1.) [G.R. No. 117407. April 15, 1997] own pants and briefs.
own pants and briefs. He kissed the girl and fondled her breasts and private
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IRVIN
TADULAN y EPAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Accused-appellant Irvin Tadulan was charged with the crime of rape before
the Regional Trial Court of xxx, Branch xxx, Metro Manila, in a complaint
docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-186, alleging as follows:
"That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1992 in the Municipality of xxx,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, armed with a knife, with lewd design and by means of force, threats
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one AAA, a minor, nine (9) years old, without
her consent and against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[1]
When arraigned under the foregoing indictment, appellant pleaded not guilty
to the crime attributed to him. Thereafter, trial commenced with both
prosecution and defendant presenting evidence consisting of testimonies of
witnesses and documentary exhibits.
The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to establish the following
facts:
" x x x Complainant BBB owns a house at xxx, in Barangay xxx, Metro
Manila where she resides with her common-law husband and their minor
daughter, AAA. Behind the said house, complainant also owns a three-door
apartment building, one unit of which was rented and occupied by accused
Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan and their three children name [sic]
Dianne, Angie and Bochoy who were aged 10, 9 and 5, respectively. In 1992
complainant's daughter, AAA was about nine (9) year [sic] old (Exh. 'A') and
was in grade school. She often played with the accused's children in the
vicinity of their house and the apartment building.
In the morning of April 2, 1992, at about 11:00 o'clock, AAA was playing
with the other children when she was called by Irvin Tadulan into the latter's
apartment unit. He brought the girl upstairs and told her to lie down on the
floor. Irvin Tadulan then removed the shorts and panties of AAA and his
parts. Then he put himself on top of her and inserted his organ into her
genitals. AAA felt the pain in her vagina. She pushed Irvin Tadulan away
from her and got up, but the latter poked a kitchen knife at her and told her to
remain lying down; and because of fear, AAA lay [sic] down on the floor
again. Irvin Tadulan placed himself on top of her once more, kissed and
fondled her breasts as before, and finally succeeded in inserting his penis into
her sex organ. As he had intercourse with AAA, blood oozed out of her
vagina and she felt the pain. Shortly thereafter, however, she heard her
mother calling her. So, Irvin Tadulan told her to dress up quickly and
ordered her to go home.
Upon reaching home, AAA did not inform her mother that Irvin Tadulan had
carnal knowledge of her; but two days later, their laundry woman saw the
blood stains on her panties and told her mother about it. At first, AAA
refused to talk when her mother asked her about the said blood stains, but
when the mother persisted in asking her, the girl cried and revealed that
Irvin Tadulan had sexual intercourse with her. The mother (BBB) was
shocked. She reported the matter to her godson who immediately confronted
Irvin Tadulan relative to what he had done to AAA. At first,
Irvin Tadulan denied having done the act imputed to him by the said girl, but
he later on admitted that he had sexual intercourse with her.
Shortly thereafter, Irvin Tadulan's wife (Adefa Tadulan) arrived from a trip
from Cagayan de Oro City, and BBB immediately informed her that her
husband, Irvin Tadulan has raped her (BBBs) daughter AAA. BBB further
informed Adefa Tadulan that she would not take action against the latter's
husband if they would vacate the apartment unit right
away. Adefa Tadulan later on met with BBB and told her that she had driven
away Irvin Tadulan, but requested that she and her children be allowed to
stay until Saturday, April 11, 1992. BBB thereafter noted, however, that
Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to the apartment unit every night
despite the promise of his wife that she herself would call the police should
he ever come back to the place. So, BBB conferred with her cousin, a
lawyer, and later on made up her mind to file a criminal charge against
Irvin Tadulan before leaving for abroad, for she was then scheduled to go to
the United States to fetch her mother who was ill due to a stroke.
On the night of April 11, 1992, BBB heard a loud noise coming from the
apartment building, and when she inquired about it she came to know that it
was Irvin Tadulan creating the noise because he was kicking the door of the
apartment unit occupied by him and his family. So, BBB called up the police
because of her apprehension that Irvin Tadulan would create trouble due to
1
the quarrel that was then taking place between him and his wife. Responding
policemen soon arrived at the place in a mobile car, and because
Irvin Tadulan was denounced by his wife for having rape [sic] the daughter
of BBB, the said police officers brought Irvin Tadulan to the xxx Police
Station for questioning and also asked BBB and her daughter to follow
them. So, that same evening, BBB and her daughter went to the xxx Police
Station where they gave their respective sworn statements (Exhs. 'B' & 'E')
and lodged their complaint against Irvin Tadulan. It was during the taking of
her statement before the police when AAA also revealed that
Irvin Tadulan had laid with her not only on April 2, 1992. She stated that
Irvin Tadulan had previously laid on top of her and first attempted to have
intercourse with her sometime in September 1, 1991, but it was not
consummated because she was hurt whenever he tried to insert his penis into
her vagina.
In order to determine physical signs of sexual abuse, the xxx Police Station
made a Request For The Medico Legal Examination of AAA to the PC
Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City (Exh. 'F') on the
following day, April 12, 1992, upon the written Consent For Examination
(Exh. 'G') which was signed by the mother, BBB. A medico-legal officer of
the PCCLS examined AAA and then issued Medico-Legal Report No. M-
0708-92 dated April 13, 1992 (Exh. 'C') finding her 'hymen with deep, healed
laceration at 4 o'clock", and with the conclusion that the 'Subject is in non-
virgin state physically'. Thereafter, the xxx Police Station forwarded the
sworn statements of AAA and her mother, together with all the pertinent
papers to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of xxx where the said minor
child and her mother signed the Complaint for Rape (Exh. 'D') against
Irvin Tadulan, which initiated the prosecution of the said accused in this
case."[2]
On the other hand, accused Irvin Tadulan set up the defense of alibi and
pardon. In support of his defense, Tadulan testified that he could not have
raped AAA in his apartment unit in xxx, Metro Manila, at 11:00 o'clock in
the morning of 2 April 1992 as he was then at his place of work at the
Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in xxx, Metro Manila, where he was
employed as a mobile equipment operator. His testimony was corroborated
by his supervisor at the plant who testified that on 2 April 1992,
Irvin Tadulan worked with him at the company plant during the first shift,
from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; and that as shown in Tadulan's daily time record
(Exhibit " 1 "), said accused punched in at 5:25 a.m. and punched out at 2:31
p.m.
Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation, Adefa Tadulan, wife of
accused-appellant, testified that when she arrived at their apartment on 7
April 1992 from Cagayan de Oro, she learned from BBB and her daughter
AAA that the latter had been raped by her husband; that she again went to
see BBB and asked for forgiveness and that the latter told her:
"Hayaan mo na lang, umalis na lang kayo dito,
kung ang Dios nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya." Said witness also testified that
she asked BBB if the accused Irvin Tadulan could just leave first while she
and their children would vacate the apartment unit on the coming Saturday,
and BBB agreed; and that pursuant to said agreement,
Irvin Tadulan immediately left the apartment and she started packing their
belongings and sent their children to Cagayan de Oro in the company of her
mother.
Adefa Tadulan further testified that on the night of 11 April 1992, her
husband came home and upon learning that she had sent their children to the
province, he got angry and they had a violent quarrel. The noise created by
the quarrel was heard by BBB who immediately called the police; and on that
same night, BBB and AAA lodged a complaint for rape against accused
Irvin Tadulan despite the previous understanding between BBB
and Adefa Tadulan that BBB would not take action anymore against
Irvin Tadulan.
Prior to the reception of evidence for the accused, his counsel filed a Motion
to Plead Guilty to Lesser Offense[3] praying that accused be allowed to plead
guilty to the crime under Article 336, Revised Penal Code, denominated as
Acts of Lasciviousness. No communication having been received from the
complainant with regard to said offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense, the
trial proceeded for the reception of evidence for the defense
After trial, the now appealed judgment was rendered by the lower court
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, this Court hereby finds accused IRVIN TADULAN
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized
by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessory penalties the law
provides therefor.
Accused Irvin Tadulan is also hereby ordered to indemnify the offended
minor girl, AAA in the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00),
2
with interest thereon at the legal rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from the
filing of the complaint in this case until the same is fully paid.
SO ORDERED."[4]
In this appeal, accused Irvin Tadulan assigns the following errors to the trial
court:
I 266). In this case, however, it is clear that accused Irvin Tadulan was not so
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY
WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES
MARKED AS THEY ARE WITH INCONSISTENCIES AND
IMPROBABILITIES WHICH CAST SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO THEIR
TRUTHFULNESS.
III
ASSUMING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S VERSION OF THE
INCIDENT IS CORRECT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
ALREADY PARDONED BY COMPLAINANTS.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT. [5]
The issues raised by accused-appellant boil down to credibility of witnesses.
In rejecting the version of the accused-appellant, the trial court made the
following findings and conclusions to which we agree.
"This Court finds, however, that the abovementioned testimonies of accused
Irvin Tadulan and his witness cannot prevail over the more convincing
testimony of the rape victim, AAA, who positively identified the said
accused as the one who raped her and described in a clear and
straightforward manner how she was sexually abused by him. In the absence
of any clear showing of ill motive that might have impelled her to impute the
heinous crime of rape against the said accused, there is no reason to doubt the
veracity of the declarations of the said victim in court; for as held in a case
(People vs. Camasis, 189 SCRA 649), 'it is hard to believe that a young
unmarried woman would reveal that she was deflowered and allow the
examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be the
subject of public trial if her motive was not to bring to justice the person who
wronged her.' Also applicable here is the well-settled principle that 'alibi is
unavailing as a defense where there is positive identification of the
perpetrator of the crime, most specially, when the said identification is made
by the victim of the rape herself in the absence of any motive to implicate the
assailant' (People vs. Felipe, 191 SCRA 176, and cases therein
cited). Besides, it has been held time and time again, that for alibi to prosper
as a defense the accused must show that he was so far away that he could not
have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA
situated on April 2, 1992, for according to him he was at the plant of the
Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation in xxx, Metro Manila -- which is but a
few kilometers from Barangay xxx of the same municipality where the crime
was committed.
Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation also set up by accused
Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan testified that on April 7, 1992 when
she arrived at their apartment unit from a trip from Cagayan de Oro City, she
came to know from both BBB and her daughter, AAA, that the latter has
been raped by her husband; that she again met with BBB and asked for
forgiveness; and that the said mother told her:
'Hayaan mo na lang, umalis na lang kayo dito,
kung ang Diyos ay nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya.' The said wife also testified
that she asked BBB if her husband could just leave first while she and their
children could vacate the apartment unit on the coming Saturday, and BBB
agreed; and that pursuant to the said agreement Irvin Tadulan immediately
left their house, after which she also sent their children to Cagayan de Oro
City in the company of her mother and then started packing-up their
belongings. She further testified that on the night of April 11, 1992,
however, her husband came home and quarreled with her upon knowing that
she had sent their children to the province; that because of the noise their
quarrel created, BBB called for the police; and that on that same night, BBB
and her daughter lodged a complaint for rape against Irvin Tadulan, despite
the previous understanding between her and BBB that the latter would not
anymore take any action against her husband.
It should be pointed out, however, as earlier narrated above, that according to
BBB, she agreed not to file any complaint against Irvin Tadulan upon the
representation of his wife, Adefa Tadulan, that she had driven away her
husband, and her promise that if he would ever return to their apartment unit,
she herself would call for the police; that she (BBB) noted, however, that
Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to their apartment unit every night; that
she was prompted to call for police assistance because she saw
Irvin Tadulan kicking the door of the apartment during a violent quarrel with
his wife on the night of April 11, 1992; and that because soon after
3
policemen arrived at the place, Adefa Tadulan herself informed them that her
husband has raped AAA, she (BBB) and her said child proceeded with the
filing of their complaint for rape against Irvin Tadulan.
From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance
of BBB from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon the
representation of the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven away her
husband, and her promise that should he ever come back to their apartment
unit she herself would call for the police; but that the said representation turn
[sic] out to be untrue, and the promise was not complied with because
Irvin Tadulan was still coming home every night and, in fact, he and her [sic]
wife had a violent quarrel in the apartment unit on the night of April 11,
1992. Otherwise stated, the desistance was subject to certain conditions
which were not complied with, and for which reason BBB proceeded with
the filing of a criminal complaint against Irvin Tadulan. Upon such
circumstances, it is clear to the mind of this Court that the complainant has
not expressly pardoned the said accused.
Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by
the parents of an offended minor but also by the minor herself in order to be
effective as an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we
find the following words: 'Neither must we be understood as supporting the
view that the parents alone can extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we,
too are of the belief that the pardon by the parents, standing alone, is
inefficacious.' It was also held in another case, that 'The express pardon of a
person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter's
parents, is not sufficient to remove criminal responsibility, but must be
accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself.' (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil.
360)
In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted
only by the mother (BBB) without the concurrence of the offended minor,
AAA. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial
desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the accused,
constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such
pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended minor
herself.
In fine, this Court concludes that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the
accused Irvin Tadulan of the crime of rape charged against him, and that the
defenses of alibi and pardon or condonation set up by him are lacking in
merit."[6]
We have consistently held that appellate courts, as a rule, will not disturb the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. We have sustained
trial courts in this respect, considering their vantage point in the evaluation of
testimonial evidence, absent, of course, any showing of serious error or
irregularity that otherwise would alter the result of the case. [7] We find no
such serious error or irregularity in the case at bar.
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court gravely erred when it
disregarded the defense of alibi despite the overwhelming evidence that the
accused did not leave his place of work on 2 April 1992. According to the
appellant, his immediate supervisor, Leandro Daguro, testified that he
(appellant) reported for work on 2 April 1992 and was assigned in a critical
area, and being the only driver at that time a problem would have ensued had
he left his post at any given time on 2 April 1992. Appellant likewise faults
the trial court when it observed that there was no physical impossibility for
him to be at xxx where the crime was committed because the court mainly
focused its attention on the fact that Barangay xxx is but a few kilometers
away from Barangay xxx, both in xxx, hence, appellant could have returned
to his place of work after committing the crime at the time and place it
occurred. Accused argues that the distance between the two barangays was
never an issue, that the question really is whether or not appellant left or
could have left his work at the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation
in Barangay xxx and gone home to Barangay xxx in the morning of 2 April
1992.
We are not persuaded. The testimony of Leonardo Daguro that accused
could not have left his work as this would have resulted in a big problem at
the area where appellant was working is too simple for comfort. The same
witness testified that he could not remember if a problem arose on that date
when the crime was committed and that he was supervising an average of
seventeen (17) men in different sections of the raw material department so
that he had to go around each section.
We quote with approval the following observation of the court a quo:
" x x x Besides, it has been held time and time again that for alibi to prosper
as a defense the accused must show that he was so far away that he could not
have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA
266). In this case, however, it is not so situated on April 2, 1992, for
according to him he was at the plant of the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation
in Barangay xxx, Metro Manila -- which is but a few kilometers
4
from Barangay xxx of the same municipality where the crime was
committed."[8]
Accused-appellant tries to discredit the victim's testimony by questioning her
behavior after she was allegedly raped by the accused in September 1991 in
that she did not show any fear of the accused on 2 April 1992 when she was
called by him. It should be borne in mind, in this connection, that the victim
was only a naive nine (9) year old child when the crime was committed on
her. She considered the accused as a friend, almost like a relative, as in fact
she called him "Tito Loloy." She therefore unsuspectingly went near the
accused when called by the latter.
As we have stressed in a recent case -
" x x x it is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone
traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected under the
circumstances from mature people. The range of emotion shown by rape
victims is yet to be captured even by the calculus. It is thus unrealistic to
expect uniform reactions from rape victims."[9]
The victim AAA was too young to totally comprehend the consequences of
the dastardly act inflicted on her by the accused-appellant.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: "(A)s regards the acts
imputed to BBB, the delay of seven (7) days from the date of her knowledge
of the rape incident on 4 April 1992 in reporting to the authorities the rape of
her daughter is excusable. At that time, she was not yet certain of the steps
she would take considering the delicate nature of the problem they were
facing" (citing People v. Danguilan, 218 SCRA 98;People v. Joaquin, Jr.,
225 SCRA 179)." Besides, we have ruled that a delay in prosecuting the rape
is not indicative of fabricated charges.[10]
Finally, the accused's denial and alibi cannot prevail over his positive
identification by the victim AAA as her rapist. AAA testified in a clear and
straightforward manner that appellant through force and intimidation and
with use of a deadly weapon (kitchen knife), succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her.[11]
As for the defense that BBB, as the mother of the victim BBB, expressly
pardoned him, we sustain the trial court's finding which reads as follows:
"From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance
of BBB from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon the
representation of the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven away her
husband, and her promise that should he ever come back to their apartment
unit she herself would call for the police; but that the said representation
turned out to be untrue, and the promise was not complied with because
Irvin Tadulan was still coming home every night and, in fact, he and her wife
had a violent quarrel in the apartment unit on the night of April 11,
1992. Otherwise stated, the desistance was subject to certain conditions
which were not complied with, and for which reason BBB proceeded with
the filing of a criminal complaint against Irvin Tadulan. Upon such
circumstances, it is clear to the mind of this Court that the complainant has
not expressly pardoned the said accused.
Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by
the parents of an offended minor but also by the minor herself in order to be
effective as an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we
find the following words: 'Neither must we be understood as supporting the
view that the parents alone can extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we,
too are of the belief that the pardon by the parents, standing alone, is
inefficacious.' It was also held in another case, that 'The express pardon of a
person guilty of attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter's
parents, is not sufficient to remove criminal responsibility, but must be
accompanied by the express pardon of the girl herself.' (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil.
360)
In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted
only by the mother (BBB) without the concurrence of the offended minor,
AAA. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial
desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the accused,
constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such
pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended minor
herself."[12]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated 4 August 1994 in Criminal
Case No. 92186 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch xxx of xxx, Metro
Manila, is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification as to the indemnity for the
victim which is raised to P50,000.00 from P30,000.00 to conform with
prevailing jurisprudence including the recent case of People
v. Romualdo Miranda y Geronimo, et al., G.R. No. 97425, 24 September
1996, where the victim was also a minor, as in the case at bar.
SO ORDERED.
5
2.) [G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE
PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA
JESSIE" and TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django,"
"Carlos Narra" and "Ka Jessie," appeals the decision of the Regional Trial
Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 2773 entitled
"People of the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias 'Ka Django,' 'Carlos
Narra,' 'Ka Jessie,' and 21 John Does" convicting him of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose
Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., charging
them of murder committed as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the
evening in the Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence and
brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO
thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his death
to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the
killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively.
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted by
his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of
the three cases was conducted considering the substantial identity of the facts
and circumstances of the case.
Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the
accused, with ten (10) armed companions, requested permission to rest in his
house, which was granted. They had with them a person who was
hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be
extinguished and Malto complied.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was
awakened by a gunshot. When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun
and ordering the person who was hogtied to lie down. After several minutes,
Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his companions
to carry away the dead man.
Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when
Patriarca went back to his place, together with the military, on March 29,
1990.
The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a
Rubuang Tolosa and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the
victim.
The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew
Patriarca, alias "Ka Django", as he told her on March 10, 1987 not to let her
son join the military. She, however, replied that they were only seeking
employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in attending to their farm
and he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in their
locality.
After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that her
son was abducted by the New People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she
reported the matter to the military and looked for him. She was informed by
the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they saw her son
hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and complained that he
was being maltreated by the NPA. After three days of searching, a certain
Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and a relative of hers, notified her that her
son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr.
In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's
death in the hands of Ka Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate was
issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to identify
them as belonging to her son by reason of the briefs found in the burial
site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print his name on the waistband of his
briefs so that it would not get lost.
6
The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who
admitted that accused is a member of the NPA operating in Donsol,
Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the victims in the three criminal cases
filed against him.
On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the accused and
imposing the following penalty:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose
Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, alias Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo and hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessory provided by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity to the heirs of the victim Alfredo Arevalo, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and as regards Crim. Case No. 2665 and
Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka
Django, is hereby acquitted.
"In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full credit of his
period of detention.
"With cost de-oficio.
"SO ORDERED."[1]
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following lone error
allegedly committed by the trial court:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER, AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN
PURSUANCE OR IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724
amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting
Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May
Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in
Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and
Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably
granted by the National Amnesty Board. Attached to appellant's brief is the
Notice of Resolution of the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) dated
November 17, 1999 which states:
"Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty Commission dated 22
October 1998.[2]
'RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125 of MR.
JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA filed with the Local Amnesty Board of
Legazpi City on 18 February 1997.
'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the
Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda and participated in the following armed
activities:
'a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Hirawon, Donsol,
Sorsogon on 14 February 1986;
'b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at Barangay
Godon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 15 February 1986;
'c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Banwang,
Gurang, Donsol, Sorsogon in 1987;
'd) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer at Barangay
Boroan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in which a case of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 2672 was filed against him before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and nuisance of the
community, at Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09 March 1984, in which a case of
Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 was filed against him before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his
misconducts at San Antonio, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12 February 1986, in
which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 was filed against him
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former member of the
CHDF at Sitio Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in
which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 was filed against him
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay captain, at
Barangay Tinanogan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20 September 1986 in which a
(sic) Criminal Case No. 2663 was filed against him.
7
'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the
applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were done
in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus recommended on 20 May 1998
the grant of his application for amnesty.
'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999,
resolved to approve the recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board.
'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA
PATRIARCA under Proclamation No. 724 is hereby GRANTED for
rebellion constituted by the acts detailed above, provided they were
committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June 1988. Let a
Certificate of Amnesty be issued in his favor as soon as this Resolution
becomes final. It shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar
days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed
with the Commission by any party within said period.'"[3]
On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the National
Amnesty Commission, wrote the following letter to the Provincial Prosecutor
of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:
"Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca"
"Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting herewith the
attached copy of RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 granting amnesty to JOSE
N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was accused of the following cases:
"1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"2. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"3. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"4. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"5. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2663 filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief prosecutor of
the province, the opportunity to take whatever action you may deem
appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant of amnesty shall become
final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice,
unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any
party within said period.
"Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process."[4]
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the
National Amnesty Commission, requested information as to whether or not a
motion for reconsideration was filed by any party, and the action, if there was
any, taken by the NAC.[5]
In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other
things, that there has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party.[6]
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under
Proclamation No. 724 dated May 17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No. 347
dated March 25, 1994.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
"Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons
who shall apply therefor and who have or may have committed crimes, on or
before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political beliefs, whether punishable
under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited to
the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal
to commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers
or employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to
commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association;
direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in
authority or agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of public
order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances; alarms
and scandals; illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives,
committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62
(absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress
mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer
and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War; Provided,
That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for
personal ends."
8
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or
other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants
to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations.[7] Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the
offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely
as though he had committed no offense.[8]
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes
the penalty and all its effects.
Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,[11] Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and
2664, which are both filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon,[12] are ordered DISMISSED. The release of Jose N. Patriarca who
is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon is likewise
ORDERED unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his
compliance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.

In the case of People vs. Casido,[9] the difference between pardon and
amnesty is given:

"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act

which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be
guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward
and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for
that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office,
or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised
Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the
law precisely as though he had committed no offense."

This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-
appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It
serves to put an end to the appeal.[10]

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the

Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No.
2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca,
Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

9
3.) SECOND DIVISION the Quezon City Prosecutors Office. During the preliminary investigation,
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., G.R. No. 167571 only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.[6] Tongson claimed
Petitioner, that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since
Present: petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latters personal capacity.
Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent
QUISUMBING, J., various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was
TINGA, not Cawilis business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal
VELASCO, JR., and cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he
BRION, JJ. had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, said checks had been falsified.
RAMON C. TONGSON and
RODRIGO G. CAWILI, Promulgated: To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing
Respondents. Tongsons signatures, which were purportedly the same as the
November 25, 2008 those appearing on the checks.[7] He also showed a copy of an affidavit of
adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawilis business
associate.[8]
DECISION
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,[9] City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V.
TINGA, J.: Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges
against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of
Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper
This is a Petition for Review[1] of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,[10] after finding that it was
dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had
dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.s (petitioners) petition for certiorari and his deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the
subsequent motion for reconsideration.[2] preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case
The facts, as culled from the records, follow. against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money
amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was
his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor denied for lack of merit.
of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all
three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the
either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutors resolution. In her
made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 resolution,[11] ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed
May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.[3] pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,[12] which provides that violations
penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20
Tongson[4] for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)[5] before January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the

10
Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more
than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been
filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him
had already prescribed.[13] Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of
the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be
sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not
the investigating prosecutor.[14] Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson
had no dealings with petitioner.[15]
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel
A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.[16]Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,[17] the DOJ, this time
through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor
and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint with the prosecutors office interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.[18] Thus, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate
informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. [19] On 8 July
2003, the City Prosecutors Office filed an information[20] charging petitioner
with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[21]
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,[22] the DOJ, presumably
acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that
the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered the withdrawal of the
three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Tongson. In
justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies
to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for
the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide
for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326
applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the
prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.[23] The DOJ also cited the case
of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,[24] wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the
proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial
proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutors office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari[25] before the Court of Appeals
assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioners failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-
forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution
of the DOJ attached to the petition is a mere photocopy.[26] Petitioner moved
for the reconsideration of the appellate courts resolution, attaching to said
motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.[27] Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion, stating
that subsequentcompliance with the formal requirements would not per
se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals
added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein
are too unsubstantial to require consideration.[28]
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed
grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that
the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too
unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,[29] states that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also
reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law
which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in
four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that
the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No.
3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and
the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. [30]
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the
Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the verification being
intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are
true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a
11
deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect
being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. [31]
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correctthe court may
simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive
strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be
served,[32] as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching
the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or
duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution
of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution
dated 9 August 2004,[33] a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex
A.[34] Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJs reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,[35] a case involving
the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive
period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to
petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan,[36] wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint
with the fiscals office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of
the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly
involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner
notes.[37] He argues that sustaining the DOJs and the Court of
Appeals pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the
delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control. [38]
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to
Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law
applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own
prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x
x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than
one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An
offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under
Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from
the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only
the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December
1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment,[39] and the prevailing rule at
the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. [40]
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is
illuminating.[41] Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time
when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at
the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada[42] and People v. Joson,[43] is
that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the
filing of the complaint signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.[44] These cases
were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao[45] that the
first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes the
nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the
offense.[46] Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,[47] we held that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
12
the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In
addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may
only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the
initial step of the proceedings against the offender, [48] and hence, the
prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan[49] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[50] which
involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are
both special laws, the Court ruled that the
prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case
of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation,
et al.,[51] the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act,[52] another special law, is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus
effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case[53] is instructive,
thus:
While it may be observed that the term judicial proceedings in Sec. 2 of Act
No. 3326 appears before investigation and punishment in the old law, with
the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term proceedings should now be understood either executive or
judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and
judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification,
any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person
which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.[54]
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. [55] A clear
example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit
on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He
likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the
dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed
periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with
the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ
issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had
elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioners control. After all, he had
already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August
1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJs flip-flopping resolutions
and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those
who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not
be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
beyond their control, like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner s filing
of his complaintaffidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24
August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover,
since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the
claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the
information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August
2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
13
4.) Republic of the Philippines Order[4] dated July 23, 1999 which denied petitioner's Motion for
Supreme Court Reconsideration.
Manila
THIRD DIVISION The facts:
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION G.R. NO. 140231
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative
(PCGG), represented by ORLANDO Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
L. SALVADOR, Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans,
Petitioner, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions
Present: to be pursued thereby.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61
Chairperson, expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ. The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a behest
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, loan, to wit: a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is
Office of the Ombudsman-Manila, undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government
CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE PNB officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of
REYNALDO TUASON, CARLOS use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate
CAJELO, JOSE BARQUILLO, JR., layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being
LORETO SOLSONA, PRIMICIAS sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.
BANAGA, JOHN DOES, and
NORTHERN COTABATO SUGAR Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group
INDUSTRIES, INC. (NOCOSII), Promulgated: (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
Respondents. July 9, 2007
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan
transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from
DECISION PNB as behest because of NOCOSIIsinsufficient capital and inadequate
collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the
PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered
The Presidential Commission on Good Government[1] (petitioner) filed the collateral or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the
herein Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the
the Resolution[2] dated May 21, 1999 of Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President
OMB No. 0-95-0890 which dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint for Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 [3] against as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB;
concerned members of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Board of Directors that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty
and Northern Cotabato Sugar Industries, Inc. (NOCOSII) officers, namely: was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.
Reynaldo Tuason, Carlos Cajelo, Jose Barquillo, Jr.,
Loreto Solsona, Primicias Banaga and John Does (respondents); and the

14
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador,
petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint
against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the
following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxx
e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx
g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before
the the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda
S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence.
In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-
Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents
and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the
recommendation on May 21, 1999.[5]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[6] but it was denied by GIO
Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by
Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.[7]
Forthwith, petitioner elevated the case to this Court and in support of its
petition alleges that:
A) The Respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint filed by the
Petitioner on the ground of Prescription considering that:
1. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER BEHEST LOANS AS
ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER ARTICLE XI,
SECTION 15, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
2. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A TRUSTEE TO
THE PREJUDICE OF THE BENEFICIARY;
3. THE OFFENSES CHARGED ARE IN THE NATURE OF
CONTINUING CRIMES AS THE STATE CONTINUES TO SUFFER
INJURY ON EACH DAY OF DEFAULT IN PAYMENT. HENCE,
PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT APPLY;
4. PRESCRIPTION AS A MATTER OF DEFENSE MUST BE PLEADED,
OTHERWISE, IT IS DEEMED WAIVED;
5. PRESCRIPTION HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN THIS CASE. SINCE
IT MAY BE WAIVED OR MAY NOT BE SET IN DEFENSE, THE
OMBUDSMAN CANNOT MOTU PROPRIODISMISS THE COMPLAINT
ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION;
6. ARTICLE 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH ADOPTS THE
DISCOVERY RULE SHALL APPLY IN THIS CASE;
7. THE LOAN CONTRACT AS OTHER LOAN TRANSACTIONS IN
THE NATURE OF BEHEST LOANS ARE KEPT SECRET. [8]
B) The respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in not finding that a probable cause exists
for violation by the private respondents of section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019
despite the presence of clear, overwhelming and unrebutted evidence.[9]
In its Comment, the Ombudsman, without delving on the issue of
prescription, in view of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto (1999),[10] contends that its finding of insufficiency
of evidence or lack of probable cause against respondents deserves great
weight and respect, and must be accorded full weight and credit.
No comment was filed by the rest of the respondents.
15

The issue before the Court is whether the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that: (a) the offense leveled against respondents
has prescribed; and (b) no probable cause exists against respondents.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the subject complaint on the ground of prescription.
Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors and Officers of
NOCOSII are charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019, a special
law. Amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,[11] increased
the prescriptive period from ten to fifteen years.
The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2
of Act No. 3326,[12] as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The issue of prescription has long been laid to rest in the
aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto,[13] where the Court held:
x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned
transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned
connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree
with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with
which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed
from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission.
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase if the same not be known in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean lack of knowledge but that the
crime is not reasonably knowable is unacceptable, as it provides an
interpretation that defeats or negates the intent of the law, which is written in
a clear and unambiguous language and thus provides no room for
interpretation but only application.[14]
The Court reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (2001),[15] thus:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the
February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of
the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made (PCGG
vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 767; Domingo
v. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no
person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus,
the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of
discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph
of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that prescription is
interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.[16]
Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992. The
complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5,
1995,[17] or within three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing
of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it
must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether
there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. [18] Settled is the rule
that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.[19] Said exercise of powers is based
upon his constitutional mandate[20] and the courts will not interfere in its
exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions
seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the
courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to
16
review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time
they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.[21]
While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in
the prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for
the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4)
when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where
the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when
double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction
over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied, [22] none apply
here.
After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner,
the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.[23] The exercise of power must have been
done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[24]
The disquisition of GIO Diaz-Salcedo, in dismissing the criminal complaint,
as approved by Ombudsman Desierto, is worth-quoting, thus:
Taking into consideration the provisions of Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61, the subject transactions can not be classified as
behest.
Evaluation of the records of this case reveals that the loans acquired by
NOCOSII are actually foreign loans from Midland Bank Ltd.
of London. There were no direct loans released by PNB but merely credit
accommodations to guaranty the loans from Midland Bank.
Anent complainant's claim that the collaterals offered by NOCOSII are
insufficient, it should be noted that under PNB Board Resolution No. 689
dated July 30, 1975, one of the conditions imposed to NOCOSII was the
execution of contract assigning all NOCOSII's share of sugar and molasses to
PNB. NOCOSII was also required to increase its paid up capital
at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980 or a total
of P25,000,000.00. In addition thereto, the stockholders of NOCOSII were
required to pledge or assign all their present and future shares to PNB while
the accommodation remains standing. The proposed plant site which was
offered as collateral was estimated to cost P307,903,000.00. The foregoing
collaterals offered by NOCOSII are more than sufficient to cover the loans
of P333,465,260.00.
Furthermore, since the loan was approved by PNB, it presupposes that all the
required clearances were submitted by NOCOSII including the clearance
from the Office of the President; and having complied with all the
documentary requirements, NOCOSII became entitled to the release of the
loan.
Complainant further alleged that NOCOSII was undercapitalized because its
paid up capital was only P50,000,000.00. Complainant, however, failed to
consider the other assets of NOCOSII which also form part of its
capital. x x x[25]
The finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause by the
Ombudsman is borne out by the evidence presented by petitioner: firstly,
there were no direct loans released by PNB but merely credit
accommodations to guaranty NOCOSII's foreign loans from Midland Bank
Ltd. of London; secondly, NOCOSII effectively came under government
control since 1975 when PNB acquired a majority of the voting rights in
NOCOSII and was given the power to appoint a comptroller
therein; thirdly, PNB's credit accommodations to NOCOSII between 1975
and 1981 in the aggregate sum of P333,465,260.00 were sufficiently secured
by: (1) the Assignment of Subscription Rights and/or Pledge of Shares dated
September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII officers pledged their shares of stock,
representing 90% of NOCOSII's subscribed capital stock, and assigned their
subscription rights to future stocks in favor of PNB;[26] (2) the Deed of
Assignment dated September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII assigned its share
of sugar and molasses from the operation of its sugar central located
at Barrio Mateo, Matalam, North Cotabato in favor of PNB;[27] (3) the Joint
and Solidary Agreement dated September 5, 1975 whereby the NOCOSII
officers bound themselves jointly and severally liable with the corporation
for the payment of NOCOSII's obligations to PNB;[28] (4) the Real Estate
Mortgage dated October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various
17
buildings, machineries and equipments, otherwise known as the NOCOSII
Sugar Mill Plant, with an estimated value of P307,593,000.00 in favor of
PNB;[29] and (5) the Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney dated October
2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various transportation, agricultural
and heavy equipment in favor of the PNB;[30] fourthly, PNB imposed other
conditions, such as, (1) the submission by NOCOSII of the Central Bank's
approval of its foreign loans; (2) the submission by NOCOSII of the required
clearances from the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)
and/or Presidential Committee on Sugar Industry (PHILSUGIN); (3)
submission by NOCOSII of its milling contracts covering a total area of not
less than 14,000 hectares; (4) submission by NOCOSII of the government
permit that the planters can cultivate the required hectarage; (5) further
increase in NOCOSII's total paid-in capital to P25,000,000.00
at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980; (6)
deposit in NOCOSII's account with the PNB of all cash proceeds
of NOCOSII's foreign loans the disposition of which shall be subject to the
bank's control; and, (7) designation by the PNB of its own representatives
in NOCOSII's Board of Directors and its own comptroller who shall have the
authority to control all disbursements and receipts of funds of NOCOSII. [31]
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is
no basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of
the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsmans
ruling, that decision will not be overturned.[32]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the

assailed Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the
Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

18
5.) Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 158131 August 8, 2007
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JOSE V. MARTEL, OLGA S.
MARTEL, and SYSTEMS AND ENCODING
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 filed by the Social Security System (petitioner)
of the Decision2 dated 17 October 2002 and Resolution dated 5 May 2003 of
the Court of Appeals. The Decision of 17 October 2002 affirmed the ruling
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing petitioner’s complaint against
respondents Jose V. Martel, Olga S. Martel and five other individuals3 for
violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of Republic Act
No. 1161 (RA 1161),4 as amended by Republic Act No. 8282 (RA
8282),5 for non-remittance of contributions to petitioner. The 5 May 2003
Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Respondents Jose V. Martel and Olga S. Martel (respondent Martels) are
directors of respondent Systems and Encoding Corporation (SENCOR), an
information technology firm, with respondent Jose V. Martel serving as
Chairman of the Board of Directors. Petitioner is a government-owned and
controlled corporation mandated by its charter, RA 1161, to provide financial
benefits to private sector employees. SENCOR is covered by RA 1161, as
amended by RA 8282, Section 22 of which requires employers like
SENCOR to remit monthly contributions to petitioner representing the share
of the employer and its employees.
In 1998, petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office a complaint
against respondent Martels and their five co-accused (docketed as I.S. No.
98-L-1534) for SENCOR’s non-payment of contributions amounting
to P6,936,435.80 covering the period January 1991 to May 1997. To pay this
amount, respondent Martels offered to assign to petitioner a parcel of land in
Tagaytay City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26340 issued
under respondent Martels’ name. Petitioner accepted the offer "subject to the
condition that x x x [respondent Martels] will x x x settle their obligation
either by way of dacion en pago or through cash settlement within a
reasonable time x x x."6 Thus, petitioner withdrew its complaint from the
Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office but reserved its right to revive the same "in
the event that no settlement is arrived at." Accordingly, the Pasay City
Prosecutor’s Office dismissed I.S. No. 98-L-1534.
In December 2001, respondent Jose V. Martel wrote petitioner offering, in
lieu of the Tagaytay City property, computer-related services. The record
does not disclose petitioner’s response to this new offer but on 7 December
2001, petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office another
complaint against respondent Martels and their five co-accused (docketed as
I.S. No. 00-L-7142) for SENCOR’s non-remittance of contributions, this
time from February 1991 to October 2000 amounting to P21,148,258.30.
In their counter-affidavit, respondent Martels and their co-accused alleged
that petitioner is estopped from holding them criminally liable since
petitioner had accepted their offer to assign the Tagaytay City property as
payment of SENCOR’s liability. Thus, according to the accused, the
relationship between SENCOR and petitioner was "converted" into an
ordinary debtor-creditor relationship through novation.
The Ruling of the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office
In the Resolution of 28 February 2001, Pasay City Assistant Prosecutor
Artemio Puti (Prosecutor Puti) found probable cause to indict respondent
Martels for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of
RA 1161, as amended by RA 8282.7 Prosecutor Puti rejected respondent
Martels’ claim of "negation" of criminal liability by novation, holding that
(1) SENCOR’s criminal liability was already "consummated" before
respondent Martels offered to pay SENCOR’s liability and (2) the dacion en
pago involving the Tagaytay City property did not materialize. Prosecutor
Puti noted that respondent Martels did not dispute petitioner’s claim on
SENCOR’s non-remittance of contributions.8 Accordingly, the Pasay City
Prosecutor’s Office filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City the
corresponding Information against respondent Martels, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 01-0517.
Respondent Martels appealed to the DOJ.
The Ruling of the Department of Justice
19
In the Resolution dated 18 May 2001 signed by DOJ Undersecretary Manuel
A.J. Teehankee, the DOJ granted respondent Martels’ appeal, set aside
Prosecutor Puti’s Resolution of 28 February 2001, and ordered the
withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 01-0517. The DOJ
found that respondent Martels and petitioner entered into a compromise
agreement before the filing of the Information in Criminal Case No. 01-0517
and that such "negated" any criminal liability on respondent Martels’ part.
The DOJ Resolution pertinently reads:
From the facts obtaining, it cannot be denied that the dismissal of the first
complaint docketed as I.S. No. 98-L-1534 constituted the compromise
agreement between the parties whereby complainant SSS agreed to
respondents’ mode of settling their liability through a "dacion en pago".
Consequently, the original relation between the parties was converted to that
of an ordinary creditor-debtor relationship thereby extinguishing the original
obligation by a new one. Complainant, therefore, cannot insist on the original
trust it had with respondents existing prior to the dismissal of the former
complaint (I.S. No. 98-L-1534) by filling [sic] the present complaint (I.S. No.
00-L-7142 now subject of this appeal). Incidentally, this Office considers the
latter complaint as a mere refilling [sic] of the former already compromised
and dismissed [complaint], because of the similarity of the parties and causes
of action.
After the dismissal of the complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-1534 and prior to the
filing of the complaint at bar docketed as 00-L-7142, respondents have
exerted great effort towards complying with the terms and conditions of the
compromise by way of "dacion en pago". For example, respondents cite their
arrangement for ocular inspection of the Tagaytay land by the Presidential
Commission on Tagaytay-Taal and with the Municipal Engineer of Laurel,
Batangas. The approval of the said commission to build a 12-storey building
had been complied with. This is not disputed by complainant. Access roads
were acquired by respondents from adjacent owners, ready to be titled in
complainant’s name. Papers and permits like ecological impact certification,
site resurvey, soil test and site appraisal were secured from various offices
like the Municipality of Laurel, the Municipal Engineer, the Presidential
Commission on Tagaytay-Taal, the Philippine Volcanology Commission, the
Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture, among others.
On the part of complainant, it equally shows [sic] adherence to the agreement
to compromise. Records show that on October 1999, one of its officers, Atty.
Mariano Pablo S. Tolentino, assistant vice-president, had expressed in
writing his finding to the effect that "(they) are satisfied to see the lot that
(respondents) have negotiated with Congressman Dumpit that (respondents)
offered as access road to (respondents[’]) property" (Annex "8" of Petition
for Review). And, as borne by the records, a Dacion En Pago Committee had
been created by complainant SSS precisely to set the mechanism of the
settlement in motion. Further, respondents proposed an alternative mode of
settlement through computer-related services, which proposal was submitted
to complainant as late as December 1, 2000.
Verily, the foregoing facts indelibly show that the parties had acted with an
obvious intention to compromise. Hence, respondents’ reliance on the
doctrine of incipient criminal liability had [sic] factual and legal bases. While
the rule provides that novation does not extinguish criminal liability, this
rule, however holds true only if a criminal information is already filed in
court. Before that bench mark point, the criminal liability is only at its
incipient stage and the new relation between the parties forged at such stage
had the effect of negating the criminal liability of the offender (People vs.
Galsim, People vs. Trinidad, 53 OG 731). x x x x
In fine, the compromise agreement between the parties whereby respondents’
obligation will be settled through a "dacion en pago" and the dismissal of the
complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-1534 has [sic] all the earmarks of novation
negating respondents’ criminal liability. Ergo, complainant is precluded from
filing the present criminal complaint against respondents.9
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the DOJ denied its motion in the
Resolution of 20 September 2001.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 17 October 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DOJ’s
rulings and dismissed petitioner’s petition. The appellate court deferred to the
DOJ’s power to review rulings of prosecutors and held that in reversing
Prosecutor Puti’s findings, the DOJ did not act with grave abuse of
discretion.10
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the appellate court denied its motion in
the Resolution of 5 May 2003.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the DOJ’s rulings because (1) respondent Martels were charged not
with Estafa but with violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section
28(e) of RA 1161, as amended, a special law impressed with public interest;
20
(2) petitioner did not agree to settle respondent Martels’ criminal liability;
and (3) novation serves only to negate civil, but not criminal, liability.
In their Comment, respondent Martels countered that the DOJ correctly
applied the concept of novation as they had settled SENCOR’s liability.
Respondent Martels added that as of the filing of their Comment, they had
already paid P17,887,442.54 of SENCOR’s liability.
In its Reply, petitioner contended that although respondent Martels attempted
to pay SENCOR’s overdue contributions through dacion en pago, no
payment took place, as evidenced by respondent Martels’ alternative offer to
provide computer related services to petitioner instead of assigning the
Tagaytay City realty. On respondent Martels’ partial payment of SENCOR’s
liability, petitioner contended that such does not preclude the resolution of
this petition.
The Issue
The issue is whether the concept of novation serves to abate the prosecution
of respondent Martels for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to
Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the negative and accordingly grant the petition.
The Concept of Novation Finds No Application Here
Novation, a civil law concept relating to the modification of
obligations,11 takes place when the parties to an existing contract execute a
new contract which either changes the object or principal condition of the
original contract, substitutes the person of the debtor, or subrogates a third
person in the rights of the creditor.12 The effect is either to modify or
extinguish the original contract. In its extinctive form, the new obligation
replaces the original, extinguishing the obligor’s obligations under the old
contract.13
This Court first recognized the possibility of applying the concept of
novation to criminal cases in People v. Nery,14involving a case for Estafa. In
that case, the Court observed that although novation is not one of the means
recognized by the Revised Penal Code to extinguish criminal liability, 15 it
may "prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature
of the original basic transaction," provided the novation takes place before
the filing of the Information with the trial court. We held:
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the criminal
information in court by the state prosecutors because up to that time the
original trust relation may be converted by the parties into an ordinary
creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the complainant in estoppel to insist
on the original trust. But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of
the crime and instituted action in court, the offended party may no longer
divest the prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, as
distinguished from the civil. The crime being an offense against the state,
only the latter can renounce it x x x.
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means
recognized by the Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be
extinguished; hence, the role of novation may only be to either prevent
the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the
original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that its breach
would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is
made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to x x
x.16(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, novation has been invoked to reverse convictions in cases where an
underlying contract initially defined the relation of the parties such as the
contract in sale on commission in Estafa cases 17 or the contract in sale of
goods in cases of violation of the Trust Receipts Law.18 Further, the party
invoking novation must prove that the new contract did indeed take effect.19
The facts of this case negate the application of novation. In the first place,
there is, between SENCOR and petitioner, no original contract that can be
replaced by a new contract changing the object or principal condition of the
original contract, substituting the person of the debtor, or subrogating a third
person in the rights of the creditor. The original relationship between
SENCOR and petitioner is defined by law – RA 1161, as amended – which
requires employers like SENCOR to make periodic contributions to
petitioner under pain of criminal prosecution. Unless Congress enacts a law
further amending RA 1161 to give employers a chance to settle their overdue
contributions to prevent prosecution, no amount of agreements between
petitioner and SENCOR (represented by respondent Martels) can change the
nature of their relationship and the consequence of SENCOR’s non-payment
of contributions.
The indispensability of a prior contractual relation between the complainant
and the accused as requisite for the application of novation in criminal cases
was underscored in People v. Tanjutco.20 In that case, the accused, who was
charged with Qualified Theft, invoked People v. Nery to support his claim
21
that the complainant’s acceptance of partial payment of the stolen funds
before the filing of the Information with the trial court converted his liability
into a civil obligation thus rendering baseless his prosecution. The Court
rejected this claim and held that unlike in Nery, there was, in that case, no
prior "contractual relationship or bilateral agreement, which can be modified
or altered by the parties," thus:
Reliance on the aforecited Nery case, in support of the contention that the
acceptance by complainant of payment converted the liability of the accused-
appellant into a civil obligation or else that it estopped said complainant from
proceeding with the prosecution of the case, is misplaced and unwarranted.
[I]n the Nery case, which is an action for estafa, there
was contractual relationship between the parties that can be validly
novated by the settlement of the obligation of the offender. Whatever
was said in that case, therefore, cannot be invoked in the present case
where no contractual relationship or bilateral agreement, which can be
modified or altered by the parties, is involved. There is here merely a
taking of the complainant’s property by one who never acquired
juridical possession thereof, qualified by grave abuse of
confidence.21 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
Similarly, there is here merely an employer’s failure to pay its contributions
to a government corporation as mandated by that corporation’s charter.
Secondly, as Prosecutor Puti correctly noted, the agreement between
petitioner and respondent Martels for the latter to pay SENCOR’s overdue
contributions through the assignment to petitioner of a piece of realty never
materialized. Petitioner’s acceptance of respondent Martels’ offer was
subject to a suspensive condition that "x x x [private] respondents will x x x
settle their obligation either by way of dacion en pago or through cash
settlement within a reasonable time x x x." This condition was not met
because three years after respondent Martels’ offer, petitioner did not receive
any payment. In fact, respondent Jose Martel, at that point, changed the terms
of the supposed settlement by offering computer-related services instead of
assigning the Tagaytay City realty. In their Comment to the petition,
respondent Martels explained that they made such alternative offer because
"the processing of the papers for the Tagaytay property met with some
delay."22 In short, respondent Martels failed to make good on their promise in
1998 to settle SENCOR’s liability through dacion en pago. The
circumstances the DOJ cited as proof of the compromise agreement’s alleged
implementation were nothing but steps preparatory to the actual payment of
SENCOR’s overdue contributions.
In sum, we hold that any payment respondent Martels would have made to
petitioner (and it appears that pending this petition, respondent Martels
partially paid SENCOR’s liability) only affects their civil, if any, but not
their criminal liability for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to
Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended. As noted in the Resolution dated 28
February 2001 of the Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office, respondent Martels do
not dispute SENCOR’s non-remittance of contributions from February 1991
to October 2000. Thus, the existence of probable cause against respondent
Martels, SENCOR’s directors,23 is beyond doubt.
Prosecutors’ Findings Not Conclusive
In dismissing petitioner’s petition, the Court of Appeals held:
[T]his Court has no power to determine whether probable cause to warrant
prosecution exist or not. x x x [T]he determination of whether or not
probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of [respondent
Martels] should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice as
reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutor x x x.
In this Petition, We are being asked to assume the function of Public
Prosecutor by determining whether probable cause exists or not. Such is a
function that this Court should not be called upon to perform x x x. 24
This is a misstatement of the law. This Court and the Court of Appeals
possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary
investigations.25 Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of
deference to the prosecutor’s findings,26 courts should never shirk from
exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine
whether the prosecutor’s findings are supported by the facts, or as in this
case, by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of
the judiciary, exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant
statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the
exercise of this Court’s review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable
criminals are prosecuted27 and, on the other hand, the innocent are spared
from baseless prosecution.28
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision
dated 17 October 2002 and Resolution dated 5 May 2003 of the Court of
Appeals. We REINSTATE the Resolution dated 28 February 2001 of the
Pasay City Prosecutor’s Office. SO ORDERED.
22
6.) SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION In its Comment,[3] the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the
BENJAMIN (KOKOY) T. G.R. Nos. 165510-33 informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that
ROMUALDEZ, petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new
Petitioner, Present: informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause
Quisumbing, in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and
Carpio, and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the
Azcuna, JJ. prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article
in his official capacity as the Ombudsman, 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Promulgated: For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment[4] that, in accordance with the
Respondents. 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the
July 28, 2006 Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the
petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or
RESOLUTION the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run
when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code,
which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
For resolution is petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[1] assailing the
Decision dated September 23, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states: The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 12, nullity; and (2) whether the offenses for which petitioner are being charged
2004 and September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, are have already prescribed.
AFFIRMED.
Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the
[2]
SO ORDERED. preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case
Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid proceeding despite the previous dismissal
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its thereof by the Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution[5] dated February 10,
discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for 2004 which reads:
violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ
aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. Nos.
prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is 143618-41, entitled Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez vs. The Honorable
no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a Sandiganbayan (First Division, et al.) promulgated on July 30, 2002 annulled
quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031- and set aside the orders issued by this Court on June 8, 2000 which, among
28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04- others, denied the accuseds motion to quash the informations in these cases;
23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on that in particular the above-mentioned Decision ruled that the herein
the ground of prescription. informations may be quashed because the officer who filed the same had no

23
authority to do so; and that the said Decision has become final and executory
on November 29, 2002, these cases are considered DISMISSED. Let these
cases be sent to the archives.
The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan[6] where petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayans Order
dated June 8, 2000 in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 which denied his
Motion to Quash, terminated the preliminary investigation conducted by
Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero and set his arraignment for violations of Section
7 of RA No. 3019 on June 26, 2000.[7] In annulling and setting aside the
aforesaid Order of the Sandiganbayan, we held that:
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable defect
of form, as in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the wording of the certification
in the information was found inadequate, or in People v. Marquez, where the
required certification was absent. Here, the informations were filed by an
unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured even by conducting another
preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no information at all and
cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.[8]
In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan[9] petitioners Motion to
Quash and directed the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429
because the informations were filed by an unauthorized party, hence void.
In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and
applicable. Thus:
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another
prosecution; exception. An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on
the grounds specified in section 3(g) and (i)[10] of this Rule.
An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of
criminal liability or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another
information for a crime constituting the same facts. Indeed, we held in Cudia
v. Court of Appeals[11] that:
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information
in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was
insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the
conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the
consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to
file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar
in petitioners subsequent prosecution. x x x.[12]
Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman in the instant cases was not a violation of petitioners right to be
informed of the charges against him. It is of no moment that the cases
investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those
cases which have already been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429. As we have previously stated:
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for
efficient record keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in
sequential order corresponding to the date and time of filing a case.
This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases
was merely for reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new
docket numbers were assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 x x
x.[13]
Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the
above-referred preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision
in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan[14] when we categorically declared therein
that:
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it
abruptly terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor
Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in G.R. No. 105248 for the
holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that the right
to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a procedural
right. Petitioners right was violated when the preliminary investigation of the
charges against him were conducted by an officer without jurisdiction over
the said cases. It bears stressing that our directive should be strictly complied
with in order to achieve its objective of affording petitioner his right to due
process.[15]
Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first
resolve the question of whether this Court may validly take cognizance of
and resolve the aforementioned issue considering that as we have said in the
assailed Decision, this case has never progressed beyond the filing of the
informations against the petitioner[16] and that it is only prudent that evidence
be gathered through trial on the merits to determine whether the offense
24
charged has already prescribed.[17] We reconsider our stance and shall rule in
the affirmative.
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time
before he enters his plea, move to quash the complaint and information[18] on
the ground that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished,[19] which ground includes the defense of prescription
considering that Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates
prescription as one of those grounds which totally extinguishes criminal
liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal
case, the accused can very well invoke the defense of prescription.
Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject
criminal cases have prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v.
Sandiganbayan[20] that:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following
should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted.[21]
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for
failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-
1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and
for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall
prescribe in 15 years. Significantly, this Court already declared in the case
of People v. Pacificador[22] that:
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No.
3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the
prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only
ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as
provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does
not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable
to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive
effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years
from January 6, 1976.[23]
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up
to March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand,
for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period
from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No.
3326 which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by
and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
In the case of People v. Duque,[24] we construed the aforequoted provision,
specifically the rule on the running of the prescriptive period as follows:
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or
should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read
as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof;"
or as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and until institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment." (Emphasis supplied)[25]
Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein
began to run from the discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date
of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
against the petitioner with the PCGG.
In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v. Desierto[26] this Court already took note that:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the
February 1986 EDSA Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
25
we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not have known of
the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made. Moreover,
no person would have dared to question the legality of those
transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from
the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation
by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans. [27]
However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from
the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive
period for the alleged offenses from running.
We disagree.
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence
of the offender from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive
period. The silence of the law can only be interpreted to mean that Section 2
of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the prescription unlike
the explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as previously held:
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such
an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the
details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat.
Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of the interpretation, enlarge the scope of
a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law
what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature
would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission. [28]
The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with
the PCGG in 1987 as well as the filing of the informations with the
Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 in 1989
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when the
Ombudsman directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit on March 3,
2004, the offenses have already prescribed.
Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person. However, there is
no such proceeding instituted against the petitioner to warrant the tolling of
the prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[29] petitioner averred that PCGG acted
without jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in conducting a
preliminary investigation of cases not falling within its competence.[30] This
Court, in its resolve to deal with the merits of the case to remove the
possibility of any misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes
petitioners cases in the Sandiganbayan to take[31]declared invalid
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses
ascribed to Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of assets and
liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction of said offenses.[32]
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[33] petitioner assailed the validity of the
informations filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 considering that the same were subscribed and filed by the PCGG. In
granting petitioners plea, this Court held, thus:
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect
cannot be cured by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid
information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal
proceedings.[34]
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General
Chavez in 1987 with the PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in
1989 is judicially settled. In contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist
that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription
is that which is filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate
body or office. Thus, in the case of People v. Maravilla,[35] this Court ruled
that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes of
preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of
prescription. Similarly, in the case of Llenes v. Dicdican,[36] this Court held
that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with the Ombudsman
tolled the running of the period of prescription.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the
PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the
prescriptive periods.
However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the
offenses charged against the petitioner could not have prescribed because the
latter was absent from the Philippines from 1986 to April 27, 2000 and thus
the prescriptive period did not run from the time of discovery on May 8,
26
1987, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that [t]he
term of prescription should not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago.
Mr. Justice Carpio argues that
Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 x x x supplementary to
[special laws], unless the latter should x x x provide the contrary. Nothing in
RA 3019 prohibits the supplementary application of Article 91 to that law.
Hence, applying Article 91, the prescriptive period in Section 11 of RA 3019,
before and after its amendment, should run only after petitioner returned to
this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the
RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions
since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied
suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases where the special
laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article
10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this
Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of the
Majority Opinion and argues that
The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own
prosecution by the simple expedient of escaping from the States jurisdiction.
x x x An accused cannot acquire legal immunity by being a fugitive from the
States jurisdiction. x x x.
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this
jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the
accused to the detriment of the States ability to investigate and prosecute
crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel, this Court should
not encourage individuals facing investigation or prosecution for violation of
special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the prescriptive
period. The majority opinion unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for such
anomalous practice.
With all due respect, we beg to disagree.
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which
are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to
the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law
such as RA No. 3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and
all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his Dissenting Opinion that
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the
RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions
since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied
suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases where the special
laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article
10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this
Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the
Revised Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds
relevance only when the provisions of the special law are silent on a
particular matter as evident from the cases cited and relied upon in the
Dissenting Opinion:
In the case of People v. Moreno,[37] this Court, before ruling that the
subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code may be
applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that the
defendant can be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung,[38] this Court applied the rules on the
service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in
favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of RA No.
6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack of similar
rules under the special law.
In the case of People v. Chowdury,[39] the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and
19 of the Revised Penal Code to define the
words principal, accomplices and accessories under RA No. 8042 or
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not
defined therein although it referred to the same terms in enumerating the
persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
27
In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or
not the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents or tolls the
running of the prescriptive period is more apparent than real.
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was
already in effect as early as December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof
categorically defines special acts as acts defining and penalizing violations
of the law not included in the Penal Code.
Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto,[40] this Court was categorical in ruling that
The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the
Revised Penal Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized
under special laws, Act No. 3326 applies.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run
from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of
the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly,
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused
from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus,
the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the
legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the
accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive
period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To elaborate, -
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This
rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters,
it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning
and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. [41]
Had the legislature intended to include the accuseds absence from
the Philippines as a ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period in
special laws, the same could have been expressly provided in Act No.
3326. A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 where
the legislature made its intention clear and was thus categorical that
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code All
violations of any provision of this Code shall prescribe after five (5) years.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty persons and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills
the so-called gap in Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the
operation of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019, Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied in cases where the
accused is absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would
supplement Act No. 3326.
This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code
suppletory to special laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the
ambit of special law as contemplated and used in Article 10 of the RPC.
In the case of United States v. Serapio,[42] the Court had the occasion to
interpret the term special laws mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code of
the Philippines, which is now Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as
referring to penal laws that punish acts not defined and penalized by the
Penal Code of the Philippines. Thus
This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that phrase is
used in article 7 of the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes especiales," as
used in the Penal Code (article 7) have the meaning applied to the phrase
"special laws," as the same is generally used? x x x It is confidently
contended that the phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code
(article 7) is not used with this general signification: In fact, said phrase may
28
refer not to a special law as above defined, but to a general law. A careful
reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that the phrase "leyes especiales"
was not used to signify "special laws" in the general signification of that
phrase. The article, it will be noted, simply says, in effect, that when a crime
is made punishable under some other law than the Penal Code, it (the crime)
is not subject to the provisions of said code.[43]
Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA
No. 3019, the same result would obtain. A conflict will arise from the
contemporaneous application of the two laws. The Revised Penal Code
explicitly states that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall be
a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does
not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it
specifically and directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal
Code shall apply to special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter
do not provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of statutory
construction dictate that special legal provisions must prevail over general
ones.
The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpios reservations about the effects of
ruling that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall not suspend
the running of the prescriptive period. Our duty, however, is only to interpret
the law. To go beyond that and to question the wisdom or effects of the law
is certainly beyond our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already
explained
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such
an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the
details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial
fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope
of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law
what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature
would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission. [44]
Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute of
limitations in favor of the accused only relates to the following issues: (1)
retroactive or prospective application of laws providing or extending the
prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the felony
committed vis--vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the reckoning
of when the prescriptive period runs. Therefore, the aforementioned principle
cannot be utilized to support the Majority Opinions conclusion that the
prescriptive period in a special law continues to run while the accused is
abroad.
We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal
cases equally provides the authority for the rule that the prescriptive period
runs while the accused is outside of Philippine jurisdiction. The nature of the
law on prescription of penal statutes supports this conclusion. In the old but
still relevant case of People v. Moran,[45] this Court extensively discussed the
rationale behind and the nature of prescription of penal offenses
We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to
statutes of limitation in criminal suits the construction that has been given to
statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are
essentially different. In civil suits the statute is interposed by the legislature
as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties. In the construction of
the statute, therefore, there is no intendment to be made in favor of either
party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is therefore no grantor
against whom the ordinary presumptions, of construction are to be made. But
it is, otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the
State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and
declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution.' The statute
is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an
amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over
the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country,
and resume his immunities as a citizen and that from henceforth he may
cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt
are blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally
construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of
construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very
existence of the statute, is a recognition and notification by the legislature of
the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has
assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.
Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting
prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to
public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of
memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be
prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously
maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the
State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure
29
for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained. (Emphasis committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982 prescribed 10 years
supplied) from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged offenses
committed by the petitioner for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.
accruing from the liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal
statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality of the State. Any bar to or Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary
cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot simply investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by
be implied nor derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses
endowment must be directly and expressly sanctioned by the source itself, subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right to
the State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the grantee prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-
thereof, the accused. 28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-
23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on
prescription. The exceptions to the running of or the causes for the WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners Motion for
interruption of the prescriptive periods may and should not be easily Reconsideration is GRANTED. Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending
implied. The prescriptive period may only be prevented from operating or before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860
may only be tolled for reasons explicitly provided by the law. pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
In the case of People v. Pacificador,[46] we ruled that:
SO ORDERED.
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of
the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused
is to be adopted. The said legal principle takes into account the nature of the
law on prescription of crimes which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the
part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case of People v. Moran, this
Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of limitations in criminal
cases, as follows:
The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied,
but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over
the offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and
resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to
preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted
out. Hence, it is that statues of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor
of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to
all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is
a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive
periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.[47]

In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods

in the instant case, were not interrupted by any event from the time they
began to run on May 8, 1987. As a consequence, the alleged offenses

30
7.) Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 100285 August 13, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NAPOLEON DUQUE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Trinidad, Reverente, Makalintal, Cabrera and Monsod Law Office for
accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Appellant Napoleon Duque was charged with and convicted of violating
Section 38 in relation to Section 39 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, known as
The Labor Code of the Philippines. The charge of illegal recruitment was set
out in the information in the following terms:
That on or about and/or sometime in January 1986, at Calamba, Laguna and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused
well knowing that he is not licensed nor authorized by the proper government
agency (POEA) to engage in recruitment of workers for placement abroad,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Glicerio
Teodoro, Agustin Ulat, Ernesto Maunahan, Norma Francisco, Elmo Alcaraz
and Marcelino Desepida as workers abroad exacted and actually received
money from the above-named victims, to their damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law. 1
The evidence in chief of the prosecution consisted principally of the
testimony of the following witnesses: Agustin Ulat, Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino
Desepida and Norma Francisco. Their testimonies were summarized in the
trial court's decision as follows:
. . . sometime in January 1986, he (Agustin Ulat) was invited by the accused
to his house in Calamba, Laguna. Thereat accused informed him that he was
recruiting workers for Saudi Arabia and that he was interested in getting (sic)
him. Accused likewise presented to him that he (accused) was a licensed
recruiter (TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 6-7). The accused told him to secure his
birth certificate, an NBI clearance and medical certificate. He was able to
secure an NBI clearance which he showed to the accused. The latter
thereafter told him that he would secure the rest of his papers like passport,
visa and medical certificate for him and for this, accused asked him to
prepare the amount of P20,000.00. He did not have that money, so he
mortgaged his lot for P20,000.00 to the cousin of the accused, Socorro
Arlata. He immediately gave this amount to the accused who assured him
that he would be able to leave within two months. The accused did not issue
a receipt for that amount despite his request. He did not persist in asking the
accused because he trusted him, accused coming from an affluent family and
a member of a well-known Catholic organization, the "Cursillo" (TSN, 22
Oct. 1990, pp. 4-9). However, accused failed to employ him at Saudi Arabia
within two months despite repeated promise (sic) to do so. Thus, he
demanded the return of his money but accused failed. Finally, he decided,
together with the other complainants, to file a complaint against accused
before the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). . . .
Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco individually
testified to the following: sometime also in January 1986, they went to the
house of accused for work abroad as the latter had earlier told them that he
was recruiting workers for the Saudi Arabia. The accused asked money to
process their papers. Alcaraz was able to give the accused on 22 February
1986 the amount of P5,000.00, but the accused failed to issue him a receipt
and he did not persist in asking for it because he trusted the accused on
(TSN, 5 Nov. 1990, pp. 5-7). Desepida was able to give the accused on 18
Feb. 1986, the amount of P7,000.00 as placement fee for which the accused
did not issue a receipt although he promised to issue one the next day.
However, the following day, when he reminded the accused of the receipt, he
refused saying that he (Desepida) should trust [the accused]. Francisco was
able to give the accused P9,000.00 on 21 February 1986 in the presence of
the other applicants (TSN, 26 Nov. 1990, p. 5). But, the accused again failed
to issue a receipt despite demand. She was told by the accused to trust him
(Ibid., p. 6). However, the accused failed to return their money
notwithstanding. Thus, all of them decided to file a complaint with the POEA
against the accused. There, they executed a joint affidavit (Exh. "A"). 2
During the trial, Duque denied the charges. He controverted the allegation
that he had recruited complainants for overseas employment. He also denied
that he had received any monies in consideration of promised employment.
However, he acknowledged that his house had served as a meeting place for
a certain Delfin and one Engr. Acopado who allegedly were the persons who
had promised complainants, work abroad.
31
On the basis of the positive identification by private complainants of
appellant Duque as the person they had talked to for placement abroad, the
person who had collected fees from them and who had received information
from them needed for arranging their departure for abroad, the trial court
concluded that accused Duque was primarily responsible for promising
placement and inducing private complainants to part with their money. The
prosecution also submitted a certification from the licensing branch of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") stating that no
records existed whatsoever of a grant to the accused of a license or authority
to recruit for overseas employment. The dispositive part of the decision
reads:
Wherefore, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, [of]
violation of [Art.] 38 in relation to [Art.] 39 of P.D. 442 otherwise known as
the Labor Code of the Philippines, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P100,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the offended
parties: Agustin Ulat the amount of P20,000.00; Marcelino Desepida the
amount of P7,000.00; Norma Francisco the amount of P9,000.00; and Elmo
Alcaraz the amount of P3,000.00 and the cost of suit. 3
Before this Court, appellant Duque raises only one (1) issue: that of
prescription of the criminal offense for which he was convicted.
The recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary
recruiting permit or authority form the POEA constitutes a crime penalized,
not by the Revised Penal Code, but rather by a special law, i.e., Article 38 in
relation to Article 290 of the Labor Code. Article 290 of the Labor Code
provides, in relevant part, that:
Art. 290. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations
issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
xxx xxx xxx
The Labor Code, however, does not contain any provisions on the mode of
computation of the three-year prescriptive period it established.
The Solicitor General states, and we agree with him, that Act No. 3326, as
amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin to Run" (emphasis supplied), supplied the
applicable norm. 4 Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, reads as follows:
Section 2: . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
Examination of the abovequoted Section 2 shows that there are two (2) rules
for determining the beginning of the prescriptive period: (a) on the day of the
commission of the violation, if such commission be known; and (b) if the
commission of the violation was not known at the time, then from discovery
thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and
punishment. Appellant Duque contends that the prescriptive period in the
case at bar commenced from the time money in consideration of promises for
overseas employment was parted with by complainants. Duque thus contends
that the prescriptive period began to run sometime in January 1986. The
information was, however, filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Laguna on 22 May 1990, i.e., more than four (4) years later. Duque
concludes that the offense of illegal recruitment had accordingly prescribed
by May 1990.
We are not persuaded. Article 38 of the Labor Code as amended reads as
follows:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to
be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor
and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints
under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall
be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized
in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
32
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such
non-license or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined
that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or
will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the
search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia,
properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the
closure of companies, establishments and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been
licensed or authorized to do so. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that illegal recruitment has two (2) basic elements, to wit: (a)
recruitment activities as listed in Articles 38 and 34 of the Labor Code; and
(b) the lack of the necessary license or authority from the POEA to engage in
such activities. Recruitment for overseas employment is not in itself
necessarily immoral or unlawful. It is the lack of necessary license or permit
that renders such recruitment activities unlawful and criminal. Such lack of
necessary permit or authority, while certainly known to appellant Duque
back in January 1986, was not known to private complainants at that time.
Indeed, private complainants discovered that appellant did not possess such
authority or permit only when they went to the offices of the POEA for the
purpose of filing a claim for return of the money they had delivered to
appellant Duque. Since good faith is always presumed, the complainants
were entitled to assume the appellant Duque was acting in good faith when
he presented himself as a recruiter for overseas placement. Even if it be
assumed arguendo that ordinary prudence required that a person seeking
overseas employment ought to check the authority or status of persons
pretending to be authorized or to speak for a recruitment or placement
agency, the offended parties' failure to do so did not start the running of the
prescriptive period. In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special
laws are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this
reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special law
is not known at the time, then prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act
or acts.
Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act No. 3326 as illogical or absurd. A
literal reading of Section 2 appears to suggest that two (2) elements must
coincide for the beginning of the running of the prescriptive period: first, the
element of discovery of the commission of the violation of the special law;
and second, the "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment." It is then argued by appellant that because the co-existence of
these two (2) requirements is necessary under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the
relevant prescriptive period would never begin to run.
Here appellant has a point. However, it should be noted, firstly, that the
literal reading that appellant suggests, does not benefit appellant, for the
prescriptive period in the case at bar had not in any case been exhausted
since prosecution of appellant commenced only a few months after the
POEA and the complainants had discovered that appellant had no
governmental authority to recruit for overseas work and was merely
pretending to recruit workers for overseas employment and to receive money
therefor, i.e., that appellant did not even attempt to locate employment
abroad for complainants. Secondly, we do not think there is any real need for
such a literal reading of Section 2. As is well-known, initiation of
proceedings for preliminary investigation of the offense normally marks
the interruption of the period of prescription. Under appellant Duque's literal
reading, the prescription period would both begin and be interrupted by the
same occurrence; the net effect would be that the prescription period would
not have effectively begun, having been rendered academic by the
simultaneous interruption of that same period. A statute providing for
prescription of defined criminal offenses is more than a statute of repose and
constitutes an act of grace by which the State, after the lapse of a certain
period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act.
A statute on prescription of crimes is an act of liberality on the part of the
State in favor of the offender. 5 The applicable well-known principles of
statutory interpretation are that statutes must be construed in such a way as to
give effect to the intention of the legislative authority, 6 and so as to give a
sensible meaning to the language of the statute and thus avoid nonsensical or
absurd results, 7 departing to the extent unavoidable from the literal language
of the statute. Appellant's literal reading would make nonsense of Section 2
of Act No. 3326.
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or
should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read
as:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof;
or as:
33
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and until institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. (Emphasis supplied)
We believe and so hold that the applicable prescriptive period in the case at
bar began to run from the time the recruitment activities of appellant Duque
were ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried
out without any license or authority from the government. The discovery by
the complainants and by the POEA was, as a practical matter, simultaneous
in character and occurred sometime in December 1989 when the
complainants went to the POEA with the complaint for recovery of the
placement fees and expenses they had paid to appellant Duque, and the
POEA, acting upon that complaint, discovered and informed the private
complainants that Duque had operated as a recruiter without the essential
government license or authority. Accordingly, the offense of illegal
recruitment had not prescribed when the complaint was filed with the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office in April 1990 and when the information was
filed in court in May 1990.
It is relevant to note that the same result would be reached by
giving supplemental effect to provisions of the Revised Penal Code in the
application of Article 290 of the Labor Code. 8 Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code reads as follows:
Art. 91. Computation of the prescription of offenses. — The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above-quoted Article 91, the prescriptive period in respect of the
offense of illegal recruitment began to run on the date of discovery thereof by
the private complainants and the authorities concerned (POEA) sometime in
December 1989 and was interrupted on 16 April 1990 when the affidavit-
sworn complaint was filed before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, 9 and certainly by May 1990 when the criminal information was
filed in court by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna. Once more,
the appellant's defense of prescription must fail.
Under Section 39 of the Labor Code as amended, the penalty of life
imprisonment is properly imposable where the illegal recruitment is
committed "in large scale," i.e., where it is "committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group." 10 In the case at bar, private
complainants are more than three (3) in number. Moreover, appellant Duque
had represented to the public at large, including private complainants, that he
was a licensed
recruiter. 11 Duque's house served as his business office and he asked the
private complainants to see him in his house. 12There, complainants were
"briefed" as to the requirements for overseas employment before their
supposed departure and were each required to secure a clearance from the
National Bureau of Investigation. 13 Considerable sums were collected from
each of the complainants supposedly to "facilitate" the processing of
passports, medical certificates and other working papers. 14 Complainants
were, in addition, shown documents which purported to be job placement
orders. This organized modus operandi was repeated in respect of each of the
complainants and presumably in respect of other persons who were similarly
victimized by appellant. There is no question that the recruitment activities of
Duque were organized and "large scale" in nature. 15
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the sole modification that the penalty properly
imposable and hereby imposed is life imprisonment and not reclusion
perpetua. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
34