MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.

case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City

March 27, 2000 did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
Puno, J. opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening
by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court
of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
Facts
The MMDA was created to put some order in the
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately
the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good
Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a
non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are private street in a private subdivision without any legal
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not
Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
Dispositive
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from
petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision
December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996.
Malonzo vs Zamora
Actions Filed:
1. BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court
issued temporary restraining order but after
due hearing, trial court denied the issuance of
a preliminary injunction.
2. BAVA – appealed to CA which issued
preliminary injunction and later ruled that
MMDA has no authority to order the opening
of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road
and cause the demolition of its perimeter
walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the
City Council of Makati by ordinance.
3. MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but
was denied by CA; hence the current recourse.

Issues

1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune

Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers?
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition
precedent before the MMDA may order the
opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?

Held

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,

ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ vs PEZA
"development authority." All its functions are
FACTS:
administrative in nature.
In 1981, PEZA, initiated before the RTC of Cavite
expropriation proceedings on three parcels of irrigated
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following
lands. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) is registered in
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
the name of Salud Jimenez. More than ten years later,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
the trial court upheld PEZA's right to expropriate, among
setting of policies, installation of a system and
others, the lot of petitioner. Petitioner sought
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that
reconsideration alleging that the lot would only be
grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
transferred to a private corporation, and hence would
power.
not be utilized for a public purpose. The trial court
reconsidered the order and released Lot 1406 A from
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the
expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406 B was
welfare of the community. It is the local government
maintained. PEZA appealed the order to the CA.
units, acting through their respective legislative councils
Later on, the petitioner and PEZA entered into a
that possess legislative power and police power. In the
compromise agreement whereby (1) PEZA agrees to
withdraw its appeal while Salud agrees to waive,
quitclaim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss of
income which it sustained by reason of the possession of
said lot by PEZA from 1981-1993; and (2) the parties
agree to swap Lot 1406B with Lot434 and that instead of
being paid the just compensation for Lot 1406B, the
estate of Salud shall be paid with Lot434. The
compromise agreement is immediately final and
executory. The CA remanded the case to the trial court
for the approval of the said compromise agreement. The
trial court approved the same.
However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot434
inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the said
lot. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion to partially annul
the order. The trial court then annulled the compromise
agreement and ordered the turn over of Lot1406B to
petitioner. The CA upheld the rescission of the
compromise agreement, however, set aside the order of
the trial court regarding the turn-over of the lot and
ordered the trial judge to proceed with the hearing of
the expropriation proceedings regarding the
determination of just compensation. This is in
accordance with Art 2041 of the Civil Code which states
that "if one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the
compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand.
ISSUE: Whether the phrase "original demand" pertains
to the return of Lot1406B which is sought to be
expropriated or the determination of just compensation
for the lot.
RULING of the SC:
Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The
first phase ends either with an order of expropriation
(where the right of plaintiff to take the land and the
public purpose to which they are to be devoted are
upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a
final one since it finally disposes of the case. The second
phase concerns the determination of just compensation
to be ascertained by three (3) commissioners. It ends
with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the
defendant.
Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this
order finally disposes of the second stage. To both
orders the remedy therefrom is an appeal.
In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when
the July 11, 1991 order of expropriation became final
and the parties subsequently entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the mode of payment of just
compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the
terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner filed an
action to partially rescind the same. Obviously, the trial
court could only validly order the rescission of the
compromise agreement anent the payment of just
compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of the
compromise. It is crystal clear from the contents of the
agreement that the parties limited the compromise
agreement to the matter of just compensation to
petitioner.
Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with
the issue of payment such that failure to pay by
respondent will also nullify the right of respondent to
expropriate. No statement to this effect was mentioned
in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the
agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment.
Hence, the "original demand" referred to means the
fixing of just compensation. When PEZA failed to fulfill
its obligation to deliver Lot 434, petitioner can again
demand for the payment but not the return of the
expropriated Lot 1406-B.
NOTES:
(1) As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then
the power of eminent domain comes into play… It is
accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirement of public use.
(2) Respondent PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of
land pursuant to Proclamation No. 1980 dated May 30,
1980 issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos.
Meanwhile, the power of eminent domain of
respondent is contained in its original charter,
Presidential Decree No. 66. (3) Accordingly, subject Lot
1406-B was expropriated “for the construction … of
terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto.”
The authority is broad enough to give the respondent
substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the
expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to
this broad authority, respondent leased a portion of the
lot to commercial banks while the rest was made a
transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even
reaffirmed by Republic Act No. 7916, a law amending
respondent PEZA’s original charter. Therefore, there is
no question that the lots were expropriated for public
purpose.
In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate
that this case be remanded to the trial court for hearing
of the expropriation proceedings on the determination
of just compensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt
payment to the petitioner.
Republic v. Fernandez
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.HEIRS
OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
G.R. No.: 165354
Date: 12 January 2015
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Facts: NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay
San Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and
maintain transmission lines. Respondents heirs of
Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property. NAPOCOR
filed a complaint for expropriation in the Regional Trial
Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of
an easement of right of way over a portion of the
property.
The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR
had not negotiated with them before entering the
property and that the entry was done without their
consent; nonetheless, they tendered no objection to
NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just
compensation not only for the portion sought to be
expropriated but for the entire property whose
potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due
to the project.
During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation
Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach
an amicable agreement; that the property sought to be
expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose
because of the intervening retirement of the
transmission lines installed on the respondents’
property; that because the public purpose for which
such property would be used thereby ceased to exist,
the proceedings for expropriation should no longer
continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return
the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or
discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings
should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.
Ruling: The dismissal of the proceedings for
expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper,
but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the
proceedings must be upon such terms as the court
deems just and equitable.
Before anything more, we remind the parties about the
nature of the power of eminent domain. The right of
eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the sovereign
power to appropriate, not only the public but the
private property of all citizens within the territorial
sovereignty, to public purpose.” But the exercise of such
right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements
should underlie the Government’s exercise of the power
of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular
public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid
to the property owner. These requirements partake the
nature of implied conditions that should be complied
with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the
public.” However, the concept has expanded to include
utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the
public. “Public use” has now been held to be
synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” and
“public convenience.”
It is essential that the element of public use of the
property be maintained throughout the proceedings
for expropriation. The effects of abandoning the public
purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu International
Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., to wit:
More particularly, with respect to the element of public
use, the expropriator should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another
petition for the new purpose.If not, it is then incumbent
upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the
same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation
suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the
power of eminent domain, namely, the particular
public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
Accordingly, the private property owner would be
denied due process of law, and the judgment would
violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness
and equity.
It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to
acquire the land in question for public use. The
fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the
expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent
domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment
that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the
expropriation is not for a public use, the action must
necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason
that the action cannot be maintained at all except when
the expropriation is for some public use. That must be
true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any
other stage of the proceedings. If, for example, during
the trial in the lower court, it should be made to appear
to the satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is
not for some public use, it would be the duty and the
obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action. And
even during the pendency of the appeal, if it should be
made to appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court
that the expropriation is not for public use, then it
would become the duty and the obligation of the
appellate court to dismiss it.
Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines
necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of
the element of public use. To continue with the
expropriation proceedings despite the definite
cessation of the public purpose of the project would
result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor
of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential
element of public use.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue
the proceedings subject to the conditions to be shortly
mentioned hereunder, and requires the return of the
property to the respondents. Having said that, we must
point out that NAPOCOR entered the property without
the owners’ consent and without paying just
compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit
any amount as required by law prior to its entry. The
Constitution is explicit in obliging the Government and
its entities to pay just compensation before depriving
any person of his or her property for public use.
Considering that in the process of installing transmission
lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants
without payment, and the installation of the
transmission lines went through the middle of the land
as to divide the property into three lots, thereby
effectively rendering the entire property inutile for any
future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be
made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of
their property rights from the time of entry until the
time of restoration of the possession of the property.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and
the eventual return of the property to the respondents,
there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them
because their property would not be taken by
NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property,
therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the
respondents for the disturbance of their property
rights from the time of entry until the time of
restoration of the possession by paying to them actual
or other compensatory damages.
This should mean that the compensation must be based
on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of
their dispossession of the property and of its use,
including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops
destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the
transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring
during the appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of
the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of
converting the case into an action for damages. For that
purpose, the Court remands the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings. The court of origin shall
treat the case as if originally filed as an action for
damages.
Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo
Case Digest GR 179334 Apr 21 2015
Facts:
Spouses “Heracleo” are the co-owners of a land which is
among the private properties traversed by MacArthur
Highway in Bulacan, a government project undertaken
sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the
requisite expropriation proceedings and without their
consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of
the fair market value of the property. The DPWH offered
to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as recommended by the
appraiser committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied, Heracleo
filed a complaint for recovery of possession with
damages. Favorable decisions were rendered by the RTC
and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6%
interest per annum from the time of filing of the until
full payment. The SC Division reversed the CA ruling and
held that computation should be based at the time the
property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70 per sqm. But
because of the contrasting opinions of the members of
the Division and transcendental importance of the issue,
the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.
Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due
process should be nullified
No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary
expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot
simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent
domain power, given that the property subject of
expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and
public policy imposes upon the public utility the
obligation to continue its services to the public. To
hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of
due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of
the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of
which is to serve the greater good.
Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not
necessarily lead to the return of the property to the
landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
compensation.
Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market
value of the property at the time of taking
Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private
owners to receive an outdated valuation, the long-
established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property
should be computed not at the time of payment, but at
the time of taking. This is because the purpose of ‘just
compensation’ is not to reward the owner for the
property taken but to compensate him for the loss
thereof. The owner should be compensated only for
what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual
value of the property at the time it is taken.
Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in
this case
No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first
and fundamental duty is the application of the law
according to its express terms, interpretation being
called for only when such literal application is
impossible. To entertain other formula for computing
just compensation, contrary to those established by law
and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of
economic policies – a matter which this Court has no
competence to take cognizance of. Equity and equitable
principles only come into full play when a gap exists in
the law and jurisprudence.
Velasco Dissent:
The State’s power of eminent domain is not absolute;
the Constitution is clear that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty and property without due process of law.
As such, failure of the government to institute the
necessary proceedings should lead to failure of taking an
individual’s property. In this case, since the property was
already taken, the complainants must be equitably
compensated for the loss thereof.
For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the
land should be determined from the time the property
owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest
therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the State’s
act as one of expropriation in spite of procedural
infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust
enrichment on its part. To continue condoning such acts
would be licensing the government to continue
dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking
private property.
Republic vs Gingoyon
481 SCRA 457 [GR No. 166429 December 19, 2005]
Facts: The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA 3) was conceived, designed and
constructed to serve as the country’s show window to
the world. Regrettably, it has spawned controversies.
Regrettably too, despite the apparent completion of the
terminal complex way back it has not yet been
operated. This has caused immeasurable economic
damage to the country, not to mention its deplorable
discredit in the international community. In the first case
that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO,the contracts
which the Government had with the contractor were
voided for being contrary to law and public policy. The
second case now before the Court involves the matter of
just compensation due the contractor for the terminal
complex it built. We decide the case on the basis of
fairness, the same norm that pervades both the Court’s
2004 Resolution in the first case and the latest
expropriation law. The present controversy has its roots
with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in Agan v.
PIATCO,promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This
decision nullified the “Concession Agreement for the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III”
entered into between the Philippine Government
(Government) and the Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments
and supplements thereto. The agreement had
authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport
terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and
maintain the said terminal during the concession period
of 25 years. The contracts were nullified, among others,
that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did
not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was
awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement
was contrary to public policy. At the time of the
promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities
had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing
completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to the
legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the
nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights
of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the
construction of the facilities. PIATCO and several
respondents-intervenors filed their respective motions
for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision. These
motions were denied by the Court in its Resolution
dated 21 January 2004 (2004 Resolution). However, the
Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the
rights of PIATCO to refund, compensation or
reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of
the NAIA 3 facilities. After the promulgation of the
rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in
the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of
the Government to put the airport terminal into
immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO
conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the
NAIA 3 facilities. It also appears that arbitral proceedings
were commenced before the International Chamber of
Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, although the Government has raised
jurisdictional questions before those two bodies. Then,
on 21 December 2004, the Government11 filed a
Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional
Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for
Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special
raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the
complaint the issuance of a writ of possession
authorizing it to take immediate possession and control
over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared
that it had deposited the amount of
P3,002,125,000.0012 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land
Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3
terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. The
case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC,
presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon
(Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint
was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance
of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it
to “take or enter upon the possession” of the NAIA 3
facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v. Serrano, the
RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the
writ of possession upon the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and
upon deposit made by the government of the amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject
to expropriation. The RTC found these requisites
present, particularly noting that “[t]he case record
shows that [the Government has] deposited the
assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank
of the Philippines, an authorized depositary, as shown
by the certification attached to their complaint.” Also on
the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession.
According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take
possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after
the Writ of Possession was issued. However, on 4
January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to
supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of
Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in
the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier
issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974
(Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as “An Act to
Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or
Location for National Government Infrastructure
Projects and For Other Purposes” and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had
amended Rule 67 in many respects.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8794 should be applied in the
instant expropriation case and not Rule 67.
Held: Yes. At the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this
case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even
assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this
case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should
then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section
2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court’s requirement
in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment
of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government
may take over the property.
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede
the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of
“immediate payment” in cases involving national
government infrastructure projects.
As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of
of NAIA 3 was made pursuant to a build-operate-and- the property to be seized. Such payment of the
transfer arrangement pursuant to Republic Act No. proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance
6957, as amended,which pertains to infrastructure or of the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is
development projects normally financed by the public precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one
sector but which are now wholly or partly implemented which facially complies with the prescription laid down
by the private sector. Under the build-operate-and- in the 2004 Resolution.
transfer scheme, it is the project proponent which Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC
undertakes the construction, including the financing, of when it ruled that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the instant
a given infrastructure facility. expropriation proceedings.
There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights
over the facilities which it had financed and constructed.
The 2004 Resolution squarely recognized that right
when it mandated the payment of just compensation to
PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of
NAIA 3. The fact that the Government resorted to
eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a
concession on its part of PIATCO’s ownership. Indeed, if
no such right is recognized, then there should be no
impediment for the Government to seize control of
NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.
Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are
established, the nature of these facilities should now be
determined.
The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties
just like the soil to which they are adhered. Any sub-
classifications of real property and divergent treatment
based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be
based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is violated. There
may be perhaps a molecular distinction between soil
and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto, yet
there are no purposive distinctions that would justify a
variant treatment for purposes of expropriation. Both
the land itself and the improvements thereupon are
susceptible to private ownership independent of each
other, capable of pecuniary estimation, and if taken
from the owner, considered as a deprivation of
property. The owner of improvements seized through
expropriation suffers the same degree of loss as the
owner of land seized through similar means. Equal
protection demands that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of
expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as
the buildings or improvements constructed thereon, and
a disparate treatment between those two classes of real
property infringes the equal protection clause.
Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that
law’s application in this case, the threshold test must
still be met whether its implementation would conform
to the dictates of the Court in the 2004 Resolution.
Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act
No. 8974 will not contravene the 2004 Resolution, which
requires the payment of just compensation before any
takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The
2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such
payment must be effected before the takeover, but it
unquestionably requires at least some degree of
payment to the private property owner before a writ of
possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No.
8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum
requirement, as it assures the private property owner