NON-JUDICIAL OFFICER – ISSUE A WARRANT OF ARREST

1. Harvey vs Miram Defensor Santiago G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988

Facts:
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months close surveillance by the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation (CID) agents in Pagsanjan Laguna. Two days after apprehension 17 opted for self deportation, one released for
lack of evidenced, one was charged by another offense, working without a valid working visa. Thus, three was left to face the deportation
proceedings.
Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitute shown in salacious poses
as well as boys and girls engaged in the sexual act. There were also posters and other literatures advertising the child prostitution.
Warrant of arrest was issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration act and sec. 69 of the
revised administrative Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines immigration act clothed the commissioner with any authority to arrest and detained petitioner pending
determination of the existence of a probable cause

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there can be no question that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is available to all persons,
including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not.
One of the constitutional requirement of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause.
The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their
activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters
without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation charges
have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens.

That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective
rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners
had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children".

2. Morano vs Vivo 20 SCRA 562

Facts: Petitioners are Chinese nationals (Chan Sau Wah from Fukein, with a minor child from prior marriage, Fu Yan Fun) who were granted a
temporary visitor’s visa as mom-immigrant for 2 months upon posting P4k cash bond to visit a cousin in the Philippines. She soon married to
Esteban Morano, a Filipino Citizen, on January 24, 1962 and gave birth to a child, Esteban Morano, Jr. After several extensions to prolong stay
in Philippines, their visas expired on Sept. 10, 1962 and were ordered by Commissioner of Immigration (COI) on Aug. 31, 1962 thru a letter, to leave
the country on or before Sept. 10, 1962 with warning of issuance of warrant of arrest for failure to leave and confiscation of bond.
Petitioners then filed with the CFI of Manila for Mandamus to compel COI to cancel their ACR, to stop issuing arrest warrant, and preliminary
injunction from confiscating their bond. They argue that Chan Sau Wah became a Filipino Citizen upon marriage to Esteban Morano by virtue of
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Act). Likewise, it argues that Section 37 of the Naturalization Law is
unconstitutional for allowing the COI to issue warrant of arrest and effecting deportation without judicial intervention enshrined in the Constitution.
CFI decided partly against petitioners, thus, COI and petitioners both appealed to SC.

Issues:
Whether or not the marriage of Chan Sau Wah to Esteban Morano makes her a Filipino citizen.
Whether or not Section 37 of the Naturalization Law empowering the COI to issue a warrant of arrest, and deport upon a warrant on deportation
cases is unconstitutional for are covered by the Constitutional mandate on searches and seizures without judicial intervention required under the
Constitution on searches and seizures.

Ruling:
Citizenship. Marriage to a Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen. She must show that she possess all the qualifications, and
none of the disqualifications required by the Naturalization Law requiring as follows:
Valid marriage; and
Alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized
In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah is not possessed of all the qualifications required by the
Naturalization Law. Thus, she did not become a Filipino citizen.
Searches and seizures. Power to deport aliens is an attribute of sovereignty planted on the accepted maxim of international law, that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions. Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in
accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental
to prosecution or proceeding for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a
competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.
Petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioners Chan Sau Wah is hereby denied; and judgment declaring her a citizen of the
Philippines, directing COI to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, and declaring the preliminary injunction with
respect to her permanent, are all hereby set aside; and in all other respects, the decision appealed is hereby affirmed.

Lim vs. Ponce de Leon 66 SCRA 299

Facts
: On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya of Palawan a motor launch. A year later Alberto Timbangcaya filed a
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with CFI of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force
Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. One June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was
in Balacbac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balacbac to impound
and take custody of the motor launch. One June 26, 1962, Fiscal de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor
launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, Delfin-Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. Consequently, on
July 6, 1962 upon the order of the Provincial Commander, Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balacbab seized the motor launch from
Delfin-Lim and impounded it. Lim and Taha filed with CFI of Palawan on November 19, 1962 a complaint for damages against Fiscal de Leon and
Orlando Maddela alleging that they entered the premises of Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch
without his consent.

Issue
Whether or not Fiscal and Maddela are civilly liable for damages?

Held
Defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiff-appellants. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. A person whose constitutional rights have been impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages
from the public officer or employee responsible therefore. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. In the instant case, Delfin-Lim’s
claims were amply supported by evidence that he should be awarded damages# 5o!e$er, !ith respect to plaintiff Jikil Taha, he is not entitled to
reco$er anydamage !hich he alleged he had s"ffered from the "nla!f"l sei0"re of the motor la"nch inasm"ch ashe had already transferred )2 the
o!nership and possession of the motor la"nch to .elfin *im at thetime it !as sei0ed and therefore, he has no legal standing to "estion the $alidity of
the sei0"r 6)

Salazar vs Achacoso and Marquez G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code,
prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance
Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them
entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.).
However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers —
practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by
Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due
process, and that since the house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making
prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)
under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through
the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general
warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:
The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order
arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE vs COURT OF APPEALS

171 SCRA 348

Status and Characteristics

Meaning of Administrative Agency

FACTS:
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the
petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation,
Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine
Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and
Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.

The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the
Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is
the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin
M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the application for the
issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the
affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985.

Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner) went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to
enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the
first of its challenged Orders, and held:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158,
159, 160, and 161 to be null and void. Accordingly, the respondents are hereby ordered to return and
surrender immediately all the personal properties and documents seized by them from the petitioners by
virtue of the aforementioned search warrants. On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration.
On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to
contest, on certiorari, the twin Orders of the lower court. In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate
Court held:

Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD 1936 to
prosecute foreign exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883. The petitioner, in
exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at bar
had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and void. Besides as correctly pointed
out by the Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is
appealable to the Office of the President.

On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a reconsideration, on the question
primarily of whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such other responsible officer'
countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizure. The Court of Appeals, on
Karamfil's motion, reversed itself and issued its Resolution, dated September 1987, and subsequently, its
Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that it is endowed with "express powers
and functions under PD No. 1936, to prosecute foreign exchange violations as defined and punished under
PD No. 1883." "By the very nature of its express powers as conferred by the laws," so it is contended,
"which are decidedly quasi-judicial or discretionary function, such as to conduct preliminary investigation
on the charges of foreign exchange violations, issue search warrants or warrants of arrest, hold departure
orders, among others, and depending upon the evidence presented, to dismiss the charges or to file the
corresponding information in court of Executive Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations effective August 26, 1984, petitioner exercises quasi-judicial power or the power of
adjudication ."

The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now assailed, was of the opinion that "the grant of quasi-judicial
powers to petitioner did not diminish the regular courts' judicial power of interpretation. The right to
interpret a law and, if necessary to declare one unconstitutional, exclusively pertains to the judiciary. In
assuming this function, courts do not proceed on the theory that the judiciary is superior to the two other
coordinate branches of the government, but solely on the theory that they are required to declare the law
in every case which come before them."
In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so issuing the Resolutions above-mentioned, the
respondent Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of its appellate
jurisdiction,"

ISSUE:
Whether or not The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is a quasi-judicial body, and one co-
equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction

RULING:
No.
This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner puts to question
is the Regional Trial Court's act of assuming jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition below and its
subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's orders of search and seizure,
for the reason that the presidential body, as an entity (allegedly) coordinate and co-equal with the
Regional Trial Court, was (is) not vested with such a jurisdiction. An examination of the Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force's petition shows indeed its recognition of judicial review (of the acts of
Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its objection, precisely, is whether it is the Regional Trial
Court, or the superior courts, that may undertake such a review.
As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in
the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular
courts, other than the higher tribunals, the Court of Appeals and this Court.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court of law and other
than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making."
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights,
and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain
finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act,
Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the
Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute
its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the
blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution
of such activities, but nothing more.
The Court sees nothing in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1936 (except with respect to the Task
Force's powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-
judicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. Its undertaking, as
we said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with
the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to
recommend action "of appropriate authorities". It is not unlike a fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine whether or not prima facie evidence exists to justify haling the respondent to
court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court. For it is
the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be
co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would
demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.
In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the
assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo.

RATIO:
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court of law and
other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule
making.

PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO SEIZURE

RULE 126

Search and Seizure

Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court. (1)

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (n)

Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

 (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)

Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach
to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (4a)

Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there
is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. (5a)

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of
his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. (6)

Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall
be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)

Section 9. Time of making search. — The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. (8)

Section 10. Validity of search warrant. — A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter it shall be void. (9a)

Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful
occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at
least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
(10a)

Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. — (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property
seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall
summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the
judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to
him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.

(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the
date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.(11a)

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. (12a)

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress
evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been
instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion
and a criminal case is subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. (n)

Espano vs CA 288 SCRA 558

Facts:

Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the
area. They saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that
there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was
brought to the police headquarters where he was charged of possession of prohibited drugs.

Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence were inadmissible

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense . . . “

Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy bust operation conducted by police
officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area. The police officer saw petitioner handling over
something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophane of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful
and the two cellophane bag of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being fruits of the crime.
 WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND ARREST

1. People vs. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990)

Facts: By the word of their civilian informer, Patrolmen Jose Luciano, Angelito Caraan, Nelson Dimatulac and Democrito Cuenca immediately
proceeded to the vicinity an alleged buy-and-sell of marijuana was taking place. They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter,
handed a wrapped object, which turned out to be marijuana worth P190, to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants in front
of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. Marquez was arrested on the spot. Both Bati and Marquez
were brought to the Police station where they admitted they were in the buying and selling of the confiscated marijuana.

Issue: Appellant contends that the arrest was not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied with.

Held: This contention is without merit.

Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules in Criminal Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it x x x

It is the considered view of the Court that there was no need for Luciano and Caraan to be armed with a warrant of arrest when they arrested
Marquez and the accused since they had personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime viz: They were eyewitnesses to the
illegal exchange of marijuana and P190.00 between Marquez and accused who were caught in flagrante delicto. The facts and
circumstances attendant precisely fall under Sec. 5, (a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The subsequent arrest of Marquez and
accused were made under the principle of "hot pursuit". The recovery of the marijuana from Marquez and the P190.00 from accused by the said
police officers were not violative of their constitutional rights since Marquez and the accused voluntarily surrendered them to the police officers. But
even for the sake of argument that the recovery of the marijuana and peso bills were against the consent of Marquez and accused, still, the search
on their persons was incidental to their valid warrantless arrest. For,the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant
is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions: (1) search incidental to an arrest, (2) search of a moving vehicle and (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view. In the case at bar, the searches made on Marquez and accused were incidental to their valid arrest.

Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation
to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest And since appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental to
the arrest was also valid.

Supreme Court Poetry: The law is severe because those who are caught in the strangle hold of prohibited drugs not only slide into the ranks of the
living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of the law-abiding members of society.

Garcia-Padilla vs Enrile
Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine & Reinstatement of the Montenegro Doctrine
In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the PC.
The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no
warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and
companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.
HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Casewas
again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president.
The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to
suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and
those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field
thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that
under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that “the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.”

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990

Facts:
Pat. Ursicio Ungad and Pat. Umbra Umpar were conducting surveillance along Magallanes Street Davao City. While they were within the
preemies they spotted petitioner carrying a buri bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached petitioner and identified
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two. They checked the bag and found
one caliber and two ammunitions.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest is a valid warrantless arrest

Ruling:
Section 12 Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on criminal Procedure is not applicable because at the time the police officers identified themselves and
apprehended petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed or actually committing the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he is hiding something.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a
search warrant for the purpose. Such exercise may prove to be useless, futile and mush too late.