Imprisonment for debt
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or
non-payment of a poll tax.
Sura vs Martin
-Appeal from the orders of CFI Negros Occidental
ordering the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant,
Vicente Martin, Sr. for contempt.
-Case filed by the wife, Nilda Sura, in her behalf and
in behalf of her minor child, Vicente Martin, Jr. against
Vicente Silvestre Martin, Sr. for the latter’s failure to
pay past and future support of P100 per month
-A writ of execution was issued and served to the
defendant however it was returned unsatisfied.
-Judgment debtor (Martin, Sr.) is jobless and residing
in the dwelling house and in the company of his
widowed mother with no leviable property (defendant
is supported by his mother) – insolvent.
-Counsel of Sura prayed that the defendant be
adjudged guilty of contempt of court for failure to
satisfy the writ of execution
-The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor
was insolvent. Hence the Orders of January 9 and
February 1, 1965, in effect, authorized his
imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution.
-The disobedience to a judgment considered as
indirect contempt in Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, does not refer to a judgment which is
a final disposition of the case and which is declaratory
of the rights of the parties, but to a special judgment,
which is defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court as a judgment "which requires the performance
of any other act than the payment of money, or the sale
or delivery of real or personal property.
-The appealed Orders of January 9 and February 1,
1965, are hereby reversed.
People vs Nitafan
Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged before the
respondent court with violation of BP 22. He moved
to quash the Information on the ground that the facts
charged did not constitute a felony as BP 22 was
unconstitutional. However, the constitutionality of BP
22 was already sustained in Lozano vs. Martinez.
The remaining issue is whether a memorandum check
issued postdated in partial payment of a pre-existing
obligation is within the coverage of BP22.
RULING: A memorandum check, upon presentment,
is generally accepted by the bank. Hence, it does not
matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a
memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether
it was issued in partial fulfillment of a pre-existing
obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance
itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for
which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a
worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee,
or even as an evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum
prohibitum.
We are not unaware that a memorandum check may
carry with it the understanding that it is not to be
presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the
maker himself when the loan falls due. This
understanding may be manifested by writing across
the check "Memorandum", "Memo" or "Mem".
However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such
understanding or private arrangement may no longer
prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by
the law.
To require that the agreement surrounding the issuance
of checks be first looked into and thereafter exempt
such issuance from the punitive provisions of B.P. 22
on the basis of such agreement or understanding would
frustrate the very purpose for which the law was
enacted — to stem the proliferation of unfunded
checks. After having effectively reduced the incidence
of worthless checks changing hands, the country will
once again experience the limitless circulation of
bouncing checks in the guise of memorandum checks
if such checks will be considered exempt from the
operation of B.P. 22. It is common practice in
commercial transactions to require debtors to issue
checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of
payment, or as evidence of indebtedness, if not as
mode of payment. To determine the reasons for which
checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes
in the stability and commercial value of checks as
currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade
and in banking communities.
In Re: Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara
Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a
property were arrested by Ormoc City policemen by
authority of a Warrant of Arrest. The warrant of arrest
stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria
P. Bolaño, as Special Administratrix of the estate of
the late Anselma P. Allers, praying that petitioners be
held guilty of indirect contempt for not complying
with the probate court's order directing them to pay
their monthly rentals to respondent Bolaño. The
sheriff had previously met with the petitioners but he
failed to collect the monthly rentals due on the
property as Taripe had already collected from the
lessees three months’ advance rentals.
RULING: In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20,
Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly
provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt.
Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or
one not arising from a criminal offense. It means any
liability to pay arising out of a contract, express or
implied. In the present case, petitioners, as recognized
lessees of the estate of the deceased, were ordered by
the probate court to pay the rentals to the
administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the
order for the principal reason that they were not certain
as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals
because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had
originally leased the subject property to them. Clearly,
the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional
guarantee against imprisonment.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for
contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court to wit:
SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. — When the
contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act
which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he
may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he
performs it. (7a)
because herein subject order is not a special judgment
enforceable, under Section 11, Rule 39, which
provides:
SEC. 11. Execution of special judgment. — When a
judgment requires the performance of any act other than
those mention in the two preceding sections, a certified copy
of judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and
shall be served by the officer upon the party against whom
the same is rendered, or upon any other person required
thereby, or by law to obey the same, and such party or person
may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.
Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of
judgments for money while Section 10 of the same
Rule refers to execution of judgments for specific acts
such as conveyance, delivery of deeds or other specific
acts vesting title; sale of real or personal property,
delivery or restitution of real property, removal of
improvements on property subject of execution and
delivery of personal property.
The order directing the payment of rentals falls within
the purview of Section 9. Until and unless all the
means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have
been resorted to and failed, imprisonment for
contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes
cannot be resorted to by the courts.
Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt
of court for their continued refusal to comply with the
probate court's order to pay rentals to the
administratrix nor could they be held guilty of
contempt for disobeying the writ of execution issued
by the probate court.
The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this
case commanded its sheriff to collect from petitioners
the rentals due from the property, and should they fail
to pay, from petitioners' personal/real properties
sufficient to cover the amounts sought to be collected.
It was not addressed to petitioners. It pertained to the
sheriff to whom the law entrusts the execution of
judgments, 41 and it was due to the latter's failure that
the writ was not duly enforced.
Information
Section 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Request Copy of 2008 SALN and Personal Data
Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of Justices, June 13,
2012
Berdin vs Mascarinas
Baldoza vs Dimaano
Tanada vs Tuvera
Valmonte vs Belmonte
Legaspi vs CSC
Garcia vs BOI
Chavez vs Public Estates Authority
BARA vs COMELEC
Echegaray vs Sec. of Justice
Association
Section 8. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Occena vs COMELEC
In Re: Edillon
Rotary International vs Rotary Club
Kapisanan vs GSIS
United Pepsi Cola vs Laguesma
Assembly
BP Blg. 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985)
Primicias vs Fugoso
Navarro vs Villegas
Ignacio vs Ela
J.B.I. Reyes vs Bagatsing
Ruiz vs Gordon
Malabanan vs Ramento
Arreza vs GAUF
German vs Barangan
Acosta vs CA
Bayan vs Ermita

Abode and Travel

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.

Art. 13, Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Everyone has the right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each State.
Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.

Art. 12, International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights
Article 12
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty
of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject
to any restrictions except those which are provided
by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order (ordre public), public health or morals
or the rights and freedoms of others, and are
consistent with the other rights recognized in the
present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right
to enter his own country.

Villavicencio vs Lukban
Office of Administrative Services vs Judge Ignacio
Macarine
Salonga vs Hermosa
Caunca vs Salazar
Manotoc vs CA
Marcos vs Manglapus
Silverio vs CA
Lorenzo vs Director of Health
Santiago vs Vasquez
Yap vs CA