of no less than P50,000.00 and registered
with the Register of Deeds of General Santos City (Exhibit "D").

5.)....On October 10, 1996, a Motion to Dismiss (Exhibit "2") was filed by 3rd Assistant City
Prosecutor Edilberto L. Jamora of General Santos City, based on an affidavit of desistance
(Exhibit "2-C") purportedly executed by Leopoldo Dacera, Jr.

6.)....On October 11, 1996, an Urgent Verified Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Motion To Dismiss
(Exhibits "3" to "3-B") was filed by State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, with the approval of City
Prosecutor Franklin G. Gacal, praying for the withdrawal of the Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the affidavit of desistance upon which it was based was the "outcome of undue influence
applied by certain quarters upon Leopoldo Dacera, Jr. who was persuaded to execute the same
without being appraised of the full import and consequences of such relinquishment of legal
right." The said motion likewise alleged inter alia that the private complainant who was then
unaided by counsel, was not made aware that his grant of concessions in such case cannot be
binding upon his co-heirs who are not parties to the case and who have not been fully informed
of the proceedings; and neither was he made aware that he could be liable for a counter-suit for
damages and/or malicious prosecution, considering the tenor in his affidavit, i.e. "after a sole
(sic) searching on my part".

From the foregoing factual findings, Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis recommended that
respondent judge be exonerated of the charge of bias and partiality in connection with Criminal
Case No. 11982. She, however, further recommended that respondent judge be admonished to
refrain from making calls to any party-litigant or counsel who have pending cases before him to
avoid any suspicion of personal interest in any case pending in his sala on the basis of the
following evaluation:

After a close scrutiny of the evidence on both sides, the undersigned investigator finds no
conclusive evidence showing that respondent judge is personally biased in favor of the accused
in Criminal Case No. 11982, it appearing that he did not actually dismiss the case despite the
prosecutor's filing of a Motion to Dismiss based on the private complainant's affidavit of
desistance. As a matter of fact, he (respondent Judge) voluntarily inhibited himself from trying
the said case as soon as the private complainant filed a motion to disqualify him.

However, from the very own testimony of the said judge, it is obvious that he called the
complainant by phone, asking him to come to his chambers, purportedly to verify the truth of the
affidavit of desistance he (complainant) signed on October 9, 1996 (Exhibit "2-C"). Privately
calling any party even just to verify something is suspicious and does not speak well of the cold
neutrality of a judge. Moreover, if it were true that Dacera had previously seen him (Judge
Dizon) in chambers to "beg" him to dismiss the case (Criminal Case No. 11982), it is no longer
necessary for the judge to call or see Dacera to verify whether or not he indeed signed the
affidavit of desistance. He (respondent) should have known already that that was Dacera's desire.
What he (respondent) should have done - if he really wanted to still verify - was to immediately
set the Motion to Dismiss for hearing, and make an official verification in open court in the
presence of all parties concerned. The voluntary admission of the judge that he did call up the
complainant could be an indication that he indeed called him (Dacera) to his chambers to talk
about the case - as testified to by the complainant.

At any rate, the complainant appeared to be candid and truthful when he testified. It is obvious
that he could not have concocted the information narrated in his affidavit of October 24, 1996
(Exhibit "6") and testified to by him in a straightforward and convincing manner. Anyway, any
private complainant who has lost interest in the prosecution of a criminal case - if indeed this
was what happened in Criminal Case No. 11982 - need not see the judge in chambers. All that he
needs to do is to tell the prosecutor or the judge handling the case at the next setting.

In this connection it must be pointed out that Prosecutor Jamora, who is the prosecutor assigned
to the sala of the respondent Judge, alleged that the affidavit of desistance and Motion to Dismiss
were already prepared when Dacera and his companions came to him. Since Dacera was not
assisted by any private prosecutor and he could not have prepared such documents, both written
in English, by himself (as in fact, he even had to testify in the Cebuano dialect during
investigation), there is only one conclusion that could be made, i.e. that the preparation thereof
was as narrated by the complainant.

Of course, this investigator notes that there is a discrepancy in the complainant's allegation that
he signed the affidavit in the judge's chambers on the one hand, and the testimony of Prosecutor
Jamora that the said affidavit was signed before him. In weighing these two conflicting
statements, this investigator gives more credence to the testimony of the complainant for the
reason that a prosecutor attends to so many cases, and it is possible that he may not remember all
the particular details of a case. On the other hand, the circumstances narrated by the complainant
in a straightforward manner appear to be very vivid in his mind. It is possible that when he went
to Prosecutor Jamora, the affidavit was already signed. In any case, the complainant has nothing
to gain and everything to lose by testifying falsely against a judge.

It is also to be noted that the complainant was a reluctant witness. He did not appear at the initial
hearing set by this investigator and just sent word that he had already desisted, and he was
standing by his affidavit of desistance (Exhibit "14"). It was only when this investigator sent
word through the complainant's brother, Prosecutor Leo Dacera III (who appeared for his
brother-complainant) that he (complainant) should come or face the consequences for wasting
the time and resources of the Court and of this investigator, that the said complainant made an
appearance. When he did, he reiterated his desire to withdraw from the case. However, his
testimony on the substantive matters was still an affirmance of his allegations in his affidavit of
October 23, 1996 which was treated as his complaint-affidavit.

Be that as it may, the circumstances that transpired thereafter, i.e., the respondent's "setting
aside" of the motion to dismiss, and his voluntary withdrawal from the case, thus enabling
another judge to take over, negates the allegation of personal interest or bias in Criminal Case
No. 11982. In fact, it is possible that there were pressures brought to bear upon the respondent
judge, in view of the report that the accused B'laans (in Criminal Case No. 11982) were creating
problems in the City Jail, as according to Prosecutor Jamora, they brought their entire families
there. Possibly, this "problem" was related to the alleged "threat" mentioned by the judge to the
complainant, as testified to by the latter. The respondent judge, however, did not mention this in
his testimony, as he denied as a whole the complainant's averments.

In any case, as stated above, this investigator cannot find sufficient basis to conclude that there
was malice or bad faith in the judge's actuations. Most probably, he wanted to finish the case
because of pressures, if not threats. These are "hazards of the trade" so to speak. If at all, the
judge could have only been guilty of judicial indiscretion or impropriety when he admittedly
made a private phone call to, or sent for, the complainant, and talked to him in the chambers.

As held in the case of Capuno vs. Jaramillo (234 SCRA 212, 222), judges have been cautioned to
avoid in-chamber sessions without the other party and his counsel present, and to observe
prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they not only act impartially and with
propriety, but are also perceived to be impartial and proper.

Moreover, the Canons of Judicial Ethics provide:

"Canon II

"Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

Rule 2.01: A Judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary. (Contreras vs. Solis, 260 SCRA 572; 581)."

The recommendation of Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis is well-taken.

In the present case, there indeed is no clear proof of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations which attended the acts of respondent. Nonetheless, the acts of respondent still
leave much to be desired and is deserving of reproof. A judge is not only required to be
impartial; he must also appear to be impartial.3 [Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.]
Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.4 [Gacayan v. Hon. Fernando Vil
Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483, 17 September 1999.] It was, thus, held that it is improper for
a judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of the complainant.5 [Gallo v.
Cordero, 245 SCRA 219 (1995)] It need not be overemphasized that making private phone calls
to, sending for and talking to the complainant in the judge's chambers, as in this case,
undermines even more the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.

A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.6
[Prosecutor Salvador C. Ruiz v. Judge Agelio L. Bringas, MTC, Branch I, Butuan City, A.M.
No. MTJ-00-126, 6 April 2000, p. 8.] Stated differently, "It is an ironclad principle that a judge
must not only be impartial; he or she must also appear to be impartial. Hence, the judge 'must, at
all times, maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. His language, both written and
spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.'"7 [De Vera
v. Dames III, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1455, 13 July 1999, 310 SCRA 213, citing People v. Serrano,
203 SCRA 171 (1991), citing Fecundo v. Berjamen, 180 SCRA 235 (1989)]

Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.8 [In
Re: Judge Benjamin H. Virrey, 202 SCRA 628 (1991)] As stressed by the Court in Magarang v.
Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr.9 [A.M. No. RTJ-99-1448, 6 April 2000, pp. 11-12.] "Judges must
adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.10 [Rule 1.], Code of Judicial Conduct.] A judge's conduct must be
above reproach.11 [Canon 31, Canons of Judicial Ethics.] Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not
only be pure but above suspicion.12 [Palang v. Zosa, 58 SCRA 776 (1974)] A judge's private as
well as official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety and be
beyond reproach."13 [Dysico v. Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275 (1996)] Viewed vis-á -vis the
factual landscape of this case, it is clear that respondent judge transgressed Canon 2, Rules 2.00
and 2.01 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. His acts have been less than circumspect. He should
have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and should have endeavored to
distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum. He must, thus, be
sanctioned.14 [See Prudential Bank v. Castro, 142 SCRA 223, (1986)] In this regard, the Court
pointed out in Rallos, et al. v. Judge Irineo Lee Gako, Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City,15 [A.M.
Nos. RTJ-99-1484 and RTJ-99-1484 (A), 17 March 2000, p. 19.] that:

Well-known is the judicial norm that 'judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial.' Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing,
would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge.
Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free
of suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court
judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with
the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between the conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the people's sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond
reproach.16 [Citing Macasa v. Imbing, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1470, 16 August 1999; italics
supplied.]

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that "A judicial office traces a line around his
official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for occupying an exalted position in
the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his
activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no
ground for reproach."17 [Virginia Villaluz Vda. de Enriquez v. Judge Jaime F. Bautista, A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1439, 9 May 2000, citing San Juan v. Bagalsca, 283 SCRA 416 (1997)]

WHEREFORE, the complaint filed by Leopoldo G. Dacera Jr. against Judge Teodoro A. Dizon,
Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, General Santos City is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. However, respondent Judge is ADMONISHED to refrain from making calls to any
parties-litigant and/or counsel with cases pending in his sala and sternly warned that a repetition
of the same will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

CLETO DOCENA, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, respondent.

A.C. No. 2387 | 1998-09-10

DECISION

PER CURIAM

On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto Docena against Atty.
Dominador Q. Limon, Sr., on grounds of malpractice, gross misconduct, and violation of
attorney's oath.

It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyers on appeal in Civil Case No.
425 for Forcible Entry. While the appeal was pending before the then Court of First Instance of
Eartern Samar, Branch I, respondent required therein defendants-appellants Docena spouses to
post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the execution of the
appealed decision.

To raise the required, complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from the
Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines; borrowed
P2,140.00 from a private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan of P4,860.00 from the
Borongan, Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank, wherein respondent himself acted as
guarantor (tsn, Session of July 8, 1983, pp. 33-34). The amount of P4,860.00 was produced by
complainant in response to respondent's letter dated September 2, 1979 (Exh. "C", tsn, p. 26,
ibid.) demanding delivery of the aforesaid amount, thus:

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Docena:

I wish to remind you that today is the last day for the deposit of the balance of P4,860.00.

Atty. Batica was in court yesterday verifying whether you have deposited the said balance and
the Honorable Judge informed him that you have until today to deposit the said amount.
I wish to inform you that the Honorable Judge will be in Sta. Fe tomorrow for rural service.

We will be waiting for you tomorrow September 22, 1979, at Sta. Fe as you promised.

Very truly yours,

(Signed)

On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar rendered a decision on the
appealed case in favor of the Docena spouses.

After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the supersedeas bond of
P10,000.00 but he thereupon discovered that no such bond was ever posted by respondent.

When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he never complied with such
undertaking despite repeated demands from the Docena spouses.

In his answer the herein complaint, respondent claimed that the P10,000.00 was his attorney's
fees for representing the Docena spouses in their appeal. But this self-serving allegation is belied
by the letter (quoted above) of respondent himself demanding from the Docena spouses the
balance of P4,860.00 supposedly to be deposited in court to stay the execution of the appealed
decision of the MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to return the P10,000.00 to the
Docena spouses is also an admission that the money was never his, and that it was only entrusted
to him for deposit.

After due investigation and hearing, the Intergrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and ordered to return the amount
of P8,500.00 (he had earlier paid complainant P1,500.00, but nothing more) within 1 month from
notice, and should he fail to do so, he shall be suspended indefinitely.

The Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Truly, the amount involved may be small,
but the nature of the transgression calls for a heavier sanction. The Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that:

Canon 1. x x x

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 16. x x x

Canon 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received from the
client.

Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is not a condition
precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order
to maintain one's good standing in the exclusive and honored fraternity (Villanueva vs. Atty.
Teresita Sta. Ana, 245 SCRA 707 [1995]).

It has been said time and again, and this cannot overemphasize, that the law is not a trade nor a
craft but a profession (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983, p. 1). Its basic ideal is to render public service
and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. [Mayer vs. State Bar, 2 Call2d 71, 39 P2d 206
(1934), cited in Agpalo, id.] If it has to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal,
those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by
their live, accord continuing fidelity to them. (Agpalo, id) By extorting money from his client
through deceit and misrepresentation, respondent Limon has reduced the law profession to a
level so base, so low and dishonorable, and most contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his
brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded the peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By
his reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of his depraved character, respondent has made
himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys. He should be disbarred.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is hereby DISBARRED. The Office
of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondent is
likewise ordered to return the amount of P8,500.00, the balance of the money entrusted to him by
complainant Docena, within one (1) month from the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., on official leave.

LILIA FERRER TUCAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL R. TUCAY, respondent.

A.C. No. 5170 | 1999-11-17

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Complainant Lilia F. Tucay, feeling deeply aggrieved by the immoral conduct of her husband
Atty. Manuel Tucay, seeks the latter's disbarment in the instant administrative proceedings.

Complainant and respondent have long been married, the two taking their vows years back on 14
July 1963 at the St. Ignatius church, Camp Murphy, in Quezon City. For thirty years, the couple
have lived together with their children.

Just a few days before their thirtieth anniversary or on 07 July 1993 to be exact, with the first
marriage still subsisting, respondent lawyers contracted another marriage with one Myrna C.
Tuplano, herself married since 1983 to a certain Florante T. Tabilog. Respondent left the
conjugal dwelling in July 1993 to cohabit with Myrna Tuplano.

Complainant also caused the filing of bigamy charge against respondent lawyer and his second
wife, docketed Criminal Case No. Q-94-54709, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, of
Quezon City, which case still pends. In an attempt to defeat the early prosecution of the criminal
case, respondent filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking the
judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage. The petition was later dismissed due to
lack of interest; subsequently, however, respondent filed a second petition for the same purpose,
this time with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. In both petitions, he averred that neither he
nor the other supposed party to the second marriage was physically present on the date of its
alleged celebration thereby rendering void any such marriage, if at all, under the provisions of
Article 3, paragraph 3, and Article 6 of the Family Code.

The IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Jaime V. Vibar gave neither credence nor validity to the
explanation of respondent and recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the disbarment of
Atty. Tucay for gross misconduct and failure to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of every member of the Bar. On 13 December 1997, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XIII-97-164 which "RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE" the report
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner after being satisfied that the latter's
findings were amply supported by the evidence on record.

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage, a matter which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
It is enough that the records of this administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed
respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, grossly immoral conduct
and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This
detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and
privileges which his license confers upon him.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. The grounds enumerated in Section
27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, including deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so, are
not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of
impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A
lawyer at no time must be wanting in probity and moral fiber which not only are conditions
precedent to his entrance to, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership in,
a great and noble profession.

The Court concurs with the IBP-CBD and IBP Board of Governors in their findings and thus
accepts their recommendation that respondent lawyers, having ceased to meet and possess the
qualifications required of every lawyer, must forthwith be disbarred.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to disbar respondent Atty. Manuel Tucay immediately
upon his receipt of this Resolution. Let a copy hereof be made a part of the records of said
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

ATTY. LAURO D. GACAYAN and NOEL SAROL, complainants vs. Hon. FERNANDO
VIL PAMINTUAN in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Baguio City, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483 | 1999-09-17

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In this administrative complaint, respondent stands charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Incompetence, Partiality and Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.

The factual and procedural antecedents as summed by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) are as follows:

"Complainant Noel Sarol is the accused in Criminal Case No. 14549-R, for Homicide, which
was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Baguio City, in an information dated
September 26, 1996.

On October 14, 1996, complainant Sarol was allegedly arraigned and thereafter, trial followed.
The Honorable Joven Costales was then the Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Baguio City.

After the prosecution rested its case, the then Presiding Judge Hon. Joven Costales, directed the
accused to present his evidence on March 2, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning. Complainant Sarol
through counsel instead of presenting his evidence filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
Evidence with the Demurrer to Evidence already attached to said Motion.
On March 2, 1998, the Demurrer to Evidence was scheduled for hearing. The Trial Prosecutor,
however, asked for ten (10) days within which to submit his Opposition thereto. Thus, Judge
Costales was constrained to set the hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence on May 4, 1998 at 8:30
in the morning.

Meanwhile, the Honorable Fernando Vil Pamintuan took over as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Baguio City. For the first time he presided in the hearing of the
case. He then inquired from the Trial Prosecutor about his announced Opposition to the
Demurrer to Evidence and the latter manifested off-the-record that he is not submitting anymore
said Opposition. Thereafter respondent directed the trial prosecutor and complainant Atty.
Gacayan to see him in his chambers where he reportedly said the following:

"You see somebody died here and I can not just dismiss this case as a result of insufficiency of
evidence. I want to talk to the mother of the deceased."

or words to that effect.

Consequently, he issued an order which directed the mother and the brother of the deceased who
were not listed as witnesses in the information to appear in the 'HEARING ON THE
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE' scheduled for May 25, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning. No other
persons were required to appear on May 25, 1998.

On May 25, 1998, complainants herein were surprised to see inside the courtroom the witnesses
who were already presented by the prosecution, namely, Restituto Abuan and Alejandro
Castaneda. The record of the case shows that a subpoena was issued to all prosecution witnesses,
including the policemen who already testified to appear on said date without any motion from
the prosecution or from the accused requesting for their appearance considering that the same
was for the hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence only. It was allegedly based purely on the
initiative of the respondent judge.

The mother and brother of the deceased as well as the other 'witnesses' subpoenaed by
respondent Judge on his own discretion, were absent on said day thus, he set the hearing on the
Demurrer to Evidence on June 23, 1998 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning sharp. Thereafter,
complainant Atty. Gacayan made the observation that the proceedings then taking place was
unprocedural. He was warned that he would be cited for contempt if he shall say that again.

Complainant Atty. Gacayan claims that at about 10:30 in the morning of May 25, 1998 while he
was about to leave the sala of RTC, Branch 4, Baguio City, which is next to RTC, Branch 3, he
observed that the prosecution witnesses (Alejandro Castaneda and Restituto Abuan) who
allegedly testified for the prosecution were seen talking to the respondent Judge. Thus, he (Atty.
Gacayan) went near the door of the Session Hall of RTC Branch 3 and when seen by respondent
Judge, asked him to approach the bench. Thereafter respondent Judge continued asking questions
to said witnesses on whether they saw complainant Sarol stabbed (sic) the victim, which they
answered 'no'.

Complainant contends that when said witnesses testified, they categorically stated under oath
that they did not witness the incident. It was obvious that the Honorable Respondent Judge
wanted the said witnesses to admit that they saw the killing. Thereupon, he again manifested his
objections to the procedure being followed by the Honorable Respondent judge considering that:

1]......the prosecution had long rested its case;

2.]......the Court had long granted the accused's Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence
and that the hearing being conducted is supposed to be a hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence,
not [the] presentation of prosecution's evidence; and

3]......the hearing for that day insofar as the Sarol case had been adjourned and terminated.

On June 17, 1998, respondent Judge ordered the arrest of one Mirriam Dominguez whom he
described as an "eyewitness" to the incident. This was done without any motion from the
Prosecution and though there is no record whatsoever supporting said conclusion that she is an
eyewitness. Thereafter respondent Judge talked alone to said witness in his chambers.

In view of the unusual interest exhibited by the respondent Judge in favor of the prosecution and
the highly unusual procedure he was then conducting the hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence,
they filed a Motion to Suspend further Proceedings on the Demurrer to Evidence until the
Motion for Inhibition is resolved by the Honorable Court.

Considering that there is no resolution yet on his Motion for Inhibition as well as the pending
Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings, complainant Atty. Gacayan did not appear in the
hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence.

The minutes of the hearing on June 23, 1998 shows that the respondent Judge made the
following orders:

a.......DENYING the Motion for Inhibition;

b.......DENYING the Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings;

c.......ORDERING the prosecution to present the witness who was ordered arrested by the
Honorable Court though:

1.......There was no valid motion complying with the requisites of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
filed by the prosecution praying that it be allowed to present further evidence - assuming such a
procedure is allowed considering that it had long rested its case and there is a pending
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;

2.......There is no resolution yet on the demurrer to evidence.

d.......ORDERING the PAO lawyer who was then present in court to act as counsel de officio
without giving said lawyer sufficient time to study the case.
e.......ORDERING the continuation of hearing of said case to June 24, 1998 at 8:30 in the
morning and 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

In the morning of June 24, 1998 at 8:30, respondent Judge again called the above case for
hearing despite the fact that there was no notice sent to complainant Atty. Gacayan. At 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon of June 24, 1998, he appeared as counsel for the accused and right then
and there, he was ordered by the respondent Judge to conduct the cross-examination of the
witness he ordered arrested despite:

a.......his vigorous objections to the unprocedural manner in which the hearing on the Demurrer
to Evidence is being conducted by the respondent judge;

b.......his objection that there was no motion duly set for hearing for the re-opening of the
prosecution's evidence;

c.......the fact that he has not heard the testimony of the witness presented by the prosecution who
was ordered arrested by the respondent Judge without any motion from the prosecution;

d.......the fact that there was no transcript of records of the testimony of the witness ordered
arrested by the respondent Judge on his own without any motion from the prosecution.

Consequently, respondent Judge agreed to the resetting of the cross-examination of the witnesses
but ordered the resumption of the hearing of said case on July 1, 1998 at 2:00 p.m. despite his
(Atty. Gacayan's) vigorous objection considering his obvious partiality. This is so because as
early as June 22, 1998, respondent informed the lawyers that the calendar of the court is already
full, yet he scheduled for June 24, 1998 at both 8:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. the Sarol case when the
testimony of the witness he ordered arrested was not completed on June 23, 1998. Complainants
contend that the act of respondent Judge is highly unusual to say the least and a blatant violation
of the unwritten rule on how a judge shall conduct himself.

Complainants stressed that considering the patent disregard by the respondent Judge of the basic
rules governing the trial of the criminal case, they were left with no other recourse but to bring
the matter to the attention of this Honorable Court in order for it to exercise its function as well
as its disciplinary powers over men in robes who are causing litigants to lose trust in our judicial
system.

On August 7, 1996, Hon. Court Administrator Benipayo directed respondent Judge Fernando Vil
Pamintuan to comment on the complaint of Atty. Lauro Gacayan and Mr. Noel Sarol.

Respondent Judge in his comment alleged in sum that:

1.......He was a newly-appointed Judge of barely a few months when introduced to Criminal Case
No. 14549-R, it was still on a hearing stage on accused's Demurrer to Evidence;

2.......On May 4, 1998, as the new Judge inquired into the nature of the case and called for the
Public Prosecutor Benedicto T. Carantes and counsel for the accused, Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan, in
his Chamber and informed them that he would need time to examine the testimony of the
witnesses and other evidence already on record. Thus, the hearing of the Demurrer to Evidence
was reset on May 25, 1998, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning with the agreement of both Public
Prosecutor and counsel for the accused. However, he takes exception to counsel for the accused's
allegation that he would not dismiss the case for insufficiency of evidence. He simply said that
he had to study the record of this case and see the witnesses and the private complainant/relatives
of the victim in Court so that he could be properly oriented as to the evidence in this case;

3.......On May 25, 1998, only two (2) prosecution's witnesses appeared, Restituto Abuan and
Alejandro Castaneda, whose presence were (sic) known to counsel for the accused, Atty. Lauro
D. Gacayan. These witnesses affirmed that they did not see the killing of the victim. This was in
the presence of counsel for the accused, Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan. Then, he issued an order
requiring the witnesses who failed to appear to show cause why they should not be cited in
contempt of court. The hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence was reset to June 23, 1998, at 8:30
o'clock in the morning. Again, said resetting was with the consent of the Public Prosecutor and
counsel for the accused.

4.......For failure of the prosecution's witnesses Mirriam Dominguez and Joseph Sarol to appear
in Court, despite notice, and again failure to show cause why they should not be cited in
contempt of court, the Court issued a warrant for their arrest. Mirriam Dominguez was arrested
on June 16, 1998. Since the next hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence was still on June 23, 1998,
Mirriam Dominguez could have been detained at the Baguio City Jail until the said next hearing.
That was the reason why she had to see him for her possible release before June 23, 1998. Had
he not granted an audience to prosecution witness Mirriam Dominguez, she could have been
detained at the Baguio City Jail from June 17, 1998 to June 23, 1998. With the commitment that
she would appear on the June 23, 1998 hearing, and further commitment to bring along [the]
prosecution's eyewitness Neil Joseph Sarol, she was released. This occasion was transparent and
properly recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of June 17, 1998;

5.......On June 23, 1998, [the] prosecution's eyewitness Joseph Sarol appeared in Court and upon
motion of the Public Prosecutor that the prosecutor is resting its case (sic) be set aside given the
appearance of an eyewitness to the crime who could not be found before, the Court granted the
same in the interest of justice. His act in allowing the prosecution to introduce an eyewitness in a
crime despite the fact that the prosecution had already rested its case is supported by a legion of
cases in jurisprudence.1 [Citing U.S. v. Cinco, 8 Phil. 388 (1907); People v. Concepcion, 84 Phil.
787 (1949); Alegre v. Reyes, 181 SCRA 80 (1990); U.S. v. Visquera, 4 Phil. 380 (1905); U.S. v.
Tria, 17 Phil. 303 (1910); Alvarez v. Guevarra Wee, 47 Phil. 12 (1924); Gaas v. Fortich, 54 Phil.
196 (1929); Siuliong & Co. v. Ylagan, 43 Phil. 393 (1922); U.S. v. Alviar, 36 Phil. 804 (1917);
Lopez v. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429 (1948); People v. Castro-Bartolome, 204 SCRA 38 (1991)]

Also in the scheduled hearing, counsel for the accused, Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan, failed to appear,
despite notice. Prompting him to appoint a counsel de officio for the accused in the person of
Atty. Reynaldo Banta [the] detailed PAO lawyer in court. Testimony of the eyewitness Neil
Joseph Sarol on direct and initial cross-examination was completed.

6.......On June 24, 1998 for the continuance of the cross-examination of eyewitness Neil Joseph
Sarol, said eyewitness manifested that he had a class examination at 11:00 o'clock in the morning
and understanding the plight of said eyewitness, he reset the hearing for the afternoon of June 24,
1998;

On June 24, 1998, in the afternoon, the hearing was cancelled on the ground that counsel for the
accused, Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan, had to study the transcript of stenographic notes of the direct
testimony of eyewitness Neil Joseph Sarol and moved for resetting of this case which the Court
granted. This case was reset to July 1, 1998, at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

On July 1, 1998, at 2:00 in the afternoon, counsel for the accused, Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan,
manifested that he did not have a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of
eyewitness Neil Joseph Sarol and he had to study the same, and moved for the resetting of the
hearing which the Court granted, so that the cross-examination was reset to September 9, 1998 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning SHARP.

7.......On the matter of his inhibition, the same has been denied and extensively discussed in the
Order dated June 23, 1998.

The pertinent portion reads as follows:

"Also before this Court is the accused's motion for inhibition of this Court from hearing this case
the same is denied for lack of factual and legal basis. Furthermore, the counsel for the accused,
Atty. Lauro Gacayan who filed this motion for inhibition failed to appear in today's hearing
despite notice and therefore failed to substantiate this motion in open court. It must be stressed
that this Court is not only a Court of Law but also a Court of Justice. This Presiding judge does
not personally know neither accused Noel Sarol [n]or the other people involved in this case. The
Presiding Judge does not come from Baguio City and, therefore, does not have any special
interest as to any person from Baguio City.

The Presiding Judge is only interested that justice shall be realized in the hearing of every case. It
does not personally matter to this Presiding Judge if the accused will be convicted or acquitted
on the basis of the evidence and law. If the accused is to be acquitted, so be it. If there is no
evidence against him to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, he should be
acquitted. But the Court cannot close its eyes to the fact that there is still an eyewitness in this
Homicide case, by the name of Neil Joseph Sarol whose written affidavit is even on record (p. 4,
Record), and can possibly shed light to the killing of the victim Cesar Dominguez in this case.
The Judge of this Court does not sit in this chair as a mute witness of what is going on in a case.
It is the duty of this Judge to see to it that justice is dispensed with. Whether or not [the] accused
Noel Sarol is convicted is none of the personal concern of this Judge. Conversely, whether or not
the accused will be acquitted is none of the personal concern of this Judge. Let the accused be
convicted or acquitted as the evidence and the law warrant.

There lies a dead victim in my Court, so to speak - a victim of the crime of Homicide. It is the
sacred duty of this Court to judicially determine the truth regarding the death of this victim. If the
accused did not kill the victim, so be it. If according to the evidence and law, the killing of this
victim is justified, so be it. If the killing of this victim falls under an exempting circumstance
favorable to the accused, so be it. This court will have no choice but to acquit the accused in this
case under those circumstances. But for as long as there is a vital eyewitness whose written
affidavit is on record and who can tell the Court and the public as to what really happened in this
capital homicide case, this Court which should be true to its duty, as a dispenser of justice shall
not rest finding out the truth. Much more, this Court cannot be a party to the suppression of an
eyewitness to a homicide case.

As the new Presiding Judge of this Court, of only a few months, I cannot help but remember my
declared sworn solemn Covenant with God and the people gathered in my oath-taking as a new
judge in the conference room of the Court of Appeals, Manila last February 28, 1998. In my
Covenant, I vowed:

"That I shall be an efficient, impartial and honest judge;

"That I shall never compromise a case for money or any other considerations; and

That justice shall prevail in my Court whatever it takes."

I have not forgotten said Covenant.

Thus finding no factual nor legal basis on this motion for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge
who does not know any one of the parties in this case, and whose conscience is clear on the
matter, the same motion is hereby denied xxx"

8.......Finally, he does not see any factual and legal basis for the complainant's charge against
him. He has been simply doing his job as a dispenser of justice in the best way he could."

From the foregoing factual findings, the OCA recommends that respondent Judge be severely
reprimanded for his obvious partiality with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt with more severely reasoning that -

"The sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and impartially without
regard to persons or their circumstances or the opinion of one. A judge thus should strive to be at
all times 'wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires
a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a
just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from the suspicion as to its
fairness and as to its integrity.' Hence, judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial. While judges should possess proficiency in the law or order that they can completely
construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a
manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality.2 [Citing Tan v.
Judge Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306 (1976)]

The issue before us is whether or not a Judge can motu proprio order the case to be re-opened
without being perceived as partial in favor of the prosecution.

The re-opening of the case by a court on its own motion was largely a matter in its discretion and
for the orderly administration of justice, and there is no merit in the first assignment of error.3
[Citing Gaas v. Fortich, supra.]

There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court governing motion[s] to re-open a case for the
reception of evidence after a case has been submitted for decision but before judgment. This is a
judicial action which is controlled only by the paramount interest of justice and rest[s] entirely
on the sound discretion of the trial court. This [is] supported by existing jurisprudence on the
matter, to wit:

"x x x it is within the discretion of the court whether or not to admit further evidence after the
party offering the evidence has rested, and the discretion will not be reviewed except where it
has clearly been abused.4 [64 CJ 160.] More, it is within the sound discretion of the court
whether or not it will allow the case to be reopened for the further introduction of the evidence
after a motion or request for a non-suit, or a demurrer to the evidence; and the case may be
reopened after the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on the request, motion or
demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the same, or after the motion has been granted, if the
order had not been written, or entered upon the minutes or signed.5 [64 CJ 164.]

In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have produced their respective
direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court,
for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their
original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of
discretion appears.6 [Siuliong & Co. v. Ylagan, supra; US v. Alviar, supra.]

6 So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered or where it has been
omitted through inadvertence or mistake or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct
evidence previously offered.7 [I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d 545; 64 J 160-
163, cited in Alegre v. Reyes, ibid., pp. 232-233; Agulto v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 80
(1990)]

In the light of the foregoing jurisprudence, it is thus necessary to determine whether respondent
judge acted within the bounds of his authority.

There is no doubt as borne by the previous resolutions of this Honorable Court thru (sic)
respondent Judge may in his own initiative order the reopening of a case or upon motion of one
of the parties for the orderly administration of justice. It must not, however, be done
whimsically, capriciously and/or unreasonably.

The records show that the subject case was filed on September 27, 1996. It took the prosecution
no less than one (1) year and four (4) months to adduce evidence against the accused, and when
the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence due to an apparent failure of the prosecution to prove
its case, respondent all of a sudden reopened the case. He subpoenaed witnesses to appear before
him and directed them to testify on what they know about the case. This he made because of the
fact that there lies a dead victim and he is to determine who is responsible thereof. Thus, in so
doing his actuation was viewed as partial by the complainants. He acted as though he was
actively prosecuting the case at the expense of the accused.
Moreover, there was no "paramount interest of justice" to speak of in this case which would have
justified the actuations of respondent in reopening the case. The prosecution was given all the
opportunity to present its evidence and to order anew the presentation of additional evidence is
but a superfluity, especially so that the same will not materially affect the position of the
prosecution.

Hence, the complainants have all the reasons to doubt the impartiality of respondent Judge.

It is, thus well to remind the members of the Judiciary:

"x x x to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion and be free from any
appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior not only in the discharge of their official
duties but also in their everyday life, for as we have earlier stressed 'no position exacts a greater
demand on [the] moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary
so that (a) magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to
him as the epitome of integrity and justice."8 [Association of Court Employees of Panabo,
Davao v. Tupas, 175 SCRA 292 (1989), citing Dia-Anonuevo v. Bercacio, 66 SCRA 81 (1975);
Quiz v. Castano, 107 SCRA 196 (1981); Fonacier-Abano v. Ancheta, 107 SCRA 538 (1981);
Cabrera v. Pajares, 142 SCRA 127 (1986)]

We agree with the factual findings of the OCA. However, the penalty recommended, i.e.,
reprimand, is too light given the facts of the case.

Apropos the charge of partiality, the Court pointed out in Dawa v. De Asa9 [AM No. MTJ-98-
1144, 22 July 1998, 292 SCRA 703.] that the '[p]eople's confidence in the judicial system is
founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the
bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to
possess.10 [Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, 259 SCRA 354 (1996)] It is towards this sacrosanct goal of
ensuring the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates the following:

"CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF

IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.

RULE 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.

CANON 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.

RULE 3.01 - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

RULE 3.02 - In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides that: "[A] judge's official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in
the performance of judicial duties, but also his everyday life should be beyond reproach." Thus,
the Court in taking the respondent to task in Sarah B. Vedana v. Judge Eudarlo B. Valencia,11
[AM No. RTJ-96-1351, 3 September 1998.] minced no words when it said:

". . . his being a public official, holding a position in the Judiciary and specifically entrusted with
the sacred duty of administering justice, breached Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandate respectively, that 'a judge should avoid
impropriety in all activities', and that 'a judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach.' These most
exacting standards of decorum are demanded from magistrates if only, in the language of Rule
2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to 'promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.'

The spirit and philosophy underlying these Canons is best expressed in Castillo v. Calanog12
[199 SCRA 75 (1991)] thus:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life can not simply be detached
or separated from his personal existence. Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.13 [See also Junio v. Rivera, Jr., 225 SCRA 688 (1993); Imbing v. Tiongson, 229
SCRA 690 (1994)]

Verily, no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any
individual than a seat on the Bench. Within the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an
important and visible symbol of government, especially considering that as opposed to appellate
courts, trial judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the
communities which the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in
the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him.
Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome
of integrity and justice.14 [Jugueta v. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 (1974); Dia-Anonuevo v. Bercacio,
supra.; Association of Court Employees of Panabo, Davao v. Tupas, supra; Imbing v. Tiongson,
supra; National Intelligence and Security Authority v. Tablang, 199 SCRA 766 (1991)] In
insulating the Bench from the unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of life,
it is essential that judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion."

A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must appear to be impartial.15 [Canon 3, Code of
Judicial Conduct.] Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.16 [Cortes v. Agcaoili,
AM No. RTJ-98-1414, 20 August 1998, 294 SCRA 423.] It was, thus, held that it is improper for
a judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of the complainant.17 [Gallo v.
Cordero, 245 SCRA 219 (1995)] Talking privately alone to an alleged eyewitness to the incident
in the seclusion of his chambers, as what transpired in this case, likewise taints this image much
more so considering the circumstances surrounding the production of said witness.

Verily, '[n]o position exacts a greater demand on [the] moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times
in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise can bear the most searching scrutiny of
the public that looks up to him as an epitome of integrity and justice."18 [Cortes v. Agcaoili,
supra, citing Dia-Anonuevo v. Bercacio, supra.] Indeed, more than simply projecting an image of
probity, a judge must not only appear to be a "good judge"; he must also appear to be a "good
person".19 [See Address delivered by Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa at the Judicial Career
Development Program for Judges, Tagaytay City, 25-29 November 1991, Reflections on Law
and Justice, 1994 ed., p. 84.]

As has been stated by this Court in Ruperto v. Banquerigo20 [AM No. MTJ-98-1154, 6 August
1998, 293 SCRA 704.] "[T]he office of a judge exists for one solemn end - to promote the ends
of justice by administering it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over
that court, is the visible representation of the law and justice. These are self-evident dogmas
which do not even have to be emphasized, but to which we are wont to advert when some
members of the judiciary commit legal missteps or stray from the axioms of judicial ethics x x
x."

The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court, which states:

"SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise, or
in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of
all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for
just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above."

While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and
leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just and valid reasons.21
[Parayno v. Meneses, 231 SCRA 807 (1994)] The import of the rule on voluntary inhibition of
judges is that the decision on whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and
conscience of the trial judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances
prevailing in the case brought before him. It points out to members of the bench that outside of
pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication,
there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for
inhibition for, indeed, the factors that lead to preferences and predilections are many and
varied.22 [Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18 (1973), as cited in Query of Executive Judge Estrella
T. Estrada of Malolos, Bulacan, 155 SCRA 72 (1987)]

Considering the high-handed manner in which the respondent resolved the motion seeking his
inhibition vis-...-vis his manifest partiality in favor of the prosecution in Criminal Case No.
14549-R, his attention is called to the pronouncement of the Court in Pimentel v. Salanga23 [21
SCRA 160 (1967)] reiterated in Gutang v. Court of Appeals:24 [G.R. No. 124760, 8 July 1998,
292 SCRA 76.]

"All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all
judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly
and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may
not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that
he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising
out of circumstance[s] reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing
party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge unmeritoriously tilted the
scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of
serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, if not altogether remote. He
is a man subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and
caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is
involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge
and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to the others involved therein. On the
result of his decision to sit or not to sit may depend on a great extent the all-important confidence
in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from
sitting in a case where his motives and fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He
serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice."

A presiding judge, to be sure, must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of
faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but
to inhibit himself from the case.25 [Gutang v. Court of Appeals, supra. p. 84.] He should
exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired.
The better course for the judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he
avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more
important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to.26 [Ibid., citing Intestate
Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo v. Fortunato Borromeo, 152 SCRA 171 (1987), citing Bautista
v. Rebueno, 81 SCRA 535 (1981)]

Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, it needs be stressed that to be able to render
substantial justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges are expected to
keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence,27 [Carpio v. De Guzman, 262 SCRA 615
(1996)] consistent with the standard that magistrates must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.28 [Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; See also
Buzon, Jr. v. Velasco, 253 SCRA 601 (1996); Galan Realty Co., Inc. v. Arranz, 237 SCRA 770
(1994)]

As aptly stated in Borromeo v. Mariano29 [41 Phil. 322 (1921)] "[O]ur conception of good
judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their
duties in accordance with law x x x." Thus, it has been held that when the judge's inefficiency
springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the
discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title
he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and
in grave abuse of judicial authority.30 [Macalintal v. Teh, 280 SCRA 623 (1997)]

Indeed, everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. When, as in this case, the law
is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.31 [Agcaoili v.
Ramos, 229 SCRA 705 (1994), citing Santos v. Judge Isidro, 200 SCRA 597 (1991)] Judges are
expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.
They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence
requires no less.32 [Cortes v. Judge Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997); Cui v. Madayag, 245 SCRA 1
(1995)] It is imperative that a judge be conversant with basic legal principles and that he be
aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines.33 [Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1
(1994), citing Aducayen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 73 (1973); Ajeno v. Insierto, 71 SCRA 166 (1976);
Ubongen v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 (1980); Libarios v. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 (1991); Lim v.
Domagas, 227 SCRA 258 (1993)] He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion
for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the rule of law.34 [Conducto v.
Monzon, AM No. MTJ-98-1147, 2 July 1998, 291 SCRA 619, citing Estoya v. Abraham-
Singson, supra, citing Cuaresma v. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 (1993)]

Needless to state, respondent was in this instance wanting in the desired level of mastery of a
fundamental rule on criminal procedure.

In Cortes v. Judge Catral;35 [279 SCRA 1 (1997)] this Court found respondent judge therein
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for granting bail to the accused without the requisite hearing.
The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with the warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely. In Mamolo, Sr. v.
Narisma,36 [252 SCRA 613 (1996)] the Court held respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and penalized him with a fine of P20,000.00. The same penalty was imposed by this
Court on respondent judge in Buzon, Jr. v. Velasco,37 [253 SCRA 601 (1996)] who was found
to have fallen short of the standard set forth in Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, thereby eroding the litigant's confidence in his competence and knowledge.
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, We find the recommended penalty of reprimand not
commensurate with the misdeed committed. A fine of P10,000.00 and reprimand, with a warning
that a commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely is a more
appropriate penalty.

Furthermore, in view of the prevailing circumstances in this case, the Court deems it the better
course for respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further hearing Criminal Case No. 14549-R.
In that way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is
preserved. Most important of all, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to.38
[Gutang v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Intestate Estate of the late Vito Borromeo v.
Borromeo, supra, citing Bautista v. Rebueno, supra.]

WHEREFORE, for violations of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of an officer of
the Judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, respondent Judge
FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Baguio
City, is hereby FINED the amount of P10,000.00. He is likewise REPRIMANDED and sternly
WARNED that a repetition of the foregoing or similar transgressions shall be dealt with more
severely. Finally, he is ORDERED to inhibit himself from further hearing Criminal Case No.
14549-R. The Executive Judge is ordered to re-raffle the case with dispatch to another sala.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

CARLOS DIONISIO, complainant, vs. HON. ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-98-1400 | 1999-02-01

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In a letter complaint1 [Rollo, p. 1] dated October 8, 1997, herein complainant Carlos Dionisio
charged herein respondent Judge Zosimo Escano with allegedly using court facilities (bulletin
board) in advertising for attractive waitresses and personable waiters and cooks for possible
employment in their restaurant business. In addition, respondent judge also said to have caused
the construction of an extension office along the corridor called "Office of Negotiable Cases"
after the respondent Judge acquitted a certain Hung.2 [Respondent in Criminal Case No. 96-662
entitled "People vs. Xiao Jia Hung alias Jose Lim," for violation of Sec. 15 Art. III RA 6425 as
amended; Rollo, pp. 119-139]
Meanwhile, in an October 19, 1997 Manila Bulletin issue, the advertisement3 [Rollo, p. 23]of
Fontana Cafá© & Restaurant appeared accepting applications for attractive waitresses and
female vocalists which reads:

"URGENTLY NEEDED
Attractive Waitresses
Female Vocalists
Bartenders-Male/Female

***********

Fontana Cafá© & Restaurant

Dampa, Ninoy Aquino Avenue
Parañaque, Metro Manila
or
RTC, Branch 259
Parañaque Municipal Hall
Tel. 825-57-32/826-00-11 loc. 226

Taking note of this advertisement, a staff member of ABS-CBN's public service show "Hoy
Gising!" disguised as an applicant was sent to conduct a videotaped investigation on the veracity
of the advertisement. The incidents of the investigation were aired live on televesion in their
regular program. This tape was also made part of the complaint submitted to the Office of the
Court Administrator. The aforesaid staff member was able to ferret out the following admissions
from respondent Judge Escano inside his chamber at RTC, Branch 259, Parañaque Municipal
Hall where he conducted the interview:

As to the ownership of the said establishment, respondent admitted: 'Ako ang may-ari. Ako
mismo ang owner.'

As to the nature of the business establishment, respondent Judge has this to say: 'Ngayon, ang
concept nitong pubhouse, lalo itong lugar ko, itong pangalan ay Fontana Cafá©, ang ano ay
we will be catering to classes A anf B.' He further added: 'Yung mga lalake target natin, may
come on tayo diyan.'

Respondent Judge even continued to say: 'I will be requiring yung mga waitresses, yung medyo
naka-mini or depende sa mga uniporme. Tapos yung medyo paseksi din dito (respondent was
making gestures on the upper part of his body, obviously referring to just above the breast).
Yung konti lang naman, yung medyo paduda, alam mo na, I hope you are getting me, yung
medyo nakaano nang konti yon.'

He further elucidates: 'May mga customers tayo na mga DOM. Medyo hahawak-hawak sa
kamay.' For singers, he explained, 'Pagkanta mo ron, hindi yung nakaganyan ka, kwan ka.
Magsuot ka ng medyo makatawag pansin sa mga lalaki. Siempre lalake, mga crowd natin lalaki.
Kung umikot makikita pati panty, pati ano. Paseksihan na yon, eh. That's the Entertainment
World Today.'
When respondent Judge was asked to give his comment on the news report against him, he
admitted the contents of the interview but clarified that the business establishments is merely a
restaurant, a sort of watering hole for some friends.

In answer to the complaint filed by Carlos Dionisio, respondent Judge explained that after his
wife was issued a Certificate of Registration of Business from the Department of Trade and
Industry4 [Annex "A," Comment/Answer of Respondent Judge Escano; Rollo, p. 10] and before
the construction of the restaurant was about to be finished, his wife requested his assistance for
the hiring of its personnel. He thought that, considering the difficulty of locating their residence
which is about three (3) kilometers from the main gate of Better Living Subdivision, it would be
convenient for him to conduct the screening of the applicants in his office. With this
arrangement, respondent Judge posted the notice at the Court bulletin board without realizing
that it may later on create in the minds of some people the perception that he was misusing the
court facilities. However, when the said matter was brought to his attention, respondent Judge
immediately ordered the removal of said posters.

On the allegation of an Office of "Negotiable Cases," respondent Judge clarified that the
structure was constructed by the Municipal Government of Parañaque to utilize the open space in
front of Branch 259. The said office now serves as stockroom and as office for the Clerk of
Court, Legal Researcher, Interpreter, the Sheriff and all other male personnel of the court who
used to work inside the courtroom.

As regards the complainant's allusion to the case of People vs. Xiao Jia Hung, et al., respondent
Judge pointed out that the acquittal of the accused was anchored mainly on the absolute absence
of hard evidence and proof worthy to overturn the presumption of innocence.

On March 3, 1998, respondent Judge supplemented the aforesaid Answer contending therein that
he has been fair and just in rendering his decisions as a special criminal court Judge. To manifest
such impartiality, he attached his performance record for the year 1997 with comparative data5
[Rollo, pp. 34-80] from other branches of the RTC, Parañaque, photocopies of his decisions in
People vs. Richard Ong, et.al.6 [Crim. Case No. 96-460, Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide;
Rollo, pp. 81-118] and People vs. Xiao Jia Hung, et al.7 [Crim. Case No. 96-662 for Violation of
Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425 as amended; Rollo, pp. 119-139]

Subsequently, this administrative matter was referred to the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation on January 19, 19988 [Resolution of the Supreme Court, Second
Division; Rollo, p. 29] which was later on assigned to Justice Minerva P. Gonza-Reyes.

During the investigation, Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes was able to establish, inter alia, that
the respondent Judge posted the advertisement for "attractive waitresses and personable waiters"
for the restaurant in the court bulletin board for more than a week, even two weeks; that he
removed the notices when his attention was called by some lawyers; that he was able to
interview about five applicants; that the suggestions he made to the applicants during the
screening regarding the wearing of dresses with short skirts and low necklines which were
recorded on videotape by the personnel of the "Hoy Gising!" program were true; and that the
establishments was originally intended as a "pub" or drinking place, but is now operated as a
cafá©.

Based on the foregoing findings, the Investigating Justice submitted her report and
recommendation, the pertinent portion of which reads:

"x x x, the plea of Judge Escano that he merely wanted to help his wife to establish a legitimate
business to help augment his judge's income, the apologies tendered to the Supreme Court and
his peers in the judiciary for any embarrassment (he) might have caused the institution, and the
fact that the infraction was committed for a short time, as he promptly desisted when his
attention was called, may mitigate the penalty which is hereby recommended to be a fine of
P15,000.00.

"With respect to the charge that Judge Escano is maintaining an Office of Negotiable Cases,
which he denied, the same is not substantiated and is recommended for dismissal.

"Respectfully submitted."9 [Rollo, pp. 142-145]

Time and again we have adhered to the rule that one who occupies an exalted position in the
administration of justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him, for his private
as well as his official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety.10
[Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165; Conde vs. Superable, 29 SCRA 727; Otero vs. Esguerra, 57
SCRA 57; Jakosalem vs. Judge Cordovez, 58 SCRA 11; Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27]
Because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions, like
Ceasar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion.11 [Palang vs. Zosa, 58 SCRA
776] It is with this exacting standard, not only of decency but also of morality, that we have
consistently avowed to promote confidence in the judiciary. And this Court will not hesitate to
wield its disciplinary power to those erring personnel under its supervision.

The Code of Judicial Ethics provides in so far as pertinent:

Canon II

Rule 2.00 - A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
acitivities.

Canon V

Rule 5.02. - A Judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities,
or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge shuld
so manage investments and other financial interests to minimize the number of cases giving
grounds for disqualification, and if necessary, divest such investments and interests. Divestments
shall be made within one year fom the effectivity of this Code or from appointment, as the case
may be."
"Rule 5.03. - Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, a judge may hold and manage
investments but should not serve as a officer, director, advisor, or employee of any business
except as director, or non-legal consultant of a family business."

Judge Zosimo Escano has behaved in a manner unbecoming of his judicial robe, betrayed the
people's high expectations, and diminished the esteem in which they hold the judiciary in
general. It is of no import that respondent Judge's act of using the court's facilities be motivated
by a good cause, no matter how honorable. The moment such act deviates from purposes not
directly related to the functioning and operation for which the courts of justice has been
established, it must be immediately rectified. In Bautista vs. Costelo, Jr.,12 [254 SCRA 148] we
have held that "the prohibition against the use of halls of justice for purposes other than that for
which they have been built extends to their immediate vicinity including their grounds.
Otherwise, if the prohibition is not thus construed, acts tending to degrade courts would go
unpunished on the pretext that they are not committed 'within the Halls of Justice'."

The exuse advanced by respondent Judge that in order for the prospective aaplicants not to have
difficulty of locating their residence it would be more convenient if the screening was made
inside his court, is a reason lacking in circumspection and delicadeza. It over-extends his
authority as judge by failing to avoid situations that make him suspect to committing immorality.
For judges are enjoined to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere
appearance of impropriety. This is true not only in the performance of their judicial duties but in
all their activities, including their private lives. Judges must conduct themselves in such a
manner that they give no ground for reproach.13 [San Juan vs. Bagalacsa, 283 SCRA 416;
Dysico vs. Dacumos, 262 SCRA 275] For no position exacts a greater demand or moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.14 [Naval vs. Panday,
275 SCRA 654]

And as correctly pointed by the Investigating Justice, the acts of posting advertisements for the
restaurant personnel on the court bulletin board, using his court address to receive the
applications, and of screening applicants in his court constitute involvement in private business
and improper use of office facilities for the promotion of the family business in violation of the
Code of Judicial Ethics. The restiction enshrined under Rules 5.02 and 5.03 of the Code of
Judicial Ethics on judges with regard to their own business interests is based on the possible
interference which may be created by these business involvements in the exercise of their
judicial duties which may tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the courts as the bastion of
justice. Judges must not allow themselves to be distracted from the performance of their judicial
tasks by other lawful enterprises.15 [Albos vs. Alaba, 231 SCRA 68] It has been a time honored
rule that judges and all court employees should endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence
and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice.16 [Re: Issuance of Subpoena
to Prisoner Nicanor De Guzman, Jr., 278 SCRA 18.]

As to the other charge that respondent Judge has caused the construction of an extension office
known as the "Office of Negotiable Cases" after he acquitted a certain Hung, we have carefully
reviewed the records of this case and find no evidence to substantiate that such office exists. In
the absence of proof necessary to have a contrary holding, we find no reason to disbelieve the
contention of respondent Judge that the extension office was constructed by the Municipal
Government of Parañaque as a stockroom and as office for some court personnel. The
complainant in this case admittedly being "incognito" for fear of placing his source of livelihood
at peril, has failed to fully support such claim. The Rules, even in an administrative case, demand
that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense,
the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge.17
[Office of the Court Administrator vs. Pascual, 259 SCRA 604.] For before any member of the
judiciary could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of
competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.18 [Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Pascual, supra]

Furthermore, we likewise find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusion of the
respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 96-62 entitled "People vs. Jia Hung, et. al." The Court
understands the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike, would at times encounter in
procedural bureaucracy, but imperative justice requires proper observance of indiputable
technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation.19 [Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Myrna Alvarez, A.M. No. CA-98-8-P, March 11, 1998 citing Young vs. Office
of the Ombudsman, 228 SCRA 718.] For if a party is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his
remedy lies with the proper court for the proper judicial action and not with the Office of the
Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint. Divergence of opinion between a
trial judge and a party's counsel as to admissibility of evidence is not proof of bias and
partiality.20 [Go vs. CA, 221 SCRA 397; Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 252 SCRA 541]

While concededly, the Investigating Justice considered certain mitigating circumstances in favor
of the respondent Judge in imposing the fine of P15,000.00 for his misconduct, this Court,
however, is of the opinion that such penalty is not commensurate to the disgraceful actuation of
respondent Judge. The gravity of the charge against the respondent Judge merits a more severe
penalty of suspension. For as officers of the court, judges are duty bound to scrupulously adhere
and hold sacred the tenets of their profession and they must be reminded, lest they have already
conveniently forgotten, that a certificate of service is not merely a means to ones's paycheck.21
[Re: Judge Fernando P. Agdamag, 254 SCRA 644] A judge should not only possess proficiency
in law, but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous
and upright man.22 [Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, 259 SCRA 354]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Zosimo Escano is hereby meted the
penalty of SUSPENSION from service for six (6) months which shall start upon receipt of notice
hereof WITH WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, and Buena, JJ., concur.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE LORENZO B.
VENERACION, and Branch Clerk of Court ROGELIO M. LINATOC, both of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 47, MANILA, respondents.

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1432 | 2000-06-21

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is an administrative complaint against Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion
for grave misconduct and violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.08 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and
Branch Clerk of Court Rogelio M. Linatoc, for grave misconduct, both of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 47, Manila, initiated by the Court Administrator.1 [Resolution adopted on
February 23, 1999, Rollo, p. 139.]

On November 24, 1998, Merlinia C. Santos filed with the Court Administrator, a sworn letter-
complaint2 [Rollo, pp. 146-149.] against Rogelio A. Tria, "Acting Sheriff IV, Branch
47,Regional Trial Court, Manila," assailing the acts of "Sheriff" Tria in the implementation of a
writ of execution in a civil case for support.3 [Docketed as Civil Case No. 97-84356, RTC
Manila, entitled Merlinia Corpuz Santos, Daughters Kristine Dominique and Jenina Anne C.
Santos v. Arthur C. Santos.]

On the basis of the letter, on January 15, 1999, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo ordered
an investigation of the status of "sheriff" Tria of RTC, Manila, Branch 47. The investigation
revealed that "sheriff" Tria was not an employee of the judiciary at the time he acted as "sheriff"
in Civil Case No. 97-84356. The record showed that on August 9, 1988, Mr. Rogelio A. Tria was
appointed process server of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila. However, on January
1, 1995, he transferred to the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB),
Department of Finance, as an Intelligence Officer. He was not thereafter re-employed in the
judiciary.4 [Rollo, p. 1.]

The investigation disclosed the following facts:

"1. that the writ of execution dated July 3, 1998 was signed by Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion
addressed to Mr. Rogelio A. Tria as Acting Sheriff IV;

"2. that the Sheriff's Return dated July 30, 1998 was signed by Mr. Rogelio A. Tria as Acting
Sheriff IV; and

"3. that the Notice of Levy and Sale dated July 3, 1998 was signed by Mr. Tria as Acting Sheriff
IV."

The investigation further disclosed that in 1985, Mr. Antonio Velasco was the duly appointed
Deputy Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila. Subsequently, however,
Judge Veneracion assigned Deputy Sheriff IV Antonio Velasco to the Office of the Clerk of
Court in order that Rogelio A. Tria, who was not an employee of the judiciary, could be
designated to perform the functions of "Acting Deputy Sheriff IV" considering the position
vacant and authorized to carry out the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 97-84356. This
irregularity was not limited to Civil Case No.97-84356, or to the period July to August 1998. The
Court Administrator concluded that Judge Veneracion and Branch Clerk of Court Rogelio M.
Linatoc had knowledge of the irregularity.5 [Rollo, pp. 1-2.]

Meantime, Justice Benipayo directed Judge Veneracion to desist from assigning any task to
"Sheriff" Rogelio A. Tria and to prevent him from holding office in his sala. On January 18,
1999 Judge Veneracion ordered Rogelio A. Tria to return to his post at the EIIB.6 [Ibid., p. 137.]

On January 29, 1999, Court Administrator Benipayo recommended that the memorandum report
be considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion for grave
misconduct and violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.08 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and against
Atty. Rogelio M. Linatoc for grave misconduct.7 [Rollo, pp. 2-3.]

On February 23, 1999, the Court adopted a resolution considering the memorandum as an
administrative complaint against Judge Veneracion and Atty. Linatoc, and directing them to file
their respective answers thereto within ten (10) days from notice.8 [Ibid., p. 139.]

On June 22, 1999, the Court referred the case to Court of Appeals Justice Remedios A. Salazar-
Fernando for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
records.9 [Ibid., p. 153.]

On August 16, 1999, Judge Veneracion filed an answer,10 [Ibid., pp. 207-220.] contending that
there was nothing irregular about a judge signing a writ of execution, considering that it had been
his practice as a matter of court policy. He professed good faith in detailing Mr. Rogelio A. Tria,
an employee of the EIIB with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila and his designation as
"Acting Deputy Sheriff" assigned to serve writs of execution in cases therein, properly supported
by documents. The latest authority for the detail was issued on October 5, 1998, by Executive
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, to Col. Wilfred A. Nicolas, Commissioner, EIIB, recommending
approval of Mr. Tria's detail with Branch 47, as requested by retired Supreme Court Justice
Emilio A. Gancayco.11 [Rollo, p. 213.]

Also on August 16, 1999, Atty. Linatoc filed an answer12 [Rollo, pp. 156-172.] denying
involvement in any anomaly. He averred that there was nothing anomalous with the issuance of a
writ of execution signed by a presiding judge. He denied participation in the temporary detail of
Mr. Rogelio A. Tria with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila as "Acting Deputy Sheriff
IV." At the same time, he expressed good faith in believing that "Sheriff" Tria's appointment was
legal since it was supported by various documents authorizing his detail with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 47, Manila.

According to the investigation conducted by Justice Fernando, on January 1, 1995, Rogelio A.

Tria was employed with EIIB, an agency under the Department of Finance. However, from
January 2, 1995 to June 30, 199513 [As authorized by LO-1-205-95.] and January 1, 1997 to
June 30, 1997,14 [As authorized by LO-12-177-96.] Tria was detailed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 47, Manila as Acting Deputy Sheriff IV, upon the request of Judge Veneracion.
From January 1, 1998 to April 22, 1998,15 [As authorized by LO-12-277-97.] Rogelio A. Tria
was detailed with Branch 47, at the request of former Justice Emilio A. Gancayco.

It will be noticed, however, that when "sheriff" Tria implemented the writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 97-84356 on July 3, 1998, he had no appointment or designation authorizing his
assignment as "Acting Deputy Sheriff IV" of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila. Nor
was he a duly bonded official.

On August 13, 1998, Judge Veneracion requested EIIB Commissioner Colonel Wilfred Nicolas
for Mr. Rogelio A. Tria's assignment as Deputy Sheriff of Branch 47.16 [Rollo, p. 256.] On
August 25, 1998, Colonel Lara denied the request.17 [Ibid, p. 258.] Nonetheless, respondent
Judge Veneracion assigned "sheriff" Tria to execute writs in cases therein.

The question is whether an employee of EIIB, an agency under the Department of Finance, of the
executive branch of the government, may be assigned by that agency on detail with the judiciary,
specifically to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila, as deputy sheriff, upon the request
of the presiding judge of the court without the authority of the Supreme Court.

Judge Veneracion's repeated requests for Mr. Rogelio A. Tria's detail with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 47, Manila, as Acting Deputy Sheriff IV, a position that was not vacant,
contravened Article VIII, Section 5 (6) of the Constitution, Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 07 dated August 27, 1987, re: appointments to vacant positions in the judiciary, and
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12, dated October 1, 1985, addressed to all judges
and clerks of court of the Regional Trial Courts, prescribing guidelines and procedure in the
service and execution of court writs and processes. Administrative Circular No. 12 provides that
"in the absence of deputy sheriff appointed and assigned in his sala" the judge may at any time
designate any of the deputy sheriffs in the office of the clerk of court. However, the judge shall
not be allowed to designate the deputy sheriff of another branch without first securing the
consent of the presiding judge thereof. Judge Veneracion failed to observe the Constitutional and
regulatory prescriptions. Judge Veneracion had no power to assign on temporary detail his duly
appointed sheriff to the office of the clerk of court. The authority to detail employees of his
branch to the office of the clerk of court is vested in the executive judge.18 [See Adm. Order No.
6, dated June 30, 1975.] Hence, there was no vacancy even temporarily in the office of branch
sheriff of Branch 47, and the judge can not appoint or designate any person of his choice to act as
sheriff. His action showed persistent disregard of the rule in the designation of acting sheriffs.
This act constitutes usurpation of the appointing authority of the Supreme Court amounting to
grave misconduct in office. As a member of the bench, Judge Veneracion is conclusively
presumed to know the law and is "expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing
jurisprudence"19 [Carpio v. de Guzman, 262 SCRA 615, 622 [1996].] which he clearly failed to
do in this instance. It was not a matter of negligence, but a deliberate act of defiance of the
Supreme Court's authority by a lower court judge. Judge Veneracion did not observe the
Constitutional and regulatory prescriptions. He persistently disregarded well-known legal rules
in the designation of acting sheriffs. By such action, he repeatedly usurped the appointing
authority of the Supreme Court. Thus, it amounts to grave misconduct in office. In fact, since
1989, Judge Veneracion has made repeated requests for the detail of Mr. Tria to his court. He
even made further request for the detail of "sheriff" Tria from the EIIB after the head of the EIIB
had denied such request. Judge Veneracion appealed the denial to the Executive Secretary, and
even asked the help of a retired Supreme Court justice to effectuate his appeal. And what
triggered the complaint at bar against respondent Judge Veneracion was an act of corruption by
"Acting Deputy Sheriff IV" Rogelio A. Tria in the enforcement of a writ of execution that Judge
Veneracion assigned directly to him. He personally signed the writ of execution, a function
normally delegated to the branch clerk of court. Worse, Judge Veneracion did not even require
"sheriff" Tria to post a sheriff's bond, as required by law. "Sheriff" Tria demanded P250.00 from
the prevailing party for his taxi fare from his residence in Antipolo to Manila, RTC.20 [Rollo, p.
146]

Atty. Linatoc, as Branch Clerk of Court is likewise liable for misconduct in office for following
the unlawful orders of Judge Veneracion regarding Mr. Rogelio A. Tria's assignment as "Deputy
Sheriff" of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila without the authority of the Supreme
Court.

On October 14, 1999, Justice Fernando submitted her final report and recommendation,
disposing as follows:

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully submitted that the respondents are guilty of
grave misconduct applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that the Court may impose its
authority upon erring judges and other court personnel whose actuations, on their face, would
show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law, or misconduct.

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondents, Judge Lorenzo Veneracion

and Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Rogelio Linatoc be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment with any other branch, instrumentality or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations."21 [Rollo,
pp. 400-418.]

We agree with the factual findings and conclusions of Justice Fernando in her report. However,
as regards the penalty, the Court after due consideration, tempers the severity of the
recommended dismissal of respondent judge considering his long service in the government and
the judiciary22 [In re: Judge Baltazar R. Dizon, 173 SCRA 719, 722-723 [1989]; Cf. State
Prosecutors v. Muro, 251 SCRA 111, 116-117 [1995].] and his obedience to the order of the
Court Administrator directing him to terminate the questioned designation of "sheriff" Tria, thus,
evincing remorse and repentance for his unauthorized acts.

As to respondent Atty. Linatoc, we consider his dismissal from the service as too harsh a penalty.
His fault was in following blindly the orders of the respondent judge, even though these violated
the Constitution and circulars of the Supreme Court.

"The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual."23 [Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690,
697 [1994]; Magarang v. Jardin, Jr., A.M. RTJ-99-1448, April 6, 2000; Concerned Employees of
the RTC of Dagupan City v. Judge Erna Falloran-Aliposa, A.M. No. RTC-99-1446, March 9,
2000.]

What is required of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can
innovate at pleasure, roaming at will in pursuit of their own ideals of beauty or of goodness.24
[State prosecutors v. Muro, supra, Note 23, at p. 118.] They are bound by limitations on their
authority, by substantive and procedural rules of law, more importantly by Constitutional
precepts and the recognition of their places in the hierarchy of courts.

Judge Veneracion's outright disregard of the well-established separation of powers of the three
great departments of government and his exercise of powers beyond his judicial competence and
in defiance of directives of the Supreme Court undermined the independence of the judiciary
Judge Veneracion can not hide behind the authorizations issued by officials of the executive
branch of the government, giving an impression of legality of his actions. Administrative
Circular No. 12, dated October 1, 1985, and Administrative Circular No. 7, dated April 27, 1987
clearly provide for the implementation of the Supreme Court's Constitutional power of
appointment of judiciary employees, including sheriffs and the assignment of acting deputy
sheriffs to the courts. Judge Veneracion repeatedly violated, nay defied, these circulars.

Finally, it is pertinent to state that on March 11, 1997, the Court found Judge Veneracion guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and imposed on him a fine of P10,000.00 for disregarding a
complainant's right to procedural due process with warning that the commission of the same or
similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.25 [Parada v. Judge Veneracion, 269 SCRA
371 [1997].]

On another tack, on June 2, 2000, as this administrative case was pending resolution after the
submission of the report and recommendation of the investigating justice, Judge Lorenzo B.
Veneracion applied for optional retirement under Republic Act No. 910, as amended, effective
July 1, 2000. However, he failed to submit supporting papers such as his service record, an
inventory of pending cases particularly those pending decision, and the required clearances. In
fact, he has a pending case with the Ombudsman. His monthly report of cases, the latest of which
was for February, 2000, did not indicate his pending undecided cases, if any. As of February 29,
2000, he has 1,145 pending civil and criminal cases including 231 cases with prisoners (meaning
that the accused are under detention).

As regards Branch Clerk of Court Rogelio M. Linatoc, he is also guilty of misconduct in

allowing the assignment of a non-judicial employee to the staff of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 47, Manila. As Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Linatoc has administrative supervision over
all other employees of the court26 [Cruz v. Tantay, 395 SCRA 128 [1999].] and ought to know
that a non-judicial person has no place in the judicial service. His admission that he did not find
any reason to report to the Supreme Court the presence of "Sheriff" Rogelio A. Tria in Branch 47
since the orders for his assignment came from Judge Veneracion showed gross ignorance of his
role as branch clerk of court. He has the obligation to report to the Supreme Court anyone in his
staff without proper appointment from the Supreme Court. As Branch Clerk of Court, Atty.
Linatoc has control of the employment records of the court's staff. However, considering his lack
of direct participation in the irregularity, we are inclined to be more lenient with him.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 47, Manila guilty of grave misconduct in office and hereby orders his
SUSPENSION from office for a period of three (3) months, without pay and allowances,
effective immediately, and, in addition, to pay a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

The Court orders Judge Veneracion to cease and desist immediately from rendering judgment, or
issuing resolution or order in any pending case or continuing with any judicial action or
proceeding whatsoever, effective upon notice of this resolution.

His application for optional retirement under Republic Act No. 910, as amended, is hereby
APPROVED, effective immediately after serving the suspension, subject to availability of funds
and the usual auditing and accounting requirements and submission of proper clearances, without
prejudice to the result of the administrative case pending with the Ombudsman, and the audit of
the cases pending with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 47, particularly those submitted
for decision, if any.

The Court finds Branch Clerk of Court Rogelio M. Linatoc guilty of simple misconduct in office,
and hereby imposes upon him a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, payable immediately,
with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.

This resolution is immediately executory upon receipt.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., on official business abroad.

CITY SHERIFF, ILIGAN CITY and SPOUSES ANGEL L. BAUTISTA and ANGELICA
M. BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. ALFARO FORTUNADO, EDITHA FORTUNADO, &
NESTOR FORTUNADO, respondents.

G.R. No. 80390 | 1998-03-27

DECISION

MARTINEZ, J:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Order 1 dated January 24, 1986 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 262, which reversed its
earlier Decision 2 dated July 31, 1985 dismissing the complaint filed by respondents.

The facts are not disputed:

Respondents Alfaro, Editha and Nestor, all surnamed Fortunado, are the registered owners of
two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-3041 and T-1929, both
registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Said properties were mortgaged by Arsenio
Lopez, Jr. on July 24, 1968 to the Traders Commercial Bank (now Traders Royal Bank) to
secure a loan obligation in the amount of P370,000.00.

On January 6, 1971, respondents instituted an action before the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XVIII, against Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Traders Royal Bank, among others, for
annulment of mortgage. In said complaint, Traders Royal Bank interposed a counterclaim for
foreclosure of the mortgage.

On August 24, 1973, the trial court rendered a decision, 3 the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:

I. As Regards the Plaintiffs Complaint:

1. Ordering the defendant Mariano Pascual to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P24,550.00 plus
legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid and attorney's fees in the amount of
P2,000.00 and to pay the costs.

2. Ordering the deed of real estate mortgage which is attached as Annex 'B' of the complaint to
be declared null and void and, ordering the Register of Deeds of Iligan City to cancel the said
mortgage at the back of TCT No. T-1929, Book I, Page 8 and TCT No. T-3040, Book I, Page 96
of said Register of Deeds.

II. With Respect to the Cross-Claim and the Third-Party Complaint of Defendant Traders
Commercial Bank:

1. Ordering the spouses Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Ofelia Lopez to pay the Traders Commercial
Bank jointly and severally the amount of P578,025.23, inclusive of interest and other bank
charges as of April 30, 1971, and, thereafter, plus all interest and bank charges until full payment
is made and, to pay to the bank the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs.

The bank 's counterclaim against the plaintiffs is hereby dismissed.

Likewise, the counterclaim of Mariano Pascual against the plaintiffs is also dismissed.

SO ORDERED."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision, in this manner:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by eliminating paragraph 2 of
the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court declaring the real estate mortgage in
favor of the Traders Commercial Bank null and void. The decision is affirmed in all other
respects." 4

On December 28, 1983, Traders Royal Bank assigned 5 its rights to the mortgage to petitioner
Angel L. Bautista. By virtue of the said assignment, petitioner on March 19, 1984 wrote the City
Sheriff of Iligan City requesting that the mortgaged properties be foreclosed for non-payment of
the loan obligation. To thwart the pending foreclosure, respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch V, a complaint for cancellation of lien with preliminary
injunction against petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 262.

After petitioner filed his answer, respondents moved for a summary judgment which was granted
by the court. Consequently, on July 31, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint. In its decision, the trial court delved on the issue of prescription of a mortgage action.

Respondents moved for reconsideration arguing that since the principal loan has already been
paid, the mortgage, which is an accessory contract, should likewise be extinguished.

On January 24, 1986, the trial court modified its earlier decision disposing thus:

"WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration, as amended, of the summary judgment of July
31, 1985 is hereby reconsidered and modified to read:

'Premises considered, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have made out a preponderating case
against the defendants.'

And as prayed for in the complaint, the temporary restraining order of the Court in the case on
April 23, 1984 is hereby converted into a preliminary injunction and by these presents made
permanent. The City Sheriff of Iligan City, Mr. Angel L. Bautista and Mrs. Angelica M. Bautista
are hereby permanently restrained from conducting a public auction sale of the property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3041 (a.f.). The Register of Deeds of Iligan City is hereby
further ordered to cancel Entry No. 451 on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3041 (a.f.) on file
with his office. No pronouncement as to damages or attorney's fees.

"'With costs against the defendants.

"SO ORDERED."

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a Resolution 6 on August 28, 1987,
forwarding the case to this Court for resolution reading thus:

"Considering that opposing counsel left the resolution of Atty. Ramon Gonzales' motion to the
sound discretion of this Court and considering the unrefuted allegation of the said motion that
there were no documentary or testimonial evidence which were the basis of the questioned
decision but mere admissions of the parties, the questions raised on appeal become mere
questions of law, over which the Supreme Court has exclusive original Jurisdiction."

On December 29, 1987, petitioner filed this present petition for review contending that the trial
court erred in modifying its earlier decision; in declaring that he has no right to foreclose the
mortgaged property; in declaring the temporary restraining order into a permanent preliminary
injunction and in ordering the Register of Deeds of Iligan City to cancel entry No. 451 on TCT
No. 3041.

We gave due course to the petition and required the contending parties to submit their respective
Memoranda on August 31, 1988.

On January 30, 1995, respondents, through counsel Ramon A. Gonzales, filed a verified
Manifestation informing the Court that the subject real estate mortgage has already been released
by the Traders Royal Bank on December 22, 1983 as shown in the certified true copy of the
Release of Real Estate Mortgage, 7 and that the petitioner was killed in a robbery in his house. 8
Respondents therefore pray for the dismissal of the petition.

On February 20, 1995, this Court required petitioner's counsel Atty. Emilio Abrogena to
comment on the said Manifestation. However, the copy of the resolution of the Court addressed
to Atty. Abrogena was returned unclaimed after three notices, 9 with the postmaster's remark
"moved." In view of this development, the Court considered the resolution as served. 10

Acting on the Manifestation of the respondents, we resolve to dismiss the petition for having
been rendered moot and academic.

The resolution of the basic issue of whether or not the petitioner has the right to extra-judicially
foreclose the mortgage is no longer necessary in view of the release of the mortgage as shown in
the certified true copy thereof. No useful purpose would be served by passing on the merits of
the petition. Any ruling in this case could hardly be of any practical or useful purpose in the
premises. It is a well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question or abstract
proposition nor express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. 11

However, we take notice of the failure of petitioner's lawyer, Atty. Emilio Abrogena, to inform
the trial court of the death of petitioner, a duty mandated by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides in part, to wit:

"SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within
thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of the counsel to comply with this duty shall be a
ground for disciplinary action.

xxx xxx xxx."

Hence, the proper substitution of the deceased in accordance with the aforequoted provisions of
Rule 3 could not be effected.
We likewise note Atty. Abrogena's failure to inform this Court of his change of address which
accounts for his failure to comment on the manifestation of respondents relative to the death of
petitioner and the release of the subject real estate mortgage.

Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court.
His duties to the court are more significant than those which he owes to his client. His first duty
is not to his client but to the administration of Justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly
subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics of the profession. 12

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for being moot and academic. Atty. Emilio
Abrogena, counsel for petitioner, is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to inform this Court
of the death of petitioner and to perform his duty under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court. He is further warned that a repetition of such omission in the future will be dealt with
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.

REQUEST OF JUDGE IRMA ZITA V. MASAMAYOR, RTC-BR. 52, TALIBON,

BOHOL, FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO DECIDE CIVIL CASE NO. 0020 and
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 98-384.

A.M. No. 98-12-381-RTC | 1999-10-05

RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Judges have a duty to decide their cases within the reglementary period. On meritorious grounds,
they may ask for additional time. It must be stressed, however, that their application for
extension must be filed before the expiration of the prescribed period.

The Case and the Facts

In a letter[1] dated July 31, 1998, addressed to the Court Administrator, Judge Irma Zita V.
Masamayor of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon, Bohol (Branch 52) requested an
extension of time to decide (1) Civil Case No. 0020, entitled Alejandro Tutor et al. v. Benedicto
Orevillo et al., the resolution of which was supposedly due on July 14, 1998; and (2) Criminal
Case No. 98-384, entitled People v. Celso Evardo, supposedly due on June 2, 1998. She was
subsequently able to complete and promulgate her Decision in the criminal case on August 6,
1998.

On August 17, 1998, Judge Masamayor requested another extension of thirty (30) days to resolve
the Motion to Dismiss filed in Civil Case No. 0020.[2] She finally resolved the Motion on
August 27, 1998.

On January 19, 1999, the Court, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), directed her, inter alia, "to EXPLAIN within ten (10) days from notice: (b-
1) why she did not specify in her letter-request dated 17 August 1998 that she already requested
for extension of thirty (30) days within which to decide Civil Case No. 0020; and (b-2) why she
requested an extension of time within which to resolve [Crim.] Case No. 98-384 only after the
reglementary period already lapsed."

In her letter[3] dated March 1, 1999, Judge Masamayor explained that her failure to mention that
a previous request for extension in Criminal Case No. 98-384 had already been made was not
deliberate, and that she was unaware of such omission. She said that she was constrained to
immediately make the second request for extension, "because by then thirty days had already
elapsed since the due date" for the resolution of Civil Case No. 0020. She also apologized for
making the said request only after the reglementary period had lapsed and promised to "strive not
to make the same lapse in the future."

Regarding Judge Masamayor's request in Civil Case No. 0020, this Court, in a Resolution dated
June 8, 1999, found her liable for violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and imposed upon her a fine of five thousand pesos (P5,000).[4]

In a Resolution dated July 6, 1999, Judge Masamayor's explanation regarding Criminal Case No.
98-384 was referred by the Court to the OCA.

The OCA's Recommendation

In its July 23, 1999 Memorandum to the Office of the Chief Justice, the OCA, through Deputy
Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada, reported that there had been several instances in
which Judge Masamayor committed an infraction of the 90-day reglementary period within
which to decide cases. Just recently, she was fined P5,000 for failure to decide Criminal Case
No. 96-185 within the prescribed period.[5] Deputy Court Administrator Ponferrada, with the
approval of Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, thus recommended that this time she be
fined in the amount of P15,000, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future would be dealt with more severely.

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, but reduce the fine
to P10,000.

Time and again, we have impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously within the constitutionally mandated 90-day period,[6] and that their failure to do
so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction upon
them.[7]

In the instant case, as reported by the OCA, there is a propensity on the part of Judge Masamayor
to request extensions of time within which to decide cases. Worse, her requests have been made
after the reglementary period had already lapsed. These lapses of Judge Masamayor speak of
serious neglect in the performance of her obligations to the party-litigants and to the speedy and
orderly administration of justice.

This Court has always reminded judges that it is their duty to devise an efficient recording and
filing system in their courts to enable them to monitor the flow of cases and to manage their
speedy and timely disposition.[8] They should keep a record of the cases submitted for decision
and ought to know when they should dispose of them. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
exacts the following:

"Rule 3.08 - A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain

professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of administrative
functions of other judges and court personnel.

Rule 3-09 - A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public
service and fidelity."

The public trust character of their office imposes upon judges the highest degree of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their functions, particularly to decide cases promptly, fairly and
competently.[9] Judges should be able to manage their dockets efficiently in order to accomplish
their work with reasonable dispatch. Needless to say, any delay in the resolution of a case is, at
bottom, a delay of justice and thus a denial thereof.[10]

The Court is well-aware of the monumental challenges faced by trial judges in the performance
of their duties, manifested particularly in the sheer volume of their case load. This is precisely
why we almost invariably grant, upon proper application and on meritorious grounds, additional
time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. Nonetheless, a heavy case load is not an excuse
for the late resolution of cases.[11] Judges should give full dedication to their primary and
fundamental task of administering justice efficiently, in order to restore and maintain the people's
confidence in the courts. At least, they should file their requests for extension before the
expiration of the prescribed period.

Based on the foregoing principles, we find that Judge Masamayor has not fully lived up to her
responsibility for the orderly administration of justice. Her repeated failure to decide cases within
90 days from the date they were submitted for resolution, aggravated by her failure to file timely
requests for additional time to dispose of them, constitutes gross inefficiency. She is reminded to
be more assiduous and conscientious in the disposition of her responsibilities as an officer of the
court.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby HOLDS Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor LIABLE for gross
inefficiency and ORDERS her to pay a FINE of ten thousand pesos (P10,000), with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

ATTY. RAUL A. SANCHEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL,

Regional Trual Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-98-1419 | 1998-10-13

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Justice delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes. Hence, judges are mandated to decide cases seasonably. Judges who cannot comply
with such mandate should ask for additional time, explaining in their request the reasons for the
delay.

The Case

In a complaint dated July 3, 1996, Atty Raul A. Sanchez charged Presiding Judge Augustine A.
Vestil of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, with (1) grave misconduct, (2)
graft, (3) gross ignorance of the law and (40 falsification of his certificate of service in relation to
Special Proceedings No. MAN 185 entitled "Intestate Estate Proceedings of the Deceased Jose
D. Sanchez," allegedly committed as follows:

"1. GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES AND

VIOLATION OF JUDICIAL ETHICS.

"The respondent committed grave misconduct in the performance of his duties by showing
partiality in granting Roquita A. Sanchez the authority to mortgage the property with an area of
8,742 Square Meters, despite the fact that in the compromise agreement entered into by the
parties, it was specifically agreed to sell the said property within the earliest possible time and
proceeds thereof will be equally divided by the parties less expenses and agent[']s commission.

"He violated Judicial Ethical Standard, by allowing his private car to be used by Roquita A.
Sanchez a litigant in the case, in the transaction of sale of property.

2. GRAFT CHARGES.
"By receiving monetary considerations and accepting foods offered to him by Roquita A.
Sanchez.

3. GROS IGNORANCE OF LAW, RENDERING UNJUST INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

D[E]PRIVING PARTY A DAY IN COURT.

"The respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of law by authorizing Roquita A. Sanchez, in behalf
of her minor children, to mortgage property in the intestate/testate proceedings of Jose D.
Sanchez when the same should be heard in Guardianship proceedings.

"The respondent is guilty of rendering unjust interlocutory order in granting Roquita A. Sanchez
the authority to mortgage the property when the same should have been sold and depriving
Teogenes P. Sanchez a day in court by failing to give notice of the notice of the motion and copy
of order granting the same.

IV. FALSIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.

"The respondent had falsified his monthly certificate of service submitted to this Honorable
Court by stating that he has no pending case submitted for decision or resolution that has gone
beyond the NINETY (90) day period allowed by law. The truth of the matter being that there are
several if not numerous not only civil but also criminal cases which the respondent ha[s] failed to
resolve within the NINETY (90) days period. In fact some of them have been submitted for
resolution more than a year ago yet until [the] present the presiding judge has not acted upon it.

"An example is the case of Ariston Perez vs. Marcelino Perez, et al., docketed as Civil Case No.
MAN-796. The last pleading filed was on April 27, 1995 which is an opposition to plaintiff's
motion for reconsideration. Until at present the same has not been acted upon. Photocopy of the
pleading hereto attached and made an integral part of this complaint as Annex 'O'.

"Aside from the above-mentioned case, so far as known to this representation, the following are
criminal cases submitted to the court for decision which has gone beyond the NINETY (90) day
reglementary period:

P.P. vs. Gerry Ando - Crim Case No. DU-2259

P.P. vs. Maximo Mora - Crim. Case No. DU-3754

P.P. vs. Rudy Atis - Crim. Case No. DU-3085

P.P. vs. Arturo Macasero - Crim. Case No. DU3096

P.P. vs. Allan Ariza - Crim. Case No. D[U]-1907

P.P. vs. Jorgie Blanco, et al. - Crim. Case No. DU-876 & 877
P.P. vs. Simeon Cagang - Crim. Case No. DU-3629

P.P. vs. Jose Bontuyan - Crim. Case No. 2322 & 2333

P.P. vs. Primo Salundaga - Crim. Case No. DU-1056"1 [Complaint, pp. 9-12; rollo, pp. 9-12.]

On October 28, 1996, respondent filed his Comment, praying that the Complaint be dismissed
and specifically denying the allegations therein, viz:

"I. Alleged Grave Misconduct.

"Complainants claim that respondent allegedly committed grave misconduct by showing

partiality in granting Roquita Sanchez authority to mortgage the property with an area of 8,742
square meters, (located in Li-ong, Mandaue City).

"This charge is a malicious lie, a distortion of facts and is without basis in fact because:

'a. What was authorized to be mortgaged was ANOTHER lot, only One Thousand Four Hundred
Thirty Nine (1,439) square meters located in Paknaan (NOT Liong) Mandaue City.

xxxx

'There is no evidence whatsoever that respondent allowed Roquita Sanchez to use his
(Resposdent's) private car. In fact, in his Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, Complainant stated
that he was allegedly merely 'told' or was 'informed'.

"II. Alleged Graft Charges

"There is absolutely no proof whasoever that respondent received monetary consideration nor
accepted foods offered by Roquita Sanchez.

"In fact, in his Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, Complainant himself stated (under oath) that he
was merely 'informed' (HEAR-SAY) about the alleged offering of food.

"With respect to the baseless and cruel charge of monetary consideration, this has been explained
and unmasked as maliciously false (please refer to our Annex '1').

"III. Alleged Gross Ignorance of Law, etc.

"This is a repetition of charegs herein before already discussed. (Please see page 5 of this
comment and the order of denying the motion to inhibit hereto attached as annex '2').

"IV. Falsification of Certificate of Service.

"This again is a distortion of facts. The truth is, and as hereinbefore already stated, almost seven
hundred (700) cases most of which had been substantially heard by other judges were unloaded
to Branch 56 from Branch[es] 55 and 28. Some of these cases were filed YEARS before
respondent assumed office. As a consequence, some transcripts of records were no longer
available. Worse, some stenographers could no longer be found. Which is precisley why in the
Certificate of Service, there is always that portion which states 'except voluminous inherited
cases which were substantially heard by another judge and require further study by the
respondent or where stenographic notes have not been transcribed.'

"Clearly, therefore, the Certificate of Service does NOT contain any falsified statement. The
cases enumerated in the Complaint were filed BEFORE respondent's assumption to duty. Despite
this however, one, DU-3629 entitled People versus Simeon Cagang, has already been resolved
while the rest are under study.

"In this connection, respondent would like to respectfully inform this Honorable Supreme Court
that he has been exerting utmost efforts reducing his case load which at one time reaches more
than one thousand one hundred (1,100) cases including the almost seven hundred (700) unloaded
to him in 1993. Almost EVERY SATURDAY and during some holidays, respondent with two or
three of this staff have been reporting for work at no additional compensation.

"But with schedules or trial reaching sometimes as many as eighteen (18) cases a day and
averaging around eight (8), it simply is beyond human capability and endurance to cope with
cases substantially heard by other judges, oftentimes WITHOUT transcipts of testimonial
evidence.

"Nonetheless, Branch 56 is doing its best, which probably explains why from a high of more
than one hundred thousand one hundred cases we now have barely seven hundred."2
[Respondent's Comment, pp. 11-14; rollo, pp. 157-160.]

In a Resolution dated July 30, 1997, this Court referred the Complaint to Justice Consuelo Y.
Santiago of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. The Court also
directed the Office of the Court Administrator to send a team to conduct a judicial audit of cases
pending before the sale of respondent.

After the judicial audit was conducted, the Court, in its Resolution dated December 3, 1997,3
[Rollo, pp. 113-115.] adopted the following recommendations of the OCA and directed
respondent (1) "to concentrate meanwhile in deciding with dispatch" those cases which have
remained unresolved beyond the constitutionality prescribed ninety days and (2) to explain
within ten days from notice the reason for the delay in the resolution of said cases. The Court
further directed the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the OCA to withhold the salary of
respondent "until he has decided the said cases and has submitted copies of the decision" to the
Office of the Court Administrator.

Report and Recommendations

In her Report dated July 27, 1998,4 [At pp. 10-21.] Justice Santiago stated:

"In the crux of the controversy is the Order of respondent Judge dated December 5, 1995 in Sp.
Proc. No. 185-MAN, the full text of which reads as follows:

'Order

Forming part of the records of this case is an Ex Parte Motion for Authority to Mortgage
Property filed by Roquita Sanchez

Considering the reasons set forth in the Motion and finding the same to be impressed with merit,
the same is granted.

Accordingly, herein movant is hereby granted the authority for and in behalf of her minor
children to mortgage/encumber the lot situated at Paknaan, Mandaue City under administration.

Notify counsel and parties.

SO ORDERED.

Given this 5th day of December 1995 at Mandaue City, Philippines.' (id., p. 29; Exh. H).'

"The aforeqouted Order failed to indicate which property in Paknaan, Mandaue City, Roquita
was authorized to mortgage. A circumspect scrutiny of the provisions of the Compromise
Agreement entered into by Roquita and Teogenes on March 2, 1995 speaks of two (2) parcels of
land situated in the same locality; a lot with an area of 1,439 square meters and another with a
bigger area of 8,742 square meters. Both lots appear to have been denominated in Roquita's
favor, except that the bigger parcel was to be disposed of immediately, with the proceeds thereof
divided equally between Roquita and Teogenes. The complainant, moreover, charged that he had
not been furnished with a copy of the December 5, 1995 Order which granted Roquita authority
to mortgage the property (id., p. 10; Exh. P). Respondent Judge failed to controvert this charge.

"It needs [to] be stressed in this regard that the judge hearing or taking cognizance of an ex parte
motion is duty bound to make known to all parties whatever action has been taken thereon. It is
not enough that a judge issues orders or pens his decision[;] it is also important to promulgate
and make them known to all concerned at the earliest possible time and within the mandated
period (Nidua v. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 58 [1989], citing Mangulabnan v. Judge Tecson, 101 SCRA
810 [1980]; Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corp. v. Katalbas-Moscardon, 247 SCRA 145
[1995])

"Furthermore, after the motion for inhibition and the supplemental thereof were filed where it
was alleged, among others, that complainant and Teogenes were not duty notified of what action
he took on Roquita's ex parte motion, it was respondent Judge duty to ascertain whether or not a
copy of the Order dated December 5, 1995 was indeed sent to complainant or Teogenes, the
latter being the duly appointed administrator of the estate who, therefore, had every right to be
notified of the said order.

"Judges should verify if notices of court hearings have been sent and received by the parties
(Fernandez v. Imbing, 260 SCRA 536 [1996]). A judge is liable for culpable negligence if he did
not ascertain the facts before reaching conclusions and issuing orders. It is, in fact, routinary in
every hearing that the judge confirms in open court whether notices were duly served on all
parties (Tabao v. Butalid, 262 SCRA 559 [1996).

"Along the same vein, judges have been tasked with drawing up their decision and resolutions
with due care and to make certain that they truly and accurately reflect their conclusions and
final dispositions (Saballa v. NLRC, 260 SCRA 697 [1996]). As a judge, who is called upon to
administer the law and apply it to the facts, respondent should be studious of the principles of
law and diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts (Del Callar v. Salvador, 268 SCRA 320
[1997], citing Canon 4, Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.02, Code of Judicial Conduct)
before granting motions[,] much more so ex parte ones as in this case.

"Certainly a judge sitting in a case is not a mere hearing officer and must look beyond the
allegations of the parties (Marciano v. Sebastian, 231 SCRA 558 [1994]). Indeed, a person
presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and
render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts which are unwarranted or uncalled for
(Ortiz v. Palaypon, 234 SCRA 391 [1994]). Thus, Rule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Ethics states in no uncertain terms that:

'In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law
unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.'

"The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that:

'Canon I

Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

Canon II

Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

Rule 2.01: A Judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.

Rule 2.03: A Judge shall not allow family, social or other relationship to influence judicial
conduct or judgmment. [T]he prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interest of others nor convey or permit others to convey the impressions that they are in a
special positions to influence the judge.'

xxxxxxxxx

"All told, the acts of respondent judge leave much to be desired and do not measure up to the
exacting standards demanded by his office viewed in the peculiar factual context of this case
much more so vis-a-viz the strong-handed manner in which he dealt with the move for this
inhibition in his Order of May 23, 1996 wherein he denied the motion 'with the warning to Raul
Sanchez, as an officer of the Court, that the Court will not hesitate to use its contempt powers to
uphold and defend its dignity' (Rollo, p. 41) instead of exercising that becoming degree of
humble self-examination expected of a member of the bench whose impartiality and integrity
ha[ve] been placed under serious inquiry, for a judge is bound never to consider lightly a motion
for his inhibition that questions or puts to doubt, however, insignificant, his supposed
predilection [in] a case (Albos v. Alaba, 231 SCRA 68 ]1994]). And while a magistrate is given a
wide latitude of discretion in the resolution of cases pending before him. He is not a depository
of arbitrary power but a judge under the sanction of law who must never for a moment act like a
petty tyrant or provide any opportunity to be perceived as such through the abuse or misuse of
the compulsory processes of the law (Caamic v. Galapon. Jr., 237 SRCA 390 [1994];
Mangalindan v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 105 [1995])

"Anent the charge that respondent judge falsified his certificate of service attesting that he has no
pending cases submitted for decision or resolution beyond the 90-day period set down by law, it
bears stressing that a judge should always be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence and should administer justice impartially and without delay (Rule 1.01 and 1.02,
Code of Judicial Ethics; Cantela v. Almoradie, 229 SCRA 712 [1994]). xxx

xxx xxx xxx

"xxx A judge who fails to decide cases within the reglementary period and continues to collect
his salaries upon his certification that he has no pending matters to resolve, transgresses the
constitutional right of the people to the speedy disposition of their cases (Re: Report on the
judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of the Record of Cases in the RTC, Br. 43, Roxas,
Mindoro Oriental, supra) and if he falsifies his certificate of service, he is not only
administratively liable for serious misconduct under the Rules of Court but is also criminally
liable under the Revised Penal Code (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC,
Branches 61, 134 and 147, Makati, Metro Manila, supra).

"The 'Report on Audit and Physical Inventory of the Records of Cases in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City' dated November 12, 1997 submitted by the Judicial Audit
Team of the OCA pursuant to the resolution of the Supreme Court dated December 3, 1997
(Rollo, pp. 220-222) discloses, among others, that RTC, Branch 56, Mandaue City presided by
respondent judge has a case load of more than [e]ight [h]undred (800) cases (Report, p. 19 with
the status of the cases thereat broken down as follows:

Case Status/Stage of Cases Proceedings Criminal Cases Civil

Submitted for Decision within & beyond ninety (90) days 59 70

On Pre-Trial/Trial/Pending 206 236

Without Court Order for Compliance 8 26

With Warrants/Summons 40 18
Unacted upon for a Considerable length of time 24 130

Decided/PromulgatedDuring the Month of Audit 6 3

Archived/dismissed/withdrawn and/or Consolidated

with another Branch (Report p. 1)' 15 14

"The said Report made an even more thorough and detailed inventory of the said Branch's case
load including therein the case's dated of submission, to wit:

'1.) Cases Submitted For Decision Beyond 90-Day Period:

a.] Criminal Cases 54

b.] Civil Case 34

c.] Land Registration Cases 26

2.) Cases Submitted For Decision Within 90-day Period

a.] Criminal Cases 5

b.] Civil Cases 5

c.] Land Registration Cases 5

3.) Cases Unacted Upon

a.] Criminal Cases 24

b.] Civil Cases 130

(Report, pp. 2-19)'

which belie[s] any claim, much less any certification that respondent judge does not have cases
submitted for decision that has gone beyond the ninety (90) day reglementary period.
Furthermore, a circumspect scrutiny of the records of this administrative matter do[es] not show
that respondent judge made any attempt to request for a reasonable extension of time to dispose
of, if not at least cut down on his backlog of cases. Instead, he preferred to keep the actual status
of his case load shrouded in silence and belatedly made such a request in his Manifestation and
Motion of February 6, 1998 (Rollo, p. 212) upon receipt of the Supreme Court Resolution dated
December 3, 1997 (id., pp. 213-214) lamely explaining in said manifestation:

'That because most if not all of the cases adverted to were however TURNED OVER or
INHERITED cases from Branch[es] 28 and 55 of this Court most of which were already in the
terminal stage with only one or two last witnesses testifying before the undersigned, stenographic
transcript transcripts of the testimonies of previous witnesses were not available; xxx'

"Suffice it to state that such an excuse is hardly a defense against the act of submitting a false
certificate of service indicating that the person submitting the same had no cases pending beyond
the reglementary ninety (90) day period (Abad v. Belen, 240 SCRA 733 [1995]). Thus, it was
held in the recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Panganiban (A.M. No. RTJ-96-
1350, 18 August 1997, 277 SCRA 499) that

'[The act of a judge in stating in her certificates of service that she had no case submitted for
decision within the 90 days preceding the submission of her certificate in the honest belief that
the salary which she collected 'had been justly earned notwithstanding the fact that there are
substantial cases remaining for decision' constitutes serious misconduct.'

and neither good faith nor a long unblemished and above-average service in the judiciary can
fully justify the erring judge's lapses (Office of the Court Administrator v. Panganiban, supra).

"It also needs be pointed out in this regard that with or without the transcribed stenographic
notes, the ninety (90) day period for deciding cases should be adhered to (Re: Report on the
Judicial Audit and Inventory of the Record of Cases in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
Roxas, Mindoro Oriental, supra). The delay in the transcription of the stenographic notes by a
stenographer reporter under the judge's supervision and control cannot be considered a valid
reason for the delay in rendering judgment in a case. Precisely judges are directed to take down
notes of salient portions of the hearings and proceed with the preparation of decisions without
waiting for the transcribed stenographic notes (Re: Judge Danilo M. Tenerife, supra).

"While complainant did not adduce the questioned certificates of service which would support
his charge that respondent judge indeed falsified the said documents, there is ample proof on
record which would support the indictment. Be that as it may, even on the assumption that
respondent judge did not falsify his certificate of service as alleged, this fact alone will not
absolve him from liability because the factual landscape of this case is replete with evidence, in
the very least, of gross inefficiency and neglect of duty. It must be borne in mind [in] this regard
that a case has to be decided within ninety (90) days from its submission otherwise the judge
would be guilty of gross inefficiency and neglect of duty (Ubarra v. Mapalad, 220 SCRA 224
[1993]. As stated earlier, the Supreme [C]ourt has consistently held that the failure of a judge to
decide a case within the required period is not exc[u]sable and constitutes gross inefficiency and
the non-observance of said rule is a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting
judge (Lambino v. De Vera, A.M. No. MTJ-94-1017, 7 July 1997, 275 SCRA 60, citing in Re
Judge Madara, 104 SCRA 245 [1981]; Longboan v. Polig, 186 SCRA 557 [1990]; Sabado v.
Cajigal, supra and Alfonso-Cortes v. Maglalang, supra).

"In previous cases, the Supreme [C]ourt considered the failure of a judge to decide even a single
case within ninety (90) days gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of fines ranging from
P5,000.00 (Castillo v. Cortes, 234 SCRA 398 [1994]; In Re Letter of Mr. Octavio Kalalo, supra);
P10,000.,(Adriano v. Sto. Domingo, 202 SCRA 446 [1991]; fine equal [to] one (1) month salary
and reprimand (In Re: Judge Madara, supra); P20,000.00 for respondent judge's failure to decide
three (3) criminal cases although the Supreme Court found four (4) mitigating circumstances
(Baguio v. Torres, 211 SCRA 1 [1992]).

"In the case at bar, the magnitude of respondent judge's backlog redefines the meaning of gross
inefficiency and neglect of duty and elevates the degree of his culpability to a much higher level
than the aforecited cases."

Capping the foregoing, the investigating justice recommended that respondent be sanctioned
thus:

"IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned recommends that respondent judge be
fined in an amount equivalent to his salary for [o]ne (1) [y]ear with the stern warning that a
repetition of similar acts of impropriety in the future will be dealt with more severely."5 [Report
and Recommendation, p. 21.]

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with Justice Santiago's conclusions and recommendation that respondent
judge be sanctioned.

We reiterate that a "judge, as the person presiding over the court, is the visible representation of
the law and justice,"6 [Renato Ruperto v. Judge Tirso V. Banquerico, AM No. MTJ-98-1154,
August 6, 1998, per Regalado, J.] and that "[a] judge's official conduct should be free and
untainted by the appearance of impropriety, and his or her personal behavior, not only upon the
bench and in performance of judicial duties, but also in his or her everyday life, should be
beyond reproach."7 [Panaganiban v. Guerrero, Jr., 242 SCRA 11 March 11, 1995, per Regalado,
J.] Evidently, the acts of herein repsondent judge have not been consistent with the conduct
expected of his stature and profession.

Gross Dereliction of Duty

Respondent judge is being charge with dereliction of duty for failing to resolve numerous civil
and criminal cases within the period prescribed by law. He is also being called to account for
falsely stating in his certificate of service that there were no cases submitted for decision or
resolution beyond the reglementary period pending before his sala.

The Report on Audit and Physical Inventory of the Records of Cases in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 56, Mandaue City, submitted by the judicial audit team of the OCA, disclosed a thorough
and detailed inventory of respondent's case load, as follows:

"1.) Cases Submitted For Decision Beyond 90-Day Period:

a.] Criminal Cases 54

b.] Civil Cases 34

c.] Land Registration Cases 26

[Total 114]

2.) Cases Submitted For Decision Within 90-Day Period:

a.] Criminal Cases 5

b.] Civil Cases 5

c.] Land Registration Cases 5

3.) Cases Unacted Upon

a.] Criminal Cases 24

b.] Civil Cases 130"

Clearly, the foregoing shows that there are 114 cases before the sala of respondent judge which
have not been resolved within the reglementary period.

In his defense, respondent judge states that almost seven hundred cases, most of which had been
substantially heard by other judges, were unloaded to his branch. Consequently, some transcript,
as well as the stenographers who had transcribed them. Were no longer around. He adds that his
certificate of service contained the following disclaimer: "except voluminous inherited cases
which were substantially heard by another judge and require further study by the respondent or
where stenographic notes have not been transcribed." For the same reason, he maintains that his
certificate of service does not contain any falsified statement.

Furthermore, he informs the Court that despite the heavy workload, he has significantly reduced
the number of cases in his sala to 700, which at one time was more than one thousand one
hundred, by working almost every Saturday and on Holidays without additional compensation.

The arguments of respondents judge are not persuasive. While he claims that he did not falsify
his certificate of service, the fact remains that he failed to decide 114 cases within the
reglementary period and to report such fact faithfully. The rule is that the ninety-day period for
deciding cases should be observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time.8
[Balagot v. Opinion, 195 SCRA 429, March 20, 1991; Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in
the RTC, Branch 16 of Laoag City, Presided by Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., 247 SCRA 519, August
23, 1995.] Failure of a judge to resolve a case within the prescribed period constitutes gross
dereliction of duty. For this, respondent judge must be sanctioned.

We reiterate that judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads which prevent them from disposing
their cases within the reglementary period, may ask for additional time. While the certificate of
service of respondent judge contained a statement that there were cases before his sala that were
still undecided beyond the reglementary period, he made no attempt to request an extension of
time.
"This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the
disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges
are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so. Constitutes gross inefficiency
and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them."9 [Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Walerico Butalid, AM No. RTJ-96-1337, August 5, 1998, per curiam.
See also Atty. Nelson Ng v. Judge Leticia Ulibari, AM No. MTJ-98-881, August 3, 1998.
Jocelyn Grefaldeo v. Judge Rica Lacson, AM No. MTJ-93-881, August 3, 1998.]

Furthermore, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Delia Panganiban,10 [AM No. RTJ-
96-1350, August 18, 1997, per Mendoza, J.] we held:

"Neither good faith nor long, unblemished and above average service in the judiciary can fully
jusitify respondent judge's lapses. The Court cannot countenance undue delay in the disposition
of cases which is one of the causes of the loss of faith and confidence of our people in the
judiciary and brings it into disrepute."

Grave Misconduct

Complainant alleges that respondent judge committed grave misconduct when he issued the
order allowing Roquita Sanchez to mortgage "the lot situated in Paknaan." The records show that
the ex parte "motion for authority to mortgage property" filed by Roquita Sanchez referred to
either one of the properties in Paknaan that had been adjudicated to her in the project of partition.
The judge, however, failed to specify which of these properties was covered by his Order. It
should be noted that, in the project of partition, both properties had been designated to be in
Paknaan.

It is true that the property subsequently mortgaged turned out to be situated in Liong-an, as
evidenced by a certification issued by the Office of the City Assessor. But this does not change
the fact that, based on the project of partition, the authority to mortgage included both properties.
Thus, it is futile for respondent to asseverate that his Order pertained to the smaller property,
which is not the subject of the compromise, since it is obvious that his Order was inaccurate and
ambiguous. Having approved the compromise agreement himself, he should have been more
careful in couching his subject Order such that it would have been ascertainable which property
he was referring to, considering that a mistake could prejudice the interest of the other parties. It
is irrelevant that no prejudice actually resulted from the mortgage, the property having been
eventually redeemed; what is significant is the misconduct attributable to the judge, which led to
the filing of the instant administrative case.

In the performance of his duties, respondent judge obviously failed to observe due care,
diligence, prudence and circumspection, which the law requires in the rendition of any public
service.11 [Fernandez v. Imbing, 260 SCRA 586, August 21, 1996.] "We reiterate the rule that
although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or
decision he renders, that relative immunity is not license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary
in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in
them by the law, there will be not only confusion in the administration of justice but even also
oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process."12 [Avelino and Asteria Daiz v.
Judge Asadon, AM No. MTJ-98-1152, June 2, 1998, per Puno, J.] This misuse of powers,
coupled with the allegations that respondent had accepted favors from one of the parties (Roquita
Sanchez), who benefited from his ambiguous order, led to the additional charge of graft against
him.

In issuing the questioning Order, respondent judge also failed to furnish the other party,
Teogenes Sanchez, a copy thereof. "It is not enough that judges write their decisions; it is also
important to promulgate and make it known to all concerned. Otherwise, what good would a
favorable decision be if the interested parties were kept in the dark about it? It would only be a
tool for maneuvers on the part of the losing party or valuable commodity for sale by
unscrupulous persons."13 [Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corporation v. Katalbas-Moscardon,
247 SCRA 145, August 11, 1995, per curiam.]

The Penalty

In the Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC-Branches 29 and 59, Toledo City,14 [AM
No. 97-9-278-RTC, July 8, 1998 per Puno, J.] the Court observed the factors considered in the
determination of the proper penalty for gross dereliction of duty:

"We have always considered the failure of a judge to decide a case within ninety (90) days as
gross inefficiency and imposed either fine or suspension from service without pay for such. The
fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within
the reglementary period and other factors, to wit: the presence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances -- the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of
the judge, etc. Thus, in one case,15 [Re: Judge Danilo M. Tenerife, AM No. 95-5-42-MTC,
March 20, 1996, 225 SCRA 184.] we set the fine at ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) for failure
of a judge to decide 82 cases within the reglementary period, taking into consideration the
mitigating circumstance that it was the judge's first offense. In another case,16 [Re: Report of the
Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court Branches, 61, 134 and 147, Makati, Metro,
Manila, AM No. 93-2-1001-RTC, September 5, 1995, 248 SCRA 5.] the fine imposed was sixty
thousand pesos (P60,000), for the judge had not decided about 25 or 27 cases. Still in other
cases, the fines were variably set at fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), for nineteen (19) cases
left undecided, taking into consideration that it was the judge's first offense;17 [Report on the
Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of the Records of Cases in MTCC-Br. 2, Batangas City
,AM No. 94-10-96-MTCC, 248 SCRA 36, September 5, 1995.] twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00), for three (3) undecided criminal cases;18 [Baguio v. Torres, AM No. MTJ-90-490,
211 SCRA 1, July 3, 1992.] eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00), for not deciding a criminal case
for three (3) years;19 [Navarro v. Judge Del Rosario, AM No. MTJ-96-1091, 270 SCRA 264,
March 21, 1997.] forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), for not deciding 278 cases within the
prescribed period, taking note of the judge's failing health and age;20 [Report on the Judicial
Audit and Physical Inventory of the Cases in RTC-Br. 138, Makati City, AM No. RTJ-94-4-156,
254 SCRA 644, MArch 13, 1996.] and ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), for belatedly rendering
a judgment of acquittal in a murder case, after one and one-half years from the date the case was
submitted for decision.21 [Lopez v. Alon, AM No. 95-95-RTJ, 254 SCRA 166, February 28,
1996.] In another case,22 [Bolalin v. Judge Occiano, AM No. MTJ-96-1104, January 14, 1997,
266 SCRA 203.] suspension without pay for a period of six (6) months was imposed since,
besides the judge's failure to timely decide an election protest for eight (8) months, the judge
submitted false certificates of service and was found guilty of habitual absenteeism."

In the present case, respondent judge is guilty not only of gross dereliction of duty for his failure
to resolve 114 cases within the reglementary period and to report such fact faithfully. He is also
culpable for grave misconduct for issuing the aforesaid Order. Worse, the present case is not his
first offense; in PDCP Development Bank v. Vestil,23 [264 SCRA 467, November 21, 1996.] he
was fined P5,000 for interfering with proceedings of another court of coequal jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Augustine Vestil is SUSPENDED from office for one year
without pay and FINED P50,000 for gross dereliction of duty and grave misconduct. This
Decision is immediately executory, and respondent is hereby ORDERED to vacate his office and
henceforth cease and desist from performing any function or act in connection with such office,
upon receipt hereof.

The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to evaluate the above-mentioned 114 cases
which have remained undecided beyond the reglementary period, and to submit to this Court,
within thirty days from notice, appropriate recommendations on the expeditious disposition
thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, CJ., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez,
Quisumbing, Purisima, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

LIWAYWAY G. BANIQUED, OIC, Statistical Reports Division, complainant, vs.

EXEQUIEL C. ROJAS, Statistician III, respondent.

A.M. No. OCA-00-03 | 2000-10-04

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

In a sworn-letter complaint dated November 8, 1999, complainant Liwayway G. Baniqued,

Statistician IV and Officer-in-Charge, Statistical Reports, Division, OCA, charged respondent
Exequiel C. Rojas with Grave Misconduct and Slander.

According to the complainant, on November 4, 1999, at around 11:00 o'clock in the morning, the
respondent arrived in the office drunk. Passing by her table, the latter, without addressing
anyone, announced in a loud voice as if he was the boss "Magbabago na tayo ng seating
arrangement dito." Then, he placed his bag on his chair, sat beside another employee, German C.
Averia, Statistician III, and repeated his previous order.

As Mr. German C. Averia did not take him seriously, respondent stood up, paced back and forth,
and said, still in a very loud voice "O, yung mga nagkukunwari diyang nagtatrabaho, ha. Huh!
Mahuli ko lang diyan ang nagkukunwaring nagtatrabaho, lagot sa 'kin. Ang mahuli ko lang
nagkukunwaring nagtatrabahong nag-aadjust."

Suddenly, respondent sat on the chair in front of complainant, faced the latter and uttered,
"Liway, itigil mo na 'yang pag-aadjust mo. . . itigil mo na yan! Kaya na yang gawin sa computer.
xxx Mag-resign ka na! Ang laki-laki ng suweldo mo, 'yan lang gagawin mo! Anong klase kang
hepe, walang alam. Magkano'ng sweldo mo . . . P20,000 wala kang ginagawa!"

Complainant explained the need to update the summaries for the previous years but respondent
repeated what he previously said, and added that she (complainant) is a disgrace to the division
for she submitted a different set of data to the Senate and changes the same, every now and then.

When nothing seemed to be resolved by the exchange of words between respondent and
complainant, another employee requested the respondent to stop his tirade. Respondent,
however, continued and berated Eric S. Fortaleza, a Computer Operator 1 of the same division,
saying "Huwag kang maupo diyan, ayaw kitang katabi! Di ba ang gusto mong trabaho mag
receive ng Docket Inventory? Gusto mo pala Receiving Clerk, doon ka sa harap maupo!"

What respondent did next was to accuse her (complainant) of being biased because she allowed
one subordinate to go on leave while she disallowed another to do the same; after which, he
shouted, "Ang kapal ng mukha mo, Liway! Nipis-nipisan mo naman!" When she pointed out that
unlike the other employee, the employee he was referring to did not ask her permission but only
called to say she was sick, he replied, "Nagkasakit ha! Huh ! Ang galing ninyong magdahilan.
Liway, 'pag lang nalaman kong umattend lang 'yan ng seminar. . . Huh! Nagkasakit ha!"

Then, complainant's daughter, Maida, who works in the Cash Division, came and defended her.
Respondent got so mad and shouted, "Huwag kang makialam dito. Nakikibahay ka lang dito."
After some exchange of words, respondent shouted as loud as ever (with fingers pointing) "Ikaw
na babae ka, ha!"

Complainant further averred that the first time respondent humiliated her in the office during
office hours and in front of so many people was in 1996; at which time respondent insulted her
by calling her a "hepeng walang alam". In the second incident, he ordered her to resign.

In his Comment, respondent explained that on November 4, 1999 he was suffering from a
terrible headache but because he had to pick up a check from the Supreme Court Savings and
Loan Association, he went to the office just the same. Unfortunately, the sight of a few
officemates using outdated methods again hounded him.

He admitted having uttered some words which should not have been said but which were not
directed to anyone in particular. Complainant thought he was drunk when in fact he was not, and
she felt what he said was an affront to her position as Acting Chief of the Statistics Division.
Having apologized to the complainant, respondent vows that the same incident will never happen
again.

On June 20, 2000, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator
for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The Report dated July 27, 2000 of the Court Administrator recommends that respondent be fined
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos. Pertinent portions of the said report read:

We find for the complainant. Respondent's high-strung and belligerent behavior cannot be
countenanced. Fighting with a co-employee during office hours is a disgraceful behavior
reflecting adversely on the good image of the judiciary. Shouting in the workplace and during
office hours is arrant discourtesy and disrespect not only towards co-workers but to the Court as
well. It displays a cavalier attitude towards the seriousness and dignity with which court business
should be treated.

Such deportment, especially during office hours, was totally unbecoming for an employee who
forms part of the judicial service and this definitely cannot be allowed. Respondent's conduct
exhibits failure on his part to discharge his duties with the required degree of professionalism, to
respect at all times the rights of others and refrain from acts contrary to good morals and good
customs as demanded by Republic Act No. 6713 which, inter alia, enunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service (Apaga vs.
Ponce, A.M. No. P-95-1119, June 21, 1995).

Anent the charge that respondent was under the influence of liquor when he committed the acts
subject of this complaint, there is no evidence adduced by the complainant to support her claim.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned respectfully recommend that a FINE in the
amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) be imposed against respondent Exequiel C.
Rojas with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

The report of the Court Administrator is well taken and accords with what is on record. To repeat
what was said in Sy vs. Academia:[1]

This Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of
all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and would diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary. xxx We laid down the rule that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with
an office charged with the dispensation of justice, like the court below, from the presiding judge
to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but above all else
must be above suspicion. [2]
WHEREFORE, respondent Exequiel C. Rojas is hereby FINED FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS and warned that a repetition of the same act or omission will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

ARNULFO B. TAURO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANGEL V. COLET, Regional Trial

Court of Manila, Branch 8, respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1434 | 1999-04-29

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The primordial duty of judges is to decide cases justly and expeditiously. Indeed, justice delayed
is justice denied.

The Case

The Court stresses this principle in resolving the June 3, 1997 sworn Complaint[1] of Arnulfo B.
Tauro, charging Judge Angel V. Colet of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, of failure
to decide Criminal Case Nos. 92-109346, 92-109347 and 92-109348 (three counts of violation of
Art. 125, Revised Penal Code) within the reglementary period of 90 days.

The Facts

In his sworn Complaint, Tauro alleges the following:

"1. That I am the complaining witness in People of the Philippines vs. Jose Sta. Cruz, Sr.
docketed under Criminal Case Nos. 92-109346, 92-109347 and 92-109348 for Violation of
Article 125 (b) (Three Counts), raffled to RTC Br. 43, Manila, presided by the Honorable Judge
ANGEL V. COLET;

"2. That the presentation of evidence by both parties in the aforementioned cases has been
terminated in the early part of December 1995, after postponements, and resettings, and
aggravated by the non-punctuality of the Honorable Judge, who often comes to court late, and
sometimes absent which caused the said cases to be considerably delayed;

"3. That the said cases were submitted for decision after the same ha[ve] been terminated in the
same year of 1995;
"4. That the said Honorable Judge failed to decide my case within the 90 day period as mandated
by law;

"5. That after the 90 day period to decide the aforementioned cases lapsed, the said Honorable
Judge was transferred to Quezon City Regional Trial Court bringing with him the records[;] and
not long thereafter, I was informed that the said Honorable Judge was again transferred to
Baguio City Regional Trial Court with all the pertaining documents relative to the above cited
cases;

"6. That until now the aforementioned cases [have] remained undecided for no valid reasons at
all[;] or for more than a year and a half now the said Honorable Judge ignored and blatantly
disregarded the 90 day period mandated by law;

"7. That if the said Honorable Judge has collected his monthly salaries and submits REPORTS
that he has no pending cases to be decided, then he is not candid with the Honorable Supreme
Court;

"8. That under the facts as above presented, it is clear that Honorable Judge ANGEL V. COLET
has violated Section 5 of Republic Act 269, as [a]mended, which ordains that judges must decide
cases submitted for decision within ninety (90) days; Likewise, Canon 1, Rule 1.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which ordains that a judge should administer justice impartially and without
delay was grossly violated;"[2]

In his Comment filed on October 10, 1997,[3] Respondent Judge Colet admits that he failed to
decide the said cases within the prescribed period, but pleads for leniency. In his words:

"1. The delays in the hearings of the cases were caused by the private prosecutor's and the
defense counsel's motion[s] for postponement or non-appearance for one reason or another. The
records of the case show that I tried and was determined to finish the proceedings [the] soonest
possible.

"The Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branches 43 and 29, Pasay City, Branch 110[;] and
Quezon City, Branch 104 can testify that I have been prompt in reporting to the office and
calling the cases for trial as scheduled.

"2. I inherited these cases when I was detailed to Branch 43 in May 1993. Because I received
almost all the evidence, on motion of the accused, Judge Manuela F. Lorenzo, the regular Judge
of Branch 43, forwarded the records of the cases to me at Branch 29 for further proceedings.
(Xerox copy of the Order is attached as Annex '1').

"3. On February 7, 1996, with the admission of defense Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, the cases were
submitted for decision 'with or without memoranda' after 20 days from the availability of the
transcript of stenographic notes. (Xerox copy of the Order is attached as Annex '2').

"4. I decided the case on May 6, 1997. (Xerox copy of the last page of the decision is attached as
Annex '3').

"5. The decision was promulgated on June 9, 1997. I acquitted the accused for insufficiency of
evidence.

"It is probably because I acquitted the accused that Mr. Tauro filed the administrative charge. His
claim that up to now I have not decided the case is obviously false and his charge is obviously
intended to get back at me for having acquitted the accused.

"I admit that I decided the cases beyond the 90-day period but please, allow me to state, not to
justify my fault but to provide basis for Your Honor's leniency which is herein pleaded.

"1. After Judge Lorenzo was appointed Presiding Judge of RTC Manila, Branch 43, I was
allowed to continue with my detail to finish the cases which were about to be finished. Three of
those were the above-cited cases;

"2. After I was detailed to Branch 29 about ten months later, the records of the cases were
transmitted to me so I could finish and decide them. The cases were submitted for decision when
I was the Presiding Judge of Branch 29;

"3. Not very long after, I was transferred to Pasay City RTC Branch 110 and then in June, 1997,
I was detailed to Quezon City;

"4. I was reverted to my regular station in La Trinidad, Benguet in April 1997;

"5. After the cases were submitted for decision, I remember having asked for the transcripts
which were lacking. I reiterated this request several times and even asked for my notes which
were missing;

"6. Failing to get the notes and transcripts, I set the records of the cases aside and continued to do
so in Pasay City;

"7. After I was transferred to Quezon City, I forgot the cases because it must have been sent to
me along with many other folders and envelopes;

"8. When I was ordered to return to La Trinidad, Benguet, in the latter part of March, I went over
all my records and there I came across the records of the cases. Immediately, I looked for the
transcripts and when I finally got them, I decided the case.

"I apologize for this records mis-management and I am ready to face the consequences with this
plea for leniency.

"I deny the accusation that I violated Canon 1, Rule 1.02 because I administered justice
impartially."[4]
Recommendation of the Court Administrator

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent judge guilty of having failed to
perform his duty to decide cases within the reglementary period, viz.:

"By his own admission, respondent Judge violated Section 15, par. 1 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution which is explicit in its pronouncement that 'All cases or matters filed after the
effectivity of this constitution must be decided or resolved within three months for all other
lower courts.'

"Respondent Judge should be reminded that assumption of the judicial office casts upon him
duties and restrictions peculiar to his position. He is expected to act within the demands of his
exalted position. A judge should always be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence and should administer justice impartially and without delay. He should be faithful
to the law and maintain professional competence, dispose of the court's business promptly, and
decide cases within the required periods."[5] (Citation omitted)

xxxxxxxxx

"In failing to decide the cases subject of the complaint within the prescribed period, respondent
judge has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that 'A
Judge should administer justice impartially and without delay."[6] (Citation omitted)

The OCA recommends that respondent be fined in the amount of P10,000.

This Court's Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator.

Speedy Resolution of Cases

Respondent admits that he failed to decide the aforementioned cases within the three-month
period prescribed by the Constitution.[7] For this reason, he should be administratively
sanctioned.

Indeed, judges are mandated to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within
the required period.[8] Accordingly, they have been consistently reminded that delay in the
disposition of cases ordinarily constitutes gross inefficiency and, as such, is deemed
inexcusable.[9] However, should the resolution of a case within the reglementary period prove to
be unlikely, they may ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to prepare a decision.[10]
In the present case, respondent judge never asked for extension, for he forgot that the cases were
pending.

As respondent himself admits, the charge against him cannot be justified by the claims that
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) were not immediately transmitted to him, and that he
totally forgot the cases after he was transferred to other stations.
Judges are required to take down notes and to proceed in the preparation of decisions, even
without the TSNs. The Court has held that the three-month reglementary period continues to run,
with or without them.[11] Thus, their absence or the delay in their transcription cannot excuse
respondent judge's failure to decide the cases within the prescribed period.

Further, respondent was remiss in his duty to adopt a system of record management, as
evidenced by the loss of the records of the cases. Worse, he did not even endeavor to locate the
missing documents. In fact, he totally forgot about the pending cases, until he accidentally came
across them. In this light, members of the bench are reminded that they are required to organize
their courts so as to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.[12] In Office of the
Court Administrator v. Villanueva, we ruled:

"A judge xxx is expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may act on them promptly
without undue delay. It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system
in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. x x
x Proper and efficient court management is as much his responsibility. He is the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions."[13]

Accordingly, we adopt the recommendation of the OCA that respondent judge be fined P10,000.
In Celino v. Abrogar,[14] the Court imposed the same fine to the respondent, who failed to
decide a civil case within the three-month period.[15]

WHEREFORE, Judge Angel V. Colet is found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and is hereby
ordered to PAY a fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000). He is WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
his personal records.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO ALVARO RUPERTO, complainant, vs. JUDGE TIRSO F. BANQUERIGO,

respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-98-1154 | 1998-08-06

DECISION

REGALADO, J:

This administrative matter was initiated by a verified complaint of one Renato Alvaro Ruperto
against Judge Tirso F. Banquerigo of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Tayasan
Jimmalud, Negros Oriental, in his acting capacity as presiding judge of the MCTC, Bindoy-
Ayungon-Manjuyod, for alleged ignorance of the law, malicious prosecution, grave abuse of
discretion and malicious delay in the administration of justice. 1

Complainant alleges that this administrative case stems from the questionable ruling of
respondent Judge Banquerigo in a case he filed against the spouses Anselmo and Pacita Mojillo,
for ejectment with damages, on August 2, 1995. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. A-178
of the MCTC of Bindoy-Ayungon-Manjuyod.

The Mojillo spouses failed to file their answer to the complaint within the reglementary period.
Since the case falls under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, herein complainant filed a
motion with the trial court on September 1, 1995 to summarily decide the case in accordance
with the aforesaid Rule. Respondent judge, however, failed to act on the motion and, worse, he
further granted therein defendant spouses an additional ten days within which to file their
answer. The case was set for hearing on December 14, 1995, and, thereafter, it was again reset to
March 14, 1996. Thus, complainant contends, Judge Banquerigo failed to promptly act as
provided for under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, but he instead allowed the case to
unduly drag on.

Complainant accordingly submits that although the case is governed by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, seven months have already elapsed and the Mojillo spouses have failed to
offer a valid defense; that respondent judge should have ruled on the motion to decide the case
through the required summary procedure; that Judge Banquerigo's refusal to act on said motion
has delayed the administration of justice; that his utter disregard of the Rule is a blatant and
irresponsible actuation, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion; and that respondent should not
go unpunished since he has made a mockery of our justice system.

Regarding the charge of malicious prosecution, complainant alleges that respondent judge issued
a warrant for his arrest on February 26, 1990 for two alleged crimes of qualified theft, despite the
fact that the supposed crimes were committed in the presence of many persons and in broad
daylight. Of greater importance, so he contends, is that the land in question belongs to him,
hence he cannot be liable for theft of coconuts thereon while the ownership of the land was still
in issue. To further bolster his claim, complainant points out that said criminal cases for qualified
theft were dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City on March 13, 1991 as no
criminal intent was proved. Hence, the issuance of the warrant of arrest by respondent judge was
malicious and tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

Respondent Judge Tirso F. Banquerigo, after several motions for extension, finally filed his
comment. He stressed that he was only an acting judge of the MCTC, Manjuyod-Bindoy-
Ayungon which had jurisdiction over the cases in question and that he was reporting to that
court, which had 226 pending cases, only twice a week. He retorts that it is complainant who is
guilty of malicious prosecution because the filing of this administrative action has wasted the
precious time of his court.

Respondent admits that he issued a warrant for the arrest of complainant, but adds that the same
was done after it was established that there was prima. facie evidence, hence the issuance of the
warrant was in order. He further asserts that he should not be accused of malicious prosecution
since he did not file any case against complainant.
As to the charges of ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and malicious delay in the
administration of justice in connection with the ejectment case filed by complainant against the
Mojillo spouses, respondent avers that the case was filed in August, 1995. Considering that there
were several cases filed with the MCTC of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon, the case was set for
hearing on March 14, 1996 allegedly as agreed upon by the parties and their counsel.

He claims that his failure to act on the motion of complainant to decide the case in accordance
with Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was because, in the interest of justice
and equity, he believed that said motion should be set for hearing. He contends that it was
complainant's own act which allowed technicalities to set in, because he filed a responsive
pleading or reply to the affirmative defenses and an answer to the counterclaim of therein
defendant spouses. It is the opinion of respondent judge that the filing of such pleadings by
complainant was tantamount to abandoning his motion for the resolution of the case based on
Section 6 of the aforecited Rule.

Respondent judge, to further justify his actuations, calls attention, to the fact that he was, at that
time, also assigned as acting presiding judge of several courts, as a consequence of which he
could not always keep track of all the cases filed in his own regular sala and those to which he
was detailed. 2

The office of a judge exists for one solemn end - to promote the ends of justice by administering
it speedily and impartially. The judge, as the person presiding over that court, is the visible
representation of the law and justice. These are self-evident dogmas which do not even have to
be emphasized, but to which we are wont to advert when some members of the judiciary commit
legal missteps or stray from the axioms of judicial ethics, hopefully only through unwitting error
or inattention.

These fundamental tenets hold true regardless of the ranking of the court and its magistrate in the
hierarchy of our judicial system. The fact that the cases involved in the present administrative
matter are comparatively among the minor transgressions in criminal and civil law, and the
respondent judge presides over a court on the lowest rung of the judicial ladder, all the more
requires the attention of this highest Court. As we have stated in Miguel Abarquez vs. Judge
Bienvenido U. Rebosura: 3

It is perceptively said that for the common tao, the municipal trial court may well be the tribunal
of first and last resort. This court presents him his only view of the legal system, with its
presiding judge as the sole personification of a dispenser of justice, and with his case as the
example of how rights are protected or disregarded. This scenario is replicated on a national
scope, and we cannot allow a wrong impression of the judiciary to be created by the
shortcomings of those manning its frontiers.

We hold that Judge Banquerigo failed to comply with what is specifically required as a judicial
duty. The ejectment case filed by complainant against the defendant spouses therein clearly falls
under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. To disregard its provisions is clearly ignorance
of the law; and a judge who, through gross ignorance of the law, frustrates the purpose for which
it was enacted, commits a disservice to the cause of justice.

In Rural Bank of Macalalag, Inc vs. Maniwang, 4 we ruled that a judge is remiss in the
performance of his duties when he fails to decide a case covered by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure after the defendants failed to file their answers therein. This is obviously so
since the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provides:

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed
for therein; Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages
and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without
prejudice to the application of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court if there are two or more
defendants.

On the other charge for malicious prosecution, however, we find that the issuance of the warrant
of arrest by respondent judge was in accordance with the procedure therefor and was not done
with malice or any dubious intent. As he explained in his comment, which has not been refuted, a
prima facie case was established during the preliminary investigation. His findings were
sustained by the Provincial Prosecutor's Office and an information was consequently filed. A
petition for reinvestigation was denied. Whether the case was subsequently dismissed on the
merits or upon a stipulation of facts of the parties contained in a motion to dismiss does not
detract from the propriety of respondent's issuance of the warrant of arrest.

We accordingly find respondent judge to be accountable only for failure to duly act on the civil
case, in violation of some provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. We, however,
believe that respondent judge should be merely reprimanded, in view of the fact that he was not
only detailed to the court where the cases herein involved were pending, but also to other courts.
Such multiple assignments, in one way or another, affected his efficient handling of cases. 5 In
addition, there was no showing of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations on the part
of respondent judge which would justify the imposition of a more severe penalty, 6 or that he has
heretofore been found guilty of any administrative offense.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Tirso F. Banquerigo is hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED,

with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will definitely be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

JUDGE NARCISO G. BRAVO, complainant vs. JUDGE RICARDO M. MERDEGIA,

respondent.

A.M. RTJ-99-1430 | 1999-10-22

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In a sworn complaint dated 25 August 1997, Judge Narciso G. Bravo, Presiding Judge of Branch
46 of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, charged respondent Judge Ricardo M. Merdegia,
Presiding Judge of Branch 45 of said court, with (1) falsification of the Certificate of Service and
(2) rendition of an unjust judgment through negligence or gross ignorance of the law. These acts
were allegedly committed in connection with Civil Case No. 4241, entitled Narciso J. Bravo vs.
Masbate Colleges, Inc., and Manuel J. Bunan, which was assigned to respondent's sala.

Complainant alleged that on 24 January 1995 he filed a Manifestation calling respondent's

attention to defendant's non-compliance with the 17 January 1995 Order for the payment of
P1,500 as reimbursement for the deposit for surveyor's fee. On 1 March 1995, he reiterated his
manifestation and moved for the issuance of a writ of execution on his second cause of action.
Despite his manifestations and motion for its resolution, his motion for execution was resolved
only on 10 June 1997 in the dispositive portion of the decision in the main case. Yet, in his
certificate of service, he reported that he had resolved all incidents and cases submitted for
decision within the reglementary period of ninety days.

Complainant further averred that in the said decision he was ordered to pay moral damages of
P10,000; attorney's fees of P10,000; and litigation expenses of P3,000. Such awards had no legal
basis, as they did not fall under the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2208 of the Civil Code.
Respondent then committed a felonious act of rendering an unjust judgment through negligence
or gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant thereafter submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator a certified true copy
of respondent's decision in Civil Case No. 4241 and a copy of his letter written in the official
stationery of his office, addressed to the respondent wherein he pointed out and discussed the
alleged palpable errors in the decision.

In his comment of 5 March 1998, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, alleging
that his failure to act on complainant's motion for a writ of execution was due to his honest belief
that the motion was merely incidental to the main case and that the resolution of the same could
be had when the case would be finally decided. Anent the second charge, respondent pointed out
that on 29 September 1997, complainant also filed a criminal complaint before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Masbate charging him with rendering a manifestly unjust judgment
through inexcusable negligence or ignorance of the law under Article 205 of the Revised Penal
Code. After submission of his counter-affidavit the MTC dismissed the criminal case.

In the meantime, having compulsorily retired on 2 March 1998, respondent asked for an early
resolution of this case. He manifested that he was amenable to the retention of any amount from
his retirement benefits to answer for any liability which he might be directed to pay in this
administrative case.

In our resolution in A.M. No. 9650-Ret., we approved the application of respondent for
compulsory retirement under R.A. No. 910; granted the release of his retirement benefits; but
directed the withholding therefrom of P50,000 pending resolution of the instant case.

On 15 February 1999, we ordered that OCA IPI No. 97-430-RTJ be docketed as a regular
administrative matter, and directed the parties to manifest whether they would submit this case
for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed. In their separate Manifestations, the
complainant and the respondent answered in the affirmative.

In his memorandum of 15 December 1998, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo Suarez

submitted this evaluation:

EVALUATION: From the facts on record which were augmented by the respondent's admission,
it is clear that respondent Judge was guilty of delay in the disposition of complainant's
Manifestation dated January 24, 1995 and Motion dated March 1, 1995. However, such delay
does not appear to be deliberate.

Respondent's explanation that the reason for such delay was due to his honest belief that the
resolution of these incidents could still be had when the case is finally decided will only mitigate
but will not exonerate him from administrative liability.

In the case of Ubarra v. Tecson, 134 SCRA 4, the Court stressed:

"Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge's sala within the reglementary
period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable and should not
be condoned."

Canon 3, Rule 3:05 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics [should be Code of Judicial Conduct] is also
very explicit on the duty of judges to be prompt in the performance of judicial duties, to wit:

"A judge shall dispose of [the] court's business promptly and decide cases within the required
period[s]."

Anent the charges of ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust judgment, a cursory
reading of the complaint and its annexes shows that these charges arose from respondent's
appreciation of the evidence of the parties in the civil case in which complainant as plaintiff lost.
It is respondent's decision which is actually being questioned.

Since obviously complainant disagrees with respondent Judge's ruling in the case, his remedy
was to appeal the decision, as he in fact did, and not to file an administrative complaint against
the judge. He must await the final outcome of his appeal so that it can then be properly
determined whether an administrative complaint lies against the judge. Even then and even if the
appellate court upholds complainant's appeal, respondent judge cannot be held administratively
liable in the absence of showing of malice or wrongful conduct on his part in rendering his
decision. (Pagayanan vs. dela Victoria, A.M. OCA IPI 97-282-RTJ, March 4, 1998).

Moreover, any action that may be taken with respect to these charges may be premature at this
stage and may pre-empt the action that the Court of Appeals may take on the appeal. (Paulina S.
Alvernaz vs. Judge Manuel Padolina, A.M. No. RTJ 90-612).

Deputy Court Administrator Suarez then recommends that for respondent's delay in the
disposition of complainant's Manifestation and Motion for Execution, respondent be fined in the
amount of P5,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits. As to the charge of ignorance of
the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgment the same should be dismissed, as the questioned
decision is still the subject of appeal with the Court of Appeals.

We are in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the Deputy Court Administrator
except as to the penalty, which should be reduced from P5,000 to P1,000 only, considering that
what is involved is a neglect of duty which does not appear to be serious enough to warrant the
penalty recommended. This should not, however, end the story in this case.

It is apparent to us that the personal and professional relationship between complainant and
respondent is far from cordial, which cannot in any manner project a good image for the
Judiciary. Complainant had exceeded the bounds of propriety. After his appeal from the adverse
decision of respondent in Civil Case No. 4241, he wrote respondent on 15 July 1997, using his
official stationery, stating therein the errors allegedly committed by respondent in his decision
"which have been causing [him] agony from the time [he] received the said decision and will
continue to agonize him for some indefinite period of time." Therein, complainant enumerated
five "palpable errors" allegedly committed by respondent, and he concluded: "In fine the merits
of the case was [sic] not judiciously considered by a magistrate of even with a mediocre ability."
The letter is a veritable Brief for the complainant in his appeal from the decision. Clearly, he
resorted to the wrong procedure. Worse, he lost his equanimity by attacking the qualification of
respondent and describing the latter as a magistrate with an ability less than that of a mediocre
judge. Worst, unsatisfied with his appeal, complainant charged respondent in a criminal
complaint with the offense of rendering a manifestly unjust judgment through inexcusable
negligence or ignorance of law under Article 205 of the Revised Penal Code.

While we cannot prevent complainant from availing himself of all available legal remedies for
redress of grievances, his position as a judge demanded utmost caution and circumspection to
avoid poor public impression on the Judiciary. Certainly, when Judges of the same court in the
same place fight, the image of the Judiciary is impaired rather than enhanced.

What happened in this case is simply regrettable.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered approving the findings and recommendation of the
Court Administrator, except as to the penalty, which is hereby reduced.

For violation of Canon 3, Rule 3:05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by delaying the disposition
of complainant's Manifestation of 24 January 1995 and Motion for Execution of 1 March 1995,
respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.

Let the amount withheld from respondent's retirement benefits, less the fine, be now released to
him.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, and Ynares_Santiago, JJ., on official leave.

ANTONIO YU-ASENSI, complainant, vs. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, MTC, Branch

36, Quezon City, respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245 | 2000-01-19

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On December 10, 1996, Mr. Antonio Yu-Asensi filed a letter-complaint1 [Rollo, pp. 2-4.] with
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, Presiding
Judge of the MeTC, Branch 36, Quezon City with serious misconduct and/or inefficiency
particularly violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics on promptness and punctuality.

The complaint was filed in connection with Criminal Case No. 5400 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Edwin Santos y Vito", for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Serious Physical
Injuries pending before Branch 36 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City presided by
respondent judge. Complainant is the father of a seven-year old boy who was hit by a car driven
by the accused Edwin Santos y Vito. Attached to the letter-complaint is an Affidavit dated
November 20, 19962 [Rollo, pp. 5-6.] which alleges:

1. That I am the private complainant in the case of People of the Philippines versus Edwin Santos
y Vito docketed as Criminal Case No. 5400 pending trial before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 36, Quezon City presided by the Honorable Judge Francisco Villanueva;

2. Though a layman, I am of the strong belief that members of the office of the judge exist[s] not
only to promote justice but likewise to recognize and respect [an] individual's right[s]
[e]specially when one comes to court for redress. This is not so in the case of judge Francisco
Villanueva!

3. That after my 7 year old child Philipp Yu-Asensi was run-over by a car driven by the above-
named acused causing him to limp for life, our case was raffled to the sala of Judge Francisco
Villanueva;

4. At that time we are on high-spirits that speedy justice will be given me and my family. I am
dead wrong!
5. That during the proceedings, from arraignment up to the present stage of trial, Judge
Villanueva consistently arrives one to one and a half (1 1/2) hour[s] late from the scheduled 2:00
p.m. hearing;

6. Worst is that, Judge Villanueva even have (sic) the temerity to be late knowing very well that
there are sometimes more than twenty (20) cases calendared for the day;

7. There was even a time when judge Villanueva compelled my lawyer to extend trial after 5:00
o'clock p.m. simply because he (Judge Villanueva) arrive[d] one and a half (1 1/2) hour[s] late
and trial started at already 3:30 p.m.

8. I have already attended my trial several times and I notice[d] that litigants, lawyers and
witnesses in the said sala while waiting for Judge Villanueva, have mixed negative reactions
even murmuring invectives against Judge Villanueva and our Judicial System obviously because
they have been waiting for more than [an] hour and the judge who is suppose[d] to be a model of
punctuality is not yet around;

9. Moreover, I was informed by some court personnel that a case was already filed against judge
Villanueva for the same misconduct;

10. Further information revealed that he was already admonish[ed] by the Supreme Court before.
However, I am not quite sure if this is true;

11. That judge Villanueva with his unpunctuality sets a bad example to the bar and tends to
create dissatisfaction and delay with the administration of justice; x x x.

In a Resolution dated February 5, 1997,3 [Ibid., p. 8.] respondent judge was required to submit
his comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice.

In compliance thereto, respondent judge filed a comment on March 13, 1997.4 [Id., pp. 9-11.] In
the comment, respondent judge made a chronological summary of the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 5400 claiming that as can be gleaned therefrom, complainant Antonio Yu-Asensi and
his lawyer were "harassing the respondent Judge, for adverse rulings and resolutions rendered,
due to the negligence and omissions" of complainant's counsel.

Denying that he arrived at 3:30 p.m. for the session, respondent judge further alleged that he has
a calendar of thirty (30) to forty (40) criminal cases for each session and conducts hearings up to
5:30 in the afternoon. Finally, respondent judge avers that he has one of the highest disposition
of cases in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and had received an award for judicial
excellence from the Rotary Club as Outstanding MTC Judge of Quezon City for 1995 and that in
1996, he also had the highest disposition of cases.

Finding the comment of respondent judge unsatisfactory, the Court thereafter issued a Resolution
dated August 6, 19975 [Id., p. 18.]referring the complaint to the Executive judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days
from notice.

On December 5, 1997, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
submitted a Partial Report dated December 3, 1997.6 [Id., pp. 130-134.]In the report, the
Executive judge chronicled the proceedings concluding that the presentation of the respective
evidence of the parties had already been terminated. Owing, however, to the request of both
parties to submit their respective summations within thirty (30) days, the Executive Judge stated
that she would be submitting the final report within a period of fifteen (15) days from the
submission of the parties' respective summations.

On January 19, 1998, respondent judge filed a Summation7 [Id., pp. 135-138.] praying that the
complaint against him be dismissed. Complainant filed his Memorandum a day later or on
January 20, 19988 [Id., pp. 140-148.] praying that the corresponding sanctions be meted against
respondent judge for repeated violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics on promptness and
punctuality.

A FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION9 [Id., pp. 366-370.]dated May 5, 1998 was
subsequently submitted by the Executive judge finding respondent guilty of habitual tardiness
which "amounts to serious misconduct and inefficiency in violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics" and recommended that he be meted the corresponding penalty.

After a careful evaluation and review of the evidence on record, We find the report and
recommendation of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada to be well taken.

Complainant Antonio Yu-Asensi declared that he attended the hearings in Criminal Case No.
5400 for about eight (8) times and signed the minutes of those hearings10 [Exhibits A-1, B-1, C-
1, D-1 and E-1.] which were scheduled at two o'clock in the afternoon11 [Exhibits A, B, C, D, E
and F.] but the Presiding Judge usually arrived one (1) to one and a half (1 1/2) hours later,
hence, trial starts one (1) to one and a half (1 1/2) hours late.12 [TSN, 23 September 1997, pp. 3-
9.]

Atty. Reynario Campanilla, counsel for complainant, likewise declared that he attended the
scheduled hearings of the criminal case as a private prosecutor for approximately eleven (11) to
fifteen (15) times and as scheduled, afternoon hearings are supposed to start at exactly two
o'clock in the afternoon. When he was queried as to whether the respondent judge had been
punctual in attending the proceedings, his answer was "[d]efinitely not, the respondent was
usually late, always late for 45 minutes to one and a half (1 1/2) hours."13 [TSN, 30 September
1997, pp. 4-5.]

Dr. Recueto Patricio of the Veteran's Memorial Hospital, who was summoned to appear as a
witness in the criminal case declared that he arrived in court at about five (5) minutes before two
o'clock in the afternoon for February 19, 1996 and when he was asked approximately when
respondent judge started calling the cases calendared for the day or what time the judge started
trial, the doctor answered "[a]bout one or one and a half hours after 2:00 in the afternoon because
we were waiting outside."14 [TSN, 23 September 1997, p. 63.]
The Court is convinced that respondent judge is guilty of habitual tardiness which amounts to
serious misconduct and inefficiency. Circular No. 13, issued July 1, 1987 which lays down the
Guidelines on the Administration of Justice particularly Section 1 of the guidelines set for trial
courts states in no uncertain terms that:

1.....Punctuality and strict observance of office hours. - Punctuality in the holding of scheduled
hearings is an imperative. Trial judges should strictly observe the requirements of at lease (sic)
eight hours of service a day, five hours of which should be devoted to trial, specifically from
8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 as required by par. 5 of the Interim Rules issued
by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1983, pursuant to Sec. 16 of B.P. 129.

Similarly, Section 5 of Supervisory Circular No. 14, issued October 22, 1985 provides:

5. Session Hours. - Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall hold daily sessions from Monday to Friday from 8:30 to
12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. assisted by a skeletal force, also on rotation, primarily to
act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters.

Along the same vein, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 which is entitled
and mandates the "Strict Observance Of Session Hours Of Trial Courts And Effective
Management Of Cases To Ensure Speedy Disposition" clearly states that -

To insure the speedy disposition of cases, the following guidelines must be faithfully observed:

I.........The session hours of all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts; Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities and Municipal Trial Courts shall be from 8:30 A.M. to noon and from 2:00 P.M.
to 4:30 P.M. from Monday to Friday. The hours in the morning shall be devoted to (1) the
conduct of pre-trial conferences; (2) writing of decisions, resolutions or orders, or (3) the
continuation of trial on the merits whenever rendered necessary as may be required by the Rules
of Court, statutes, or circulars in specified cases.

x x x.........................x x x.........................x x x

II.........Judges must be punctual at all times.

x x x.........................x x x.........................x x x

III.....There should be strict adherence to the policy on avoiding postponements and needless
delay.

x x x.........................x x x.........................x x x

VI.....All trial judges must strictly comply with Circular No. 38-98 entitled "Implementing the
Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493" ("An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All Cases Before the
Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes), issued by the Honorable Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa on 11 August 1998
and which took effect 15 September 1998,"

The aforesaid circulars are restatements of the Canon of Judicial Ethics which enjoin judges to
be punctual in the performance of their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants,
witnesses, and attorneys are of value, and that if the judge is not punctual in his habits, he sets a
bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction in the administration of justice.

The Code of Judicial Conduct decrees that a judge should administer justice impartially and
without delay.15 [Amion v. Chiongson, AM No. RTJ-97-1371, 22 January 1999, 301 SCRA
614, citing Bentulan v. Dumatol, 233 SCRA 166 (1994)] A judge should likewise be imbued
with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly
administer justice.16 [Ibid., citing Cantela v. Almoradie, 229 SCRA 712 (1994)] The trial court
judges being the paradigms of justice in the first instance have, time and again, been exhorted to
dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases within the required period because
delay results in undermining the people's faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of
their supplications is anticipated and expected, and reinforces in the minds of the litigants the
impression that the wheels of justice grind ever so slowly.17 [Sy Bang v. Mendez, 287 SCRA 84
(1998)]

It is towards the sacrosanct goal of ensuring the people's faith in the judiciary that the Code of
Judicial Conduct mandates the following:

CANON 1. - A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF

THE JUDICIARY.

x x x.........................x x x.........................x x x

Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

CANON 3. - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 3.01 - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

x x x.........................x x x.........................x x x

Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.

x x x.........................x x x.........................x x x

Rule 3.09. A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public
service and fidelity.
Thus, for the foregoing considerations -

... [T]his Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously, pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 15 (1)
and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution. This requirement is designed to prevent delay in the
administration of justice for, obviously, justice delayed is justice denied; and delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it into disrepute.18 [Report on the Audit and Inventory of Cases in the
RTC, Branch 11, Balayan, Batangas, 234 SCRA 502 (1994)] Judges are repeatedly reminded
that the failure to decide cases within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency19 [Re: Partial Report on the Audit and Inventory of Cases in the RTC, Branches 7
and 8, Tanauan, Batangas, 242 SCRA 167 (1995)] and which is a ground for administrative
sanction against the defaulting judge.20 [Report on the judicial Audit in RTC, Branch 27, Lapu-
Lapu City, 289 SCRA 398 (1998), citing Alfonso-Cortes v. Maglalang, 227 SCRA 482 (1993);
see also Re: Judge Danilo Tenerife, 255 SCRA 184 (1996)]

It need not be overemphasized that any delay in the determination or resolution of a case no
matter how insignificant is, at the bottom line, delay in the administration of justice in general.
The suffering endured by just one person - whether plaintiff, defendant or accused - while
awaiting a judgment that may affect his life, honor, liberty or property taints the entire judiciary's
performance in its solemn task of administering justice. Inefficient, indolent or neglectful judges
are as equally impermissible in tile judiciary as the incompetent and dishonest ones. Any of them
tarnishes the image of the judiciary or brings it to public contempt, dishonor or disrespect and
must then be administratively dealt with or criminally prosecuted, if warranted, and punished
accordingly.21 [Re: Report on the Judicial Audit, RTC Branches 4 and 23, Manila 291 SCRA 10
(1998)]

In In re Anonymous Complaint v. Judge Echiverri,22 [67 SCRA 467 (1967)] this Court pursuant
to Section 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which expressly provides for the observance of daily
sessions of Courts of First Instance, called on judges to calendar as many cases as possible and to
dispose of them with dispatch considering the increasing number of litigations pending with the
courts, adding that all other matters needing the attention of the judges have to be attended to
even outside the schedule of trial. Indeed, as pointed out by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm in
the old but nevertheless still very much relevant case of In re Impeachment of Hon. Tomas
Flordeliza.23 [44 Phil. 608 (1923)]

A judge should display that interest in the office which stops not at the minimum of the day's
labors fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which
proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods.

At the risk of sounding trite, it bears stressing that no position is more demanding as regards
moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench. "[W]ithin the
hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of government
especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are those directly in
contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities which the judiciary is bound to serve.
Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a
high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must comport himself at all times in
such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the
public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice.24 [Jugueta v. Boncaros, 60
SCRA 27 (1974); Dia-Anonuvo v. Bercacio, 66 SCRA 81 (1975); Association of Court
Employees of Panabo, Davao v. Tupas, 175 SCRA 292 (1989); Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA
690 (1994); NISA v. Tablang, 199 SCRA 766 (1991)] In insulating the Bench from unwarranted
criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar's
wife, should be above suspicion."25 [Vedana v. Judge Eudarlo Valencia, 295 SCRA 1 (1998)]

Verily, "[T]he office of a judge exists for one solemn end - to promote the ends of justice by
administering it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over that court, is the
visible representation of the law and justice. These are self-evident dogmas which do not even
have to be emphasized, but to which we are wont to advert to when some members of the
judiciary commit legal missteps or stray from the axioms of judicial ethics."26 [Atty. Lauro D.
Gacayan, et al. v. Hon. Fernando Vil Pamintuan, AM No. RTJ-99-1483 (OCA-IPI No. 98-578-
RTJ), 17 September 1999, pp. 18-19, citing Ruperto v. Banquerigo, 293 SCRA 704 (1998)] To
reiterate what has been stated earlier, this Court has -

. . . [c]onstantly impressed upon judges - may it not be said ,without success - the need to decide
cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied.
Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary.
Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction[s] against them.27 [Re:
Report on the Judicial Audit of Cases in the RTC, BR. 35, Iriga City, AM NO. 97-8-262-RTC,
27 November 1998, 299 SCRA 382, citing OCA v. Judge Walerico Butalid, 293 SCRA 589
(1998); Sanchez v. Vestil, AM No. RTJ-98-1419, 13 October 1998, 298 SCRA 1, citing OCA v.
Judge Walerico Butalid, supra; Ng v. Judge Leticia Ulibari, 293 SCRA 342 (1998); Grefaldeo v.
Judge Rica Lacson, 293 SCRA 524 (1998)]

All told, the Court views the conduct of respondent judge as untenable and unjustified.
Respondent is presumed to be aware of his duties and responsibilities under the Code of Judicial
Conduct. As a member of the Bench, he should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.28 [Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.] Rule 3.01 of Canon 3 calls for
a judge to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence. Rule 3.05 admonishes
all judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases within the periods fixed
by law. Rule 3.09 requires a judge to organize and supervise the court personnel to insure the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business and requires at all times the observance of high
standards of public service and fidelity. Respondent judge unfortunately failed to live up to these
standards.

The penalty for gross or serious inefficiency ranges from reprimand and admonition29 [Cui v.
Madayag, 245 SCRA 1 (1995)] to removal from office.30 [Report on Audit and Physical
Inventory of the records and cases in RTC, Branch 120, Kalookan City, 238 SCRA 248 (1994);
Ng v. Ulibari, supra.; See also Stern, Is Judicial Discipline In New York a Threat To Judicial
Independence?, 7 Pace L. Rev. 291, 303-45 (1987)] The records bear out that the habit of
dispatch and punctuality seem to be dormant traits of respondent Judge which needs to be roused
from their lethargy by appropriate administrative penalties. With regard to that degree of
stringency which must be adopted in the determination and imposition of the proper sanctions,
Section II of Administrative Circular No. 2-99 entitled "Strict Observance of Working Hours
And Disciplinary Action For Absenteeism And Tardiness" provides that:

II.....Absenteeism and tardiness, even if such do not qualify as "habitual" or "frequent" under
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991, shall be dealt with
severely, and any falsification of daily time records to cover up for such absenteeism and/or
tardiness shall constitute gross dishonesty or serious misconduct.

If even non-habitual absenteeism and tardiness merit severe penal sanctions, much more so
should such severity in the imposition of the proper penalties be brought to bear on respondent
judge because the present case is not his first offense.

In Louis Vuitton, S.A. v. Judge Francisco Diaz Villanueva,31 [216 SCRA 121 (1992)]"
respondent judge was chastised by the Court saying that -

... [h]is delay in the promulgation of this case deserves a reprimand from this Court as it is
contrary to the mandate of our Constitution which enshrines the right of the litigants to a speedy
disposition of their cases.
In Spouses Lorenzo and Ana Labayen v. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva32 [MTJ-96-1107
(Formerly OCA IPI-96-84-MTJ), 13 July 1998.] the Court's Third Division again reprimanded
respondent judge for failing to secure a written permission from this Court to engage in business.

Still more recently, in Report On The Spot Judicial Audit Conducted In The Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 36, Quezon City,33 [AM No. 98-3-34-MeTC, 25 August 1999.] the Court En
Banc imposed a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) on respondent judge for failing to act
seasonably on the cases pending before him, pointing out that -

... [J]udge Villanueva has disregarded Administrative Circular No. 3-9034 [Dated 31 January
1990.] requiring all trial courts to adopt the mandatory continuous trial system in accordance
with (1) Administrative Circular No. 435 [Dated 22 September 1998.] to the effect that trial
courts should, after arraignment, fix the specific dates needed to complete the presentation of
evidence by the parties and conduct the trial without unnecessary postponements, and (2)
Circular No. 1-89,36 [Dated 19 January 1989.] which has established the guidelines to be
observed by the trial courts in the conduct of such trials.
It appears, however, that being castigated thrice has not reformed the respondent judge because
the records of the office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reveal that aside from the present
case, respondent judge has six (6) other administrative complaints37 1.) MTJ-99-1207 (Formerly
AM No. 99-5-54-MeTC) for Illegal Recruitment;

2.) MTJ-99-1227 (Formerly OCA IPI-97-339-MTJ) for Grave Misconduct; Oppression; Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
Canons of Judicial Ethics;

3.) MTJ-99-1232 (Formerly OCA IPI-97-454-MTJ) for Gross Ignorance of the Law; Knowingly
Rendering an Unjust Judgment; Grave Abuse of Discretion; and Conduct Unbecoming of a Trial
Judge;

4.) MTJ-99-1233 (Formerly OCA IPI-97-454-MTJ) for Immorality;

5.) OCA IPI-97-422-MTJ for Ignorance of the Law; Incompetence; Dishonesty; and
Inefficiency;

6.] OCA IPPI-99-674-MTJ for Rendering an Unjust Decision; Gross Ignorance of the Law; and
Abuse of Authority.] still pending against him. Needless to state, such an unflattering record only
further erodes the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all members
of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the
judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy.38 [Nazareno v.
Almario, 268 SCRA 657 (1997)]

Verily, the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel, hence,
it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good
name and standing as a true temple of justice.39 [Re: Report on Audit and Physical Inventory of
the Records of cases in MTC of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, 276 SCRA 257 (1997), citing Miro v.
Tan 235 SCRA 400 (1994), citing Recto v. Raulis, 70 SCRA 438 (1976)] For his part, a judge, as
the visible representation of the law and the embodiment of the people's sense of justice40 [Lao
v. Abellita, III, 295 SCRA 267 (1998)] must always strive to live up to his responsibility of
assisting parties-litigants in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases
and proceedings.41 [Perez v. Andaya, 286 SCRA 40 (1998)]

Judicial indolence is considered gross inefficiency punishable by fine or suspension from service
without pay with the gravity of the penalty dependent on the attendant aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.42 [Sanchez v. Vestil, supra, citing Report on Judicial Audit conducted in RTC
Branches 29 and 59. Toledo City, 292 SCRA 8 (1998)] While this Court is not convinced that
the magnitude of respondent Judge's culpability warrants the supreme penalty of removal from
office, the Court nonetheless deems it appropriate that stiffer sanctions should be meted out to
respondent.

The prevailing facts of the present case vis-a-vis respondent Judge's record for habitual
malfeasance in office warrants the imposition of a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and
One (1) Year suspension without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, the Presiding Judge of Branch 36 of

the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City is found GUILTY of Serious Misconduct and/or
Inefficiency in violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Accordingly, he is hereby: a.] FINED
an amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and b.] SUSPENDED for One (1) YEAR
WITHOUT PAY, with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.