decision was thus read in open court.
Afterwards, the public prosecutor, the defense counsel, and
[G.R. No. 140243. December 14, 2000]
MARILYN C. PASCUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
What constitutes a valid promulgation in absentia? In case of such promulgation, when does
the accused's right to appeal accrue?
Before us is a petition that calls for a ruling on the aforestated issues, particularly seeking
the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 1999 and its order dated
September 28, 1999 denying reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner which questioned the legality of the orders dated
June 22, 1998 and October 8, 1998 issued by Branch 153 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig City.
The antecedent facts may be briefly chronicled as follows:
Petitioner was charged under 26 Informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The
Informations alleged that in 1989, petitioner issued 26 Philippine National Bank (PNB) checks to
apply on account or for value in favor of Lucita Lopez with the knowledge that at the time of issue,
petitioner did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
face value of the checks in full. Upon presentment of the subject checks, they were dishonored by
the drawee bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds and against a closed account.
After trial, a judgment of conviction was rendered on February 17, 1998, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, MARILYN C. PASCUA, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of twenty six (26) counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, and hereby sentences
her to suffer ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment in each case and to pay the private complainant,
LUCITA LOPEZ in the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P605,000.00),
Philippine Currency without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 41, Rollo.)
The judgment was initially scheduled for promulgation on March 31, 1998. However,
considering that the presiding judge was on leave, the promulgation was reset to May 5, 1998.
When the case was called on May 5, 1998, Public Prosecutor Rogelio C. Sescon and
defense counsel Atty. Marcelino Arias appeared and manifested their readiness for the
promulgation of judgment, although the latter intimated that petitioner would be late. Hence, the
case was set for second call. After the lapse of two hours, petitioner still had not appeared. The
trial court again asked the public prosecutor and the defense counsel if they were ready for the
promulgation of judgment. Both responded in the affirmative. The dispositive portion of the
private complainant Lucita Lopez, acknowledged receipt of their respective copies of the subject
decision by signing at the back of the original copy of the decision on file with the record of the
case.
Forthwith, the public prosecutor moved for the forfeiture of the cash bond posted by
petitioner as well as for the issuance of a warrant for her arrest. Acting on the motion, the trial
court issued, also on May 5, 1998, the following order:
When this case was called for the promulgation of judgment, the accused failed to appear despite
due notice. Upon motion of the Public Prosecutor, that the cash bond posted for her provisional
liberty be forfeited in favor of the government, being well-taken, the same is hereby
granted. Likewise, let a warrant of arrest be issued against her.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 42, Rollo.)
No motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed by petitioner within 15 days from
May 5, 1998.
On June 8, 1998, a notice of change of address was filed by petitioner with the trial court,
sent through a private messengerial firm. On the same date, without terminating the services of
her counsel of record, Atty. Marcelino Arias, the one who received the copy of the judgment of
conviction, petitioner, assisted by another counsel, Atty. Rolando Bernardo, filed an urgent
omnibus motion to lift warrant of arrest and confiscation of bail bond, as well as to set anew the
promulgation of the subject decision on the following allegations: that petitioner failed to appear
before the trial court on the scheduled date of promulgation (May 5, 1998) because she failed to
get the notices sent to her former address at No. 21 La Felonila St., Quezon City; that she had no
intention of evading the processes of the trial court; that in February 1998, she transferred
residence to Olongapo City by reason of an ejectment case filed against her by her landlord
concerning her former residence in Quezon City; and that due to the abrupt dislocation of their
family life as a result of the transfer of their residence to Olongapo City, there were important
matters that she overlooked such as the filing of a notice of change of address to inform the trial
court of her new place of residence.
The motion was set for hearing on June 11, 1998 but on said date, neither petitioner nor
assisting counsel was present. On June 22, 1998, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. The Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasig filed its comment on the motion for reconsideration arguing that: the
promulgation of the subject decision was made by the trial court on May 5, 1998 in the presence
of the accused's (herein petitioner's) counsel; that the subject decision is already final and
executory, there having been no appeal interposed by the accused within the reglementary period;
that there is no such thing as repromulgation of a decision; that before the accused could ask for
relief from the trial court, she, being a convict, should submit herself first to the lawful order thereof,
that is, to surrender to the police authorities.
On June 22, 1998, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's urgent omnibus motion
and notice of appeal for lack of merit, mentioning that its February 17, 1998 decision had already
become final and executory. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, this time assisted by another
lawyer, Atty. Romulo San Juan. The motion was set for hearing on July 8, 1998 but on said hearing
date, neither petitioner nor Atty. San Juan appeared. Instead, Atty. Porfirio Bautista appeared as
collaborating counsel of Atty. San Juan. When asked if he knew petitioner's counsel of record,
Atty. Bautista could not answer.
On July 17, 1998, Attys. San Juan and Bautista as counsel for petitioner, filed a motion for
inhibition of the presiding judge. The motion was set for hearing on July 28, 1998. Once again,
petitioner failed to appear although Atty. Bautista did. On October 8, 1998, the trial court denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and inhibition.
On December 14, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals praying for the nullification of the June 22, 1998
and October 8, 1998 orders of the trial court. At first, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
dated December 29, 1998 dismissing the petition for certiorari, for failure to contain an explanation
why the respondent therein was not personally served a copy of the petition. However, upon
reconsideration, said petition was reinstated.
After an exchange of pleadings, on June 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the decision
assailed herein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but to no avail.
Hence, the instant petition on the basis of the following grounds: (1) that petitioner was not
properly notified of the date of promulgation and therefore, there was no valid promulgation; hence
petitioner's period to appeal has not commenced; (2) that the promulgation in absentia of the
judgment against petitioner was not made in the manner set out in the last paragraph of Section
6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which then provided that promulgation in
absentia shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof
shall be served upon the accused or counsel; (3) that the decision of the trial court is contrary to
applicable laws and that it disregarded factual evidence and instead resorted to make a conclusion
based on conjectures, presumptions, and misapprehension of facts.
The resolution of the instant petition is dependent on the proper interpretation of Section 6,
Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment --The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the
presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel
or representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may
be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place
of confinement or detention upon request of the court that rendered the judgment. The court
promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the
bail bond pending appeal.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or
warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. In case the
accused fails to appear thereat the promulgation shall consist in the recording of the judgment in
the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel. If the
judgment is for conviction and the accuseds failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the
court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision to him or his counsel. (Italics supplied)
Incidentally, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took
effect December 1, 2000 adds more requirements but retains the essence of the former Section
6, to wit:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence
of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.However, if the conviction is for
a light offense the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or
representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city the judgment may be promulgated
by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement
or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the
judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending
appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature
of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved
by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or
warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused
was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be
served at his last known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment however, the accused
may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for
a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from
notice. (Italics supplied)
Promulgation of judgment is an official proclamation or announcement of the decision of the
court (Jacinto, Sr., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Revised Rules of Court [Criminal
Procedure], 1994 ed., p. 521). In a criminal case, promulgation of the decision cannot take place
until after the clerk receives it and enters it into the criminal docket. It follows that when the judge
mails a decision through the clerk of court, it is not promulgated on the date of mailing but after
the clerk of court enters the same in the criminal docket (Ibid., citing People v. Court of Appeals, 52
O.G. 5825 [1956]).
According to the first paragraph of Section 6 of the aforesaid Rule (of both the 1985 and
2000 versions), the presence in person of the accused at the promulgation of judgment is
mandatory in all cases except where the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the accused
may appear through counsel or representative. Under the third paragraph of the former and
present Section 6, any accused, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged against him, must
be given notice of the promulgation of judgment and the requirement of his presence. He must
appear in person or in the case of one facing a conviction for a light offense, through counsel or
representative. The present Section 6 adds that if the accused was tried in absentia because he
jumped bail or escaped from prison, notice of promulgation shall be served at his last known
address.
Significantly, both versions of said section set forth the rules that become operative if the
accused fails to appear at the promulgation despite due notice: (a) promulgation shall consist in
the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the
accused at his last known address or through his counsel; and (b) if the judgment is for conviction,
and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the
arrest of the accused.
Here lies the difference in the two versions of the section. The old rule automatically gives
the accused 15 days from notice (of the decision) to him or his counsel within which to appeal. In
the new rule, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies
available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of
judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these
remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation
and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within 15 days from notice.
It thus appears that the judgment in a criminal case must be promulgated in the presence
of the accused, except where it is for a light offense, in which case it may be pronounced in the
presence of his counsel or representative (Dimson v. Elepao, 99 Phil. 733 [1956]), and except
where the judgment is for acquittal, in which case the presence of the accused is not
necessary (Cea, etc., et al. v. Cinco, et al., 96 Phil. 31 [1954]). Notably, one of the conditions of
the bail given for the provisional liberty of an accused in a criminal case is that he shall surrender
himself (or the bondsman shall surrender the accused) for execution of the final judgment (Section
2[d], Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). Thus, it follows that it is the responsibility
of the accused to make himself available to the court upon promulgation of a judgment of
conviction, and such presence is secured by his bail bond. This amplifies the need for the presence
of the accused during the promulgation of a judgment of conviction, especially if it is for a grave
offense. Obviously, a judgment of conviction cannot be executed --and the sentence meted to the
accused cannot be served --without his presence. Besides, where there is no promulgation of the
judgment, the right to appeal does not accrue (People v. ]aranilla, 55 SCRA 565 [1974]).
Jurisprudence further dictates that the absence of counsel during the promulgation will not
result in a violation of any substantial right of the accused, and will not affect the validity of the
promulgation of the judgment (Bernardo v. Abeto, CA-G. R. No. 6076, 31 January 1940; Gonzales
v. Judge, 186 SCRA 101 [1990]).
In the vintage case of Cea, etc., et al. v. Cinco, et al (supra), the Court citing U. S. v.
Beecham, (28 Phil. 258 [1914]), stated the reasons for requiring the attendance of the accused in
case of conviction for a grave or less grave offense, to wit:
...The common law required, when any corporal punishment was to be inflicted on the
defendant, that he should be personally present before the court at the time of pronouncing
the sentence. (1 Chitty's Crim. Law [5th Am. ed.], 693, 696.) Reasons given for this are, that
the defendant may be identified by the court as the real party adjudged to be punished (Holt,
399); that the defendant may have a chance to plead or move in arrest of judgment (King
vs. Speke, 3 Salk., 358); that he may have an opportunity to say what he can say why
judgment should not be given against him (2 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 401, 402); and that
the example of the defendants, who have been guilty of misdemeanors of a gross and public
kind, being brought up for the animadversion of the court and the open denunciation of
punishment, may tend to deter others from the commission of similar offenses (Chitty's
Crim. Law [5th ed.], 693, 696) ***.
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, regardless of the gravity of the offense, promulgation of
judgment in absentia is allowed under the Rules. The only essential elements for its validity are:
(a) that the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) that a copy thereof shall be served
upon the accused or counsel.
Let us examine the validity of the May 5, 1998 promulgation which took place in the case at
bar. The dispositive portion of the decision convicting petitioner was read in open court, after which
the public prosecutor, the defense counsel Atty. Marcelino Arias, and private complainant Lucita
Lopez, acknowledged receipt of their respective copies of the decision by affixing their signatures
at the back of the original of the decision on file with the record of the case. Atty. Arias failed to file
a notice of appeal within fifteen days from receipt of the decision. Is it proper to rule that the period
within which to file an appeal has lapsed?
In Florendo v. Court of Appeals (239 SCRA 325 [1994]), the facts are parallel to those of
the instant case. We held -
In the case at bench, a copy of the judgment was served to the counsel of petitioner on June 15,
1992; therefore, he had only up to June 30, 1992 within which to appeal. The notice of appeal filed
on July 6, 1992 was clearly out of time.
It is presumed that official duties are regularly performed and that the proceedings are made of
record. This serves as a substantial compliance with the procedural requirement of the recording
of the judgment in the criminal docket of the court. At any rate, petitioner does not question non-
compliance of the requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket.
(At p. 329.)
Petitioner's first argument is devoid of merit. In the first place, her non- receipt of the notice
of promulgation was due to her own failure to immediately file a notice of change of address with
the trial court, which she clearly admitted. Besides, promulgation could be properly done even in
her absence, subject to the service of a copy of the decision upon her or her counsel and the
recording of the judgment in the criminal docket.
However, in line with petitioner's second argument, petitioner has presented evidence
sufficient to controvert the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty as regards the
procedural requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the
court. Attached to the petition is a piece of evidence that cannot be ignored by this Court -- a
certification dated October 26, 1998 signed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that this Office has not yet been furnished, as of this date, with copies of
the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 85283-306 and 86064-65, entitled People of the Philippines
versus Marilyn C. Pascua, which were assigned to Branch 153 of this Court.
This certification is issued upon request of Romulo D. San Juan and Porfirio Bautista, both
counsels for the accused.
City of Pasig, October 26, 1998, 1:30 p.m.
(Sgd.) GREGORIO P. SUBONG, JR.
Administrative Officer I In-Charge
Criminal Cases Unit
(Sgd.) GRACE S. BELVIS
Clerk of Court
(p. 61,
Record.)
We take judicial notice of said certification and hold that in view thereof, we cannot presume
substantial compliance with the requirement of recording a judgment in the criminal docket. And
in the absence of such compliance, there can be no valid promulgation. Without the same, the
February 17, 1998 decision could not attain finality and become executory. This means that the
15-day period within which to interpose an appeal did not even commence.
What is the significance of the recording of the judgment with the criminal docket of the
court? By analogy, let us apply the principles of civil law on registration.
 To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities are unanimous on
the meaning of the term to register as "to enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to
enroll; to enter in a list" (Po Sun Tun vs. Prize and Provincial Government of Leyte, 54 Phil. 192
[1929]). In general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the registry, including both
registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal
notes. In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry which records solemnly
and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights (Ibid.). Simply stated, registration is
made for the purpose of notification (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 ed., p.
653, citing Bautista vs. Dy Bun Chin, 49 O.G. 179 [1952]).
assails the Court of Appeals' decision dated June 17, 1999 and its order dated September 28,
1999 both of which concern the orders of the trial court dated June 22, 1998 and October 8, 1998,
in essence ruling that petitioner's notice of appeal dated June 19, 1998 was filed out of time. The
petition is not directed against February 17, 1998 decision of the trial court which convicted
petitioner on 26 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Hence, this is not the proper time
to rule on the merits of Criminal Cases No. 85283-306/86064-65. There is, rather, a need to
remand the matter to the trial court for proper promulgation of its decision. Significantly, it is not
what petitioner describes as "repromulgation" since promulgation was not validly made, and
hence, as if not conducted. The requisites of the remedy of appeal shall then apply from that point.

Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 17, 1999 decision and
be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the the September 28, 1999 order of the Court of Appeals are hereby set aside. The instant case is
certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument. Being a ministerial hereby remanded to the trial court for proper promulgation of its decision in accordance with
act, it must be performed in any case and, if it is not done, it may be ordered performed by a court Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
of justice (Cruz, The Law of Public Officers, 1997 ed., p. 102). In fact, the public officer having this
ministerial duty has no choice but to perform the specific action which is the particular duty SO ORDERED.
imposed by law. Its purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons. It operates as a notice of
the deed, contract, or instrument to others, but neither adds to its validity nor converts an invalid
instrument into a valid one between the parties. If the purpose of registration is merely to give
notice, then questions regarding the effects or invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided
after, not before, registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that registration must
first be allowed, and validity or effect of the instruments litigated afterwards (Seron vs. Hon.
Rodriguez, etc., and Seron, 110 Phil.. 548 [1960]; Gurbax Singh Pabla & Co., et al. vs. Reyes, et
al., 92 Phil. 177 [1952]; Register of Deeds of Manila vs. Tinoco Vda. De Cruz, 95 Phil. 818
[1954]; Samanilla vs. Cajucom, et al., 107 Phil. 432 [1960]).

Applying the above-mentioned principles to the instant case, we are prompted to further
examine the provisions on promulgation in absentia.

As held in Florendo vs. Court of Appeals (supra), the rules allow promulgation of judgment in
absentia to obviate the situation where juridical process could be subverted by the accused
jumping bail. But the Rules also provide measures to make promulgation in absentia a formal and
solemn act so that the absent accused, wherever he may be, can be notified of the judgment
rendered against him. As discussed earlier, the sentence imposed by the trial court cannot be
served in the absence of the accused. Hence, all means of notification must be done to let the
absent accused know of the judgment of the court. And the means provided by the Rules are: (1)
the act of giving notice to all persons or the act of recording or registering the judgment in the
criminal docket (which Section 6 incidentally mentions first showing its importance; and (2) the act
of serving a copy thereof upon the accused (at his last known address) or his counsel. In a scenario
where the whereabouts of the accused are unknown (as when he is at large), the recording
satisfies the requirement of notifying the accused of the decision wherever he may be.

Thus, on May 5, 1998, although the second kind of notification was satisfied when defense
counsel Atty. Arias received a copy of the February 17, 1998 decision, the solemn and operative
act of recording was not done, making the promulgation in absentia invalid. This being so, the
period to appeal did not begin to run.

The next matter we have to consider is the effect of the service of a copy of the judgment
upon petitioner, who admits having received a copy thereof on June 17, 1998. Did the 15-day
period to appeal begin to run on said date of receipt?

We rule in the negative. Petitioner's later receipt of the copy of the decision does not in any
way cure an invalid promulgation. And even if said decision be recorded in the criminal docket
later, such piece-meal compliance with the Rules will still not validate the May 5, 1998
promulgation which was invalid at the time it was conducted. The express mention in the provision
of both requirements for a valid promulgation in absentia clearly means that they indeed must
concur.

Finally, as regards the third argument, we agree with the Solicitor General that matters of
sufficiency of evidence may not be passed upon in the herein proceedings. The instant petition
JUDITH YU, G.R. No. 170979
Petitioner, On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution.
Present:
On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
BRION, RTC from acting on the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the
[10]
BERSAMIN, decision.
- versus - VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ. The Petition

Promulgated: The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions motions
when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, of Court, applying the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes.
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, February 9, 2011
Quezon City, Branch 105, and the The Case for the Respondents
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x (OSG), filed a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that Neypes applies to criminal actions
since the evident intention of the fresh period rule was to set a uniform appeal period provided in
[11]
DECISION the Rules.

BRION, J.: In view of the OSGs manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to comment on
[12]
the petition.
We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin respondent Judge In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek refuge
Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from taking in Neypes to extend the fresh period rule to criminal casesbecause Neypes involved a civil case,
further proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled People of the Philippines v. Judith and the pronouncement of standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules referred to the
[1]
Yu, et al. interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure among others; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases,
[13]
The Factual Antecedents Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned.

The facts of the case, gathered from the parties pleadings, are briefly summarized Issue
below.
Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for The core issue boils down to whether the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes applies
estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC. to appeals in criminal cases.

In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It imposed on The Courts Ruling
her a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto mayor), a fine of P3,800,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same We find merit in the petition.
[2]
amount as the fine.
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right it is a statutory
Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes.
[14]
with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law. The period to
[3] [15]
the crime for which she was convicted. appeal is specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), as
amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122
In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for new of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[4]
trial for lack of merit.
Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:
On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging
[5]
that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a fresh period of 15 days from SEC. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders,
November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall
[6]
2005, within which to file a notice of appeal. be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That
On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours
[7]
of Neypes for his guidance. from the notice of the judgment appealed from.

On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
[8]
filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.
[9]
On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision.
 SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion
for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final
order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be
suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served
upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period
begins to run.
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period
within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a
motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.
It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a
more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of
cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals,
particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based
on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These
extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for
new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order
[16]
or resolution.
The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration
that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
The raison dtre for the fresh period rule is to standardize the appeal period provided in
the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance
of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of
a fresh period to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based,
makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section
39 of BP 129 categorically states that [t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice
of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not
[17]
to recognize any distinction.
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded,
mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as
legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for
new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason
exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal
cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a
purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review
from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases,
as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by
petition for review under Rule 42.
xxxx
Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124,
all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its
appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason
exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA
in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.
Were we to strictly interpret the fresh period rule in Neypes and make it applicable only
to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation
where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case
a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-
appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property
interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must
emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time,
courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not
[18]
allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.
 Thus, we agree with the OSGs view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same
treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where
no less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend
to matters of liberty cannot be overstated.

In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of
appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3,
2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge

Rosa Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction
over the prosecutions motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. The respondent
Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to the petitioners appeal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-
105698, and to elevate the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed
decision on the merits.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006 automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,
vs. Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent. sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3
Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for
the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
DECISION

Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 Maderal.
1
December 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003
Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
decision reads as follows:
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court
instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the
Department of Justice.
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001,
Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued
dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge
a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the
Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby
cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING,
Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and
AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order
prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint
dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22
October 2001.
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
Isabela; and
with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda,
SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said
2 On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.
restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly
after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows: dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court
took note of respondent’s cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001,
and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which
adjudication on the merits.
were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging
that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On
SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez
21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
to it of respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of
the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who
was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition
and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following
assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside
the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001,
October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-
3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by
then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek
any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement
of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36
of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to
re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal
cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the
public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal
issued therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person
of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals’ ruling
that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of
the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory
process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso
V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed
3
in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and
Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of
their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to
4
reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming
that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash
the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court
by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for
bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case
even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed
on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In
Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance
of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs.
5
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 102 ), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable
6
cause.
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing
of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.
7
Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez :
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person,
is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction
over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for
bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person
8 9
of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
10
appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion
before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction
of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused
11
escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint
on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient
12
to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.
13
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., cited by the Court of Appeals should not have
been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of
someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of
his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to
invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the
whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused
before considering the application for bail.
13

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as
a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
15
of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being
16
in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure
one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.’" The rationale behind
this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice
wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the
jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
17
therefor.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance
of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1)
in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
18
defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases,
motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure
to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The
third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the
submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused
can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for
bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused
is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following
cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the
custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the
court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an
information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
19
1. In Allado v. Diokno, on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of
lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing
the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and,
instead, to elevate the records to us.
20
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings and
to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for
Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist
from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests
against the accused.
21
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan
to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants
of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are
not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons
not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain
at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is
proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in
the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would
remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will
decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he
can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining
the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in
force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time
22
of the day and night. Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against
him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to
require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference
23
in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, demanding that due process in the deprivation of
liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary
of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge
Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he
quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed
appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause
due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutor’s resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in
another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed
the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after
assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge
Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is
24
but proper."
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan
as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against
petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor’s
resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review
of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
25
In Webb v. de Leon, we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of
the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the
adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants
of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same
ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if
true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional
proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal
Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal
of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the
26
contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by
Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
27
persons or things to be seized.
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to
the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad
gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent
from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was
based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally
made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly
28
and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscal’s certification.
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such indication that he
relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine
the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was accompanied by supporting
30 31
documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix and People v. Inting. The
supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo
de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in
Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan
of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive
part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge
Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it
was given after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was
given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was
given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given
during the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were
pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor
32
Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings
of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the
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province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb :
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well
put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it
requires "less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different
accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there
was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice.
However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, Judge Anghad
summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following
explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41,
Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda – the mastermind and
with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of
the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a
"narration of falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who
were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now
beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and
therefore the same is without probable value." This Court agrees with the defense’s views. Indeed,
of what use is Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s evidence
presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state
witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative
value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying
for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the
Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting
the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in
that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered
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dismissed.
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and
interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the
accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different
accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact
that our decision in Leaño was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that the crime
did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused
therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is
not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an
eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive to kill respondent
Tuliao’s son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño, "it is now
beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and
35
therefore the same is without probable value." On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our
decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability
of the prosecution’s version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria
of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations two days after we
resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from
further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were
dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Court’s resolve to issue
a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by
the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or
reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to
36
issue apparently new warrants of arrest. According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court
of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or
merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely
a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect
the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of
Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001
37
Order of Judge Tumaliuan, which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals
likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of
nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside
by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the warrants of arrest had been
nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based
on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so.
The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are
also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally
examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we
have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable
cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the
finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the
same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause,
also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that
the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November
14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliao’s
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court
of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following
Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint
Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the
38
Joint Order of November 14, 2001.
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and 3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases
Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from the transfer;
decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution.
Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court
Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in
compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and
filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
"deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the
Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, 5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said
we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent cases with reasonable dispatch.
Tuliao’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B.
the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of
claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave
abuse of discretion.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED.
Costs against Petitioners.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15
November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In
said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining SO ORDERED.
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing
of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November
2005.

While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to

lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require
39
the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent, the prayer to cite public
respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be
construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.

In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute
double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned
40
and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.

As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion
to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold
that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an
apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v.
41
SPO1 Leaño, by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the
City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution
dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,

1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City
of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10)
days after receipt hereof;

2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed
to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these
cases;