ALCANTARA V.

RETA, 372 SCRA 364 -

Personal Easement
Construction of a house on the lot of another to facilitate the utilization of usufruct may constitute as
personal easement pursuant to Article 614.

FACTS:
Edilberto Alcantara et. al. filed with the RTC, Davao City a complaint against Cornelio B. Reta, Jr. for
the exercise of the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with preliminary
injunction, attorney's fees and nullity of amicable settlement.

Alcantara et. al. claimed that they were tenants or lessees of the land; that the land has been converted
by Reta into a commercial center; and that Reta is threatening to eject them from the land. They assert
that they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of
Presidential Decree No. 1517 since they are legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.

They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble was void ab
initio for being violative of Presidential Decree No. 1517.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517.

HELD:
No right of first refusal. The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone
(ULRZ). In fact, Alcantara et. al. filed a petition with the National Housing Authority requesting that
the land they were occupying be declared as an ULRZ. On May 27, 1986, the request was referred to
Mr. Jose L. Atienza, General Manager, National Housing Authority, for appropriate action. The request
was further referred to acting mayor Zafiro Respicio, Davao City, as per 2nd Indorsement dated July 1,
1986. Clearly, the request to have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the
property was an ULRZ.

Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as "The Urban Land Reform Act," pertains to areas
proclaimed as Urban Land Reform Zones.11 Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the
said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ.

To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one must
be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the
land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Obviously, those who do
not fall within the said category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to
the right of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the land decide to sell the same at
a reasonable price within a reasonable time.

Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from
where he gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Usufruct
gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance,
unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.

Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his gathering
of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code.
Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the conclusion would still be the same since the
agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, petitioner Roble is not a legitimate tenant as
defined by Presidential Decree No. 1517.

SOLID MANILA CORP. vs. BIO HONG

TRADING CO.- Easement and Servitudes
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenement of which they form part, and even if they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, they cannot be alienated from the tenement or mortgaged
separately.

Note: In a personal servitude, there is no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement
pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. (Merger, which
presupposes ownership, is not possible.)

FACTS:
Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita. The same lies in the vicinity of
another parcel registered under Bio Hong Trading whose title came from a prior owner. In the deed of
sale between Bio Hong and the vendor, 900 sqm of the lot was reserved as an easement of way.
The construction of the private alley was annotated on Bio Hong’s title stating among other things "(6)
That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon;
and (7) that the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use
the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for
any indemnity for the use thereof”

The petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with other residents of neighboring estates) made use of
the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when,
and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, to
have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement.
The trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates but the latter argued that the easement has been
extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of
the property from its former owner.

CA reversed holding that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the
private respondent's title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the property,
"merger" brought about an extinguishment of the easement.

Thus, Solid went to the SC alleging that the very deed of sale executed between the Bio Hong and the
previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the
parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale.

[While the case was pending, Bio Hong asked the RTC to cancel the annotation in question, which it
granted subject to the final outcome of the prior case.]

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easements may be alienated (sold) from the tenement or mortgaged separately
2) Whether or not the easement had been extinguished by merger.

HELD: NO to both
1) The sale included the alley. The court rejected Solid’s contention that the alley was not included in
the sale. It was included but there was a limitation on its use-the easement. As a mere right of way, it
cannot be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence. (Art. 617)
Even though Bio Hong acquired ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley –– as a
result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions
thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be
open to the public.
2) No genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent
corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and
servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger requires full ownership of both
estates.
Note that The servitude in question is a personal servitude (established for the benefit of a
community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong). In a
personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Thus,
merger could not have been possible.
3)
VALDERRAMA V. THE NORTH NEGROS
SUGAR CO., INC.- Easement Right of Way
What is prohibited by Art. 543 is that in extending the line or repairing or using the same, a larger area
of land is occupied or excavations or materials deposited are outside the area occupied not by causing
wagons to pass just because of a change of ownership of the objects being transported.

FACTS:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling contract with Miguel
Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons for the milling
and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners who in turn would furnish the
central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the execution of the
contract. Later on, Osorio’s rights and interests were acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.
2 years after, the current petitioners, Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al, made
other milling contracts identical to the first one with the North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda
owners, however, could not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as required by its capacity, so
the North Negros made other milling contracts with the various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros. This prompted Valderrama et. al to each file a complaint against North Negros.

The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in Valderrama et. al’s favor finding that North
Negros had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the transportation of sugar
cane not grown from their lands. Thus the appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar cane from the
hacienda owners’ lands

HELD: NO
(the SC also made 1 judgment for all the 3 cases)
The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners contained a clause that granted the North
Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years upon their properties for the
construction of a railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since it could permit the transportation of sugar
cane which they did not produce which is contrary to their intent but the SC held that it is clear that the
easement was established for the benefit of all producers and of the corporation as it is the intent of the
milling contract.

Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of the corporation, it
is contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced by the servient estates
since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by reason of
easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for there is nothing in the contract prohibiting the
central from obtaining other sources.

Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more burdensome since what is prohibited in Art.
543 of the CC is that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should occupy a greater area or deposit
excavations outside the granted 7 meters. This does not happen in this case when the North Negros
transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing the servient estates, since it continues to occupy the same
area and the encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number of times it passes through the
estates.

Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of the milling contracts, so even if the owners
no longer desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros still has the right to the
easement for the remaining period so the contention that it should be limited to the canes produced by
the owners has no basis.