Sie sind auf Seite 1von 255

MARRIAGE (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age

even with the consent of parents or guardians;


1. Classification of Marriages/Relationships/Parties In Interest; (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
NCC; FC; AM 02-11-10 SC perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with
either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
Valid officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites the preceding Chapter;
are present: (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male Article 41;
and a female; and (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing to the identity of the other; and
officer. (53a) (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
Chapter 2 of this Title; and even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be
legitimate or illegitimate:
Voidable (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following (81a)
causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning
annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one,
for reasons of public policy:
and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
lived together as husband and wife;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
adopted child;
wife;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless
adopter;
such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force,
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with
(82)
the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the Terminable
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and Divorced
appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible Other Classifications
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)
Legal Separation
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud Separation in Fact
referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article: Common Law Relationship
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the
other party of a crime involving moral turpitude; JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner, - versus - JESUS S. LUCAS,
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the Respondent.
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband; G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011 (2D)
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of
its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or FACTS:
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or  Petitioner Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish
homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage. Illegitimate (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, DNA Testing) before the RTC alleging that respondent is
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds petitioner’s father. The name of petitioner’s father was
for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a) not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live birth.
 Attached to the petition were the following: (a)
Void petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s
baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma,
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
35 (2). Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n) articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

1 of 255 | P a g e
 Respondent argued that there is no basis for the taking reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures,
of DNA test and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the
the acceptability of DNA evidence possible sources of error, the available objections to the
 RTC  dismissed the case admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the
o Based on the case of Herrera v. Alba, there probative value of DNA evidence.” It seeks “to ensure
are four significant procedural aspects of a that the evidence gathered, using various methods of
traditional paternity action which the parties DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and]
have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative shall not be misused and/or abused and, more
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis
physical resemblance between the putative serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the
father and the child. Petitioner must first public.”[35]
establish these four procedural aspects before  Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
he can present evidence of paternity and merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
filiation, which may include incriminating acts safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing.
or scientific evidence like blood group test and Section 4 states:
DNA test results. The petition did not show o SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. –
that these procedural aspects were present. The appropriate court may, at any time, either
 Petitioner filed a MR which the RTC resolved in his favor motu proprio or on application of any person
o The petition was sufficient in form and who has a legal interest in the matter in
substance. The allegation that the statements litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order
in the petition were not of petitioner’s personal shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
knowledge is a matter of evidence. The new parties upon a showing of the following:
Rule on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant
DNA testing, whether at the court’s instance or to the case;
upon application of any person who has legal (b) The biological sample: (i) was not
interest in the matter in litigation. previously subjected to the type of DNA
 Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
 CA  decided in favor of respondent subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
o Petitioner failed to show that the four require confirmation for good reasons;
significant procedural aspects of a traditional (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
paternity action had been met. The CA further technique;
held that a DNA testing should not be allowed (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential
when the petitioner has failed to establish a to produce new information that is relevant to
prima facie case. the proper resolution of the case; and
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the CA (e) The existence of other factors, if any,
denied which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA
ISSUE: Whether DNA testing can only be ordered after petitioner testing.
establishes prima facie proof of filiation.  This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need
of a prior court order, at the behest of any party,
HELD: including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or
 The statement in Herrera v. Alba[34] that there are four proceeding is commenced.
significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity  This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order
case which parties have to face has been widely will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing,
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is the said conditions are established.
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during  In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA
trial, when the parties have presented their respective testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable
only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of
CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a the test. [36] In these states, a court order for blood
prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a testing is considered a “search,” which, under their
paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding
case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
allegations in the initiatory pleading. requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
 Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart
discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of
motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, Louisiana eloquently explained —
been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is  Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the
premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of
such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, sufficient justification under the particular factual
the latter has just set the said case for hearing. circumstances of the case must be made before a court
 At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various
allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
taken and deserves the Court’s attention. In light of this procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
observation, we find that there is a need to supplement have almost universally found that a preliminary showing
the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving must be made before a court can constitutionally order
motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree,
and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court
of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the
court can issue a DNA testing order. moving party must show that there is a reasonable
 The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases
Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA in which paternity is contested and a party to the action
evidence in the judicial system. It provides the refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show
“prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for cause hearing must be held in which the court can
2 of 255 | P a g e
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
a court order for blood testing.[37] 9
 The same condition precedent should be applied in our  Respondent and complainant were sweethearts
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere whose sexual relations were evidently consensual.
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the We do not find complainant's assertions that she
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible.
prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend
possibility of paternity. even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until
 Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations
issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual
upon the court. The court may, for example, consider congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who
whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and
If there is already preponderance of evidence to was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led
establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry
corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a and settle permanently with another woman. We
DNA testing. cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner
of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, bond which should be entered into because of love,
JR., respondent. not for any other reason.
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997  We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act
EN BANC of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to
the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer
FACTS: severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the
 Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on profession he worked very hard to be admitted into.
the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble,
1967 and 1968. the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented
 Before respondent could take his oath, however, from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
complainant filed the instant petition averring that therefor. During this time there appears to be no other
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child indiscretion attributed to him. 10 Respondent, who is
out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed,
not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her. albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.
 The Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDGAR
period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014 FIRST DIVISION
 Respondent's hopes were again dashed when the Court,
in response to complainant's opposition, resolved to FACTS:
cancel his scheduled oath-taking. The Court then  Accused-appellant and his wife were married on October
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 18, 1975. They lived together since then and raised their
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 4 children as they put up several businesses over the
 The IBP's report recommended the dismissal of the case years.
and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's  KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit alleging that her
oath. husband, accused-appellant raped her on Dec. 3, 1998
and that on Dec. 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed
ISSUE: Whether respondent’s morality may be questioned on the her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
ground of the alleged breach of promise to marry complainant.  Two informations for rape were filed before the RTC
 Accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation
HELD: NO. which was denied by the trial court
 Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath  The accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a
in 1971 because of the charge of gross immorality made plea of not guilty to both charges
by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an  The criminal informations were amended by indicating the
illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, name of the private complainant and changing the dates
who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to of the commission of the crime to Oct. 16 and 17, 1998.
marry her after he passes the bar examinations.  The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He
 We find that these facts do not constitute gross maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a
immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in  During trial, KKK vividly recounted how the accused-
premarital sexual relations with complainant and appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character refusal on October 16 and 17, 1998. The testimonies of
on his part but the same does not constitute grossly KKK were corroborated by their children, MMM and OOO.
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify  Defense’s version  Accused-appellant denied raping his
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must wife on the aforesaid dates. He claimed on those dates
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. KKK merely fabricated
immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to the rape charges as her revenge because he took over
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful the control and management of their businesses as well
as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It is a willful, as the possession of their pick-up truck. Also, KKK
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd
the community. 7 behavior.
 We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang 8 quite relevant  RTC  found accused-appellant guilty of two separate
because mere intimacy between a man and a woman, charges of rape
both of whom possess no impediment to marry, o The RTC sustained the version proffered by the
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on prosecution by giving greater weight and
the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so credence to the spontaneous and
unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of
3 of 255 | P a g e
straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether
witnesses. The trial court also upheld as occurring in public or in private life.
sincere and genuine the two daughters' o Article 2
testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for Violence against women shall be understood to
daughters to testify against their own father for encompass, but not be limited to, the following:
a crime such as rape if the same was not truly (a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence
committed. occurring in the family, including battering,
 In appealing to the CA, accused-appellant argued the two sexual abuse of female children in the
incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the household, dowry-related violence, marital
criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual, rape, female genital mutilation and other
obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a traditional practices harmful to women, non-
legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that spousal violence and violence related to
consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting exploitation;119
husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.  Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of
 CA  affirmed in toto the RTC ruling sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who
o The physical showing of external injures is not penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will
indispensable to prosecute and convict a commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as
person for rape; what is necessary is that the a State Party to the CEDA W and its accompanying
victim was forced to have sexual intercourse Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under
with the accused. In addition, the fact that KKK R.A. No. 8353.
and the accused-appellant are spouses only  A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices
reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse
accusations because no wife in her right mind with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling
would accuse her husband of having raped her a marital consortium with a fellow human being with
if it were not true. Finally, the CA dismissed the dignity equal to that he accords himself. He cannot be
accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage
evidence that it was physically impossible for in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely,
him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro the Philippines cannot renege on its international
City at the time of the commission of the crimes, commitments and accommodate conservative yet
considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the irrational notions on marital activities that have lost their
place where he allegedly was, is only about four relevance in a progressive society.
or five hours away.  It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to
 Hence, the present review love one another but this rule sanctions affection and
sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both
ISSUE: Whether rape does not exist in marriage on the ground that spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is
consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
wife.  Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual
intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty
HELD: and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness
 The ancient customs and ideologies from which the and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery
irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is
been superseded by modem global principles on the a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
equality of rights between men and women and respect ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an
for human dignity established in various international expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening
State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to
the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge
society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will
between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and
appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested
achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may
other practices which are based on the idea of the legally seek the court's intervention to declare her
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital
stereotyped roles for men and women. One of such obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual
measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the intimacy from her coercively or violently.
archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a  Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-
husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute
body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the
with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed. equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal
 Another important international instrument on gender protection of the laws ordains that similar subjects should
equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
Violence Against Women, which was Promulgated118 by some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person
the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of
The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender- laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes
based violence that constitute acts of discrimination in like circumstances.
against women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of  As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of
sexual violence, viz: R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known;
o Article 1 (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single
"violence against women" means any act of definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the
gender-based violence that results in, or is law does not distinguish between rape committed in
likely to result in, physical, sexual or wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence,
psychological harm or suffering to women, the law affords protection to women raped by their
including threats of such acts, coercion or husband and those raped by any other man alike.

4 of 255 | P a g e
 Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards
rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38,
raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license may contract marriage. (54a)
should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly
rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the
Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the
woman.128 She can give or withhold her consent to a
contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing
sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses
unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This
refuses.
declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which
 Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and
have control over and decide freely and responsibly on attested by the solemnizing officer.
matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the
reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be
violence.129 Women do not divest themselves of such sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the
right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing
human rights are inalienable.130 officer. (55a)
 Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation
because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and
dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
physical condition or social status. It can happen (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown jurisdiction;
in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored (2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious
fortress, the family home, committed against her by her sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered
husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written
herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that
rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing
sexually coercive husbands. officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in
 Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not
Article 31;
a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not
own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, (4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is
she does not divest herself of the human right to an assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation,
likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can
lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital (5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided
coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting in Article 10. (56a)
refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to
felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the
succor before the Family Courts that can determine chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul,
justifying an annulment of the marriage. as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
 Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the
the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by
sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)
imposition.
 Accused-appellant is found guilty of two counts of rape. Art. 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar
of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually
2. F.C. Marriage Requirements; Civil Wedding v. Church resides, except in marriages where no license is required in
Wedding; Cert. of Civil Registrar accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title (58a)

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be
are present: solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license
and a female; and and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be
officer. (53a) performed by said consular official. (75a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: Art. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the
Chapter 2 of this Title; and following:
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance (1) Full name of the contracting party;
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their (2) Place of birth;
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and (3) Age and date of birth;
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (4) Civil status;
(53a, 55a) (5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous
marriage was dissolved or annulled;
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites (6) Present residence and citizenship;
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article (7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties;
35 (2). (8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the father;
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the (9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; and
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the (10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n) having charge, in case the contracting party has neither father nor
mother and is under the age of twenty-one years.
5 of 255 | P a g e
The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required to Art. 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is
exhibit their residence certificates in any formality in connection needed, the party or parties concerned shall, in addition to the
with the securing of the marriage license. (59a) requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued
by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage
Art. 12. The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage counsellor duly
shall require the presentation of the original birth certificates or, in accredited by the proper government agency to the effect that the
default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting parties contracting parties have undergone marriage counselling. Failure
or copies of such documents duly attested by the persons having to attach said certificates of marriage counselling shall suspend the
custody of the originals. These certificates or certified copies of the issuance of the marriage license for a period of three months from
documents by this Article need not be sworn to and shall be the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the
exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The signature and official marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the
title of the person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof of issuing officer to administrative sanctions but shall not affect the
its authenticity. validity of the marriage.
If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth Should only one of the contracting parties need parental
or baptismal certificate or a certified copy of either because of the consent or parental advice, the other party must be present at the
destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by an affidavit of counselling referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n)
such party or of any other person that such birth or baptismal
certificate has not yet been received though the same has been Art. 17. The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice which shall
required of the person having custody thereof at least fifteen days contain the full names and residences of the applicants for a
prior to the date of the application, such party may furnish in lieu marriage license and other data given in the applications. The
thereof his current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up notice shall be posted for ten consecutive days on a bulletin board
and sworn to before the local civil registrar concerned or any public outside the office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicous
official authorized to administer oaths. Such instrument shall place within the building and accessible to the general public. This
contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
setting forth the full name, residence and citizenship of such impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
contracting party and of his or her parents, if known, and the place thereof. The marriage license shall be issued after the completion
and date of birth of such party. The nearest of kin of the of the period of publication. (63a)
contracting parties shall be preferred as witnesses, or, in their
default, persons of good reputation in the province or the locality. Art. 18. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar
The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars
required if the parents of the contracting parties appear personally thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage
before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to the license, but shall nonetheless issue said license after the
correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated in the completion of the period of publication, unless ordered otherwise
application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by merely looking by a competent court at his own instance or that of any interest
at the applicants upon their personally appearing before him, be party. No filing fee shall be charged for the petition nor a
convinced that either or both of them have the required age. (60a) corresponding bond required for the issuances of the order. (64a)

Art. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been Art. 19. The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the
previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, fees prescribed by law or regulations before the issuance of the
instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the nature of a
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of said license. It shall,
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of however, be issued free of charge to indigent parties, that is those
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. who have no visible means of income or whose income is
In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall insufficient for their subsistence a fact established by their affidavit,
make an affidavit setting forth this circumstance and his or her or by their oath before the local civil registrar. (65a)
actual civil status and the name and date of death of the deceased
spouse. (61a)
Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for
a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of issue, and
Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having shall be deemed automatically cancelled at the expiration of the
been emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the ages said period if the contracting parties have not made use of it. The
of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the expiry date shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of
requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil every license issued. (65a)
registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother,
surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of
them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens
writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a
proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal
presence of two witnesses and attested before any official capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic
authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation or consular officials.
shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu
affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said of the certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an
applications. (61a) affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to
contract marriage. (66a)
Art. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and
twenty-five shall be obliged to ask their parents or guardian for Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare
advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such that they take each other as husband and wife, shall also state:
advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be (1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party;
issued till after three months following the completion of the (2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence;
publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the (3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage;
contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, (4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to
together with the written advice given, if any, shall be attached to law, except in marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
the application for marriage license. Should the parents or (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the
guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the parental consent in appropriate cases;
sworn statement. (62a)

6 of 255 | P a g e
(6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew
the legal requirement regarding parental advice in appropriate members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an
cases; and airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in
(7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. (74a)
any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a)
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned
Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in
to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military
marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen
days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the
where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the
issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a)
officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage
certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a) other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found
interested parties without any charge in both cases. The no legal impediment to the marriage. (76a)
documents and affidavits filed in connection with applications for
marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax. REX M. TUPAL, Complainant, vs. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO,
(n) Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City,
Negros Occidental, Respondent.
Art. 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014
applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a registry book [Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]
strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall record THIRD DIVISION
in said book the names of the applicants, the date on which the
marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be FACTS:
necessary. (n)  Tupal filed a complaint against Judge Rojo for violating
the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in the law, alleging, among others, that the latter has been
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were notarizing affidavits of cohabitation instead of requiring
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this marriage licenses in marriages that he solemnizes
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and o Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No. 1-
(6), 3637 and 38. (17a) 90 dated February 26, 1990.8 Circular No. 1-
90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
notaries public ex officio and notarize
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
documents only if connected with their official
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
functions and duties. Rex argues that
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
affidavits of cohabitation are not connected
law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
with a judge’s official functions and duties as
solemnizing officer.9 Thus, Judge Rojo cannot
Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the notarize ex officio affidavits of cohabitation of
point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity parties whose marriage he solemnized.
of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party  Judge Rojo  did not deny notarizing the affidavits of
subsequently survives. (72a) cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation was connected with his official functions
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no and duties as a judge.13 The Guidelines on the
means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized Judiciary14 does not prohibit judges from notarizing
without necessity of a marriage license. (72a) affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they
will solemnize
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the  OCA  found that Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90
solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the o The Office of the Court Administrator ruled
local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to that affidavits of cohabitation are documents
administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis not connected with municipal trial court judges’
or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or official functions and duties. Under the
barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil by the Members of the Judiciary,21 a judge’s
registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain duty is to personally examine the allegations in
the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the the affidavit of cohabitation before performing
absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a) the marriage ceremony.22 Nothing in the
Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize
affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding marriage they will solemnize.
article, together with the legible copy of the marriage contract, shall
be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil ISSUE: Whether an affidavit of cohabitation may be notarized by
registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the the solemnizing judge.
period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage. (75a)
HELD: NO.

7 of 255 | P a g e
 Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of The Guidelines does not state that the judge can
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation.
solemnize.  Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not
 Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which connected with the judge’s official function and duty to
were documents not connected with the exercise of his solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of
official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the
also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing
that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot
territorial jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements
No. 1-90. before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there
 Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
must personally interview the contracting parties and cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to
examine the requirements they submitted.25 The parties admit that he solemnized the marriage despite the
must have complied with all the essential and formal irregularity or false allegation.
requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is  Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of
a marriage license.26 cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will
 A marriage license is issued by the local civil solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not
registrar to parties who have all the qualifications connected with their official function and duty to
and none of the legal disqualifications to contract solemnize marriages.
marriage.27 Before performing the marriage  Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of
ceremony, the judge must personally examine the cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he solemnized
marriage license presented.28 their marriages]."33 He notarized documents not
 If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband connected with his official function and duty to solemnize
and wife for at least five years and have no legal marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
impediment to marry, they are exempt from the  Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the
marriage license requirement.29 Instead, the parties Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to Judiciary does not expressly prohibit judges from
before any person authorized by law to administer notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he cannot be
oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must prohibited from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.
personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the  To accept Judge Rojo’s argument will render the
parties having lived together as husband and wife for at solemnizing officer’s duties to examine the affidavit of
least five years and the absence of any legal impediment cohabitation and to issue a sworn statement that the
to marry each other.31 The judge must also execute a requirements have been complied with redundant. As
sworn statement that he personally ascertained the discussed, a judge cannot objectively examine a
parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal document he himself notarized. Article 34 of the Family
impediment to the marriage.32 Article 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of
Code of the Philippines provides: Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary assume that
o Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the "the person authorized by law to administer oaths" who
marriage of a man and a woman who have notarizes the affidavit of cohabitation and the
lived together as husband and wife for at least "solemnizing officer" who performs the marriage
five years and without any legal impediment to ceremony are two different persons.
marry each other. The contracting parties shall  Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before municipal trial court judges from notarizing "private
any person authorized by law to administer documents x x x [bearing] no direct relation to the
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state performance of their functions as judges."34 Since a
under oath that he ascertained the marriage license is a public document, its "counterpart,"
qualifications of the contracting parties and the affidavit of cohabitation, is also a public document.
found no legal impediment to the marriage. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he
 Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of notarizes a public document. He did not violate Circular
Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary also provides: No. 1-90.
o Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer  An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document
before the solemnization of the marriage in until notarized. Notarization converts a private document
legal ratification of cohabitation. — In the case into a public document, "[rendering the document]
of a marriage effecting legal ratification of admissible in court without further proof of its
cohabitation, the solemnizing officer shall (a) authenticity."35 The affidavit of cohabitation, even if it
personally interview the contracting parties to serves a "public purpose," remains a private document
determine their qualifications to marry; (b) until notarized.
personally examine the affidavit of the  Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of
contracting parties as to the fact of having cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents. As
lived together as husband and wife for at least discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not connected
five [5] years and the absence of any legal with a judge’s official duty to solemnize marriages.
impediments to marry each other; and (c) Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
execute a sworn statement showing  Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is to
compliance with (a) and (b) and that the "eliminate competition between judges and private
solemnizing officer found no legal impediment lawyers in transacting legal conveyancing business."36
to the marriage. He cited Borre v. Judge Moya37 where this court found
 Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization City Judge Arcilla guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90 for
of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person notarizing a deed of sale. Judge Rojo argued that when
who notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he did "not
cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize compete with private law practitioners or regular notaries
the parties’ marriage. in transacting legal conveyancing business."38 Thus, he
 As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine  In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is
whether the parties have indeed lived together for at the context in which this court stated that "[judges]
least five years without legal impediment to marry. should not compete with private [lawyers] or regular
notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business."39
8 of 255 | P a g e
 At any rate, Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is not limited to Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now
documents used to transact "legal conveyancing requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
business." So long as a judge notarizes a document not marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of
connected with his official functions and duties, he evading the immigration laws of the United States." The
violates Circular No. 1-90. focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
 Thus, in Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr.,40 this establish a life together, to determining the intention of
court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a certificate of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however,
candidacy. In Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr.,41 this court that this standard is used purely for immigration
fined Judge Galapon for notarizing the verification page purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
of an answer filed with the Department of Agrarian legal validity or existence of a marriage.
Reform Adjudication Board. The documents involved in  United States v. Rubenstein: a marriage to convert
these cases were not used to transact "legal temporary into permanent permission to stay in the
conveyancing business." Nevertheless, this court found country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty of violating wit; a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. It is quite
Circular No. 1-90. true that a marriage without subsequent consummation
 Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only
which were not connected with his official function and for the sake of representing it as such to the outside
duty to solemnize marriages, he violated Circular No. 1- world and with the understanding that they will put an
90. end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive,
 Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation they have never really agreed to be married at all. They
without certifying that lawyers or notaries public are must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily
lacking in Bacolod City. Failure to certify that lawyers or understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely
notaries public are lacking in the municipality or circuit of a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.
the judge’s court constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-  Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines which declared as valid a
90.42 marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain
 That other judges have notarized affidavits of entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage
cohabitation of parties whose marriages they solemnized could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was
does not make the practice legal. Violations of laws are entered into for a limited purpose.
not excused by practice to the contrary.43  CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the
 All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90. parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the
Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013 (3D) absence of any essential requisite shall render a
MENDOZA, J.: marriage void ab initio.
 Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be
FACTS: (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
 Oct 22, 2004: Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
were married before Judge Calo of Mandaluyong MeTC that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
 Dec 6, 2006: Albios filed a petition for declaration of enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the
nullity of her marriage with Fringer: alleged that sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
immediately after their marriage, they separated and of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the
never lived as husband and wife because they never Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and
really had any intention of entering into a married state undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or
or complying with any of their essential marital intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
obligations intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
 RTC declared the marriage void ab initio: of the view that beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
the parties married each other for convenience only (she Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
to acquire American citizenship)  Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
 Petitioner, represented by OSG, filed MFR  RTC Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
denied the MFR: the marriage was declared void because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
by it beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
 CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
essential requisite of consent was lacking their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship
ISSUE: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
American citizenship in consideration of 2,000.00, void ab initio on willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
the ground of lack of consent? was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of
HELD: NO. an application for citizenship. There was a full and
 The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
benefits. This has led to the development of marriage created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple  In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a
purpose" marriages. pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
 Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service: the joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
principal test for determining the presence of marriage marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the
fraud in immigration cases  "marriage is a sham if the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
bride and groom did not intend to establish a life followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter
together at the time they were married. " This standard into such a relation. It is a pretended marriage not
was modified with the passage of the Immigration intended to be real and with no intention to create any
legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
9 of 255 | P a g e
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally as it
for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a was a fictitious marriage
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine  There is no inconsistency in finding the marriage
consent because the parties have absolutely no intention between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and,
of being bound in any way or for any purpose. at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the
 The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an undeniable except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this
necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would solemnized without a license. The marriage between
allow them to further their objective, considering that Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the
only a valid marriage can properly support an application general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article
for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
enter into the actual marriage status and to create a simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent beginning."
was, therefore, clearly present.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R.
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013 (2D) ACOSTA, Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch
CARPIO, J.: 4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, Branch 8; all of
MTCC-Cebu ·City; CELESTE P. RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC
FACTS: Branch 6, Cebu City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court
 Benjamin filed a petition for declaration of nullity of Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City; RHONA F.
marriage alleging that on 10 Sept 1973, he married RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of
Azucena Alegre Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D.
 1979: Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu
Sally Go City; MARILOU CABANEZ, Court Stenographer, MTCC,
 Dec 1981: Azucena left for the US Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server,
 Feb 1982: Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court
and wife Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City; and HELEN
 7 Mar 1982: in order to appease her father, Sally brought MONGGAYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they City.
signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013 (E)
Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage (Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
contract would not be registered.
 1994: The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended FACTS:
when Sally left for Canada  She then filed criminal  An audit team was created by OCA in investigating
actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City: A
against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage female and male lawyer of the audit team went
contract as evidence undercover as a couple looking to get married. Inside
 Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of nullity Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and
of marriage on the ground that his marriage to Sally was assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer
bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a asked if the marriage process could be rushed, Helen
valid marriage. assured the lawyer that the marriage could be
 RTC ruled in favor of Benjamin: gave weight to the solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate
certification from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar no would only be dated the day the marriage license
marriage license was issued to Benjamin and Sally; that becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not of the process for a fee of P3K.
bigamous (the second marriage was void not because of  Later, OCA submitted its Memorandum: 643 marriage
the existence of the first marriage but because of other certificates were examined and out of which, 280
causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license) marriages were solemnized under Article 34 of the FC.
 CA declared Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher
number of solemnized marriages than the number of
ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null marriage certificates in the courts’ custody. There is also
and void ab initio and non-existent. an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from
the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan,
HELD: YES. Cebu.15 There were even marriages solemnized at 9
a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.
 On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, the
 27 Nov 2007: the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a)
Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there
was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and requiring Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta,
Sally  The certification from the local civil registrar is Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu
license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the City, to comment on the findings of the 14 August 2007
certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the Supplemental Report of the OCA
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data  In their Comments and/or Answers, the respondent
relative to the issuance of a marriage license  if judges argued the following:
indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage  Judge Necessario relies on the presumption of
contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for regularity regarding the documents presented
lack of a marriage license to him by contracting parties. He claims that
 It was also established before that the purported marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of
the Family Code had the required affidavit of
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded
cohabitation.
with the local civil registrar and the NSO  lack of
record was certified by the Local Civil Registrar THUS  Judge Acosta argues that the law only
the documentary and testimonial evidence proved that requires a marriage license and that he is not
required to inquire whether the license was
obtained from a location where one of the
10 of 255 | P a g e
parties is an actual resident. The judge qualifications of parties to contract marriage. Fourth,
believes that it is not his duty to verify the Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise
signature on the marriage license to determine guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of
its authenticity because he relies on the the Family Code with respect to the marriages they
presumption of regularity of public documents. solemnized where legal impediments existed during
 Judge Tormis claims that there is nothing cohabitation such as the minority status of one party.
wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that
of the issuance of the marriage license and there were parties whose ages ranged from 18 to 22
with the fact that the issued marriage license years old who were married by mere submission of a pro
was obtained from a place where neither of forma joint affidavit of cohabitation.121 These affidavits
the parties resided. were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or
 Judge Rosales denies violating the law on herself. Finally, positive testimonies were also given
marriage. He maintains that it is the local civil regarding the solemnization of marriages of some
registrar who evaluates the documents couples where no marriage license was previously
submitted by the parties, and he presumes the issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the
regularity of the license issued. It is only when application for a license on the same day the marriage
there is no marriage license given that he was solemnized.123
ascertains the qualifications of the parties and  The Court does not accept the arguments of the
the lack of legal impediment to marry. As to respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity
the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty
believes there is nothing wrong with the fact of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring
that these are pro forma. pieces of evidence that point to the contrary  the
presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license
ISSUE: Whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC disappears the moment the marriage documents do not
in Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect appear regular on its face
of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn,  People v. Jansen: the solemnizing officer is not duty-
warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service when bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license
they solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
laid down by the FC and existing jurisprudence. registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is
that the license has been issued by the competent
HELD: YES. official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the
 OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the
are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when requirements of law. However, in Sevilla v. Cardenas,
they solemnized marriages without following the proper that "the presumption of regularity of official acts may be
procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family Code rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. to perform a duty." The visible superimpositions on the
 To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing
following: First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales judges to the irregularity of the issuance.
solemnized marriages even if the requirements  It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code
submitted by the couples were incomplete and of requires the submission of the certificate from the
questionable character. Most of these documents embassy of the foreign party to the local registrar for
showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections acquiring a marriage license, the judges should have
or superimpositions of entries related to the parties’ been more diligent in reviewing the parties’ documents
place of residence. These included indistinguishable and qualifications. The absence of the required
features such as the font, font size, and ink of the certificates coupled with the presence of mere affidavits
computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the
marriage license. These actions of the respondent marriage license issuance.
judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala,  The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident
the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the
incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness. Second, Family Code without the required qualifications and with
the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a
regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those
in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to
the failure to give one’s attention to a task expected of the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of
him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious construction, exceptions as a general rule should be
in its character as to endanger or threaten public strictly but reasonably construed. The affidavits of
welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro
team show that corresponding official receipts for the forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the
solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation
was made for marriages performed on different dates. should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but
The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage contract. The parties should have been capacitated to
application process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" marry each other during the entire period and not only at
on the process. Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and the time of the marriage.
Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting  Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: Authority of
party is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of the solemnizing officer; A valid marriage license except
legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and A
the foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating marriage ceremony which takes place with the
their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates appearance of the contracting parties before the
of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of FC solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that
displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They they take each other as husband and wife in the
should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
required for the marriage license issuance. Any  Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
irregularities would have been prevented in the requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
11 of 255 | P a g e
as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the their personal declaration that they take each other as
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively witnesses of legal age.
liable. (n)  Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
 The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
marriage void ab initio. The actions of the judges have as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the essential
raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided
marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall
proper procedure or check the required documents and not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano, a parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void criminally and administratively liable.
and the subsequent issuance of the license cannot  Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
render valid or add even an iota of validity to the beginning: (3) Those solemnized without a license,
marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage  Republic v. CA: such certification was allowed, as
and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of ROC, which reads: A
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. written statement signed by an officer having the custody
of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013 (3D) exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
VELASCO, JR., J.: certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence
that the records of his office contain no such record or
FACTS: entry.  The above Rule authorized the custodian of the
 Petitioner Syed filed for the declaration of nullity of his documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
marriage to Gloria alleging the absence of a marriage particular document does not exist in his office or that a
license as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
Gloria in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
 In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is stated registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter
that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
Cavite on Jan 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
officer. including the names of the applicants, the date the
 Syed testified that he met Gloria in Taiwan and they marriage license was issued and such other relevant
were married on Aug 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque. On data.
Jan 9, 1993, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence in  In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of
Manila, when a marriage ceremony between him and the certification, stating that it did not comply with Sec
Gloria was celebrated. He further testified that he did not 28, Rule 132  CA deduced that from the absence of
go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, the words "despite diligent search" in the certification,
and that he had never resided in that area. Civil and since the certification used stated that no marriage
Registrar then issued a certification to the effect that the license appears to have been issued, no diligent search
marriage license number appearing in the marriage had been conducted and thus the certification could not
contract he submitted was the number of another be given probative value.
marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado  Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a
and Myra Mabilangan and that no Marriage License disputable presumption that an official duty has been
appear to have been issued to SYED and GLORIA regularly performed, absent contradiction or other
 Gloria presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo evidence to the contrary  "The presumption of
Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola: Reverend regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
Dauz testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No
barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal
marriages within the Philippines; that Atty. Sanchez gave Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking
him the marriage license the day before the actual the records of their office, thus the presumption must
wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared stand.
by his secretary; that after the solemnization of the  It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage
marriage, it was registered and Rev. Dauz submitted the license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to
marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with explain why the marriage license was secured in
that office Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither
 RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued in party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license,
favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra existence of said license. Neither could the other
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license marriage license, as none of them applied for the license
had been issued for Gloria and Syed THUS the in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not
marriage of Gloria and Syed was void ab initio even testify as to the contents of the license, having
 CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez,
her appeal: the certification of the Registrar failed to one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage approached for assistance in securing the license,
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held admitted not knowing where the license came from. The
that said certification could not be accorded probative task of applying for the license was delegated to a
value certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the
license was secured and thus impeached the
ISSUE: Whether a valid marriage license has been issued. certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to
HELD: NO. present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil
 Art. 3. Requisites: (1) Authority of the solemnizing Registrar still enjoys probative value.
officer; (2) A valid marriage license; and (3) A marriage  All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding
ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was
12 of 255 | P a g e
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the
marriage license. Article 4 of FC is clear when it says, purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar
"The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated charged under the law to keep a record of all data
in Article 35(2) relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on
 As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his said certification, the Court held that there is absence of
marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are a marriage license that would render the marriage void
less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be ab initio; (2) Cariño v. Cariño, the Court considered the
that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure marriage of Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago
of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage S. Carino as void ab initio as the marriage contract of
license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of
attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the such marriage license; (3) Sy v. CA, the marriage
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, license was issued on 17 Sept 1974, almost one year
the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio. after the ceremony took place on 15 Nov 1973
 Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA vs. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
HON. COURT OF APPEALS license, the law requires that the absence of such
G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007 (3D) marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
FACTS: license was issued to the parties. In this case, the
 A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent
petitioner against Rosita alleging that on 8 Dec 1982 he reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this
and PR, w/o securing the required marriage license, effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
went to the Manila City Hall where they were wed by a Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in
certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel that it specifically identified the parties to whom the
of the CDCC BR Chapel. Petitioner and PR went marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara
through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a
Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 Mar 1983 license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
(again w/o the parties securing a marriage license)   This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty
The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they official business. The presumption of regularity of official
never went to Carmona to apply for a license acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
 PR asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the
that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than
by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Carmona, Cavite; that Petitioner has a mistress with  Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative
whom he has three children and that he only filed the value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then,
concubinage there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and
 RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in
 CA affirmed RTC and held that the marriage license of a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license
petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome despite the absence of publication or prior to the
the presumption completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the
ISSUE: Whether the requirement as to marriage license were validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the
complied with herein. formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are
HELD: YES. civilly, criminally and administratively liable.31
 The marriage involved herein having been solemnized  Under the principle that he who comes to court must
on 8 Dec 1982 or prior to the effectivity of the Family come with clean hands, petitioner cannot pretend that he
Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the was not responsible or a party to the marriage
Civil Code celebration which he now insists took place without the
 Article 53 of the Civil Code: No marriage shall be requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the
solemnized unless all these requisites are complied civil marriage took place because he "initiated it."
witHELD: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical
(2) Their consent, freely given; (3) Authority of the engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily
person performing the marriage; and (4) A marriage went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He
 The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
the State’s demonstration of its involvement and extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his
which the general public is interested. taste or suited to his lifestyle.
 Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage  Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they
license to impugn the validity of his marriage. appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything for
 The cases where the court considered the absence of a them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain
marriage license as a ground for considering the Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the
marriage void are clear-cut  (1) Republic v. CA, the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The
Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have
and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the
parties. The Court held that the certification of "due solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate
13 of 255 | P a g e
whether or not a marriage license has been duly and del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the
been issued by the competent official, and it may be municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos  judges who
presumed from the issuance of the license that said are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
always in favor of the validity of the marriage. requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. officiating official to administrative liability
OCCIANO  In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002 (1D) respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ) Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
PUNO, J.: marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines
Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
FACTS: administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
 Petitioner charges respondent judge with Gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the
Ignorance of the Law alleging that respondent judge marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at  Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial a marriage without the requisite marriage license 
jurisdiction People vs. Lara: a marriage which preceded the
 They lived together as husband and wife on the strength issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
of this marriage until her husband passed away. subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid
However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that
not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the marriage.
Philippine Navy
 Respondent judge averred that he was requested by a G.R. No. 132529 February 2, 2001 (1D)
certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize the marriage of the SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
parties; Having been assured that all the documents to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in his sala. However, Arroyo informed him that FACTS:
Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the  During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño,
rigors of travelling to Balatan thus Arroyo then requested he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20,
if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao, with whom he had
Nabua, to which request he acceded two offsprings; and the second was on Nov 10, 1992,
 Respondent judge further avers that before he started with respondent Susan Yee, with whom he had no
the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that back in 1982
the parties did not possess the requisite marriage  SPO4 Cariño passed away on Nov 23, 1992, under the
license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and care of Susan Yee
suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to  Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded deceased from various government agencies. Susan
to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146K while Susan
also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might Yee received a total of P21K
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just  Dec 14, 1993: Susan Yee filed the instant case for
suffered from a stroke. collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao 
 Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased
petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage took place during the subsistence of, and w/o first
License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
Application that the marriage license shall be issued on between petitioner and the deceased but claimed that
17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and
claimed it. contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
 It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar deceased is void ab initio because the same was
General issued a Certification that it has no record of solemnized without the required marriage license
such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February (presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased
2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of and the petitioner which bears no marriage license
Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification number; and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from
dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan)
Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of  RTC ruled in favor of Susan Yee  CA affirmed in toto
their marriage. RTC
 The Office of the Court Administrator found the
respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Susan Nicdao and SPO4
without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so Carino is void ab initio due to the lack of a valid marriage license.
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD: YES.
ISSUE: Whether there is compliance herein with the requirements  Article 40 of FC: the absolute nullity of a previous
for a valid marriage. marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
HELD: NO. previous marriage void  THUS where the absolute
 Navarro vs. Domagtoy: respondent judge held office and nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
had jurisdiction in MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
14 of 255 | P a g e
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to  As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the deceased, Article 147 of FC, which in contrast to
the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other Article 148, wages and salaries earned by either party
than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other equal shares and will be divided equally between them,
purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of even if only one party earned the wages and the other
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the
of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a
of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the faith in the present case, both parties of the first
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime,
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
such previous marriage void. children with Susan Nicdao.
 It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and
marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000
“death benefits” of the deceased. SECOND DIVISION
 Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when
the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the FACTS:
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage  March 28, 1977  Private respondent married Anna
license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony in Manila
thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the  April 4, 1979  private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty,
marriage void ab initio. herein petitioner in ceremonies officiated by the judge of
 In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage the City Court of Pasay BEFORE his marriage with
of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the Villanueva was dissolved
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A  August 4, 1980  The marriage with Villanueva was
marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the finally declared null and void for lack of a valid marriage
validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the license
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner  Jan 3, 1991  private respondent sought that his
and the deceased bears no marriage license number marriage with petitioner be declared null and void
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, o He alleged that they had no marriage license
Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage when they got married. He also averred that at
license. the time he married petitioner, he was still
 Such being the case, the presumed validity of the married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been time he married petitioner the decree of nullity
sufficiently overcome. of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been
 It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, issued.
however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the  RTC  declared the marriage between petitioner and
deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” PR null and void
under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent  CA  affirmed RTC
Susan Yee. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant o ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the
case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be
and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the secured before a subsequent marriage could
second marriage of the deceased with respondent be validly contracted.
Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was o We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree cited by defendant’s counsel that ‘no judicial
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and decree is necessary to establish the invalidity
the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent of void marriages.’ It does not say, however,
Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. that a second marriage may proceed even
 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the without a judicial decree. While it is true that if
applicable property regime would not be absolute a marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in
community or conjugal partnership of property, but fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling
rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is
148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions valid or not is for each married spouse to
Without Marriage determine for himself – for this would be the
 The disputed P146K from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed
Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, to a second marriage even before a
and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and competent court issues a judicial decree of
benefits from governmental agencies earned by the nullity of his first marriage. The results would
deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan be disquieting, to say the least, and could not
Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said have been the intendment of even the now-
that she contributed money, property or industry in the repealed provisions of the Civil Code on
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are marriage.
not owned in common by respondent and the deceased,
but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is
no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly.
succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being HELD:
the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.  At the outset, we must note that private respondent‟s
first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979,
15 of 255 | P a g e
respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil  Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
Code. be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
 As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no marriage void.
express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the  In Terre v. Terre (1992) the Court, applying Gomez,
matter, however, appears to be conflicting. Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a
 Originally, in People v. Mendoza, and People v. Aragon, judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is
this Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a
establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first
involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was
second marriage during the subsistence of his first void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We
marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused held that Atty. Terre should have known that the
contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the prevailing case law is that “for purposes of determining
second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint whether a person is legally free to contract a second
for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
that the second marriage is void, having been contracted was null and void ab initio is essential.”
during the existence of the first marriage. There is no  The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In
need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993), the Court held:
is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the first  Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required
bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art.
saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a
whether a marriage is void or not. previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
 In Gomez v. Lipana, and Consuegra v. Consuegra, of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
however, we recognized the right of the second wife who acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free
entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also
insurance of the husband. The Court observed that arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).
although the second marriage can be presumed to be  However, a recent case applied the old rule because of
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v.
was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial
declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage.
since the death of the husband supervened before such The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since
declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom
share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first
and equity. marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We
 But in Odayat v. Amante (1977), the Court adverted to held that since the second marriage took place and all
Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We exonerated a the children thereunder were born before the
clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family
that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity
was void, since she was already previously married to of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence
one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The at that time.
Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to  Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of
establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was private respondent was entered into in 1979, before
affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras. Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in
 Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of
that there is a need for a judicial declaration of nullity of private respondent being void for lack of license and
a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its
In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In
a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to this case, therefore, we conclude that private
declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her respondent‟s second marriage to petitioner is valid.
previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on
Consuegra, concluded that: G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000 (2D)
 There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about FILIPINA Y. SY vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
time they married each other, for then such a marriage FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial QUISUMBING, J.:
declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all
legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as FACTS:
a married woman at the time she contracted her  Petitioner and PR contracted marriage on Nov 15, 1973
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in QC (w/o
accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent marriage license). Both were then 22 years old. Their
would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis union was blessed with two children, Frederick and
supplied). Farrah Sheryll
 In Yap v. Court of Appeals however, the Court found the  The spouses first established their residence in
second marriage void without need of judicial Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later
declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
Aragon rulings.  Sept 15, 1983: PR left their conjugal dwelling  Since
 At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children
to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in Gomez, were in the custody of their mother. However, their son
Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Frederick transferred to his father's residence on May
Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 40 of said Code 15, 1988, and from then on, lived with his father
expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of  Feb 11, 1987: Filipina filed a petition for legal separation
marriage – which was later amended to a petition for separation of
property on the grounds that her husband abandoned
16 of 255 | P a g e
her without just cause; that they have been living daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as
separately for more than one year; and that they Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of
voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court 
dated Sept 29, 1983, containing the rules that would These pieces of evidence on record plainly and
govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership  indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
Judgment was rendered dissolving their CPG and ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage
approving a regime of separation of properties license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
 May 1988: Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract
parricide against her husband  testified that when she shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519,
went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner
owned by her husband, Fernando pulled Filipina away nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
from their son, and punched her in the different parts of  Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on
her body and started choking her when she fell on the record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly
floor, and released her only when he thought she was state in her petition before the trial court that there was
dead incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of
 RTC convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their
slight physical injuries marriage license. From the documents she presented,
 Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation the marriage license was issued on September 17,
against PR, on the following grounds: (1) repeated 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on
physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that
respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage
by her husband w/o justifiable cause for more than one license. Nowhere do we find PR denying these dates on
year record  THUS the marriage between petitioner and PR
 RTC, on Dec 4, 1991, granted the petition on the is void from the beginning.
grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual
infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 (2D)
 Aug 4, 1992: Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of RODOLFO G. NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the DOMAGTOY
ground of psychological incapacity  RTC denied the ROMERO, J.:p
petition as the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited
by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity FACTS:
which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of  Herein is an administrative case against Judge
their marriage Hernando Domagtoy for solemnizing the wedding
 CA affirmed RTC: the testimony of petitioner concerning between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the
respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his
short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a first wife and for performing a marriage ceremony
marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
requisites of law. Moreover, petitioner failed to show that outside his court's jurisdiction
the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had  Respondent judge avers that he merely relied on the
existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
1973 (the couple's marital problems surfaced only in Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first
1983, or almost ten years from the date of the wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.
celebration of their marriage) With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del
ISSUE: Whether the marriage between petitioner and PR is void Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the
from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be
ceremony. solemnized by: “ Any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof
HELD: YES. applies to the case in question.
 Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the
marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license ISSUE 1: WON the marriage between Tagadan and Borga is void.
at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to
her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage HELD 1: YES.
and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and  Article 41 of FC: A marriage contracted by any person
marriage license are different and incongruous. during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
 Petitioner states that though she did not categorically null and void, unless before the celebration of the
state in her petition for annulment of marriage before the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
marriage license and the celebration of the marriage well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
that these critical dates were contained in the documents of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting
marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, the subsequent marriage under the preceding
1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
26
The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady  In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a
of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of
court, and private respondent's answer admitting it. respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
marriage of the parents in both their son's and
17 of 255 | P a g e
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, World War II, records were destroyed. Thus,
marriage. only a Certification was issued by the LCR.
 Peregrina  filed an Answer with counterclaim
ISSUE 2: WON the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside o she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio
the court's jurisdiction makes the marriage void. who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao
City, their marriage having been celebrated on
HELD 2: NO. 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
 Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by (1) Any City. She also contended that the case was
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's instituted to deprive her of the properties she
jurisdiction; owns in her own right and as an heir of
 Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the Eustaquio.
chambers the judge or in open court, in the church,  RTC  denied Tecla’s petition; likewise dismissed
chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, Peregrina’s counterclaim
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not o The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied
the point of death or in remote places in accordance with on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the marriage to Eustaquio. Without such
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage certificate, the trial court considered as
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by useless the certification of the Office of the
them in a sworn statement to that effect. Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no
 Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions more records of marriages during the period
as the justification for his having solemnized the 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del regards the Certification issued by the
Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the National Statistics Office of Manila.
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held  Tecla appealed before CA
outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the  CA  ruled in favor of Tecla; declaring the validity of her
following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to
request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to be bigamous, and thus, null and void.
this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or o The court a quo committed a reversible error
del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
place. Moreover, the written request presented [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who
addressed to the respondent judge was made by only testified that she personally witnessed the
one party, Gemma del Rosario. wedding celebration of her older brother
 More importantly, the elementary principle underlying EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September
this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest
Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified
is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at
jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, the outset. It should be stressed that the due
refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and execution and the loss of the marriage
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing contract, both constituting the condition sine
officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non- qua non, for the introduction of secondary
compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. evidence of its contents, were shown by the
 Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the very evidence the trial court has disregarded
o The CA concluded that there was a
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not
presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla
clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
and Eustaquio as they deported themselves
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article
as husband and wife and begot four (4)
8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise
children. Such presumption, supported by
of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
documentary evidence consisting of the same
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as
principles of civil law.
well as the testimonial evidence especially that
of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according
3. Marriage Certificate v. Presumption of Marriage; Torrens
to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of
Title Entry; “Single, Civil Status’’ marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling,
the CA found that its appreciation of the
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner, v. TECLA evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord
HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent. with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014
 Peregrina elevated to SC
SECOND DIVISION
o Peregrina now questions the said ruling
assigning as error, among others, the failure of
FACTS: the CA to appreciate the validity of her
 Tecla, alleging that she was the lawful wife of deceased marriage to Eustaquio
Eustaquio Avenido, filed a complaint against Peregrina
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between the ISSUE: Whether the existence of a presumption of marriage
latter and the deceased between Tecla and deceased is sufficient to overturn the marriage
o In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her certificate presented by Peregrina.
marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30
September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites HELD: YES.
officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town.
 In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court
According to her, the fact of their marriage is
did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her
evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded
witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-
with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
serving assertions. Superior significance was given to
(LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to
the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy

18 of 255 | P a g e
of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) papers of similar character are usually kept by
and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial the person in whose custody the document
court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of lost was, and has been unable to find it; or
the first marriage. who has made any other investigation which is
 We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the sufficient to satisfy the court that the
trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing  In the present case, due execution was established by
precedents, that: the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during
o While a marriage certificate is considered the the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a
primary evidence of a marital union, it is not party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and
fact of marriage may be proven by relevant admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the
evidence other than the marriage certificate. loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial
be recognized as competent evidence of the and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage between his parents. marriage.30
 The error of the trial court in ruling that without the  As correctly stated by the appellate court:
marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be o In the case at bench, the celebration of
accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO
Court of Appeals.29 Thus: was established by the testimonial evidence
o It should be stressed that the due execution furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be
and the loss of the marriage contract, both present during the marriage ceremony, and by
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event.
introduction of secondary evidence of its The loss was shown by the certifications
contents, were shown by the very evidence issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol.
they have disregarded. They have thus These are relevant, competent and admissible
confused the evidence to show due execution evidence. Since the due execution and the
and loss as "secondary" evidence of the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court shown by the evidence presented, secondary
clarified this misconception thus: evidence – testimonial and documentary –
 x x x [T]he court below was entirely may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
mistaken in holding that parol In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the Supreme Court
evidence of the execution of the held that "marriage may be proven by any
instrument was barred. The court competent and relevant evidence. The
confounded the execution and the testimony by one of the parties to the marriage
contents of the document. It is the or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has
contents, x x x which may not be been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
proven by secondary evidence marriage. The person who officiated at the
when the instrument itself is solemnization is also competent to testify as
accessible. Proofs of the execution an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
are not dependent on the existence o The court a quo committed a reversible error
or non-existence of the document, when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
and, as a matter of fact, such proofs [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who
of the contents: due execution, testified that she personally witnessed the
besides the loss, has to be shown wedding celebration of her older brother
as foundation for the inroduction of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September
secondary evidence of the contents. 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest
o Evidence of the execution of a document is, in son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified
the last analysis, necessarily collateral or that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
primary. It generally consists of parol father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and
testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at
document is actually produced, its authencity the outset. It should be stressed that the due
is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its execution and the loss of the marriage
face or recital of its contents but by parol contract, both constituting the condition sine
evidence. At the most, failure to produce the qua non for the introduction of secondary
document, when available, to establish its evidence of its contents, were shown by the
execution may effect the weight of the very evidence the trial court has
evidence presented but not the admissibility of disregarded.31
such evidence.  The starting point then, is the presumption of
o The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial marriage.
court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the
there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n]
presumption:
by other competent evidence.
o The basis of human society throughout the
o Truly, the execution of a document may be civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1
proven by the parties themselves, by the Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
recognized the signatures of the parties; or institution in the maintenance of which the
even by those to whom the parties have public is deeply interested. Consequently,
previously narrated the execution thereof. The every intendment of the law leans toward
Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
shown by any person who [knows] the fact of together in apparent matrimony are
its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the presumed, in the absence of any counter-
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination presumption or evidence special to the
in the place or places where the document or case, to be in fact married. The reason is

19 of 255 | P a g e
that such is the common order of society, For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
and if the parties were not what they thus case against the respondent must be established by
hold themselves out as being, they would clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the
be living in the constant violation of serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of
decency and of law. A presumption a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held
established by our Code of Civil Procedure that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
is that a man and a woman deporting justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23
themselves as husband and wife have  In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. that respondent contracted a second marriage despite
(Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as
pro matrimonio – Always presume evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of
marriage. Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil
 In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that
marriage was completed by the testimonies of respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the
certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the
of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol. second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on
October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan,
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ROGELIO Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera
JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent. contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo
A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014 Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church,
EN BANC Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
 Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage
FACTS: certificates to prove that respondent entered into a
 Rose, the sister of the alleged legal wife of Atty. Celera second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still
(Gracemarie R. Bunagan), filed the present disbarment subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently
case against the latter for gross immoral conduct took place barely a year from his first marriage to
 Rose alleged that while Atty. Celera was married to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first
Gracemarie (evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent
certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of contracted the second marriage with Alba.
Manila), he married a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba  The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts,
(evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as
Juan, Manila) provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
 Atty. Celera failed to file his Comment Court, to wit:
 Atty Celera then filed his Explanation o Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original
o reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of document is a public record. – When the
the complaint. He claimed that Bansig original of a document is in the custody of a
probably had not complied with the Court's public officer or is recorded in a public office,
Order, otherwise, he would have received the its contents may be proved by a certified copy
same already. He requested anew that Bansig issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
be directed to furnish him a copy of the  Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
complaint. certificates, other than being admissible in evidence,
 SC resolved due to Celera’s failure to comply with its also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the
Show Cause Order second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting.
 Return of Warrant showed that incorrect address By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
 Celera likewise failed to appear before the IBP despite certificates would already have been sufficient to
several notices establish the existence of two marriages entered into by
respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
ISSUE # 1: Whether complainant has sufficiently proven that Atty. accorded the full faith and credence given to public
Celera contracted a subsequent marriage during the subsistence documents. For purposes of this disbarment
of a prior valid marriage. proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the
name of respondent are competent and convincing
HELD # 1: YES. evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar
ISSUE # 2: What is the quantum of evidence required?  NB: Celera was disbarred

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. BEDE S.


HELD # 2: clear preponderant evidence TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
 A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely A.C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012
civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by EN BANC
the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to
be determined is whether respondent is still fit to FACTS:
continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation  Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent on the
of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for grounds of unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the
disbarment continues despite the desistance of a Code or Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of
complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying
the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to two other women while respondent’s first marriage was
answer the charges against him despite numerous subsisting.
notices. o On the third charge of gross immorality,
 In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the complainant accused respondent of
burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the committing two counts of bigamy for having
allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has married two other women while his first
been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable marriage was subsisting. He submitted a
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the
20 of 255 | P a g e
Office of the Civil Registrar General-National  We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by
Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. respondent. He has not disputed the authenticity or
Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies
marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to
Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in prove the former’s marriages to two other women aside
Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment
September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name
Piñon in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 of respondent are competent and convincing evidence
September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin proving that he committed bigamy, which renders him
Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents
 Respondent  assailed the Affidavit submitted by were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository
William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage
Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, and death of a person. Having been issued by a
since it had been retracted by the affiant himself. government agency, the NSO certification is accorded
o Respondent did not specifically address the much evidentiary weight and carries with it a
allegations regarding his alleged bigamous presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has
marriages with two other women. not presented any competent evidence to rebut those
documents.
ISSUE: Whether the subject certification issued by the issued by  According to the respondent, after the discovery of the
the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office second and the third marriages, he filed civil actions to
(NSO) is sufficient proof that respondent committed an act which annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached
warranted administrative punishment. Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations
therein treated the second and the third marriage
HELD: YES. contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special
 The third charge that respondent committed bigamy contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code
twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate this provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds
allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its
of the Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent amendment by the Family Code. Respondent’s regard
with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates
introduction of these documents, claiming that they were either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or
submitted after the administrative case had been his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action
submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code
to controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his provisions.
argument.  What has been clearly established here is the fact that
 We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui respondent entered into marriage twice while his first
generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v.
lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the Alejandro,56 we held thus:
procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we o We have in a number of cases disciplined
explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53 members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
o Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that
procedure — such as the verification of good moral character required of them not
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this only as a condition precedent for their
case, prescription of offenses or the filing of admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their
affidavits of desistance by the complainant — continued membership therein. No distinction
do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's has been made as to whether the misconduct
qualifications and fitness for membership in was committed in the lawyer’s professional
the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we capacity or in his private life. This is because a
see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, lawyer may not divide his personality so as to
admission to the practice of law is a be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
component of the administration of justice and at another. He is expected to be competent,
is a matter of public interest because it honorable and reliable at all times since he
involves service to the public. The admission who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his
qualifications are also qualifications for the private affairs, can hardly be expected to do
continued enjoyment of the privilege to so in his professional dealings nor lead others
practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or in doing so. Professional honesty and honor
the violation of the standards for the practice are not to be expected as the accompaniment
of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations.
concern that the State may inquire into The administration of justice, in which the
through this Court. lawyer plays an important role being an officer
 In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests of the court, demands a high degree of
upon the complainant.1âwphi1 For the court to exercise intellectual and moral competency on his part
its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent so that the courts and clients may rightly
must be established by convincing and satisfactory repose confidence in him.
proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-  Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
certified true copies to prove that respondent entered morality required of him as a member of the bar. He
into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing
the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and
assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138
dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but of the Revised Rules of Court.
denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He
submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed
separately with the RTC of Laguna – one in Biñan and
the other in Calamba – to declare the second and the
third Marriage Contracts null and void.

21 of 255 | P a g e
 Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise,
whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence
4. Declaration Of Nullity; NCC v. FC, AM 02-11-10 SC; Civil of such marriage even after the death of her father. The
Code; Muslim Code (PD 1083) said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement
JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the
and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent. case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute
SECOND DIVISION nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the
death of either party to the said marriage does not
FACTS: extinguish such cause of action.
 Eliseo Quiazon died intestate  Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s
 Respondent, claiming to be the natural child of Eliseo marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine
and represented by her mother, Eliseo’s common law whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void
spouse, filed for petition for letters of administration for being bigamous.
 Petitioners, previous spouse and children, respectively,  Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
of Eliseo, opposed said petition existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and
 Respondent impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac
been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San
marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said
 RTC  issued letters marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage
 CA  affirmed and the certification from the National Archive that no
o In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court information relative to the said marriage exists does not
of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We
that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
husband and wife by establishing a common celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility
residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up National Archive, given the interval of time, is not
to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the
of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the
the conclusion reached by the RTC that the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.

ISSUE: Whether CA was correct in declaring that petitioner Amelia


was not validly married to Eliseo, considering her then existing
marriage to one Filipito.

HELD: YES.
 Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the
Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to SULTAN PANDAGARANAO A. ILUPA, Complainant, vs.
Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, Clerk of Court II, Shari'a Circuit
no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the Court, Marawi City, Respondent.
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the A.M. No. SCC-11-16-P June 1, 2011
marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be (formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I No. 10-33-SCC [P])
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the THIRD DIVISION
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law FACTS:
in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code,  Complainant was married to Nella Rocaya Mikunug —
making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four- originally solemnized on May 19, 1959, based on the
square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no Maranao culture, and later renewed through a civil
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a wedding before a Marawi City judge
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s  Complainant filed the present complaint averring that
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their respondent issued a certificate of divorce on the basis of
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable an illegal "Kapasadan" or Agreement
marriages, to wit: o The complainant believes that the respondent
o Consequently, void marriages can be should not have issued the divorce certificate
questioned even after the death of either party because divorce is not recognized in the
but voidable marriages can be assailed only country and the "Kapasadan" or separation
during the lifetime of the parties and not after agreement had already been revoked by
death of either, in which case the parties and Philippine civil law.
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had o the complainant alleges that he signed the
been perfectly valid. That is why the action or "Kapasadan" because the Principal of the
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike Mindanao State University, a certain Mackno,
voidable marriages where the action and Police Officer Hadji Amin threatened to kill
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable him. For this reason, he wrote a letter to the
marriage can assail it but any proper SCC judge of Marawi City, assailing the
interested party may attack a void marriage.24 agreement; he even personally handed a copy
 It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no of the letter to the respondent who took no
marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of action on the matter.
rights, such that any interested party may attack the  Respondent  as court registrar, it is his ministerial duty
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, to accept and register marriage contracts, conversions to
which may be filed even beyond Islam and divorce certificates. When he performs this
22 of 255 | P a g e
duty, he assumes no responsibility with respect to the
entries made by the applicants or owners of the
documents to be registered.
o On the complainant’s claim that there is no
divorce in the Philippines, the respondent
points out that this is true only as far as the
civil law is concerned, but not under the
Muslim Law which recognizes divorce. The
civil marriage they subsequently entered into
was just an affirmation of their marriage vows ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF
under the Muslim Law. THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and
ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the legality of the subject divorce may be G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
questioned in the present case. FIRST DIVISION

HELD # 1: NO. FACTS:


 Anent the legality of the divorce of the complainant and  Petitioner and then Senator Mamintal A.J. Tamano were
Dr. Nella Rocaya Mikunug-Ilupa, this Office is bereft of first married under Islamic laws and subsequently before
any authority to rule on the matter. The issue is judicial an RTC judge of Lanao del Sur.
in nature which cannot be assailed through this o During the latter marriage, Sen. Tamano
administrative proceeding. declared himself as divorced
 Upon death of Sen. Tamano, herein PRs sought before
ISSUE # 2: Whether respondent was correct in issuing a RTC QC that his marriage with petitioner be declared
certification of divorce, in view of the governing laws. void ab initio
o The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen.
HELD # 2: YES. Tamano married PR Zorayda on May 31, 1958
 We agree with the OCA and Judge Disalo that the under civil rites, and that this marriage
complaint is devoid of merit. The issuance of a certificate remained subsisting when he married
of divorce is within the respondent’s duties, as defined Estrellita in 1993.
by law. Articles 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code of the o Petitioner  filed an MD averring that RTC
Philippines provide: QC had no jurisdiction over the complaint,
o Article 81. District Registrar. - The Clerk of considering that her marriage with Sen.
Court of the Shari’a District Court shall, in Tamano was under Islam laws
addition to his regular functions, act as District o RTC, CA and SC, however, all upheld RTC’s
Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, jurisdiction over said complaint
Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions  RTC  finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and
within the territorial jurisdiction of said court. Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamano’s
The Clerk of Court of the Shari’a Circuit Court subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for
shall act as Circuit Registrar of Muslim being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of
Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of
and Conversations within his jurisdiction. the Philippines
o Article 83. Duties of Circuit Registrar. - Every  CA  adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to Sen.
Circuit Registrar shall: Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning
 a) File every certificate of marriage that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is
(which shall specify the nature and governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for
amount of the dower agreed upon), an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial
divorce or revocation of divorce and celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent
conversion and such other Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then,
documents presented to him for according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the
registration; action as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence, the
 b) Compile said certificates monthly, injured party in the senator’s subsequent bigamous
prepare and send any information marriage with Estrellita.
required of him by the District  Petitioner  steadfast in her belief that her marriage
Registrar; with the late senator is valid as the latter was already
 c) Register conversions involving divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married
Islam; her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to
 d) Issue certified transcripts or the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need
copies of any certificate or of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both
document registered upon payment parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized
of the required fees[.] under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano
 We quote with approval the following excerpt from the married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to
OCA’s Report: by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.
o Evidently, respondent Clerk of Court merely
performed his ministerial duty in accordance ISSUE: Whether petitioner is correct in her contention that her
with the foregoing provisions. The alleged marriage with Sen. Tamano should be governed by Islam laws,
erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce hence, is not bigamous.
cannot be attributed to respondent Clerk of
Court considering that it is only his duty to HELD: NO.
receive, file and register the certificate of  The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the
divorce presented to him for registration. late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated
Further, even if there were indeed erroneous by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to
entries on the certificate of divorce, such Estrellita is void ab initio.
errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled  The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and
through [his] administrative complaint. Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil
and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing
marriage relationships between Muslims and non-
23 of 255 | P a g e
Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the  Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the
provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of the Civil which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under
Code, divorce is not recognized except during the Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to
effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration
availed of during its effectivity. of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano
 As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of  Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a
divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity
personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply
Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both  In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a spouses may file the petition to the exclusion of
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the o The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Separation and Provisional Orders explicates
Muslim rites."53 on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
 Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February  (1) Only an aggrieved or injured
4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the spouse may file petitions for
Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the annulment of voidable marriages
marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former and declaration of absolute nullity of
explicitly provided for the prospective application of its void marriages. Such petitions
provisions unless otherwise provided: cannot be filed by the compulsory or
o Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. — intestate heirs of the spouses or by
Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this the State. [Section 2; Section 3,
Code shall be governed by the laws in force at paragraph a]
the time of their execution, and nothing herein  Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
except as otherwise specifically provided, shall for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
affect their validity or legality or operate to absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
extinguish any right acquired or liability be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
incurred thereby. or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they
 It has been held that: do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory
o The foregoing provisions are consistent with or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
the principle that all laws operate death of their predecessor, and hence can only question
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
is clearly, plainly and unequivocably death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
every case of doubt will be resolved against courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57
aforecited enunciates the general rule of the  Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a)
Muslim Code to have its provisions applied of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or
prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed,
and effect of a pre-existing body of law, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an
specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s  The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take
enactment. action if he or she had only discovered during the
 An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
Code is Article 186(2) which states: especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished.
o A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the
to the effectivity of this Code in accordance bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
with non-Muslim law shall be considered as would file an action to declare the marriage void and
one contracted under Muslim law provided the thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
spouses register their mutual desire to this should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
effect. previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
 Even granting that there was registration of mutual party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
consent for the marriage to be considered as one financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden
mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will
still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and
was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code protected by the Constitution.
governs their personal status since this was in effect at  Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes
the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of the son from impugning the subsequent
Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda
time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for
correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio. nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs
 Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is
personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage. prospective in application and does not apply to cases
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband already commenced before March 15, 2003.
or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective  Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity
in application and does not shut out the prior spouse of Estrellita’s marriage in November 1994. While the
from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party
marriage. who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held
24 of 255 | P a g e
that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions"
place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested rather than to the word "marriages."
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally  A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. is no room for construction or interpretation. There is
02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain,
of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or
 Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is
couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the
preserve their respective rights which include striking words of a statute there should be no departure."10
down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA  There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the
Decision correctly rendered. tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance
of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner, vs. DANILO T. BOLOS, warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and
Respondent. again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010 must be faithfully complied with and should not be
SECOND DIVISION discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the
FACTS: time for doing specific acts or for taking certain
 Petitioner sought that her marriage with respondent be proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to
declared null and void prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly
 RTC  granted petition and declared marriage null and discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these
void rules are regarded as mandatory.12
 Respondent timely filed a notice of appeal but the same  The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s
was denied by RTC on the ground of failing to avail first motion for extension of time to file a motion for
of the remedy of MR reconsideration considering that the reglementary period
 Respondent filed a petition for certiorari for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-
o Danilo also prayed that he be declared extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
psychologically capacitated to render the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13
essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who  The rule is and has been that the period for filing a
should be declared guilty of abandoning him, motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court
the family home and their children. has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas
 CA  reversed RTC Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has
o he appellate court stated that the requirement consistently and strictly adhered thereto.
of a motion for reconsideration as a  Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11- appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
10-SC did not apply in this case as the reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s
marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a
Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the
of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner
Medinaceli3 to the effect that the "coverage [of filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those same decision was already beyond the review
marriages entered into during the effectivity of jurisdiction of this Court.
the Family Code which took effect on August  In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting
3, 1988." aside the RTC decision which denied due course to
respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for
ISSUE: Whether A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable in the present extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
case so as to require respondent to avail of the remedy of MR first  Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its
prior to appealing the adverse decision. purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the
lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with
HELD: NO. caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to
 Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las
case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While the
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10- nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system
SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is and courts should proceed with caution so as not to
explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure
o Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for
petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the
void marriages and annulment of voidable constraints of technicalities.
marriages under the Family Code of the  In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the
Philippines. fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal
 The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct
 The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC institution of marriage.
leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to  No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage
those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof
rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:
by the Family Code and those solemnized under the o Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of
Civil Code.8 permanent union between a man and a
 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s woman entered into in accordance with law for
interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in the establishment of conjugal and family life. It
25 of 255 | P a g e
is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, ISSUE # 1: Whether A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should be given
consequences, and incidents are governed by retroactive application insofar as its provision that only the spouses
law and not subject to stipulation, except that may petition for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage is
marriage settlements may fix the property concerned.
relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. HELD # 1: NO.
 This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to  Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact
protect and strengthen the family as the basic to the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.)
autonomous social institution and marriage as the No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute
foundation of the family.16 Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
 Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.
a mere contract, but a social institution in which the  Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation
and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
of the family members.17 covered by the Family Code and those solemnized
under the regime of the Civil Code.9 Specifically, A.M.
ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988,
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010 but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
THIRD DIVISION application, is confined only to proceedings commenced
after March 15, 2003.
FACTS:  Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions
 Petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage excepted from the limitation, to wit:
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late o 1. Those commenced before March 15,
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-
o petitioner alleged that the marriage between 10-SC; and
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated o 2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages
without a marriage license, due to such celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
license being issued only on January 9, 1950, Code and, those celebrated under the
thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio regime of the Family Code prior to March
for having been solemnized without a 15, 2003.
marriage license. He insisted that his being  Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano
the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949,
died without any issue entitled him to one-half the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in
of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
before his death, thereby making him a real Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to
party in interest; and that any person, himself the marriage as having the right to initiate the action
included, could impugn the validity of the for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M.
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the
any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, petitioner.
due to the marriage being void ab initio  The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on
 RTC  dismissed the petition on the ff grounds: who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
o 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog,12
prescribed) the children were allowed to file after the death of their
o 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their
(contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and father’s marriage to their stepmother contracted on
Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license.
solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot). There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage
 CA  affirmed RTC and a voidable one, and explained how and when each
o While an action to declare the nullity of a might be impugned, thuswise:
marriage considered void from the beginning o Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that
does not prescribe, the law nonetheless no judicial decree is necessary in order to
requires that the same action must be filed by establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void
the proper party, which in this case should be marriage does not require a judicial decree to
filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In restore the parties to their original rights or to
the instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro make the marriage void but though no
Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, sentence of avoidance be absolutely
who is not a party to the marriage contracted necessary, yet as well for the sake of good
by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. order of society as for the peace of mind of all
The contention of petitioner-appellant that he concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
is considered a real party in interest under marriage should be ascertained and declared
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil by the decree of a court of competent
Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances,
injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply the effect of a void marriage, so far as
misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage concerns the conferring of legal rights upon
will not prosper if persons other than those the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
specified in the law file the case. taken place. And therefore, being good for no
o Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained
spouse is not the proper party to file the in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
subject petition. More so that the surviving may be material, either direct or collateral, in
wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not any civil court between any parties at any
even impleaded as a party to said case. time, whether before or after the death of
26 of 255 | P a g e
either or both the husband and the wife, and widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated or their children to the other half.
as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a o Article 1003. If there are no descendants,
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the to the entire estate of the deceased in
death of either, the marriage cannot be accordance with the following articles.
impeached, and is made good ab initio. But  Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the
provides that there must be a judicial deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner
declaration of the nullity of a previous from succeeding to the deceased’s estate.18 Necessarily,
marriage, though void, before a party can therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action
enter into a second marriage and such hinges upon a prior determination of whether
absolute nullity can be based only on a final Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or
judgment to that effect. For the same reason, children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the
the law makes either the action or defense for petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir.
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage Such prior determination must be made by the trial court,
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
either party would extinguish the cause of  As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously
action or the ground for defense, then the resolved the issue presented in this case. We reverse
same cannot be considered imprescriptible their error, in order that the substantial right of the
 However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an  Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s surviving
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or wife,19stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a under the old Civil Code required a marriage license for
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is made all the more necessary in order to shed light on
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. whether the marriage had been celebrated without a
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration marriage license and whether the marriage might have
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of who must be joined herein:
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need o xxx under any and all conditions, [her]
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. presence being a sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power.
ISSUE # 2: Whether petitioner, as brother of the deceased, may be  It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before
considered as the real party in interest in the present petition for the court [that] the action should be dismissed." The
declaration of nullity of marriage between the latter and Leonila absence of an indispensable party renders all
Honato. subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
HELD # 2: YES. even as to those present.
 It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in
the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD
giving a license to just any person to bring an action to SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or
declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL
Carlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.
who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in THIRD DIVISION
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in FACTS:
interest.15 Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a  Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate
"proper interest" can file the action.16 Interest within the and left their properties to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo
meaning of the rule means material interest, or an Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos
interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment  Teofilo then died intestate and was survived by
of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II
the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One (Teofilo II)
having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the  Petitioner then instituted an action before the RTC
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the against respondents with the following causes of action:
plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child;
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.17 (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum
 Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late of money and damages.
Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that o In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the
the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of
will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. the absence of the required marriage license.
Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a He likewise maintained that his deceased
compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the brother was neither the natural nor the
right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article  Respondents  contended that the dearth of details
1003 of the Civil Code, as follows: regarding the requisite marriage license did not
o Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents
their children survive with the widow or
27 of 255 | P a g e
declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-
deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman. 10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the
 RTC  Declared the marriage between defendant effectivity of the Civil Code.
Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at  Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage.
 CA  reversed The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by
o Moreover, even if We were to sustain the stating:
applicability of the rules on summary judgment o SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute
to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record nullity of void marriages.
shows that the finding of the court a quo for  (a) Who may file. - A petition for
appellee would still not be warranted. While it declaration of absolute nullity of void
may be readily conceded that a valid marriage marriage may be filed solely by the
license is among the formal requisites of husband or the wife. (Underscoring
marriage, the absence of which renders the supplied)
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article  Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the
80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of
the failure to reflect the serial number of the absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the
marriage license on the marriage contract Rule is enlightening, viz.:
evidencing the marriage between Teofilo o Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee declaration of absolute nullity of void
represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses
Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said or by the State. The Committee is of the belief
marriage license is corroborated by the that they do not have a legal right to file the
following statement in the affidavit executed by petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit: predecessor, and, hence, can only question
 "That as far as I could remember, the validity of the marriage of the spouses
there was a marriage license issued upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 the settlement of the estate of the deceased
as basis of the said marriage spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
contract executed by Teofilo Carlos hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
and Felicidad Sandoval, but the marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17
number of said marriage license (Underscoring supplied)
was inadvertently not placed in the  The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife
marriage contract for the reason that are the sole architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful
it was the Office Clerk who filled up marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when
the blanks in the Marriage Contract and how to build the foundations of marriage. The
who in turn, may have overlooked spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life.
the same." They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their
o Rather than the inferences merely drawn by matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and
the trial court, We are of the considered view should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance
that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing with the grounds allowed by law.
statement as well as the motivations  The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
underlying the same should be properly sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered
threshed out in a trial of the case on the by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
merits. Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered
o If the non-presentation of the marriage into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is effect on August 3, 1988.18
not proof that a marriage did not take place,  The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
neither should appellants' non-presentation of of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the
the subject marriage license be taken as proof right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a
that the same was not procured. The burden nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse.
of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it
But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory
must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff
or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
and any doubt should be resolved in favor of
 While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
the validity of the marriage.
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the standing to question the validity
the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any
of the subject marriage.
recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the
HELD: remanded to determine whether petitioner is a real party in
interest Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
 ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death
prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
courts.19
judgment.
 It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply
 A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
although the marriage involved is within the coverage of
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which
28 of 255 | P a g e
became effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in divorce decree was obtained which allowed
its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.: dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of
o As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10- marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas
SC covers marriages under the Family Code Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
of the Philippines, and is prospective in its same.29 (Underscoring supplied)
application.22 (Underscoring supplied)  The case must be remanded to determine whether or
 Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest to seek the
against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law  In the case at bench, the records reveal that when
would govern depends upon when the marriage took Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
place. compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son,
 The marriage having been solemnized prior to the Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to
celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may succeed by operation of law.
bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this  If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not
mean that any person can bring an action for the to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of
declaration of nullity of marriage? Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek
 We respond in the negative. The absence of a the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that
license for any person to institute a nullity of collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire
marriage case. Such person must appear to be the successional right over the estate if the decedent dies
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the  Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial
avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the
be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack
and defended in the name of the real party-in- of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo
interest.26 II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of
 Interest within the meaning of the rule means material Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from 5. Arts. 15-17, 50-5, NCC; Art.26, FC; Divorce [Filipino;
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere Foreigner; Parenting; Children, Property Rights;
incidental interest. One having no material interest to Succession rights]; Declaratory Relief; Rule 108; Art. 412
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as NCC
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-
in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack  Articles 15, 16, 17, 50, 51 NCC
of cause of action.
 Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
Appeals,28 where the Court held: status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
o True, under the New Civil Code which is the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
law in force at the time the respondents were
married, or even in the Family Code, there is
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
no specific provision as to who can file a
to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
however, only a party who can demonstrate However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
"proper interest" can file the same. A petition respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
to declare the nullity of marriage, like any successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
other actions, must be prosecuted or defended provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
in the name of the real party-in-interest and whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held that the said property may be found. (10a)
children have the personality to file the petition
to declare the nullity of marriage of their Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
deceased father to their stepmother as it other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
affects their successional rights country in which they are executed.
o In fine, petitioner's personality to file the When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic
petition to declare the nullity of marriage or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
cannot be ascertained because of the foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign shall be observed in their execution.
law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
the trial court for reception of additional and those which have for their object public order, public policy
evidence is necessary to determine whether and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
decree and whether the foreign law which agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
decree was obtained and the same did not civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of
allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then their habitual residence. (40a)
the trial court should declare respondent's
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but
Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any
reduced the amount of moral damages from
other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the
P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary
same shall be understood to be the place where their legal
damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00.
On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid
29 of 255 | P a g e
representation is established or where they exercise their MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA
principal functions. (41a) MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
 Article 26 FC REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they SECOND DIVISION
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), FACTS:
(5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)  Minori Fujiki, a Japanese, married Maria Paz Galela
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner Marinay in the Philippine on 23 January 2004, but was
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained unable to bring his wife to Japan, and eventually lost
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, contact with each other.
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under  Without the first marriage being dissolved, in 2008,
Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227) Marinay married Shinichi Maekara, who brought Marinay
to Japan. After suffering abuse from Maekara, Marinay
was able to reestablish her relationship with Fujiki, who
 Rule 108
helped her obtain a judgment from a family court in
Japan, in 2010, which declared the marriage between
RULE 108 Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry  Fujiki filed with the RTC a petition for the recognition of
the foreign judgment, which the RTC denied, as it
Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any considered the petition as a collateral attack on the
act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating ISSUE # 1: Whether recognition of a foreign judgment may be
thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the province where made under Rule 108.
the corresponding civil registry is located.
HELD # 1: YES. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births: (b) marriage; (c) registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. … [I]n Corpuz v. Sto.
deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial party or a particular fact."
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (o) changes of name. ISSUE # 2: Whether Fujiki has personality to file the petition under
Rule 108.
Section 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all HELD # 2: YES. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.
There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
Section 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These
province. property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving
Section 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person the property regime of the marriage.
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
such notice, file his opposition thereto. Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
Section 6. Expediting proceedings. — The court in which the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule
proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such Family Court.
proceedings.
ISSUE # 3: Whether a resort to Rule 108, for the recognition of a
Section 7. Order. — After hearing, the court may either dismiss foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the
the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or parties is a citizen of the foreign country, substitutes for the proper
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the action in invalidating a marriage.
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who
shall annotated the same in his record. HELD # 3: NO. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action
to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
 Article 412 NCC recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes
a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
Article 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
corrected, without a judicial order. (n) recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage

30 of 255 | P a g e
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither  At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special
can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC
in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner, vs. married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent. concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of
G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012 bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still
SECOND DIVISION existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the
findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage
FACTS: between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA
 Orlando, a naturalized American, married petitioner after held that petitioner was not an interested party in the
obtaining a divorce from previous wife, Felicitas Amor estate of Orlando.
 Orlando died intestate  Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the
 Petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for issuance of bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed,
letters of administration we had already ruled that under the principles of comity,
 Respondent, one of Orlando’s children during his first our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
marriage, opposed the same contending that petitioner spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was
is not a party in interest established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
o Respondent alleged that a criminal case for Jr.7 wherein we said:
bigamy was filed against petitioner before o It is true that owing to the nationality principle
Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Pangasinan Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
o Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint against absolute divorces[,] the same being
for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted considered contrary to our concept of public
a second marriage to Orlando despite having policy and morality. However, aliens may
been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 obtain divorces abroad, which may be
December 1959. recognized in the Philippines, provided they
o RTC had acquitted petitioner of the charge are valid according to their national law. In
 The trial court ruled that since the this case, the divorce in Nevada released
deceased was a divorced American private respondent from the marriage from the
citizen, and since that divorce was standards of American law, under which
not recognized under Philippine divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx
jurisdiction, the marriage between  We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of
him and petitioner was not valid. Appeals,8 to wit:
 it took note of the action for o In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing
declaration of nullity then pending to the nationality principle embodied in Article
action with the trial court in Dagupan 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
City filed by Felicitas Amor against are covered by the policy against absolute
the deceased and petitioner. It divorces, the same being considered contrary
considered the pending action to be to our concept of public policy and morality. In
a prejudicial question in determining the same case, the Court ruled that aliens
the guilt of petitioner for the crime of may obtain divorces abroad, provided they
bigamy. are valid according to their national law.
 CONCLUSION OF RTC: petitioner  Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v.
was never married to Eusebio Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was
Bristol no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce
 RTC  dismissed petition for letters of administration from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
 CA  The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right
filed her petition for letters of administration. As a to inherit" from him.
spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to  In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce
administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
marriage certificate, like any other public document, is Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and
only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
and was acquitted has not been disputed by the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by persons.
contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the  For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the
first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction
deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the as a matter of comity. xxx
petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her  Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven
subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,9 to wit:
been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt o Respondent is getting ahead of himself.
from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. Before a foreign judgment is given
There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary presumptive evidentiary value, the document
finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a must first be presented and admitted in
stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the trial court is in place. the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
ISSUE: Whether the acquittal of petitioner of the bigamy charge written act or record of an act of an official
against her rendered her marriage with Orlando invalid. body or tribunal of a foreign country.
 Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
HELD: remanded for the purpose of proving the validity of the hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
divorce and the subsequent marriage or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
31 of 255 | P a g e
officer having legal custody of the document. If the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to
service stationed in the foreign country in which the the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party,
office. vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case,
 The divorce decree between respondent and Editha as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Australian family court. However, appearance is not Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him,
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on would be on file with the Civil Registry Office.
evidence must be demonstrated.  Pasig City Civil Registry then recorded the divorce
 Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, based on the mere presentation of the decree
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility,
but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the ISSUE # 1: Whether petitioner may invoke Article 26 so as to
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court recognize the divorce decree that he himself obtained in Canada.
ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and HELD # 1: NO
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure  The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
to object properly rendered the divorce decree paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
Sydney, Australia. spouse
 Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of  The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no legislative history and intent behind the second
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is  The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
laws. citizens.18
 Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and  Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted
respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of
kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
78 of the Revised Rules of Court. o Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
 Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party force in the country where they were
to be issued the letters of administration over the estate solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
of Orlando B. Catalan be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. 36, 37 and 38.
TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents. o Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010 and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
THIRD DIVISION divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
FACTS: remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
 Petitioner is a former Filipino who became a naturalized have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Canadian citizen  Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
 He then married PR, a Filipina, in PH Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the
 He later on found out that PR was having an affair, thus, law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20
was constrained to obtain a divorce decree in Canada and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court
 Petitioner then sought before the RTC that said court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of
recognize the divorce decree under Art 26 of FC marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree
 RTC  denied petition between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus,
recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed
o concluded that Gerbert was not the proper
the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
party to institute the action for judicial
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he
is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that o To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the
only the Filipino spouse can avail of the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article married to [the alien spouse] and still subject
26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just.
to be able to remarry under Philippine law. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
 Petitioner  asserts that his petition before the RTC is
and render support to [the alien spouse]. The
essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
latter should not continue to be one of her
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
She should not be discriminated against in her
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind
own country if the ends of justice are to be
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
served.22
he contends that the provision applies as well to the
32 of 255 | P a g e
 As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of
in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse  Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO
the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of
benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce which required a final order from a competent Philippine
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage,
of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void
of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign and cannot produce any legal effect.
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted  Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second  Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
 Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court and procedural requirements that must be complied with
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No requires, among others, that the verified petition must be
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar filed with the RTC of the province where the
declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil
established by the decree), whose status and legal registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
capacity are generally governed by his national law.26 must be made parties to the proceedings;39 and that the
 Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and time and place for hearing must be published in a
the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Rules of Court.
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this  We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should
provision. not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings
 The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and
for its recognition in this jurisdiction another specifically for cancellation of the entry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
ISSUE # 2: Whether the subject divorce was properly recorded by foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
the Civil Registry. proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
HELD # 2: NO. precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
 Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41
persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities,
that produce legal consequences touching upon a want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting mistake of law or fact.
"all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO
will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
being married or not." G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
 A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a FIRST DIVISION
foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and
status that must be recorded. FACTS:
 But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree  Respondent married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in PH
in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the and they begot 2 children
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the  Lady went to US, became an American citizen, obtained
decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation a divorce decree and married a certain Innocent Stanley
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the  Respondent, upon learning the foregoing, filed with the
foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce  OSG  contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
totally out of turn and without authority of law when it because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is,
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to
33 of 255 | P a g e
file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that supplied)
governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this  On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to
is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
ISSUE # 1: Whether a petition for declaratory relief is the proper celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino
recourse in the present case. citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at
the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
HELD # 1: YES. two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
 At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides: in the U.S.A.
o Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person  Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the
interested under a deed, will, contract or other Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the
written instrument, or whose rights are Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
affected by a statute, executive order or Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental o 1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates
regulation may, before breach or violation against those whose spouses are Filipinos
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate who divorce them abroad. These spouses who
Regional Trial Court to determine any question are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while
of construction or validity arising, and for a the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. them abroad can.
 The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) o 2. This is the beginning of the recognition of
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens.
controversy must be between persons whose interests For those whose foreign spouses validly
are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a divorce them abroad will also be considered to
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We
ripe for judicial determination.8 propose that this be deleted and made into
 law only after more widespread consultation.
 This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of  Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.  Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
second marriage. Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
ISSUE # 2: Whether Article 26 may be applied in the present case  Does the same principle apply to a case where at the
concerning a Filipino husband a naturalized American wife. time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
HELD # 2: YES but there was no sufficient evidence showing that foreign citizenship by naturalization?
wife was indeed able to acquire divorce decree which capacitated o The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the
her to remarry. 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In
 On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino
into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as citizens when they got married. The wife
the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. became a naturalized American citizen in
Article 26 thereof states: 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year.
o All marriages solemnized outside the The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter
Philippines in accordance with the laws in dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
force in the country where they were naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also married under Philippine law and can thus
be valid in this country, except those remarry.
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38. o Thus, taking into consideration the legislative
 On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the interpreted to include cases involving parties
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article who, at the time of the celebration of the
26. As so amended, it now provides: marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
o ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
Philippines in accordance with the laws in citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
force in the country where they were Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
be valid in this country, except those at the time of the solemnization of the
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
36, 37 and 38. sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a interpretation of a statute according to its
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter exact and literal import would lead to
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating mischievous results or contravene the clear
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have purpose of the legislature, it should be

34 of 255 | P a g e
construed according to its spirit and reason, American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of had remarried an American, that respondent is now
the law. A statute may therefore be extended capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be
to cases not within the literal meaning of its made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or aforecited evidence in his favor.
intent.12
o If we are to give meaning to the legislative 6. Article 36 FC; AM 02-11-10 SC; See also Articles 48, 68-71,
intent to avoid the absurd situation where the 220-221 & 225 FC
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
instant case must be deemed as coming with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
Article 26. solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
 In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
o 1. There is a valid marriage that has been nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
foreigner; and
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
o 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
remarry. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
 The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties
confession of judgment. (88a)
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
 In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has help and support. (109a)
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
allowed to remarry. exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
 We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the solidarity of the family. (110a)
proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal
this particular case, not even feasible, considering that obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in
the marriage of the parties appears to have all the the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate
badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate
the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino properties. (111a)
spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
spouse.
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and
 However, we note that the records are bereft of
the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management
competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
(115a)
respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not evidence. Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority
 Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on
must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as wards the following rights and duties:
an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce (1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing (2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts companionship and understanding;
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate
fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would (4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational
be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association
capacitated to enter into another marriage. with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them
 Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. morals;
209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be (5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been (6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign (7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, circumstances; and
considering that in the present petition there is no (8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are parents and guardians. (316a)
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
35 of 255 | P a g e
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority obligation and that such incapacity existed at
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the the time of marriage.
acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their o It held that Maribel’s personality disorder is not
company and under their parental authority subject to the the psychological incapacity contemplated by
appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a law. Her refusal to perform the essential
) marital obligations may be attributed merely to
her stubborn refusal to do so
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal ISSUE: Whether respondent’s continuous refusal to have sexual
guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common intercourse with petitioner constituted psychological incapacity.
child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is HELD: NO.
a judicial order to the contrary.
 The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals21 that the
Where the market value of the property or the annual income
phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to
of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to
required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value
causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic
of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the
expressed by Article 6822 of the Family Code, include
proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place
respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
where the property or any part thereof is situated.
intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding
serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article
meaning and significance to the marriage.
shall be heard and resolved.
 In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory
was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was
except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or
psychologically incapacitated. Noel’s evidence merely
the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which
established that Maribel refused to have sexual
case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a)
intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she
left him after their quarrel when he confronted her about
NOEL B. BACCAY, Petitioner, vs. MARIBEL C. BACCAY and her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and
G.R. No. 173138 December 1, 2010 establish the requirements of gravity, juridical
THIRD DIVISION antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by
the CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded
FACTS: that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
 After PR informed him that she was pregnant, petitioner Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood,
allegedly grudgingly agreed to marry PR did not establish how the personality disorder
 According to petitioner, PR never showed any sign of incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the
pregnancy and, one night, did not go home and told essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same
petitioner that she had a miscarriage psychologist even testified that Maribel was capable of
 They quarreled and PR left petitioner’s parents’ home entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult
 After 2 years of marriage, petitioner finally sought that for her to sustain one.24 Mere difficulty, it must be
the same be nullified on the ground of respondent’s stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.
psychological incapacity  The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon
 RTC  granted petition petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent
o The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such
the essential marital obligations of marriage, psychological disorder renders her "truly incognitive of
and such failure was due to a personality the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
disorder called Narcissistic Personality assumed and discharged by the parties to the
Disorder characterized by juridical marriage."25 Psychological incapacity must be more
antecedence, gravity and incurability as than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the
determined by a clinical psychologist. The performance of some marital obligations. An
RTC cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
clinical psychologist presented as witness by As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:26
Noel, that Maribel was a very insecure person. o Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not
She entered into the marriage not because of to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
emotional desire for marriage but to prove marital bond at the time the causes therefor
something, and her attitude was exploitative manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
particularly in terms of financial rewards. She psychological illness afflicting a party even
was emotionally immature, and viewed before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
marriage as a piece of paper and that she can malady so grave and so permanent as to
easily get rid of her husband without any deprive one of awareness of the duties and
provocation responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
 CA  reversed about to assume. x x x.
o The CA further held that Maribel’s refusal to
have sexual intercourse with Noel did not REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. RODOLFO O.
constitute a ground to find her psychologically DE GRACIA, Respondent.
incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014
Code. As Noel admitted, he had numerous
sexual relations with Maribel before their FACTS:
marriage. Maribel therefore cannot be said to  Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15,
be incapacitated to perform this particular 1969.

36 of 255 | P a g e
 Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of nullity Code, among others,34 include their mutual obligations
of marriage before the RTC alleging that Natividad was to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
essential marital obligations. the intendment of the law has been to confine the
 Rodolfo testified, among others, that when he decided to meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
join and train with the army, Natividad left their conjugal serious cases of personality disorders clearly
home and sold their house without his consent. demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she meaning and significance to the marriage.35 In Santos
lived with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore v. CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that
him a child named Julie Ann Terez. After cohabiting with psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a)
Terez, Natividad contracted a second marriage on gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence
Cagayan de Oro City. From the time Natividad (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care antedating the marriage, although the overt
of Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza and he exerted earnest manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and
efforts to save their marriage which, however, proved (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it
futile because of Natividad’s psychological incapacity were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
that appeared to be incurable. the party involved).37 The Court laid down more
 Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application
during trial, despite service of summons.Nonetheless, of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils.
she informed the court that she submitted herself for v. CA,38 whose salient points are footnoted
psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) hereunder.39 These guidelines incorporate the basic
in response to Rodolfo’s claims. Rodolfo also underwent requirements that the Court established in Santos.40
the same examination.  Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v.
 In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report, Dr. Zalsos CA,41 held that therein respondent’s emotional
stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these
essential marital obligations, finding that both parties acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which
suffered from "utter emotional immaturity [which] is make her completely unable to discharge the essential
unusual and unacceptable behavior considered [as] marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
deviant from persons who abide by established norms of her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42 In the
conduct." As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that same light, the Court, in the case of Pesca v. Pesca43
she lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a (Pesca), ruled against a declaration of nullity, as
mother to her two daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to petitioner therein "utterly failed, both in her allegations in
perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let
noted that the mental condition of both parties already alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as
existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage,"
although it only manifested after. significantly noting that the "[e]motional immaturity and
 OSG  filed an opposition to the complaint, contending irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
that the acts committed by Natividad did not psychological incapacity." In Pesca, the Court upheld the
demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated appellate court’s finding that the petitioner therein had
by law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under not established that her husband "showed signs of
the Family Code. mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly
 RTC  declared the marriage between Rodolfo and incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided
Natividad void on the ground of psychological incapacity. for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is
It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos, grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that
holding that Natividad’s emotional immaturity exhibited a his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is
behavioral pattern which in psychiatry constitutes a form because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the
of personality disorder that existed at the time of the root cause of the incapacity has been identified
parties’ marriage but manifested only thereafter. It medically or clinically, and has been proven by an
likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsos’s observation that expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and
Natividad’s condition is incurable since it is deeply incurable in nature."44
rooted within the make-up of her personality.  The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based
 Republic appealed to the CA on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient
 CA  affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding that while factual or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s
Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual
promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to promiscuity, can be equated with psychological
psychological incapacity, "their degree or severity, as incapacity.
duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has sufficiently  The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the
established a case of psychological disorder so profound psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does
as to render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform her not, however, explain in reasonable detail how
essential marital obligations." Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave,
deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
ISSUE: Whether the acts committed by Natividad demonstrate psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from
psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. failing to disclose the types of psychological tests which
she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to
HELD: identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's
 "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a condition and to show that it existed at the time of the
marriage under Article 3632 of the Family Code, should parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness
refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – of Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be described in Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the finding
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's
which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the Family condition remains unsupported by any factual or
37 of 255 | P a g e
scientific basis and, hence, appears to be drawn out as a merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,
bare conclusion and even self-serving. In the same vein, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff bears
Dr. Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is essentially a the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the
reiteration of her report, also fails to convince the Court existence at the time of the celebration of marriage),
of her conclusion that Natividad was psychologically gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant
incapacitated. Verily, although expert opm10ns furnished spouse.
by psychologists regarding the psychological  In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s
temperament of parties are usually given considerable alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the
weight by the courts, the existence of psychological dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her
incapacity must still be proven by independent subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as
evidence.45 After poring over the records, the Court, his continued financial support to her and their children
however, does not find any such evidence sufficient even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely
enough to uphold the court a quo's nullity declaration. To mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin
the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as  In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply
would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute
Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
duties is another. To hark back to what has been earlier disordered personality that completely prevented the
discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to support
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and
meaning and significance to the marriage.46 In the final abandonment were manifestations of any psychological
analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this illness.
nature to exist in the present case. Thus, for these  Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological
reasons, coupled too with the recognition that marriage evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged
is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation,
the family, the instant petition is hereby granted. in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any
major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores’ observation on
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CESAR Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our
ENCELAN, Respondent. mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013 conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage –
SECOND DIVISION psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital
union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved,
FACTS: a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply
 Respondent and Lolita married in PH and begot 2 be equated with her professional/work relationship;
children workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles
 While respondent was in Saudi Arabia, he learned that apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring
Lolita was allegedly having an affair with one Alvin Perez from human relationship, their relatedness and
and had left their conjugal home with their children to live relevance to one another should be fully established for
with Alvin them to be compared or to serve as measures of
 Upon arriving in PH, respondent sought that his comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation
marriage with Lolita be declared null and void on the report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal
 Lolita  denied the allegations; said that she left the to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work
conjugal home because of differences with respondent’s out a good marital relationship30 is a mere
mother generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a
 RTC  granted petition rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.
 CA  originally reversed RTC but, upon  In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence
reconsideration, nullified the marriage of Lolita’s psychological incapacity; thus, the CA
o In its amended decision,20 the CA found two committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its
circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious original decision.
psychological incapacity that resulted in her  Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable
gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal social institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt
to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence
and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of and continuation and against its dissolution and
abandoning the conjugal dwelling. nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the
ISSUE: Whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s other during the marriage.
marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD: NO.
 Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological
incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE HON.
after its solemnization." COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C.
 In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly DE QUINTOS, .JR., Respondents.
stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of FIRST DIVISION
and to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not
38 of 255 | P a g e
FACTS: start with, no evidence showing the root cause of her
 Respondent married Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos alleged borderline personality disorder and that such
in PH but they did not beget any child disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have
 After a few years, respondent sought that their marriage repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the
be nullified on the ground of Catalina’s psychological psychological incapacity must be identified as a
incapacity psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully
o Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their explained and established by the totality of the evidence
house without his consent; that she engaged presented during trial.29
in petty arguments with him; that she  What we can gather from the scant evidence that
constantly refused to give in to his sexual Eduardo adduced was Catalina’s immaturity and
needs; that she spent most of her time apparent refusal to perform her marital obligations.
gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the However, her immaturity alone did not constitute
household chores and caring for their adopted psychological incapacity.30 To rule that such immaturity
daughter; that she squandered by gambling all amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown
his remittances as an overseas worker in that the immature acts were manifestations of a
Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the disordered personality that made the spouse completely
conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
Castro, her paramour marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth
 RTC  granted petition or immaturity
 CA  affirmed  we held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be proof of
a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying
declaration of the nullity of Catalina’s marriage to Eduardo based with the basic marital obligations, viz:
on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family o It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to
Code. be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty
in complying with his marital obligations, or
HELD: NO. was unwilling to perform these obligations.
 Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take – an adverse integral element in the
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, respondent’s personality structure that
and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the effectively incapacitated him from complying
performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists o with his essential marital obligations – must be
Facts (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the performance of marital obligations or ill will on
essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal the part of the spouse is different from
act, the community of life and love, the rendering of incapacity rooted in some debilitating
mutual help, and the procreation and education of psychological condition or illness;
offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed perversion, emotional immaturity and
to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married irresponsibility and the like, do not by
person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must themselves warrant a finding of psychological
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some incapacity under Article 36, as the same may
psychological illness. only be due to a person’s refusal or
 We have said that the expert evidence presented in unwillingness to assume the essential
cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on obligations of marriage.
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-  The only fact established here, which Catalina even
depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the
expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe conjugal home to live with another man. Yet,
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.26 abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity
We have explained this need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,27 of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also
stating: constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a
o The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the
after a maximum of seven (7) hours of Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity
interview, and unsupported by separate was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under
psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there
the trial court and prevent it from making its should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a
own factual finding on what happened in this manifestation of a disordered personality that made her
case. The probative force of the testimony of completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
an expert does not lie in a mere statement of of marriage.33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not
his theory or opinion, but rather in the adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her
assistance that he can render to the courts in infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.
showing the facts that serve as a basis for his
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
of his conclusion is founded. PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents.
 But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012
did not personally seek out and meet with other persons, FIRST DIVISION
aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and
established the conduct of the spouses before and FACTS:
during the marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes’ report  Petitioner and PR got married when the latter
lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed impregnated the former while they were in college.
the necessary support for the conclusion that the RTC  During their marriage, petitioner shouldered most of the
and the CA reached about Catalina’s psychological family expenses, until PR landed a job as a car
incapacity to perform her marital duties. salesman
 Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony  PR was then charged with BP22 and estafa by his
by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability employer and was later on found to have swindled some
of Catalina’s psychological incapacity. There was, to of his client
39 of 255 | P a g e
 Petitioner sought that their marriage be nullified on the physician examine the person to be declared
ground of PR’s psychological incapacity psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
 PR  presented no evidence cause may be "medically or clinically
 RTC  granted petition identified." What is important is the presence
o he result of Dr. Samson’s clinical evaluation as of evidence that can adequately establish the
testified to by her and per Psychiatric Report party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if
she issued together with one Dr. Doris the totality of evidence presented is enough to
Primero showed that petitioner appears to be sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
mature, strong and responsible individual. then actual medical examination of the person
Godly, childlike trust however, makes her concerned need not be resorted to.
vulnerable and easy to forgive and forget.  In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of
Petitioner also believes that marriage was a psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the
partnership "for better and for worse", she granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
gave all of herself unconditionally to the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be
respondent. Unfortunately, respondent cannot dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented
reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent was was enough to support a finding of his psychological
found to have a personality that can be incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of
characterized as inadequate, immature and any form of medical or psychological evidence to show
irresponsible. His criminal acts in the present the psychological incapacity would have automatically
time are mere extensions of his misconduct ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of
established in childhood. His childhood nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should
experiences of separations and emotional emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that
deprivation largely contributed to this can adequately establish the party’s psychological
antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle. condition," as the Court said in Marcos.
 CA  reversed  But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity
o In her testimony, petitioner described her to present the professional and expert opinions of
husband as immature, deceitful and without psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and
remorse for his dishonesty, and lack of incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity, then
affection. Such characteristics, however, do the opinions should be presented and be weighed by the
not necessarily constitute a case of trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or
psychological incapacity. A person’s inability not to declare the nullity of the marriages.
to share or take responsibility, or to feel  It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other
remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share cases they try, must always base their judgments not
his earnings with family members, are solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties
indicative of an immature mind, but not but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
necessarily a medically rooted psychological their proceedings.23
affliction that cannot be cured.  We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner
insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically
ISSUE: Whether the allegations that PR was immature, deceitful unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
and without remorse for his dishonesty, and lacked affection were husband, and that he suffered from such psychological
sufficient in sustaining his psychological incapacity. incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly,
the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for
HELD: NO. declaration of nullity of marriage.
 Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by  We have time and again held that psychological
her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not
 By the very nature of cases involving the application of physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must
to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. live together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to
However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not render help and support. We have also held that the
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to to the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual as a ground for nullification of marriage, a person’s
medical or psychological examination of the person psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply
any other given case presented before it, must always with the essential objects of marriage, including the
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions rights and obligations between husband and wife. The
furnished by the parties but also on the totality of affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage,
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. and must be incurable.
 Petitioner’s view that the Court in Marcos stated that the  Accordingly, the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s
personal medical or psychological examination of psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity,
respondent spouse therein was not a requirement for the antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny.
declaration of his psychological incapacity22 is not The medical report failed to show that his actions
entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or
ran as follows: serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted.
o The guidelines incorporate the three basic His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of
requirements earlier mandated by the Court in remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not
Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was
40 of 255 | P a g e
not necessarily a medically rooted psychological
affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and HELD: NO.
irresponsibility did not equate with psychological  Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or
incapacity.24 Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
and criminal offenses manifestations of psychological marital obligations.72 The burden of proving
incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.73 The plaintiff
for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or
Family Code. her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological
disorder that completely disables him or her from
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, understanding and discharging the essential obligations
Respondent. of the marital state. The psychological problem must be
G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011 grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and
FIRST DIVISION must be incurable.
 In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
FACTS: (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
 Petitioner and respondent married in HK and begot 4 presented the testimonies of two supposed expert
children witnesses who concluded that respondent is
 Petitioner then had an extramarital affair with one psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
Jocelyn Quejano these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
 When respondent left the conjugal home, petitioner lived behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
with Jocelyn and begot 3 children with the latter proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s
 After 9 years of separation de facto, petitioner sought allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions,
that his marriage with respondent be nullified on the visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends,
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s
 Petitioner  narrated the circumstances of Malyn’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when
alleged infidelity. performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
o Dr. Gates, a psychologist, explained on the quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
stand that the factual allegations regarding wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of
Malyn’s behavior – her sexual infidelity, NPD.
habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent  But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or
nights-out with friends – may reflect a underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts,
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).17 were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented
NPD is present when a person is obsessed to contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the
meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of petitioner.
her significant others.18 Malyn’s NPD is  For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent
manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a constantly played mahjong and neglected their children
mother. as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but
 Respondent  denied psychological incapacity and it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
accusation of adultery frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and
 RTC  both parties are psychologically incapacitated a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that
o From the evidence, it appears that parties are she played four to five times a week. She maintained it
both suffering from psychological incapacity to was only two to three times a week and always with the
perform their essential marital obligations permission of her husband and without abandoning her
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The children at home. The children corroborated this, saying
parties entered into a marriage without as that they were with their mother when she played
much as understanding what it entails. They mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not
failed to commit themselves to its essential present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
obligations: the conjugal act, the community of mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent
life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his
procreation and education of their children to sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link
become responsible individuals. Parties’ this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least
psychological incapacity is grave, and serious that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
such that both are incapable of carrying out respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when
the ordinary duties required in marriage. The these two children were in second grade. This was not
incapacity has been clinically established and done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
was found to be pervasive, grave and played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
incurable adverse effect on the children were not proven.
 CA  reversed  Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s
o because it is not supported by the facts on alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out
record. Both parties’ allegations and with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other
incriminations against each other do not men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her
support a finding of psychological incapacity. visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with
The parties’ faults tend only to picture their friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged
immaturity and irresponsibility in performing companion of respondent during these nights-out) in
their marital and familial obligations. At most, order to prove that respondent had affairs with other
there may be sufficient grounds for a legal men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared
separation.57 Moreover, the psychological to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendo that
report submitted by petitioner’s expert witness, petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of
of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual
requirements for the declaration of nullity of infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it
marriage. does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
 Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent
actually engaged in the behaviors described as
suffers from psychological incapacity.
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that
41 of 255 | P a g e
she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, manifested psychological aversion to cohabit
the totality of the evidence points to the opposite with her husband or to take care of him. The
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show psychological make-up of private respondent
that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of was evaluated by a psychologist, who found
appreciating and performing her marital and parental that the psychological incapacity of both
duties. Not once did the children state that they were husband and wife to perform their marital
neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable.
that she took care of them, was around when they were Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic
sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features;
respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her whereas petitioner suffers from passive
children despite her estrangement from their father. aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder
There was no testimony whatsoever that shows that renders him immature and irresponsible to
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While assume the normal obligations of a marriage
petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy,  Petitioner  failed and MD on the ground that petition
both failed the second elementary level despite having failed to state cause of action
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic  RTC  denied MD
shortcomings to Malyn’s actions. o In denying petitioner’s motion, the RTC ruled
 After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds that respondent’s petition for declaration of
no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological nullity of marriage complied with the
incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and
trial court’s ruling that there was psychological whether or not the allegations are meritorious
incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized would depend upon the proofs presented by
the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the both parties during trial, to wit:
respective parties, but it did not actually assess the  A review of the petition shows that it
veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the observed the requirements in
witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268
did not make factual findings which can serve as bases SCRA 198), otherwise known as the
for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity. Molina Doctrine. There was
 What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, allegation of the root cause of the
perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them psychological incapacity of both the
from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and petitioner and the respondent
to their children. There may be grounds for legal contained in paragraphs 12 and 13
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity of the petition. The manifestation of
that voids a marriage. juridical antecedence was alleged in
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition.
DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner, vs. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. The allegations constituting the
AURELIO, Respondent. gravity of psychological incapacity
G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011 were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l)
SECOND DIVISION of the petition. The incurability was
alleged in paragraph 10 of the
FACTS: petition. Moreover, the clinical
 Petitioner and PR married in PH finding of incurability was quoted in
 After a few years, respondent sought before the RTC paragraph 15 of the petition. There
QC that their marriage be nullified on the ground that is a cause of action presented in the
both of them were psychologically incapacitated. petition for the nullification of
o Said psychological incapacity was existing marriage under Article 36 of the
prior and at the time of the marriage. Said Family Code.
psychological incapacity was manifested by  Petitioner  filed a petition for certiorari before CA
lack of financial support from the husband; his  CA  dismissed petition
lack of drive and incapacity to discern the
plight of his working wife. The husband ISSUE: Whether the allegations in the petition for declaration of
exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust nullity of marriage were sufficient for the RTC to declare said
towards his wife. His moods alternated marriage null and void.
between hostile defiance and contrition. He
refused to assist in the maintenance of the HELD: YES.
family. He refused to foot the household bills  First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds
and provide for his family’s needs. He that the root cause of psychological incapacity was
exhibited arrogance. He was completely stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the
insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds
to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the
the presence of their children. complaint as the root causes of their psychological
o Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert
and displays her feelings openly and freely. psychologist clinically identified the same as the root
Her feelings change very quickly – from joy to causes.
fury to misery to despair, depending on her  Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of
day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring
boredom was very low. She was emotionally about a disability for them to assume the essential
immature; she cannot stand frustration or obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that
disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder
her needs. She gets upset when she cannot with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand,
get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic)
spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to
other distorted their relationship. Their perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave,
incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential incorrigible and incurable.
obligations of marital life led to the breakdown  Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital
of their marriage. Private respondent obligations that were not complied with were alleged in
42 of 255 | P a g e
the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of from their friends and relatives on the pretext
the petition, respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 that Christopher was confined in a hospital.
of the Family Code which states that "the husband and According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from
the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual "mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and discernment and total lack of care, love and
support." affection [towards him and their] child." He
 It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and posited that Juvy’s incapacity was "extremely
respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill serious" and "appears to be incurable."
their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide  RTC  nullified marriage
at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines o After a careful perusal of the evidence in the
would show that the same contemplate a situation instant case and there being no controverting
wherein the parties have presented their evidence, evidence, this Court is convinced that as held
witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been in Santos case, the psychological incapacity of
reached by the court after due hearing. Such process respondent to comply with the essential
can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to marital obligations of his marriage with
a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. petitioner, which Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can
It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to be characterized by (a) gravity because the
resolve at first instance whether the allegations subject cannot carry out the normal and
contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a ordinary duties of marriage and family
case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered shouldered by any average couple existing
that each case involving the application of Article 36 under ordinary circumstances of life and work;
must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of (b) antecedence, because the root cause of
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but the trouble can be traced to the history of the
according to its own attendant facts. Courts should subject before marriage although its overt
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided manifestations appear over after the wedding;
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in and (c) incurability, if treatments required
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church exceed the ordinary means or subject, or
tribunals.18 It would thus be more prudent for this Court involve time and expense beyond the reach of
to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the the subject – are all obtaining in this case.
best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear  CA  affirmed in toto
and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the
ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by ISSUE: Whether Juvy’s psychological incapacity was sufficiently
the parties. established.
 Given the allegations in respondent’s petition for nullity
of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit HELD: NO.
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion  In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,15 the Court
to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant first declared that psychological incapacity must be
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence;
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to "no less
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual confined to "the most serious cases of personality
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
contemplation of law.19 Even assuming arguendo that inability to give meaning and significance to the
this Court were to agree with petitioner that the marriage."16 We laid down more definitive guidelines in
allegations contained in respondent’s petition are the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
insufficient and that the RTC erred in denying petitioner’s Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, whose salient
judgment correctible by appeal and not an abuse of points are footnoted below.17 These guidelines
discretion correctible by certiorari.20 incorporate the basic requirements we established in
 Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioner’s petition. Santos.18
As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss,  In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos,19 we further
which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce
certiorari. Petitioner’s remedy is to reiterate the grounds expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
in his motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence,
of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due and incurability can be duly established. Thereafter, the
time.21 The existence of that adequate remedy removed Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on
the underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
CA.22 Annulment of Voidable Marriages)20 which provided that
"the complete facts should allege the physical
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. NESTOR manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
GALANG, Respondent. incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage
G.R. No. 168335 June 6, 2011 but expert opinion need not be alleged."
THIRD DIVISION  Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena
Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te21 placed some cloud in the
FACTS: continued applicability of the time-tested Molina22
 Respondent and one Juvy Salazar contracted marriage guidelines. We stated in this case that instead of serving
in PH as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
 After some years, respondent sought that their marriage straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological
be nullified on the ground of Juvy’s psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. This is contrary
incapacity to the intention of the law, since no psychological
o He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and incapacity case can be considered as completely on "all
his parents’ money, and often asked money fours" with another.
43 of 255 | P a g e
 Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting23 and squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00
Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo,24 however, laid to that the respondent entrusted to her, while no
rest any question regarding the continued applicability of doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be
Molina.25 In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te26 did equated with a psychological disorder,
not abandon Molina.27 Far from abandoning Molina,28 especially when the evidence shows that
Ngo Te29 simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent these were mere isolated incidents and not
requirements. We also explained that Suazo30 that Ngo recurring acts. Neither can Juvy’s penchant for
Te31 merely stands for a more flexible approach in playing mahjong and kuwaho for money, nor
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of her act of soliciting money from relatives on
marriages based on psychological incapacity.32 the pretext that her child was sick, warrant a
 In the present case and using the above guidelines, we conclusion that she suffered from a mental
find the totality of the respondent’s evidence – the malady at the time of the celebration of
testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and marriage that rendered her incapable of
the latter’s psychological report and evaluation – fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The
insufficient to prove Juvy’s psychological incapacity respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. engaged in these behaviors (gambling and
 a. The respondent’s testimony what the respondent refers to as "swindling")
o The respondent’s testimony merely showed only two (2) years after their marriage, and
that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to after he let her handle his salary and manage
prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the their finances. The evidence also shows that
care of their neighbors when she went out of Juvy even tried to augment the family’s
the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of income during the early stages of their
the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted marriage by putting up a sari-sari store and by
to her; (d) stole the respondent’s ATM card working as a manicurist.
and attempted to withdraw the money  b. The Psychologist’s Report
deposited in his account; (e) falsified the o The submitted psychological report hardly
respondent’s signature in order to encash a helps the respondent’s cause, as it glaringly
check; (f) made up false stories in order to failed to establish that Juvy was
borrow money from their relatives; and (g) psychologically incapacitated to perform her
indulged in gambling. essential marital duties at the material time
o These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to required by Article 36 of the Family Code.
the level of psychological incapacity that the o To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her
law requires. We stress that psychological report that she derived her conclusions
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," exclusively from the information given her by
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the respondent. Expectedly, the respondent’s
some marital obligations. In Republic of the description of Juvy would contain a
Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al.,33 considerable degree of bias; thus, a
we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a psychological evaluation based on this one-
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and sided description alone can hardly be
duty as a married person; it is essential that he considered as credible or sufficient. We are of
or she must be shown to be incapable of doing course aware of our pronouncement in
so because of some psychological, not Marcos36 that the person sought to be
physical, illness. In other words, proof of a declared psychologically incapacitated need
natal or supervening disabling factor in the not be examined by the psychologist as a
person – an adverse integral element in the condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If
personality structure that effectively the incapacity can be proven by independent
incapacitates the person from really accepting means, no reason exists why such
and thereby complying with the obligations independent proof cannot be admitted to
essential to marriage – had to be shown.34 A support a conclusion of psychological
cause has to be shown and linked with the incapacity, independently of a psychologist’s
manifestations of the psychological incapacity. examination and report. In this case, however,
o The respondent’s testimony failed to show that no such independent evidence has ever been
Juvy’s condition is a manifestation of a gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence
disordered personality rooted in some from independent sources who intimately
incapacitating or debilitating psychological knew Juvy before and after the celebration of
condition that rendered her unable to her marriage would have made a lot of
discharge her essential marital obligation. In difference and could have added weight to the
this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only psychologist’s report.
showed indications of immaturity and lack of o Separately from the lack of the requisite
sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing factual basis, the psychologist’s report simply
more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in stressed Juvy’s negative traits which she
the performance of marital obligations. In considered manifestations of Juvy’s
Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,35 we psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness,
emphasized that irreconcilable differences, immaturity and irresponsibility; her
sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional involvement in swindling and gambling
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do activities; and her lack of initiative to change),
not by themselves warrant a finding of and declared that "psychological findings tend
psychological incapacity, as these may only to confirm that the defendant suffers from
be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or personality and behavioral disorders x x x she
neglect to undertake the obligations of doesn’t manifest any sense of responsibility
marriage that is not rooted in some and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be
psychological illness that Article 36 of the incorrigible."37 In the end, the psychologist
Family Code addresses. opined – without stating the psychological
o In like manner, Juvy’s acts of falsifying the basis for her conclusion – that "there is
respondent’s signature to encash a check, of sufficient reason to believe that the defendant
stealing the respondent’s ATM, and of wife is psychologically incapacitated to

44 of 255 | P a g e
perform her marital duties as a wife and marriage, the burden of proof to show the
mother to their only son."38 nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff.41
o We find this kind of conclusion and report Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals
grossly inadequate. First, we note that the a situation where the parties, or one of them,
psychologist did not even identify the types of could not have validly entered into a marriage
psychological tests which she administered on by reason of a grave and serious
the respondent and the root cause of Juvy’s psychological illness existing at the time it was
psychological condition. We also stress that celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the
the acts alleged to have been committed by indissolubility of the marital tie.42
Juvy all occurred during the marriage; there
was no showing that any mental disorder ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR y ALUNAN, Petitioner, vs. ERLINDA
existed at the inception of the marriage. AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Second, the report failed to prove the gravity Respondents.
or severity of Juvy’s alleged condition, G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010
specifically, why and to what extent the THIRD DIVISION
disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated
her to comply with her marital duties. FACTS:
Significantly, the report did not even  Petitioner, a security guard in a beerhouse, married PR,
categorically state the particular type of a waitress in the same establishment.
personality disorder found. Finally, the report  After years of being married, petitioner sought that the
failed to establish the incurability of Juvy’s marriage be nullified.
condition. The report’s pronouncements that o He alleged that the respondent was
Juvy "lacks the initiative to change" and that psychologically incapacitated to exercise the
her mental incapacity "appears incorrigible"39 essential obligations of marriage as she was
are insufficient to prove that her mental carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do
condition could not be treated, or if it were household chores like cleaning and cooking;
otherwise, the cure would be beyond her stayed away from their house for long periods
means to undertake. of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not
 c. The Psychologist’s Testimony take care of their sick child; consulted a witch
o The psychologist’s court testimony fared no doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and
better in proving the juridical antecedence, refused to use the family name Agraviador in
gravity or incurability of Juvy’s alleged her activities.
psychological defect as she merely reiterated o The petitioner likewise claimed that the
what she wrote in her report – i.e., that Juvy respondent refused to have sex with him since
was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong 1993 because she became "very close" to a
and kuhawo for money; stole money from the male tenant in their house. In fact, he
respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; discovered their love notes to each other, and
and neglected her child – without linking these caught them inside his room several times.
to an underlying psychological cause. Again,  Respondent  denied all allegations
these allegations, even if true, all occurred  RTC  nullified the marriage
during the marriage. The testimony was totally o Dr. Patac’s psychiatric report  Without
devoid of any information or insight into Juvy’s contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and
early life and associations, how she acted the findings of the doctor show that
before and at the time of the marriage, and Respondent is indeed suffering from "Mixed
how the symptoms of a disordered personality Personality Disorder" that render her
developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed incapable of complying with her marital
to trace the history of Juvy’s psychological obligations. Respondent’s refusal to commit
condition and to relate it to an existing herself to the marriage, her tendencies to
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the avoid a close relationship with Petitioner,
marriage. preferring to be with her lover and finally
o She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the abandoning their home for a lesbian, a
elements of gravity and incurability.1âwphi1 In disregard of social norm, show that she was
these respects, she merely stated that despite never prepared for marital commitment in the
the respondent’s efforts to show love and first place. This incapacity is deeply rooted
affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From from her family upbringing with no hope for a
this premise, she jumped to the conclusion cure. Therefore, for the good of society and of
that Juvy appeared to be incurable or the parties themselves, it is best that this
incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure. marriage between ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR
These unfounded conclusions cannot be Y ALUNAN and ERLINDA AMPARO
equated with gravity or incurability that Article AGRAVIADOR be annulled as if it never took
36 of the Family Code requires. To be place at all. The Civil Registrar of the City of
declared clinically or medically incurable is Manila and the General Civil Registrar,
one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change National Census and Statistics Office, East
is another. To hark back to what we earlier Avenue, Quezon City, are hereby requested to
discussed, psychological incapacity refers only make the necessary correction of the civil
to the most serious cases of personality record of the marriage between the parties
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter and on their respective civil status.
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and  CA  reversed
significance to the marriage.40 o held that Dr. Patac’s psychiatric evaluation
o The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting report failed to establish that the respondent’s
and strengthening the family as the basic personality disorder was serious, grave and
social institution, and marriage is the permanent; it likewise did not mention the root
foundation of the family. Marriage, as an cause of her incapacity. The CA further ruled
inviolable institution protected by the State, that Dr. Patac had no basis in concluding that
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. the respondent’s disorder had no definite
In petitions for the declaration of nullity of

45 of 255 | P a g e
treatment because he did not subject her to a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with
mental assessment. her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are
insufficient to establish that the incapacity was rooted in
ISSUE: Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the history of the respondent antedating the marriage.
the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to Dr. Patac failed to elucidate on the circumstances that
comply with the essential marital obligations. led the respondent to act the way she did, for example,
why she "defied her parents" and decided to live alone;
HELD: NO. why she "neglected her obligations as a daughter;" and
 In the present case, the petitioner’s testimony failed to why she often slept with the petitioner. This is an area
establish that the respondent’s condition is a where independent evidence, such as information from a
manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on person intimately related to the respondent, could prove
some incapacitating or debilitating psychological useful. As earlier stated, no such independent evidence
condition that makes her completely unable to discharge was gathered in this case. In the absence of such
the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report
merely showed that the respondent had some Evaluation failed to explain how and why the
personality defects that showed their manifestation respondent’s so-called inflexible maladaptive behavior
during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details was already present at the time of the marriage.
necessary to establish that the respondent’s defects  Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed
existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondent’s
petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondent’s condition. He simply made an enumeration of the
condition; neither did he mention that the respondent’s respondent’s purported behavioral defects (as related to
malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure him by third persons), and on this basis characterized
would be beyond the respondent’s means to undertake. the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality
The petitioner’s declarations that the respondent "does disorder. In the "Background History" portion of his
not accept her fault," "does not want to change," and Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that
"refused to reform" are insufficient to establish a the respondent employed one of her siblings to do the
psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or household chores; did not help in augmenting the
incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family family’s earnings; belittled the petitioner’s income;
Code. continued her studies despite the petitioner’s
 In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,29 we ruled that it was not disapproval; seldom stayed at home; became "close" to
enough that the respondent, alleged to be a male border; had an affair with a lesbian; did not
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying disclose the actual date of her departure to Taiwan;
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform threatened to poison the petitioner and their children;
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening neglected and ignored their children; used her maiden
disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the name at work; and consulted a witch doctor to bring bad
respondent's personality structure that effectively fate to the petitioner. Except for the isolated and
incapacitated him from complying with his essential unfounded statement that "Erlinda’s lack of motivation
marital obligations – had to be shown. and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love,
 The Court finds that Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation respect and support to the family,"34 there was no other
Report fell short in proving that the respondent was statement regarding the degree of severity of the
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential respondent’s condition, why and to what extent the
marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not disorder is grave, and how it incapacitated her to comply
personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in with the duties required in marriage. There was likewise
fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the no showing of a supervening disabling factor or
respondent to "undergo the same examination [that the debilitating psychological condition that effectively
petitioner] underwent."30 Dr. Patac relied only on the incapacitated the respondent from complying with the
information fed by the petitioner, the parties’ second essential marital obligations. At any rate, the personality
child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah. Largely, flaws mentioned above, even if true, could only amount
the doctor relied on the information provided by the to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity,
petitioner. Thus, while his Report can be used as a fair and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant
gauge to assess the petitioner’s own psychological a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
condition (as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be the Family Code.
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations  Interestingly, Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report
of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with highlighted only the respondent’s negative behavioral
respect to the respondent’s condition. The methodology traits without balancing them with her other qualities.
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and The allegations of infidelity and insinuations of
comprehensiveness of the examination required to promiscuity, as well as the claim that the respondent
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a refused to engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of
psychological disorder.31 course, came from the petitioner, but these claims were
 We do not suggest that a personal examination of the not proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that
party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is these accusations were true, the Psychiatric Evaluation
mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that Report did not indicate that unfaithfulness or
the person sought to be declared psychologically promiscuousness were traits that antedated or existed at
incapacitated must be personally examined by a the time of marriage. Likewise, the accusation that the
psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at respondent abandoned her sick child which eventually
such declaration.32 If a psychological disorder can be led to the latter’s death appears to be an exaggerated
proven by independent means, no reason exists why claim in the absence of any specifics and corroboration.
such independent proof cannot be admitted and given On the other hand, the petitioner’s own questionable
credit.33 No such independent evidence appears on traits – his flirtatious nature before marriage and his
record, however, to have been gathered in this case. admission that he inflicted physical harm on the
 In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the respondent every time he got jealous – were not
juridical antecedence of the respondent’s condition by pursued. From this perspective, the Psychiatric
stating that the respondent manifested "inflexible Evaluation Report appears to be no more than a one-
maladaptive behavior" before marriage, pointing out how sided diagnosis against the respondent that we cannot
the respondent behaved before the marriage – the consider a reliable basis to conclusively establish the
respondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a
46 of 255 | P a g e
root cause and the degree of seriousness of her o The diagnoses of the doctors were hearsay,
condition. as they were not able to personally examine
 The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to respondent
adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the
conclusion that the respondent’s personality disorder ISSUE: Whether the diagnoses of the doctors were sufficient in
had "no definite treatment." It did not discuss the sustaining respondent’s psychological incapacity, considering that
concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its they were unable to personally examine the latter.
classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to
show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited HELD: YES
this disorder in order to create a necessary inference  The lack of personal examination and interview of the
that the respondent’s condition had no definite treatment respondent, or any other person diagnosed with
or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the
Psychiatric Evaluation Report’s failure to support its testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings
findings and conclusions with any factual basis. It simply automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their
enumerated the respondent’s perceived behavioral exclusion as evidence.
defects, and then associated these traits with mixed  For one, marriage, by its very definition,16 necessarily
personality disorder. We find it unfortunate that Dr. Patac involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of
himself was not called on the witness stand to expound one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is
on the findings and conclusions he made in his generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.
Psychiatric Evaluation Report. It would have aided In this case, the experts testified on their individual
petitioner’s cause had he called Dr. Patac to testify. assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage
 Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in from the perception of one of the parties, herein
assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage,
reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, had occasion to interact with, and experience,
in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then
in favor of the validity of the marriage and the validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.35 Marriage, an psychiatrist.
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be  For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s
dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where assessment were not based solely on the narration or
the prices of evidence presented are grossly deficient to personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants
show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and
of the condition of the party alleged to be psychologically sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own
incapacitated to assume and perform the essential observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions
marital duties. with them, spanning the period of time they knew him.17
 The petitioner’s marriage to the respondent may have These were also used as the basis of the doctors’
failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation assessments.
The remedy, however, is not always to have it declared  Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. diagnose the psychological make up of a person based
We stress that Article 36 of the Family Code on a number of factors culled from various sources. A
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to assume person afflicted with a personality disorder will not
and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part case, considering that a personality disorder is
of the errant spouse. It is not to be confused with a manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the
grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The State, doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke
fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of
that divorce should be available in this country. Neither experts.
should an Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated  A recommendation for therapy does not automatically
with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists,
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock’s textbook
interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,21 treatment, ranging
abandonment, and the like.36 Unless the evidence from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the
presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or listed kinds of personality disorders are recommended.
one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable In short, Dr. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent
psychological illness existing at the time the marriage should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the
was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is
obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have incurable.
validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled  Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically
to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie. declared that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner, vs. RAMON obligations.22 As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her
REYES, Respondent. separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of
G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010 Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:
SECOND DIVISION o [T]he professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in such
FACTS: cases. Data about the person’s entire life, both
 Petitioner and respondent married and begot 2 children before and after the ceremony, were
 After years of financial difficulties and owing to the fact presented to these experts and they were
that she had become the breadwinner of the family and asked to give professional opinions about a
that respondent’s business ventures had been party’s mental capacity at the time of the
continuously unsuccessful, petitioner sought that their wedding. These opinions were rarely
marriage be nullified on the ground of respondent’s challenged and tended to be accepted as
psychological incapacity decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
 RTC  granted petition o … [Because] of advances made in psychology
 CA  reversed during the past decades. There was now the
47 of 255 | P a g e
expertise to provide the all-important o RTC believed Dr. Albaran’s psychological
connecting link between a marriage evaluation and testimony and, on the totality of
breakdown and premarital causes. Ricardo’s evidence, found Teresita to be
 In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in psychologically incapacitated to assume the
all three reports and the respective testimonies of essential obligations of marriage. The OSG
Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent appealed the decision to the CA.
does have problems; and (2) these problems include  CA  reversed
chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work o held that the trial court’s findings did not
towards providing the needs of his family; several failed satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this
business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
unpaid money obligations. Molina.7 The RTC failed to specifically point
 It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s out the root illness or defect that caused
diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not Teresita’s psychological incapacity, and
automatically believed by the courts in cases of likewise failed to show that the incapacity
declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical already existed at the time of celebration of
psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality marriage.
disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is o CA found that Ricardo’s allegations on
valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties’ Teresita’s overspending and infidelity do not
or both parties’ psychological incapacity. constitute adequate grounds for declaring the
 On more than one occasion, we have rejected an marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
expert’s opinion concerning the supposed psychological Family Code. These allegations, even if true,
incapacity of a party.24 In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,25 we could only effectively serve as grounds for
ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive legal separation or a criminal charge for
list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,26 adultery.
the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of
Appeals27 must be independently met by the party ISSUE: Whether the allegations are sufficient to constitute
alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
36 of the Family Code. We declared, thus:
o It was folly for the trial court to accept the HELD: NO.
findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with  Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be
nary a link drawn between the alleged in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the
"psychodynamics of the case" and the factors Family Code
characterizing the psychological incapacity.  Citing Barcelona,25 Ricardo defended the RTC decision,
Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to alleging that the root cause in a petition for annulment
the inevitable conclusion that the parties were under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer
psychologically incapacitated to comply with necessary. We find this argument completely at variance
the essential marital obligations. Even on with Ricardo’s main argument against the assailed CA
questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' decision – i.e., that the RTC, in its decision, discussed
testimony did not illuminate on the parties' thoroughly the root cause of Teresita’s psychological
alleged personality disorders and their incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These
incapacitating effect on their marriage conflicting positions, notwithstanding, we see the need to
 The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a address this issue to further clarify our statement in
maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie to support his present petition that "since the new Rules
the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
own factual finding on what happened in this case. The psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie need to allege in the petition the root cause of the
in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in psychological incapacity."26
the assistance that he can render to the courts in  In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for
showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion annulment for its failure to state the "root cause" of the
and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. The
founded. Court resolved this issue, ruling that the petition
 In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ sufficiently stated a cause of action because the
conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of petitioner – instead of stating a specific root cause –
events) alleged in the petition and established during clearly described the physical manifestations indicative
trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent of the psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to
is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential be sufficiently compliant with the first requirement in the
marital obligations. Molina case – that the "root cause" of the psychological
incapacity be alleged in an Article 36 petition.
RICARDO P. TORING, Petitioner, vs. TERESITA M. TORING and  Thus, contrary to Ricardo’s position, Barcelona does not
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. do away with the "root cause" requirement. The ruling
G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010 simply means that the statement of the root cause does
THIRD DIVISION not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature,
as the root causes of many psychological disorders are
FACTS: still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege
 Petitioner and PR were married in PH the physical manifestations constituting the root cause of
 After more than 20 years of marriage, petitioner sought the psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of
that said marriage ne nullified on the ground of PR’s the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
psychological incapacity Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
o At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their (Rules)27 in fact provides:
marriage contract; the psychological o SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute
evaluation and signature of his expert witness, nullity of void marriages.
psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and  (d) What to allege.• – A petition
Dr. Albaran’s respective testimonies. under Article 36 of the Family Code
 RTC  granted petition shall specially allege the complete
facts showing that either or both
48 of 255 | P a g e
parties were psychologically  Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
incapacitated from complying with Procedureis clear that the civil action must be instituted
the essential marital obligations of first before the filing of the criminal action.
marriages at the time of the o In this case, thecivil case for annulment was
celebration of marriage even if such filed after the filing of the criminal case for
incapacity becomes manifest only frustrated parricide.
after its celebration. o As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111
 The complete facts should allege the physical of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological not met since the civil action was filed
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
but expert opinion need not be alleged.
 As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal
the root cause in a petition for annulment under Article Case for Parricide
36 of the Family Code was not dispensed with by the  There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a
adoption of the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the
was the need for an expert opinion to prove the root civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved
cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further before the criminal action may proceed because
held that the Rules, being procedural in nature, apply howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
their adoption. accused in the criminal case.
 To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of  A prejudicial question is defined asone that arises in a
proof to show that Teresita suffered from psychological case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
must fail. Ricardo merely established that Teresita had pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a
been remiss in her duties as a wife for being fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
irresponsible in taking care of their family’s finances – a connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
fault or deficiency that does not amount to the of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action,
psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family it must appear not only that said case involves facts
Code requires. We reiterate that irreconcilable intimately related to those upon which the criminal
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, innocence of the accused would necessarily be
as the same may only be due to a person’s difficulty, determined.
refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of  The relationship between the offender and the victim is a
marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any
that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses. person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
7. Declaration of Nullity, Prejudicial Question; Sec. 7, Rule descendants, or his spouse." The relationship between
117, Rules of Procedure the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of
parricide from murder or homicide.
 Sec. 7, Rule 117, Rules of Procedure  However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not
similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the
of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue innocence of the accused.
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution  The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner
proceed. is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, vs. MARIA CHRYSANTINE whether the accused killed the victim.
L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents o In this case, since petitioner was charged with
G.R. No. 172060 | September 13, 2010 (2D) frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would
Facts: have killed respondent as a consequence but
 25 October 2004: Private respondent filed an action for which, nevertheless, did not produce it by
frustrated parricide against petitioner. reason of causes independent of petitioner’s
will.
 7 February 2005: Petitioner received summons to appear
before the RTC for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case for o At the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, petitioner and respondent were
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the
married.The subsequent dissolution of their
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
marriage will have no effect on the alleged
 11 February 2005: Petitioner filed an urgent motion to crime that was committed at the time of the
suspend the proceedings before the RTC on the ground subsistence of the marriage.
of the existence of a prejudicial question. o In short, even if the marriage between petitioner
o Petitioner asserted that since the relationship and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still
between the offender and the victim is a key be held criminally liable since at the time of the
element in parricide, the outcome of the Civil commission of the alleged crime, he was still
Case would have a bearing in the criminal case married to respondent.
filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
 We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals that "the judicial declaration of the nullity
Issue: W/N the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is
of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
case for frustrated parricide against petitioner
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned.
Held: No
o First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the
judicial declaration of nullity of a second or
49 of 255 | P a g e
subsequent marriage on the ground of  The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v.
psychological incapacity on a criminal liability People where it was held that the subsequent judicial
for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
question in that case. immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
o Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that "there crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
is a recognition written into the law itself that petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of
such a marriage, although void ab initio, may bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply
still produce legal consequences." file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE question in the criminal case.
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 164435 | September 29, 2009 (3D) Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void
or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
Facts: otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if
 Petitioner was as charged with Bigamy before the RTC petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
for contracting marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
Uy, while having been legally married with Rafael M. the second marriage were subsisting before the first
Alocillo marriage was annulled.
 Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy  For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-
before the RTC. quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of
 Petitioner then filed against Alocillofor declaration of bigamy must be affirmed.
nullity of their marriage. o The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
 Subsequently, petitioner was convicted of the crime of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be
bigamy charged against her. considered a valid defense in the crime of
 On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a
in toto. second marriage without the previous one
 In the meantime, the RTC declared petitioner’s 1974 and having been judicially declared null and void,
1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the the crime of bigamy was already consummated
ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. because at the time of the celebration of the
 In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to
declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null
conviction. However, in its Resolution, the CA, citing and void by a court of competent jurisdiction,
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, denied reconsideration and was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither
ruled that the subsequent declaration of nullity of her first would a judicial declaration of the nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any
it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage difference.
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is o As held in Tenebro, since a marriage
concerned, the said marriage is not without legal contracted during the subsistence of a valid
consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for
for bigamy.
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
 Hence this petition.
o A plain reading of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, therefore, would indicate that the
Issue: WN/ CA erred in proceeding with the case despite the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting
pendency of a case which is prejudicial to the outcome of the case a second or subsequent marriage during the
at bar subsistence of a valid marriage.
Held:
 It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution
evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the
proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition
for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to
Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial
question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by
the latter, was a ground for suspension of the
proceedings.
 As held by the Court in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis:

x xx as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a


second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not
be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity

The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its


nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for
nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential
to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore,
not a prejudicial question. x xx
50 of 255 | P a g e
8. Declaration of Nullity, Arts. 36, 40, 45; Sec. 19 (1) AM 02-10- Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
11 SC; Arts. 147 & 148 Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
amended by Executive Order 227) money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
declaring such previous marriage void. (n). acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
existing at the time of the marriage:
parties are in both faith. (144a)
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one,
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, vs AVELINA AMORES,
and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
Respondent.
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority
G.R. No. 195670 | December 3, 2012 (2D)
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-
one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
Facts:
together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after  Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina,
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and married in March 29, 1980.
wife;  After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental declared
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless the nullity of their marriage.
such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting  Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of
the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; Conjugal Partnership praying for the distribution of the
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, properties claimed to have been acquired during the
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having subsistence of their marriage – Lots 1, 2142, 5845, 4 and
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with 2055.
the other as husband and wife;  In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the their 2 residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during
to be incurable; or their marriage, the truth being that she used her own
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible personal money to purchase said Lots.
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)  During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142,
5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent,
 Sec. 19 (1) AM 02-10-11 SC there properties were acquired with the money the Dutch
government as his disability benefit.
 RTC awarded the subject lots to respondent.
Section 19. Decision – (1) If the court renders a decision granting
the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity
 CA affirmed RTC’s decision and stressed the fact that
or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition
compliance with Article 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines." Hence, he
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
cannot invoke equity to support his claim for
Distribution of Properties.
reimbursement.

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry Issue: W/N the Court can grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife on the basis of unjust enrichment
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the Held: No
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry  The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court had
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
the household. bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his ownership of Philippine land24 enshrined under Section
or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the reads:
termination of their cohabitation. o Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, succession, no private lands shall be
the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or corporations, or associations qualified to
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving  Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition"25 and
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he
place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a) and respondent registered the subject properties in the
latter’s name.26 Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed

51 of 255 | P a g e
his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure,
On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to
why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements
deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement. built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots
 As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned
that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the
comes into equity must come with clean hands. purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national
Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is duty-
accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by bound to protect.
a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful.27
 In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real
source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels
of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to
have previously executed a joint affidavit that
respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot
1,28 he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds
were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these
inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as
petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands,
he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
 In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of
equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties
by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-
established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will
not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly.29 Surely, a
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null
and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and
produces no legal effect at all.30 Corollary thereto, under
Article 1412 of the Civil Code,31 petitioner cannot have
the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to
recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.32
Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an
unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
 Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for
reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment.33 As
held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner
seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on
purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by
the Constitution, to wit:
 Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New
Civil Code which reads:
o Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.1âwphi1
 The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM
ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another). An action for recovery of what has been paid
without just cause has been designated as an accion in
rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case,
the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair
and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem
verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the
money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord
Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson:
"The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as
between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all
times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his
sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is
founded in general principles of policy, which the
defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real
justice, as between him and the plaintiff."
 Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice
based on his foreign citizenship.35 Precisely, it is the
Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens
52 of 255 | P a g e
ALAIN M. DIÑO, Petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, property acquired during cohabitation and
Respondent. (2D) owned in common, without the consent of the
G.R. No. 178044 | January 19, 2011 (2D) other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
Facts: When only one of the parties to a void
 On 14 January 1998, petitioner and respondent got marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
married. in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
 On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration forfeited in favor of their common children. In
of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family common children or their descendants, each
Code, alleging that respondent failed in her marital vacant share shall belong to the respective
obligation to give love and support to him, and had surviving descendants. In the absence of
abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing descendants, such share shall belong to the
instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at  For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
times become violent and hurt him. elements must be present:
 The trial court granted the petition. The dispositive portion 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated
of the trial court’s decision includes the below statement: to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE husband and wife; and
shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage,
51 of the Family Code. or their marriage is void.
 Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration  All these elements are present in this case and there is no
questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall property relations between petitioner and respondent.
only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51  We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in
of the Family Code. ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
 The trial court partially granted the motion and modified be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution
its decision as follows: of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles
shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution 147 and 148 of the Family Code
of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family o Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a
Code. decision granting the petition, it shall declare
 Hence this petition. therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the
Issue: W/N the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of court only after compliance with Articles 50 and
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, 51 of the Family Code as implemented under
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
of the Family Code Distribution of Properties.
o The pertinent provisions of the Family Code
Held: Yes cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
 The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void  Article 50. The effects provided for in
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. apply in proper cases to marriages
o Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union which are declared void ab initio or
of parties who are legally capacitated and not annulled by final judgment under
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, Articles 40 and 45.10
but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such The final judgment in such cases
as petitioner and respondent in the case before shall provide for the liquidation,
the Court. partition and distribution of the
 Article 147 of the Family Code provides: properties of the spouses, the
o Article 147. When a man and a woman who are custody and support of the common
capacitated to marry each other, live children, and the delivery of their
exclusively with each other as husband and presumptive legitimes, unless such
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a matters had been adjudicated in
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be previous judicial proceedings.
owned by them in equal shares and the All creditors of the spouses as well
property acquired by both of them through their as of the absolute community of the
work or industry shall be governed by the rules conjugal partnership shall be notified
on co-ownership. of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, In the partition, the conjugal
properties acquired while they lived together dwelling and the lot on which it is
shall be presumed to have been obtained by situated, shall be adjudicated in
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be accordance with the provisions of
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes Articles 102 and 129.
of this Article, a party who did not participate in  Article 51. In said partition, the value
the acquisition by the other party of any of the presumptive legitimes of all
property shall be deemed to have contributed common children, computed as of
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s the date of the final judgment of the
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
of the family and of the household. property or sound securities, unless
Neither party can encumber or dispose by the parties, by mutual agreement
acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
53 of 255 | P a g e
judicially approved, had already needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly
provided for such matters. allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.
The children of their guardian, or  To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility,
the trustee of their property, may ask petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-
for the enforcement of the judgment. laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered
The delivery of the presumptive further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to
legitimes herein prescribed shall in make ends meet as the single-income earner of the
no way prejudice the ultimate household, respondent’s business floundered.
successional rights of the children Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in
accruing upon the death of either or Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful.
both of the parents; but the value of  After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred
the properties already received residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner’s
under the decree of annulment or mother. But the new set up did not end their marital
absolute nullity shall be considered difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged.
as advances on their legitime. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a
 It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are  Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard
Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary,
of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondent’s gift
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not
Code, which should be declared void without waiting for only unable to provide financially for their family, but he
the liquidation of the properties of the parties. was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain
 Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation faithful to her and their family.
where a second or bigamous marriage was  One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’
contracted.1avvphil Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and
judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played
we ruled: dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her
o x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of
of contracting a second marriage, the sole respondent’s lack of concern, and asked her mother to
basis acceptable in law, for said projected order respondent to leave the recovery room.
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final  Finally in 2001, petitioner filed petition for the declaration
judgment declaring a previous marriage of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the
void.11 latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
 Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid The petition was granted.
until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent  Taking exception to the trial court’s rulings, respondent
court in an action for annulment.12 In both instances appealed to the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity
under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing
either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal with the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the
partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a parties’ marriage as valid and subsisting. Hence this
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement petition.
entered into before the marriage. Since the property
relations of the parties is governed by absolute Issue: W/N the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity, as provided in
there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the Article 36 of the Family Code
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.
That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Held: Yes
Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is  The lack of personal examination and interview of the
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership. respondent, or any other person diagnosed with
 In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the
declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their
of properties owned in common by petitioner and exclusion as evidence.
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the  For one, marriage, by its very definition,16 necessarily
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In
The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the this case, the experts testified on their individual
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage
Code provisions on co-ownership. from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner.
Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner, vs. RAMON to interact with, and experience, respondent’s pattern of
REYES, Respondent. behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical
G.R. No. 185286 | August 18, 2010(2D) psychologists and the psychiatrist.
 For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s
Facts: assessment were not based solely on the narration or
 Petitioner and respondent got married. personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such
 Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent’s as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-
family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own
shouldered by respondent’s parents, and the couple’s observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions
respective salaries were spent solely for their personal with them, spanning the period of time they knew him.17

54 of 255 | P a g e
These were also used as the basis of the doctors’ own factual finding on what happened in this case. The
assessments. probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie
 A recommendation for therapy does not automatically in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in
imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy the assistance that he can render to the courts in
are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion
to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock’s textbook and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is
entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,21 treatment, ranging founded.
from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the  In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’
listed kinds of personality disorders are recommended. conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of
In short, Dr. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent events) alleged in the petition and established during
should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent
finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
incurable. marital obligations.
 Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically
declared that respondent is psychologically METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs.
incapacitated to perform the essential marital NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
obligations.22 As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her (2D)
separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of GR No. 163744 | February 29, 2008
Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:
o [T]he professional opinion of a psychological Facts:
expert became increasingly important in such  Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga
cases. Data about the person’s entire life, both were married on January 19, 1985.
before and after the ceremony, were  During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito
presented to these experts and they were and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door
asked to give professional opinions about a apartment standing thereon located in Makati City.
party’s mental capacity at the time of the  Subsequently, TCT was issued in the name of Florencia,
wedding. These opinions were rarely "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
challenged and tended to be accepted as  Florenciathen filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of
decisive evidence of lack of valid consent. marriage which was granted on July 31, 1995.
o … [Because] of advances made in psychology  In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the
during the past decades. There was now the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses’ conjugal
expertise to provide the all-important partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple
connecting link between a marriage going their separate ways without liquidating their
breakdown and premarital causes. conjugal partnership.
 In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in  On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses
all three reports and the respective testimonies of Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million
Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
does have problems; and (2) these problems include (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the
chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages
towards providing the needs of his family; several failed (REMs) on their properties, including one involving the
business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of aforesaid lot
unpaid money obligations.
 Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros
 It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank,
diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not initiated foreclosure proceedings
automatically believed by the courts in cases of
 Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson
declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical
filed on June 28, 2000, before the RTCa Complaint to
psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality
declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed
disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is
property, alleging that the property, which is still conjugal
valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties’
property, was mortgaged without his consent.
or both parties’ psychological incapacity.
 RTC declared the mortgage invalid.
 On more than one occasion, we have rejected an
o Even as it declared the invalidity of the
expert’s opinion concerning the supposed psychological
mortgage, the trial court found the said lot to be
incapacity of a party.24 In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,25 we conjugal, the same having been acquired
ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive during the existence of the marriage of
list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,26 Nicholson and Florencia.
the stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of o In so ruling, the RTC invoked Art. 116 of the
Appeals27 must be independently met by the party Family Code, providing that "all property
alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article acquired during the marriage, whether the
36 of the Family Code. We declared, thus: acquisition appears to have been made,
o It was folly for the trial court to accept the contracted or registered in the name of one or
findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
nary a link drawn between the unless the contrary is proved." To the trial court,
"psychodynamics of the case" and the factors Metrobank had not overcome the presumptive
characterizing the psychological incapacity. conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal,
Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the RTC concluded that the disputed property
the inevitable conclusion that the parties were may not be validly encumbered by Florencia
psychologically incapacitated to comply with without Nicholson’s consent.
the essential marital obligations. Even on
questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' Issue: W/N CA erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of
testimony did not illuminate on the parties' marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia
alleged personality disorders and their Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of
incapacitating effect on their marriage the spouses.
 The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a
maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and Held: No
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie  While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and
the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the
55 of 255 | P a g e
conjugal partnership, the character of the properties  RTC: Declared nullity of the marriage and ordered the
acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family
partition of the partnership. Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51,
o This conclusion holds true whether we apply and 52 of the same code
Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the  Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of
conjugal partnership’s assets and liabilities the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and
which is generally prospective in application, or 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code
Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 contained no provisions on the procedure for the
to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, liquidation of common property in "unions without
Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the marriage."
relevant provisions of both Codes first require  RTC: Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the
the liquidation of the conjugal properties before Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired
a regime of separation of property reigns. by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof
 In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned
conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own
ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and their "family home" and all their properties for that matter
the other heirs of the deceased. in equal shares.
 In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code  Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order which
shall govern the property relationship between the former was denied.
spouses, where:  Hence this petition where Valdez contends that assuming
o Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with
or mortgage it, and even substitute another Article 129.
person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the Issue: W/N Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the where the parties are psychologically incapacitated
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the Held: Yes
termination of the co-ownership.  The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void
 In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147
Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted
the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the and so applied in previous cases; 6 it provides:
aforequoted Art. 493. o Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
o Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or capacitated to marry each other, live
even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in exclusively with each other as husband and
the disputed property even without the consent wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
of Nicholson.
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
o However, the rights of Metrobank, as owned by them in equal shares and the
mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided property acquired by both of them through their
portion that Florenciaowned. Accordingly, the work or industry shall be governed by the rules
mortgage contract insofar as it covered the on co-ownership.
remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null
In the absence of proof to the contrary,
and void, Nicholson not having consented to
properties acquired while they lived together
the mortgage of his undivided half.
shall be presumed to have been obtained by
 Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank’s right, as their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the auction of owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided portion of this Article, a party who did not participate in
thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. the acquisition by the other party of any
The other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner property shall be deemed to have contributed
pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's
may ask for the partition of the lot and its property rights efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
"shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to of the family and of the household.
[the bank] in the division upon the termination of the co- Neither party can encumber or dispose by
ownership." acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
o This disposition is in line with the well- property acquired during cohabitation and
established principle that the binding force of a owned in common, without the consent of the
contract must be recognized as far as it is other, until after the termination of their
legally possible to do so––quando res non valet cohabitation.
ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest. When only one of the parties to a void
marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited
COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. in favor of their common children. In case of
GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents default of or waiver by any or all of the common
G.R. No. 122749 | July 31, 1996 (1D) children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
Facts: cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the
 Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 termination of the cohabitation.
January 1971.  This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man
 Valdez then sought the declaration of nullity of the and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code each other, so exclusively live together as husband and
56 of 255 | P a g e
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously
first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do
party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" 7 of the of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family
Code. Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
 Under this property regime, property acquired by both marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous
spouses through their work and industry shall be marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant
property acquired during the union is prima facie to have coincident property relations, on the one hand,
presumed to have been obtained through their joint between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition annulment) and, on the other, between common-law
of the property shall be considered as having contributed spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain,
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership
and maintenance of the family household." 8 Unlike the subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of
separate property are not included in the co-ownership. the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of
 Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the property regime of the spouses.
the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil
Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that — LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court,
intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property, Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
without consent of the other, during the period of A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 | March 29, 1995 (EB)
cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith Facts:
shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor  In this complaint for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by Impropriety against Judge Brillantes, Atienza alleges that
any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall he saw respondent sleeping on his bed and that upon
belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had
default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall been cohabiting with De Castro.
take place upon the termination of the cohabitation 9 or  Complainant claims that respondent is married to one
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children.
 When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal  Respondent denies having been married to Ongkiko,
impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively although he admits having five children with her. He
with each other (as husband and wife), only the property alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a
acquired by both of them through their actual joint marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor, the
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage
in common and in proportion to their respective license.
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding  Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in
shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. civil rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991,
The share of any party who is married to another shall he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, purposes, that he was single because his first marriage
as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. was solemnized without a license.
If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married  Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a
manner already heretofore expressed. 11 party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40
 In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the of said Code provides:
settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court
acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible  Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the
error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own Family Code does not apply to him considering that his
the "family home" and all their common property in equal first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage
partition of the property owned in common by them, the took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not
Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, Issue: W/N Art. 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at
12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set bar
up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the Held: Yes
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable  Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under
exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
(2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article
marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted shown any vested right that was impaired by the
by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is application of Article 40 to his case.
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that  The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning application to pending actions. The retroactive application
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
57 of 255 | P a g e
who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is
that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws.
 Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good
faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage
and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman,
who beget him five children.
 While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to
his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his
immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began
and continued when he was already in the judiciary.
 WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the
service.

58 of 255 | P a g e
9. RA 9262 – Law on Violation Against Women and Their [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or
Children; Support; Art. 213 FC on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The
court shall order the immediate personal
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall service of the TPO on the respondent by the
be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of
take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice law enforcement agents for the service. The
of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is TPO shall include notice of the date of the
unfit. (n) hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
 In Garcia v. Drilon,13 wherein petitioner therein argued
RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due
Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the
and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA, Respondents. challenge and held:
G.R. No. 170701 January 22, 2014  A protection order is an order issued to prevent further
acts of violence against women and their children, their
FACTS: family or household members, and to grant other
 Respondent filed with the RTC of Imus, Cavite a verified necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
petition for herself and in behalf of her minor children for parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to RA 9262 daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain
against her husband, petitioner herein control of their life.
 Respondent claimed, among others, that:  The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to
o There was a time when petitioner went to her ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
room and cocked his gun and pointed the barrel remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to
of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from
her not to proceed with the legal separation greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
case she filed; there was also an instance when designated family or household member safety in the
petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
that her youngest daughter had chewed and committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
spat out; in order to stop his child from crying, support of the victim. It also enables the court to award
petitioner would threaten him with a belt; when temporary custody of minor children to protect the
she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
insecure with the latter's presence and asked perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
him to stop coming to the house as often as he  The rules require that petitions for protection order be in
wanted or she would apply for a protection writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby
order, petitioner got furious and threatened her undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
of withholding his financial support and even allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases
held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court
on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she was is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but
at work, petitioner with companions went to her before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property
new home and forcibly took the children and of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground
refused to give them back to her. to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim
 RTC  issued a TPO from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
 Petitioner filed his Comment on the petition and motion to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
lift TPO  There need not be any fear that the judge may have no
 Petitioner’s argument  there was no basis for the rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is
issuance of the TPO, considering that the provision required not only to verify the allegations in the petition,
authorizing such issuance is unconstitutional but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.
 Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the  The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be
petition and motion to lift TPO, petitioner filed with the CA challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just
a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining without notice and hearing because the time in which the
order and preliminary injunction and hold departure order hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant
assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the RTC to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way,
 CA  issued a TRO to temporarily enjoin the parties and the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
their agents from enforcing the assailed TPO experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly
 Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a even death, if notice and hearing were required before
Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Manifestation, praying such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
that the enforcement of all orders, decision to be issued commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
by the RTC and all the proceedings therein be restrained procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests, among which is protection
 CA  denied the petition and upheld the TPO issued by
of women and children from violence and threats to their
the RTC
personal safety and security.
ISSUE: Whether the grant of a TPO ex parte pursuant to Sec. 15 of  It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex
RA 9262 is violative of the right to due process. parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file
HELD: an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover,
the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and
 Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:
TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the
o SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. –
court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30)
Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to
the protection order issued by the court on the days from service on the respondent.
date of filing of the application after ex parte  Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will
determination that such order should be issued. nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of
A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service.
effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the
schedule a hearing on the issuance of a merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.

59 of 255 | P a g e
 The opposition to the petition which the respondent (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or
himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits reckless conduct, personally or through
of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or another, that alarms or causes substantial
permanent protection order should not be issued. emotional or psychological distress to the
 It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of woman or her child. This shall include, but not
a petition for protection order should be apprised of the be limited to, the following acts:
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to (1) Stalking or following the woman or her
present his side. x x x. The essence of due process is to child in public or private places;
be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and (2) Peering in the window or lingering
submit any evidence one may have in support of one's outside the residence of the woman or her
defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal child;
arguments in court; one may be heard also through (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through on the property of the woman or her child
oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no against her/his will;
denial of procedural due process. (4) Destroying the property and personal
 Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date belongings or inflicting harm to animals or
of the filing of the application after ex parte determination pets of the woman or her child; and
that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte (5) Engaging in any form of harassment or
means that the respondent need not be notified or be violence;
present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public
it is within the court’s discretion, based on the petition and ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent including, but not limited to, repeated verbal
acts against women and their children for the issuance of and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
a TPO have been committed. support or custody of minor children of access
 And Section 5 of the same law provides: to the woman's child/children.
o SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women  In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others,
and Their Children.- The crime of violence i.e., he cocked the gun and pointed the same to his head
against women and their children is committed in order to convince respondent not to proceed with the
through any of the following acts: legal separation case; feeding his other children with the
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her food which another child spat out; and threatening the
child; crying child with a belt to stop him from crying which was
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her repeatedly done; and holding respondent by her nape
child physical harm; when he got furious that she was asking him not to come
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child often to their conjugal home and hold office thereat after
physical harm; their agreed separation and threatening her of withholding
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of half of the financial support for the kids, while not
imminent physical harm; conclusive, are enough bases for the issuance of a TPO.
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the Petitioner's actions would fall under the enumeration of
woman or her child to engage in conduct which Section 5, more particularly, paragraphs a, d, e (2), f, h,
the woman or her child has the right to desist and i.
from or desist from conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to engage in, or KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner, vs.
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY
or her child's freedom of movement or conduct (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA.
by force or threat of force, physical or other ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC,
intimidation directed against the woman or Respondents.
child. This shall include, but not limited to, the G.R. No. 193960 | January 7, 2013 (2D)
following acts committed with the purpose or
effect of controlling or restricting the woman's Facts:
or her child's movement or conduct:  Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually 9262 before the RTC.
depriving the woman or her child of  It was alleged in the complaint that petitioner, being then
custody to her/his family; the boyfriend of the complainant, did then and there
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence
woman or her children of financial support on the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching
legally due her or her family, or complainant’s back, shoulder and left eye, thereby
deliberately providing the woman's demeaning and degrading the complainant’s intrinsic
children insufficient financial support; worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.
woman or her child of a legal right;  RTC denied petitioner’s motion. It did not consider
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in material the fact that the parties’ dating relationship had
any legitimate profession, occupation, ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the
business or activity or controlling the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the
victim's own money or properties, or solely infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of
controlling the conjugal or common violence against women and their children as defined in
money, or properties; Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical  Hence this petition.
harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling
her actions or decisions; Issue: W/N RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman the accused
or her child to engage in any sexual activity
which does not constitute rape, by force or Held: No
threat of force, physical harm, or through  Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical
intimidation directed against the woman or her injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262
child or her/his immediate family; because its proximate cause was not their dating
60 of 255 | P a g e
relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private
committed was only slight physical injuries under the respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls
Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec.
the Municipal Trial Court. 7 of the said law.
 The Court is not persuaded.
 Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads: CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner, vs. GLENN D. VALLECERA,
Respondent.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) G.R. No. 182367 | December 15, 2010 (2D)
"Violence against women and their children" refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a Facts:
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman  Petitioner filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating temporary protection order against respondent for alleged
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within  In filling out the blanks in the pro-forma complaint, Dolina
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to added a handwritten prayer for financial support from
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer
or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, on the latter’s Certificate of Live Birth which listed
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of Vallecera as the child’s father.
liberty. x x x.  Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolina’s
 The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting petition was essentially one for financial support rather
qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered than for protection against woman and child abuses; that
as a crime of violence against women through physical he was not the child’s father; that the signature appearing
harm, namely: on the child’s Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the
o It is committed against a woman or her child petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to
and the woman is the offender’s wife, former acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support;
wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with
dating relationship or with whom he has a Dolina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a
common child; and protection order against him.
o It results in or is likely to result in physical harm  RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior
or suffering. judgment exists establishing the filiation of Dolina’s son
 In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the and granting him the right to support as basis for an order
elements of the crime of violence against women through to compel the giving of such support.
harassment, to wit:
o The offender has or had a sexual or dating Issue: W/N the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for
relationship with the offended woman; temporary protection and denied her application for temporary
o The offender, by himself or through another, support for her child
commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and Held: No
o The harassment alarms or causes substantial  Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support
emotional or psychological distress to her. for her child.
 Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a o The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed
sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for the case is the protection and safety of women
RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the and children who are victims of abuse or
act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. violence.
Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. Hence, o Although the issuance of a protection order
applying the rule on statutory construction that when the against the respondent in the case can include
law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, the grant of legal support for the wife and the
clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence child, this assumes that both are entitled to a
against women with whom the offender has or had a protection order and to legal support.
sexual or dating relationship.  To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
 As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same
relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient is not admitted or acknowledged.
evidence showing the past or present existence of such o Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son
relationship between the offender and the victim when the is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s
physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give support if he had not acknowledged him, until
credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.
should be due to the sexual or dating relationship. o The child’s remedy is to file through her mother
 Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of a judicial action against Vallecera for
petitioner using the rule of lenity7 because there is no compulsory recognition.
ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any o If filiation is beyond question, support follows as
construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate
9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the children are entitled to support and
same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a successional rights but their filiation must be
higher penalty for the former. duly proved.
o Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely  Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an
impose a more severe sanction on the action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in
offenders whose violent act/s physically harm order to establish filiation and then demand support.
women with whom they have or had a sexual Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support,
or dating relationship, and/or their children with where the issue of compulsory recognition may be
the end in view of promoting the protection of integrated and resolved.
women and children.  It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not
 Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged have dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack
the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating of any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera
relationship between the petitioner and the private and Dolina’s child since the main issue remains to be the
respondent; the act of violence committed by the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina

61 of 255 | P a g e
and her child and whether they are entitled to protection. for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date
But of course, this matter is already water under the of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review.  Hence, the issuance of the TPO by respondent Judge
This omission lends credence to the conclusion of the Arcaya•-Chua even before complainant Ocampo could
RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain file his answer was neither irregular nor improper.
support from Vallecera.  The investigating Justice was convinced by the reasons
why respondent Judge issued the TPO. A preliminary
FRANCISCO P. OCAMPO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE EVELYN S. determination of the facts of the case justified the
ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, issuance of the TPO as it appeared that the subject
Respondent. minors therein were the illegitimate children of the
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ | April 23, 2010 (EB) petitioner, Milan Ocampo, having been conceived through
artificial insemination without the required written
Facts: authorization or ratification of the husband, complainant
 Francisco P. Ocampo charged respondent Judge Arcaya- Francisco Ocampo. The pertinent provision of the Family
Chua with harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross Code states:
ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality
and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage
service. of the parents are legitimate.
 Francisco Ocampo's wife, Milan ArceoOcampo, filed a
petition claiming the sole custody of their minor Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of
daughters, which was raffled before the sala of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor
respondent Judge. or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and
 During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties, his wife, provided that both of them authorized or ratified
respondent Judge issued an Order enjoining Francisco such insemination in a written instrument executed and
Ocampo from taking their minor daughters out of the signed by them before the birth of the child. The
country without the court's permission and directing him instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together
to allow his wife, Milan, visitation rights over their minor with the birth certificate of the child.
daughters in their residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan.  Moreover, Milan Ocampo appended evidence of
 Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of complainant Ocampo's alleged perversity and violent
lack of jurisdiction, alleging that he and Milan were behavior. A sworn affidavit of Emelita S. Valentino,
residents and registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan. narrating alleged perverse behavior of complainant
He then served written interrogatories to his wife, and Ocampo, as well as the certification from the Philippine
presented testimonial and documentary evidence to National Police of Meycauayan, stating acts of violence
prove that his wife was not really a resident of Makati City. committed by complainant Ocampo on Milan, were
 Respondent Judge denied the Motion and later on also appended to the Petition. The totality of the evidence thus
denied petitioner’s MR. presented, while not exactly conclusive, justified a prima
 Respondent Judge stated that the issuance of the TPO facie determination of the necessity of a TPO.
was anchored on the provision of Section 5 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262.According to respondent Judge, RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
Milan Ocampo’s prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) was anchored mainly G.R. No. 182835 | April 20, 2010 (2D)
on R.A. No. 9262. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9262 is explicit
that the TPO should be issued by the court on the date of Facts:
the filing of the application after ex parte determination  Evidence for the prosecution shows that petitioner and
that such order should be issued. Milan's prayer for the accused Rustan were college sweethearts.
issuance of a TPO and a PPO, based on R.A. No. 9262,  Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with
was incorporated in the Petition that was filed as early as Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying
November 23, 2006. Thus, it was not necessary for the that he did not love the woman he was about to marry.
court to await the filing of complainant Ocampo's Answer Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his
or the expiry of the period within which to file it before responsibility to the other woman and their child.
issuing the TPO.  Later then on, Irish received through multimedia message
service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread
Issue: W/N Respondent Judge erred in issuing the TPO against legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure from
Petitioner Rustan.
 After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
Held: No messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy
 According to the Investigating Justice, the alleged for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And
precipitate issuance of the TPO had no leg to stand on. he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua correctly stated that the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in
issuance of the TPO can be made upon the filing of the text messaging shorthand, read: "Madalilangikalatyun,
application after ex parte determination by the judge that my chatrumangtarlacraytpwede ring send salahatng
the same be issued. This is in accordance with Sec. 15 of chatter."
R.A. No. 9262, thus:  Thorugh the help of a politician, police officers were able
to intercept Rustan, searched him and seized his Sony
SEC. 15.Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
Protection Orders (TPOs) refer to the protection order  RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of
issued by the court on the date of filing of the application R.A. 9262.
after ex parte determination that such order should be  CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence this petition.
issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the
reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty Issue: W/N Petitioner’s action of sending private respondent a
(30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the picture message with the latter’s face pasted on the body of a nude
issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on
of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal her is in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff
who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents Held: Yes

62 of 255 | P a g e
 Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f)
women includes an act or acts of a person against a defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to
woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating a single sexual act which may or may not result
relationship. Thus: in the bearing of a common child." The dating
relationship that the law contemplates can,
SEC. 3.Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to involved.
any act or a series of acts committed by any person  Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against offensive picture should not be considered a form of
a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of
within or without the family abode, which result in or is acts" that constitutes violence against women. This
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or means that a single act of harassment, which translates
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary to protect women and children. Punishing only violence
deprivation of liberty. x xxx that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
 Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence  The Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish
against women and these include any form of harassment experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged
that causes substantial emotional or psychological moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and
distress to a woman. Thus: injurious to an offended woman can of course only be
determined based on the circumstances of each case.
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread
Children. – The crime of violence against women and their open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an
children is committed through any of the following acts: obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive
one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the
x xxx pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if
she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture
personally or through another, that alarms or causes with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the must have given her a nightmare.
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited
to, the following acts: SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.
x xxx G.R. No. 168852 | September 30, 2008 (3D)

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; Facts:


 The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the  Petitionera Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
elements of the crime of violence against women through Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against her husband,
harassment are: Steven Tan and her parents-in-law, herein respondent,
o The offender has or had a sexual or dating alleging that they were causing verbal, psychological and
relationship with the offended woman; economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5 of
o The offender, by himself or through another, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the
commits an act or series of acts of harassment "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
against the woman; and 2004,
o The harassment alarms or causes substantial  RTC granted the petition.
emotional or psychological distress to her.  Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to
 One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order. RTC then
needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating dismissed the case as to respondents on the ground that,
relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
"dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262
are romantically involved over time and on a continuing under the well-known rule of law
basis during the course of the relationship. Thus: "expressiouniusestexclusioalterius."
 RTC denied petitioner’s MR. Hence this petition.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the
parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of Issue: W/N Respondent spouses, parents-in-law of petitioner, may
marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a be included in the petition for the issuance of protective order in
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A accordance with RA 9262
casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between
two individuals in a business or social context is not a Held: Yes
dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)  Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against
o It seems clear that the law did not use in its women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts
provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that committed by any person against a woman who is his
implies a sexual act. It did not say that the wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
offender must have "romanced" the offended person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to whom he has a common child, or against her child
describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
affair." family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
o R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
against women x xx refers to any act or a series
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
of acts committed by any person against a
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
woman x xx with whom the person has or had
liberty."
a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law
itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a  While the said provision provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
63 of 255 | P a g e
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy  Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal
under the RPC. construction of the law, thus:
 Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides
for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus: SEC. 4.Construction. - This Act shall be liberally
construed to promote the protection and safety of victims
SEC. 47.Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis
Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, supplied)
shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
 Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:  It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law24
and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction
punishable under special laws are not subject to the as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should protection and safety of victims of violence against
specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied) women and children.
 Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code  Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim
may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes "expressiouniosestexclusioalterius" finds no application
punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an
which the special law is silent on a particular matter. "ancillary rule of statutory construction."
 With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy  The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at
under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to great length on the attendance of circumstances
R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and
Section 47. For once conspiracy or action in concert to respondents to cause verbal, psychological and
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the economic abuses upon her.
act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or o However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter
modality of participation of each of them becomes which should be threshed out in a full-blown
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. trial on the merits and cannot be determined in
 It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 the present petition since this Court is not a trier
expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against of facts. It is thus premature for petitioner to
women and their children may be committed by an argue evidentiary matters since this
offender through another, thus: controversy is centered only on the
determination of whether respondents may be
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The
Children. - The crime of violence against women and their presence or absence of conspiracy can be best
children is committed through any of the following acts: passed upon after a trial on the merits.

x xx 10. Art. 40, FC; AM-02-10-11 SC; March 15, 2003; NCC; Rule 108

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
personally or through another, that alarms or causes for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the declaring such previous marriage void. (n).
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited
to, the following acts: ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public G.R. No. 158298 | August 11, 2010 (3D)
or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL,
residence of the woman or her child; also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE
of the woman or her child against her/his will; CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or G.R. No. 179922 | December 16, 2008 (3D)
inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her
child; and SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, Petitioner vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO,
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x xx. Respondent
(Emphasis supplied) G.R. No. 132529 | February 2, 2001 (1D)

 In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
woman or her child may includeindividuals other than the PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG,
offending husband, thus: respondent.
G.R. No. 133778 | March 14, 2000 (1D)
SEC. 8.Protection Orders. – x xxThe protection orders
that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some Facts:
or all of the following reliefs:  Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to herein petitioners.
commit or committing, personally or through another,  Teodulfa was then shot by Pepito resulting in her death.
any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;  Later on, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
1avvphi1.net married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof,
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; license.
x xx (Emphasis supplied)

64 of 255 | P a g e
 Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, necessary, yet as well for the sake of good
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the order of society as for the peace of mind of all
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. marriage should be ascertained and declared
 The case was filed under the assumption that the validity by the decree of a court of competent
or invalidity of the second marriage would affect jurisdiction."
petitioner's successional rights. o "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a
 RTC dismissed the petition: Petitioners should have filed void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring
the action to declare null and void their father's marriage of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
to respondent before his death, applying by analogy marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity
and the persons who could initiate an action for can be maintained in any proceeding in which
annulment of marriage. the fact of marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral, in any civil court between
Issue: W/N petitioners have the personality to file a petition to any parties at any time, whether before or after
declare their father's marriage void after his death the death of either or both the husband and the
wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
Held: Yes rendering such marriage void, it will be
 Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the disregarded or treated as non-existent by the
Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to courts."
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. o It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot
o The second ground for annulment of marriage be collaterally attacked except in direct
relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at parties so that on the death of either, the
anytime before the death of either party" is marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, good ab initio.
periods and persons who can file an annulment o But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of provides that there must be a judicial
marriage. declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
o The Code is silent as to who can file a petition though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage and such absolute nullity can
to declare the nullity of a marriage.
o Voidable and void marriages are not identical. be based only on a final judgment to that effect.
A marriage that is annulable is valid until For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place and cannot o Corollarily, if the death of either party would
be the source of rights. extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered
o Consequently, void marriages can be
imprescriptible.
questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only  However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
during the lifetime of the parties and not after judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
death of either, in which case the parties and absolute nullity.
o For other purposes, such as but not limited to
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
determination of heirship, legitimacy or
been perfectly valid. That is why the action or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
voidable marriages where the action
case for that matter, the court may pass upon
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
the validity of marriage even in a suit not
marriage can assail it but any proper interested
directly instituted to question the same so long
party may attack a void marriage. Void
as it is essential to the determination of the
marriages have no legal effects except those
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
declared by law concerning the properties of
may arise in the case. When such need arises,
the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
or ownership through actual joint contribution, necessary even if the purpose is other than to
and its effect on the children born to such void remarry.
marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation o The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and declaring such previous marriage void" in
54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
property regime governing voidable marriages such final judgment need not be obtained only
is generally conjugal partnership and the for purpose of remarriage.
children conceived before its annulment are  WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
legitimate.
 Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's 11. Arts. 40, 35 (4) & 41, FC; Art. 349 RPC; Civil and Criminal
father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him Bigamy; Art. 83 NCC
and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as
declaring such previous marriage void. (n).
if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing.
 Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under
marriage. Article 41;
o "A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original
rights or to make the marriage void but though Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of
no sentence of avoidance be absolutely a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the

65 of 255 | P a g e
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been  As defined in Antone v. Beronilla, "a motion to quash
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a information is the mode by which an accused assails the
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil defects which are apparent in the face of the information."
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.  An examination of the information filed against
respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the
 Art. 349 RPC allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it
contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in
Art. 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed Article 34932 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent o That the offender has been legally married;
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or o That the first marriage has not been legally
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
(Revised Penal Code) presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
o That he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and
 Art. 83 NCC
o That the second or subsequent marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity.
Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person  Here, the information contained the following allegations:
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that
other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3)
performance, unless: that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years the second marriage has all the essential requisites for
at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present validity.
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though  Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial
he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally court’s declaration that his marriage with Modina is null
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration,
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the
is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage allegations in the information do not charge the offense of
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree
null and void by a competent court. (29a) extinguished his criminal liability.
 The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EDGARDO V. either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has
ODTUHAN, Respondent. been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration
G.R. No. 191566 | July 17, 2013 (3D) of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage
can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
Facts: marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
 Respondent married Jasmin Modina on July 2, 1980.  What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when
 On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
Alagon (Alagon). subsistence of a valid marriage.
 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for o Parties to the marriage should not be permitted
annulment of his marriage with Modina. RTC granted the to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
petition. must be submitted to the judgment of
 Alagon thereafter died. In the meantime, in June 2003, competent courts and only when the nullity of
private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
respondent’s previous marriage with Modina. She thus void, and so long as there is no such
filed a Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with declaration, the presumption is that the
Bigamy. marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
 Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on second marriage before the judicial declaration
two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or of being prosecuted for bigamy.
liability has been extinguished. o If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the
 RTC denied respondent’s motion. CA’s ratiocination, a person who commits
 Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the immediately filing a petition for the declaration
CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a
information despite the fact that his first marriage with favorable decision is rendered therein before
Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the anyone institutes a complaint against him.
filing of the bigamy case.
 CA granted the appeal. Hence this petition. JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
o The CA applied the conclusion made by the PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS
Court in Morigo v. People, and held that there G.R. No. 183805 | July 3, 2013 (3D)
is cogent basis in looking into the motion to
quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence Facts:
would establish that his first marriage was  Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before
indeed void ab initio, one essential element of the RTC. It was alleged in the information that petitioner
the crime of bigamy would be lacking. being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y.
Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been
Issue: W/N CA erred in granting respondent’s appeal legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
Held: Yes with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.
66 of 255 | P a g e
 Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would
Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering
for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that
the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) cannot allow that.
the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity  The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
the instant criminal case. determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the
 In the interim, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for
voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
between petitioner and private respondent on the ground be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband contracted.
during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the  Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void
beginning. or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
 Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if
and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
that the second marriage between him and private the second marriage were subsisting before the first
respondent had already been declared void by the RTC. marriage was annulled.
 RTC dismissed the petition. Aggrieved, private
respondent filed an appeal before the CA. MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA
 CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. Hence this MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
petition. QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
Issue: W/N the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy G.R. No. 196049 | June 26, 2013 (2D)

Held: No MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant, vs. LOURDES


 Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows: G.R. No. 181089 | October 22, 2012 (3D)

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be Facts:


imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or  Respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo,
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has Aklan.
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has  During the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent
been declared presumptively dead by means of a married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro,
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. Laguna.
 The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1)  In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC a Petition for the
the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be Article 36 of the Family Code.
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he  Petitioner , Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that with the MTC a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent.
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential  Respondent filed a Motion to Quash Information alleging
requisites for validity. that her marriage with Socrates had already been
 In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more
crime of bigamy were present when the Information was marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on
filed. January 24, 1983.
o It is undisputed that a second marriage  RTC decided in favor of respondent. Aggrieved, petitioner
between petitioner and private respondent was directly filed the present petition.
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage between Issue: W/N RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili against respondent
contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the
RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the Held: Yes
bigamous nature of the second marriage  Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and
between petitioner and private respondent. penalizes bigamy as follow:
Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the
second marriage for being bigamous in nature Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be
does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
the crime of bigamy. subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
 Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, been declared presumptively dead by means of a
even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still  The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated o the offender has been legally married;
 In Jarillo v. People, the Court affirmed the accused’s o the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
consummated on the celebration of the subsequent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
marriage without the previous one having been judicially according to the Civil Code;
declared null and void, viz.: o that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the o the second or subsequent marriage has all the
first marriage was immaterial because prior to the essential requisites for validity.
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
67 of 255 | P a g e
 The felony is consummated on the celebration of the since the essential elements of the offense charged were
second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential sufficiently alleged.
in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second  Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA is not applicable,
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be since the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case
 In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted where the declaration was rendered before the
a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a
with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy a valid marriage.
were alleged in the Information.
 The annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
ground of psychological incapacity was declared only in PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
2003. The question now is whether the declaration of G.R. No. 191425 | September 7, 2011 (2D)
nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal
of the Information for bigamy filed against her. The Court Facts:
rule in the negative.  Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo
o Mercado v. Tan: The subsequent judicial filed an Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino ("Geraldino") for the
was immaterial, because prior to the crime of Bigamy.
declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had  During the pre-trial conference, both the prosecution and
already been consummated. And by defense entered the following stipulation of facts:
contracting a second marriage while the first o The validity of the first marriage between
was still subsisting, the accused committed the Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa Pinat Nollora
acts punishable under Article 349 of the solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay,
Revised Penal Code. San Jose del Monte;
o Abunado v. People: What is required for the o That Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino on
marriage be subsisting at the time the second December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
marriage is contracted. Even if the accused o That in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O.
eventually obtained a declaration that his first Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he contracted the
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
the first and the second marriage were o That Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her
subsisting before the first marriage was Counter-Affidavit the Certificate of Marriage
annulled. with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8,
o Tenebro v. CA: Although the judicial 2001;
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the o The fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her
the date of the celebration of the marriage Counter-Affidavit."
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is  The trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted Geraldino.
concerned, it is significant to note that said The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to
marriage is not without legal effects. Among prosecution for bigamy:
these effects is that children conceived or born o Article 41 of the Family Code, or Executive
before the judgment of absolute nullity of the Order No. 209, and
marriage shall be considered legitimate. There o Article 180 of the Code of Muslim Personal
is, therefore, a recognition written into the law Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree
itself that such a marriage, although void ab No. 1083.
initio, may still produce legal consequences.  CA affirmed the said decision. Hence this petition.
Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise Issue: W/N Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy of bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract Held: Yes
be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape  Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be
women with the promise of futurity and imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
commitment. subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
o Jarillo v. People: The accused's conviction for been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused been declared presumptively dead by means of a
contracted a second marriage without the judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
previous one having been judicially declared  The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
null and void, the crime of bigamy was already o That the offender has been legally married.
consummated because at the time of the o That the marriage has not been legally
celebration of the second marriage, the dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
accused’s first marriage which had not yet been absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
declared null and void by a court of competent presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting. o That he contracts a second or subsequent
 Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage.
marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had o That the second or subsequent marriage has
not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above- all the essential requisites for validity.
mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial  The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the
declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not elements of bigamy.
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage o Nollora is legally married to Pinat;
during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus,
respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy,

68 of 255 | P a g e
o Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been  Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:
legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
o Nollora admitted the existence of his second person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage to Geraldino; and marriage before the former marriage has been legally
o Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
essential requisites for validity except for the presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior the proper proceedings.
marriage
 Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his  The elements of this crime are as follows:
Muslim religion as his sole defense. He alleged that his o That the offender has been legally married;
religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting o That the marriage has not been legally
arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
of celebration of both marriages,Nollora cannot deny that absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or o That he contracts a second or subsequent
Presidential Decree No. 1083. marriage; and
o rticle 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal o That the second or subsequent marriage has
Laws states that "in case of a marriage between all the essential requisites for validity.
a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in  The instant case has all the elements of the crime of
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the
[Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive conviction of petitioner.
Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the o Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26
Philippines] shall apply." Nollora’s religious November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court
affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or
claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized subsequent marriage with Edita on 10
according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At
his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim the time of his second marriage with Edita, his
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy. marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting.
 In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the  It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the
validity of his marriage to Geraldino. Nollora may not crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged
impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled
opening the doors to allowing the solemnization of once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
produce legal consequences. Among these legal previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in marriage void.
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of  The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family
hapless women with the promise of futurity and Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a
commitment. marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
CENON R. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
and DANILO R. BONGALON, Respondents. before they can be allowed to marry again.
G.R. No. 188775 | August 24, 2011 (2D)  If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who
commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
Facts: immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of
 Petitioner and Thelma Jaime got married at the his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is
Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila. rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
 After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would against him. We note that in petitioner’s case the
only come home to the Philippines for vacations. While on complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared
a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was
had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
 Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the
complaint accusing petitioner of committing bigamy. offender can still escape liability provided that a decision
 The trial court found petitioner guilty of the said crime. nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing of the
 Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner appealed the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so
decision before the Court of Appeals contending that the would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the
court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal action or ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to
liability had already been extinguished. immediately act on complaints and eventually file
 CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence this petition. Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading
of the law is against its simple letter.
Issue: W/N petitioner is guilty of bigamy despite the fact that the first
marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy MYRNA P. ANTONE, Petitioner, vs. LEO R. BERONILLA,
case was filed in court Respondent.
G.R. No. 183824 | December 8, 2010 (1D)
Held: Yes
 We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. There Facts:
is nothing in the law that would sustain petitioner’s
contention.
69 of 255 | P a g e
 Petitioner executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous one, is
against Leo R. Beronilla, herein respondent, alleging that guilty of bigamy.
her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been  To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the
legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the
marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991. latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore,
 Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts
respondent moved to quash the Information. He argued alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute
that since the marriage had been declared null and void an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may
from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage to such defense be interposed by the respondent in his
speak of. Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged motion to quash by way of exception to the established
in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy. rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information
 The trial court quashed the information. Applying Morigo are matters of defense which may be raised only during
vs. People, it ruled contrary to what was stated in the the presentation of evidence.
Information, accused Beronilla was actually never legally
married to Myrna Antone. On this score alone, the first VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
element appears to be missing. Furthermore, the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
statement in the definition of Bigamy which reads "before G.R. No. 164435 | September 29, 2009 (3D)
the first marriage has been legally dissolved" clearly
contemplates that the first marriage must at least be Facts:
annullable or voidable but definitely not void, as in this  Petitioner was as charged with Bigamy before the RTC
case. for contracting marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos
 On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence Uy, while having been legally married with Rafael M.
this petition. Alocillo
 Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy
Issue: W/N trial court act without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave before the RTC.
abuse of discretion when it sustained respondent’s motion to quash  Petitioner then filed against Alocillofor declaration of
on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information nullity of their marriage.
 Subsequently, petitioner was convicted of the crime of
Held: Yes bigamy charged against her.
 Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the  On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed
motion was a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in toto.
in the information and any evidence contrary thereto can  In the meantime, the RTC declared petitioner’s 1974 and
only be presented as a matter of defense during trial. The 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the
Court agrees with the petitioner. ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity.
 Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, a reading of the  In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said
information will disclose that the essential elements of the declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her
offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper conviction. However, in its Resolution, the CA, citing
therefore to resolve the charges at the very outset, in a Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, denied reconsideration and
preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of a full- ruled that the subsequent declaration of nullity of her first
blown trial. marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while
 With the submission of the documents showing that the it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
court has declared the first marriage void ab initio, insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
respondent heavily relied on the rulings in People v. concerned, the said marriage is not without legal
Mendoza and Morigo declaring that: consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability
o a case for bigamy based on a void ab initio for bigamy.
marriage will not prosper because there is no  Hence this petition.
need for a judicial decree to establish that a
void ab initio marriage is invalid; and Issue: WN/ CA erred in proceeding with the case despite the
o a marriage declared void ab initio has pendency of a case which is prejudicial to the outcome of the case
retroactive legal effect such that there would be at bar
no first valid marriage to speak of after all,
which renders the elements of bigamy Held:
incomplete.  It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution
 Both principles, however, run contrary to the new evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the
provision of the Family Code, which was promulgated by proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition
the late President Corazon C. Aquino in 1987, a few years for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to
before respondent’s subsequent marriage was celebrated Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial
in 1991. question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition
 The specific provision, which reads: for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by
the latter, was a ground for suspension of the
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may proceedings.
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely  As held by the Court in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis:
of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
x xx as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a
 This provision was exhaustively discussed in Mercado, second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
where this Court settled the "conflicting" jurisprudence on of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
"the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not
marriage." After establishing that Article 40 is a new be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
provision expressly requiring a judicial declaration of case for declaration of nullity
nullity of a prior marriage and examining a long line of
cases, this Court, concluded, in essence, that under the The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
because, by then, the crime had already been purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared that contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against
a person, who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for
70 of 255 | P a g e
nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered  Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential o that the offender has been legally married;
to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, o that the first marriage has not been legally
not a prejudicial question. x xx dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
 The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
People where it was held that the subsequent judicial presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was o that he contracts a second or subsequent
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the marriage; and
crime had already been consummated. Moreover, o that the second or subsequent marriage has all
petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of the essential requisites for validity
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply  Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered
file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and defense, in which he
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial o denies the existence of his first marriage to
question in the criminal case. Villareyes, and
o argues that the declaration of the nullity of the
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void second marriage on the ground of
or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared psychological incapacity, which is an alleged
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and date on which the second marriage was
the second marriage were subsisting before the first celebrated.Hence, petitioner argues that all
marriage was annulled. four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are
 For the very same reasons elucidated in the above- absent, and prays for his acquittal.
quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of  Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
bigamy must be affirmed.  First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both
o The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary
considered a valid defense in the crime of evidence presented was in the form o Facts
bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a o a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro
second marriage without the previous one and Villareyes
having been judicially declared null and void, o a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas
the crime of bigamy was already consummated dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that
because at the time of the celebration of the Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.
second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to  As to petitioner’s second defense: As a second or
Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence
and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
would a judicial declaration of the nullity of completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during
difference. the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
o As held in Tenebro, since a marriage the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
contracted during the subsistence of a valid argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
second marriage is not per se an argument for criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
o A plain reading of Article 349 of the Revised been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
Penal Code, therefore, would indicate that the been declared presumptively dead by means of a
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain
a second or subsequent marriage during the reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
subsistence of a valid marriage. provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT valid marriage.
OF APPEALS, respondent. o Thus, as soon as the second marriage to
G.R. No. 150758 | February 18, 2004 (EB) Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990,
during the subsistence of the valid first
Facts: marriage, the crime of bigamy had already
 Petitioner contracted marriage with private complainant been consummated. To our mind, there is no
Leticia Ancajas. cogent reason for distinguishing between a
 Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously subsequent marriage that is null and void
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, purely because it is a second or subsequent
1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking null and void on the ground of psychological
this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating for bigamy is concerned.
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
 Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
petitioner. PHILIPPINES, respondent.
 RTC convicted petitioner for bigamy. This was affirmed by G.R. No. 145226 | February 06, 2004 (2D)
the CA. Hence this petition.
Facts:
Issue: W/N CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision convicting  Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
petitioner for the crime of bigamy boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran
City, Province of Bohol.
Held: No  August 30, 1990: Both agreed to get married at the Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

71 of 255 | P a g e
 September 8, 1990: Lucia reported back to her work in  The trial court found that there was no actual marriage
Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
 August 19, 1991: Lucia filed with the Ontario Court solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere
(General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held
to take effect on February 17, 1992. that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
 October 4, 1992: Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code.
Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish,  The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
Tagbilaran City, Bohol. accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
 September 21, 1993: Accused filed a complaint for judicial legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that no Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under
marriage ceremony actually took place between him and the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
Lucia, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020 void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
 October 19, 1993: Appellant was charged with Bigamy in beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no
an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran, legal effect.
with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.  Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
o RTC found appellant guilty of bigamy: Want of purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time
a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage existence and the validity of the first marriage being an
should not be allowed to assume that their essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical
marriage is void even if such be the fact but that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained
must first secure a judicial declaration of the where there is no first marriage to speak of. The
nullity of their marriage before they can be petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
allowed to marry again. charge.
o Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia,  WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which
held that the court of a country in which neither
of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE
both spouses may resort merely for the FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court,
purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no Branch 28, Manila, respondent.
jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 | March 29, 1995 (EB)
of the parties.
 Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
 Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the
trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020
declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab
initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No
appeal was taken from this decision, which then became
final and executory.
 CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
o The subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s
marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could
not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is
sought to be punished by Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a
second marriage before the first marriage had
been dissolved.
o The divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity
in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of the
Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary
to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article
17 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public
policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a
judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Issue: W/N petitioner committed bigamy

Held: No
 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis: Elements of bigamy:
o the offender has been legally married;
o the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead;
o he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
o the subsequent marriage would have been
valid had it not been for the existence of the first
 Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, the Court
note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
the RTC of Bohol issued a decree of annulment of
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete.

72 of 255 | P a g e
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible
12. Arts. 41 - 44, 49 FC; Art. 83 NCC disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a performance, unless:
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage
reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a) so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared
null and void by a competent court. (29a)
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article
shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. YOLANDA
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment CADACIO GRANADA, respondent
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. G.R. No. 187512 | June 13, 2012 (2D)
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance
shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties Facts:
to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person,  Respondent and Cyrus Granada got married at the Manila
with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and City Hall on 3 March 1993.
without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
 Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric, where
determined in case such fact is disputed. (n)
Cyrus was then employed, closed down, Cyrus went to
Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in
that time, she had not received any communication from
the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its
brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
termination shall be considered legitimate;
regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership,
 After 9 years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have
as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either
Cyrus declared presumptively dead.
spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the
net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership  RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there presumptively dead
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage  Republic filed MFR of this Decision: Yolanda had failed to
or in default of children, the innocent spouse; exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead
if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations  Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to
made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; the CA  CA granted Yolanda’s MTD on the ground of
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other lack of jurisdiction
spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy,
even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and Issue: WON the decision herein is final and executor.
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith
shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate Held: YES.
and intestate succession. (n)  Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, it was an error for the
Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad elevated the matter to the CA, to wit: In Summary Judicial
faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal,
favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by
express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, "immediately final and executor”; what the OSG should
existing at the time of the marriage: have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage a petition for review under Rule 45.
annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one,  In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-
and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc: In Jomoc, the RTC
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty- granted respondent’s Petition for Declaration of
one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the purpose
together as husband and wife; of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that,
wife; under the Rules of Court, a record on appeal is required
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless to be filed when appealing special proceedings cases.
such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this
the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, or absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having under the category of special proceedings, a petition for
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
the other as husband and wife; Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the Article 238 of the same Code. Since its purpose was to
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage,
to be incurable; or petitioner’s action was a summary proceeding based on

73 of 255 | P a g e
Article 41 of the Family Code, rather than a special applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner could
proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. not be expected to comply with this requirement because
 Republic v. Jomoc did not supersede Republic v. it was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio
Bermudez-Lorino: the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not Reyes in 1985; contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code
expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding was not repealed by Article 41 of the Family Code
under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in
Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the Issue: WON Art 41 of the FC shall be applied in this case.
impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for
questioning the trial court’s Decision in a summary Held: NO.
proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under  It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of
Article 41 of the Family Code was intended "to set the petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and
records straight and for the future guidance of the bench June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under
and the bar." the auspices of the Civil Code.
 Republic v. Tango: By express provision of law, the  Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it person with any person other than such first spouse shall
follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that the time of the second marriage without the spouse
an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of declared null and void by a competent court.
choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of  Article 390 of the Civil Code: After an absence of seven
Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except
Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the for those of succession. The absentee shall not be
court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession
errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after
appeal. the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
 In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of opened.
presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the  For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting an absentee. The declaration of absence made in
to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules precautions for the administration of the estate of the
of Court. absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however,
the law only requires that the former spouse has been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
ANGELITA VALDEZ, petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE second marriage, that the spouse present does not know
PHILIPPINES, respondent his or her former spouse to be living, that such former
G.R. No. 180863 | September 8, 2009 (3D) spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
Facts: marriage.
 Petitioner married Sofio on Jan 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal.  Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is
 March 1972: Sofio left their conjugal dwelling  Petitioner established by law and no court declaration is needed for
and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in May the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to
1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents’ home have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio
in Tarlac. is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
 Oct 1975: Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st  He and  Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to
petitioner agreed to separate and executed a document Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s
to that effect capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under
 Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985  Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies,
 Subsequently, however, Virgilio’s application for proof of "well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner
naturalization was denied because petitioner’s marriage could not have been expected to comply with this
to Sofio was subsisting requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect
 Mar 29, 2007: petitioner filed a Petition seeking the at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of
declaration of presumptive death of Sofio the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion.
 RTC dismissed the Petition for lack of merit  Angelita The Family Code itself states:
"was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her  Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." This belief, it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to- accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the  To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code
whereabouts of the absent spouse. requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will,
 OSG recommended that the Court set aside the assailed ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second
RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated.
presumptively dead  the requirement of "well-founded Such a situation would be untenable and would go against
belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code is not the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
74 of 255 | P a g e
 24 April 1992: Teodorico Calisterio died intestate,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. FERVENTINO U. leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value
TANGO, respondent of P604,750  survived by his wife, Marietta Calisterio
G.R. No. 161062 | July 31, 2009 (2D) (solemnized on 08 May 1958)
 Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had
Facts: previously been married to James William Bounds on 13
 Mar 9, 1987: Ferventino and Maria were married in civil Jan 1946  James Bounds disappeared without a trace
rites on 11 Feb 1947
 Mar 13, 1987: Maria and her family flew to Seattle, USA  Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later,
 Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year without Marietta having priorly secured a court
before she stopped responding to his letters. Out of declaration that James was presumptively dead
resentment, he burned all the letters Maria wrote him. He  09 Oct 1992: petitioner, a surviving sister of Teodorico,
claims to have forgotten her address since. filed a petition claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving
 Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find Maria. heir of Teodorico, the marriage between the latter and
Upon inquiry from the latter’s uncle  even Maria’s respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly
relatives were unaware of her whereabouts. He also bigamous and thereby null and void
solicited the assistance of a friend in Texas but to no avail.  Marietta opposed the petition: her first marriage had
Finally, he sought the aid of his parents Antonio and been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his
Eusebia in Los Angeles, and his aunt. Like, Ledesma whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years
though, their attempts to find Maria proved fruitless. The before she contracted her second marriage with
next 14 years went by without any news of Maria. Teodorico
 On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino filed a  05 Feb 1993: RTC issued an order appointing jointly
verified petition for the declaration of presumptive death Sinfroniano Armas, Jr., and Marietta administrator and
of Maria within the contemplation of Article 41 of the administratrix, respectively
Family Code  17 Jan 1996: RTC declared petitioner as the sole heir of
 RTC declared MARIA presumptively dead the estate of Teodorico
 CA affirmed the RTC’s Order: It held that Maria’s absence  CA reversed RTC: Marietta Calisterio's marriage to
for 14 years without information about her location despite Teodorico remains valid; (b) The house and lot belong to
diligent search was sufficient to support a well-founded the conjugal partnership property; Marietta, being
belief of her death Teodorico's compulsory heir, is entitled to one half of her
husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister to the other
Issue: WON Ferventino has established a basis to form a well- half; Marietta to act as administrator of Teodorico's
founded belief that his absent spouse is already dead. estate

Held: YES. ISSUE: WON the marriage between Teodorico and Marietta is
 ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately valid.
final and executory.  By express provision of law, the
judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be HELD: YES.
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it  The applicable law is the Civil Code, specifically Article
follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court’s 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: Any marriage
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of subsequently contracted by any person during the
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the CA in been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. the second marriage without the spouse present having
 In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in CA though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
instead of a petition for certiorari. . generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
 Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that the spouse present at the time of contracting such
a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
any respect even if the modification is meant to correct contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be declared null and void by a competent court.
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court  A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse
of the land.16 In light of the foregoing, it would be is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of
unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the issues raised absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the
by petitioner. marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit
 The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice null and void by a competent court." It follows that the
that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party
and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become assailing the second marriage.
final on some definite date fixed by law. The only  In contrast, under the Family Code, in order that a
exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no considered valid, the following conditions must
prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision must have been absent for four consecutive years, or
which render its execution unjust and inequitable. two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner vs. MARIETTA the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
CALISTERIO, respondent well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
G.R. No. 136467 | April 6, 2000 (3D) dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for
which purpose the spouse present can institute a
FACTS: summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration.
75 of 255 | P a g e
 In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
respondent Marietta's first husband, James William the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse
Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more  THUS Even if the spouse present has a well-founded
than eleven years before she entered into a second belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a
marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
Calisterio. This second marriage, having been death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been
thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage
judicial declaration of presumptive death of James subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the
Bounds. previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing
 The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance
evidence having been adduced to indicate another with pertinent provisions of law.
property regime between the spouses, pertains to them  In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a
in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's
Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
equal portions — one portion going to the surviving remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or
spouse and the other portion to the estate of the unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased, groom.
concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces (the latter by right of REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. GREGORIO
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the NOLASCO, respondent
brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being G.R. No. 94053 | March 17, 1993 (3D)
entitled to the other half.
Facts:
 Gregorio Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration of
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, petitioner vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
DOMAGTOY, respondent invoking Article 41 of the Family Code
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 | July 19, 1996 (2D)  Republic opposed the petition: that Nolasco did not
possess a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
Facts: already dead
 Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized the wedding  During trial, Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British
the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port
his first wife. calls. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas,
 Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of Janet Monica had left Antique and was never found
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar  RTC granted Nolasco's petition
Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and  CA affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that
Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a
Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, belief that his absent spouse had already died.
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first
wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. Issue: WON Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is
 The certified true copy of the marriage contract between already dead.
Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's
civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the Held: NO.
wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge.  Article 41: A marriage contracted by any person during
He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer stating that they knew void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida founded belief that the absent spouse was already
Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard death under the circumstances set forth in the provision
of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
presumption that she is already dead. years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting
 In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding
Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason for as provided in this Code for the declaration of
him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Issue: Is respondent judge correct? (Emphasis supplied).
 Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to
Held: NO. arise has been shortened to 4 years; however, there is
 Article 41 of the FC: A marriage contracted by any person need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to
during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null enable the spouse present to remarry. Article 83 of the
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well- is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that
Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two the absentee is already dead before a petition for
years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,  4 requisites for the declaration of presumptive death
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding under Article 41 of the Family Code: 1. That the absent
as provided in this Code for the declaration of spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
76 of 255 | P a g e
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present affect the regime of absolute community except that:
spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 10 is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a
 The investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in summary proceeding;
his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a
dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)
another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city
of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there. Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not
 Respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:
any information as to her personal background even after (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
she had married respondent too convenient an excuse to therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
justify his failure to locate her. (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other
 The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to summary proceeding;
regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the
well-founded one. separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
 The spouses should not be allowed, by the simple support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a
expedient of agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)
even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial
court in the same proceeding.
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
TITLE II. LEGAL SEPARATION for judicial separation of property:
De Facto Separation vs. Legal Separation/Article 63 (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated
See also Arts 86 (4), 99 & 126, 100 & 127, 135 (6), 204; Title XI, in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
Chapter 2, Arts 239 – 248; Rule of Procedure on Legal Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to
Separation (A.M. No. 02-11-11, SC); See R.A. 9262 – Compare fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by
Section 19 with Article 58; Rules on Revocation of Donations; receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has
Incapacity to Succeed by Will or Interstate Succession a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of
Are multiple appeals allowed?; Article 61 (Admin pendente lite) in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (299a)
See also, and compare with, Article 24
Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization
effects: for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified
but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the
dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction
to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be
the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties
the provisions of Article 43(2); shall be submitted to and approved by the court. (n)
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Art. 240. Claims for damages by either spouse, except costs of the
Code; and proceedings, may be litigated only in a separate action. (n)
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from
the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions Art. 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of notice to
in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent the other spouse, be exercised by the proper court authorized to
spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a) hear family cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial court or its
equivalent sitting in the place where either of the spouses resides.
(n)
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the
donor in the following cases: Art. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse; spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, of said
petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates: not be granted, on or before the date set in said notice for the initial
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or concerned. (n)
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Article 134 to 138. (175a) Art. 243. A preliminary conference shall be conducted by the judge
personally without the parties being assisted by counsel. After the
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates: initial conference, if the court deems it useful, the parties may be
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; assisted by counsel at the succeeding conferences and hearings.
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (n)
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138 (175a)
77 of 255 | P a g e
Art. 244. In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent
is sought, the court shall inquire into the reasons for his failure to Issue: WON the forfeiture of the net profits earned in favor of the
appear, and shall require such appearance, if possible. (n) children herein is valid.

Art. 245. If, despite all efforts, the attendance of the non-consenting Held: YES. Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present
spouse is not secured, the court may proceed ex parte and render case since the parties' property relation is governed by the system
judgment as the facts and circumstances may warrant. In any case, of CPG
the judge shall endeavor to protect the interests of the non-  Since at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the
appearing spouse. (n) operative law was the Civil Code and since they did not
agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations
Art. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said between the petitioner and the respondent is the system
petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of of CPG  under this property relation, "the husband and
affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify property and the income from their work or industry." The
the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their husband and wife also own in common all the property of
testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses. (n) the conjugal partnership of gains.
 Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the
executory. (n) Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the
applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
Art. 248. The petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article
specific separate property of the abandoning spouse and to use the 129  The latter provision is applicable because
fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the family shall also be according to Article 256 of the Family Code "[t]his Code
governed by these rules. (n) shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the accordance with the Civil Code or other law."
spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.  Petitioner claims that his vested rights have been
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the impaired, arguing: since the property relations between
spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to the spouses is governed by the regime of CPG under the
administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half
The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same of the properties of CPG
powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of  Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals: "vested right"  A vested right
Court. (104a) is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to
the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
contingency; expresses the concept of present fixed
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
just and imperative right which enlightened free society,
implementing such decision.
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, petitioner vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C.  ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara,
QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by et al. v. The Hon. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita:
their mother RITA QUIAO, respondent The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of
G.R. No 176556 | July 4, 2012 (2D) the constitutional guaranty of due process that expresses
a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
Facts: justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it
 Petitioner and the respondent tied the marital knot on includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement
January 6, 1977 of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations
 Oct 26, 2000: Rita Quiao filed a complaint for legal created after the right has become vested. Rights are
separation against Brigido Quiao considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
 RTC declared the legal separation of Rita and Brigido B. present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or
Quiao fixed and irrefutable.
 Neither party filed MFR and appeal  Note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's
 Dec 12, 2005: Rita filed a motion for execution which the "vested right" is one founded, not only in the provisions of
trial court granted the Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This
 Feb 10, 2006: RTC issued a Writ of Execution  the writ provision is like Articles 63 and 129 of the Family Code on
was partially executed with the petitioner paying the the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal
respondents the amount ofP46,870 partnership profits. The said provision says: In case of
 July 7, 2006: petitioner filed a Motion for legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit his or her
Clarification asking the RTC to define the term "Net Profits share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be
Earned”  RTC issued an Order which held that the awarded to the children of both, and the children of the
phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the remainder guilty spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the
of the properties of the parties after deducting the conjugal partnership property came mostly or entirely
separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts; from the work or industry, or from the wages and salaries,
after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall or from the fruits of the separate property of the guilty
be forfeited in favor of the common children because the spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply. In case there are no
offending spouse does not have any right to any share of children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled to all the
the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and net profits.
43, No. (2) of the Family Code  Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.: Prior to the liquidation of
 Petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in
applied Art 129 of FC, instead of Art 102  argues that the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
Art 102 applies because there is no other provision under constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and
FC which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture does not ripen into title until it appears that there are
as a result of legal separation assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
78 of 255 | P a g e
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the family to gain control of the conjugal properties  ...it
net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty
resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home
partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the and be separated from her children whom she loves, if
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does there exists no cause, which is already beyond her
not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal endurance.
partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is  The claim of William that a decree of legal separation
finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater
obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this
between the spouses or their respective heirs. Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation
then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner vs. LUCITA G. relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason
ONG, respondent to go to court in the first place.
G.R. No. 153206 | October 23, 2006 (1D)  Also without merit is the argument of William that since
Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal
Facts: separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par.
 William Ong and Lucita were married on July 13, 1975 at (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
the San Agustin Church in Manila separation shall be denied when both parties have given
 Mar 21, 1996: Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to
Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of FC alleging that her by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable
life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, cause for more than one year. As it was established that
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does
 William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said
harm on his wife, used insulting language against her, or provision.
whipped the children with the buckle of his belt  The Constitution is committed to the policy of
 RTC decreed the legal separation of plaintiff and strengthening the family as a basic social institution; it
defendant: It is indubitable that Lucita and William had however does not establish the parameters of state
their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the
both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to
day that he did not quarrel with his wife. These quarrels protect it and put into operation the constitutional
were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, provisions that protect the same.
threats and intimidation by the defendant against the
plaintiff and on the children SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner vs. ROSANNA H.
 CA affirmed in toto RTC: The straightforward and candid AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS,
testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted and represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS,
credible. Dr. Elinzano’s testimony was able to show that respondent
Lucita suffered several injuries inflicted by William. G.R. No. 165546 | February 27, 2006 (1D)
 William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her
family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership Facts:
of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; these  Pablo Aguas died on Dec 8, 1996  His surviving spouse,
properties, which include real properties in Hong Kong, Rosanna Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death
Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were acquired during benefits
the marriage through his (William’s) sole efforts  Her claim for monthly pension was settled on Feb 13,
1997
Issue: WON the legal separation herein was validly decreed  April 1997: SSS received a sworn letter from Leticia,
Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s claim for death
Held: YES. benefits  alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family
 William himself admitted that there was no day that he did abode approximately more than six years before, and
not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, lived with another man on whom she has been dependent
and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties for support (Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña were
and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their married on Nov 1, 1990)
children.  SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna monthly
 Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous pension
accounts of the instances when William displayed violent  Social Security Officer who conducted the investigation
temper against Lucita and their children; such as: when reported that the deceased had no legal children with
William threw a steel chair at Lucita; threw chairs at their Rosanna; Jenelyn and Jefren were Rosanna’s children
children; slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at with Romeo; and Rosanna left the deceased six years
her; use the buckle of the belt in whipping the before his death and lived with Romeo while she was still
children; pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong pregnant with Jenelyn. Mariquita also confirmed that
arms almost strangling her, and smashed the flower vase Pablo was not capable of having a child as he was under
and brick rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in treatment.
disarray; shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in  SSS denied Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of
front of Linda and the employees of their business, their pensions
because he could not find a draft letter on his table;29got  This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition
mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social
prompting William to smash the plate with steak and hit Security Commission (SSC)
Charleston, then slapped Lucita and shouted at her  Mar 14, 2001: SSC rendered a decision denying the
"putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" claims for lack of merit and ordering Rosanna to
when she sided with Charleston; and the December 9 and immediately refund to SSS the amount of P10,350
December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave erroneously paid to her and Jeylnn
the conjugal dwelling.  CA reversed SSC: relied on the birth certificates of Janet
 To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are and Jeylnn showing that they were the children of the
denials and attempts to downplay the said incidents. deceased  for judicial purposes, these records were
 William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing binding upon the parties, including the SSS. These entries
the case for legal separation is in order for her side of the
79 of 255 | P a g e
made in public documents may only be challenged  Presumption of legitimacy under Art 164 cannot extend to
through adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may Janet because her date of birth was not substantially
not be altered by mere testimonies of witnesses to the proven
contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found no evidence to  For Rosanna to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must
show that she ceased to receive support from Pablo prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for
before he died. Rosanna’s alleged affair with Romeo dela support from the employee” THUS prove: (1) that she is
Peña was not properly proven. the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon
 Petitioner invokes Sec 8 of RA 1161 which defines a the member for support  Rosanna presented proof to
dependent spouse as "the legitimate spouse dependent show that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo (marriage
for support upon the employee:  Rosanna forfeited her certificate which was verified with the civil register); But
right to be supported by Pablo when she engaged in an WON Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was
intimate and illicit relationship with Romeo and married still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains
the latter during her marriage to Pablo. Such act to be resolved
constitutes abandonment, which divested her of the right  Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to support each
to receive support from her husband other, but whether one is actually dependent for support
upon the other is something that has to be shown; it
Issue: WON Rosanna is entitled to the SSS death benefit. cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.
 A wife who is already separated de facto from her
Held: NO. Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support"
monthly pension  justified by the photocopy of her birth upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary 
certificate which bears the signature of Pablo if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living
 At the time of Pablo’s death, the prevailing law was RA together at the time of his death, it would be safe to
1161, as amended by PPD 735. Section 13: Effective July presume that she was dependent on the husband for
1, 1975, upon the covered employee’s death, (a) his support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing
primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the basic monthly for herself.
pension, and his dependents to the dependent’s pension:  Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory
Provided, That he has paid at least thirty-six monthly requirements have been complied with, particularly her
contributions prior to the semester of deatHELD: dependency on her husband for support at the time of his
Provided, further, That if the foregoing condition is not death. Aside from her own testimony, the only evidence
satisfied, or if he has no primary beneficiaries, his adduced by Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo lived
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum together as husband and wife until his death were the
benefit equivalent to thirty times the basic monthly affidavits of Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu where
pension: Provided, however, That the death benefit shall they made such declaration.
not be less than the total contributions paid by him and his  Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their
employer on his behalf nor less than five hundred pesos: testimonies before the SSC will not prevail over the
Provided, finally, That the covered employee who dies in categorical and straightforward testimonies of the other
the month of coverage shall be entitled to the minimum witnesses who testified that Rosanna and Pablo had
benefit. already separated for almost six years before the latter
 Dependent. – The legitimate, legitimated, or legally died.
adopted child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed,
and not over twenty-one years of age provided that he is HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner vs. JUDGE ROQUE R.
congenitally incapacitated and incapable of self-support SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent
physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 | March 8, 2001 (1D)
for support upon the employee; and the legitimate parents (Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
wholly dependent upon the covered employee for regular
support. Facts:
 Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries  21 May 1966: Complainant married the late David
and dependent children, who shall be the primary Manzano in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents Avenue, Caloocan City
and, subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent  22 March 1993: Her husband contracted another
children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent
children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the Judge  When respondent Judge solemnized said
absence of any of the foregoing, any other person marriage, he knew that the same was void and bigamous,
designated by the covered employee as secondary as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
beneficiary. contracting parties were "separated"
 Article 164 of the Family Code: children conceived or born  Respondent Judge claims that when he did not know that
during the marriage of the parents are legitimate (De Manzano was legally married and thaw what he knew was
Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon)  that the two had been living together as husband and wife
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly for seven years already without the benefit of marriage,
established and founded on sounder morality and more as manifested in their joint affidavit  In those affidavits,
convincing reason than the presumption that children both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
born in wedlock are legitimate; conclusive in the absence stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and
of proof that there is physical impossibility of access Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 respective marriages had been marked by constant
days which immediately precedes the birth of the child quarrels, they had both left their families and had never
due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore.
sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those
husband and wife are living separately in such way that affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse Issue: WON the affidavits herein suffice to prove that both
 THUS impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly Manzano and Payao were already separated from their respective
personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his spouses.
heirs  In this case, there is no showing that Pablo
challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime Held: NO.

80 of 255 | P a g e
 Article 34 of FC: No license shall be necessary for the  RTC then decreed the issuance of a Decree of Legal
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together Separation of the marriage between Concepcion and
as husband and wife for at least 5 years and w/o any legal Enrico; That several properties are hereby declared as
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties the conjugal properties of the partnership of Concepcion
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any and the defendant half and half; and that the subsequent
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The marriage between defendant Enrico and Clarita is void ab
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he initio;
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties  Hence, the instant special civil action of certiorari.
and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
 Requisites for legal ratification of marital cohabitation to Issue: WON a default order can be validly issued in a legal
apply: 1. The man and woman must have been living separation proceeding.
together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal Held: NO.
impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence  Under ordinary circumstances, the petition would have
of legal impediment between the parties must be present outrightly been dismissed, for the proper remedy of
at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an petitioners should have instead been either to appeal from
affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least the judgment by default or to file a petition for relief from
five years [and are without legal impediment to marry judgment. This rule, however, is not inflexible; a petition
each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute for certiorari is allowed when the default order
a sworn statement that he had ascertained the is improperly declared, or even when it
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal is properly declared, where grave abuse of discretion
impediment to their marriage. attended such declaration. In these exceptional
 Not all of these requirements are present in the case at instances, the special civil action of certiorari to declare
bar  in their separate affidavits Manzano and Payao the nullity of a judgment by default is available.
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.  In the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is
Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both not legally sanctioned. The Civil Code provides: Art. 101.
were "separated." No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon
 The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case
from their respective spouses for a long time already is of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order
immaterial. Article 63(1) of FC allows spouses who have the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a
obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
are not severed  THUS legal separation does not State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff
dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties is not fabricated.
to remarry; all the more when the separation is merely de  The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for
facto, as in the case at bar the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
 Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
Affidavit of Manzano and Payao stating that they had annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to
been cohabiting as husband and wife for 7 years. Just like emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract;
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally
person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not
subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a be made to depend upon the parties themselves. It is
long period of time between two individuals who are consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal
legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that
for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or
a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a annulment are fully justified or not.
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior  Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family
existing marriage. Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation
must "in no case be tried before six months shall have
ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order
C. PACETE, EVELINA C. PACETE and EDUARDO C. PACETE, to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim,
petitioners vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE, respondents reconcile.
G.R. No. L-53880 | March 17, 1994 (3D)  Further, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 6. If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
Facts: legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
 29 Oct 1979: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
declaration of nullity of the marriage between her husband collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it
as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
accounting and separation of property  averred that she
was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938; that Pacete SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner vs. THE COURT OF
subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents
Clarita; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter G.R. No. 106169 | February 14, 1994 (1D)
acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land,
fishponds and several motor vehicles and placed the Fact:
several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita  As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to
or in the names of his children with Clarita and other different countries during his successive tours of duties,
"dummies;" petitioner left to his wife, herein respondent, the
 The defendants were each served  They filed a motion administration of some of their conjugal, properties for 15
for an extension within which to file an answer; the years
defendants then filed a second motion for an extension;  Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back
and then another motion for an extension which the court to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children
denied on the ground that it was "filed after the original  4 years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to
period given . . . as first extension had expired." sell a building and lot belonging to the conjugal
 RTC declared the defendants in default partnership
81 of 255 | P a g e
 In her answer, PR opposed the authorization and filed a defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue
counterclaim for legal separation: the house in Greenhills doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain
was being occupied by her and their six children and that and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be
they were depending for their support on the rentals from rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.
another conjugal property; She also informed the court  The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the
that despite her husband's retirement, he had not existence of a right and its actual or threatened
returned to his legitimate family and was instead violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it
maintaining a separate residence in Quezon City, with cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife
Thelma Cumareng and their three children (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for
 RTC found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a legal separation), the private respondent has a right to a
bigamous marriage with Thelma Cumareng; thus decreed share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is
the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of also enough evidence to raise the apprehension that
the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its
 Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for the improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and
issuance of WPI to enjoin the petitioner from interfering children.
with the administration of their properties in Greenhills
and Forbes Park  alleged inter alia that he had harassed TITLE III. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND
the tenant of the Forbes Park property by informing him AND WIFE (Arts 68 -73)
that his lease would not be renewed and that the See also Arts 220, 221 and 225; RA 9262 & IRR; Article 50 NCC;
petitioner had disposed of one of their valuable conjugal Different kinds of domicile; Article 69; See also Article 110
properties in the US NCC; Habeas Corpus; Rule 102, Rules of Court; Art 73 FC v Art
 CA granted WPI 117 NCC; RA 10572 amended Arts 73 & 111 FC (Signed May 23,
 Petitioner: since the law provides for a joint administration 2013 – Effectivity Date: 15 Days after Publication in 2
of the conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no Newspapers)
injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other
because no right will be violated Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall
have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards the
Issue: WON an injunctive relief can thus be issued. following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct
Held: YES. them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their
 Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the upbringing in keeping with their means;
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both (2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's companionship and understanding;
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and
within five years from the date of the contract thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse compliance with the duties of citizenship;
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the (4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials,
administration of the conjugal properties, the other supervise their activities, recreation and association with others,
spouse may assume sole powers of the administration. protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring
These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
without authority of the court or the written consent of the (5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, (6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, (7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the
the transaction shall be construed and the third person, circumstances; and
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the (8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon
acceptance by the other spouse or the authorization by parents and guardians. (316a)
the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority
 Pending the appointment of an administrator over the shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts
whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company
justified in allowing the wife to continue with her and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
administration and in enjoining the petitioner from defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
interfering with his wife's administration pending
resolution of the appeal.
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal
 The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child
administration over the conjugal properties as clearly without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of
provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a
Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that judicial order to the contrary.
after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial Where the market value of the property or the annual income of
court shall, in the absence of a written agreement the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required
between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but
a third person to act as the administrator. not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or
 While it is true that no formal designation of the annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations
administrator has been made, such designation was prescribed for general guardians.
implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the
petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus
also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
designation was in effect approved by the Court of obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their
Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the habitual residence. (40a)
preliminary injunction now under challenge.
 The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case
injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things of disagreement, the court shall decide.
subject of the action or the relations between the parties
and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these
matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the
82 of 255 | P a g e
Article 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But known, but if his name is not known he may be otherwise described
the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he or identified. The writ may be served in any province by the sheriff
should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. (58a) or other proper officer, or by a person deputed by the court or judge.
Service of the writ shall be made by leaving the original with the
person to whom it is directed and preserving a copy on which to
RULE 102
make return or service. If that person cannot be found, or has not
Habeas Corpus
the prisoner in his custody, then the service shall be made on any
other person having or exercising such custody.
Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to
Section 8. How writ executed and returned. — The officer to whom
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
the writ is directed shall convey the person so imprisoned or
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
restrained, and named in the writ, before the judge allowing the writ,
is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
or in case of his absence or disability, before some other judge of
the same court, on the day specified in the writ, unless, from
Section 2. Who may grant the writ. — The writ of habeas corpus
sickness or infirmity of the person directed to be produced, such
may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof in
person cannot, without danger, be bought before the court or judge;
the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be
and the officer shall make due return of the writ, together with the
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made
day and the cause of the caption and restraint of such person
returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court
according to the command thereof.
of First Instance, or any judge thereof for the hearing and decision
on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or
Section 9. Defect of form. — No writ of habeas corpus can be
a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before
disobeyed for defect of form, if it sufficiently appears therefrom in
himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.
whose custody or under whose restraint the party imprisoned or
restrained is held and the court or judge before whom he is to be
Section 3. Requisites of application therefor. — Application for the
bought.
writ shall be by petition signed and verified either by the party for
whose relief it is intended, or by some person on his behalf, and
Section 10. Contents of return. — When the person to be produced
shall set fortHELD:
is imprisoned or restrained by an officer, the person who makes the
(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is
return shall state therein, and in other cases the person in whose
imprisoned or restrained on his liberty;
custody the prisoner is found shall state, in writing to the court or
(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned
judge before whom the writ is returnable, plainly and unequivocably:
or restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or
(a) Whether he has or has not the party in his custody or power, or
person may be described by an assumed appellation, and the
under restraint;
person who is served with the writ shall be deemed the person
(b) If he has the party in his custody or power, or under restraint, the
intended;
authority and the true and whole cause thereof, set forth at large,
(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;
with a copy of the writ, order execution, or other process, if any, upon
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person,
which the party is held;
if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy;
(c) If the party is in his custody or power or is restrained by him, and
or, if the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such
is not produced, particularly the nature and gravity of the sickness
fact shall appear.
or infirmity of such party by reason of which he cannot, without
danger, be bought before the court or judge;
Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it
(d) If he has had the party in his custody or power, or under restraint,
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
and has transferred such custody or restraint to another, particularly
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
to whom, at what time, for what cause, and by what authority such
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
transfer was made.
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
Section 11. Return to be signed and sworn to. — The return or
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
statement shall be signed by the person who makes it; and shall
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
also be sworn by him if the prisoner is not produced, and in all other
judgment, or order. Not shall anything in this rule be held to
cases unless the return is made and signed by a sworn public officer
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
in his official capacity.
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment.
Section 12. Hearing on return. Adjournments. — When the writ is
returned before one judge, at a time when the court is in session, he
Section 5. When the writ must be granted and issued. — A court or
may forthwith adjourn the case into the court, there to be heard and
judge authorized to grant the writ must, when a petition therefor is
determined. The court or judge before whom the writ is returned or
presented and it appears that the writ ought to issue, grant the same
adjourned must immediately proceed to hear and examine the
forthwith, and immediately thereupon the clerk of the court shall
return, and such other matters as are properly submitted for
issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of emergency,
consideration, unless for good cause shown the hearing is
the judge may issue the writ under his own hand, and may depute
adjourned, in which event the court or judge shall make such order
any officer or person to serve it.
for the safekeeping of the person imprisoned or restrained as the
nature of the case requires. If the person imprisoned or restrained
Section 6. To whom writ directed, and what to require. — In case of
is not produced because of his alleged sickness or infirmity, the
imprisonment or restraint by an officer, the writ shall be directed to
court or judge must be satisfied that it is so grave that such person
him, and shall command him to have the body of the person
cannot be produced without danger, before proceeding to hear and
restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated in the
dispose of the matter. On the hearing the court or judge shall
writ at the time and place therein specified. In case of imprisonment
disregard matters of form and technicalities in respect to any warrant
or restraint by a person not an officer, the writ shall be directed to an
or order of commitment of a court or officer authorized to commit by
officer, and shall command him to take and have the body of the
law.
person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge designated
in the writ at the time and place therein specified, and to summon
Section 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. — If it
the person by whom he is restrained then and there to appear before
appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of
said court or judge to show the cause of the imprisonment or
commitment in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered
restraint.
prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained
of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall be
Section 7. How prisoner designated and writ served. — The person
to be produced should be designated in the writ by his name, if
83 of 255 | P a g e
considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party the costs shall be taxed against him, or against the person who
claiming the custody must prove such facts. signed the application for the writ, or both, as the court shall direct.

Section 14. When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession,
when let to bail. — If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The
committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not be In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or (1) The objection is proper, and
restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so (2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or
punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting
bail in the discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the
he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge spouse who has not obtained consent.
deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors
and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his who acted in good faith. (117a)
appearance before the court where the offense is properly
cognizable to abide its order of judgment; and the court or judge
shall certify the proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the Article 117. The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or
proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be engage in business. However, the husband may object, provided:
recommitted to confinement. (1) His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social
Section 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. — When the standing, and
court or judge has examined into the cause of caption and restraint (2) His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.
of the prisoner, and is satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained, he shall forthwith order his discharge from confinement, In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and
but such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be consulted.
has been served on the officer or person detaining the prisoner. If If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may
the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to be proper and in the best interest of the family. (n)
appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith released.
NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON
Section 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the ELECTIONS and MALIK "BOBBY" T. ALINGAN, respondent
same. — A clerk of a court who refuses to issue the writ after G.R. No. 181097 | June 25, 2008 (E)
allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a person to whom a writ
is directed, who neglects or refuses to obey or make return of the Facts:
same according to the command thereof, or makes false return  Petitioner Norlainie, her husband, Mohammad Limbona
thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf of the prisoner, (Mohammad), and respondent Malik were mayoralty
refuses to deliver to the person demanding, within six (6) hours after candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte during the 2007
the demand therefor, a true copy of the warrant or order of Elections
commitment, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one  Malik filed a petition to DQ Mohammad for failure to
thousand pesos, to be recorded in a proper action, and may also be comply with the residency requirement; Malik filed
punished by the court or judge as for contempt. another petition to disqualify Norlainie also on the ground
of lack of the one-year residency requirement
Section 17. Person discharged not to be again imprisoned. — A  Norlainie filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of
person who is set at liberty upon a writ of habeas corpus shall not COC; Thereafter, she filed a MTD on the petition for
be again imprisoned for the same offense unless by the lawful order disqualification filed against her
or process of a court having jurisdiction of the cause or offense; and  Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of Norlainie’s
a person who knowingly, contrary to the provisions of this rule, COC
recommits or imprisons, or causes to be committed or imprisoned,  Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec granted the
for the same offense, or pretended offense, any person so set at petition filed by Malik and disqualifying Mohammad from
liberty, or knowingly aids or assists therein, shall forfeit to the party running as municipal mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte for
aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a failing to satisfy the one year residency requirement 
proper action, notwithstanding any colorable pretense or variation in became final and executory
the warrant of commitment, and may also be punished by the court  Consequently, Norlainie filed a new COC as substitute
or judge granting the writ as for contempt. candidate for Mohammad which was given due course by
the Comelec en banc
Section 18. When prisoner may be removed from one custody to  Thus, Malik filed a second petition for DQ against
another. — A person committed to prison, or in custody of an officer, Norlainie
for any criminal matter, shall not be removed therefrom into the  After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning
custody of another unless by legal process, or the prisoner be candidate and accordingly took her oath and assumed
delivered to an inferior officer to carry to jail, or, by order of the office
proper court or judge, be removed from one place to another within  However, the Second Division of Comelec DQ Norlainie
the Philippines for trial, or in case of fire epidemic, insurrection, or on three grounds: lack of the one-year residency
other necessity or public calamity; and a person who, after such requirement; not being a registered voter of the
commitment, makes signs, or counter-signs any order for such municipality; and, nullity of her COC for having been filed
removal contrary to this section, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved at a place other than the Office of the Election Officer
the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action. ISSUE: WON Norlainie shall be DQ
HELD: YES.
Section 19. Record of writ, fees and costs. — The proceedings upon  The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to
a writ of habeas corpus shall be recorded by the clerk of the court, satisfy the one-year residency requirement. The term
and upon the final disposition of such proceedings the court or judge "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous
shall make such order as to costs as the case requires. The fees of with "domicile," which imports not only intention to reside
officers and witnesses shall be included in the costs taxed, but no in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
officer or person shall have the right to demand payment in advance coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The
of any fees to which he is entitled by virtue of the proceedings. When manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification
a person confined under color of proceedings in a criminal case is is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with
discharged, the costs shall be taxed against the Republic of the the conditions and needs of a community and not
Philippines, and paid out of its Treasury; when a person in custody identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve
by virtue or under color of proceedings in a civil case is discharged, that community.
84 of 255 | P a g e
 Note: petitioner’s domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the
Norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is  The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
Rapasun, Marawi City  Mohammad, petitioner’s corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint,
husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on Nov 11, 2006. Since it is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of
presumed that the husband and wife live together in one liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
legal residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be
change of her domicile also on Nov 11, 2006 actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
 Art. 68 of FC: The husband and wife are obliged to live  The evidence shows that there was no actual and
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty
render mutual help and support. that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that
 Art. 69 of FC: The husband and wife shall fix the family Potenciano is about 86 years of age, or under medication
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with  Note though that CA exceeded its authority when it
the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, where Erlinda never even prayed for such right. When the
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also
compatible with the solidarity of the family. emphasized that the same shall be enforced under
 Considering that petitioner failed to show that she penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to
maintained a separate residence from her husband, and comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is
as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on unnecessary.  CA missed the fact that the case did not
these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the
consonance with human experience. right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband
refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the
SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents exercise of his right.
G.R. No. 139789 |May 12, 2000 (1D)  No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife.
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and  Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of
SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS and habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority
G.R. No. 139808 | May 12, 2000 and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

FACTS
 Erlinda is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio (about 86 ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner vs. ERLINDA K.
years of age possessed of extensive property)  they ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES
lived together for a period of 30 years and JANE DOES, respondents
 1972: they separated from bed and board for undisclosed G.R. No. 139789 | July 19, 2001 (1D)
reasons; Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse when POTENCIANO
he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in
Antipolo City POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and
 Dec 30, 1997: upon Potenciano’s arrival from the US, he SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months in Antipolo City  and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents
The children alleged that during this time, their mother G.R. No. 139808 | July 19, 2001
gave Potenciano an overdose of Zoloft, thus Potenciano’s
health deteriorated Facts:
 Feb 25, 1998: Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over  Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed a petition with the CA for habeas
the person and property of Potenciano corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium
 May 31, 1998: after attending a corporate meeting in  CA promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for
Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject
instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati  May 12, 2000: SC dismissed the petition for habeas
 March 11, 1999: Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus for lack of merit and granted the petition to nullify
corpus to have the custody of Potenciano  She alleged CA’s ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda
that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and  Sept 20, 2000: SC set the case for preliminary conference
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from to determine the propriety of a physical and medical
returning to Antipolo City examination of Potenciano
 CA denied the petition  Jan 31, 2001: the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's
manifestation and motion praying that Potenciano Ilusorio
Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her be produced before the Court and be medically examined
husband to live with her in conjugal bliss?
Issue: WON Erlinda shall be given custody of Potenciano.
Held: NO. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal
dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas Held: NO.
corpus.  The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the
 Writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal hearing at the CA. Potenciano himself declared that he
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody
of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other
available where a person continues to be unlawfully children whom he loved.
denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms,  Potenciano Ilusorio was not mentally incapacitated to
where there is denial of due process, where the restraints choose whether to see his wife or not  this is a question
are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later
become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual

85 of 255 | P a g e
 As to whether the children were in fact taking control of Code. However, it is also accepted in this jurisdiction that
the corporation, these are matters that may be threshed liability for a quasi-delict may still exist despite the
out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus presence of contractual relations, that is, the act which
 Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and violates the contract may also constitute a quasi-
Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position delict. Consequently, moral damages are recoverable for
that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty the breach of contract which was palpably wanton,
bound to live together and care for each other. SC agrees. reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.
 The law provides that the husband and the wife are  Petitioners' act or omission in recklessly erasing the video
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and coverage of private respondents' wedding was precisely
fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual the cause of the suffering private respondents had to
affection between husband and wife and not any legal undergo.  Considering the sentimental value of the
mandate or court order" to enforce consortium. tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a
 Obviously, there was absence of empathy between wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to
spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from be cherished and remembered — could no longer be
bed and board since 1972  empathy is a shared feeling reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct
between husband and wife experienced not only by in awarding the appellees moral damages albeit in the
having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of amount of P75,000.00, which was a great reduction from
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. plaintiffs' demand in the complaint in compensation for the
 Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and
relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice humiliation that the appellees suffered and which under
and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious the circumstances could be awarded.
of its value as a sublime social institution.  Finally, petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial
and appellate courts holding him jointly and severally
NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE liable with his wife Nancy regarding the pecuniary
COURT OF APPEALS, HERMOGENES ONG and JANE C. ONG, liabilities imposed. He argues that when his wife entered
respondents into the contract with private respondent, she was acting
G.R. No. 114791 | May 29, 1997 (2D) alone for her sole interest.
 Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the
Facts: Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession,
 PR spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on occupation or engage in business without the consent of
June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City  The video coverage the husband. In the instant case, it was only petitioner
of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private
price of P1,650.00 respondent. Consequently, she is solely liable to private
 Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to
video tape of their wedding and thrice they failed because the principle that contracts produce effect only as
the tape was apparently not yet processed  The parties between the parties who execute them.
then agreed that the tape would be ready upon PR's
return. IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner vs. HON. CORONA
 When PR came home from their honeymoon, however, IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
they found out that the tape had been erased by Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C.
petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
 PR filed a complaint for specific performance and EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents
damages against petitioners G.R. No. 80116 | June 30, 1989 (2D)
 RTC ordered the rescission of the agreement entered into
between plaintiff Hermogenes Ong and defendant Nancy Facts:
Go and payment of damages to PR (with Alex, as  Sept 7, 1979: Imelda, a Filipino citizen, and Erich
husband of Nancy, jointly and severally liable) Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in
 CA affirmed RTC Germany
 Petitioners: there is no evidence to show that the erasure  Thereafter, marital discord set in followed by a separation
of the tape was done in bad faith so as to justify the award de facto between them
of damages  After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
Issue: WON Alex shall be J&S liable initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany in January, 1983  claimed that there was
Held: NO. failure of their marriage and that they had been living
 As regards the award of damages, petitioners would apart since April, 1982
impress upon this Court their lack of malice or fraudulent  Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
intent in the erasure of the tape  They insist that since separation, support and separation of property before the
private respondents did not claim the tape after the lapse RTC of Manila
of thirty days, as agreed upon in their contract, the  Jan 15, 1986: Local Court of Germany promulgated a
erasure was done in consonance with consistent decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of
business practice to minimize losses. the spouses
 It is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to  June 27, 1986: PR filed two complaints for adultery before
neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married
fact that PR filed a case against petitioners belies such to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
assertion. William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man
 Clearly, petitioners are guilty of contravening their named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983  The complaints
obligation to said private respondents and are thus liable were accordingly filed
for damages.  Mar 14, 1987: petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary
 The grant of actual or compensatory damages in the of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
amount of P450.00 is justified, as reimbursement of the respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her
downpayment paid by private respondents to petitioners. be dismissed
 Generally, moral damages cannot be recovered in an  Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases
action for breach of contract because this case is not to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
among those enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil proceedings thereon; A motion to quash was also filed in

86 of 255 | P a g e
the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of.
motion was denied by the respondent judge The severance of the marital bond had the effect of
 Oct 27, 1987: petitioner filed this special civil action dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence
for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on
seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court the other.
denying her motion to quash  anchored lack of
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner vs. HON. MANUEL V.
is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial
officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained UPTON, respondents
a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his G.R. No. L-68470 | October 8, 1985 (1D)
filing the criminal complaint."
 SC issued TRO enjoining the respondents from further Facts:
proceeding with the Criminal Cases  Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were
Issue: WON PR has legal standing to sue petitioner for adultery. married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage,
they established their residence in the Philippines; that
Held: NO. the parties were divorced in Nevada in 1982; and that
 Art 344 of RPC: adultery cannot be prosecuted except petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended Theodore Van Dorn.
spouse. It has long since been established, with  June 8, 1983: PR filed suit against petitioner stating that
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop,
a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
requirement. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that
to the offended spouse to institute the action, it business, and that PR be declared with right to manage
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the the conjugal property.
status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the  Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
time of the filing of the criminal action. the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
 This policy was adopted out of consideration for the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. "no community property" as of
 Hence, Art 344 of RPC presupposes that the marital  RTC denied MTD on the ground that the property involved
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree
of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical has no bearing in the case.
consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of  Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from
law would be absent where the supposed offended party laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of
had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the representation he made in the divorce proceedings
the time of the filing of the criminal case. before the American Court that they had no community of
 It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
be determined by his status before or subsequent to the through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status barred by prior judgment.
existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired  PR avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
institution of the case. Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts
 American jurisprudence: after a divorce has been and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the
decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts
institute proceedings against the offenders where the of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Issue: WON the Nevada divorce decree is binding as to petitioner
Where, however, proceedings have been properly who is a Filipino Citizen.
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no
legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings
to a conclusion.
 THUS, in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as Held: YES.
of the time the complaint was filed  the person who  There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused decree is binding on private respondent as an American
spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint. citizen.
 In the present case, the fact that PR obtained a valid  It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
divorce in his country is admitted. Said divorce and its in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
as private respondent is concerned  PR, being no same being considered contrary to our concept of public
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to police and morality.
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he  However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
 The allegation of PR that he could not have brought this according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, Nevada released PR from the marriage from the
even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce the marriage.
proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer  Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799: The purpose
be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to
there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the change the existing status or domestic relation of
family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
87 of 255 | P a g e
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
 Thus, pursuant to his national law, PR is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by
the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
 Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.

88 of 255 | P a g e
TITLE IV. PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND FACTS:
WIFE (Articles 74 -148)  Petitioner and his wife, Melecia, were indicted for the
crime of murder
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS; Pre-nuptial Agreement;  Petitioner was acquitted but Melecia and another person
(Arts 74-81, FC; Art. 119, NCC) were found guilty and civilly liable to the heirs of the
victims
Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall o P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and
be governed in the following order: P150,000.00 actual damages.
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;  CA  affirmed conviction; modified, among others, civil
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and liability
(3) By the local custom. (118) o affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral
damages but deleted the award for actual
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree damages for lack of evidentiary basis
upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of o made an award of P15,000.00 each by way of
gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the temperate damages.
absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon o awarded P50,000.00 exemplary damages per
is void, the system of absolute community of property as established victim to be paid solidarily by them
in this Code shall govern. (119a)  RTC then ordered the issuance of a writ to levy property
 Petitioner and Melecia  filed a motion to quash the writ
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements of execution, claiming that the levied properties were
may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia
subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. (121)
ISSUE: Whether the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and
Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of
be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons
unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the HELD: YES.
marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of  To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising
properties. (122a) from her criminal liability is chargeable against the
properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify
Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may the spouses’ property relations.
also execute his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be valid  Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the
only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given that they
marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code
provisions of Title IX of this Code. (120a) and that they did not execute any prenuptial
agreement.14 Although the heirs of the deceased victims
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a do not dispute that it was the Civil Code, not the Family
person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been Code, which governed the marriage, they insist that it was
pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be the system of absolute community of property that applied
indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be to Efren and Melecia. The reasoning goes:
made a party thereto. (123a) o Admittedly, the spouses were married before
the effectivity of the Family Code. But that fact
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage does not prevent the application of [A]rt. 94, last
settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed paragraph, of the Family Code because their
by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the property regime is precisely governed by the
marriage and their residence. law on absolute community. This finds support
This rule shall not apply: in Art. 256 of the Family Code which states:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;  "This code shall have retroactive
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting effect in so far as it does not
property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the country prejudice or impair vested or
where the property is located; and acquired rights in accordance with
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Civil Code or other laws."
the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country  None of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights
whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity. have been acquired by each over the properties of the
(124a) community. Hence, the liabilities imposed on the
accused-spouse may properly be charged against the
Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred community as heretofore discussed.15
to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future marriage,  The RTC applied the same reasoning as above.16 Efren
including donations between the prospective spouses made therein, and Melecia’s property relation was admittedly conjugal
shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place. However, under the Civil Code but, since the transitory provision of
stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the the Family Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no
marriages shall be valid. (125a) vested or acquired rights are impaired, that property
relation between the couple was changed when the
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements Family Code took effect in 1988. The latter code now
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon prescribes in Article 75 absolute community of property
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the for all marriages unless the parties entered into a
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the prenuptial agreement. As it happens, Efren and Melecia
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as had no prenuptial agreement. The CA agreed with this
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between position.17
husband and wife. (n)  Both the RTC and the CA are in error on this point.
While it is true that the personal stakes of each
EFREN PANA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or
and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents. unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
G.R. No. 164201 | December 10, 2012 partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can
THIRD DIVISION be said to have acquired vested rights in specific
assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code
89 of 255 | P a g e
does not intend to reach back and automatically  Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing
convert into absolute community of property relation conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the terms of
all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code.
1988 excepting only those with prenuptial Article 105 of the Family Code states:
agreements. o The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal
 The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to
settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage. conjugal partnerships of gains already
o Art. 76. In order that any modification in the established between spouses before the
marriage settlements may be valid, it must be effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
made before the celebration of the marriage, vested rights already acquired in accordance
subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
135 and 136. Article 256."23
 Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that  Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code
governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who provisions in deciding whether or not the conjugal
were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for
before the celebration of that marriage. the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case.
 Post-marriage modification of such settlements can Its Article 122 provides:
take place only where: (a) the absolute community or o Art. 122. The payment of personal debts
conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated contracted by the husband or the wife before or
upon a decree of legal separation;18 (b) the spouses during the marriage shall not be charged to the
who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to conjugal properties partnership except insofar
revive their former property regime;19 (c) judicial as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
separation of property had been had on the ground o Neither shall the fines and pecuniary
that a spouse abandons the other without just cause indemnities imposed upon them be charged to
or fails to comply with his obligations to the family;20 the partnership.
(d) there was judicial separation of property under o However, the payment of personal debts
Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for contracted by either spouse before the
the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed
or conjugal partnership of gains.21 None of these upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate
circumstances exists in the case of Efren and children of either spouse, may be enforced
Melecia. against the partnership assets after the
 What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains responsibilities enumerated in the preceding
Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband
bound should have no exclusive property or if it
and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property
should be insufficient; but at the time of the
and incomes from their work or industry in the common
liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall
fund. Thus:
be charged for what has been paid for the
o Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership
purpose above-mentioned.
of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate  Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that
property and the income from their work or Melecia has no exclusive property of her own,24 the
industry, and divide equally, upon the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the
dissolution of the marriage or of the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated
indiscriminately by either spouse during the in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.25
marriage. Those responsibilities are as follows:
 This means that they continue under such property o Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be
regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate liable for:
properties. Consequently, to automatically change the  (1) The support of the spouse, their
marriage settlements of couples who got married under common children, and the legitimate
the Civil Code into absolute community of property in children of either spouse; however,
1988 when the Family Code took effect would be to impair the support of illegitimate children
their acquired or vested rights to such separate shall be governed by the provisions
properties. of this Code on Support;
 (2) All debts and obligations
 The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses’ loose
contracted during the marriage by
admission that absolute community of property governed
the designated administrator-spouse
their property relation since the record shows that they
for the benefit of the conjugal
had been insistent that their property regime is one of
partnership of gains, or by both
conjugal partnership of gains.22 No evidence of a
spouses or by one of them with the
prenuptial agreement between them has been presented.
consent of the other;
 What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married
 (3) Debts and obligations contracted
when the Civil Code was still the operative law on
by either spouse without the consent
marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to
of the other to the extent that the
the contrary, is that they were married under the
family may have benefited;
regime of the conjugal partnership of gains. Article
 (4) All taxes, liens, charges, and
119 of the Civil Code thus provides:
expenses, including major or minor
o Art. 119. The future spouses may in the
repairs upon the conjugal
marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
partnership property;
relative community of property, or upon
 (5) All taxes and expenses for mere
complete separation of property, or upon any
preservation made during the
other regime. In the absence of marriage
marriage upon the separate property
settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal of either spouse;
partnership of gains as established in this  (6) Expenses to enable either
Code, shall govern the property relations spouse to commence or complete a
between husband and wife. professional, vocational, or other
activity for self-improvement;

90 of 255 | P a g e
 (7) Antenuptial debts of either to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
spouse insofar as they have marriage. (133a)
redounded to the benefit of the
family; ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L.
 (8) The value of what is donated or VALENCIA, petitioners, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased
promised by both spouses in favor of and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the
their common legitimate children for REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF PANGASINAN, respondents.
the exclusive purpose of G.R. No. 122134 | October 3, 2003
commencing or completing a
professional or vocational course or CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. BENITO A.
other activity for self-improvement; LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO,
and respondent.
 (9) Expenses of litigation between SECOND DIVISION
the spouses unless the suit is found
to be groundless.
o If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to FACTS:
cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall  May 22, 1944  Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with executed a deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of
their separate properties.1âwphi1 their son, respondent Benito Locquiao (hereafter,
 Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows respondent Benito) and his prospective bride, respondent
payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Tomasa Mara (hereafter, respondent Tomasa)
Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these o Said donees were gifted with 4 parcels of land,
are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities including the land in question, a male cow, and
"may be enforced against the partnership assets after 1/3 of the conjugal house pf the donor parents,
the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding in consideration of the impending marriage of
article have been covered."[26] No prior liquidation of said donees
those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair  Herminigildo and Raymunda died and left as heirs their 6
since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation children: respondent Benito, Marciano, Lucio, Emeteria,
of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be Anastacia, and petitioner Romana
charged for what has been paid for the purposes  May 15, 1970  respondents registered the deed of
above-mentioned." donation with the Office of the Registrar of Deeds thereby
cancelling the OCT under the name of Herminigildo and
CHAPTER 2. DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE (Articles Raymunda Locquiaoa and causing the issuance of TCT
82-87) No. 84897 under the name of said respondents
 With the permission of respondents, petitioner took
Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made possession and cultivated the subject land. Petitioner’s
before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of husband died and their daughter, petitioner Constancia,
one or both of the future spouses. (126) took over.
 March 18, 1973 said heirs executed a Deed of Partition
Art. 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary with Recognition of Rights where 12 parcels of land,
donations established in Title III of Book III of the Civil Code, insofar excluding the land in question, were distributed among 3
as they are not modified by the following articles. (127a) of them
 June 12, 1976  due to some disagreements, sad heirs
Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the executed a compromise agreement which provided for
absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each other the re-distribution of the two (2) lots.
in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present  1983  petitioner filed an action for annulment of title
property. Any excess shall be considered void. against respondents
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on o Dismissed by RTC, but reason therefor was not
testamentary succession and the formalities of wills. (130a) indicated
 December 13, 1983  respondent filed against petitioner
Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to an ejectment suit before the MTC
encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the o MTC  ordered petitioner to vacate
encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount  December 23, 1985  petitioners instituted a complaint
of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for the for annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897
deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of against respondents
said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess. (131a) o the issuance of the transfer certificate of title
was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the spurious; that the notary public who notarized
donor in the following cases: the document had no authority to do so, and;
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab that the donation did not observe the form
initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which required by law as there was no written
shall be governed by Article 81; acceptance on the document itself or in a
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the separate public instrument
parents or guardian, as required by law;  MTC decision in ejectment suit was appealed before the
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith; same RTC where the annulment of TCT suit was pending
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse; o RTC  ordered that ejectment suit be
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied suspended until it shall have decided the
with; ownership issue in the title annulment case
(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified  RTC  dismissed the annulment of TCT case on the
by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in general. (132a) grounds of prescription and laches
o likewise ruled that the Inventario Ti Sagut is a
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or valid public document which transmitted
indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, ownership over the subject land to the
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on respondents
the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply

91 of 255 | P a g e
o affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC in the donation. The validity of the donation is
ejectment case unaffected in either case.
 CA  affirmed RTC’s decision  Even the petitioners agree that the Old Civil Code should
o petitioners’ cause of action had already be applied. However, they invoked the wrong
prescribed, considering that the complaint for provisions50 thereof.
annulment of title was filed more than fifteen  Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be
(15) years after the issuance of the title, or applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse just the
beyond the ten (10) - year prescriptive period same. As earlier shown, even implied acceptance of a
for actions for reconveyance donation propter nuptias suffices under the New Civil
o rejected the petitioners’ assertion that the Code.51
donation propter nuptias is null and void for  With the genuineness of the donation propter nuptias and
want of acceptance by the donee, positing that compliance with the applicable mandatory form
the implied acceptance flowing from the very requirements fully established, petitioners’ hypothesis
fact of marriage between the respondents, that their action is imprescriptible cannot take off.
coupled with the registration of the fact of
marriage at the back of OCT No. 18383, CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE
constitutes substantial compliance with the BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C.
requirements of the law TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C.
TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE,
ISSUE: Whether CA was correct in ruling that implied acceptance and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
by respondents flowing from the very fact of their marriage G.R. No. 146683 | November 22, 2001
constituted substantial compliance with the law requiring SECOND DIVISION
acceptance of donation by the donee.
FACTS:
HELD: YES.  January 16, 1956  Francisco Comille and his wife
 Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or Zosima Montallana, who had no children, became the
donations by reason of marriage are those "made before registered owners of the subject parcel of land
its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor  Zosima died
of one or both of the future spouses."44 The distinction is  October 3, 1980  Francisco and mother-in-law executed
crucial because the two classes of donations are not a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights where
governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property
the formal essential requisites. of Francisco. Said lot was then registered under the name
 Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must of Francisco before the RD
be made in a public instrument in which the property  Francisco then asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo , the
donated must be specifically described.45 However, latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian and then widow,
Article 1330 of the same Code provides that "acceptance petitioner Cirila to take care of his house and store
is not necessary to the validity of such gifts". In other  January 24, 1991  before Francisco’s death, the latter
words, the celebration of the marriage between the executed an instrument denominated "Deed of Donation
beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the Inter Vivos where he ceded a portion of the subject lot,
prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation together with his house, in favor of petitioner Cirila who
propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code. accepted the same
 Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article o the deed stated that the donation was being
127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter made in consideration of "the faithful services
nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten
1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds (10) years." The deed was notarized by Atty.
requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.19 and later registered by
in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Cirila as its absolute owner
Article 129, express acceptance "is not necessary for the  October 4, 1991  Francisco died without issue
validity of these donations." Thus, implied acceptance is  During the settlement of Francisco’s estate, several
sufficient. testimonies arose with respect to petitioner Cirila’s
 The pivotal question, therefore, is which formal relationship with said deceased:
requirements should be applied with respect to the o Leticia Bellosillo  deceased and petitioner
donation propter nuptias at hand. Those under the Old were lovers
Civil Code or the New Civil Code? o Erlinda Tabancura  deceased told her that
o It is settled that only laws existing at the time of petitioner was his mistress; that petitioner was
the execution of a contract are applicable never given by Francisco a regular cash wage
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter for her purported services but was given food
are specifically intended to have retroactive and lodging for her and her family
effect.46 Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code o Petitioner  she was only a helper of deceased
which applies in this case since the donation  February 18, 1993  respondents, Francisco’s heirs by
propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the intestate succession, filed a complaint against petitioner
New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
1950.47 The fact that in 1944 the Philippines recovery of possession, and damages; they posit that the
was still under Japanese occupation is of no subject donation is void under Article 87 of FC:
consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law o Every donation or grant of gratuitous
of Nations that municipal laws, as contra- advantage, direct or indirect, between the
distinguished from laws of political nature, are spouses during the marriage shall be void,
not abrogated by a change of sovereignty.48 except moderate gifts which the spouses may
This Court specifically held that during the give each other on the occasion of any family
Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
Code was in force.49 As a consequence, persons living together as husband and wife
applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in without a valid marriage.
the determination of the validity of the  RTC  donation is void
questioned donation, it does not matter  CA  affirmed
whether or not the donees had accepted the

92 of 255 | P a g e
o Its conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy,"
of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of RTC Civil Case No.4719 (for collection of rentals), these
documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of lessees referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of
Francisco's surname; (3) a pleading in another Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand
civil case mentioning payment of rentals to from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that
Cirila as Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's
the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a
wage. regular cash wage under the law.36 It is difficult to believe
that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure
ISSUE: Whether CA was correct in ruling that petitioner was the beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the
common law spouse of deceased thereby rendering the subject conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law
donation null and void under Article 87 of FC. spouse.
 Respondents having proven by a preponderance of
HELD: YES. evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as
 The general rule is that only questions of law may be husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
of Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, Family Code
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V.
there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the G.R. No. 116668 | July 28, 1997
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of SECOND DIVISION
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of FACTS:
both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the  July 16, 1949  Miguel Palang contracted marriage with
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol
(h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without o May 12, 1950  their child, respondent
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) Herminia, was born
when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is  1957  Miguel attempted divorce with respondent
premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is CARLINA (CORNELIA) in Hawaii
contradicted by the evidence on record; and G) when the  July 15, 1973  Miguel contracted another marriage, this
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant time with petitioner Erlinda
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly o December 6, 1977  their child, Kristopher A.
considered, would justify a different conclusion.27 It Palang, was born
appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on  May 17, 1973  Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the
evidence presented by both parties, the general rule Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural
should apply. land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with
 In Bitangcor v. Tan,28 we held that the term "cohabitation" an area of 10,080 square meters (TCT No. 101736)
or "living together as husband and wife" means not only o September 23, 1975  a house and lot was
residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual purchased by petitioner as sole vendee (TCT
intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than No. 143120)
sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is  October 30, 1975  Miguel and respondent Carlina
already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter
and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together whereby said parties agreed to donate their conjugal
as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child,
public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely respondent Herminia
spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute  1979  Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.29 concubinage
In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient  February 15, 1981  Miguel died
proof of common-law relationship the stipulations
 Respondents then instituted an action against petitioner
between the parties,30 a conviction of concubinage,31 or
for recovery of ownership and possession with damages
the existence of legitimate children.32
o sought to get back the riceland and the house
 Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan
wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
under one roof for a long time, It is very possible that the cohabitation with petitioner.
two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave  Petitioner  contended that while the riceland covered by
Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept TCT No. 101736 is registered in their names (Miguel and
in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to
conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of their son Kristopher Palang.
caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin o Further, the house and lot covered by TCT No.
to husband and wife. 143120 is her sole property, having bought the
 Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle same with her own money
told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other o Furthermore, petitioner contended that
indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law respondent Carlina can no longer claim
spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents aforesaid properties since she has already
apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." donated her conjugal estate with Miguel to their
As previously stated, these are an application for a child, Herminia.
business permit to operate as a real estate lessor,33 a  RTC  dismissed the complaint declaring that there was
sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a little evidence to prove that the subject properties
health certificate,34 and the death certificate of pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel
Francisco.35 These documents show that Cirila saw Palang
herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she  CA  reversed
would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the
answer filed by Francisco's lessees in "Erlinda
93 of 255 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was correct in her contention that the (1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either
subject properties may no longer be claimed by respondent Calina, spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it
considering that the latter entered into an agreement with deceased is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall
Miguel donating their conjugal properties to their child, respondent form part of the community property;
Herminia. (2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse.
However, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
HELD: NO. (3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has
 Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well
previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in as the income, if any, of such property. (201a)
favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to
erred in holding that the decision adopting their belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those
compromise agreement "in effect partakes the nature of excluded therefrom. (160)
judicial confirmation of the separation of property between
spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership."
12 Separation of property between spouses during the Section 3. Charges Upon & Obligations of the Absolute
marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or Community (Articles 94-95)
without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements. 13 The judgment Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
which resulted from the parties' compromise was not (1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and
specifically and expressly for separation of property and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
should not be so inferred. illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code
 With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly on Support;
bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community,
notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other;
the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
the money for the purchase price and directed that benefited;
Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel repairs, upon the community property;
to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during
by express provision of law because it was made between marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of family;
the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a
Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-
provides that the prohibition against donations between improvement;
spouses now applies to donations between persons living (7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, 15 redounded to the benefit of the family;
for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in
would turn out to be better than those in legal union. favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose
of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY (Articles other activity for self-improvement;
88-104); RA 8369 (9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under
paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of
Section 1. General Provisions (Articles 88-90) either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of
a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the
Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall
commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the
Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and
community regime at any other time shall be void. (145a) (10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is
found to be groundless.
Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing
community of property during the marriage can be made except in liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses
case of judicial separation of property. shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, properties. (161a, 162a, 163a, 202a-205a)
or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall
appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of
Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling,
petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser
sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. (146a) and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings
therefrom shall form part of the community property. (164a)
Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute
community of property between the spouses in all matters not Section 4. Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment &
provided for in this Chapter. (n) Disposition of Community Property (Articles 96-98)

Section 2. What Constitutes Community Property (Articles 91- Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
93) property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property availed of within five years from the date of the contract
owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage implementing such decision.
or acquired thereafter. (197a) In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the common properties, the other
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
property: do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
94 of 255 | P a g e
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a) and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
the community property. (n) (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of
the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority
the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age
consent of the other, make moderate donations from the community of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the
distress. (n) court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said
children. (n)

Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime (Arts 99- Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
101) community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates: If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community
under Article 134 to 138. (175a) property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
affect the regime of absolute community except that: regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of
is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the
summary proceeding; effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined
property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of
the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each. (189a)
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)
RULE 87
Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators
to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved
spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation Section 3. Heir may not sue until shall assigned — When an
of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the executor or administrator is appointed and assumes the trust, no
absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the action to recover the title or possession of lands or for damages
court may impose. done to such lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph devisee until there is an order of the court assigning such lands to
refer to marital, parental or property relations. such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts has
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she expired.
has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner, vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C.
months or has failed within the same period to give any information QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by
as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a) G.R. No 176556 | July 4, 2012
SECOND DIVISION

Section 6. Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets & FACTS:


Liabilities (Arts 102-104); Succession; Probate; Sec. 3, Rule 87  RTC  promulgated a decision of legal separation
between Petitioner Brigido and Respondent Rita
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the o except for the personal and real properties
following procedure shall apply: already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the remaining properties shall be divided equally
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties between herein [respondents] and [petitioner]
of each spouse. subject to the respective legitimes of the
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be children and the payment of the unpaid
paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the conjugal liabilities of [P]45,740.00.
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their o Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited
paragraph of Article 94. in favor of the common children.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses  Petitioner  more than 9 months after the promulgation
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. of decision, file a Motion or Clarification asking the RTC
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community to define the term "Net Profits Earned."
shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally o To resolve the petitioner's Motion for
between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division Clarification, the RTC issued an Order13 dated
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase
95 of 255 | P a g e
"NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
remainder of the properties of the parties after brings into the marriage, and those acquired
deducting the separate properties of each [of during the marriage (except those excluded
the] spouse and the debts."14 The Order under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the
further held that after determining the common mass of the couple's properties. And
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited when the couple's marriage or community is
in favor of the common children because the dissolved, that common mass is divided
offending spouse does not have any right to between the spouses, or their respective heirs,
any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to equally or in the proportion the parties have
Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family established, irrespective of the value each one
Code. may have originally owned.73
 Petitioner filed an MR o Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon
 RTC  set aside its previous Order dissolution of marriage, an inventory is
o NET PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of prepared, listing separately all the properties of
forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common the absolute community and the exclusive
children, is ordered to be computed in properties of each; then the debts and
accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the obligations of the absolute community are paid
Family Code. out of the absolute community's assets and if
 Petitioner filed another MR the community's properties are insufficient, the
 RTC  changed its ruling again separate properties of each of the couple will
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance.
ISSUE: Whether Article 102 of FC may be applied in defining the Whatever is left of the separate properties will
term “net profit earned”. be delivered to each of them. The net
remainder of the absolute community is its net
HELD: YES. assets, which shall be divided between the
 The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of "net profits" husband and the wife; and for purposes of
earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture,
effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the said profits shall be the increase in value
Family Code. He insists that since there is no other between the market value of the community
provision under the Family Code, which defines "net property at the time of the celebration of the
profits" earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal marriage and the market value at the time of its
separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code applies. dissolution.74
 What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the o Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the
computation of "net profits" earned in the conjugal "net profits" requires that we first find the
partnership of gains the same with the computation of "net market value of the properties at the time of the
profits" earned in the absolute community? community's dissolution. From the totality of the
o First and foremost, we must distinguish market value of all the properties, we subtract
between the applicable law as to the property the debts and obligations of the absolute
relations between the parties and the community and this result to the net assets or
applicable law as to the definition of "net net remainder of the properties of the absolute
profits." As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the community, from which we deduct the market
Family Code applies as to the property relations value of the properties at the time of marriage,
of the parties. In other words, the computation which then results to the net profits.75
and the succession of events will follow the o Granting without admitting that Article 102
provisions under Article 129 of the said Code. applies to the instant case, let us see what will
Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we happen if we apply Article 102:
cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family  (a) According to the trial court's
Code, since it expressly provides that for finding of facts, both husband and
purposes of computing the net profits subject to wife have no separate properties,
forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article thus, the remaining properties in the
63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this list above are all part of the absolute
provision, net profits "shall be the increase in community. And its market value at
value between the market value of the the time of the dissolution of the
community property at the time of the absolute community constitutes the
celebration of the marriage and the market "market value at dissolution."
value at the time of its dissolution."72 Thus,  (b) Thus, when the petitioner and the
without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies respondent finally were legally
to both the dissolution of the absolute separated, all the properties which
community regime under Article 102 of the remained will be liable for the debts
Family Code, and to the dissolution of the and obligations of the community.
conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 Such debts and obligations will be
of the Family Code. Where lies the difference? subtracted from the "market value at
As earlier shown, the difference lies in the dissolution."
processes used under the dissolution of the  (c) What remains after the debts and
absolute community regime under Article 102 obligations have been paid from the
of the Family Code, and in the processes used total assets of the absolute
under the dissolution of the conjugal community constitutes the net
partnership regime under Article 129 of the remainder or net asset. And from
Family Code such net asset/remainder of the
 Let us now discuss the difference in the processes petitioner and respondent's
between the absolute community regime and the conjugal remaining properties, the market
partnership regime. value at the time of marriage will be
subtracted and the resulting totality
o On Absolute Community Regime:
o When a couple enters into a regime of absolute constitutes the "net profits."
community, the husband and the wife becomes  (d) Since both husband and wife
joint owners of all the properties of the have no separate properties, and

96 of 255 | P a g e
nothing would be returned to each of partnership shall be paid
them, what will be divided equally out of the conjugal assets.
between them is simply the "net In case of insufficiency of
profits." However, in the Decision said assets, the spouses
dated October 10, 2005, the trial shall be solidarily liable for
court forfeited the half-share of the the unpaid balance with
petitioner in favor of his children. their separate properties,
Thus, if we use Article 102 in the in accordance with the
instant case (which should not be the provisions of paragraph
case), nothing is left to the petitioner (2) of Article 121.
since both parties entered into their  (5) Whatever remains of
marriage without bringing with them the exclusive properties of
any property the spouses shall
o On Conjugal Partnership Regime: thereafter be delivered to
o Before we go into our disquisition on the each of them.
Conjugal Partnership Regime, we make it clear  (6) Unless the owner had
that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in been indemnified from
the instant case for purposes only of defining whatever source, the loss
"net profit." As earlier explained, the definition or deterioration of
of "net profits" in Article 102(4) of the Family movables used for the
Code applies to both the absolute community benefit of the family,
regime and conjugal partnership regime as belonging to either
provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the spouse, even due to
Family Code, relative to the provisions on Legal fortuitous event, shall be
Separation. paid to said spouse from
o Now, when a couple enters into a regime of the conjugal funds, if any.
conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142  (7) The net remainder of
of the Civil Code, "the husband and the wife the conjugal partnership
place in common fund the fruits of their properties shall constitute
separate property and income from their work the profits, which shall be
or industry, and divide equally, upon the divided equally between
dissolution of the marriage or of the husband and wife, unless
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained a different proportion or
indiscriminately by either spouse during the division was agreed upon
marriage."76 From the foregoing provision, in the marriage
each of the couple has his and her own settlements or unless
property and debts. The law does not intend to
there has been a voluntary
effect a mixture or merger of those debts or
waiver or forfeiture of such
properties between the spouses. Rather, it
share as provided in this
establishes a complete separation of
Code.
capitals.77
 (8) The presumptive
o Considering that the couple's marriage has
been dissolved under the Family Code, Article legitimes of the common
129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation children shall be delivered
of the couple's properties in the event that the upon the partition in
conjugal partnership of gains is dissolved, to accordance with Article
wit: 51.
 Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the  (9) In the partition of the
conjugal partnership regime, the properties, the conjugal
following procedure shall apply: dwelling and the lot on
 (1) An inventory shall be which it is situated shall,
prepared, listing unless otherwise agreed
separately all the upon by the parties, be
properties of the conjugal adjudicated to the spouse
partnership and the with whom the majority of
exclusive properties of the common children
each spouse. choose to remain.
 (2) Amounts advanced by Children below the age of
the conjugal partnership in seven years are deemed
payment of personal debts to have chosen the
and obligations of either mother, unless the court
spouse shall be credited to has decided otherwise. In
the conjugal partnership case there is no such
as an asset thereof. majority, the court shall
decide, taking into
 (3) Each spouse shall be
consideration the best
reimbursed for the use of
interests of said children.
his or her exclusive funds
o In the normal course of events, the following
in the acquisition of
are the steps in the liquidation of the properties
property or for the value of
of the spouses:
his or her exclusive
 (a) An inventory of all the actual
property, the ownership of
properties shall be made, separately
which has been vested by
listing the couple's conjugal
law in the conjugal properties and their separate
partnership.
properties.78 In the instant case, the
 (4) The debts and trial court found that the couple has
obligations of the conjugal no separate properties when they
97 of 255 | P a g e
married.79 Rather, the trial court returned to the guilty party in the
identified the following conjugal conjugal partnership regime,
properties, to wit: because there is no separate
 1. coffee mill in property which may be accounted for
Balongagan, Las Nieves, in the guilty party's favor.
Agusan del Norte; o In the discussions above, we have seen that in
 2. coffee mill in Durian, both instances, the petitioner is not entitled to
Las Nieves, Agusan del any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold
Norte; the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial
 3. corn mill in Casiklan, court. However, we must clarify, as we already
Las Nieves, Agusan del did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.
Norte;
 4. coffee mill in
Esperanza, Agusan del LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO, Petitioners,
Sur; vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and
 5. a parcel of land with an VITTORIO C. ROMERO, Respondents.
area of 1,200 square G.R. No. 188921 | April 18, 2012
meters located in Tungao, SECOND DIVISION
Butuan City;
 6. a parcel of agricultural FACTS:
land with an area of 5  Petitioners claim that, upon the death of their father, PR
hectares located in Manila Aurora, their mother became the legal guardian of their
de Bugabos, Butuan City; properties
 7. a parcel of land with an  Petitioners discovered that several Deeds of Sale were
area of 84 square meters registered over parcels of land that are purportedly
located in Tungao, Butuan conjugal properties of their parents
City; o They claim that their brother, PR Vittorio, –
 8. Bashier Bon Factory through fraud, misrepresentation and duress –
located in Tungao, Butuan succeeded in registering the above-mentioned
City.80 properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale
 (b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by executed by their mother, PR Aurora.
a spouse from the conjugal  Petitioners then filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale,
partnership during the marriage is Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title against PRs
returned in equal amount to the o RTC  dismissed said complaint on the ground
assets of the conjugal partnership;81 that there has been no adjudication of the
and if the community is enriched at estate of the deceased among the compulsory
the expense of the separate heirs
properties of either spouse, a  Petitioners filed an MR on said decision
restitution of the value of such o RTC  citing Section 3, Rule 87 of the Rules
properties to their respective owners of Court which bars an heir or a devisee from
shall be made.82 maintaining an action to recover the title or
 (c) Subsequently, the couple's possession of lands until such lands have
conjugal partnership shall pay the actually been assigned. The court ruled that
debts of the conjugal partnership; "plaintiffs must first cause the termination of
while the debts and obligation of Special Proceedings No. 5185 to its logical
each of the spouses shall be paid conclusion before this case could be
from their respective separate entertained by the Court.
properties. But if the conjugal  Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
partnership is not sufficient to pay all o CA  dismissed the same ruling that the
its debts and obligations, the properties involved in this case are part of the
spouses with their separate estate left to the heirs of Judge Romero, the
properties shall be solidarily liable.83 partition of which is already subject of an
 (d) Now, what remains of the intestate proceeding filed on 6 January 1976 in
separate or exclusive properties of the then Court of First Instance (CFI).9 The CA
the husband and of the wife shall be based its judgment on the findings of the RTC
that the inventory of the estate of Judge
returned to each of them.84 In the
Romero submitted to the CFI included the
instant case, since it was already
same parties, properties, rights and interests as
established by the trial court that the
in the case before it.
spouses have no separate
properties,85 there is nothing to
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are barred under Section 3 Rule 87
return to any of them. The listed
from seeking the annulment of title arising from the deed of sale
properties above are considered part
executed by PRs.
of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
ordinarily, what remains in the
HELD: YES.
above-listed properties should be
divided equally between the spouses  Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from filing the present
and/or their respective heirs.86 action
However, since the trial court found  Petitioners next contend that even if the probate court has
the petitioner the guilty party, his the power to rule on their Complaint, the submission of
share from the net profits of the the issues in this case to the probate court is merely
conjugal partnership is forfeited in optional, and not mandatory upon them. Hence, they
favor of the common children, argue, they still have the right to bring these issues in a
pursuant to Article 63(2) of the separate civil action, if they so choose. They argue further
Family Code. Again, lest we be that Section 3, Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court is
confused, like in the absolute not applicable to the present case.
community regime, nothing will be  The said provision states that:
98 of 255 | P a g e
o Sec. 3. Heir may not sue until share assigned.  In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the
– When an executor or administrator is jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of
appointed and assumes the trust, no action to properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs
recover the title or possession of lands or for before final adjudication; to determine who are the heirs
damages done to such lands shall be of the decedent; the recognition of a natural child; the
maintained against him by an heir or devisee status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the
until there is an order of the court assigning decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the
such lands to such heir or devisee or until the testator; and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of
time allowed for paying debts has expired. hereditary rights.25 (Citations omitted.)
 Petitioners believe that the above rule is subject to certain  Thus, the validity of the sales made by Aurora, allegedly
exceptions. They invoke the doctrine that while heirs have orchestrated by petitioners’ co-heir, Vittorio, can only be
no standing in court to sue for the recovery of property of determined by the probate court, because it is the probate
the estate represented by an administrator, these heirs court which is empowered to identify the nature of the
may maintain such action if the administrator is unwilling property, and that has jurisdiction over Aurora’s actions
to bring the suit, or has allegedly participated in the act and dispositions as administrator. In Peñaverde v.
complained of. Peñaverde,26 the Court even adjudged the petitioners
 On this contention, petitioners’ theory must again fail. guilty of forum-shopping for filing a separate civil action
There is nothing on the record that would prove that despite the pendency of the said petitioners’ own case
Aurora defied the orders of the probate court or entered seeking that letters of administration be granted to them
into sale agreements in violation of her trust. In fact,
petitioners are really accusing a co-heir, their brother LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, vs.
Vittorio, of having acquired certain properties which they THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; THE HONORABLE
allege to be properties of their parents. PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan,
 Even if we assume the property to be conjugal and thus, Zamboanga Del Norte; THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHERIFF,
part of the estate, Aurora Romero’s acts as the Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte; THE CLERK OF
administrator of the estate are subject to the sole COURT OF MANILA, as Ex-Officio Sheriff; and LAMBERTO T.
jurisdiction of the probate court. In Acebedo v. CHUA, respondents.
Abesamis,21 the Court stated: G.R. No. 164401 | June 25, 2008
o In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this SECOND DIVISION
Court made a pronouncement that it is within
the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve FACTS:
the sale of properties of a deceased person by  PR Chua and one Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership
his prospective heirs before final adjudication. engaged in the marketing of liquefied petroleum gas,
Hence, it is error to say that this matter should named Shellite
be threshed out in a separate action.  Shellite was registered as a sole proprietorship
 The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of notwithstanding its true nature as a partnership
Court do not specifically state that the sale of an  Jacinto Sunga died
immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent,  Upon Jacinto’s death, herein petitioners, his married
in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval daughter and wife, respectively carried on the business
of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its without PR’s consent
capacity as a probate court.22  PR instituted a complaint before the RTC seeking to wind
 Again, petitioners do not pose issues pertaining to title or up said business
ownership. They are, in effect, questioning the validity of  RTC  rendered a decision in favor of PR
the sales made by the administrator, an issue that can o The writ of execution cannot, however, be
only be properly threshed out by the probate court. implemented immediately as PR required a
Paragraph 13 of petitioners’ Complaint alleges as follows: CPA-computed accounting if petitioners would
o 13. The purported transfers and sales executed not be able to submit their accounting on time
by Defendant Aurora C. Romero to and in favor  petitioners limited Chua’s entitlement
of Defendant Vittorio C. Romero are nullities from the winding up of partnership
since all were simulated, entered into without affairs to an aggregate amount of
the intent and volition of Defendant Aurora C. PhP 3,154,736.65 only
Romero, attended by force, intimidation, duress  Chua, on the other hand, submitted a
and fraud and not supported with any valid or new computation, this time applying
sufficient consideration and with the sole simple interest on the various items
depraved intentions of depriving the other covered by his claim. Under this
compulsory heirs of the late Judge Dante Y. methodology, Chua’s aggregate
Romero of their rightful share in the estate.23 claim went down to PhP
(Emphasis omitted. 8,733,644.75
 Indeed, implicit in the requirement for judicial approval of  CA  denied petitioners’ petition for certiorari
sales of property under administration is the recognition
that the probate court has the power to rescind or nullify ISSUE: Whether the property of petitioner Sunga-Chan may be
the disposition of a property under administration that was used to satisfy for the whole obligation of both the latter and her
effected without its authority.24 That petitioners have the mother, petitioner Sunga.
prerogative of choosing where to file their action for
nullification – whether with the probate court or the regular HELD: YES.
court – is erroneous. As held in Marcos, II v. Court of  Primarily anchored as the last issue is the erroneous
Appeals: theory of divisibility of petitioners’ obligation and their joint
o xxx (T)he authority of the Regional Trial Court, liability therefor. The Court needs to dwell on it lengthily.
sitting, albeit with limited jurisdiction, as a  Given the solidary liability of petitioners to satisfy the
probate court over the estate of deceased judgment award, respondent sheriff cannot really be
individual, is not a trifling thing. The court's faulted for levying upon and then selling at public auction
jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective, the property of petitioner Sunga-Chan to answer for the
cannot be treated with indifference nor should whole obligation of petitioners. The fact that the levied
it be ignored with impunity by the very parties parcel of land is a conjugal or community property, as the
invoking its authority case may be, of spouses Norberto and Sunga-Chan does
not per se vitiate the levy and the consequent sale of the
99 of 255 | P a g e
property. Verily, said property is not among those Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses
exempted from execution under Section 13,37 Rule 39 of shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is
the Rules of Court. celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the
 And it cannot be overemphasized that the TRO issued by commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be
the Court on May 31, 2005 came after the auction sale in void. (145a)
question.
 Parenthetically, the records show that spouses Sunga- Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute
Chan and Norberto were married on February 4, 1992, or community of property during the marriage can be made except in
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. case of judicial separation of property.
Withal, their absolute community property may be held
liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse. When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property,
Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code pertinently provides: or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall
o Art. 94. The absolute community of property appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in
shall be liable for: Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may
 (1) x x x x petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount
 (2) All debts and obligations sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. (146a)
contracted during the marriage by
the designated administrator-spouse Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
for the benefit of the community, or agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
by both spouses, or by one spouse complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
with the consent of the other. absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
 (3) Debts and obligations contracted system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as
by either spouse without the consent established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
of the other to the extent that the husband and wife.
family may have been benefited.
(Emphasis ours.)
 Absent any indication otherwise, the use and Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the
appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the assets of husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
Shellite even after the business was discontinued on May property and the income from their work or industry, and divide
30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
used for her and her husband’s benefit. the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
 It may be stressed at this juncture that Chua’s legitimate during the marriage. (1392a)
claim against petitioners, as readjusted in this disposition,
amounts to only PhP 5,529,392.52, whereas Sunga- Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those
Chan’s auctioned property which Chua acquired, as the mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has
highest bidder, fetched a price of PhP 8 million. In net reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth
effect, Chua owes petitioner Sunga-Chan the amount of more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply
PhP 2,470,607.48, representing the excess of the to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the
purchase price over his legitimate claims. sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it
finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum
CHAPTER 4. CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the
increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157
Section 1. General Provisions (Articles 105-108); See also Arts and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by
88 & 89, FC; Arts 119, 142; 160 -173 NCC; Section 7, Article XII, the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or
1987 Constitution; RA 10572 – amended Arts 73 & 111 FC owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule
and procedure shall apply.
Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family
settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the
Chapter shall be of supplementary application. judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the
judgment debtor. (247a, 248a)
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home
the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as beneficiary of, only one family home. (n)
provided in Article 256. (n)
Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing
Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. (n)
husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products,
fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption.
by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate. (n)
upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided parents are legitimate.
equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife
settlements. (142a) with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise
legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both
Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
conjugal partnership of gains. (n) instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child.
The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)
the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are
marriage settlements. (147a) illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code. (n)

Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the


following grounds:
100 of 255 | P a g e
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
which immediately preceded the birth of the child because o Facts the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
with his wife; institute the action.
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such
a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or Article XII, 1987 Constitution
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented
sexual intercourse; Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or domain.
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination,
the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, vs. AVELINA AMORES,
(255a) Respondent.
G.R. No. 195670 | December 3, 2012
Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the SECOND DIVISION
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. (256a) FACTS:
 Petitioner, a Dutch, and respondent, Filipina, married in
Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted PH
another marriage within three hundred days after such termination  Their marriage was subsequently declared null and void,
of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of however, due to petitioner’s psychological incapacity
proof to the contrary:  Petitioner then sought the dissolution of conjugal
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the partnership praying for the distribution, among others, of
solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have Lots 1, 2142, 5345, and 4
been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born o these properties were acquired with the money
within three hundred days after the termination of the former he received from the Dutch government as his
marriage; disability benefit
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the o that they were registered in the name of his
celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been former wife only because of the constitutional
conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the prohibition against foreign ownership
three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. o he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2)
(259a) of the value of what he had paid in the purchase
of the said properties, waiving the other half in
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three favor of his estranged ex-wife
hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be  Respondent  insisted that she was the one who
proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. (261a) purchased said properties
 RTC  dissolved parties’ CP
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be o It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds
brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4,
recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any petitioner could not have acquired any right
of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth whatsoever over these properties as petitioner
took place or was recorded. still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition
place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was against foreign ownership of private lands.17
recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the This was made evident by the sworn
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has statements petitioner executed purporting to
been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, show that the subject parcels of land were
the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife,
birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever the herein respondent.18 Petitioner’s plea for
is earlier. (263a) reimbursement for the amount he had paid to
purchase the foregoing properties on the basis
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the of equity was likewise denied for not having
child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the come to court with clean hands.
following cases:  CA  affirmed in toto
(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period
fixed for bringing his action; ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still be entitled to reimbursement of
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having the money he allegedly spent for the purchase of the subject lots,
desisted therefrom; or considering the constitutional prohibition on aliens acquiring
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a) properties in PH.
Chapter 2. Proof of Filiation
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of HELD: NO.
the following:  The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
judgment; or Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court had
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina
be proved by: spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
child; or equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign
(265a, 266a, 267a) ownership of Philippine land24 enshrined under Section

101 of 255 | P a g e
7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the
reads: money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord
o Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson:
succession, no private lands shall be "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all
corporations, or associations qualified to times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is
 Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well founded in general principles of policy, which the
aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition"25 and defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real
even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he justice, as between him and the plaintiff."34 (Citations
and respondent registered the subject properties in the omitted)
latter’s name.26 Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed  Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice
his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. based on his foreign citizenship.35 Precisely, it is the
On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens
why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure,
deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement. the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to
 As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements
that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots
comes into equity must come with clean hands. 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned
Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the
accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national
a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been patrimony36 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or bound to protect.
deceitful.27
 In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, petitioner vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C.
source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by
of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to their mother RITA QUIAO, respondent
have previously executed a joint affidavit that G.R. No 176556 | July 4, 2012 (2D)
respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot
1,28 he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds ELENITA M. DEWARA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these FERDINAND MAGALLANES, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES RONNIE
inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as AND GINA LAMELA and STENILE ALVERO, Respondents.
petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, G.R. No. 179010 | April 11, 2011
he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge. SECOND DIVISION
 In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of
equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he FACTS:
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties  Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita were
by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well- married before the enactment of FC, thus, their marriage
established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will is governed by CC
not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of o They were, however, separated in fact as
public policy, cannot be done directly.29 Surely, a petitioner worked abroad while Eduardo stayed
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null in Bacolod City
and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and  Eduardo, while driving a jeepney, accidentally hit PR
produces no legal effect at all.30 Corollary thereto, under Ronnie, which led the latter to file a criminal complaint
Article 1412 of the Civil Code,31 petitioner cannot have against the former for serious physical injuries through
the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to reckless imprudence
recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.  MTCC found Eduardo guilty
The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or  The writ of execution for the civil liability was returned
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.32 unsatisfied, however, as Eduardo did not have any
Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an properties under his name
unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.  PRs sought that the subject parcel of land be levied
 Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for instead
reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment.33 As o The same was sold by the sheriff at public
held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner auction which PR Ronnie purchased
seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on o PR Ronnie then caused the consolidation of
purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust title in a Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC,
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by which ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-
the Constitution, to wit: 80054 in the name of Elenita and the issuance
o Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of a new certificate of title in the name of
of the New Civil Code which reads: respondent spouses
 Art. 22. Every person who through an  Petitioner, upon learning the same, filed a complaint,
act of performance by another, or through atty-in-fact Ferdinand Magallanes, for annulment
any other means, acquires or comes of sale and for damages against respondent spouses and
into possession of something at the ex-officio sheriff Stenile Alvero
expense of the latter without just or o Petitioner claimed that the levy on execution of
legal ground, shall return the same to Lot No. 234-C was illegal because the said
him. property was her paraphernal or exclusive
 The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM property and could not be made to answer for
ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No the personal liability of her husband.
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of Furthermore, as the registered owner of the
another). An action for recovery of what has been paid property, she received no notice of the
without just cause has been designated as an accion in execution sale. She sought the annulment of
rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the sale and the annulment of the issuance of
the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the the new TCT in the name of respondent
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair spouses.
and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem
102 of 255 | P a g e
 PRs  averred that the subject lot was the conjugal Thus, we agree with the CA that Elenita has not
property of petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted sufficiently proven that the prices involved in the sales in
that the property was acquired by Elenita during her question were so inadequate for the Court to reach a
marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with conclusion that the transfers were in the nature of a
the money of Eduardo because, at the time of the donation rather than a sale.
acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife;  Furthermore, gross inadequacy of the price does not
that the jeep involved in the accident was registered in the affect a contract of sale, except as it may indicate a defect
name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any in the consent, or that the parties really intended a
objection pending the levy on execution of the property donation or some other act or contract.26 The records are
 RTC  in favor of petitioner bereft of proof that the consent of petitioner’s father and
o Subject property is paraphernal in nature her aunt were vitiated or that, in reality, they intended the
o The RTC gave credence to the testimony of sale to be a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy
Elenita on the circumstances surrounding the of the price per se will not rule out the transaction as one
sale of the property. First, it was sold to her by of sale; the price must be grossly inadequate or shocking
her father and her aunt so that the family would to the conscience, such that the mind would revolt at it
remain on the lot. Second, the minimal and and such that a reasonable man would neither directly nor
inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq m indirectly consent to it.
property was for the purpose of helping her
expand her capital in her business at the time. ISSUE # 2: Whether the same may be used to satisfy the civil liability
Thus, the sale was essentially a donation and incurred by Eduardo upon PR Ronnie.
was therefore gratuitous in character.
 CA  reversed HELD # 2: NO.
o elucidated that the gross inadequacy of the  However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C
price alone does not affect a contract of sale, is the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo,
except that it may indicate a defect in the it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be
consent, or that the parties really intended a levied upon in an execution to answer for debts,
donation or some other act or contract. Except obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses.
for the assertions of Elenita, there was nothing Before debts and obligations may be charged against the
in the records that would indicate a defect in conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same
Jesus and Concepcion Magallanes’ consent to were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should
the sale.19 The CA ruled that Elenita and have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal
Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title partnership. Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
during their marriage through their common upon the husband or the wife, as a rule, may not be
fund. Thus, it belonged to the conjugal charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is
partnership of gains and might be levied upon bound should have no exclusive property or if the property
to answer for civil liabilities adjudged against should be insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be
Eduardo enforced upon the partnership assets only after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil
ISSUE # 1: Whether the subject property belonged to the conjugal Code have been covered.
partnership.  In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be
compensated for the serious physical injuries he suffered.
HELD # 1: YES. It should be remembered that even though the vehicle
 All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the that hit Ronnie was registered in the name of Elenita, she
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains was not made a party in the said criminal case. Thus, she
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.21 Registration may not be compelled to answer for Eduardo’s liability.
in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership property may be
destroy this presumption.22 The separation-in-fact held accountable for it since Eduardo has no property in
between the husband and the wife without judicial his name. The payment of indemnity adjudged by the
approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot RTC of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor
retains its conjugal nature.23 Moreover, the presumption of Ronnie may be enforced against the partnership assets
of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in of spouses Elenita and Eduardo after the responsibilities
which the property was acquired does not appear. The enumerated under Article 161 of the Civil Code have been
use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement covered. This remedy is provided for under Article 163 of
for the presumption to arise.24 the Civil Code, viz.
 There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired o Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by
by spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. It the husband or the wife before the marriage
is also undisputed that their marital relations are governed shall not be charged to the conjugal
by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were partnership.
married before the enactment of the Family Code and  Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
they did not execute any prenuptial agreement as to their upon them be charged to the partnership.
property relations. Thus, the legal presumption of the  However, the payment of debts contracted by the
conjugal nature of the property applies to the lot in husband or the wife before the marriage, and that of fines
question. The presumption that the property is conjugal and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced
property may be rebutted only by strong, clear, against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
categorical, and convincing evidence—there must be enumerated in Article 161 have been covered, if the
strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property
spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the
asserting it.25 liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be
 Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-
property by her father and her aunt was in the nature of a mentioned.28
donation because of the alleged gross disparity between  Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerates the obligations
the actual value of the property and the monetary which the conjugal partnership may be held answerable,
consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that viz.:
would convince this Court of the paraphernal character of o Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be
the property. Elenita proffered no evidence of the market liable for:
value or assessed value of the subject property in 1975.
103 of 255 | P a g e
 (1) All debts and obligations o RTC  denied MD
contracted by the husband for the o CA  dismissed initial petition for prohibition
benefit of the conjugal partnership, and certiorari for insufficiency in form; noted 2nd
and those contracted by the wife, petition for being filed beyond reglementary
also for the same purpose, in the period
cases where she may legally bind  Respondents’ Answer  Domingo failed to pay the
the partnership; purchase price, hence, sold his rights to PR Dolores
 (2) Arrears or income due, during the Camisura. The latter then sold her right to PR Plaridel
marriage, from obligations which Mingoa, who then sold to his eldest child, PR Melanie
constitute a charge upon property of Mingoa, the property in question. TCT No. 290121 was
either spouse or of the partnership; then issued in the name of Melanie Mingoa.
 (3) Minor repairs or for mere  RTC  in favor of petitioners
preservation made during the  CA  reversed
marriage upon the separate property
of either the husband or the wife; ISSUE: Whether the alienation of the subject land was valid,
major repairs shall not be charged to considering that Sergia’s signature was falsified on the SPA used in
the partnership; effecting said alienation.
 (4) Major or minor repairs upon the
conjugal partnership property; HELD: YES.
 (5) The maintenance of the family  Petitioners contend that such lack of consent on the part
and the education of the children of of Sergia Hernandez rendered the SPAs and the deed of
both the husband and wife, and of sale fictitious, hence null and void in accordance with
legitimate children of one of the Article 140936 of the Civil Code. Petitioners likewise
spouses; contend that an action for the declaration of the non-
 (6) Expenses to permit the spouses existence of a contract under Article 1410 does not
to complete a professional, prescribe.
vocational or other course.  We find, after meticulous review of the facts, that Articles
 The enumeration above-listed should first be complied 1409 and 1410 are not applicable to the matter now
with before the conjugal partnership may be held to before us.
answer for the liability adjudged against Eduardo.  It bears stressing that the subject matter herein involves
conjugal property. Said property was awarded to
HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ, SR., namely: SERGIA V. Domingo Hernandez, Sr. in 1958. The assailed SPAs
HERNANDEZ (Surviving Spouse), DOMINGO V. HERNANDEZ, were executed in 1963 and 1964. Title in the name of
JR., and MARIA LEONORA WILMA HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, vs. Domingo Hernandez, Sr. covering the subject property
PLARIDEL MINGOA, SR., DOLORES CAMISURA, MELANIE was issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the property to
MINGOA AND QUEZON CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS,1 Melanie Mingoa and the issuance of a new title in her
Respondents. name happened in 1978. Since all these events occurred
G.R. No. 146548 | December 18, 2009 before the Family Code took effect in 1988, the provisions
FIRST DIVISION of the New Civil Code govern these transactions. We
quote the applicable provisions, to wit:
FACTS: o Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of
 Domingo Hernandez, Sr. and spouse Sergia were the conjugal partnership.
awarded by Philippine Homesite and Housing o Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a
Corporation (PHHC) a piece of real property by way of non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
salary deduction civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
 After effecting full payment, a deed of absolute sale was the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
executed by PHHC in their favor thereby resulting in the real property of the conjugal partnership
issuance of TCT No. 107534 which had an annotation of without the wife’s consent. If she refuses
a restriction of any unauthorized sale to third persons unreasonably to give her consent, the court
within a certain period may compel her to grant the same. x x x.
 Domingo died o Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage,
 After his burial, herein petitioners learned that TCT No. and within ten years from the transaction
107534 has been cancelled 1 year prior to his death and questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
that TCT No. 290121 has been issued to PRs any contract of the husband entered into
 Petitioners instituted a complaint against PRs for the f without her consent, when such consent is
Facts required, or any act or contract of the husband
o (a) the annulment and/or declaration of nullity which tends to defraud her or impair her interest
of TCT No. 290121 including all its derivative in the conjugal partnership property. Should the
titles, the Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
(SPA) dated February 14, 1963 in favor of after the dissolution of the marriage, may
Dolores Camisura,7 the SPA dated May 9, demand the value of property fraudulently
1964 in favor of Plaridel Mingoa, Sr.,8 and the alienated by the husband. (Emphasis ours.)
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate9 dated  Notwithstanding the foregoing, petitioners argue that the
July 9, 1978 executed by Plaridel Mingoa, Sr. disposition of conjugal property made by a husband
in favor of Melanie Mingoa for being products without the wife’s consent is null and void and the right to
of forgery and falsification; and file an action thereon is imprescriptible, in accordance
o (b) the reconveyance and/or issuance to them with Garcia v. CA38 and Bucoy v. Paulino.39 .
(petitioners) by the Quezon City Register of  Concededly, in the aforementioned cases of Garcia and
Deeds of the certificate of title covering the Bucoy, the contracts involving the sale of conjugal
subject property. property by the husband without the wife's consent were
 Respondents  filed a Motion to Dismiss declared null and void by this Court. But even in Bucoy,
o the claim or demand has been paid, waived, we significantly ruled, in reference to Article 173, that:
abandoned or otherwise extinguished; lack of o The plain meaning attached to the plain
cause of action; lack of jurisdiction over the language of the law is that the contract, in its
person of the defendants or over the subject or entirety, executed by the husband without the
nature of the suit; and prescription
104 of 255 | P a g e
wife’s consent, may be annulled by the wife.40 o xxx [Under] Article 173 of the New Civil Code,
(emphasis ours) an action for the annulment of any contract
 In succeeding cases, we held that alienation and/or entered into by the husband without the wife’s
encumbrance of conjugal property by the husband without consent must be filed (1) during the marriage;
the wife’s consent is not null and void but merely voidable. and (2) within ten years from the transaction
 In Sps. Alfredo v. Sps. Borras,41 we held that: questioned. Where any one of these two
o The Family Code, which took effect on 3 August conditions is lacking, the action will be
1988, provides that any alienation or considered as having been filed out of time.
encumbrance made by the husband of the  In the case at bar, while respondent filed her complaint for
conjugal partnership property without the annulment of the deed of sale on July 8, 1994, i.e., within
consent of the wife is void. However, when the the ten-year period counted from the execution of the
sale is made before the effectivity of the Family deed of sale of the property on June 3, 1986, the marriage
Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code. between her and Avelino had already been dissolved by
 Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition the death of the latter on November 20, 1993. In other
of conjugal property without the wife's consent is not void words, her marriage to Avelino was no longer subsisting
but merely voidable. at the time she filed her complaint. Therefore, the civil
 We likewise made the same holding in Pelayo v. Perez : case had already been barred by prescription. (Emphasis
o xxx [Under] Article 173, in relation to Article ours.)
166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still  Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the
in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in courts an action for annulment of the contract during the
question was executed, the lack of marital marriage and within ten (10) years from the transaction
consent to the disposition of conjugal property necessarily barred her from questioning the sale of the
does not make the contract void ab initio but subject property to third persons.
merely voidable.  As we held in Vda. De Ramones v. AgbayanIssue:45
 In Vera-Cruz v. Calderon,43 the Court noted the state of o In Villaranda v. Villaranda, et al., this Court,
jurisprudence and elucidated on the matter, thus: through Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
o In the recent case of Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar- ruled that without the wife’s consent, the
Reyes v. Spouses Mijares, we reiterated the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of
rule that the husband cannot alienate or conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the
encumber any conjugal real property without Family Code is not void, but merely voidable.
the consent, express or implied, of the wife, However, the wife’s failure to file with the courts
otherwise, the contract is voidable. To wit: an action for annulment of the contract during
 Indeed, in several cases the Court has ruled that such the marriage and within ten (10) years from the
alienation or encumbrance by the husband is void. The transaction shall render the sale valid. x x x
better view, however, is to consider the transaction  More than having merely prescribed, petitioners’ action
as merely voidable and not void. This is consistent with has likewise become stale, as it is barred by laches.
Article 173 of the Civil Code pursuant to which the wife
could, during the marriage and within 10 years from the
questioned transaction, seek its annulment.
o Likewise, in the case of Heirs of Christina SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA, Petitioners, vs.
Ayuste v. Court of Appeals, we declared that: ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and VILMA B. DE
 There is no ambiguity in the wording LEON, Respondents.
of the law. A sale of real property of G.R. No. 185063 | July 23, 2009
the conjugal partnership made by the THIRD DIVISION
husband without the consent of his
wife is voidable. The action for FACTS:
annulment must be brought during  Bonifacio De Leon, when he was still singe, entered into
the marriage and within ten years a conditional contract to sell with People’s Homesite and
from the questioned transaction by Housing Corporation (PHHC) for the installment purchase
the wife. Where the law speaks in of a lot
clear and categorical language, there  He then married PR Anita and they bore their children,
is no room for interpretation – there PRs Danilo and Vilma
is room only for application.  Upon the full payment of the subject lot, PHHC executed
 Here, the husband’s first act of disposition of the subject a final deed of sale in favor of Bonifacio which indicated a
property occurred in 1963 when he executed the SPA and civil status of “single” (TCT No. 173677)
the Deed of Transfer of Rights in favor of Dolores  Bonifacio then sold the subject lot to sister Lita and her
Camisura. Thus, the right of action of the petitioners husband Feliz, herein petitioners
accrued in 1963, as Article 173 of the Civil Code provides o The deed of sale, however, did not bear the
that the wife may file for annulment of a contract entered written consent and signature of PR Anita
into by the husband without her consent within ten (10)  3 months after Bonifacio’s death, petitioners registered
years from the transaction questioned. Petitioners filed the Deed of Sale and had TCT No. 173677 canceled.
the action for reconveyance in 1995. Even if we were to They secured the issuance in their names of TCT No. N-
consider that their right of action arose when they learned 173911 from the Quezon City Register of Deeds
of the cancellation of TCT No. 107534 and the issuance  PRs Danilo and Vilma then filed a Notice of Adverse
of TCT No. 290121 in Melanie Mingoa’s name in 1993, Claim before the RD
still, twelve (12) years have lapsed since such discovery, o They, together with their mother, PR Anita, then
and they filed the petition beyond the period allowed by filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC QC
law. Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, together with her  RTC  subject lot is the conjugal property of Bonifacio
children, filed the action for reconveyance, the conjugal and PR Anita
partnership of property with Hernandez, Sr. had already  CA  affirmed except for award of damages, attorney’s
been terminated by virtue of the latter's death on April 16, fees, and costs of suit
1983. Clearly, therefore, petitioners’ action has o Held that petitioners failed to overthrow the
prescribed. legal presumption that the parcel of land in
 And this is as it should be, for in the same Vera-Cruz case, dispute was conjugal
we further held that:44

105 of 255 | P a g e
 Petitioners  since Bonifacio purchased the lot from  Petitioners’ argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacio’s
PHHC on installment before he married Anita, the land exclusive property, since it was registered solely in his
was Bonifacio’s exclusive property and not conjugal, even name, is untenable. The mere registration of a property in
though some installments were paid and the title was the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal
issued to Bonifacio during the marriage. In support of their nature.17 What is material is the time when the property
position, petitioners cite Lorenzo v. Nicolas7 and Alvarez was acquired.
v. Espiritu.8  Thus, the question of whether petitioners were able to
adduce proof to overthrow the presumption is a factual
ISSUE # 1: Whether the subject lot was conjugal in nature. issue best addressed by the trial court. As a matter of long
and sound practice, factual determinations of the trial
HELD # 1: YES. courts,18 especially when confirmed by the appellate
 Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision court, are accorded great weight by the Court and, as rule,
in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted will not be disturbed on appeal, except for the most
marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is compelling reasons.19 Petitioners have not, as they really
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it cannot, rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot in
is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the question. In this regard, the Court notes and quotes with
wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court approval the following excerpts from the trial court’s
of Appeals9 teaches, even necessary to prove that the disposition:
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Only o The defendants, however, did not adduce any
proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise proof that the property in question was acquired
the presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even solely by the efforts of [Bonifacio]. The
when the manner in which the properties were acquired established jurisprudence on the matter leads
does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the this Court to the conclusion that the property
properties will still be considered conjugal.10 involved in this dispute is indeed the conjugal
 In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC property of the deceased [Bonifacio] De Leon.
lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional o In fact, defendant even admitted that
Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage [Bonifacio] brought into his marriage with
of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled that a conditional plaintiff Anita the said land, albeit in the concept
sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In both of a possessor only as it was not yet registered
types of contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the in his name. The property was registered only
vendor’s obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the in 1972 during the existence of the marriage.
happening of a future and uncertain event, usually the full However, the absence of evidence on the
payment of the purchase price, so that if the suspensive source of funding has called for the application
condition does not take place, the parties would stand as of the presumption under Article 160 in favor of
if the conditional obligation had never existed.11 In other the plaintiffs.20
words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the  The cases petitioners cited are without governing
seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of applicability to this case simply because they involved a
the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes law specifically enacted to govern the disposition of and
upon delivery of the thing sold.12 ownership of friar lands. In Lorenzo, the Court held that
 Such is the situation obtaining in the instant case. The the pervading legislative intent of Act No. 1120 is "to sell
conditional contract to sell executed by and between the friar lands acquired by the Government to actual
Bonifacio and PHHC on July 20, 1965 provided that settlers and occupants of the same."21 The Court went
ownership over and title to the property will vest on on further to say in Alvarez that "under the Friar Lands Act
Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed of sale of 1120, the equitable and beneficial title to the land
which, in turn, will be effected upon payment of the full passes to the purchaser the moment the first installment
purchase price, to wit: is paid and a certificate of sale is issued."22 Plainly, the
o 14. Titles to the property subject of this contract said cases are not applicable here considering that the
remains with the CORPORATION and shall disputed property is not friar land.1awph!1
pass to, and be transferred in the name of the  There can be no quibbling that Anita’s conformity to the
APPLICANT only upon the execution of the sale of the disputed lot to petitioners was never obtained
final Deed of Sale provided for in the next or at least not formally expressed in the conveying deed.
succeeding paragraph. The parties admitted as much in their Joint Stipulation of
o 15. Upon the full payment by the APPLICANT Facts with Motion earlier reproduced. Not lost on the
of the price of the lot above referred to together Court of course is the fact that petitioners went to the
with all the interest due thereon, taxes and process of registering the deed after Bonifacio’s death in
other charges, and upon his faithful compliance 1996, some 22 years after its execution. In the interim,
with all the conditions of this contract the petitioners could have had work—but did not—towards
CORPORATION agrees to execute in favor of securing Anita’s marital consent to the sale.
the APPLICANT a final deed of sale of the  It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is
aforesaid land, and the APPLICANT agrees to very explicit on the consequence of the husband
accept said deed, as full performance by the alienating or encumbering any real property of the
CORPORATION of its covenants and conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent.23 To a
undertakings hereunder.13 x x x specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the
 Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the
Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on wife’s consent. Else, the sale is not valid. So it is that in
June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of
more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired during consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing
the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or
property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal like causes. The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds
partnership. from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory
 Such presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear, requirements of Art. 166 of the Code.24 Since Art. 166 of
categorical, and convincing evidence.14 There must be the Code requires the consent of the wife before the
clear evidence of the exclusive ownership of one of the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of
spouses,15 and the burden of proof rests upon the party the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or
asserting it.16 transactions executed against this mandatory provision
106 of 255 | P a g e
are void except when the law itself authorized their o Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the
validity.25 Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to
 Accordingly, the Deed of Sale executed on January 12, obtain the consent of Benjamin. Moreover, as
1974 between Bonifacio and the Tarrosas covering the appearing in the Agreement, Benjamin signed
PHHC lot is void. as a witness to the contract, indicating his
knowledge of the transaction and, impliedly, his
ISSUE # 2: Whether ½ of the subject lot may automatically be conformity to the agreement entered into by his
adjudicated in favor of PR Anita. wife. Benjamin was, therefore, estopped from
questioning the validity of the Agreement
HELD # 2: NO.
 As a final consideration, the Court agrees with the CA that ISSUE: Whether PR Benjamin may invoke the FC and CC
the sale of one-half of the conjugal property without provisions that his consent is necessary in the contract of lease
liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior to the entered into by his spouse, PR Joselyn, and herein petitioner.
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each
spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere HELD: NO.
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an  In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an
equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a
appears that there are assets in the community as a result Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. In
of the liquidation and settlement.26 The interest of each addressing the matter before us, we are confronted not
spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente only with civil law or conflicts of law issues, but more
liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of importantly, with a constitutional question.
the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.27 Thus,  It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay
the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal property in 1989. Said acquisition was evidenced by a
assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property
of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the was also declared for taxation purposes under her name.
marriage, when it is finally determined that, after When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds:
left which can be divided between the spouses or their first, that he was the actual owner of the property since he
respective heirs. provided the funds used in purchasing the same; and
 Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract
sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still involving the subject property without his consent.
theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the  The trial and appellate courts both focused on the
husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets property relations of petitioner and respondent in light of
does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. They,
partnership. however, failed to observe the applicable
 Nevertheless, this Court is mindful of the fact that the constitutional principles, which, in fact, are the more
Tarrosas paid a valuable consideration in the amount of decisive.
PhP 19,000 for the property in question. Thus, as a matter  Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
of fairness and equity, the share of Bonifacio after the o Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary
liquidation of the partnership should be liable to reimburse succession, no private lands shall be
the amount paid by the Tarrosas. It is a well-settled transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
principle that no person should unjustly enrich himself at corporations, or associations qualified to
the expense of another. acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
 Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have
PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, Respondents. domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited
G.R. No. 164584 | June 22, 2009 constitutional provision, they are also disqualified
THIRD DIVISION from acquiring private lands.19 The primary purpose of
this constitutional provision is the conservation of the
FACTS: national patrimony.20 Our fundamental law cannot be any
 June 30, 1988  PR Benjamin, a British national, married clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is
PR Joselyn, 17-year old Filipina reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least
 Using Benjamin’s funds and with his consent, Joselyn sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by
bought a property in Boracay, constructed improvements Filipinos.21
thereon and converted the same into a commercial area  In Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 cited in Muller v.
o All licenses and permits were obtained in the Muller,23 we had the occasion to explain the
name of Joselyn’s sister, Ginna Celestino constitutional prohibition:
 The two had a falling out and Joselyn executed an SPA in o Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the
favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, Constitution, "natural resources, with the
lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract exception of public agricultural land, shall not
with third parties with respect to their Boracay property be alienated," and with respect to public
 However, Joselyn entered into a contract of lease with agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to
herein petitioner Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose
 Upon learning the same, Benjamin instituted an action for conserving agricultural resources in the hands
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by
Damages on the grounds that (1) it was his money that the Filipino citizens themselves who may
was used in acquiring and improving the subject property alienate their agricultural lands in favor of
and (2) his consent was not obtained by his spouse in aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that
entering said contract of lease Section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads
 RTC  no Answer having been filed, declared Joselyn as follows:
and petitioner in default and declared the contract null and  "Section 5. Save in cases of
void hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land will be transferred or
 CA  set aside the decision and directed RTC to allow
assigned except to individuals,
petitioner to file his Answer
corporations, or associations
 Petitioner  he contracted in good faith

107 of 255 | P a g e
qualified to acquire or hold lands of  In Frenzel v. Catito,32 petitioner, an Australian citizen,
the public domain in the Philippines." was married to Teresita Santos; while respondent, a
o This constitutional provision closes the only Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller. Petitioner and
remaining avenue through which agricultural respondent met and later cohabited in a common-law
resources may leak into alien’s hands. It would relationship, during which petitioner acquired real
certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of properties; and since he was disqualified from owning
public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, lands in the Philippines, respondent’s name appeared as
they may be freely so alienated upon their the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their relationship
becoming private agricultural lands in the turned sour, petitioner filed an action for the recovery of
hands of Filipino citizens. x x x the real properties registered in the name of respondent,
o If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be claiming that he was the real owner. Again, as in the other
construed as not including residential lots or cases, the Court refused to declare petitioner as the
lands not strictly agricultural, the result would owner mainly because of the constitutional prohibition.
be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess The Court added that being a party to an illegal contract,
not only residential lots and houses for he could not come to court and ask to have his illegal
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole objective carried out. One who loses his money or
towns and cities," and that "they may validly property by knowingly engaging in an illegal contract may
buy and hold in their names lands of any area not maintain an action for his losses.
for building homes, factories, industrial plants,  Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33
fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and petitioner (an American citizen) and Criselda Cheesman
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, acquired a parcel of land that was later registered in the
playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses latter’s name. Criselda subsequently sold the land to a
and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words, third person without the knowledge of the petitioner. The
strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General’s Brief, petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did
p. 6) That this is obnoxious to the conservative not give his consent thereto. The Court held that
spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.24 assuming that it was his (petitioner’s) intention that the lot
o The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired
absolutely not allowed to acquire public or no right whatever over the property by virtue of that
private lands in the Philippines, save only in purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest
constitutionally recognized exceptions.25 in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly
There is no rule more settled than this violated the Constitution; thus, the sale as to him was null
constitutional prohibition, as more and more and void.
aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by  In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so
trying to own lands through another. In a long hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the
line of cases, we have settled issues that Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner.
directly or indirectly involve the above Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited
constitutional provision. We had cases where from acquiring private and public lands in the
aliens wanted that a particular property be Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be
declared as part of their father’s estate;26 that the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said
they be reimbursed the funds used in property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is
purchasing a property titled in the name of
true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided
another;27 that an implied trust be declared in the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such
their (aliens’) favor;28 and that a contract of
contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was
sale be nullified for their lack of consent.29
created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses
 In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui,30 Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the
citizen, acquired a parcel of land, together with the subject property was part of the conjugal/community
improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs (the property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no
petitioners therein) claimed the properties as part of the capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease
estate of their deceased father, and sought the partition of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in
of said properties among themselves. We, however, so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a
excluded the land and improvements thereon from the husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such
estate of Felix Ting Ho, precisely because he never a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the
became the owner thereof in light of the above-mentioned constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
constitutional prohibition. declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a
 In Muller v. Muller,31 petitioner Elena Buenaventura substantial interest and right over the land, as he would
Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
Germany. During the subsistence of their marriage, This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
respondent purchased a parcel of land in Antipolo City have.
and constructed a house thereon. The Antipolo property  In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between
was registered in the name of the petitioner. They Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds
eventually separated, prompting the respondent to file a advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.
petition for separation of property. Specifically,
respondent prayed for reimbursement of the funds he CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O.
paid for the acquisition of said property. In deciding the DESCALLAR, Respondent.
case in favor of the petitioner, the Court held that G.R. No. 159310 | February 24, 2009
respondent was aware that as an alien, he was prohibited FIRST DIVISION
from owning a parcel of land situated in the Philippines.
He had, in fact, declared that when the spouses acquired FACTS:
the Antipolo property, he had it titled in the name of the  Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, married respondent, a
petitioner because of said prohibition. Hence, we denied Filipina
his attempt at subsequently asserting a right to the said
 They purchased the subject properties, 3 parcels of land.
property in the form of a claim for reimbursement. Neither
 However, considering that Jambrich is an alien, his name
did the Court declare that an implied trust was created by
was erased in the Deed of Absolute Sale when presented
operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to
before the RD
respondent. We said that to rule otherwise would permit
o His signature, however, remained on the left
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
hand margin of page 1, beside respondent’s
108 of 255 | P a g e
signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere
of page 4 which is the last page possession of a title does not make one the true owner of
 The two subsequently broke up the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the
 Jambrich became indebted to herein petitioner, a titles of the disputed properties in her name does not
businessman engaged in real estate, and sold his rights necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
to the subject properties via deed of absolute owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not
sale/assignment apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the
 When petitioner attempted to have said deed registered title is quiet,23 and that it is perfect, absolute and
before the RD, he learned that the titles of the 3 lots have indefeasible.24 However, there are well-defined
been transferred to herein respondent and that said exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a
properties were mortgaged holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject
 Petitioner then instituted an action for recovery of real properties for a valuable consideration.25 This is the
property alleging that the deeds of sale purportedly situation in the instant case. Respondent did not
showing herein respondent was the buyer did not reflect contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor
pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in did she have any savings. She and her two sons were
fact a buyer, as it was Jambrich who paid for the same then fully supported by Jambrich.
 Respondent  she "solely and exclusively used her own  Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from
personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase price acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7,
of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,26 which is basically a
an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
the Philippines. Constitution,27 and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973
 RTC  in favor of petitioner Constitution.28 The capacity to acquire private land is
 CA  reversed dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain." Private land may be
ISSUE # 1: Whether Wilhelm Jambrich, an alien, can validly transferred only to individuals or entities "qualified to
purchase the subject properties and assign them to herein acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only
petitioner. Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the
capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to
HELD # 1: YES. acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as
 The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly
court, who between respondent and Jambrich possesses prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title
the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. to private lands, except only by way of legal
At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 1985 to succession or if the acquisition was made by a former
1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering- natural-born citizen.29
Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company. He was earning  Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land
an estimated monthly salary of P50,000.00. Then, from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to
Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one year Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been
where his monthly salary was approximately P90,000.00. declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich
 Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino
interests and participation over the subject properties to citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v.
petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in
executed on July 11, 1991. a number of cases31 that if land is invalidly transferred to
 Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or
The findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction
weight and respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
a number of exceptions. In the instant case, we find no rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World
reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.:
Even the appellate court did not controvert the factual o [W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic)
findings of the trial court. They differed only in their Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under
conclusions of law. litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were]
contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines,
 Further, the fact that the disputed properties were
he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of
acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also does not
these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino
help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a
citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the
man and a woman living exclusively with each other as
original transaction and the title of the
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are
transferee is valid.
otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not
 The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of
apply.19 In the instant case, respondent was still legally
petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the
married to another when she and Jambrich lived together.
name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee
In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists
simple of the residential house of strong materials and
between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5,
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
and ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to
acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to
issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial court
any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner P25,000 as
contribution do not apply.20
attorney’s fees and P10,000 as litigation expenses, as
well as the costs of suit.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the fact that the subject properties were
registered in the name of respondent signifies her ownership over
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA
the same.
BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner, vs. HELMUT MULLER,
Respondent.
HELD # 2: NO.
G.R. No. 149615 | August 29, 2006
 It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring
FIRST DIVISION
ownership.21 It is only a means of confirming the fact of
its existence with notice to the world at large.22
FACTS:
109 of 255 | P a g e
 Petitioner and respondent were married in Germany but of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by
subsequently decided to transfer and reside in PH the Filipino citizens themselves who may
 Respondent inherited a house in Germany, sold the same alienate their agricultural lands in favor of
and used the proceeds to purchase a land in PH and to aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that
make improvements thereon section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads
 They separated, however, which resulted in respondent’s as follows:
institution of a petition for separation of properties before  "Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary
the RTC succession, no private agricultural
 RTC  rendered a decision which terminated the regime land will be transferred or assigned
of absolute community of property except to individuals, corporations,
o It also decreed the separation of properties or associations qualified to acquire or
between them and ordered the equal partition hold lands of the public domain in the
of personal properties located within the Philippines."
country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous o This constitutional provision closes the only
title during the marriage. With regard to the remaining avenue through which agricultural
Antipolo property, the court held that it was resources may leak into aliens’ hands. It would
acquired using paraphernal funds of the certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of
respondent. However, it ruled that public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all,
respondent cannot recover his funds they may be freely so alienated upon their
because the property was purchased in becoming private agricultural lands in the
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
Constitution o If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be
o However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family construed as not including residential lots or
Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by lands not strictly agricultural, the result would
either spouse during the marriage shall be be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess
excluded from the community property. The not only residential lots and houses for
real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole
in Germany is excluded from the absolute towns and cities," and that "they may validly
community of property of the herein spouses. buy and hold in their names lands of any area
Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said for building homes, factories, industrial plants,
real property as well as the personal properties fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the vacation resorts, markets, golf courses,
petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses
used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words,
and lot in this country cannot be recovered by strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General’s Brief,
the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
provides that "save in cases of hereditary  Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition
succession, no private lands shall be and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, Court. 11 He declared that he had the Antipolo property
corporations or associations qualified to titled in the name of petitioner because of the said
acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The prohibition. 12 His attempt at subsequently asserting or
law will leave the parties in the situation where claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
they are in without prejudice to a voluntary  The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust
partition by the parties of the said real property was created and resulted by operation of law in view of
 CA  modified RTC’s decision petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the
o It held that respondent merely prayed for exception provided in cases of hereditary succession,
reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the
property, and not acquisition or transfer of Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is
ownership to him. It also considered petitioner’s allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation
ownership over the property in trust for the of an existing statute and in evasion of its express
respondent. As regards the house, the Court of provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is
Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the guilty of the fraud. 13 To hold otherwise would allow
Constitution which prohibits respondent from circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
acquiring the same  Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law
but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may rely on Section 7 Article XII of the been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will
Constitution in arguing that respondent is no longer entitled to the not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
reimbursement of his money used to purchase the subject public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who seeks
properties. equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated
HELD: YES. maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he
 Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on
Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair
lands. 9 The primary purpose of the constitutional and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In controversy in issue. 15
the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court  Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek
held: reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
o Under section 1 of Article XIII of the that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
Constitution, "natural resources, with the despite the constitutional prohibition.
exception of public agricultural land, shall not  Further, the distinction made between transfer of
be alienated," and with respect to public ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement
Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
conserving agricultural resources in the hands property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is

110 of 255 | P a g e
likewise proscribed by law. As expressly held in spouses Eusebia Retuya and Nicolas Retuya in
Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court: accordance with Art. 124 of the Family Code to Eusebia
o Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale Napisa Retuya;
to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article  On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence
XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save this petition.
in cases of hereditary succession, no private o The appellate court found that Pacita failed to
land shall be transferred or conveyed except to rebut the presumption under Article 116 of the
individuals, corporations, or associations Family Code that the subject properties are
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public conjugal. The appellate court dismissed
domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of Pacita’s defense of prescription and laches
course, charged with knowledge of this since she failed to have the issue included in
prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his the pre-trial order after raising it in her answer
intention that the lot in question be purchased with her co-petitioners.
by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that Issue: W/N CA erred in not applying instead the presumption under
purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right Art. 148 of the Family Code in favor of co-ownership between the
or interest in land, vicariously and spouses
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and Held: No
void. In any event, he had and has no capacity  The only issue proper for resolution is the question of
or personality to question the subsequent sale whether the subject properties are conjugal.
of the same property by his wife on the theory  Petitioners claim that the subject properties are exclusive
that in so doing he is merely exercising the properties of Nicolas except for Lot No. 152, which they
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal claim is Pacita’s exclusive property.
property. To sustain such a theory would permit  The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships
indirect controversion of the constitutional govern the property relations between Nicolas and
prohibition. If the property were to be declared Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of
conjugal, this would accord to the alien Family Code.
husband a not insubstantial interest and right o Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly
over land, as he would then have a decisive mandates that the Family Code shall apply to
vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a conjugal partnerships established before the
right that the Constitution does not permit him Family Code without prejudice to vested rights
to have. already acquired under the Civil Code or other
 As already observed, the finding that his wife had used laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will properties are acquired during the marriage,
not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and the presumption is that they are conjugal.
overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had  The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are
used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement
considerations just set out to militate, on high that the properties must first be proven to have been
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding acquired during the marriage before they are presumed
the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether conjugal. Petitioners argue that Eusebia failed to prove
in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share this pre-requisite. We disagree.
of the money used for the purchase or charge her with o The question of whether the subject properties
unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas
is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a and Eusebia is a factual issue. Both the trial
purely academic exercise. and appellate courts agreed that the subject
properties were in fact acquired during the
PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.
VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE  Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were
HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA, respondents. acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the
G.R. No. 143286 | April 14, 2004 (1D) presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that
all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Facts: The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject
 Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of petitioner properties are not conjugal. The presumption in Article
Nicolas Retuya. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot 5 116, which subsists "unless the contrary is proved,"
children, namely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, Salome, stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may
and Roberta. have. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive
 During their marriage they acquired real properties and all property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and
improvements situated in Mandaue City, and the evidence required must be clear and convincing.
Consolacion, Cebu. Petitioners failed to meet this standard.
 Also, petitioner, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel  Finally, petitioners’ reliance on Article 148 of the Family
of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from Code is misplaced.
his parents. o A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there
 Nicolas then no longer lived with his legitimate family and must be proof of "actual joint contribution" by
cohabited with petitioner Pacita Villanueva, wherein both the live-in partners before the property
petitioner, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. becomes co-owned by them in proportion to
Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the their contribution. The presumption of equality
income of the above-mentioned properties. of contribution arises only in the absence of
 When Nicolas suffered stroke, petitioner Procopio has proof of their proportionate contributions,
been receiving the income of these properties. subject to the condition that actual joint
 Natividad, on failure to negotiate with Procopio, contribution is proven first. Simply put, proof of
complained to the Barangay Captain for actual contribution by both parties is required,
reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no
hence, the said official issued a certification to file action presumption of equal sharing. Petitioners failed
 The trial court rendered a decision ordering the transfer of to show proof of actual contribution by Pacita in
the sole administration of conjugal properties of the the acquisition of Lot No. 152.
111 of 255 | P a g e
o In short, petitioners failed to prove that Pacita principal-agent relationship only between his wife, Marilou
bought Lot No. 152 with her own money, or that Catral-Villegas (Marilou) as principal, and Catral, as
she actually contributed her own money to agent, and then only for the latter to administer the
acquire it. properties of the former; that he never authorized Catral
to administer his properties, particularly, herein subject
Section 2. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse (Articles 109- property; and that Catral had no authority to execute the
115) Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent, since
from the very wordings of the power of attorney, she had
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each no special authority to sell or convey any specific real
spouse: property.
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;  RTC dismissed the complaint.
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;  Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed the adverse
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by judgment to the CA claiming that the trial court erred in
exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and finding that there was a principal-agent relationship
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of between petitioner and Catral; and that the trial court
the husband. (148a) erred in concluding that the power of attorney is a special
power of attorney with an authority to sell.
Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession,  CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence this petition.
administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties.
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration Issue: W/N Marilou, the wife of the petitioner, as successor-in-
of his or her exclusive property to the other by means of a public interest, may validly redeem the property in question
instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the
place the property is located. (137a, 168a, 169a) Held: Yes
 Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides:
Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or
otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without the Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made
consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the
with regard to the same. (n) debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor
or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having
Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed
administered by the other automatically terminates the of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the
administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation same at any time within the term of one year from and
shall be turned over to the owner-spouse. (n) after the date of sale; and such redemption shall be
governed by the provisions of section four hundred and
Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the
with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee- Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not
spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the absence of inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of  Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
accretion when proper. (150a) provides:

Art. 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges SEC. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold. –Real
shall be borne by the exclusive property of the donee spouse, property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or
whenever they have been advanced by the conjugal partnership of any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the
gains. (151a) manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons:

Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, (a) The judgment obligor, or his successor-in-interest in
usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on the whole or any part of the property;
gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case.
(n) xxxx

ISAAC VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. VICTOR LINGAN and ATTY. The "successor-in-interest" of the judgment debtor
ERNESTO CARREON, respondent. referred to in the above provision includes a person who
G.R. No. 153839 | June 29, 2007 (3D) succeeds to his property by operation of law, or a person
with a joint interest in the property, or his spouse or heirs.
Facts:  Section 33, Rule 39, Rules of Court, states:
 Petitioner was the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration
 In order to secure the payment of a loan from the of redemption period; by whom executed or given. – If no
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) the petitioner redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of
constituted a real estate mortgage over the said parcel of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is
land in favor of DBP. The said loan and mortgage was entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property;
subsequently transferred by the DBP to the Home Mutual or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed
Development Fund (HMDF). and no other redemption has been made, and notice
 When the petitioner failed to settle his loan, the real estate thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired,
mortgage he constituted over the property was the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and
foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction and, possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall
as the HMDF was itself the highest bidder at such public have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of the
auction, a certificate of sheriff’s sale was issued and, registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed
thereafter, registered with the Register of Deeds. shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his
 By virtue of a power of attorney executed by petitioner’s successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the
wife, Marilou C. Villegas in favor of Gloria Roa Catral, the same validity as though the officer making the sale had
latter redeemed the property from the HMDF. continued in office and executed it.
 Catral, by virtue of the same power of attorney, executed
a Deed of Sale in favor of respondent. Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the
purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and
 Petitioner claims that the power of attorney executed in
favor of Catral, petitioner’s mother-in-law, created a acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the
112 of 255 | P a g e
judgment obligor to the property at the time of the levy. Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of
The possession of the property shall be given to the time belongs to one of the spouses, the sums which may be
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless collected during the marriage in partial payments or by installments
a third party is actually holding the property adversely to on the principal shall be the exclusive property of the spouse.
the judgment obligor. (emphasis supplied) However, interests falling due during the marriage on the principal
shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
 Under the above provision, petitioner could have
redeemed the property from Marilou after she had Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or
redeemed it. The pleadings filed and the records of this adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the
case do not show that petitioner exercised said right. expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or
Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the
acquired ownership of the subject property. All rights and original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the
expiration of the right of redemption. When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership
 And where the redemption is made under a property and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the
regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one
Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at
of the spouses redeeming the property. the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
 Clearly, therefore, Marilou, as owner, had the right to sell retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
the property to another. reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
o In the present case, there is no property right
that exists in favor of the petitioner, and, with In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested
more reason, no such obligation arises in upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the
behalf of the defendant, herein respondent, to liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
respect such right. There was no violation of a
legal right of the petitioner. Civil Code
o It must be stressed that there is no allegation or
proof that Marilou redeemed the property in Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
behalf of the petitioner—Marilou did not act as conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
agent of the petitioner. Rather, she exercised to the husband or to the wife.
the right of redemption in her own right as
successor-in-interest of the petitioner. Under ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PEÑA,
the circumstances, should there be any right Petitioners, vs. GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA and FAR EAST
violated, the aggrieved party is Marilou, BANK & TRUST CO., Respondents.
petitioner’s wife. The property in question was G.R. No. 187490 | February 8, 2012 (2D)
the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of
her redemption. Thus, petitioner has no valid Facts:
cause of action against the respondent.
 The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential
land, together with the improvements thereon, situated in
Section 3. Conjugal Partnership Property
Marikina City and previously registered in the name of
petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), "married to
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the Antegono A. Dela Peña" (Antegono).
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in  To obtain a loan from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila),
the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless Antonio executed in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of
the contrary is proved. Real Estate Mortgage over the property, for the purpose
of securing the payment of said loan obligation.
Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:  Antonia then executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
over the property in favor of respondent Gemma Remilyn
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the C. Avila (Gemma).
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
 Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over said
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
parcel in favor of respondent Far East Bank and Trust
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of
Company.
either or both of the spouses;
 Subsequently, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds an
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the
Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the effect, among others,
marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from
that she was the true and lawful owner of the property
the exclusive property of each spouse;
which had been titled in the name of Gemma; and, that
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law
the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring
awards to the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is
her title was simulated.
found;
 In view of Gemma’s failure to pay the principal as well as
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;
the accumulated interest and penalties on the loans she
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in
excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by either obtained, on the other hand, FEBTC-BPI caused the
spouse; and extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
constituted over the property. As the highest bidder at the
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from
gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne public auction conducted in the premises, FEBTC-BPI
exclusively by the loser-spouse. later consolidated its ownership over the realty and
caused the same to be titled in its name.
Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive  Antonio and her son, petitioner Alvin, filed against
funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale,
belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property, the
the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was Dela Peñas alleged, among other matters, that the Deed
vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of
by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who had, by
by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership. (n) then, already died.

113 of 255 | P a g e
 RTC went on to render a Decision finding that the subject "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of the
property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband
Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible
void as a disposition without the liquidation required under that the property was acquired by the wife while she was
Article 130 of the Family Code. still single and registered only after her marriage, neither
 On appeal, CA rendered the herein assailed decision, would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof
reversing the RTC’s appealed decision, upon finding that that the same was acquired during the marriage and, for
the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. "Since
Dela Peñas to prove that the same was acquired during there is no showing as to when the property in question
Antonia’s marriage to Antegono. was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the
wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal,
Issue: W/N CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the subject house i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse."
and lot conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela
Peña EVANGELINE D. IMANI,* Petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK
& TRUST COMPANY, Respondent
Held: No G.R. No. 187023 | November 17, 2010 (2D)
 Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, all property of the marriage is presumed to Facts:
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved  Petitioner, together with some others, signed a Continuing
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent
Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank).
acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition  As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank
during the marriage is an essential condition for the whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI)
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal incurs.
partnership.  Later, CPDTI obtained loans. CPDTI then defaulted in the
 In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, this Court payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands
categorically ruled as follows: for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted
Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its
 Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all sureties, including herein petitioner.
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the  RTC rendered a decision in favor of Metrobank. CA
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains affirmed this decision.
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the  Consequently, the sheriff levied on a property registered
party who invokes this presumption must first prove that in the name of petitioner. A public auction was conducted
the property in controversy was acquired during the and the property was awarded to Metrobank, as the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a highest bidder.
condition sine qua non for the operation of the  Metrobank undertook to consolidate the title covering the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The subject property in its name, and filed a Manifestation and
party who asserts this presumption must first prove said Motion, praying that spouses Sina and Evangline Imani
time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers be directed to surrender the owner’s copy of the TCT of
only to the property acquired during the marriage and the subject property for cancellation.
does not operate when there is no showing as to when  Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing that the subject
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it
this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by
only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there CPDTI to Metrobank.
must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the  RTC denied Metrobank’s motion. On motion for
spouses. reconsideration filed by Metrobank, RTC set aside its
previous order.
 As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality  But on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, RTC
under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peñas did reinstated its first order. RTC relied on the affidavit of
not even come close to proving that the subject property Crisanto Origen, and declared the property levied upon as
was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and conjugal, which cannot be held answerable for petitioner’s
Antegono. personal liability.
o Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated  CA then rendered the now challenged Decision reversing
assertion that the property was purchased the RTC.
when she was already married, the record is
bereft of any evidence from which the actual Issue: W/N CA erred in sustaining the writ of execution, the public
date of acquisition of the realty can be auction, and the certificate of sale of the subject property, which the
ascertained. petitioner asserts as part of the conjugal partnership and as such, it
o When queried about the matter during his cannot be made to answer for her obligation with Metrobank
cross-examination, even Alvin admitted that his
sole basis for saying that the property was Held: No
owned by his parents was Antonia’s unilateral
 Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be
pronouncement to the effect.
conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the
o Considering that the presumption of conjugality
party who invokes it must first prove that the property was
does not operate if there is no showing of when
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during
the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired, we find that the CA cannot be faulted the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation
for ruling that the realty in litigation was of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Antonia’s exclusive property. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is
material.
 Not having established the time of acquisition of the
property, the Dela Peñas insist that the registration  Francisco v. CA is instructive, viz.:
thereof in the name of "Antonia R. Dela Peña, of legal
age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Peña" should Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all
have already sufficiently established its conjugal nature. property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
Confronted with the same issue in the case Ruiz vs. Court conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
of Appeals, this Court ruled, however, that the phrase exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the

114 of 255 | P a g e
party who invokes this presumption must first prove that  The CA misapplied Article 158 of the Civil Code and
the property in controversy was acquired during the Calimlim-Canullas
marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a o As the respondents were married during the
condition sine qua non for the operation of the effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to
party who asserts this presumption must first prove said 189) should have governed their property
time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers relations. However, with the enactment of the
only to the property acquired during the marriage and Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code
does not operate when there is no showing as to when provisions on conjugal partnership of gains,
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. including Article 158, have been superseded by
 To support her assertion that the property belongs to the those found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to
conjugal partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit of 133).
Crisanto Origen, attesting that petitioner and her husband o Thus, in determining the nature of the subject
were the vendees of the subject property, and the property, we refer to the provisions of the
photocopies of the checks allegedly issued by Sina Imani Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except
as payment for the subject property. with respect to rights then already vested.
o Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit o Article 120 of the Family Code, which
can hardly be considered sufficient evidence to supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code,
prove her claim that the property is conjugal. As provides the solution in determining the
correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said ownership of the improvements that are made
Affidavit has no evidentiary weight because on the separate property of the spouses, at the
Crisanto Origen was not presented in the RTC expense of the partnership or through the acts
to affirm the veracity of his Affidavit. or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this
provision, when the cost of the improvement
FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR., Petitioner, vs. ERLINDA RAMIREZ and any resulting increase in value are more
and ELISEO CARLOS, Respondents than the value of the property at the time of the
G.R. No. 156125 | August 25, 2010 (3D) improvement, the entire property of one of the
spouses shall belong to the conjugal
Facts: partnership, subject to reimbursement of the
 A residential lot, which is the subject property herein, was value of the property of the owner-spouse at the
previously covered by TCT No. 1427, in the name of time of the improvement; otherwise, said
Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). property shall be retained in ownership by the
 Eliseo, with Erlinda’s consent, to secure a P136,500.00 owner-spouse, likewise subject to
housing loan from GSIS, mortgaged TCT No. 1427. The reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
respondents then constructed a residential house on the o In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a
lot. portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly
 The title to the subject property was then transferred to salary deductions. From April 6, 198942 to April
the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, 30, 1992,43 Eliseo paid about P60,755.76,44
executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan
Eliseo plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the
P176,445.2745 paid by Erlinda to cancel the
 The respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the
mortgage in 1992. Considering the
nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that
P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan,
there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and
it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value
the documents transferring the title to the petitioner’s
of the residential lot is considerably more than
name were falsified.
the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through
 RTC dismissed the complaint. monthly salary deductions.
 Applying the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil o Thus, the subject property remained the
Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, the CA held exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the
that the subject property, originally Erlinda’s exclusive time she contracted with the petitioner; the
paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was
was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid not necessary.
through conjugal funds – Eliseo’s monthly salary
deductions; the subject property, therefore, cannot be METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs.
validly sold or mortgaged without Eliseo’s consent, NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code. Thus, the CA G.R. No. 163744 | February 29, 2008 (2D)
declared void the deed of absolute sale, and set aside the
RTC decision. Facts:
 Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga
Issue: W/N the subject property is conjugal were married on January 19, 1985.
 During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito
Held: No and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot.
 As a general rule, all property acquired during the  Florencia then filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both granted by the RTC.
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary o In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia,
is proved. ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the
 In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited ex-spouses’ conjugal partnership of gains.
the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted Subsequent events saw the couple going their
this presumption of conjugal ownership. separate ways without liquidating their conjugal
o Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family partnership.
Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by  Subsequently, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto
either spouse, during the marriage, shall be and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from
excluded from the community property and be petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (MBTC).
the exclusive property of each spouse. The  To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses
residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs)
paraphernal property.
115 of 255 | P a g e
on their properties, including one involving the aforesaid presumption of conjugal ownership applies.
lot. The correct lesson of Francisco and Jocson is
 Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros that proof of acquisition during the marital
to pay their loan obligation, the REMs were foreclosed coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
and eventually bought by petitioner bank in an auction operation of the presumption in favor of
sale. conjugal ownership. When there is no showing
 Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson as to when the property was acquired by the
filed before the RTC a Complaint to declare the nullity of spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the
the mortgage of the disputed property, alleging that the spouse is an indication that the property
property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged belongs exclusively to said spouse.
without his consent.
 RTC declared the REM invalid: Even as it declared the JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER, Petitioner, vs. SPS. MANUEL M.
invalidity of the mortgage, the trial court found the said lot FERRER & VIRGINIA FERRER and SPS. ISMAEL M. FERRER
to be conjugal, the same having been acquired during the and FLORA FERRER, Respondents
existence of the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia. In G.R. No. 166496 | November 9, 2006 (1D)
so ruling, the RTC invoked Art. 116 of the Family Code.
 The CA Affirmed with Modification the RTC’s Decision. Facts:
 Hence this petition.  In her Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements,
 MBTC’s contention: Art. 116 of the Family Code could not sum of money, and accounting with prayer for injunction
be of governing application inasmuch as Nicholson and and damages, petitioner alleged that she is the widow of
Florencia contracted marriage before the effectivity of the Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), a half-brother of respondents
Family Code on August 3, 1988. Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael).
o Citing Manongsong v. Estimo, Metrobank  Before petitioner’s marriage with Alfredo, the latter
asserts that the presumption of conjugal acquired a piece of lot. He applied for a loan with the
ownership under Art. 160 of the Civil Code Social Security System (SSS) to build improvements
applies when there is proof that the property thereon, including a residential house and a two-door
was acquired during the marriage. apartment building. However, it was during their marriage
o To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature that payment of the loan was made using the couple’s
of the disputed property, Metrobank cites conjugal funds.
Francisco v. Court of Appeals and Jocson v.  From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they
Court of Appeals, among other cases, where constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner
this Court held that a property registered in the averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the
name of a certain person with a description of apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however,
being married is no proof that the property was he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had
acquired during the spouses’ marriage. acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed
of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents.
Issue: W/N CA erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by  It is petitioner’s contention that on 2 October 1989, when
applying Article 116 of the Family Code. her husband was already bedridden, respondents Ismael
and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported to
Held: No be his last will and testament. The document, however,
 First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredo’s lot and the
the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the improvements thereon. Learning of this development,
applicable legal provision since the property was acquired Alfredo filed with the RTC of Pasig, a Complaint for
prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its Annulment of the said sale against respondents, docketed
theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally as Civil Case No. 61327.
presumed, there must be a showing that the property was o RTC dismissed the complaint. The dismissal
acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
o Contrary to Metrobank’s submission, the Court o Subsequently, this Court, in G.R. No. L-
did not, in Manongsong vs. Estimo, add the 117067, finding no reversible error committed
matter of the use of conjugal funds as an by the appellate court in affirming the dismissal
essential requirement for the presumption of of the RTC, affirmed the Decision of the Court
conjugal ownership to arise. of Appeals.
o Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only  Further, in support of her Complaint, petitioner alluded to
proof of acquisition during the marriage is a portion of the Decision dated 22 June 1993 of the RTC
needed to raise the presumption that the in Civil Case No. 61327, which stated, to wit:
property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use
of conjugal is still required as a necessary In determining which property is the principal and which
condition before the presumption can arise, is the accessory, the property of greater value shall be
then the legal presumption set forth in the law considered the principal. In this case, the lot is the
would veritably be a superfluity. principal and the improvements the accessories. Since
o As the Court stressed in Castro v. Miat: Article 120 of the Family Code provides the rule that the
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New ownership of accessory follows the ownership of the
Civil Code. It provides that "all property of the principal, then the subject lot with all its improvements
marriage is presumed to be conjugal became an exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with
partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains an obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership of the
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This cost of improvements at the time of liquidation of [the]
article does not require proof that the property conjugal partnership. Clearly, Alfredo has all the rights to
was acquired with funds of the partnership. The sell the subject property by himself without need of
presumption applies even when the manner in Josefa’s consent.
which the property was acquired does not  According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows that,
appear. (Emphasis supplied.) when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at the time
 Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the
Metrobank’s theory. right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on
o As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains Alfredo’s lot.
on the acquisition of the property during the  RTC denied respondents’ motion to dismiss. CA, on
existence of the marriage, then the appeal, granted respondents’ petition for certiorari.
116 of 255 | P a g e
 On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court's ruling in toto,
Issue: W/N respondents have the correlative obligation to pay the holding that the disputed lot belonged to the conjugal
value of the improvements on the subject lot partnership of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar.
o The lower court rejected the statement of the
Held: No Court of First Instance of Capiz in
 Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation Reconstitution Case No. 1408 that Lot 1201
on the part of the respondents to respect or not to violate was inherited by Petra Unating from her
her right. While we could concede that the Civil Case mother. We agree with the lower court when it
made a reference to the right of the spouse as found the phrase "having inherited said lot from
contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be her mother Margarita Argamaso" as a mere
reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obiter, a finding of fact which we find no
obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom justifiable reason to set aside. It must be
ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no considered that the authority of the Court of
obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in First Instance of Capiz to declare Lot 1201 as
case the property is sold by the owner-spouse. having been inherited by Petra Unating from
 Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining her mother is doubtful.
the ownership of the improvements that are made on the o We further agree with the lower court when it
separate property of the spouses at the expense of the held that "in the absence [o]f any evidence o[f]
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both any system [o]f property relation between Petra
spouses. Unating and Aquilino Villar, it is presumed that
o Thus, when the cost of the improvement and it is one of conjugal partnership." Besides, it
any resulting increase in value are more than appears that Lot 1201 was acquired during the
the value of the property at the time of the marriage of the Spouses Petra Unating and
improvement, the entire property of one of the Aquilino Villar, since the Original Certificate of
spouses shall belong to the conjugal Title indicates that Lot 1201 was registered in
partnership, subject to reimbursement of the the name of Petra Unating, married to Aquilino
value of the property of the owner-spouse at the Villar. Thus, the property is presumed conjugal.
time of the improvement; otherwise, said
property shall be retained in ownership by the Issue: W/N CA erred in ruling that Lot 1201 belongs to the conjugal
owner-spouse, likewise subject to partnership of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
o The subject property was precisely declared as Held: Yes
the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of  Both the CA and the RTC held that the disputed lot was
Article 120 of the Family Code. conjugal and dismissed, as obiter, the phrase "having
inherited said lot from her [Petra Unating's] mother,
JESSIE V. PISUEÑA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF PETRA UNATING Margarita Argamaso" found in the dispositive portion of
and AQUILINO VILLAR Represented by Salvador Upod and the Decision of the Court of First Insurance (CFI) of Capiz
Dolores Bautista, respondents. in Reconstitution Case No. 1408. They explained that the
G.R. No. 132803 | August 31, 1999 (3D) CFI had no authority to include the phrase, because the
only objective of reconstitution was to "restore the
Real property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal. certificate covering the property as it stood at the time of
Such prima facie presumption, however, can be overturned by a its loss or destruction, and should not be stretched to
cadastral courts' specific finding, which has long become final, that include later changes which alter of affect the title of the
the lot in question was paraphernal in character. The title to the registered owner."
entire property shall pass by operation of law to the buyer once the  The Supreme Court does not agree.
seller acquires title over it by hereditary succession, even if at the  It must be emphasized that the dispositive portion of the
time of the execution of the deed of sale, the seller owned only a 1930 Decision, which was rendered by the same CFI of
portion of the property. Capiz acting as a cadastral court, already contained the
questioned phrase. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
Facts: CFI in 1980 exceeded its authority when it ordered the
 The subject lot in dispute is a registered land in the name reconstitution, in Petra Unating's name, of the original
of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. certificate of title covering the disputed lot or in stating
 During the lifetime of the registered owners, Aquilino therein that she had inherited it from her mother. After all,
entered into an oral partnership agreement for 10 years such disposition was copied from the same court's 1930
with Agustin Navarra involving the swampy portion of the Decision, as evidenced by an authentic copy of it on file
lot in question. with the Bureau of Lands in Capiz.
 This arrangement continued until Aquilino died.  Cadastral proceedings are proceedings in rem; like
Thereafter, his share in the income of the partnership was ordinary registration proceedings, they are governed by
delivered by Agustin Navarra to Felix Villar and Catalina the usual rules of practice, procedure and evidence. A
Villar. cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued only
 After the death of Agustin Navarra, his heirs executed a after the applicants prove that they are entitled to the
Deed of Extra Judicial Partition and Deed of Sale of the claimed lots, all parties are heard, and evidence is
land in question in favor of the Spouses Jessie Pisueña considered.
and Rosalie Navarra. o Thus, the finding of the cadastral court that
 Respondents herein then filed an action for recovery of Petra Unating inherited the lot in question from
possession against herein petitioner. her mother cannot be dismissed as an obiter,
 RTC: Since the disputed lot was the conjugal property of which is "an observation by the court not
Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, its purported necessary to the decision rendered."
sale by Felix and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra could o The conclusion of the cadastral court was found
be considered valid. The court, however, ruled that its in the dispositive portion of its Decision, and it
validity pertained only to the share of the late Petra was material to the nature of Petra Unating's
Unating, considering that at the time of the sale, Aquilino ownership of the lot.
Villar was still alive. It likewise held that the respondents, o Furthermore, it was based on the evidence
presented by the parties and considered by the
as heirs of Aquilino Villar, were entitled to his one-half
said court.
share in the disputed lot.

117 of 255 | P a g e
o In any event, it must be pointed out that the property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation
Decision became final a long time ago, and a of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been
final judgment in a cadastral proceeding, or any paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
other in rem proceeding for that matter, is
binding and conclusive upon the whole world. Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of
Therefore, the lot in dispute can properly be chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling
considered as a paraphernal property of Petra whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser
Unating. and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any
 Concededly, properties acquired during the marriage are winnings therefrom shall form part of the conjugal partnership
presumed to be conjugal. However, this prima facie property.
presumption cannot prevail over the cadastral court's
specific finding, reached in adversarial proceedings, that RA 10572: AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE LIABILITY OF THE
the lot was inherited by Petra Unating from her mother. ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR
Noteworthy is the fact that the parties do not assail the AN OBLIGATION OF A SPOUSE WHO PRACTICES A
validity of the cadastral court's Decision. PROFESSION AND THE CAPABILITY OF EITHER SPOUSE TO
o The 1980 reconstitution of the title to the lot in DISPOSE OF AN EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY WITHOUT THE
the name of "Petra Unating, 40 years old, CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE, AMENDING FOR THE
married to Aquilino Villar, Filipino and resident PURPOSE ARTICLES 73 AND 111 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
of Ivisan, Capiz, having inherited said lot from 209, ALSO KNOWN AS THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
her mother Margarita Argamaso . . ." was notice PHILIPPINES
to the world, including her heirs and
successors-in-interest, that it belonged to Petra SECTION 1. Article 73 of the Family Code, as amended, is hereby
as her paraphernal property. Thus, the words further amended to read as follows:
"married to" were merely descriptive of Petra
Unating's status at the time the lot was awarded “Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession,
and registered in her name. occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The
latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
Section 4. Charges Upon and Obligations of the Conjugal
Partnership (Articles 121-123) See also Articles 73, 111 FC, RA “In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
10572
“(1) The objection is proper, and
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: “(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or
thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the obligation shall be enforced against the community property. If the
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of benefit accrued thereafter, such obligation shall be enforced against
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the “The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal who acted in good faith.”
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
consent of the other; SEC. 2. Article 111 of the Family Code, as amended, is hereby
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the further amended to read as follows:
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor “Art. 111. Either spouse may mortgage, encumber, alienate or
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property.”
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; EFREN PANA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR.
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents.
professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement; G.R. No. 164201 | December 10, 2012
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have THIRD DIVISION
redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ, Complainant, vs. SERGIO V.
favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose PASCUA, Sheriff III. Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Trece Martires
of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or City, Cavite. Respondent.
other activity for self-improvement; and A.M. No. P-11-2972 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3430-P) |
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is September 28, 2011 (1D)
found to groundless.
Facts:
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing  Alicia Panganiban (Panganiban) instituted a criminal case
liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid against Juanito Corpuz for violations of Batas Pambansa
balance with their separate properties. Blg. 22.
 When Juanito failed to comply with his obligations under
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband the Compromise Agreement in the said case, Panganiban
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the filed Motions for Execution of the MTCC judgment. MTCC
conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to acted favorably on Panganiban’s Motions and issued a
the benefit of the family. Writ of Execution addressed to the Sheriff of the MTCC of
Trece Martires City
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon  When Yolanda, Juanito’s wife, and her daughter were in
them be charged to the partnership. her office at the Cavite Provincial Engineering Office of
Trece Martires City, Sheriff Pascua arrived at Yolanda’s
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either office and demanded that Yolanda surrender the Toyota
spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed Town Ace Noah with Plate No. 471, which was registered
upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either in Yolanda’s name, threatening to damage the said
spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the vehicle if Yolanda would refuse to do so.
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been
covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
118 of 255 | P a g e
 Offended, humiliated, and embarrassed, Yolanda was obtained is chargeable against the conjugal
compelled to file the present administrative complaint4 partnership.
against Sheriff Pascua.
 Sheriff Pascua argued that he only took Yolanda’s vehicle Issue: W/N CA erred in declaring, without basis, that the loan
after verification from the Land Transportation Office contracted by husband Joe A. Ros with respondent Philippine
(LTO) that it was registered in Yolanda’s name. Yolanda National Bank – Laoag redounded to the benefit of his family
is the wife of Juanito, the accused in Criminal Case Nos.
2079 to 2082, and the vehicle is their conjugal property, Held: No
which could be levied upon in satisfaction of a Writ of  The application for loan shows that the loan would be
Execution against Juanito. used exclusively "for additional working capital of buy &
sell of garlic & virginia tobacco." In her testimony, Aguete
Issue: W/N the subject vehicle can be presumed as the conjugal confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but
property of the Juanito and Yolanda claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was
also aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did not know
Held: No where he "wasted the money."
 Sheriff Pascua cannot rely on the presumption that the o Debts contracted by the husband for and in the
vehicle is the conjugal property of Juanito and Yolanda. exercise of the industry or profession by which
 Indeed, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that he contributes to the support of the family
"all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains private debts.
exclusively to the husband or to the wife."  If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
o However, for this presumption to apply, the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services
party who invokes it must first prove that the to be used in or for his own business or his own
property was acquired during the marriage. profession, that contract falls within the term "x x x x
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
condition sine qua non to the operation of the Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that
presumption in favor of the conjugal the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the
partnership. Thus, the time when the property contract.
was acquired is material. There is no such proof  From the very nature of the contract of loan or services,
in the records of the present case. the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
 Sheriff Pascua’s assertions of diligence do not exculpate services to be rendered to the business or profession of
him from administrative liability. After inquiry from the the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or
LTO, he already discovered that the vehicle was profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated,
registered in Yolanda’s name only. This fact should have where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
already prompted Sheriff Pascua to gather more family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
information, such as when Juanito and Yolanda were such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
married and when did Yolanda acquire the vehicle, which, partnership.
in turn, would have determined whether or not Sheriff  For this reason, we rule that Ros’ loan from PNB
Pascua could already presume that the said vehicle is redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
conjugal property. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH, Respondent. ROMULO NICOL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170166 | April 6, 2011 (2D) G.R. No. 145222 | April 24, 2009 (2D)

Facts: Facts:
 Spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a  Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a
complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda).
and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB. Said action originated from Erlinda Nicol’s civil liability
 The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff- arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against
appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from her by petitioners.
PNB and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros  The trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay
executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of damages. Said decision was affirmed, successively, by
land. the Court of Appeals and this Court.
 Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a  Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties insufficient to
result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the levy on real property on execution addressed to the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued Register of Deeds of Cavite.
in favor of PNB as the highest bidder.  Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol,
 Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and
no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners
she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal and the deputy sheriff.
property – a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings  RTC dismissed respondent’s complaint. On appeal, the
pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
property – interposing the defense that her signatures
affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan Issue: W/N the obligation of Erlinda arising from her criminal liability
did not redound to the benefit of the family. is chargeable to the conjugal partnership
 The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. However, CA
reversed the same. Held: No
o Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give  There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in
her consent to Ros’ loan, the appellate court nature. Article 122 of the Family Code16 explicitly
ruled that the conjugal partnership is still liable provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the
because the loan proceeds redounded to the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
benefit of the family. The records of the case not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar
reveal that the loan was used for the expansion as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
of the family’s business. Therefore, the debt
119 of 255 | P a g e
 Unlike in the system of absolute community where in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime services to be used in or for his own business or
or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of profession, the transaction falls within the term
property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." In
property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not other words, where the husband contracts an obligation
accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. on behalf of the family business, there is a legal
The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit
advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. of the conjugal partnership.
 Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be
concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime On the other hand, if the money or services are given to
of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit another person or entity and the husband acted only as a
of the conjugal partnership. surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be
 To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and
some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to not for the surety or his family. No presumption is raised
the conjugal partnership. that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
 In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the
was claimed by the third party complainant to be conjugal conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to
property was being levied upon to enforce "a judgment for establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal
support" filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit
wife is proper since the obligation which is personal to the received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot be held
husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the
on his separate property. husband to accommodate a third party.
 In this case, the principal contract, the credit line
SECURITY BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. MAR agreement between petitioner and respondent
TIERRA CORPORATION, WILFRIDO C. MARTINEZ, MIGUEL J. corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The
LACSON and RICARDO A. LOPA, Respondents. accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under
G.R. No. 143382 | November 29, 2006 (2D) which individual respondent Martinez assumed the
obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was
Facts: similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden
 Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses
president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to
credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and discharge that burden.
Trust Company.  To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation
 Petitioner approved the application and entered into a pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of
credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It was the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of
secured by an indemnity agreement executed by the family as a unit. The underlying concern of the law is
individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. the conservation of the conjugal partnership. Hence, it
Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts
jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
payment of the loan. of the conjugal partnership.
 Unable to collect the balance of the loan, petitioner filed a
complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners vs.
attachment against respondent corporation and individual THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING
respondents. CORPORATION, respondents.
 RTC found that the obligation contracted by individual G.R. No. 124642 | February 23, 2004 (2D)
respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his
family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment Facts:
previously issued on the conjugal house and lot of the  Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI)
spouses Martinez. obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking
 Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, petitioner appealed to Corporation (ABC).
the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s  By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive
decision in toto. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory
was denied. Hence, this petition. note for the said amount.
 As added security for the said loan, Alfredo Ching,
Issue: W/N RTC and CA were wrong in ruling that the conjugal together with some others, executed a continuing
partnership of the Martinez spouses could not be held liable for the guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and
obligation incurred by individual respondent Martinez severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI
obligations owing the ABC to the extent of
Held: No P38,000,000.00.
 Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal  The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans.
partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations Hence, ABC filed a complaint for sum of money, wherein
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal Ching was impleaded as co-defendant.
partnership." But when are debts and obligations  ABC’s application for a writ of preliminary attachment was
contracted by the husband alone considered for the granted.
benefit of and therefore chargeable against the conjugal  Subsequently, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her
partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the
contract entered into by the husband in favor of his levy on attachment, alleging that the 100,000 shares of
employer within the contemplation of the said provision? stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and
 Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia: In acting as a her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds
guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the
clearly intended for a third party. continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract
 Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of
of Appeals: If the husband himself is the principal obligor PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
120 of 255 | P a g e
 RTC then issued an order lifting the writ of preliminary
attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the (A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
sheriff to return the said stocks to the petitioners. contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services
 On appeal by ABC, CA reversed RTC’s judgment. to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term "…
Issue: W/N CA erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
liable for the payment of PBMCI loans Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the
Held: Yes signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
 Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit
and 3] of the Family Code of the Philippines) provides: from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: in the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
 The petitioner-husband signed the continuing guaranty HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. MANUEL T. ABELARDO,
and suretyship agreement as security for the payment of respondent.
the loan obtained by the PBMCI from the private G.R. No. 146504 | April 9, 2002 (1D)
respondent in the amount of P38,000,000.
o Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v. Facts:
Court of Appeals: The signing as surety is  Petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money and
certainly not an exercise of an industry or damages against respondent Manuel Abelardo, his son-
profession. It is not embarking in a business. in-law, and the latter’s wife, Maria Theresa Carlos-
No matter how often an executive acted on or Abelardo.
was persuaded to act as surety for his own  In the said complaint, petitioner alleged that:
employer, this should not be taken to mean that o Respondent and his wife approached him and
he thereby embarked in the business of requested him to advance the amount of US
suretyship or guaranty. 25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot
 For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive
should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a Heights Village, Paranaque.
showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. o Thereafter, respondent expressed violent
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for resistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the
a liability that should appertain alone to one of the amount to the extent of making various death
spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code threats against petitioner.
to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well  RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. CA, on
being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is appeal, however reversed the lower court’s decision.
denied the power to assume unnecessary and
unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal Issue: W/N the loan incurred by the respondent is the liability of the
partnership. conjugal partnership
 In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the
conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by Held: Yes
the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing  The evidence adduced by petitioner sufficiently
guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private established his claim that the US 25,000.00 he advanced
respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. to respondent and his wife was a loan.
o The contract of loan was between the private  The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership
respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code:
benefit of the latter. No presumption can be
inferred from the fact that when the petitioner- xxx
husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the
partnership would thereby be benefited. The marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the
private respondent was burdened to establish benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both
that such benefit redounded to the conjugal spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
partnership.
 It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one without the consent of the other to the extent that the
of its top twenty stockholders, and that the shares of family may have been benefited;
stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would
appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the
loans obtained; that the petitioner-husband’s career foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
infusion of fresh capital.
o However, these are not the benefits Xxx
contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil  While respondent did not and refused to sign the
Code. The benefits must be those directly acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife,
resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the
a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. family because it was used to purchase the house and lot
 This is different from the situation where the husband which became the conjugal home of respondent and his
borrows money or receives services to be used for his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent
own business or profession. In the Ayala case, we ruled of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall
that it is such a contract that is one within the term be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
"obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
Thus:
121 of 255 | P a g e
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and debts by the husband or the wife before or
ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS during the marriage shall not be charged to the
and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING, conjugal partnership except insofar as they
respondents. redounded to the benefit of the family." As can
G.R. No. 118305 | February 12, 1998 (2D) be seen, the terms are used interchangeably.
 Petitioners further contend that the ruling of the
Facts: respondent court runs counter to the pronouncement of
 Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) this Court in the case of Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, that the
obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala husband as head of the family and as administrator of the
Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter conjugal partnership is presumed to have contracted
referred to as AIDC). obligations for the benefit of the family or the conjugal
 As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, partnership.
respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of  Jurisprudence on the said matter:
PBM, executed security agreements making himself o Javier vs. Osmeña: The debts contracted by
jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness the husband during the marriage relation, for
to AIDC. and in the exercise of the industry or profession
 PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for by which he contributes toward the support of
sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband his family, are not his personal and private
Alfredo Ching. debts, and the products or income from the
 CFI rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent- wife's own property, which, like those of her
husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC husband's, are liable for the payment of the
the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests. marriage expenses, cannot be excepted from
 Upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of the payment of such debts.
execution pending appeal. o Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin: Debts contracted by the
 Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy husband for and in the exercise of the industry
Sheriff of Rizal caused the issuance and service upon or profession by which he contributes to the
respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale. support of the family, cannot be deemed to be
his exclusive and private debts.
 Private respondents filed a case of injunction against
o Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila: The fruits of the
petitioners to enjoin the auction sale alleging that
paraphernal property which form part of the
petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the
assets of the conjugal partnership, are subject
conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among
to the payment of the debts and expenses of
others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of
the spouses, but not to the payment of the
the said conjugal partnership.
personal obligations (guaranty agreements) of
 The lower court issued a temporary restraining order to the husband, unless it be proved that such
prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the obligations were productive of some benefit to
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the family.
the said properties at public auction. o Liberty Insurance Corporation vs. Banuelos:
 On a Petition for Certiorari filed by AIDC, CA issued TRO When there is no showing that the execution of
enjoining CFI from enforcing its order. The auction sale an indemnity agreement by the husband
then took place where AIDC being the only bidder, was redounded to the benefit of his family, the
issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo undertaking is not a conjugal debt but an
 AIDC then filed a motion to dismiss the petition for obligation personal to him.
injunction filed before the CFI on the ground that the same  From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we
had become moot and academic with the consummation can derive the following conclusions:
of the sale. o If the husband himself is the principal obligor in
 The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, trial the contract, i.e., he directly received the
on the merits proceeded. The trial court promulgated its money and services to be used in or for his own
decision declaring the sale on execution null and void. CA business or his own profession, that contract
affirmed the decision. Hence this petition. falls within the term . . . . obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no
Issue: W/N a surety agreement or an accommodation contract actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that
entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the the benefit to the family is apparent at the time
contemplation of Article 161 of the Civil Code of the signing of the contract. From the very
nature of the contract of loan or services, the
Held: No family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
 Petitioners aver that the wordings of Article 161 of the services to be rendered to the business or
Civil Code is very clear: for the partnership to be held profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in
liable, the husband must have contracted the debt "for the the end, his business or profession fails or does
benefit of the partnership; that here is a difference not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
between the phrases: "redounded to the benefit of" or contracts obligations on behalf of the family
"benefited from" (on the one hand) and "for the benefit of business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
(on the other). The former require that actual benefit must such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
have been realized; the latter requires only that the conjugal partnership.
transaction should be one which normally would produce o On the other hand, if the money or services are
benefit to the partnership, regardless of whether or not given to another person or entity, and the
actual benefit accrued. husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
 There is no difference between the terms "redounded to that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and categorized as falling within the context of
"for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and the "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
same thing. partnership." The contract of loan or services is
o Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and
(2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., not for the surety or his family. No presumption
both use the term "for the benefit of." can be inferred that, when a husband enters
o On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family into a contract of surety or accommodation
Code provides that "The payment of personal agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal

122 of 255 | P a g e
partnership." Proof must be presented to
establish benefit redounding to the conjugal Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. partnership.
 In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the
respondent family would reasonably anticipate were the Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years
following: from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
o The employment of co-respondent Alfredo any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when
Ching would be prolonged and he would be
such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which
entitled to his monthly salary of P20,000.00 for
tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
an extended length of time because of the loan
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
he guaranteed;
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
o The shares of stock of the members of his
property fraudulently alienated by the husband. (n)
family would appreciate if the PBM could be
rehabilitated through the loan obtained;
o His prestige in the corporation would be Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even
enhanced and his career would be boosted though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
should PBM survive because of the loan.
 However, these are not the benefits contemplated by (1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to
Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must be one a contract;
directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by- (2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,
product or a spin-off of the loan itself. Such benefits intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
(prospects of longer employment and probable increase
in the value of stocks) might have been already apparent These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper
or could be anticipated at the time the accommodation action in court. They are susceptible of ratification. (n)
agreement was entered into.
 Are indirect and remote probable benefits, the ones
referred to in Article 161 of the Civil Code? The Court of SPOUSES REX AND CONCEPCION AGGABAO, Petitioners, vs.
Appeals in denying the motion for reconsideration, DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN,
disposed of these questions in the following manner: Respondents.
G.R. No. 165803 | September 1, 2010 (3D)
No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit
respondents-appellants is purely a corporate debt Facts:
granted to PBM, with petitioner-appellee-husband merely  Real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio (Atanacio) offered
signing as surety. While such petitioner-appellee- two parcels of land, which in the name of respondents
husband, as such surety, is solidarily liable with the Spouses Maria Elena A. Parulan (Ma. Elena) and Dionisio
principal debtor AIDC, such liability under the Civil Code Z. Parulan, Jr. (Dionisio), who have been estranged from
provisions is specifically restricted by Article 122 (par. 1) one another, to the petitioners
of the Family Code, so that debts for which the husband  The petitioners went to the Office of the Register of Deeds
is liable may not be charged against conjugal partnership and the Assessor’s Office of Parañaque City to verify the
properties. Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit — TCTs shown by Ma. Elena
"The payment of personal debts contracted by the  There, they discovered that the one of the lots had been
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall encumbered to Banco Filipino in 1983 or 1984, but that
not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar the encumbrance had already been cancelled due to the
as they redounded to the benefit of the family. full payment of the obligation. They noticed that the Banco
Filipino loan had been effected through an SPA executed
Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. They found on the TCT
Property (Articles 124-125); Article 165, 173, 1390 NCC; Rule of the other lot the annotation of an existing mortgage in
on Forum Shopping; Article 124 FC v. Guardianship v. favor of the Los Baños Rural Bank, also effected through
Summary Proceedings; an SPA executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena,
coupled with a copy of a court order authorizing Ma. Elena
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal to mortgage the lot to secure a loan of P500,000.00.
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of  Following their verification, the petitioners delivered final
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to amount to Ma. Elena, who executed a deed of absolute
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be sale in their favor.
availed of within five years from the date of the contract  Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner’s copy of
implementing such decision. TCT No. 63376 as promised. In due time, the petitioners
learned that the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No. 63376
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z.
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots.
do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the  Subseqeuntly, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan,
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of commenced an action praying for the declaration of the
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena,
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and by virtue thereof.
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the  RTC ruled in favor of Dionisio. CA affirmed the RTC,
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is opining that Article 124 of the Family Code applied
withdrawn by either or both offerors. because Dionisio had not consented to the sale of the
conjugal property by Ma. Elena; and that the RTC
Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership correctly found the SPA to be a forgery.
property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse
may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations Issue: W/N Article 173 of the Civil Code and not Article 124 of the
from the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property
family rejoicing or family distress. executed without the consent of Dionisio

Civil Code Provisions


123 of 255 | P a g e
Held: No. Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal  The petitioners contend that the forgery of the SPA
properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code notwithstanding, the CA could still have decided in their
 To start with, Article 254 of the Family Code has expressly favor conformably with Veloso v. Court of Appeals, a case
repealed several titles under the Civil Code, among them where the petitioner husband claimed that his signature
the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property and that of the notary public who had notarized the SPA
relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, the petitioner supposedly executed to authorize his wife
are found. to sell the property had been forged. In denying relief, the
 Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after Court upheld the right of the vendee as an innocent
August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. purchaser for value.
o The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article o Veloso is inapplicable, however, because the
124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any contested property therein was exclusively
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property owned by the petitioner and did not belong to
made during the effectivity of the Family Code the conjugal regime. Veloso being upon
is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code. conjugal property, Article 124 of the Family
 Article 124 of the Family Code provides: Code did not apply.
o In contrast, the property involved herein
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the pertained to the conjugal regime, and,
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both consequently, the lack of the written consent of
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s the husband rendered the sale void pursuant to
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by Article 124 of the Family Code. Moreover, even
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of assuming that the property involved in Veloso
within five years from the date of the contract was conjugal, its sale was made on November
implementing such decision. 2, 1987, or prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code; hence, the sale was still properly
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise covered by Article 173 of the Civil Code, which
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal provides that a sale effected without the
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of consent of one of the spouses is only voidable,
administration. These powers do not include disposition not void. However, the sale herein was made
or encumbrance without authority of the court or the already during the effectivity of the Family
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of Code, rendering the application of Article 124
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance of the Family Code clear and indubitable.
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed
as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners, vs.
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND
either or both offerors. INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE, Respondents
G.R. No. 160708 | October 16, 2009 (2D)
Issue: W/N CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding that the sale
between Mrs. Elena and the petitioners had been a nullity under Facts:
Article 124 of the Family Code  Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa
Abrille are husband and wife.
Held: No  In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel
 Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
consent of both spouses before the conjugal property may T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of
be disposed of by sale, mortgage, or other modes of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and
disposition. In Bautista v. Silva, the Court erected a which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-
standard to determine the good faith of the buyers dealing 26471.
with a seller who had title to and possession of the land  In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his
but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their
consent of the other spouse was required before the movables to support the family and the studies of her
conveyance, declaring that in order to prove good faith in children.
such a situation, the buyers must show that they inquired  By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two
not only into the title of the seller but also into the seller’s lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina.
capacity to sell.  Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her
 Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the
kinds of requisite diligence, namely: two lots without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a
o the diligence in verifying the validity of the title Deed of Sale.
covering the property; and  Mary Ann then filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale
o the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas).
transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in  The trial court ruled in favor of herein respondent Mary
behalf of the other spouse. Ann.
 Petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the  On appeal, CA rendered the following judgment:
written consent of Dionisio to the sale, but yet they did not o The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 26471 in
present evidence to show that they had made inquiries favor of defendants spouses Wilfredo and
into the circumstances behind the execution of the SPA Patrocinia Ravina is declared valid.
purportedly executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. o The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 88674 in
Had they made the appropriate inquiries, and not simply favor of said defendants spouses Ravina,
accepted the SPA for what it represented on its face, they together with the house thereon, is declared
would have uncovered soon enough that the respondents null and void.
had been estranged from each other and were under de
facto separation, and that they probably held conflicting Issue: W/N the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 by
interests that would negate the existence of an agency Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s consent
between them. To lift this doubt, they must, of necessity,
further inquire into the SPA of Ma. Elena. Held: No

124 of 255 | P a g e
 A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, SPOUSES RENATO and FLORINDA DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs.
is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now SPOUSES GIL and LEONILA SEGOVIA, respondents.
treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the G.R. No. 149801 | June 26, 2008 (1D)
consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case
of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court. Facts:
 Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the  Petitioner Florinda dela Cruz (Florinda) wanted to
time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit: purchase two (2) parcels of land located at Paltok Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila, Lot 503 with an apartment unit erected
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the thereon and Lot 505 with a residential house. The two lots
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both were being sold together for P180,000.00.
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s  Inasmuch as Florinda had only P144,000.00 at hand, she
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by asked her sister, respondent Leonila Segovia (Leonila), to
the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within contribute P36,000.00 to complete the purchase price.
five years from the date of the contract implementing such  The sisters agreed that Lot 503 and the apartment unit
decision. thereat would belong to Leonila upon full payment of its
purchase price of P80,000.00, while Lot 505 with a
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise residential house would belong to Florinda.
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal  The properties were then registered in the name of
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of petitioner Renato dela Cruz married to Florinda. The
administration. These powers do not include the powers parties, however, verbally agreed that Leonila and her
of disposition or encumbrance which must have the family would stay at Lot 505 until she had fully paid for Lot
authority of the court or the written consent of the other 503.
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the  Florinda and Leonila then signed an Agreement
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the embodying the detailed scheme of payment for the lot
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the covered by the sisters’ agreement.
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and  Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for Nullity of
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the Contract/Agreement with Damages on the ground that the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the said Agreement executed did not contain the true
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both intention of the parties because Florinda’s consent thereto
offerors. was vitiated by mistake.
 The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the  RTC dismissed the complaint. As to the contention that
wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance the subject agreement had no force and effect on account
was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear of the absence of the signature of Florinda’s husband,
that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal petitioner Renato dela Cruz (Renato), the RTC ruled to
partnership property by the husband without the consent the contrary, thus:
of the wife is null and void. o Indeed, Renato dela Cruz did not sign the
 Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of Agreement, however, he was present at the
property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent time the Agreement was signed by the parties
of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the and their witnesses, and the same was
sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of presented to him for his signature. In fact,
the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is attempts were even made to procure his
annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) signature, but plaintiff wife Florinda dela Cruz
years from the date the contract implementing the insisted that her signature already carries that
decision of the husband to institute the case. of her husband Renato dela Cruz. The parties
 Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for never insisted that Renato dela Cruz sign the
annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of Agreement as the wife has spoken. It is further
sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to observed that by his actuations Renato dela
annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot Cruz has agreed and has given his conformity
and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, to the agreement. He also did not object to the
a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he execution of the same at the time it was signed
can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent. by his wife Florinda dela Cruz on September 9,
 In addition, petitioners contend that they are buyers in 1991, even he was present and he was shown
good faith. and furnished a copy of the said agreement.
o To establish his status as a buyer for value in  The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC in its decision.
good faith, a person dealing with land Hence this petition.
registered in the name of and occupied by the
seller need only show that he relied on the face Issue: W/N Art. 124 of the Civil Code which was relied upon by the
of the seller’s certificate of title. But for a person petitioners is applicable in the case at bar
dealing with land registered in the name of and
occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is Held: No
restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of  Article 124 of the Family Code relied upon by petitioners
the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family provides that the administration of the conjugal
Code, he must show that he inquired into the partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and
latter’s capacity to sell in order to establish the wife. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
himself as a buyer for value in good faith. otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
 In the present case, the property is registered in the name conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole
of Pedro and his wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny powers of administration. However, the power of
knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro administration does not include the power to dispose or
was married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Ann’s encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership.
conformity did not appear in the deed. Even assuming In all instances, the present law specifically requires the
that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the
property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her objection to the sale partnership property without which, the disposition or
and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property encumbrance shall be void.
without Mary Ann’s written consent.
125 of 255 | P a g e
 The foregoing provision finds no application in this case
because the transaction between Florinda and Leonila in Held: No
reality did not involve any disposition of property  In Vda. de Ramones v. Agbayani, citing Villaranda v.
belonging to any of the sisters’ conjugal assets. Villaranda, the Court held that without the wife's consent,
o It may be recalled that the agreement was for the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
the acquisition of two lots which were being property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on
sold together for P180,000.00. August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable.
o Florinda who had only P144,000.00 asked  Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code provide:
Leonila to contribute P36,000.00 to complete
the purchase price of said lots. With money ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non
pooled together, the sisters agreed that Lot 503 compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
be valued at P80,000.00 and Lot 505 valued at interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband
P100,000.00. cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
o The P36,000.00 contribution of Leonila shall be conjugal partnership without the wife's consent…
applied to the 503 property which upon full
payment of the remaining balance of This article shall not apply to property acquired by the
P44,000.00 advanced by Florinda shall belong conjugal partnership before the effective date of this
to Leonila. On the other hand, of Florinda’s Code.
P144,000.00 contribution, P 100,000.00 shall
be considered as full payment for the purchase ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within
of the 505 property and the P44,000.00 which ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts
was the balance of the purchase price of Lot for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered
503, as loan to Leonila. into without her consent, when such consent is required,
o To secure payment of the loan, Lot 503 was or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
provisionally registered in the name of defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
petitioners. Hence Lot 503 was at the outset not partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this
intended to be part of the conjugal asset of the right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
petitioners but only as a security for the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently
payment of the P44,000.00 due from
alienated by the husband. (Emphasis supplied.)
respondents.
 Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and
 Moreover, while Florinda’s husband did not affix his
Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal property
signature to the above-mentioned Agreement, we find no to be valid.
ground to disturb the uniform findings of the trial court and
o In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera
appellate court that Renato, by his actuations, agreed and was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold
gave his conformity to the Agreement. the lot and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale
o As found by the courts below, Renato’s consent on May 13, 1992.
to the Agreement was drawn from the fact that o Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino
he was present at the time it was signed by the is annullable at Elisera's instance, during the
sisters and their witnesses; he had knowledge marriage and within ten years from the
of the Agreement as it was presented to him for transaction questioned, conformably with
his signature, although he did not sign the same Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely
because his wife Florinda insisted that her questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case
signature already carried that of her husband; No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten
Renato witnessed the fact that Leonila years from the date of sale and execution of the
contributed her hard earned savings in the deed.
amount of P36,000.00 to complete their share
 Petitioners finally contend that, assuming arguendo the
in the purchase price of the properties in
property is still conjugal, the transaction should not be
question in the total amount of P180,000.00.
entirely voided as Florentino had one-half share over the
The aforesaid factual findings of the courts
lot. Petitioners' stance lacks merit.
below are beyond review at this stage.
o In Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares
citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., a case involving
WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA,
the annulment of sale executed by the husband
petitioners, vs. FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG,
without the consent of the wife, it was held that
respondents. the alienation must be annulled in its entirety
G.R. No. 159889 | June 5, 2008 (2D) and not only insofar as the share of the wife in
the conjugal property is concerned. Although
Facts: the transaction in the said case was declared
 Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married void and not merely voidable, the rationale for
sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in the annulment of the whole transaction is the
fact since 1975. same. Thus:
 During their marriage, they acquired a lot, one-half of o The plain meaning attached to the plain
which was later sold by Florentino to petitioners. language of the law is that the contract, in its
 Shortly after their last installment payment, petitioners entirety, executed by the husband without the
demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife.
sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a Had Congress intended to limit such annulment
deed of sale. in so far as the contract shall "prejudice" the
 Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title wife, such limitation should have been spelled
with Damages. Petitioners also filed with the RTC a out in the statute. It is not the legitimate concern
Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages. Upon of this Court to recast the law.
proper motion, the RTC consolidated these two cases.
 Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, petitioner, vs. NORMA
Sale in favor of petitioners. FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA,
 RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of absolute respondents.
sale. CA affirmed the RTC's decision. G.R. No. 147978 | January 23, 2002 (1D)

Issue: W/N the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent valid Facts:

126 of 255 | P a g e
 Petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the
across an advertisement placed by respondents, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the newspaper part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
BULLETIN TODAY for the sale of their ten-door may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal. acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
 As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
RTC, she met with respondent spouses and made a offerors. (Underscoring ours.)
definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto  The properties subject of the contracts in this case were
Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective,
respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real the consent of both husband and wife must concur.
estate broker. This agreement was handwritten by  Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her
petitioner and signed by Edilberto. written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent
 When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of
the real estate broker at Edilberto's office for the formal the subject properties, which she denied, her written
affixing of Norma's signature, she was surprised when consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.
respondent spouses informed her that they were backing Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused
out of the agreement because they needed "spot cash" to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have
for the full amount of the consideration. Petitioner been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their
reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a
had already been duly perfected and Norma's refusal to transaction is not consent.
sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still,  Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma
Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts to
to file a complaint for specific performance and damages sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the Family
against respondent spouses before the RTC to compel Code is warranted.
respondent Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell. o The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is
 The trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing correct insofar as she alleges that if the written
the complaint on the ground that under Art. 124 of the consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained
Family Code, the court cannot intervene to authorize the or is being withheld, the matter may be brought
transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife since to court which will give such authority if the
said wife who refused to give consent had not been same is warranted by the circumstances.
shown to be incapacitated. However, it should be stressed that court
 Petitioner, thus, elevated the case to the Court of authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to
Appeals: in cases where the spouse who does not give
o The Court of Appeals explained that the consent is incapacitated.
properties subject of the contracts were o In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove
conjugal properties and as such, the consent of that respondent Norma was incapacitated to
both spouses is necessary to give effect to the give her consent to the contracts. In the
sale. Since private respondent Norma Camaisa absence of such showing of the wife's
refused to sign the contracts, the sale was incapacity, court authorization cannot be
never perfected. In fact, the downpayment was sought.
returned by respondent spouses and was
TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, petitioner, vs. GILDA L. JARDELEZA,
accepted by petitioner. The Court of Appeals
ERNESTO L. JARDELEZA, JR., MELECIO GIL L. JARDELEZA,
also stressed that the authority of the court to
and GLENDA L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
allow sale or encumbrance of a conjugal
property without the consent of the other G.R. No. 112014 | December 5, 2000 (1D)
spouse is applicable only in cases where the
said spouse is incapacitated or otherwise Facts:
unable to participate in the administration of the  Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were
conjugal property. married long before 03 August 1988, when the Family
Code took effect.
Issue: W/N the properties subject of the contracts herein were  Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered a
conjugal properties and as such, the consent of both spouses is stroke and lapsed into comatose condition. To date, his
necessary to give effect to the sale condition has not materially improved.
 Petitioner then commence with RTC a petition for
Held: Yes appointment of judicial guardian over the person and
 The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. and prayed for the issuance
property by the husband as administrator in appropriate of letters of guardianship to his mother, Gilda L. Jardeleza
cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise,  Petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the
the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family issuance of letters of guardianship to him, rather than to
Code provides: his mother, on the ground that she considered the
property acquired by Dr. Jardeleza as her own and did not
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the want to be appointed guardian.
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both  Respondents filed with the trial court an opposition to the
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's petition for guardianship and the motion for issuance of
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by letters of guardianship to petitioner.
the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of  The trial court issued an order dismissing the petition for
within five years from the date of the contract guardianship.
implementing such decision. o The petition is superfluous and would only
serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise the explicit provisions of Article 124, second
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal paragraph, of the Family Code.
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of  Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out
administration. These powers do not include the powers that the Court of Appeals held in a case under Article 124
of disposition or encumbrance which must have the of the Family Code where the incapacitated spouse is
authority of the court or the written consent of the other incapable of being notified or unable to answer the
127 of 255 | P a g e
petition, the procedural recourse is guardianship of the property due to illness that had rendered him
incapacitated spouse. comatose, the proper remedy was the
 The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration appointment of a judicial guardian of the person
finding it unmeritorious. Hence, this petition. or estate or both of such incompetent, under
Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of
Issue: W/N Article 124 of the Family Code renders "superfluous" the Court. Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such
appointment of a judicial guardian over the person and estate of an a petition for judicial guardianship.
incompetent married person  Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

Held: ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the


 Very recently, in a related case, we ruled that Article 124 conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
of the Family Code was not applicable to the situation of spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the proper procedure decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
was an application for appointment of judicial guardian the wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of
under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. within five years from the date of the contract
 WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition. (See next implementing such decision.
case)
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents administration. These powers do not include the powers
G.R. No. 109557 | November 29, 2000 (1D) of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other
Facts: spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
 Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
his parents, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza and Gilda L. Jardeleza, transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
private respondent filed a petition of guardianship of Dr. part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
 Teodoro averred therein that the present physical and acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
him from competently administering his properties, and in offerors. (165a).
order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the  In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial
Jardelezas’ real and personal assets, there was a need proceedings under the Family Code govern the
for a court-appointed guardian to administer said proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code.
properties. o The situation contemplated is one where the
 Respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza then herself filed a spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has
petition, regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto abandoned the other or consent is withheld or
Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of cannot be obtained.
administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to o Such rules do not apply to cases where the
sell the same. non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent.
 RTC found that Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly
o In this case, the trial court found that the subject
incapacitated to participate in the administration of the
spouse "is an incompetent" who was in
conjugal properties, and that the sale of a conjugal lot and
comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim
the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the
of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without
mounting expenses for treatment and Hospitalization.
motor and mental faculties, and with a
The said court also made the pronouncement that the
diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case,
petition filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was "pursuant to Article
the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
124 of the Family Code, and that the proceedings thereon proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised
are governed by the rules on summary proceedings Rules of Court.
sanctioned under Article 253 of the same Code x x x.
 Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial
 Gilda Jardeleza disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 proceedings under the Family Code may apply to the
and all its improvements to her daughter, Ma. Glenda wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law
Jardeleza Uy. provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of
 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion for administration has the same powers and duties as a
approval of the deed of sale. This was denied by the lower guardian under the Rules of Court.
court.
 Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property
 On appeal, CA promulgated its decision reversing the as such administrator of the conjugal property must
appealed decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate
the special proceedings to approve the deed of sale, required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964
which was also declared void. Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code.
Issue: W/N Petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto
 In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the
Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident,
procedure under the Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and
trial court did not even observe the requirements of the
could not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article
Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to
124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its
the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show
improvements
cause why the petition should not be granted.
 Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an
Held: No
opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial
 The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. court is void for lack of due process.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the procedural rules on summary
o The doctrine consistently adhered to by this
proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code
Court is that a denial of due process suffices to
are not applicable.
cast on the official act taken by whatever
o Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was unable to take branch of the government the impress of nullity.
care of himself and manage the conjugal
128 of 255 | P a g e
sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses.
Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners, vs. The fact remains that such contract was entered into
COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA COPUZ, respondents. without the wife's consent.
G.R. No. 125172 | June 26, 1998 (1D)
MELANIA A. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
Facts: APPEALS and ANTONIO M. CAYETANO, respondents.
 Over the objection of private respondent and while she G.R. No. 92245| June 26, 1991 (2D)
was in Manila seeking employment, her husband, Junie
Corpuz, sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their Facts:
conjugal property, consisting of their residence and the lot  Petitioner discovered that her estranged husband,
on which it stood. defendant Antonio S. Roxas, had entered into a contract
 Private respondent then filed an Amended Complainant of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano covering a
against her husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioner- portion of their conjugal lot.
Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang, seeking the  Due to the illegal lease contract entered into between the
declaration of the deed of sale, which involved the herein defendants and the resultant unlawful deprivation
conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, of petitioner from operating her own legitimate business
null and void. on the same lot of which she is a conjugal owner, plaintiff
 The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Gilda. has been compelled to seek redress and ventilate her
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the grievance to the court.
Court of Appeals, which however, affirmed the lower  Defendant Antonio M. Cayetano moved to dismiss the
court’s decision. complaint on the sole ground that the complaint states no
cause of action.
Issue: W/N CA erred in finding no reversible error in the trial court's  Respondent judge dismissed the complaint. Petitioner
ruling that any alienation or encumbrance by the husband of the directly appealed the Decision of the lower court to the
conjugal propety without the consent of his wife is null and void as Supreme Court. The Court referred the case to CA.
provided under Article 124 of the Family Code Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment
affirming in toto the Order of the trial court.
Held: No  Hence, this petition.
 The contract entered into herein falls within the ambit of
Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly Issue: W/N a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal
applied by the lower court: partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease involving
conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the wife
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnerhip properly shall belong to both spouses Held: No
jointly. In case of disgreement, the husband's decision  Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art. 165. The husband
shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the wife for is the administrator of the conjugal partnership," in view of
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years the fact that the husband is principally responsible for the
from the date of the contract implementing such decision. support of the wife and the rest of the family. If the
conjugal partnership does not have enough assets, it is
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise the husband's capital that is responsible for such support,
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal not the paraphernal property. Responsibility should carry
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of authority with it.
administration. These powers do not include the powers  The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while a
of disposition or encumbrance which must have the mere administrator has no right to dispose of, sell, or
authority of the court or the written consent of the other otherwise alienate the property being administered, the
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the husband can do so in certain cases allowed by law. He is
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the not required by law to render an accounting. Acts done
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the under administration do not need the prior consent of the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and wife.
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the  However, administration does not include acts of
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the ownership. For while the husband can administer the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or
offerors. (165a) (Emphasis supplied) encumber the conjugal realty. Thus, under Art. 166 of
 Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the NCC "unless the wife has been declared a non-compos
Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained the mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is
amendatory effect of the above provision in this wise: confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her
encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we consent, the court may compel her to grant the same."
compare the same with the equivalent provision of the o This rule prevents abuse on the part of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the Civil husband, and guarantees the rights of the wife,
Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or who is partly responsible for the acquisition of
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnershit the property, particularly the real property.
without the wife's consent. The alienation or Contracts entered into by the husband in
encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It violation of this prohibition are voidable and
is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action subject to annulment at the instance of the
to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code)
provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the  The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a lease is
Philippines. an encumbrance and/or alienation within the scope of Art.
 Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the 166 of the New Civil Code.
intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in  Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of
the execution of the document embodying the amicable things, one of the parties binds himself to give to another
settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for
barangay authorities made her sign said document a period which may be definite or indefinite. However, no
through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event, its lease for more than ninety-nine years shall be valid."
execution does not alter the void character of the deed of Under the law, lease is a grant of use and possession: it
129 of 255 | P a g e
is not only a grant of possession as opined by the Court unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct  failed
of Appeals. The right to possess does not always include to exercise due diligence in the performance of her
the right to use. For while the bailee in the contract of function as a notary public and to comply with the
deposit holds the property in trust, he is not granted by requirements of the law.
law the right to make use of the property in deposit.  IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
 In the case at bar, the allegation in paragraph 2 of the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
complaint indicates that petitioner's estranged husband, ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial dissolution herein is valid
defendant Antonio S. Roxas had entered into a contract HELD: NO.
of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano without her  Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership
marital consent being secured as required by law under without judicial approval is void
Art. 166 of the Civil Code. Petitioner, therefore, has a  A notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case for annulment marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of
of the contract of lease entered into without her consent. the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
Petitioner has a cause of action not only against her partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this
husband but also against the lessee, Antonio M. casevphi1
Cayetano, who is a party to the contract of lease.  We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-
time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with
the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract.
Section 6. Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership Regime Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who
(Articles 126-128); - Collection Suits Against the Partnership; notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña’s
Death of Spouse negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that
a notary public is personally responsible for the entries in
Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates: his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; any member of his staff.
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage ALAIN M. DIÑO,petitioner vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, respondent
under Articles 134 to 138 (175a) G.R. No. 178044 | January 19, 2011 (2D)

Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not FACTS
affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:  Alain and Caridad started living together in 1984 until they
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live decided to separate in 1994
therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;  1996: petitioner and respondent decided to live together
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other again  14 Jan 1998, they were
is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a  30 May 2001: petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
summary proceeding; Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the psychological incapacity
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the  Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a divorce of her marriage with petitioner in the US which
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or was granted on 25 May 2001; also learned that on 5 Oct
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and 2001, respondent married Manuel Alcantara
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)  RTC granted the petition on the ground that respondent
was psychologically incapacited thereby dissolving ACP
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails and that the decree of annulment shall only be issued
to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved upon compliance with Art 50 and 51 of FC
spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation  Petitioner filed MFR questioning the dissolution of ACP
of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be
conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary issued upon compliance with Art 50 and 51 of FC
conditions as the court may impose.  RTC partially granted the motion: Decree of nullity of
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
refer to marital, parental or property relations. distribution of the parties’ properties under Art 147 of FC
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she ISSUE: WON a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three properties under Art 147 of FC
months or has failed within the same period to give any information HELD: NO.
as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have  Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City: in a void
no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (167a, 191a) marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO, petitioners either by Art 147 or Art 148 of FC
vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, respondent  Art 147 applies to union of parties who are legally
A.C. No. 9081 | October 12, 2011 (2D) capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
Facts: marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such
 Complainants alleged that Espinosa and his wife Elena as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
Marantal sought Omaña’s legal advice on whether they  For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage elements must be present: 1. The man and the woman
 Omaña then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live
Ng Paghihiwalay” exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3.
 Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage is void.
marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions.  All these elements are present in this case and there is no
However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
children and took possession of most of the property they property relations between petitioner and respondent.
acquired during their union.  RTC erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
 Omaña denied that she prepared the contract marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition
 IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and distribution of the parties’ properties under Art 147 of
of CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
130 of 255 | P a g e
FC  no basis because Sec 19(1) of the Rule does not appears to have been made, contracted or registered in
apply to cases governed under Art 147 and 148 of FC  the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
Sec 19(1) of the Rule: If the court renders a decision conjugal unless the contrary is proved."  Being
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the conjugal, the RTC concluded that the disputed property
decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be may not be validly encumbered by Florencia without
issued by the court only after compliance with Art 50 and Nicholson’s consent.
51 of FC as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation,  CA affirmed RTC, except for the award therein of moral
Partition and Distribution of Properties. damages and attorney’s fees
 Article 50: The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), ISSUE: WON subject property is conjugal by applying Art 116 of FC
(4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply HELD: YES.
in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab  While Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the
initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the
45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its
the spouses, the custody and support of the common theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, presumed, there must be a showing that the property was
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. Contrary
judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well to Metrobank’s submission, the Court did not add the
as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership matter of the use of conjugal funds as an essential
shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the requirement for the presumption of conjugal ownership to
partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is arise. THUS only proof of acquisition during the marriage
situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the is needed to raise the presumption that the property is
provisions of Articles 102 and 129. conjugal.
 It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section  Castro v. Miat: Article 160 "all property of the marriage is
19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n]
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article This article does not require proof that the property was
50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption
are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family applies even when the manner in which the property was
Code, which should be declared void without waiting for acquired does not appear.”
the liquidation of the properties of the parties.  On Metrobank’s argument that the registration of the
 In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was property in the name of "Florencia Nevalga, married to
declared void under Art 36 of the Family Code and not Nelson Pascual" operates to describe only the marital
under Art 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of status of the title holder, but not as proof that the property
properties owned in common by petitioner and was acquired during the existence of the marriage 
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. THUS proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is
a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner vs. presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent is no showing as to when the property was acquired by
G.R. No. 163744 | February 29, 2008 (2D) the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the
spouse is an indication that the property belongs
FACTS exclusively to said spouse
 Respondent Nicholson and Florencia were married on
Jan 19, 1985 LOREA DE UGALDE, petitioner vs. JON DE YSASI, respondent
 During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito G.R. No. 130623 | February 29, 2008 (2D)
and Belen Sering a lot with apartment in Makati City 
Subsequently, TCT was issued in the name of Florencia, FACTS
"married to Nelson Pascual"  15 Feb 1951: Lorea and Jon got married before Municipal
 Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of Judge
marriage  RTC granted the same on the ground of  1 Mar 1951: church wedding  Petitioner and respondent
psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson and did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement and had a
ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses’ son named Jon de Ysasi III.
CPG  Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April
 Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate 1957
ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership  26 May 1964: respondent allegedly contracted another
 Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith  Petitioner further
Oliveros, obtained a P58M loan from Metrobank  REMs alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring
were executed as collateral, including one involving the and disposing of real and personal properties to her
subject lot prejudice as the lawful wife
 Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros  12 Dec 1984: petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of
to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank CPG against respondent; also prayed for a monthly
initiated foreclosure proceedings  At the auction sale support of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in CPG
Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder  Respondent countered: he and petitioner entered into an
 Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson agreement which provided, among others, that their CPG
filed a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957  the CFI
the disputed property  alleged that the property, which approved the Amicable Settlement on 6 June 1961;
is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his further alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce
consent from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico and that
 RTC declared REM on the property covered as null and Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with
void and ordered Metrobank and Florencia jointly and Richard Galoway and a third marriage with Frank
severally to pay plaintiff damages  Even as it declared Scholey.
the invalidity of the mortgage, RTC found the said lot to  RTC dismissed the petition: ruled that the existence of a
be conjugal, the same having been acquired during the CPG is predicated on a valid marriage. Considering that
existence of the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia. the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
Thus invoking Art. 116 of FC, providing that "all property solemnized without a marriage license, the marriage was
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
131 of 255 | P a g e
null and void, and no community of property was formed  Petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari assailing
between them. the trial court's denial of her MTD
 CA affirmed RTC: ruled that the absence of a marriage  CA denied the petition
license is fatal and made the marriage between petitioner ISSUE: WON respondent's petition for appointment as sole
and respondent a complete nullity; further the administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her
compromise agreement is a valid contract between the husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against
parties Since it was entered into freely, voluntarily, and petitioner.
with the full understanding of its consequences, it is HELD: NO.
conclusive and binding on the parties  A cause of action (COA) is an act or omission of one party
ISSUE: WON the action for dissolution of CPG herein was validly the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other
dismissed.  Elements of COA are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
HELD: YES. whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
 The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order resulted in the created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
dissolution of the petitioner and respondent's CPG defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3)
 The applicable law at the time of their marriage was the an act or omission on the part of such defendant in
Civil Code  Pursuant to Art 119 of CC, the property violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
regime of petitioner and respondent was CPG of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which
 Art 142 of CC defines CPG: By means of CPG the the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of  Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is
their separate property and the income from their work or sought against petitioner  causes of action were all
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the against her husband.
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits  1st COA: for judicial appointment of respondent as
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute
marriage. community property arising from her marriage to Alberto
 Art 175 of CC: CPG terminates: (1) Upon the death of  Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action.
either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal  Art 128 of FC refers only to spouses: If a spouse w/o just
separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled; (4) In case cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or
of judicial separation of property under Article 191. her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
 The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order approving the petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation
parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of
of CPG in accordance with Art 175 the conjugal partnership property
 Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve  The administration of the property of the marriage is
the Compromise Agreement because the case was for entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other
custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto is her husband.
parties, as also required under Article 191 of the Civil Therefore, her COA is against Alberto. There is no right-
Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise duty relation between petitioner and PR that can possibly
Agreement on this ground. A judgment upon a support a cause of action.
compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any  2nd COA: for an accounting "by respondent husband" 
other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an
and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are incident of marriage.
not parties to it.  PR's alternative COA is for forfeiture of Alberto' share in
the co-owned property acquired during his illicit
IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, relationship and cohabitation with petitioner and for the
respondent "dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between
G.R. No. 138497 | January 16, 2002 (1D) Alberto and the respondent
FACTS PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO
 Sept15, 1993: PR filed a petition for "APPOINTMENT AS G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G.
SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP JARING, respondents
OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.," against Alberto G.R. No. 134100 | September 29, 2000 (2D)
Lopez, impleading herein petitioner  alleged that
sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally FACTS
married to PR, abandoned the latter and their 4 legitimate  Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a fishpond in Bataan for
children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive a period of five years ending on Sept 12, 1990
control and administration of the conjugal properties,  June 19, 1987: he subleased the fishpond, for the
spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit; remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and
that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios
maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein Manuel for a stipulated amount of rent at P485,600
petitioner since 1976 payable in two installments of P300K and P185,600
 In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father  The first installment was duly paid, but of the second
and husband, he excluded the private respondent and installment, the sublessees only satisfied a portion
their four children from sharing or benefiting from the thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600
conjugal properties and the income or fruits there from.  Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with
As such, defendant Lopez either did not place them in his their obligation  PR sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses
name or otherwise removed, transferred, stashed away or for the collection of the said
concealed them from the private-respondent. He placed  Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the
substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed
name of petitioner Relucio.1âwphi1.nêt away  RTC denied petitioner's motion on the ground
 Dec 8, 1993: MTD the Petition was filed by herein that since petitioner was herself a party to the sublease
petitioner on the ground that private respondent has no contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit
cause of action against her together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of
 RTC denied petitioner Relucio's MTD on the ground that her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the
she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party case
because some of the subject properties are registered in  RTC ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay
her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name PR the unpaid balance of P50,600 plus attorney's fees

132 of 255 | P a g e
 CA dismissed her appeal. It held: The rule that an action
for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be FACTS
dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment  Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women
in the regional trial court, does not apply where there are and fathered fifteen children  first wife is herein
other defendants against whom the action should be petitioner, whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo
maintained.  1980: petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial
ISSUE: WON creditor may file a collection of sum of money suit separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier
against herein surviving spouse. action for support,
HELD: NO.  RTC: holds that Prima was legally married to Jo, and, is
 A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent entitled to support as the lawfully wedded wife  no
in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of definite disposition of the complaint for judicial separation
money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and of conjugal property
that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the  CA affirmed RTC in the complaint for support
settlement of estate of the decedent  The complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property
 Petitioner's husband died on Dec 1, 1988, more than ten was dismissed for lack of a cause of action and on the
months before PR filed the collection suit  Under the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by
law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) Article 178 of the Civil Code  dismissed the complaint
is one which is chargeable against their conjugal on the ground that the separation of the parties was due
partnership to their agreement and not because of abandonment;
 Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is relied mainly on the testimony of the petitioner, who
liable for ¾  All debts and obligations contracted by the declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and she and Jo were living together "because that was our
those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, agreement."  agreement to live separately without just
in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. cause was void under Art 221 of the Civil Code and could
 When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal not sustain any claim of abandonment by the aggrieved
partnership was automatically dissolved and debts spouse THUS, fo r CA, the only remedy availabe to the
chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of petitioner was legal separation under Article 175 of the
estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73 Civil Code, 4 by virtue of which the conjugal partnership of
 Calma v. Tañedo: after the death of either of the spouses, property would be terminated.
no complaint for the collection of indebtedness ISSUE: WON the order of judicial separation of conjugal property
chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be herein is proper.
brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim HELD: YES.
must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and  Petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code: The
settlement of the conjugal property BECAUSE upon the separation in fact between H&W w/o judicial approval,
death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that: (3) If
surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the H has abandoned W w/o just cause for at least 1 year,
administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction she may petition the court for a receivership, or
over the settlement of estate proceedings THUS the administration by her of the conjugal partnership property
surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such or separation of property.
that conveyances made by him of any property belonging  This has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family
to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of Code: If a spouse w/o just cause abandons the other or
conjugal partnership property is void.12 fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the
 Reaffirmed by Ventura v. Militante: Where a complaint is aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership,
brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of for judicial separation of property, of for authority to be the
an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property,
partnership, any judgment obtained thereby is void. The subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may
proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed impose.
in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased  A spouse is deemed to have abondoned the other when
spouse. he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any
 THUS, even after the death of one of the spouses, there intention of returning. The spouse who has left the
is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has
mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. failed within the same period to give any information as to
And PR cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to
Rule 78 of ROC, he may apply in court for letters of have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the  THUS, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
deceased . . . if after 30 days from his death, petitioner separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abondonment
failed to apply for administration or request that by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure
administration be granted to some other person. of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the
 It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules family without just cause, even if she said spouse does
of CPG, an obligation entered into by the husband and not leave the other spouse.
wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and  Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the
it is the partnership which is primarily bound for its avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged
repayment. Thus, when the spouses are sued for the absence without just cause, and without in the meantime
enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they providing in the least for one's family although able to do
are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations,
of the conjugal partnership and not as independent duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, separation.
as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the  As early as 1942, the private respondent had already
contrary to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their
this case, as will be discussed later, is not solidary but conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned
rather merely joint. from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted
by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover,
OF APPEALS and HO HANG (with aliases JOSE JO and beginning 1968 until the determination by this Court of the
CONSING), respondents action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused
G.R. No. 82606 | December 18, 1992 (1D) to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical
133 of 255 | P a g e
separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the
private respondent to give support to the petitioner, Art. 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person
judicial separation of their conjugal property. before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the
 In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second respective capital, fruits and income of each partnership shall be
ground allowed by Article 128, for the fact is that he has determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the
failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the
the family as husband or parent. Apart form refusing to existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the
admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete different partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of
City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other each. (189a)
women and siring many children by them
 Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 Art. 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of
of the Family Code: Any of the following shall be deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale of
considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are
property: (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse not expressly determined in this Chapter. (187a)
have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable. Art. 133. From the common mass of property support shall be given
to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of
Section 7. Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets & the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered;
Liabilities (Articles 129-133); Succession; Probate Section 3 but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support
Rule 87; See also Articles 147, 148, FC; Section 2, Rule 73 which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. (188a)

Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
the following procedure shall apply: each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
of each spouse. property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
by law in the conjugal partnership. to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said the household.
assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
paragraph (2) of Article 121. common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses of their cohabitation.
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was the cohabitation. (144a)
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been
a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Code. Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51. owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of money and evidences of credit.
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
children. (181a, 182a, 183a, 184a, 185a) acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall
be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal preceding Article.
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
the settlement of the estate of the deceased. parties are in both faith. (144a)
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either RULE 87
judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the Actions By and Against Executors and Administrators
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no Section 3. Heir may not sue until shall assigned — When an
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the executor or administrator is appointed and assumes the trust, no
conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be action to recover the title or possession of lands or for damages
void. done to such lands shall be maintained against him by an heir or
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage devisee until there is an order of the court assigning such lands to
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory such heir or devisee or until the time allowed for paying debts has
regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property expired.
relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
134 of 255 | P a g e
applicable only as between the representatives of the
Settlement Of Estate Of Deceased Persons estate and strangers thereto
RULE 73  Bacquial v. Amihan: The rulings of this court have always
Venue and Process been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the
Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons
When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are
the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and allowed to do so protect the same, but not for a decision
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate on their action  A court which takes cognizance of
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the testate or intestate proceedings has power and
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties
proceedings of either. included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie
to the deceased, although such a determination is not
LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO, petitioners final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO and right of interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the
VITTORIO C. ROMERO, respondents question on the ownership or existence of the right or
G.R. No. 188921 | April 18, 2012 (2D) credit.
FACTS  Not only do petitioners assert their legal interest as
 Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death on 18 Oct compulsory heirs, they also seek to be the owners, pro
1974, their mother, Aurora Romero, was appointed as indiviso, of the said properties  arguing that the
legal guardian  Since that year until the present, she properties are conjugal in nature and hence form part of
continues to be the administrator of the properties, their inheritance
businesses, and investments comprising the estate of her  Bernardo v. CA: the determination of whether a property
late husband is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes of inclusion in the
 2006: petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that inventory of the estate rests with the probate court  The
several Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a
land that are purportedly conjugal properties of their deceased person regarding the ownership of properties
parents alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be
 Petitioners claim that sometime in August of 2005, their vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose
brother Vittorio – through fraud, misrepresentation and of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the
duress – succeeded in registering the above-mentioned estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and
properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale executed legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the
by their mother, Aurora assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and
 18 Dec 2006: petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment expenses. Thereafter, distribution is made of the
of Sale, Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of Title decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled
against PR to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an
 Respondents filed their Answer, arguing that the action of partition, in which each party is required to bring
properties in question were acquired long after the death into the mass whatever community property he has in his
of their father hence, the properties cannot be considered possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the
conjugal interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the
ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who
 RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint: case remains
take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are
pending in that no distribution of the assets of the estate
before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in
of the late Romero, nor a partition, has been effected
all matters and incidents necessary to the complete
among his compulsory heirs
settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third
 CA rendered dismissed the Petition, ruling that the
parties are affected.
properties involved in this case are part of the estate of
 Herein, petitioners assume that the properties subject of
Judge Romero, the partition of which is already subject of
the allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part
an intestate proceeding filed on 6 Jan 1976
of their share in the estate. To date, there has been no
 Petitioners: the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate
final inventory of the estate or final order adjudicating the
or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with
shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can
the settlement of the estate but does not extend to the
competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal
determination of questions of ownership that arise during
and form part of the estate. It is only the probate court that
the proceedings
can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the
same to the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been
ISSUE WON the probate court has jurisdiction as to the liquidation
paid.
of the CPG.
LUCIANO P. PAZ, petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
HELD YES.
PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF
 GR  the question as to title to property should not be ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, PUBLIC
passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding; it ESTATES AUTHORITY, FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT
should be ventilated in a separate action CORPORATION, and FILINVEST ALABANG, INC., respondents
 XPN  if the interested parties are all heirs, or the G.R. No. 157367 | November 23, 2011 (1D)
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate FACTS
court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then  Nov 29, 2000: Petitioner brought a petition for the
the probate court is competent to decide the question of cancellation of OCT  averred that the petitioner was the
ownership owner of land with total area of 143,102,167 square
 Here, the probate court had already received evidence on meters; that OCT No. 684 was registered in the name of
the ownership of the subject propertyn during the hearing the Republic; that FDC and FAI developed said lot into a
of the motion for its exclusion from (the) inventory  The subdivision; and that the subdivision lots were then sold
only interested parties are the heirs who have all to third parties  prayed that RD be ordered to issue a
appeared in the intestate proceeding new certificate of title in the name of Luciano P. Paz,
 While it is true that a probate court’s determination of married to Elvira Joson
ownership over properties which may form part of the  FDC and FAI filed MTD: The serious and controversial
estate is not final or ultimate in nature, this rule is dispute spawned by the Petition for cancellation of title is
litigable in an ordinary action outside the special and
135 of 255 | P a g e
limited jurisdiction of land registration courts. The Petition fall under any of the situations covered by Section 108,
is thus removed from the ambit of Sec. 108 of the Property and was for that reason rightly dismissed.
Registration Decree which requires, as an indispensable
element for availment of the relief thereunder, either THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA,
unanimity of the parties or absence of serious controversy namely: LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO,
or adverse claim. It authorizes only amendment and BEVERLY ANN LORRAINNE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA
alteration of certificates of title, not cancellation thereof; and ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, represented by LEONORA
 RTC granted FDC and FAI’s MTD  CA affirmed RTC B. GO, petitioners vs. ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO,
respondents
ISSUE WON petition herein is validly dismnissed. G.R. No. 15753 | September 7, 2011(1D)

HELD YES. FACTS


 Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529: Amendment and alteration  Feb 22, 1976: Jesus Gaviola sold two parcels of land to
of certificates. – No erasure, alteration, or amendment Protacio B. Go, Jr.
shall be made upon the registration book after the entry  Mar 29, 1999: Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of
of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under
the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, oath that it was his father, Protacio Sr. who had
except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A purchased the property
registered owner or other person having interest in the  Nov 25, 1987: Marta Barola Go, wife of Protacio, Sr. and
registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of mother of the petitioners, died.
Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land  Dec 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito Go (joined
Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the by Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property
ground that the registered interest of any description, with to Ester Servacio
whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate  Mar 2, 2001: petitioners demanded the return of the
appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; property, but Servacio refused to do so  petitioners
or that new interest not appearing upon the certificate sued Servacio and Rito for the annulment of the sale of
have arisen or been created; or that an omission or an the property: averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s
error was made in entering a certificate or any renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and
memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate: or that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior
that the same or any person in the certificate has been liquidation of the community property between Protacio,
changed or that the registered owner has married, or, if Sr. and Marta was null and void
registered as married, that the marriage has been  Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will exclusively owned the property because he had
thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned purchased it with his own money
registered land and has been dissolved has not yet  RTC: the property was the conjugal property of Protacio,
convened the same within three years after its dissolution; Sr. and Marta because there were three vendors in the
or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may sale to Servacio; that the participation of Rito and Dina as
hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late
in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in
new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a effect when the property was acquired, all property
memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief acquired by either spouse during the marriage was
upon such terms and conditions, requiring security and conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus
bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the
however, That this section shall not be construed to give wife; and that Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation was grossly
the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of insufficient to rebut the legal presumption. 
registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by Nonetheless, RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the
the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a property
purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith,
or his heirs and assigns without his or their written ISSUE WON the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void
consent. Where the owner’s duplicate certificate is not for being made without prior liquidation.
presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in
the preceding section. HELD NO.
 Based on the provision, the proceeding for the  Article 130 of the Family Code reads: Upon the
amendment and alteration of a certificate of title under termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 is applicable in seven partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
instances or situations, namely: (a) when registered proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is
expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b) instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal
when new interests have arisen or been created which do partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
not appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If
omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is
any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the
(d) when the name of any person on the certificate has conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage
been changed; (e) when the registered owner has been shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a
married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been subsequent marriage without compliance with the
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
thereby be affected; (f) when a corporation, which owned separation of property shall govern the property relations
registered land and has been dissolved, has not of the subsequent marriage.
conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution;  Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of
and (g) when there is reasonable ground for the the Family Code, viz: In case the future spouses agree in
amendment or alteration of title.8 the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
 CA and RTC are correct that the petitioner was in reality partnership of gains shall govern their property relations
seeking the reconveyance of the property, not the during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of
cancellation of a certificate of title as contemplated by supplementary application. The provisions of this Chapter
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, his petition did not shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this
136 of 255 | P a g e
Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, petitioner vs. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP,
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE
provided in Article 256. SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, respondents
 It is clear that CPG established before and after the G.R. No. 177099 | June 8, 2011 (2D)
effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules
found in Chapter 4 of Title IV of the Family Code  THUS SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, petitioner vs. EDUARDO G.
any disposition of CPG after the dissolution of CPG must AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER
be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, respondents
disposition is void. G.R. No. 177192
 Before applying such rules, however, CPG must be
subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. FACTS
There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were  Sept 15, 1994: Eduardo filed a verified petition for the
married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on Aug judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father
3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized Joaquin  alleged that Joaquin died intestate on Nov 21,
as one of CPG governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta’s 1964; During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two
death in 1987, CPG was dissolved and an implied marriages, first with Lucia Garcia and second with
ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and Caridad Garcia; Lucia died on April 24, 1924 (3 children);
the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the Joaquin married Caridad on Feb 9, 1926 (3 children)
assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation.  At the time of his death, Joaquin left 2 parcels of land with
The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was governed improvements  Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had
by Article 493 of the Civil Code, to wit: Each co-owner been leasing and improving the said realties and had
shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits been appropriating for himself P26K per month since April
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore 1994
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute  RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal administrator of Joaquin’s estate
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the  RTC then issued an Order of Partition: In the light of the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited filing by the heirs of their respective proposed projects of
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division partition and the payment of inheritance taxes due the
upon the termination of the co-ownership. estate as early as 1965, and there being no claim in Court
 Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his against the estate of the deceased, the estate of
children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now consequently – ripe – for
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any distribution among the heirs minus the surviving spouse
specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition Caridad Garcia who died on Aug 25, 1999. Considering
of the property being first done either by agreement or by that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during
judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or the existence of the second marriage, the greater part of
abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner the estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage
could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had and the compulsory heirs thereunder (with a total value of
the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided P14,177,500
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.  CA affirmed RTC
Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-
owners without the consent of the other co-owners was ISSUE WON payment of inheritance tax is sufficient ground for the
not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners issuance of an order of distribution of CPG
were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer
(Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. This result HELD NO.
conforms to the well-established principle that the binding  GR  the jurisdiction of RTC, either as a probate or an
force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with
possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
quantum valere potest).21 deceased persons, but does not extend to the
 Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides determination of questions of ownership that arise during
that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that
conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights such court merely exercises special and limited
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or jurisdiction  a probate court or one in charge of estate
other laws." This provision gives another reason not to proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
the property subject of the sale. from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
 From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co- deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do
owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the as regards said properties is to determine whether or not
entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the they should be included in the inventory of properties to
other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the be administered by the administrator. If there is no
rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the
making the buyer a co-owner of the property. parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have
 The proper action in cases like this is not for the to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising
nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession general jurisdiction for a final determination of the
of the thing owned in common from the third person who conflicting claims of title.
substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their  XPN  (1) the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from,
shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to
continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners the final determination of ownership in a separate action;
who possessed and administered it. (2) if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or
 Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co- the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
owners in cases where their consent were not secured in parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of probate court and the rights of third parties are not
the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve
action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of ROC. issues on ownership

137 of 255 | P a g e
 Herein, GR does not apply to the instant case considering benefits of P6,304.47  Consuegra did not designate any
that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights beneficiary THUS Rosario filed a claim  Basilia and her
of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the GSIS,
ownership issue asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life
 More importantly, the determination of whether the insurance policy of Consuegra, they are the only ones
subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the entitled to receive the retirement insurance benefits due
probate court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin  GSIS ruled that the legal heirs owere Rosario, who is
 Sec 2, Rule 73: when the marriage is dissolved by the entitled to one-half of the retirement insurance benefits,
death of the husband or the wife, the community property on the one hand; and Basilia are entitled to the remaining
shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the 1/2
debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings  Basilia and her children filed a petition for mandamus
of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, praying that they be declared the legal heirs and exclusive
the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate beneficiaries of the retirement insurance of the late Jose
or intestate proceedings of either  THUS RTC had Consuegra
jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are  RTC: "When two women innocently and in good faith are
conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal partnership to legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they
determine the estate of the decedent and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded
 Further, Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, does not as legitimate children and each family be entitled to one
settle the estate of a deceased person  Sec 1, Rule 90: half of the estate. Lao & Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739;
When order for distribution of residue made. -- When the Estrella vs. Laong Masa, Inc., (CA) 39 OG 79; Pisalbon
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, vs. Bejec, 74 Phil. 88.
the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have ISSUE WON Basilia and her children are the exclusive beneficiaries
been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or of the herein retirement insurance.
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and
after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the HELD NO.
estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them  The proceeds of the retirement insurance of the late Jose
and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, Consuegra should be divided equally between Rosario
and such persons may demand and recover their and Basilia and his children, it being accepted as a fact
respective shares from the executor or administrator, or that the second marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia
any other person having the same in his possession. If Berdin was contracted in good faith.
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the  Gomez vs. Lipana, L-23214, June 30, 1970: in construing
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the the rights of two women who were married to the same
distributive share to which each person is entitled under man — a situation more or less similar to the case of
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in appellant Basilia Berdin and appellee Rosario Diaz —
ordinary cases. No distribution shall be allowed until the held "that since the defendant's first marriage has not
payment of the obligations above mentioned has been been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share
such time as the court directs. in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
 THUS, an estate is settled and distributed among the Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
heirs only after the payment of the debts of the estate, subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an
funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to interest in the husband's share in the property here in
the widow, and inheritance tax. The records of these dispute.... " And with respect to the right of the second
cases do not show that these were complied with wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs. celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent. there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And
(2D) inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
GR No. 163744 | February 29, 2008 second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration
of its nullity, "[t]he only lust and equitable solution in this
BASILIA BERDIN VDA. DE CONSUEGRA; JULIANA, PACITA, case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to
MARIA LOURDES, JOSE, JR., RODRIGO, LINEDA and LUIS, all her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and
surnamed CONSUEGRA, petitioners vs. GOVERNMENT her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC the conjugal partnership of the first marriage."
HIGHWAYS, HIGHWAY DISTRICT ENGINEER OF SURIGAO
DEL NORTE, COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, and CHAPTER 5. SEPARATION OF PROP. OF THE SPOUSES &
ROSARIO DIAZ, respondents ADM. OF COMMON PROP. BY ONE SPOUSE DURING THE
G.R. No. L-28093 | January 30, 1971 (E) MARRIAGE (Articles 134-142)

FACTS Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage


 The late Jose Consuegra, at the time of his death, was settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the
employed as a shop foreman of the office of the District marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial
Engineer in the province of Surigao del Norte separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient
 In his lifetime, Consuegra contracted two marriages, (1) cause. (190a)
Rosario Diaz on July 15, 1937, out of which marriage
were born two children but both predeceased their father; Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
and (2) Basilia Berdin, on May 1, 1957, out of which for judicial separation of property:
marriage were born seven children. (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
 Being a member of GSIS, when Consuegra died on Sept penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
26, 1965, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an
the GSIS to Basilia and her children who were the absentee;
beneficiaries named in the policy. (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has
 Having been in the service of the government for 22.5028 been decreed by the court;
years, Consuegra was entitled to retirement insurance
138 of 255 | P a g e
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or CHAPTER 6. REGIME OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided (Articles 143-146)
for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage
marriage settlements has abused that power; and settlements that their property relations during marriage shall be
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions of
in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. this Chapter shall be suppletory. (212a)
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the
presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the
separation of property. (191a) property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute
community. (213a)
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court
for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer
conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the
common properties. consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural,
partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her
shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The separate property. (214a)
court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons
with pecuniary interest. (191a) Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion
to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the
Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the current market value of their separate properties.
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall,
liquidated in conformity with this Code. however, be solidary. (215a)
During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property,
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the CHAPTER 7. PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNIONS WITHOUT
support of the spouses and their children. (192a) MARRIAGE (Articles147-148) – See A.M. No. 92-11-10 SC; See
Articles 148, 256 (FC); Article 144 NCC
Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the
conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
property shall apply. (191a) each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
Art. 139. The petition for separation of property and the final and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper local property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
civil registries and registries of property. (193a) shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
Art. 140. The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
previously acquired by creditors. (194a) joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
Art. 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
decree reviving the property regime that existed between them efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
before the separation of property in any of the following instances: the household.
(1) When the civil interdiction terminates; Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
(2) When the absentee spouse reappears; her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
(3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
power of administration in the marriage settlements will not again of their cohabitation.
abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said administration; When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
(4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
decree of legal separation resumes common life with the other; in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
(5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
previously deprived thereof; share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
(6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
year, reconcile and resume common life; or party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
(7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of the cohabitation. (144a)
property or conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed upon
the joint petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of the Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
former property regime. No voluntary separation of property may Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
thereafter be granted. their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
Article 67. (195a) contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: money and evidences of credit.
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
civil interdiction; or acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
as an accused in a criminal case. preceding Article.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both
conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a parties are in both faith. (144a)
suitable person to be the administrator. (n)
Civil Code

139 of 255 | P a g e
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and properties acquired by both of the parties through their
wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
by the rules on co-ownership. (n) contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares
are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., petitioner vs. SPOUSES PAULINO presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
and EVANGELINE ABUDA, respondents evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married
G.R. No. 202932 | October 23, 2013 (2D) to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
FACTS: existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
 Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes were married on 9 bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share
June 1980  Although Socorro and Esteban never had shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
common children, both of them had children from prior paragraph of the preceding Article.
marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline  Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan
Abuda, and Socorro had a son, who was the father of the properties can be considered common property iFacts (1)
petitioner in this case these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban
 Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties
when she married Esteban  marriage was not annulled, were acquired through the parties’ actual joint contribution
and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro’s marriage to of money, property, or industry.
Esteban  The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by
 Esteban’s prior marriage, on the other hand, was Esteban alone  The phrase "married to Socorro Torres"
dissolved by virtue of his wife’s death in 1960 is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show
that Socorro co-owned the property.
 According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban
purchased a portion of a lot (Vitas property) remaining  The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired
portion was purchased by Evangeline on her father’s ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to
behalf sometime in 1970  TCT was issued to Esteban Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the
Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres celebration of the marriage. Registration under the
Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest
 Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and
Esteban operated small business establishments located title.
in Delpan  The Delpan property was acquired prior to the marriage
of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment of
 6 Sept 1997: Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan
the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by
properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda
Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her
According to Edilberto when Esteban was diagnosed
father.  Art. 1238 of CC: Payment made by a third
with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to sell
person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the
the Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline
debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the
 Esteban passed away on 11 Sept 1997, while Socorro
debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as
passed away on 31 July 1999
to the creditor who has accepted it.
 Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila, the mother of
 Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her
Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto,
father, and the parties intended that the Delpan property
represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of
would be owned by and registered under the name of
Deeds of Sale alleged that the sale of the properties was
Esteban.
fraudulent because Esteban’s signature on the deeds of
sale was forged.
JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., petitioner vs. EDEN VILLENA
 Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of AGUILA, respondent
Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent G.R. No. 202370 | September 23, 2013 (2D)
marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither
Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over FACTS:
the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents
 7 Sept 1985: Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. and respondent Eden
 RTC dismissed the petition: the marriage between Villena Aguila were married.
Socorro and Esteban was void from the beginning;
 1986: Salas left their conjugal dwelling  Since then, he
Accordingly, the Vitas and Delpan properties are not no longer communicated with Aguila or their daughter
conjugal, and are governed by Art 144 and 485 of CC;
 7 Oct 2003: Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for
of Marriage citing psychological incapacity  petition
the acquisition of the properties. Hence, she cannot be
states that they "have no conjugal properties whatsoever
considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any
 RTC rendered a Decision declaring the nullity of the
rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties.
marriage of Salas and Aguila and provides for the
 CA sustained the decision of the RTC but ruled that the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, if any
RTC should have applied Art 148 of FC, and not Art 144
 8 Feb 2008: Salas alleged that there is no conjugal
and 485 of CC; applied Saguid v. CA that Art 148 applies
property to be partitioned based on Aguila’s petition 
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property
Aguila’s statement was a judicial admission and was not
occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code
made through palpable mistake. Salas claimed that
 Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the
Aguila waived her right to the Discovered Properties
Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned
THUS the conjugal properties were deemed partitioned.
by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer
 RTC ruled in favor of Aguila: petitioner and the
Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or
respondent are hereby directed to partition between
several months after the parties were married; and (2) title
themselves
to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age,
 11 Nov 2008: Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention,
married to Socorro Torres."
claiming that: (1) she is Rubina Cortez, a widow and
unmarried to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her
ISSUE: WON the subject properties herein are conjugal in nature
paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did not contribute
HELD: NO. money to purchase the Discovered Properties as he had
no permanent job in Japan
 Article 148 of FC: In cases of cohabitation [wherein the
parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only the  CA affirmed RTC

140 of 255 | P a g e
ISSUE: WON there is co-ownership herein. of marriage and worked together as business partners,
HELD: YES. acquiring real properties amounting to P15.5M
 Respondent denied petitioner’s claim of cohabitation and
 Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were said that the properties were acquired out of his own
acquired by Salas during their marriage  TCTs of the personal funds without any contribution from petitioner
Discovered Properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and  RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and lack of merit  CA affirmed RTC: An action for partition
Aguila’s marriage may be seen to present simultaneously two principal
 Diño v. Diño: Art 147 of FC applies to the union of parties issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and,
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is second – assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family the first – the issue of how the property is to be divided
Code, as in this case. between plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the
 ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are court must initially settle the issue of ownership for the
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage divide the property without first making a determination as
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall to the existence of co-ownership. Until and unless the
be owned by them in equal shares and the property issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be
acquired by both of them through their work or industry premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the precisely what the trial court did when it discounted the
absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired merit in appellant’s claim of co-ownership.
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall ISSUE: WON action for partition is proper herein.
be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition HELD: YES.
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have  Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia: the determination as to
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the resolution of an action for partition  The first phase of a
family and of the household. Neither party can encumber partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally
common, without the consent of the other, until after the proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of
termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the all the parties interested in the property. This phase may
parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist,
favor of their common children. In case of default of or or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other
waiver by any or all of the common children or their hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent from the real estate in question is in order. The second
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon phase commences when it appears that "the parties are
termination of the cohabitation. unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court.
 Under this property regime, property acquired during the In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the
marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained court with the assistance of not more than 3
through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the commissioners. This second stage may well also deal
rules on co-ownership. with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval
 In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. by the court after the parties have been accorded
 THUS RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just
partnership of gains. share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question.
 While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for
partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner
insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate
BETTY B. LACBAYAN, petitioner vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR, properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs)
respondent covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains
G.R. No. 165427 | March 21, 2011 (3D) otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this
issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it
FACTS: would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed
 Despite respondent being already married, petitioner and properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even
respondent’s relationship developed until petitioner gave lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even
birth to respondent’s son on Oct 12, 1979 have any rightful interest over the subject properties.
 During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent,  As to whether respondent’s assent to the initial partition
together with three more incorporators, were able to agreement serves as an admission against interest, in
establish a manpower services company; 5 parcels of that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the
land were also acquired during the said period and were existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner,
registered in petitioner and respondent’s names, SC rules in the negative
ostensibly as husband and wife
 Eventually, they decided to part ways sometime in 1991. ALAIN M. DIÑO, Petitioner, vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO,
 1998: both parties agreed to divide the said properties Respondent. (2D)
and terminate their business partnership by executing a G.R. No. 178044 | January 19, 2011 (2D)
Partition Agreement.
 Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial
partition  averred that she and respondent started to live EDGAR SAN LUIS, peitioner vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit respondent
G.R. No. 133743 | February 6, 2007 (3D)
141 of 255 | P a g e
that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging
G.R. No. 134029 | February 6, 2007 to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
FACTS: contrary is proven.
 Settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis (former  Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both
gov of Laguna)  During his lifetime, Felicisimo the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
contracted 3 marriages: (1) Virginia Sulit on Mar 17, 1942 would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled
but Virginia predeceased Felicisimo; (2) May 1, 1968 the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
Merry Lee Corwin, but Merry Lee was able to secure a regulating the property relations of couples living together
divoce decree; and (3) June 20, 1974 Felicidad San Luis as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
 Respondent filed a petition for letters of administration   Saguid v. Court of Appeals: even if the cohabitation or the
alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal took effect, Article 148 governs  The regime of limited
spouse, his 6 children by his 1st marriage, and son by his co-ownership of property governing the union of parties
2nd marriage who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but
 Petitioner Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo by his who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
1st marriage, filed MTD on the ground of failure to state a applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
cause of action (respondent has no legal personality to proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership
file the petition because she was only a mistress of will only be up to the extent of the proven actual
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof
still legally married to Merry Lee) of the extent thereof, their contributions and
 RTC denied MTD: ruled that respondent, as widow of the corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition  Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which
 After the case was re-raffled, RTC dismissed the petition involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired
for letters of administration: respondent was without legal by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential.
thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent
not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who G.R. No. 152716 | October 23, 2003 (3D)
was a Filipino citizen
 CA reversed RTC: the marriage between Felicisimo and FACTS:
Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of  Mar 1983: petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with
absolute divorce; Therefore, under Art 130 of the Family respondent in the latter’s residence in Metro Manila  got
Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute married on Mar 14, 1985
the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of  In the meantime, they purchased on installment a
the deceased condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983
ISSUE: WON respondent has legal capacity to file the subject executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos
petition for letters of administration Commercial Corporation as the seller  Petitioner also
signed the contract as witness, using the name "Elna
HELD: YES. Mercado Fehr". Upon completion of payment, the title to
 Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to the condominium unit was issued in the name of
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, respondent has petitioner.
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters  Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired against respondent Bruno
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.  RTC declared the marriage void ab initio under Art 36 of
 Section 6, Rule 78 of ROC states that letters of FC and ordered the dissolution of their CPG
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of  RTC later issued an Order: finds the following properties
the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also to be excluded from the conjugal properties, namely: the
provides in part: A petition for letters of administration Bacolod property considering that the same is owned by
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as petitioner’s parents and Suite 204 of the LCG
far as known to the petitioner: Condominium covered considering that the same was
 An "interested person" has been defined as one who purchased on installment basis by respondent with his
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one exclusive funds prior to his marriage
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.  Petitioner filed MFR of said Order with respect to the
The interest must be material and direct, and not merely adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium  alleged
indirect or contingent. that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the
 In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an time when petitioner and respondent were living
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership
of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the should apply in accordance with Art 147 of FC
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to  RTC: since the marriage between petitioner and
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was respondent was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she ownership should apply in the liquidation and partition of
may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the the properties they own in common pursuant to Article
Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations 147 of the Family Code. The court, however, noted that
between parties who live together as husband and wife the parties have already agreed in principle to divide the
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof
from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired proportionately among them and their children as follows:
by either or both of them through their work or industry or 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent and 1/3 for the
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules children. It also affirmed its previous ruling that Suite 204
on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary
142 of 255 | P a g e
of LCG Condominium was acquired prior to the couple’s the petitioner  alleged that from her salary of
cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to respondent. 1,500/month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to
 CA affirmed RTC contribute P70K in the completion of their unfinished
house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and
ISSUE: WON Suite 204 of LCG Condominium forms part of fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate
community property of the parties. appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with
a total value of P111,375  prayed that she be declared
HELD: YES. the sole owner of these personal properties and that the
 In light of these facts, Suite 204 was acquired during the amount of P70K representing her contribution to the
parties’ cohabitation  Accordingly, under Art 147 of the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her
Family Code, said property should be governed by the  Petitioner claimed that the expenses for the construction
rules on co-ownership. of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a
 Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally captain of their fishing vessel.
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract  RTC decided in favor of PR: ordering the partition of the
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in house and directing petitioner to return and/or reimburse
the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership to PR the P70K which the latter actually contributed to its
with respect to the properties they acquire during their construction and completion; Declaring PR as the
cohabitation. exclusive owner of the personal
 Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City:  CA affirmed RTC
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man
and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry ISSUE: WON there is co-ownership herein.
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of HELD: YES.
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the  It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not
first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a capacitated to marry each other because the former was
party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the validly married to another man at the time of her
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the cohabitation with the latter.
impediments mentioned in Article 37 and 38" of the Code.  Their property regime therefore is governed by Art 148 of
Under this property regime, property acquired by both FC, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
spouses through their work and industry shall be relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any relationships where both man and woman are married to
property acquired during the union is prima facie other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married
presumed to have been obtained through their joint man.  only the properties acquired by both of the parties
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
of the property shall still be considered as having or industry shall be owned by them in common in
contributed thereto jointly if said party’s "efforts consisted proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual
in the care and maintenance of the family household." contribution is required.
 Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman:  In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of
(1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) of the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 148 thereof
their union is without the benefit of marriage or their applies because this provision was intended precisely to
marriage is void. All these elements are present in the fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before
case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no
respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. provision governing property relations of couples living in
They lived exclusively with each other as husband and a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the
wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred
residence and were later united in marriage. Their before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36  Agapay v. Palang,and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which
of the Family Code because of respondent’s involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired
psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
obligations. relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
 The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential.
was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at  Adriano v. CA: the fact that the controverted property was
the time when petitioner and respondent were already titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
living together. Hence, it should be considered as relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent
common property of petitioner and respondent. evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property
JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,  In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC, and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent
MARINDUQUE AND GINA S. REY, respondents alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70K for the
G.R. No. 150611 | June 10, 2003 (1D) completion of their house. However, nowhere in her
testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution.
FACTS: What appears in the record are receipts in her name for
 17-year old Gina Rey was married, but separated de facto the purchase of construction materials on Nov 17, 1995
from her husband, when she met petitioner, sometime in and Dec 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413
July 1987  the two decided to cohabit as husband and  On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used
wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto’s father.4 to purchase the disputed personal properties came partly
 Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel from their joint account. While there is no question that
"Saguid Brothers." Gina, on the other hand, worked as a both parties contributed in their joint account deposit,
fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount
from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacinto’s of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148
relatives turned sour. of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of
 1996: couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year the parties’ respective contribution, their share shall be
cohabitation presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal
 Jan 9, 1997: PR filed a complaint for Partition and properties were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and
Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against value of which were not questioned by the petitioner.
143 of 255 | P a g e
Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., man, Only the properties acquired by both of the parties
P55,687.50 each. through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, proportion to their respective contributions.  In this
respondent property regime, the properties acquired by the parties
G.R. No. 132529 | February 2, 2001 (1D) through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the
co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
FACTS: belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions
 During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, in the form of care of the home, children and household,
he contracted two marriages: (1) June 20, 1969, with or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this
Susan Nicdao and (2) Nov 10, 1992 with respondent regime.  Considering that the marriage of Susan Yee
Susan Yee to whom he cohabited for almost ten years and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
way back in 1982 solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage
 Nov 23, 1992: SPO Carino died then presumed to be valid, the application of Art 148 is
 Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary therefore in order.
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the  The disputed P146K from MBAI, NAPOLCOM,
deceased from various government agencies  Susan Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146K from MBAI, renumerations, incentives and benefits from
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, & Pag-ibig while governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
Susan Yee received a total of P21K from GSIS Life, Burial police officer. Unless Susan Yee presents proof to the
and SSS burial contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money,
 Dec 14, 1993: Susan Yee filed the instant case for property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
collection of sum of money against petitioner praying, benefits.
inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least  As to the property regime of Susan Nicdao and the
½ of the P146K which she received deceased, Art 147 of FC governs  This article applies
 Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
took place during the subsistence of, and without first barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons,
between petitioner and the deceased but contended that like the absence of a marriage license.
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab  In contrast to Art 148, under Art 147, wages and salaries
initio because the same was solemnized without the earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be
required marriage license owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided
 RTC ruled in favor of Susan Yee: petitioner is ordered to equally between them, even if only one party earned the
pay the respondent P73K wages and the other did not contribute thereto.
 CA affirmed in toto RTC Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were
earned by the deceased alone as a government
ISSUE: What are the property regimes for the respective marriages. employee, Art 147 creates a co-ownership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof.
HELD: Susan Yee  Art 148; Susan Nicdao  Art 147 As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case,
 Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits”
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the
requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, renders property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
the marriage void ab initio. deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal
 It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under scrutiny EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner vs. MA. ELVIRA
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To CASTILLO, respondent
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for G.R. No. 136803 | June 16, 2000 (2D)
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though FACTS:
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,  Feb 24, 1993: Eustaquio filed a complaint for Partition
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share against Elvira 
 Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity alleged that herein parties, both married but separated
of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner from their respective spouses, cohabited sometime in
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted;
the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact During their union, they set up Superfreight Customs
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first Brokerage Corporation (petitioner and respondent
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of acquired properties which were registered solely in
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, respondent's name); In 1992, due to irreconcilable
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased differences, the couple separated
is, likewise, void ab initio.  Respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs
 One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage brokerage business with petitioner but denied that she
is the separation of the property of the spouses according and petitioner lived as husband and wife because the fact
to the applicable property regime. Considering that the was that they were still legally married to their respective
two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property spouses and claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real
regime would not be ACP or CPG, but rather, be personal properties involved in the petition
governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the  Nov 25, 1994: respondent filed a Motion for Summary
Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Judgment because the issues raised in the pleadings
Marriage” were sham and not genuine, to wit: (1) Respondent
 Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the contended that even if she and petitioner actually
property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous cohabited, petitioner could not validly claim a part of the
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, subject real and personal properties because Art. 144 of
relationships where both man and woman are married to CC, which provides that the rules on co-ownership shall
other persons, multiple alliances of the same married govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife but not married, or
144 of 255 | P a g e
under a marriage which is void ab initio, applies only if the shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
parties are not in any way incapacitated to contract presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
marriage. In the parties' case, their union suffered the evidences of credits. If one of the parties is validly married
legal impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. Thus, the to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
question of fact being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
they lived together as husband and wife, was irrelevant existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
as no co-ownership could exist between them. bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share
 Petitioner opposed: contended that the case presented shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
genuine factual issues and that Art. 144 of CC had been paragraph of the preceding article. The foregoing rules on
repealed by the FC which now allows, under Art. 148, a forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
limited co-ownership even though a man and a woman bad faith.
living together are not capacitated to marry each other.  It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the
 RTC rendered its decision granting respondent's MSJ: parties in this case were not capacitated to marry each
sustained respondent's contention that petitioner's action other at the time that they were alleged to have been living
for partition amounted to a collateral attack on the validity together, they could not have owned properties in
of the certificates of title covering the subject properties. common. The Family Code, in addition to providing that a
It held that even if the parties really had cohabited, the co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who
action for partition could not be allowed because an action live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
for partition among co-owners ceases to be so and marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are
becomes one for title if the defendant, as in the present incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by
case, alleges exclusive ownership of the properties in them through their joint contribution of money, property or
question. industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
 CA ordered the case remanded the case citing Roque v. to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the
IAC to the effect that an action for partition is at once an contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-
action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to
and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties marry each other.
involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the
property, the action for partition should not be dismissed. ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M.
plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co- GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents
owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because G.R. No. 122749 | July 31, 1996 (1D)
the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis
exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition; CA FACTS:
upheld petitioner's position that Art. 144 of CC had been  Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05
repealed by Art. 148 FC. Jan 1971; with five children
 CA granted respondent's MFR: Manifestly, absent any  22 June 1992: Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of
cause or prayer for the alteration, cancellation, the marriage p
modification or changing of the titles involved, the desired  RTC granted the petition: Parties are directed to start
declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition will proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties
utterly be an indirect or collateral attack on the subject as defined by Art 147 of FC w/in 30 days from notice of
titled in this suit. this decision
 Petitioner anchors his claim of co-ownership on two  Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of
factual grounds: first, that said properties were acquired the decision directing compliance with Art 50, 51 and 52
by him and respondent during their union from 1979 to of FC: asserted that the FC contained no provisions on
1992 from profits derived from their brokerage business; the procedure for the liquidation of common property in
and second, that said properties were registered solely in "unions without marriage
respondent's name only because they agreed to that  RTC made the following clarification: Considering that Art
arrangement, thereby giving rise to an implied trust in 147 of the FC explicitly provides that the property
accordance acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
ISSUE: WON properties herein are community properties of obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be
petitioner and respondent. owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant
will own their "family home" and all their properties for that
HELD: YES. matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of
 Art. 144 of CC: When a man and a woman live together properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired Code shall apply  Art 102 and 129 of the Family Code
by either or both of them through their work or industry or finds no application since Art 102 refers to the procedure
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules for the liquidation of the CPG and Art 129 refers to the
on co-ownership  This provision of the Civil Code, procedure for the liquidation of ACP
applies only to cases in which a man and a woman live  Petitioner submits that Art 50, 51 and 52 of FC should be
together as husband and wife without the benefit of held controlling.
marriage provided they are not incapacitated or are ISSUE: WON Art 147 applies herein.
without impediment to marry each other, or in which the HELD: YES.
marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous.  In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
 Art. 144, therefore, does not cover parties living in an property relations of the parties during the period of
adulterous relationship. cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Art 147 or
 HOWEVER, Art. 148 of FC now provides for a limited co- Art 148, such as the case may be, of FC
ownership in cases where the parties in union are  Art 147: When a man and a woman who are capacitated
incapacitated to marry each other  In cases of to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
cohabitation not falling under the preceding article, 16 husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
their actual joint contribution of money, property or by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion of them through their work or industry shall be governed
to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to
to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
145 of 255 | P a g e
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the void.
acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household. TITLE V. FAMILY HOME; See also Article 2035, NCC
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos
of his or her share in the property acquired during Article 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent valid:
of the other, until after the termination of their (1) The civil status of persons;
cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith (3) Any ground for legal separation;
in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their (4) Future support;
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any (5) The jurisdiction of courts;
or all of the common children or their descendants, each (6) Future legitime. (1814a)
vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination CHAPTER 1. THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION (Articles 149-
of the cohabitation. 151)
 This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man
and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom,
marriage  "capacitated" refers to the legal capacity of a practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized
party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the or given effect. (216a, 218a)
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Art 37 and 38" of the Code. Art. 150. Family relations include those:
 Under this property regime, property acquired by both (1) Between husband and wife;
spouses through their work and industry shall be (2) Between parents and children;
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any (3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood.
property acquired during the union is prima facie (217a)
presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper
of the property shall be considered as having contributed unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's made, the same case must be dismissed.
separate property are not included in the co-ownership. This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
 Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)
the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil
Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that — ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO, CAMILO
intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property, FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR.,
without consent of the other, during the period of MILAGROS FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO,
cohabitation; and (b) In the case of a void marriage, any HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES,
party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co- ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED)
ownership in favor of their common children; in default SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA,
thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving EUGENIO RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA RIMON
party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination GONZALES AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO
of the cohabitation 9 or declaration of nullity of the INING (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING (WIFE)
marriage. AND PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS, vs. LEONARDO R.
 When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA, RESTONILO I.
impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO,
with each other, only the property acquired by both of AND LENARD VEGA, RESPONDENTS.
them through their actual joint contribution of money, G.R. No. 174727 | August 12, 2013
property or industry shall be owned in common and in SECOND DIVISION
proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are FACTS:
prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party  Leon was married to Rafaela and was the owner of a
who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute parcel of land in Kalibo
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be,  Leon and Rafaela died without issue
if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has o Leon  survived by his siblings, Romana and
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or Gregoria, who are now both deceased
her share shall be forfeited in the manner already  Romana  survived by her
heretofore expressed. daughter, Asuncion, and grandson,
 Petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" herein respondent Leonardo, now
and all their common property in equal shares, as well as both deceased
in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the  Leonardo  survived by
property owned in common by them, the provisions on co- his wife, Lourdes, and their
ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and children, Restonilo,
52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, Crispulo, Milbuena, and
should aptly prevail.  The first paragraph of Articles 50 Lenard
of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and
95) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to
146 of 255 | P a g e
 Gregoria  survived by her 6 when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of
children, herein petitioners Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new
Natividad, Dolores, Antipolo, Pedro, tax declaration over the property (TD 16414)
Jose, and Amando solely in his name that a repudiation of his co-
 Natividad  survived by ownership with Leonardo was made, which
Edilberto, Josefa, Martha, repudiation effectively commenced the running
Carmen, Amparo, Henry, of the 30-year prescriptive period under Article
and Pastor 1141.
 Dolores  survived by o The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.’s sole
Jesus, Cesaria, and possession of the property for more than 30
Remedios years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the
 Antipolo  survived by respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-
Manuel, daughter ownership either, stating that his exclusive
Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, possession of the property and appropriation of
Lucimo Jr., Milagros, its fruits – even his continuous payment of the
Celedonio, and taxes thereon – while adverse as against
Herminigildo strangers, may not be deemed so as against
 Pedro  survived by wife Leonardo in the absence of clear and
Elisa and Pedro Jr. conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter
 Amando  died without was ousted or deprived of his rights as co-
issue owner with the intention of assuming exclusive
 Jose  not clear whether ownership over the property, and absent a
he was made a party in the showing that this was effectively made known
proceedings and whether to Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v. Camumot29
he is alive at all and Segura v. Segura,30 the appellate court
 Petitioners are Gregoria’s heirs, except for Ramon and held that as a rule, possession by a co-owner
Roberto will not be presumed to be adverse to the other
 Respondent Leonardo, Romana’s heir, instituted an co-owners but will be held to benefit all, and
action before the RTC demanding for partition, recovery that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of
of ownership and possession, with damages against an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
petitioners representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if he
 In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners averred, administers or takes care of the rest thereof
among others, that respondent Leonardo has no right with the obligation to deliver the same to his co-
over the subject property owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a
depositary, lessee or trustee.
 During the proceedings, it became clear that petitioners
have been in possession over the subject property for
ISSUE: Whether Lucimo Sr. was an heir of Leon and, therefore, a
more than 30 years; that the subject property was sold by
co-owner of the subject property such that the period within which
Leon to Enriquez through an unnotarized document, who,
Leonardo may seek partition of the same commenced to run on the
in turn, sold the same to Lucimo Sr.; that prior to Lucimo
date of Lucimo Sr.’s repudiation of the purported co-ownership.
Sr.’s death, the latter executed an affidavit claiming sole
ownership over the property; that respondent Leonardo
HELD: NO.
acquired custody of OCT RO-630; and that the subject
property was partitioned to the exclusion of respondent  One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does
Leonardo not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner
of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot
 RTC  dismissed the complaint on the ground of
effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that
prescription (reckoned the prescriptive period within
was formed among the decedent’s heirs.
which Leonardo may seek partition from the date of death
of Leon)  For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by
o No valid sale was effected by Leon a co-owner.
 CA  reversed  Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot
o Proceeding from the premise that no valid prior acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
disposition of the property was made by its absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order
owner Leon and that the property – which that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
remained part of his estate at the time of his following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has
death – passed on by succession to his two performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to
siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which thus an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of
makes the parties herein – who are Romana’s repudiation have been made known to the other co-
and Gregoria’s heirs – co-owners of the owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
property in equal shares, the appellate court convincing."41
held that only the issues of prescription and  From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the
laches were needed to be resolved. trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within
o The CA did not agree with the trial court’s which Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon
pronouncement that Leonardo’s action for in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph)
partition was barred by prescription. The CA provide that prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-
declared that prescription began to run not from owner and against the other co-owners only from the time
Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes
execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land known his repudiation to the other co-owners.
in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his  Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo’s co-ownership of the
co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. property only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the
Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the former executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land,
Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his name,
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or and informed the latter – before the Lupon
co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so Tagapamayapa – of his 1943 purchase of the property.
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes These apparent acts of repudiation were followed later on
the co-ownership," the CA held that it was only by Lucimo Sr.’s act of withholding Leonardo’s share in the
fruits of the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo
147 of 255 | P a g e
himself claims in his Amended Complaint. Considering  Respondent  denied that Dagadag was related to him
these facts, the CA held that prescription began to run by affinity
against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when  Justice Inting transmitted to the Court her Report,
it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. recommending the dismissal of the instant complaint for
has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole lack of substantial evidence
ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that
the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 ISSUE: Whether respondent is related by affinity to Dagadag.
years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period
prescribed under Article 1141. HELD: NO.
 What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice,  The supposed relationship between Judge Wacas and
however, is that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. Dagadag, unsubstantiated as it were by the required
performed acts that may be characterized as a substantial relevant evidence, remains a mere allegation
repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co- of Tiggangay. In his testimony on December 9, 2011,
owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Tiggangay tried to assert that Judge Wacas and Dagadag
Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being are related within the sixth degree by affinity in that the
married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.42 Under the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of Dagadag.
Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis Tiggangay even drew a sketch to show the affinity. The
for succession, exclude relations by affinity. fact, however, is that no substantial evidence was
 Art. 150. Family relations include those: presented to prove the relationship angle.
o (1) Between husband and wife;  We can grant arguendo that the aunt of Judge Wacas is
o (2) Between parents and children; married to the uncle of Dagadag. But such reality is not a
o (3) Among other ascendants and descendants; ground for the mandatory inhibition of a Judge as required
and under Sec. 118 of Rule 137, Revised Rules of Procedure,
o (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the since there is actually no relation of affinity between
full or half blood. Judge Wacas and Dagadag.
 In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of  Affinity denotes "the relation that one spouse has to the
the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly blood relatives of the other spouse."19 It is a relationship
effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage.
never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection
adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a with the institution of marriage and family relations.20
partition of the property has not been lost.  Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a
 Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity,
admission and acknowledgment in his pleadings – that therefore, are those commonly referred to as "in-laws," or
Lucimo Sr. was in possession of the property since 1943 stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like.21
– should be taken against him, is unavailing. In 1943,  Affinity may also be defined as "the relation which one
Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the
Sr. knew this very well, being married to Teodora, other. The connection existing, in consequence of
daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More marriage between each of the married persons and the
significantly, the property, which is registered under the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of
Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and
name. Leon’s ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to
death when the property passed on to his heirs by his wife’s blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and
operation of law. vice versa."22
 In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid  Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of
repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A
seek partition of the property at any time. husband is related by affinity to his wife’s brother, but not
to the wife of his wife’s brother. There is no affinity
JOHNWELL W. TIGGANGAY, Complainant, vs. JUDGE between the husband’s brother and the wife’s sister; this
MARCELINO K. WACAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk is called affinitas affinitatis."23
City, Kalinga, Respondent.  In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ | April 1, 2013 related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it
THIRD DIVISION follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of
Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the
FACTS: uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third
 Complainant ran for but lost to one Rustom Dagadag in degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the
the election for the mayoralty position in Tabuk blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not
 Complainant then filed an electoral protest which was his in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to
raffled to the sala of Judge Wacas, herein respondent Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law
 Respondent  rendered a decision that it was indeed of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to
Dagadag who won (but with a slimmer margin of 97 [from the blood relatives of Judge Wacas’ aunt, like Judge
158]) Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity
 Complainant then filed verified letter-complaint charging between Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-
Judge Wacas with Impropriety and Partiality laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified
o Complainant averred, among others, that he under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear Election Case No. 40.
learned that respondent is Dagadag’s second
cousin by affinity, the former’s aunt is married
to an uncle of Dagadag; that, notwithstanding SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS,
such relationship, respondent did not inhibit petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City
himself from hearing said electoral case in and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA
violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct AYSON, respondents.
and Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court; G.R. No. 125465 | June 29, 1999
and that respondent never bothered to rebuke SECOND DIVISION
the statement of his sister-in-law, one Rebecca
Alunday, that “Tiggangay will win the protest if FACTS:
he has much money”  Petitioners, as owners of a parcel of land, instituted a
Complaint before the RTC for damages against PRs,
148 of 255 | P a g e
averring, among others that they were deprived of income have reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for
from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration present purposes to pass upon this question. Courts do
case allegedly filed by PRs against them in bad faith not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the
 PRs, in their Answer, denied that they were married and very lis mota of the case.
that they deprived the subject land from petitioners.
Further, PRs contended that petitioners, in their
Complainant failed to state a cause of action since it did CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents.
been made, considering that petitioner Augusto G.R. No. 114742 | July 17, 1997
Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros FIRST DIVISION
are brothers
 Petitioners then filed an Amended Complaint to insert FACTS:
therein an allegation that "earnest efforts towards a  Petitioner and PR cohabited without the benefit of
compromise have been made between the parties but the marriage. They begot 2 children, Ramon Carlos and Rica
same were unsuccessful." Natalia
 RTC  dismissed the Complaint on the ground that the  They separated thereafter.
complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151 of the  PR allegedly started refusing to allow petitioner, in
Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to
efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise have the children in his company on weekends
 Petitioners filed an MR but the same was denied  Petitioner filed petition for custodial rights over the
children before RTC
ISSUE: Whether RTC was correct in dismissing the Complaint on  PR  averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and
the ground that the same was not verified as required by Art. 151 of womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and
the Family Code. social values of the children.
 RTC  allowed visitorial rights
HELD: NO. o during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no
 Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family case should he take out the children without the
Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not written consent of the mother
exclusively among the family members. Citing several  PR appealed
cases 18 decided by this Court, petitioners claim that  PR then married a Dutch national and subsequently
whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving the emigrated to Holland with her husband and 2 children
family members, the requisite showing the earnest efforts with herein petitioner
to compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that  CA  in favor of PR; reversed RTC
since private respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger o "In all questions, regarding the care, custody,
to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the education and property of the child, his welfare
requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code. shall be the paramount consideration" — not
 We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private the welfare of the parents (Art. 8, PD 603).
respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Under the predicament and/or status of both
Hontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant,
Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the We find it more wholesome morally and
phrase "members of the same family" refers to the emotionally for the children if we put a stop to
husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and the rotation of custody of said children. Allowing
descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or these children to stay with their mother on
half-blood. 19 As this Court held in Guerrero v. RTC, weekdays and then with their father and the
Ilocos Norte, Br. XVISSUE: 20 latter's live-in partner on weekends may not be
o As early as two decades ago, we already ruled conducive to a normal up-bringing of children of
in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of tender age. There is no telling how this kind of
"brothers and sisters" as member of the same set-up, no matter how temporary and/or
family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law." In remote, would affect the moral and emotional
that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion conditions of the minor children. Knowing that
emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also they are illegitimate is hard enough, but having
"brother-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of to live with it, witnessing their father living with
the New Civil Code as members of the same a woman not their mother may have a more
family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code damaging effect upon them.
repeats essentially the same enumeration of o With Articles 3 and 8 of PD 603, in mind, We
"members of the family," we find no reason to find it to the best interest of the minor children,
alter existing jurisprudence on the mater. to deny visitorial and/or temporary custodial
Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling rights to the father, even at the expense of
that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law hurting said parent. After all, if indeed his love
of private respondent Hernando, was required for the children is genuine and more divine than
to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise the love for himself, a little self-sacrifice and
before filing the present suit. self-denial may bring more benefit to the
 Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not children. While petitioner-appellee, as father,
given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. 21 Consequently, may not intentionally prejudice the children by
private respondent Ayson, who is described in the improper influence, what the children may
complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and witness and hear while in their father's house
petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse may not be in keeping with the atmosphere of
of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered morality and rectitude where they should be
strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. brought up.
151. o The children concerned are still in their early
 Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 formative years of life. The molding of the
of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect amends character of the child starts at home. A home
the Rules of Court. This, according to them, cannot be with only one parent is more normal than two
done since the Constitution reserves in favor of the separate houses — (one house where one
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of parent lives and another house where the other
pleadings and procedure. Considering the conclusion we parent with another woman/man lives). After
149 of 255 | P a g e
all, under Article 176 of the Family Code, goodness, would ever take the trouble and
illegitimate children are supposed to use the expense in instituting a legal action for the
surname of and shall be under the parental purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It
authority of their mother. can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a
o The child is one of the most important assets of father who is deprived of his children of tender
the nation. It is thus important we be careful in ages. 6
rearing the children especially so if they are  The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private
illegitimates, as in this case. respondent and their well-meant concern for the children;
nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have
ISSUE: Whether the allegations against herein petitioner, viz, that ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parent's
he was often engaged in "gambling and womanizing", are sufficient natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on
in denying the latter visitorial rights. brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case,
has seen it fit to understandably provide this
HELD: NO. precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner)
 Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and take out the children without the written consent of the
legal duty, to care for their children, see to their proper mother."
upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare.
This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied CHAPTER 2. THE FAMILY HOME (Articles 152-162); Articles
the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even 225, 229-231, 233; 240, 242 NCC
when the parents are estranged and their affection for
each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and
offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house
nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is
any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of situated. (223a)
the child.
 The issue before us is not really a question of child Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
custody; instead, the case merely concerns the visitation from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of
right of a parent over his children which the trial court has its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
have "visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided
and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)
children without the written consent of the mother . . . ."
The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
noncustodial parent to his or her child or children. 3 (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head
 There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, of a family; and
enough recognition on the inherent and natural right of (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living
expresses that "(f)amily relations include those . . . (2) in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for
(b)etween parents and children; . . . ." Article 209, in legal support. (226a)
relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the
natural right and duty of parents and those exercising Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
parental authority to, among other things, keep children in sale or attachment except:
their company and to give them love and affection, advice (1) For nonpayment of taxes;
and counsel, companionship and understanding. The (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
primary rights" of parents in the rearing of the youth. 4 such constitution; and
There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
provisions are meant to solely address themselves to materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying material for the construction of the building. (243a)
degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by
way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate Art. 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the
members of the family and so explicitly encompass absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive
illegitimate relationships as well. 5 Then, too, and most properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. It may also be
importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own
situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, property.
Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on
visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to
their children. guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a
 There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his family home. (227a, 228a)
interest and welfare is always the paramount
consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at
General, who has recommended due course to the the time of its constitution, the amount of the three hundred
petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos
children, however, could not all be that detrimental to the in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.
children. Similarly, what the trial court has observed is not In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption
entirely without merit; thus: of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family
o The allegations of respondent against the home shall be the basis of evaluation.
character of petitioner, even assuming as true, For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include
cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least
petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are
by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall deemed to be rural areas. (231a)
be able to corrupt and degrade their children
once allowed to even temporarily associate Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated,
with petitioner is but the product of assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the
respondent's unfounded imagination, for no written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's
man, bereft of all moral persuasions and
150 of 255 | P a g e
spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of
conflict, the court shall decide. (235a) Article 240. The family home may be extrajudicially constituted by
recording in the Registry of Property a public instrument wherein a
Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or person declares that he thereby establishes a family home out of a
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of dwelling place with the land on which it is situated.
ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons Article 241. The declaration setting up the family home shall be
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the under oath and shall contain:
property or constituted the family home. (238a)
(1) A statement that the claimant is the owner of, and is actually
Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those residing in the premises;
mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth (2) A description of the property;
more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply
to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the (3) An estimate of its actual value; and
sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it
finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum (4) The names of the claimant's spouse and the other beneficiaries
amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the mentioned in article 226.
increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157
and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by Article 242. The recording in the Registry of Property of the
the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or declaration referred to in the two preceding articles is the operative
owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule act which creates the family home.
and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family SPOUSES CHARLIE FORTALEZA and OFELIA FORTALEZA,
home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES RAUL LAPITAN and RONA LAPITAN,
amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the Respondents.
judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the G.R. No. 178288 | August 15, 2012
judgment debtor. (247a, 248a) FIRST DIVISION
Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home FACTS:
as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the  Petitioners obtained a loan from respondents
beneficiary of, only one family home. (n)
 As security, petitioners mortgaged their residential house
in Laguna
Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing
 As a result of petitioners’ failure to pay said loan including
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. (n)
interests, respondents applied for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage
Civil Code  Respondents and their son, Dr. Raul, became the highest
bidder and they were issued a Certificate of Sale
Article 225. The family home may be constituted by a verified  After failure of petitioners to avail of their right to
petition to the Court of First Instance by the owner of the property, redemption, respondents executed an affidavit of
and by approval thereof by the court. consolidation of ownership and caused the registration of
the property under their name
Article 229. The petition shall contain the following particulars:  Respondents instituted a petition for issuance of writ of
possession
(1) Description of the property;  Petitioners  questioned the validity of the real estate
mortgage and the foreclosure sale. They argued that the
(2) An estimate of its actual value; mortgage was void because the creditors bloated the
principal amount by the imposition of exorbitant interest.
(3) A statement that the petitioner is actually residing in the Spouses Fortaleza added that the foreclosure proceeding
premises; was invalid for non-compliance with the posting
requirement.
(4) The encumbrances thereon;  RTC  ordered the issuance of writ of possession
 Petitioners filed an MR  contended that the subject
(5) The names and addresses of all the creditors of the petitioner property is their family home and is exempt from
and of all mortgagees and other persons who have an interest in the foreclosure sale
property; o RTC  denied the MR
 CA  dismissed petitioners’ appeal
(6) The names of the other beneficiaries specified in article 226. o any question regarding the regularity and
validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure
Article 230. Creditors, mortgagees and all other persons who have cannot be raised as a justification for opposing
an interest in the estate shall be notified of the petition, and given an the issuance of the writ of possession since the
opportunity to present their objections thereto. The petition shall, proceedings is ex parte and non-litigious.
moreover, be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in Moreover, until the foreclosure sale is annulled,
a newspaper of general circulation. the issuance of the writ of possession is
ministerial.
Article 231. If the court finds that the actual value of the proposed
family home does not exceed twenty thousand pesos, or thirty ISSUE: Whether the subject property is exempt from foreclosure
thousand pesos in chartered cities, and that no third person is sale.
prejudiced, the petition shall be approved. Should any creditor
whose claim is unsecured, oppose the establishment of the family HELD: NO.
home, the court shall grant the petition if the debtor gives sufficient  Spouses Fortaleza’s argument that the subject property
security for the debt. is exempt from forced sale because it is a family home
deserves scant consideration. As a rule, the family home
Article 233. The order of the court approving the establishment of is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment.49
the family home shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly

151 of 255 | P a g e
allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured  Petitioner Araceli obtained a loan from respondent
by mortgages on the premises before or after such Claudio in the amount of P100,000.00, which was
constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses secured by a mortgage over the subject property
Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a  The check that Araceli issued was dishonored as the
deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property account from which it was drawn had already been closed
which was even notarized by their original counsel of  After petitioners’ failure to heed respondent’s demand for
record. And assuming that the property is exempt from payment, the latter filed a complaint for violatin of BP 22
forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove  RTC  acquitted petitioners but ordered them to pay
to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it Claudio the amount of P100,000.00 with legal interest
was sold at the public auction. As elucidated in Honrado from date of demand until fully paid.
v. Court of Appeals:50  A writ of execution was then issued and the subject
o While it is true that the family home is property was sold on public auction where Claudio was
constituted on a house and lot from the time it the highest bidder
is occupied as a family residence and is exempt  Claudio then leased said property to petitioners and a
from execution or forced sale under Article 153 certain Juanito Oliva (Juanito) for a monthly rent of
of the Family Code, such claim for exemption P5,500.00.
should be set up and proved to the Sheriff  Petitioners and Juanito defaulted in payment
before the sale of the property at public auction.
 A Final Deed of Sale was then executed in favor of
Failure to do so would estop the party from later
Claudio
claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in
Gomez v. Gealone:  For failure to pay the rentals, Claudio and spouse filed a
complaint for ejectment with MTC against petitioners and
 Although the Rules of Court does not
Juanito
prescribe the period within which to
claim the exemption, the rule is, o Petitioners  contended that they were the true
owners
nevertheless, well-settled that the
o MTC  rendered a decision ordering
right of exemption is a personal
petitioners to vacate
privilege granted to the judgment
o Petitioners appeal was dismissed for their
debtor and as such, it must be
failure to submit their Memorandum
claimed not by the sheriff, but by the
o Petitioners then elevated the case to CA via a
debtor himself at the time of the levy
petition for review, which denied the same
or within a reasonable period
 Petitioners then filed an action against respondents
thereafter.51 (Emphasis supplied.)
before the RTC for the nullification TCT No. T-221755 (M)
 Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on and other documents with damages
exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of o petitioners asserted that the subject property is
the one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the a family home, which is exempt from execution
property.52 under the Family Code and, thus, could not
 Equally without merit is spouses Fortaleza’s reliance on have been validly levied upon for purposes of
the cases of Tolentino53 and De Los Reyes54 in praying satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of execution.
for the exercise of the right of redemption even after the  RTC  dismissed petitioners’ complaint
expiration of the one-year period. In Tolentino, we held o Citing Article 155(3) of the Family Code, the
that an action to redeem filed within the period of RTC ruled that even assuming that the subject
redemption, with a simultaneous deposit of the property is a family home, the exemption from
redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is equivalent to execution does not apply. A mortgage was
an offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the constituted over the subject property to secure
right to redemption for future enforcement even beyond the loan Araceli obtained from Claudio and it
the one-year period.55 And in De Los Reyes, we allowed was levied upon as payment therefor.
the mortgagor to redeem the disputed property after  CA  affirmed
finding that the tender of the redemption price to the o the exemption of a family home from execution,
sheriff was made within the one-year period and for a attachment or forced sale under Article 153 of
sufficient amount. the Family Code is not automatic and should
 The circumstances in the present case are far different. accordingly be raised and proved to the Sheriff
The spouses Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a prior to the execution, forced sale or
formal offer to redeem the subject property accompanied attachment. The appellate court noted that at
by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. It is no time did the petitioners raise the supposed
also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to exemption of the subject property from
lapse from the registration of the certificate of sale without execution on account of the same being a
redeeming the mortgage. For all intents and purposes, family home.
spouses Fortaleza have waived or abandoned their right
of redemption. ISSUE: Whether the subject property is exempt from execution.
 Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in
favor of the original owner of the property, we cannot HELD: NO.
apply the privilege of liberality to accommodate the  The petitioners maintain that the subject property is a
spouses Forteza due to their negligence or omission to family home and, accordingly, the sale thereof on
exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed execution was a nullity. In Ramos v. Pangilinan,20 this
period without justifiable cause. Court laid down the rules relative to exemption of family
homes from execution:
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE o For the family home to be exempt from
MESA, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and execution, distinction must be made as to what
MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE law applies based on when it was constituted
and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS, Respondents. and what requirements must be complied with
G.R. No. 185064 | January 16, 2012 by the judgment debtor or his successors
SECOND DIVISION claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of
rules are applicable.
FACTS:  If the family home was constructed before the effectivity
 Petitioners jointly purchased the subject property while of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must
they were merely cohabiting before their marriage
152 of 255 | P a g e
have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially  Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home
as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, we
Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home nevertheless rule that the CA did not err in dismissing the
requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts petitioners’ complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-
and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry 221755 (M). We agree with the CA that the petitioners
of Deeds of the area where the property is located. should have asserted the subject property being a family
Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by home and its being exempted from execution at the time
Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. As the
execution of a public instrument which must also be CA aptly pointed out:
registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply o In the light of the facts above summarized, it is
with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar evident that appellants did not assert their claim
a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. of exemption within a reasonable time.
 On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is law on exemption, does not mean a time after
no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the the expiration of the one-year period provided
exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 Court for judgment debtors to redeem the
actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home property sold on execution, otherwise it would
should belong to the absolute community or conjugal render nugatory final bills of sale on execution
partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its and defeat the very purpose of execution – to
constitution must have been with consent of the other, put an end to litigation. x x x.24
and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending  The foregoing disposition is in accord with the Court’s
upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts November 25, 2005 Decision in Honrado v. Court of
incurred for which the exemption does not apply as Appeals,25 where it was categorically stated that at no
provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made other time can the status of a residential house as a family
answerable must have been incurred after August 3, home can be set up and proved and its exemption from
1988.21 (citations omitted) execution be claimed but before the sale thereof at public
 In the earlier case of Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, auction:
Inc.,22 we stressed that: o While it is true that the family home is
o Under the Family Code, there is no need to constituted on a house and lot from the time it
constitute the family home judicially or is occupied as a family residence and is exempt
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed from execution or forced sale under Article 153
after the effectivity of the Family Code (August of the Family Code, such claim for exemption
3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation should be set up and proved to the Sheriff
of law. All existing family residences as of before the sale of the property at public auction.
August 3, 1988 are considered family homes Failure to do so would estop the party from later
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in
accorded to a family home under the Family Gomez v. Gealone:
Code.23 (emphasis supplied and citation  Although the Rules of Court does not
omitted) prescribe the period within which to
 The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for claim the exemption, the rule is,
purposes of exemption from execution, could be nevertheless, well-settled that the
summarized as follows: right of exemption is a personal
o First, family residences constructed before the privilege granted to the judgment
effectivity of the Family Code or before August debtor and as such, it must be
3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home claimed not by the sheriff, but by the
either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance debtor himself at the time of the levy
with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to or within a reasonable period
be exempt from execution; thereafter;
o Second, family residences constructed after  "In the absence of express provision
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, it has variously held that claim (for
1988 are automatically deemed to be family exemption) must be made at the time
homes and thus exempt from execution from of the levy if the debtor is present,
the time it was constituted and lasts as long as that it must be made within a
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein; reasonable time, or promptly, or
o Third, family residences which were not before the creditor has taken any
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a step involving further costs, or before
family home prior to the effectivity of the Family advertisement of sale, or at any time
Code, but were existing thereafter, are before sale, or within a reasonable
considered as family homes by operation of law time before the sale, or before the
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits sale has commenced, but as to the
accorded to a family home under the Family last there is contrary authority."
Code.  In the light of the facts above
 Here, the subject property became a family residence summarized, it is self-evident that
sometime in January 1987. There was no showing, appellants did not assert their claim
however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially of exemption within a reasonable
constituted as a family home in accordance with the time. Certainly, reasonable time, for
provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code purposes of the law on exemption,
took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property does not mean a time after the
became a family home by operation of law and was thus expiration of the one-year period
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39
were thus correct in asserting that the subject property of the Rules of Court for judgment
was a family home. debtors to redeem the property sold
 The family home’s exemption from execution must be on execution, otherwise it would
set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the render nugatory final bills of sale on
property at public auction. execution and defeat the very

153 of 255 | P a g e
purpose of execution—to put an end  The petitioners’ negligence or omission renders their
to litigation.1awphil We said before, present assertion doubtful; it appears that it is a mere
and We repeat it now, that litigation afterthought and artifice that cannot be countenanced
must end and terminate sometime without doing the respondents injustice and depriving the
and somewhere, and it is essential to fruits of the judgment award in their favor. Simple justice
an effective administration of justice and fairness and equitable considerations demand that
that, once a judgment has become Claudio’s title to the property be respected. Equity
final, the winning party be not, dictates that the petitioners are made to suffer the
through a mere subterfuge, deprived consequences of their unexplained negligence.
of the fruits of the verdict. We now
rule that claims for exemption from JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL
execution of properties under T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R. ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA
Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, Petitioners, vs. DANILO
Court must be presented before its PANGILINAN, RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and
sale on execution by the sheriff.26 ROLANDO ANTENOR, Respondents.
(citations omitted) G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010
 Reiterating the foregoing in Spouses Versola v. Court of THIRD DIVISION
Appeals,27 this Court stated that:
o Under the cited provision, a family home is FACTS:
deemed constituted on a house and lot from the  Respondents filed an illegal dismissal case against E.M.
time it is occupied as a family residence; there Ramos Electric, Inc., wholly owned by Ernesto M.
is no need to constitute the same judicially or Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners
extrajudicially.  Judgment was rendered in favor of respondents and a writ
 The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced of execution was then issued by the LA which the sheriff
sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal of the NLRC implemented by levying a property in Ramos’
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it name covered by TCT No. 38978, situated in Pandacan,
must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor Manila (Pandacan property).
himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It  Ramos moved to quash the writ of execution alleging that
is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely the Pandacan roperty was the family home hence exempt
alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for from execution to satisfy the judgment
exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. x x  Respondents  Pandacan property is not the Ramos
x.28 (emphasis supplied and citations omitted) family home, as it has another in Antipolo, and the
 Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the Pandacan property in fact served as the company’s
supposed exemption of the subject property before the business address as borne by the company’s letterhead.
sale thereof at public auction, the petitioners now are Respondents added that, assuming that the Pandacan
barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them property was indeed the family home, only the value
from later claiming the said exemption equivalent to P300,000 was exempt from execution.
 Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love  LA  denied the motion to quash
and is the repository of cherished memories that last  NLRC  affirmed
during one’s lifetime.29 It is likewise without dispute that  Ramos died and was substituted by herein petitioners
the family home, from the time of its constitution and so  Petitioners also filed before the NLRC, as third-party
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is claimants, a Manifestation questioning the Notice to
generally exempt from execution, forced sale or Vacate issued by the Sheriff, alleging that assuming that
attachment.30 the Pandacan property may be levied upon, the family
 The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, home straddled two (2) lots, including the lot covered by
inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized TCT No. 38978, hence, they cannot be asked to vacate
by creditors except in certain special cases.31 However, the house.
this right can be waived or be barred by laches by the  LA  denied petitioners’ claim
failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a  NLRC  affirmed
family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time o Noted that petitioners failed to exercise their
thereafter. right to redeem the Pandacan property within
 In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a the one 1 year period or until January 16, 2009.
considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject The NLRC brushed aside petitioners’
property is a family home and its exemption from contention that they should have been given a
execution and forced sale under the Family Code. The fresh period of 1 year from the time of Ramos’
petitioners allowed the subject property to be levied upon death on July 29, 2008 or until July 30, 2009 to
and the public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from redeem the property, holding that to do so
the time the subject property was sold until a Final Deed would give petitioners, as mere heirs, a better
of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli’s Torrens right than the Ramos’.
title was cancelled and a new one issued under Claudio’s  CA  denied petitioners’ appeal
name, still, the petitioner remained silent. In fact, it was o Pandacan property was not exempted from
only after the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful execution, for while "Article 1538 of the Family
detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the time of Code provides that the family home is deemed
the auction sale, that the petitioners claimed that the constituted on a house and lot from the time it
subject property is a family home, thus, exempt from is occupied as a family residence, [it] did not
execution. mean that the article has a retroactive effect
 For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence such that all existing family residences are
or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time deemed to have been constituted as family
gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, homes at the time of their occupation prior to
waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under the effectivity of the Family Code."
Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is
incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the ISSUE: Whether the Pandacan property was exempt from
same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s execution.
duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property
as a family home. HELD: NO.

154 of 255 | P a g e
 Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real made answerable must have been incurred after August
right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from 3, 1988.
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the  And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the
land on which it is situated, which confers upon a Family Code, it is not sufficient that the person claiming
particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. home. This claim for exemption must be set up and
It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special proved.15
cases.9  In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family
 Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.10 lays down the rules home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early
relative to the levy on execution over the family home, viz: as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated
o No doubt, a family home is generally exempt by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the
from execution provided it was duly constituted Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially
as such. There must be proof that the alleged constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law’s
family home was constituted jointly by the protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners.
husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a Parenthetically, the records show that the sheriff
family. It must be the house where they and exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed
their family actually reside and the lot on which because Ramos’ bank accounts16 were already closed
it is situated. The family home must be part of while other properties in his or the company’s name had
the properties of the absolute community or the already been transferred,17 and the only property left was
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive the Pandacan property.
properties of either spouse with the latter’s
consent, or on the property of the unmarried SIMEON CABANG, VIRGINIA CABANG and VENANCIO CABANG
head of the family. The actual value of the ALIAS "DONDON", Petitioners, vs. MR. & MRS. GUILLERMO
family home shall not exceed, at the time of its BASAY, Respondents.
constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban G.R. No. 180587 | March 20, 2009
areas and P200,000 in rural areas. THIRD DIVISION
 Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the
family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes FACTS:
constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code  Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of the
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of subject lot, located at Lot No. 7777, Ts- 222 located in
law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, which he or his heirs never
are considered family homes and are prospectively took possession of
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under  Respondents bought said property from the heirs of Felix
the Family Code. Odong for P8,000.00.
 The exemption is effective from the time of the  Petitioners, on the other hand, had been in continuous,
constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same
as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. parcel of land since 1956 up to the present.
Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made o They were the awardees in the cadastral
answerable must have been incurred after August 3, proceedings of Lot No. 7778 of the Molave
1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August Townsite, Ts-222. During the said cadastral
3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have proceedings, defendant-appellees claimed Lot
been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially No. 7778 on the belief that the area they were
pursuant to the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied) actually occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it
 For the family home to be exempt from execution, turned out, however, when the Municipality of
distinction must be made as to what law applies based on Molave relocated the townsite lots in the area
when it was constituted and what requirements must be in 1992 as a big portion of Lot No. 7778 was
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors used by the government as a public road and
claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are as there were many discrepancies in the areas
applicable. occupied, it was then discovered that
 If the family home was constructed before the effectivity defendant-appellees were actually occupying
of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must Lot No. 7777.
have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially  Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC for
as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Recovery of Property against petitioners
Civil Code.11 Judicial constitution of the family home  RTC  in favor of petitioners
requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts  CA  reversed RTC’s decision
and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry  SC  remanded to the court a quo and the latter
of Deeds of the area where the property is located. commissioned the Municipal Assessor of Molave,
Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Zamboanga del Sur to determine the value of the
Articles 240 to 24212 of the Civil Code and involves the improvements introduced by the defendant-appellees.
execution of a public instrument which must also be  It was found by the commissioners that there were three
registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply (3) residential buildings constructed on the property in
with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar litigation. During the ocular inspection, plaintiff-appellants’
a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. son, Gil Basay, defendant-appellee Virginia Cabang, and
 On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the one Bernardo Mendez, an occupant of the lot, were
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is present.
no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the  RTC  denied respondents’ motion for execution on the
exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and ground that petitioners’ family home was still subsisting
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 15413  CA reversed
actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home  Petitioners insist that the property subject of the
should belong to the absolute community or conjugal controversy is a duly constituted family home which is not
partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its subject to execution, thus, they argue that the appellate
constitution must have been with consent of the other, tribunal erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court.
and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending
upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts ISSUE: Whether the subject house may be sold in public auction.
incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 15514 for which the family home is
155 of 255 | P a g e
HELD: YES. land are family homes will not extricate them from their
 It bears stressing that the purpose for which the records predicament.
of the case were remanded to the court of origin was for  As defined, "[T]he family home is a sacred symbol of
the enforcement of the appellate court’s final and family love and is the repository of cherished memories
executory judgment6 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207 which, that last during one’s lifetime.21 It is the dwelling house
among others, declared herein respondents entitled to the where the husband and wife, or an unmarried head of a
possession of Lot No. 7777 of the Molave Townsite family reside, including the land on which it is situated.22
subject to the provisions of Articles 448,7 546,8 5479 an It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by
54810 of the Civil Code. Indeed, the decision explicitly an unmarried head of a family."23 Article 153 of the
decreed that the remand of the records of the case was Family Code provides that –
for the court of origin "[t]o determine the rights of the o The family home is deemed constituted from
defendants-appellees under the aforesaid article[s] of the the time it is occupied as a family residence.
New Civil Code, and to render judgment thereon in From the time of its constitution and so long as
accordance with the evidence and this decision." any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein,
 A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified the family home continues to be such and is
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct exempt from execution, forced sale or
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be attachment except as hereinafter provided and
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court to the extent of the value allowed by law
in the land.11 The only exceptions to this rule are the  The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at
correction of (1) clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000.00 in
tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and urban areas and P200,000.00 in rural areas.24 Under the
(3) void judgments.12 afore-quoted provision, a family home is deemed
 Well-settled is the rule that there can be no execution until constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is
and unless the judgment has become final and executory, occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
i.e. the period of appeal has lapsed without an appeal constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially.25
having been taken, or, having been taken, the appeal has  There can be no question that a family home is generally
been resolved and the records of the case have been exempt from execution,26 provided it was duly constituted
returned to the court of origin, in which event, execution as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must
shall issue as a matter of right.13 In short, once a be constituted on property owned by the persons
judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a constituting it. Indeed as pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v.
writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a Planters Products, Inc.27 "[T]he family home must be part
court’s ministerial duty.14 of the properties of the absolute community or the
 Furthermore, as a matter of settled legal principle, a writ conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
of execution must adhere to every essential particulars of either spouse with the latter’s consent, or on the property
the judgment sought to be executed.15 An order of of the unmarried head of the family."28 In other words:
execution may not vary or go beyond the terns of the o The family home must be established on the
judgment it seeks to enforce.16 A writ of execution must properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b)
conform to the judgment and if it is different from, goes the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive
beyond or varies the tenor of the judgment which gives it property of either spouse with the consent of
life, it is a nullity.17 Otherwise stated, when the order of the other. It cannot be established on property
execution and the corresponding writ issued pursuant held in co-ownership with third persons.
thereto is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment However, it can be established partly on
which gives it life, they have pro tanto no validity18 – to community property, or conjugal property and
maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional partly on the exclusive property of either
provision against depriving a person of his property spouse with the consent of the latter.1avvphi1
without due process of law.19 o If constituted by an unmarried head of a family,
 As aptly pointed out by the appellate court, from the where there is no communal or conjugal
inception of Civil Case No. 99-20-127, it was already of property existing, it can be constituted only on
judicial notice that the improvements introduced by his or her own property.29 (Emphasis and
petitioners on the litigated property are residential houses italics supplied)
not family homes. Belatedly interposing such an  Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners.
extraneous issue at such a late stage of the proceeding is For all their arguments to the contrary, the stark and
tantamount to interfering with and varying the terms of the immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged
final and executory judgment and a violation of family home stands is owned by respondents and the
respondents’ right to due process because – question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the
o As a general rule, points of law, theories and finality of the appellate court’s judgment in CA-G.R. CV
issues not brought to the attention of the trial No. 55207. Thus, petitioners’ continued stay on the
court cannot be raised for the first time on subject land is only by mere tolerance of respondents.
appeal. For a contrary rule would be unfair to  All told, it is too late in the day for petitioners to raise this
the adverse party who would have no issue. Without doubt, the instant case where the family
opportunity to present further evidence material home issue has been vigorously pursued by petitioners is
to the new theory, which it could have done had but a clear-cut ploy meant to forestall the enforcement of
it been aware of if at the time of the hearing an otherwise final and executory decision. The execution
before the trial court.20 of a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the
 The refusal, therefore, of the trial court to enforce the prevailing party whose implementation is mandatory and
execution on the ground that the improvements ministerial on the court or tribunal issuing the judgment.30
introduced on the litigated property are family homes goes  The most important phase of any proceeding is the
beyond the pale of what it had been expressly tasked to execution of judgment.31 Once a judgment becomes
do, i.e. its ministerial duty of executing the judgment in final, the prevailing party should not, through some clever
accordance with its essential particulars. The foregoing maneuvers devised by an unsporting loser, be deprived
factual, legal and jurisprudential scenario reduces the of the fruits of the verdict.32 An unjustified delay in the
raising of the issue of whether or not the improvements enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of
introduced by petitioners are family homes into a mere courts in disposing of justiciable controversies with
afterthought. finality.33 Furthermore, a judgment if not executed would
 Even squarely addressing the issue of whether or not the just be an empty victory for the prevailing party because
improvements introduced by petitioners on the subject
156 of 255 | P a g e
execution is the fruit and end of the suit and very aptly the premises of the claimed family home; order
called the life of the law.34 a submission of photographs of the premises,
 The issue is moreover factual and, to repeat that trite depositions, and/or affidavits of proper
refrain, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not individuals/parties; or a solemn examination of
the function of the Court to review, examine and evaluate the petitioner, his children and other witnesses.
or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. A At the same time, the respondent is given the
question of fact would arise in such event. Questions of opportunity to cross-examine and present
fact cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the evidence to the contrary;
Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration.35 o 3. If the property is accordingly found to
The rationale behind this doctrine is that a review of the constitute petitioner’s family home, the court
findings of fact of the appellate tribunal is not a function should determine:
this Court normally undertakes. The Court will not weigh  a) if the obligation sued upon was
the evidence all over again unless there is a showing that contracted or incurred prior to, or
the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support after, the effectivity of the Family
or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse Code;18
of discretion.36 Although there are recognized  b) if petitioner’s spouse is still alive,
exceptions37 to this rule, none exists in this case to justify as well as if there are other
a departure therefrom. beneficiaries of the family home;19
 c) if the petitioner has more than one
ALBINO JOSEF, petitioner, vs. OTELIO SANTOS, respondent. residence for the purpose of
G.R. No. 165060 | November 27, 2008 determining which of them, if any, is
THIRD DIVISION his family home;20 and
 d) its actual location and value, for
FACTS: the purpose of applying the
 Respondent filed a case for collection of sum of money provisions of Articles 15721 and
against petitioner, claiming that the latter failed to pay the 16022 of the Family Code.
shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent  The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his
 RTC rendered a judgment in favor of respondent, which family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of
was affirmed by CA cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime.23 It is
 A real property was sold in a public auction and the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and
respondent emerged as highest bidder protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a shelter for
 Petitioner  filed a petition for certiorari contending, the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge
among others, that the real property covered by TCT No. and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which
N-105280 was his family home thus exempt from ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The
execution. protection of the family home is just as necessary in the
 Respondent, on the other hand, argues that petitioner’s preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and
alleged family home has not been shown to have been since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
judicially or extrajudicially constituted, obviously referring family shall be recognized or given effect,24 the trial
to the provisions on family home of the Civil Code – not court’s failure to observe the proper procedures to
those of the Family Code which should apply in this case; determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations, is
that petitioner has not shown to the court’s satisfaction unjustified.
that the personal properties executed upon and sold
belonged to his children. Respondent argues that he is SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY,
entitled to satisfaction of judgment considering the length Complainants, vs. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A.
of time it took for the parties to litigate and the various RAGUTANA,1 Respondents.
remedies petitioner availed of which have delayed the G.R. No. 172263 | July 9, 2008
case. FIRST DIVISION
 CA  denied the petition on the ground that petitioner
failed to file an MR before the RTC to assail the Order FACTS:
granting the motion for execution  Petitioner Auther acquired some agricultural chemical
products from respondent Planters but was unable to pay
ISSUE: Whether the subject house should be included in the public therefor
auction.  Planters then instituted an action for sum of money before
RTC Makati
HELD: NO.  RTC Makati  decided in favor of Planters
 The family home is a real right which is gratuitous,  Sheriff then sold on execution the subject property
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the  After being belatedly informed of the sale, petitioners filed
dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which a Motion to Dissolve or Set Aside Notice of Levy on the
confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such ground that the subject property was their family home
properties, which must remain with the person which was exempt from execution
constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by  RTC Makati  denied the motion for failure to comply with
creditors except in certain special cases.15 the three-day notice requirement
 Upon being apprised that the property subject of  Petitioners then filed a complaint for declaration of nullity
execution allegedly constitutes petitioner’s family home, of levy and sale of the alleged family home with damages
the trial court should have observed the following against herein respondents before RTC Naga
procedure:  RTC Naga  dismissed the complaint for lack of
o 1. Determine if petitioner’s obligation to jurisdiction and lack of cause of action
respondent falls under either of the exceptions  CA  affirmed
under Article 155 of the Family Code;
o 2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of ISSUE: Whether petitioners may still prove at this point that the
petitioner’s claim that the property was his subject property sold is a family home.
family home;17 conduct an ocular inspection of
the premises; an examination of the title; an HELD: YES. Case was remanded to RTC Naga for determination
interview of members of the community where whether subject property is a family home and therefore exempt
the alleged family home is located, in order to from execution.
determine if petitioner actually resided within
157 of 255 | P a g e
 Petitioners anchor their action in Civil Case No. 2000- o [The husband and children] were not parties to
0188 on their contention that TCT No. 15079 is the Kelley the Pasig RTC case and are third-party
family home. No doubt, a family home is generally exempt claimants who became such only after trial in
from execution3 provided it was duly constituted as such. the previous case had been terminated and the
There must be proof that the alleged family home was judgment therein had become final and
constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an executory. Neither were they indispensable nor
unmarried head of a family.4 It must be the house where necessary parties in the Pasig RTC case, and
they and their family actually reside and the lot on which they could not therefore intervene in said case.
it is situated.5 The family home must be part of the As strangers to the original case, respondents
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal cannot be compelled to present their claim with
partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse the Pasig RTC which issued the writ of
with the latter’s consent, or on the property of the execution.xxx
unmarried head of the family.6 The actual value of the o In said case, the alleged family home was sold
family home shall not exceed, at the time of its on execution by the sheriff of the Pasig
constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas and RTC.1avvphi1 The husband and children of the
P200,000 in rural areas.7 judgment debtor filed a complaint for
 Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the annulment of sale of the levied property in
family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya where the alleged
constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code family home was situated. As they were
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of considered strangers to the action filed in the
law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 Pasig RTC, we ruled that the Nueva Vizcaya
are considered family homes and are prospectively RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint and
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under that they could vindicate their alleged claim to
the Family Code.8 the levied property there.
 The exemption is effective from the time of the
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA,
constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long
petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, respondent.
as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.9
G.R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008
Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made
THIRD DIVISION
answerable must have been incurred after August 3,
1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August
FACTS:
3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have
been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially  Respondent, son of decedent Fidel with the latter’s first
pursuant to the Civil Code. wife Victoria, filed an action for judicial partition of
decedent’s properties against petitioners
 The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in
fact, expressly provides for the following exceptions:  RTC rendered a judgment ordering the partition of the
o Article 155. The family home shall be exempt land in equal shares
from execution, forced sale or attachment  Said parties cannot agree on how to partition among them
except: the land, resulting in an Order by the RTC to sell said land
 (1) For non-payment of taxes; in a public auction
 (2) For debts incurred prior to the  Petitioners  refused to include the subject house
constitution of the family home; standing on the subject land
 (3) For debts secured by a mortgage  Respondent  filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
on the premises before or after such for Contempt of Court praying that petitioners be declared
constitution; and in contempt
 (4) For debts due to laborers,  RTC  denied the motion
mechanics, architects, builders, o petitioners are correct in holding that the house
materialmen and others who have or improvement erected on the property should
rendered service or furnished not be included in the auction sale
material for the construction of the  Respondent  elevated the same to the CA
building.  CA  reversed RTC’s order
o Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is not o the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public
among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains auction sale of the subject lot covered by TCT
a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable No. 383714, including the house constructed
grounds to believe that the family home is thereon.
actually worth more than the maximum amount
fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court ISSUE: Whether the subject house should be included in the public
which rendered the judgment for an order auction.
directing the sale of the property under
execution. The court shall so order if it finds that HELD: NO.
the actual value of the family home exceeds the  We agree that the subject house is covered by the
maximum amount allowed by law as of the time judgment of partition for reasons postulated by the CA.
of its constitution. If the increased actual value We qualify, however, that this ruling does not necessarily
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law countenance the immediate and actual partition of the
in Article 157 and results from subsequent subject house by way of public auction in view of the
voluntary improvements introduced by the suspensive proscription imposed under Article 159 of The
person or persons constituting the family home, Family Code which will be discussed forthwith.
by the owner or owners of the property, or by  It is true that the existence of the subject house was not
any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and specifically alleged in the complaint for partition. Such
procedure shall apply. omission notwithstanding, the subject house is deemed
 We grant the petition only to the extent of allowing part of the judgment of partition for two compelling
petitioners to adduce evidence in the trial court that TCT reasons.
No. 15079 is in fact their family home as constituted in  First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of
accordance with the requirements of law. This is in the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the
consonance with our ruling in Gomez v. Sta. Ines10 subject land. The Court quotes with approval the ruling of
where we held: the CA, to wit:

158 of 255 | P a g e
o The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil
30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the house Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore,
constructed on the subject lot was not alleged Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the
in the complaint and its ownership was not family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the
passed upon during the trial on the merits, the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus,
court cannot include the house in its applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the
adjudication of the subject lot. The court further specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are
stated that it cannot give a relief to[sic] which is deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased
not alleged and prayed for in the complaint. and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began
 We are not persuaded. occupying the same as a family residence 20 years
 To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect back.31
render meaningless the pertinent rule on accession. In  It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot
general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased
requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate
principal. So that even if the improvements including the partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz:
house were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they o Article 159. The family home shall continue
are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, despite the death of one or both spouses or of
following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot the unmarried head of the family for a period of
subject of judicial partition in this case includes the house ten years or for as long as there is a minor
which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it would beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without same unless the court finds compelling reasons
dividing the house which is permanently attached therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
thereto.23 (Emphasis supplied) whoever owns the property or constituted the
 Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)
subject house was built by the deceased.24 Petitioners  The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of
never controverted such claim. There is then no dispute the family unit following the death of its head. To this end,
that the subject house is part of the estate of the it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of
deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the latter's family love, security and unity by imposing the following
heirs, the parties herein,25 any one of whom, under restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot
Article 49426 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the
the partition of the subject house.27 Therefore, death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of
respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor
cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs
omission of said common property from the complaint for cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods
partition. unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No
 That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor
while we treat the subject house as part of the co- has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the
ownership of the parties, we stop short of authorizing partition of the family home, either by physical
its actual partition by public auction at this time. It segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through
bears emphasis that an action for partition involves auction sale as suggested by the parties.
two phases: first, the declaration of the existence of  More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription
a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual against the immediate partition of the family home
termination of that state of co-ownership through the regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the
segregation of the common property.28 What is family home has passed by succession to the co-
settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of
is under the co-ownership of the parties, and them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home
therefore susceptible of partition among them. into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection
 Whether the subject house should be sold at public cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-
auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely different owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the
matter, depending on the exact nature of the subject rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the
house. family home.
 Respondent claims that the subject house was built by  Set against the foregoing rules, the family home --
decedent Fidel on his exclusive property.29 Petitioners consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands
add that said house has been their residence for 20 -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed
years.30 Taken together, these averments on record to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein.
establish that the subject house is a family home within Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003.32 Thus, for 10
the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a
particularly: longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing
o Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly therein, the family home he constituted cannot be
by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists
head of a family, is the dwelling house where for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and
they and their family reside, and the land on order the partition of the property.
which it is situated.  The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals33 that a
o Article 153. The family home is deemed claim for exception from execution or forced sale under
constituted on a house and lot from the time it Article 153 should be set up and proved to the Sheriff
is occupied as a family residence. From the before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein
time of its constitution and so long as any of its petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family house although for a different reason.
home continues to be such and is exempt from  To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA
execution, forced sale or attachment except as ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment of co-
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the ownership and partition. The same evidence also
value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.) establishes that the subject house and the portion of the
 One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code subject land on which it is standing have been constituted
is the automatic constitution of the family home from the as the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs.
time of its occupation as a family residence, without need Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot
anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes
159 of 255 | P a g e
be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from execution becomes a ministerial duty of the
the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013. court.
 It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there
is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still invoke the subject property’s
portion of the subject land covered by TCT No. 383714, exemption from execution considering his failure to object to the
which falls outside the specific area of the family home. Motion for Execution filed by Premium.

JOSE E. HONRADO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HELD: NO.


ROGELIO M. PIZARRO in his official capacity as Presiding Judge  While it is true that the family home is constituted on a
of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 222; THE CLERK house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
OF COURT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, as Ex-Officio residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale
Sheriff of the RTC of Quezon City; MR. NERY G. ROY, in his official under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for
capacity as Sheriff IV of the RTC of Quezon City; and PREMIUM exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff
AGRO-VET PRODUCTS, INC., Respondents. before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure
G.R. No. 166333 | November 25, 2005 to do so would estop the party from later claiming the
SECOND DIVISION exemption. As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:28
o Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe
FACTS: the period within which to claim the exemption,
 Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed a the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the
complaint for collection of money against petitioner before right of exemption is a personal privilege
RTC QC granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it
 Petitioner, however, failed to filed an Answer and was must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the
thus declared in default debtor himself at the time of the levy or within
 Meanwhile, petitioner and his spouse had filed a petition a reasonable period thereafter;
with the RTC of Calamba City for the judicial constitution o "In the absence of express provision it has
of the parcel of land registered in Honrado’s name under variously held that claim (for exemption) must
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-143175 located be made at the time of the levy if the debtor is
in Calamba, Laguna, and the house thereon, as their present, that it must be made within a
family house reasonable time, or promptly, or before the
o In his petition, Honrado declared that his creditor has taken any step involving further
costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at
creditors were Atty. Domingo Luciano, P & J
Agriculture Trading, Inc., and Mr. Tito Dela any time before sale, or within a reasonable
Merced, and that the estimated value of the time before the sale, or before the sale has
property was not more than P240,000.00. commenced, but as to the last there is contrary
authority."
 RTC QC  rendered a judgment in favor of Premium
 In the light of the facts above summarized, it is self-
o A writ of execution was issued and Sheriff
evident that appellants did not assert their claim of
levied on the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
exemption within a reasonable time. Certainly,
T-143175, which was sold on public auction
where Premium was highest bidder reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption,
does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year
 RTC Calamba  then declared the subject property as
period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules
family home
of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold
 Petitioner then filed a Motion to Declare Properties
on execution, otherwise it would render nugatory final
Exempt from Execution under Article 155 of the Family
bills of sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of
Code of the Philippines
execution—to put an end to litigation. We said before,
o It was alleged therein that the property is
and We repeat it now, that litigation must end and
exempt from execution because it is a family
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential
home which had been constituted as such
to an effective administration of justice that, once a
before he incurred his indebtedness with
judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
Premium. He also alleged that he and his family
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
had no other real property except the land
verdict. We now rule that claims for exemption from
which was levied upon and sold on execution.
execution of properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the
 Premium  opposed the motion on the ground that Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on
Honrado was already estopped or barred by laches from execution by the sheriff.29
claiming the exemption, and that said claim has been
mooted by the lapse of the redemption period for Honrado PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and
to redeem the property. Premium averred that, after the HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND, petitioners, vs.
sale at public auction, Honrado and his family even COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.
vacated the property. Honrado re-occupied the property G.R. No. 108532 | March 9, 1999
only in April or May 2002.13 It further averred that the law
FIRST DIVISION
does not automatically exempt a family home from levy or
execution and there was no showing that its present value FACTS:
does not exceed the amount allowed by law under Article
 PR obtained a decision in his favor in an action for
157 of the Family Code
recovery of property
 RTC  denied petitioner’s motion
 As a result thereof, 2 of petitioners’ properties, including
o Honrado is deemed to have waived the
their family home, were sold in a public auction.
exemption considering that he failed to object
 Since petitioners were unable to redeem said property, a
to the sale of the property on execution
final deed of conveyance was executed in favor of PR
 Petitioner elevated the case to CA
 To forestall said conveyance, petitioners filed an action to
 CA  dismissed the petition
declare the deed of conveyance void, contending that
o ruled that the petitioner failed to assert his claim
they are the children of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa
for exemption at the time of the levy or within a
Valaceras; that the subject property was left to them by
reasonable time thereafter. It held that once a
said parents and since said property has been acquired
judgment becomes final and executory, the
through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable
prevailing party can have it executed as a
and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of
matter of right, and the issuance of a writ of
debt; that it is a family home occupied by them since 1972
160 of 255 | P a g e
 PR  argued that he may lawfully acquire said property, of a family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was
considering that it has been described as private property merely an afterthought in order to escape execution of
by the sheriff their property but to no avail.
 MTC  dismissed petitioners’ action to declare the deed
of conveyance TITLE VI. PATERNITY & FILIATION
 CA  affirmed in toto See also RA 9255 (Use of Father’s Surname)
Rules Of Evidence (DNA)
ISSUE: Whether the subject property should be considered a family RA 9262 Anti–Violence against Women & Children
home therefore exempt from attachment. RA 9858 –Amendment to Art. 177, FC
Article 345, Revised Penal Code (RPC)
HELD: NO.
 While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the Article 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity.
family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot - Person guilty of rape, seduction or abduction, shall also be
from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it does sentenced:
not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such
that all existing family residences, petitioner's included, 1. To indemnify the offended woman.
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the 2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him
Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution from so doing.
for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 3. In every case to support the offspring.
(Mondequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766). Neither does
Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of The adulterer and the concubine in the case provided for in Articles
Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It simply 333 and 334 may also be sentenced, in the same proceeding or in
means that all existing family residences at the time of the a separate civil proceeding, to indemnify for damages caused to the
effectivity of the Family Code are considered family offended spouse.
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code Filial Privilege, Art 965 NCC, Sec. 25, Rule 130 [Rule Of
(Modequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since petitioner's debt was Evidence]
incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore not Article 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.
exempt from attachment (Annex "O," Plaintiff's Position
Paper and Memorandum of Authorities, p. 78)." (pp. 5-6, The former unites the head of the family with those who descend
Decision; pp. 64-65, Rollo) (emphasis ours) from him.
 The applicable law, therefore. in the case at bar is still the
Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. (917)
home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides
certain instances where the family home is not exempted
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be
from execution, forced sale or attachment.
compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants,
 Art. 243 reads:
children or other direct descendants. (20a)
o The family home extrajudicially formed shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment, except:
 (1) For nonpayment of taxes;
 (2) For debts incurred before the
declaration was recorded in the
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. NORA FE
Registry of Property;
SAGUN, Respondent.
 (3) For debts secured by mortgages
G.R. No. 187567 | February 15, 2012
on the premises before or after such
FIRST DIVISION
record of the declaration;
 (4) For debts due to laborers,
FACTS:
mechanics, architects, builders,
 Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a
material-men and others who have
Chinese, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino. She was born
rendered service or furnished
on August 8, 1959 in Baguio but did not elect PH
material for the construction of the
citizenship upon reaching age of majority. She then
building. 12
married Alex Sagun, a Filipino, and executed an Oath of
 The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo
Allegiance to PH
constituted the house in question, erected on the land of
 Her subsequent application for a PH passport, however,
Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument
was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there
constituting the family home was registered only on
being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has
January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo
elected Philippine citizenship.
Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that
time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was  Respondent then sought a judicial declaration of her
not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' election of Philippine citizenship
alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not o asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, that
exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2). is, being raised in PH, studying in PH, being a
 Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo registered voter in Baguio, and actively voting
Taneo is even doubtful considering that such constitution in the local and national elections therein, she
has effectively elected Philippine citizenship
did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial
and such fact should be annotated on her
court found that the house was erected not on the land
record of birth so as to entitle her to the
which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco
issuance of a Philippine passport.
Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the "family
home is the dwelling house where a person and his family  RTC  granted the petition
resides and the land on which it is situated," 13 it is  OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari
understood that the house should be constructed on a o Argued, among others, that
land not belonging to another. Apparently, the constitution
161 of 255 | P a g e
ISSUE: Whether respondent should be judicially declared a Filipino,  Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be
considering her filiation and the procedure by which she attempted accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the
to obtain PH citizenship. party exercising the right of election has complied with the
requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In
HELD: NO. other words, he should first be required to register as an
 When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the alien.24 Pertinently, the person electing Philippine
governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which citizenship is required to file a petition with the
declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. of registration based on his aforesaid election of
Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads: Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide,
o Section 1. The following are citizens of the based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity
Philippines: of said election.25 Afterwards, the same is elevated to the
 (4) Those whose mothers are Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final
citizens of the Philippines and, upon determination and review.26
reaching the age of majority, elect  It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or
Philippine citizenship. procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a
 Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother before the courts. The special proceeding provided under
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows
elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine any interested party to file an action for cancellation or
citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss
it provided that "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen for by the respondent.
hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines.17  Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural
Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that respondent
carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the
"[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, records undisputably show that respondent failed to
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of comply with the legal requirements for a valid election.
majority" are Philippine citizens.18 It should be noted, Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The
provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in
not be understood as having a curative effect on any support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age
covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out
person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that
remains subject to challenge under the new charter even respondent’s oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was
if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the
the effectivity of the new Constitution.19 age of majority and was not registered with the nearest
 Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625.
followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to
upon reaching the age of majority, she elects mean that the election should be made generally within
Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.27
legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered
and that illegitimate children are under the parental by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with
authority of the mother and follow her nationality.20 the nearest local civil registry.
An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any  Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent
act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
automatically becomes a citizen himself.21 But in the Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage
case of respondent, for her to be considered a and the participation in election exercises constitutes a
Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition
majority. of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage,
 Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,22 enacted pursuant continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and
to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine
to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit: citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to
o Section 1. The option to elect Philippine seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her
citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly
[S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching,28 the
be expressed in a statement to be signed and prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
sworn to by the party concerned before any certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election
be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution foregoing requirements, respondent’s petition before the
and the Government of the Philippines. trial court must be denied.
 Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of
electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES,
election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA.
Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) ANGELA S. REYES, Petitioners, vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO
registration of the statement of election and of the oath (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO, Respondents.
with the nearest civil registry.23 G.R. No. 175080 | November 24, 2010
FIRST DIVISION
162 of 255 | P a g e
separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be
FACTS: subject to collateral attack.27
 Petitioner Eugenio is the registered owner of the subject  Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave
property located in Bulacan, which has been adjudicated out the status of Leonida from the case for annulment of
to him by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the the "Kasunduan" that supposedly favors petitioners’
heirs following the death of his parents. cause.
 Respondents, alleging that they were the legal heirs of
one Godofredo Mauricio, the lawful and registered tenant IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF
of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH,
subject land, filed a complaint before the DARAB EMMA K. LEE, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE,
o Contended that Eugenio caused the LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN
preparation of a document denominated as K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K.
Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and
respondents from the subject property but such THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact,
Kasunduan was void, considering that Librada Respondents.
was illiterate and said Kasunduan was neither G.R. No. 177861 | July 13, 2010
read nor explained to her SECOND DIVISION
 Petitioner Eugenio  contended, among others, that no
tenancy relationship existed between him and FACTS:
respondents and that Leonida had no legal personality to  This is a special proceeding for the deletion from the
file the present suit. certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee of the
 Provincial Adjudicator  concluded that Godofredo was name Keh to replace the same with the name Tiu to
the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving indicate her true mother’s name.
spouse, should be maintained in peaceful possession of  A subpoena ad testificandum was issued against Tiu,
the subject land. Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to compel Tiu to testify in
 DARAB  banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa the case.
Sakahan or the leasehold contract executed by Susana in
favor of Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. ISSUE: Whether Tiu may be compelled to testify in the correction of
Furthermore, the DARAB declared the other Kasunduan entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction
as void by relying on the evaluation of the Provincial of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is
Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter not Keh’s daughter.
into such a contract.
 CA  affirmed DARAB HELD: YES.
 Petitioner Eugenio  contended that Leonida is a mere  But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to
ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir. requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering
her advance age, testifying in court would subject her to
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner may question Leonida’s filiation in the harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would
present case. violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify
against her stepdaughter.
HELD: NO.  SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may
 It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
attacked.20 Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
in his book "Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries  The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in
and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal
rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure
Philippines. He explained thus: chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
o The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against
by way of defense or as a collateral issue in parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.
another action for a different purpose. The  But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims
necessity of an independent action directly that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee.
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants,
which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
of a child by the husband or his heirs must be stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her
made by proper complaint before the stepmother.
competent court; any contest made in any other  Article 965 thus provides:
way is void." This principle applies under our o Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code ascending. The former unites the head of the
confirm this view, because they refer to "the family with those who descend from him. The
action to impugn the legitimacy." This action latter binds a person with those from whom he
can be brought only by the husband or his heirs descends.
and within the periods fixed in the present  Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against
articles.21 petitioner Emma Lee.
 In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental,22 the Court stated that legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action CHAPTER 1. LEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Articles 163-171)
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack.23 Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption.
 The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate. (n)
also be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v.
Sotero,24 this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the
assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of parents are legitimate.
a decedent’s estate.25 Furthermore, in Austria v. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife
Reyes,26 the Court declared that the legality of the with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise
adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both
of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
163 of 255 | P a g e
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. G.R. No. 138961 | March 7, 2002
The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with SECOND DIVISION
the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)
FACTS:
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are  Petitioner, represented by his mother, Corazon, filed an
illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code. (n) action for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate
(spurious) child of the late William Liyao" against herein
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the respondents
following grounds: o The Complaint was later on amended to include
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual that petitioner "was in continuous possession
intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days and enjoyment of the status of the child of said
which immediately preceded the birth of the child because oFacts: William Liyao," petitioner having been
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse "recognized and acknowledged as such child
with his wife; by the decedent during his lifetime."
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such  Complaint further alleged that Corazon was married to,
a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or but living separately with, Ramon M. Yulo for more than
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented 1o years; that Corazon cohabited with deceased William
sexual intercourse; Liyao until the latter’s death; that Corazon and William
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the lived with the former’s 2 children with Yulo, Enrique and
child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance Bernadette; that Corazon gave birth to herein petitioner
provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or and that all expenses were paid by the deceased; that
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, deceased even opened a bank account for petitioner
the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained where he deposited weekly amounts for said petitioner
through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.  Respondents  William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao,
(255a) were legally married and they were not living separately;
that Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo.
Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the Corazon was not legally separated from her husband and
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate
sentenced as an adulteress. (256a) that the couple obtained any annulment of their marriage
 RTC  declared petitioner as the illegitimate son of
Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted deceased
another marriage within three hundred days after such termination o it was convinced by preponderance of evidence
of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of that the deceased William Liyao sired William
proof to the contrary: Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the
solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have deceased. The trial court observed that herein
been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born petitioner had been in continuous possession
within three hundred days after the termination of the former and enjoyment of the status of a child of the
marriage; deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the such as securing the birth certificate of
celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been petitioner through his confidential secretary,
conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and publicly
three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing
(259a) sustenance and even introducing herein
petitioner to his legitimate children.
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three  CA  reversed
hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be o the law favors the legitimacy rather than the
proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. (261a) illegitimacy of the child and "the presumption of
legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be and by proof that marital intimacy between
brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its husband and wife was physically impossible at
recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any the period cited in Article 257 in relation to
of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate
took place or was recorded. court gave weight to the testimonies of some
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the witnesses for the respondents that Corazon
place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally
recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the married and have not secured legal separation,
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has were seen in each other’s company during the
been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the
the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the deceased William Liyao. The appellate court
birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever further noted that the birth certificate and the
is earlier. (263a) baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which
were presented by petitioner are not sufficient
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the to establish proof of paternity in the absence of
child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao,
following cases: had a hand in the preparation of said
(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period certificates and considering that his signature
fixed for bringing his action; does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having stated that neither do family pictures constitute
desisted therefrom; or competent proof of filiation. With regard to the
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a) passbook which was presented as evidence for
petitioner, the appellate court observed that
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, there was nothing in it to prove that the same
petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. was opened by William Liyao for either
TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William
respondents.
164 of 255 | P a g e
Liyao’s signature and name do not appear though the mother may have declared against its
thereon. legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
 CA denied petitioner’s MR adulteress.30 We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his
present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances,
able to claim from the estate of the deceased. his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a
valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot
HELD: NO. choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be
 Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child,
during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate.22 then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot
The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour.
flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is husband who successfully defeated the presumption.31
grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the  Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the
odium of illegitimacy.23 undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo,
 The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by the legitimacy of the latter?
evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New o We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in
Civil Code24 provides: exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband
o Article 255. Children born after one hundred are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the
and eighty days following the celebration of the child. There is nothing on the records to
marriage, and before three hundred days indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed
following its dissolution or the separation of the away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. at the time of the initiation of this proceedings.
o Against this presumption no evidence shall be Notably, the case at bar was initiated by
admitted other than that of the physical petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon
impossibility of the husband having access to Garcia, and not through Enrique and
his wife within the first one hundred and twenty Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy
days of the three hundred which preceded the of the child can be impugned only in a direct
birth of the child. action brought for that purpose, by the proper
o This physical impossibility may be caused: parties and within the period limited by law.
 1) By the impotence of the husband;  Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss
 2) By the fact that husband and wife the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties
were living separately in such a way on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation with the late
that access was not possible; William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent
 3) By the serious illness of the and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his
husband. alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
 Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had
been living separately for ten (10) years from her IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner, vs. NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO,
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for respondents.
her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when G.R. No. 132305 | December 4, 2001 (2D)
petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim,
petitioner presented a document entitled, "Contract of Facts:
Separation,"25 executed and signed by Ramon Yulo  Herein private respondents, sisters of the late Jose
indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any Santiago, filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership,
property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the and possession against herein petitioner to recover from
future.26 her the 1/3 portion of a lot pertaining to Jose but which
 The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death.
from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was  Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property
conceived and born is of no moment. While physical belongs to them by operation of law, because they are the
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and
with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the without issue.
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds  On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name
for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida
Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the C. Santiago, and that she is the daughter of Jose and thus
husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the entitled to his share in the subject property.
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.27  The trial court rendered a decision holding that even if
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal there was indeed no consideration for the deed of sale
right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, the latter would
the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted still be entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property as
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife Jose's daughter.
produces and he should be the one to decide whether to  CA reversed the same. The appellate court noted that the
conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and birth certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents
economic interest involved.28 It is only in exceptional showed that Ida was born of different parents, not Jose
cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such and his wife.
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs
- can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to Issue: W/N respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this
his memory.29 action for recovery of title and possession
 It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by
Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, Held: Yes
herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of  Petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code to be
petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the misplaced. Said article provides:
late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child
born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even
165 of 255 | P a g e
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by
shall be brought within one year from the recording of the forging her signature
birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the  Petitioner  filed an MD, then an Answer, averring,
same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs. among others, that respondent has no legal capacity to
file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen Family Code; and that the instant petition is barred by
months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family
years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been Code."
concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery o Petitioner contends that respondent has no
of the fraud. standing to sue, because Article 171 of the
Family Code states that the child's filiation can
 This article should be read in conjunction with the other be impugned only by the father or, in special
articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the
Civil Code. legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral
o A careful reading of said chapter would reveal attack.
that it contemplates situations where a doubt o Petitioner next contends that the action to
exists that a child is indeed a man's child by his contest her status as a child of the late
wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed
heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not citing Article 170 of FC.
refer to situations where a child is alleged not  RTC  in favor of respondent
to be the child at all of a particular couple.  CA  affirmed
 Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of o held that the evidence adduced during trial
a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's proved that petitioner was not the biological
child by his wife. However, the present case is not one child of Hermogena Babiera
impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are o also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171
asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of the Family Code, which stated that only the
of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and
 In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's that the same was not subject to a collateral
legitimate status but are, instead, asserting that she is not attack. It held that said provisions contemplated
at all their brother's child. The birth certificate presented a situation wherein the husband or his heirs
by respondents support this allegation. asserted that the child of the wife was not his.
o At the pre-trial, petitioner's counsel admitted In this case, the action involved the cancellation
that petitioner did not have a birth certificate of the child's Birth Certificate for being void ab
indicating that she is Ida Santiago, though she initio on the ground that the child did not belong
had been using this name all her life. to either the father or the mother.
o Petitioner opted not to present her birth
certificate to prove her relationship with Jose ISSUE # 1: Whether Article 171 of the Family Code may be applied
and instead offered in evidence her baptismal in the present case in that the issue of legitimacy of petitioner should
certificate. not be collaterally attacked in a petition for the cancellation of the
 A baptismal certificate, a private entry of her birth.
document, is not conclusive proof of
filiation. HELD # 1: NO.
o Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to  Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate the
be Ida Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
Labagala. The similarity is too uncanny to be a provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to
mere coincidence. be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
 Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding party entitled to the avails of the suit."9 The interest of
of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an
of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to action for partition which the latter filed against the former.
her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza 10 The case concerned the properties inherited by
Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that respondent from her parents.
petitioner cannot inherit from him through intestate  Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable
succession. to the present case. A close reading of this provision
shows that it applies to instances in which the father
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B. impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision,
CATOTAL, respondent. however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed
G.R. No. 138493 | June 15, 2000 offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and
THIRD DIVISION shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In
other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that
FACTS: petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to
 Respondent filed before the RTC a petition for the establish that the former is not the latter's child at all.
cancellation of the entry of birth of petitioner Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner's
o Respondent contended that she is the only filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa; that a a place.
baby girl, herein petitioner, was delivered by  In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court ruled
"hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and thus:
Hermogena Babiera and without the o Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of
knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family
mother of the child and a housemaid of Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained.
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, These articles provide:
caused the registration/recording of the facts of o A careful reading of the above articles will show
birth of her child, by simulating that she was the that they do not contemplate a situation, like in
child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old the instant case, where a child is alleged not to
and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made be the child of nature or biological child of a
certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a

166 of 255 | P a g e
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies
as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ
the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was AGUILAR, respondents.
physically impossible for him to have sexual G.R. No. 105625 | January 24, 1994
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 SECOND DIVISION
days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for FACTS:
biological or other scientific reasons, the child  Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned
could not have been his child; (3) that in case various properties in Laguna. Isabel and Vicente died in
of children conceived insemination, the written 1982 and 1989, respectively.
authorization or ratification by either parent was  PRs Victoria and Feoor, Vicente’s sister and nephew,
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, respectively filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 administration
and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of  Petitioner opposed the petition, averring that she is the
the prescriptive period within which the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of
husband or any of his heirs should file the administering his estate.
action impugning the legitimacy of said child. o tried to prove that she is the only legitimate
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
when it refused to apply these articles to the Chipongian. She submitted documentary
case at bench. For the case at bench is not one evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of
where the heirs of the late Vicente are Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal Certificate
contending that petitioner is not his child by (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and
Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that Information Sheet for Membership with the
petitioner was not horn to Vicente and Isabel. GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his
Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4) School
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in Records
the impugned decision is apropos, viz: o also testified that the said spouses reared an
o "Petitioners" recourse to Article 263 of the New continuously treated her as their legitimate
Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is daughter
not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an  PRs  tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence,
action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their
this case because this is not an action to marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years of
impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a
of the private respondents to claim their noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless o primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder
deceased aunt. They do not claim that sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years of age,
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate 2 categorically declared that petitioner was not
child of the deceased, but that she is not the the biological child of the said spouses who
decedent's child at all. Being neither [a] legally were unable to physically procreate.
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural  RTC  in favor of petitioner
child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza o dismissed the private respondents petition for
Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the letters and administration and declared
deceased. 12 (Emphasis supplied.) petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole
heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and
ISSUE # 2: Whether Article 170 of the Family Code may be applied Isabel Chipongian.
in the present case in that the action to assail petitioner’s legitimacy o relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family
has already prescribed. Code.
 CA  reversed
HELD # 2: NO. o Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter
 She cites Article 170 of the Family Code which provides or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O.
the prescriptive period for such action: Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore,
o Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O.
the child shall be brought within one year from Benitez. Her opposition to the petition for the
the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the appointment of an administrator of the intestate
civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is,
any of his heirs, should reside in the city or consequently, DENIED
municipality where the birth took place or was
recorded. ISSUE # 1: Whether Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family
o If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs Code may be applied in the present case which involves the
do not reside at the place of birth as defined in issuance of letters of administration for the settlement of the estate
the first paragraph or where it was recorded, of the deceased.
the period shall be two years if they should
reside in the Philippines; and three years if HELD # 1: NO.
abroad. If the birth of the child has been  Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164,
concealed from or was unknown to the 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench
husband or his heirs, the period shall be cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
counted from the discovery or knowledge of the o Art. 164. Children conceived or born during
birth of the child or of the fact of registration of the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
said birth, whichever is earlier.  Children conceived as a result of
 This argument is bereft of merit. The present action artificial insemination of the wife with
involves the cancellation of petitioner's Birth Certificate; it sperm of the husband or that of a
does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive donor or both are likewise legitimate
period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not children of the husband and his wife,
apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does provided, that both of them
not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio. authorized or ratified such

167 of 255 | P a g e
insemination in a written instrument as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it
executed and signed by them before is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said
the birth of the child. The instrument child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him
shall be recorded in the civil registry to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first
together with the birth certificate of 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
the child. birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
o Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that
only on the following grounds: in case of children conceived through artificial
 1) That it was physically impossible insemination, the written authorization or ratification by
for the husband to have sexual either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
intercourse with his wife within the violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and
first 120 days of the 300 days which 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the
immediately preceded the birth of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his
child because oFacts: heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of
 a)the physical incapacity said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err
of the husband to have when it refused to apply these articles to the case at
sexual intercourse with his bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs
wife; of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his
 b)the fact that the husband child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
and wife were living petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling
separately in such a way in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166
that sexual intercourse SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
was not possible; or apropos, viz.:
 c)serious illness of the o Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New
husband, which absolutely Civil Code [now Article 170 of the Family Code]
prevented sexual is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to
intercourse. an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable
 2) That it is proved that for biological to this case because this is not an action to
or other scientific reasons, the child impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action
could not have been that of the of the private respondents to claim their
husband except in the instance inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
provided in the second paragraph of deceased aunt. They do not claim that
Article 164; or petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate
 3) That in case of children conceived child of the deceased, but that she is not the
through artificial insemination, the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally
written authorization or ratification of adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural
either parent was obtained through child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
or undue influence. deceased.
o Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy
of the child shall be brought within one year ISSUE # 2: Whether petitioner was able to sufficiently show that she
from the knowledge of the birth or its recording was a legitimate child of the deceased.
in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper
case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city HELD # 2: NO.
or municipality where the birth took place or  We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court
was recorded. that petitioner was not the biological child or child of
 If the husband or, in his default, all of nature of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
his heirs do not reside at the place of Chipongian. The appellate court exhaustively dissected
birth as defined in the first paragraph the evidence of the parties as follows:
or where it was recorded, the period o . . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say
shall be two years if they should that appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to
reside in the Philippines; and three establish her biological and blood kinship with
years if abroad. If the birth of the child the aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on
has been concealed from or was record is strong and convincing that she is not,
unknown to the husband or his heirs, but that said couple being childless and
the period shall be counted from the desirous as they were of having a child, the late
discovery or knowledge of the birth of Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from
the child or of the fact of registration somewhere while still a baby, and without he
of said birth, which ever is earlier. and his wife's legally adopting her treated,
o Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may cared for, reared, considered, and loved her as
impugn the filiation of the child within the period their own true child, giving her the status as not
prescribed in the preceding Article only in the so, such that she herself had believed that she
following case: was really their daughter and entitled to inherit
 1) If the husband should die before from them as such.
the expiration of the period fixed for  The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the
bringing his action; following:
 2) If he should die after the filing of o First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that
the complaint, without having Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant
desisted therefrom; or and, therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel's
 3) If the child was born after the own only brother and sibling, Dr. Lino
death of the husband. Chipongian, admitted that his sister had
 A careful reading of the above articles will show that they already been married for ten years and was
do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, already about 36 years old and still she has not
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or begotten or still could not bear a child, so that
biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles he even had to refer her to the late Dr.
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies Constantino Manahan, a well-known and

168 of 255 | P a g e
eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth
of his mother and wife, who treated his sister certificate, should the child not have been born
for a number of years. There is likewise the in a hospital under the experienced, skillful and
testimony of the elder sister of the deceased caring hands of Isabel's obstetrician-
Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria Benitez Lirio, who gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan, since
then, being a teacher, helped him (he being the delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel
only boy and the youngest of the children of would have been difficult and quite risky to her
their widowed mother) through law school, and health and even life? How come, then, that as
whom Vicente and his wife highly respected appearing in appellee's birth certificate,
and consulted on family matters, that her Marissa was supposedly born at the Benitez
brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna,
childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest with no physician or even a midwife attending?
daughter and when she refused, they looked for o At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that
a baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found it has become a practice in recent times for
two baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl as people who want to avoid the expense and
she feared a boy might grow up unruly and trouble of a judicial adoption to simply register
uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought the child as their supposed child in the civil
home a baby girl and told his elder sister registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez, though a lawyer
Victoria he would register the baby as his and himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble
his wife's child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa
already 77 years old and too weak to travel and through court proceedings by merely putting
come to court in San Pablo City, so that the himself and his wife as the parents of the child
taking of her testimony by the presiding judge in her birth certificate. Or perhaps he had
of the lower court had to be held at her intended to legally adopt the child when she
residence in Parañaque, MM. Considering, her grew a little older but did not come around
advanced age and weak physical condition at doing so either because he was too busy or for
the time she testified in this case, Victoria some other reason. But definitely, the mere
Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly trustworthy registration of a child in his or her birth
and credible, for as one who may be called by certificate as the child of the supposed parents
her Creator at any time, she would hardly be is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the
interested in material things anymore and can child the status of an adopted child and the
be expected not to lie, especially under her oath legal rights of such child, and even amounts of
as a witness. There were also several simulation of the child's birth or falsification of
disinterested neighbors of the couple Vicente his or her birth certificate, which is a public
O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, document.
Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and o Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the
Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified in this real, biological daughter of the late Vicente O.
case and declared that they used to see Isabel Benitez and his wife Isabel Chipongian, why did
almost everyday especially as she had he and Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr. Nilo
drugstore in the ground floor of her house, but Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25,
they never saw her to have been pregnant, in 1982, state in the extrajudicial settlement
1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was o Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we
allegedly born, according to her birth certificate are the sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL
Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that it is also CHIPONGIAN because she died without
true with the rest of their townmates. descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian,
Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's placed on a witness stand by appellants,
personal beautician who used to set her hair testified that it was his brother-in-law Atty.
once a week at her (Isabel's) residence, Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said
likewise declared that she did not see Isabel document and that he signed the same only
ever become pregnant, that she knows that because the latter told him to do so (p. 24, tsn,
Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when Nov. 22, 1990). But why would Atty. Benitez
she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day make such a statement in said document,
she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's unless appellee Marissa Benitez is not really
hair, she was surprised and asked the latter his and his wife's daughter and descendant
where the baby came from, and "she told me and, therefore, not his deceased wife's legal
that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez and heir? As for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely
told me not to tell about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29, explained that he signed said document without
1990). understanding completely the meaning of the
o The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and words "descendant and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn,
growing big with child, as well as her delivering Nov. 22, 1990). This we cannot believe, Dr.
a baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who
the public eye, and so is the fact that a woman has even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn,
never became pregnant and could not have, Dec. 13, 1990). Obviously, Dr. Chipongian was
therefore, delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she just trying to protect the interests of appellee,
is suddenly seen mothering and caring for a the foster-daughter of his deceased sister and
baby as if it were her own, especially at the brother-in-law, as against those of the latter's
rather late age of 36 (the age of Isabel collateral blood relatives.
Chipongian when appellee Marissa Benitez o Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if
was allegedly born), we can be sure that she is appellee Marissa Benitez is really the daughter
not the true mother of that baby. and only legal heir of the spouses Vicente O.
o Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, that the latter,
the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the before her death, would write a note to her
informant, is highly questionable and husband and Marissa stating that:
suspicious. For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who  even without any legal papers, I wish
wads already 36 years old at the time of the that my husband and my child or only
child's supposed birth, was truly the mother of daughter will inherit what is legally

169 of 255 | P a g e
my own property, in case I die partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot
without a will, No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate.
 and in the same handwritten note,  Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco,
she even implored her husband — herein private respondents, filed with the lower court an
 that any inheritance due him from my amended complaint claiming that the said lot was owned
property — when he die — to make by their common father, Lupo, thus they were deprived of
our own daughter his sole heir. This their respective shares in the lots.
do [sic] not mean what he legally  Petitioners’ motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
owns or his inherited property. I cause of action, contending that the complaint was one
leave him to decide for himself for recognition of natural children, was dismissed by the
regarding those. trial court.
 We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really  On appeal, CA rendered a decision declaring all the
the daughter of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including
Isabel Chipongian, it would not have been necessary for respondents herein as entitled to equal shares in the
Isabel to write and plead for the foregoing requests to her estate of the decedent.
husband, since Marissa would be their legal heir by
operation of law. Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to Issue: W/N respondents herein are the legitimate children of the
implore and supplicate her husband to give appellee decedent
although without any legal papers her properties when
she dies, and likewise for her husband to give Marissa the Held: Yes
properties that he would inherit from her (Isabel), since  The Civil Code provides for the manner under which
she well knew that Marissa is not truly their daughter and legitimate filiation may be proven.
could not be their legal heir unless her (Isabel's) husband o However, considering the effectivity of the
makes her so. Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar
 Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister must be decided under a new if not entirely
Victoria Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother dissimilar set of rules because the parties have
Vicente gave the date been overtaken by events, to use the popular
 December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth certificate phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
because that date is the birthday of their (Victoria and No. 76873, October 26, 1989).
Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too much of a coincidence o Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there
for the child Marissa and the mother of Vicente and are only two classes of children — legitimate
Victoria to have the same birthday unless it is true, as and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among
Victoria testified, that Marissa was only registered by various types of illegitimate children have been
Vicente as his and his wife's child and that they gave her eliminated
the birth date of Vicente's mother.  Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of
 We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by legitimate children may be established by the record of
the evidence on record. The weight of these findings was birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or
not negated by documentary evidence presented by the by the open and continuous possession of the status of a
petitioner, the most notable of which is her Certificate of legitimate child.
Live Birth (Exh. "3") purportedly showing that her parents  Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the
were the late private respondents.
 Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate o Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth
registered on December 28, 1954 appears to have been referred to in the said article. Again, no
signed by the deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article evidence which tends to disprove facts
410 of the New Civil Code, however, "the books making contained therein was adduced before the
up the Civil Registry and all documents relating thereto lower court.
shall be considered public documents and shall be prima o In the case of the two other private
facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As related respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not
above, the totality of contrary evidence, presented by the have presented in evidence any of the
private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the documents required by Article 172 but they
content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said continuously enjoyed the status of children of
rebutting evidence, the most telling was the Deed of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased brother Jacinto.
Isabel Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982  In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion
by Vicente Benitez, and than that private respondents are legitimate children and
 Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation
document, they stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition
deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without is inapplicable to this case.
descendants or ascendants". In executing this Deed,
Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of CHAPTERR 2. PROOF OF FILIATION (Articles 172-174),
Live Birth of petitioner where it appeared that he was Evidence, Rules of Court; Succession
petitioner's father. The repudiation was made twenty-
eight years after he signed petitioner's Certificate of Live Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
Birth. the following:

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners, vs. (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN judgment; or
MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents. (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
G.R. No. L-57062 | January 24, 1992 (3D) private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

Facts: In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
 Lupo Mariategui, who contracted 3 marriages during his be proved by:
lifetime, died without will.
 Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
herein petitioners, executed a deed of extrajudicial child; or

170 of 255 | P a g e
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. xxxx
(265a, 266a, 267a)  Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of
Randy identifying Antonio as the father. However, said
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, same.
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute o It is settled that "a certificate of live birth
the action. purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competent evidence of paternity when
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right: there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of said
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity certificate."
with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames; o Aside from Antonio’s denial in having any
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in participation in the preparation of the document
proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the as well as the absence of his signature thereon,
provisions of this Code on Support; and respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights that Antonio indeed supplied certain entries in
granted to them by the Civil Code. (264a) Randy’s birth certificate. Besides, the several
unexplained discrepancies in Antonio’s
ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner, vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY personal circumstances as reflected in the
PERLA, Respondents. subject birth certificate are manifestations of
Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation.
G.R. No. 172471 | November 12, 2012 (2D)
Most important, it was Mirasol who signed as
informant thereon which she confirmed on the
Facts:
witness stand.
 Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor
 Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his
son, Randy (collectively respondents), filed before the
illegitimate filiation.
RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio Perla.
o That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy
 They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio
called Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand
lived together as common-law spouses for two years. As
while Antonio hugged him and promised to
a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born on
support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him
November 11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as a relative and was good to him during his
as seaman, he abandoned them and failed to give any one-week stay in her place, cannot be
support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio considered as indications of Randy’s open and
be ordered to support Randy. continuous possession of the status of an
 In his Answer with Counterclaim, Antonio, who is now illegitimate child under the second paragraph of
married and has a family of his own, denied having Article 172(1).
fathered Randy. o To prove open and continuous possession of
 RTC granted the petition. the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
 On appeal, CA upheld Randy’s illegitimate filiation based evidence of the manifestation of the permanent
on the certified true copies of his birth certificate and of intention of the supposed father to consider the
his baptismal certificate identifying Antonio as his father. child as his, by continuous and clear
o According to the appellate court, while these manifestations of parental affection and care,
documents do not bear the signature of which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such
Antonio, they are proofs that Antonio is the acts must be of such a nature that they reveal
known, imputed and identified father of Randy. not only the conviction of paternity, but also the
apparent desire to have and treat the child as
Issue: W/N Randy’s illegitimate filiation was established, entitling such in all relations in society and in life, not
him of support from Antonio accidentally, but continuously.
o Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly
Held: No hugged Randy and promised to support him
 The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 cannot be considered as proof of continuous
and 175 of the Family Code which provide as follows: possession of the status of a child.
o To emphasize, the father’s conduct towards
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is his son must be spontaneous and
established by any of the following: uninterrupted for this ground to exist.
o Here, except for that singular occasion in which
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a they met, there are no other acts of Antonio
final judgment; or treating Randy as his son. Neither can
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public Antonio’s paternity be deduced from how his
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court,
by the parent concerned. Lelita’s actuations could have been done due
to charity or some other reasons.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate  Anent Randy’s baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with
filiation shall be proved by: the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonio’s paternity
of Randy.
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of o Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of
a legitimate child; or participation of the supposed father in the
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and preparation of a baptismal certificate renders
special laws. this document incompetent to prove paternity.
o Wwhile a baptismal certificate may be
xxxx considered a public document, it can only serve
as evidence of the administration of the
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their sacrament on the date specified but not the
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s
evidence as legitimate children. paternity. Thus, baptismal certificates are per

171 of 255 | P a g e
se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation Tirol. In addition, the latter states that said documents are
and they cannot be admitted indirectly as the birth certificates of Jonathan Christopher Harper and
circumstantial evidence to prove the same. Christian Fredrik Harper issued by the Registrar Office of
 This Court cannot likewise agree with the RTC’s Oslo, Norway on March 23, 2004.
conclusion that Antonio fathered Randy merely on the  Petitioner assails the CA’s ruling that respondents
basis of his admission that he had sexual encounters with substantially complied with the rules on the authentication
Mirasol. Neither does it agree with the CA that the of the proofs of marriage and filiation set by Section 24
inconsistencies in Antonio’s testimony with regard to the and Section 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court because
number of times he had sexual intercourse with Mirasol the legal custodian did not duly attest that Exhibit Q-1 and
are good reasons to disregard his denials and uphold the Exhibit R-1 were the correct copies of the originals on file,
respondents’ claims. It is well to stress that as plaintiff, and because no certification accompanied the documents
Mirasol has the burden of proving her affirmative stating that "such officer has custody of the originals." It
allegation that Antonio is the father of her son Randy. contends that respondents did not competently prove
 All told, it is clear that respondents failed to establish their being Harper’s surviving heirs by reason of such
Randy’s illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, the order documents being hearsay and incompetent.
for Antonio to support Randy has no basis. o Petitioner’s challenge against respondents’
documentary evidence on marriage and
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., Petitioner, vs. heirship is not well-taken.
ELLEN JOHANNE HARPER, JONATHAN CHRISTOPHER o Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 provide:
HARPER, and RIGOBERTO GILLERA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189998 | August 29, 2012 (1D) Section 24. Proof of official record. — The
record of public documents referred to in
Facts: paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
 The late Christian Harper was murdered in the for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
establishment of herein petitioner. official publication thereof or by a copy attested
 Respondents then commenced a suit to recover various by the officer having the legal custody of the
damages from petitioner. record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
 RTC granted the petition. This was affirmed by CA. the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
 In this petition, petitioner questions the evidence certificate that such officer has the custody. If
presented by respondents in proving that they are the the office in which the record is kept is in a
widow and son of Harper. foreign country, the certificate may be made by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
Issue: W/N respondents were able to establish their legal general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
relationship with the decedent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
Held: Yes which the record is kept, and authenticated by
 The Revised Rules of Court provides that public the seal of his office.
documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record. Section 25. What attestation of copy must state.
o The attestation must state, in substance, that —Whenever a copy of a document or record is
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a attested for the purpose of evidence, the
specific part thereof, as the case may be. attestation must state, in substance, that the
o The attestation must be under the official seal copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the attestation must be under the official seal of the
seal of such court. attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
 If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
copy must be accompanied with a certificate that such such court.
officer has the custody. o Although the questioned documents were not
o If the office in which the record is kept is in a attested by the officer having the legal custody
foreign country, the certificate may be made by of the record or by his deputy in the manner
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul required in Section 25 of Rule 132, and said
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent documents did not comply with the requirement
or by any officer in the foreign service of the under Section 24 of Rule 132 to the effect that
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in if the record was not kept in the Philippines a
which the record is kept, and authenticated by certificate of the person having custody must
the seal of his office. accompany the copy of the document that was
 The documents involved in this case are all kept in duly attested stating that such person had
Norway. These documents have been authenticated by custody of the documents, the deviation was
the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; they bear not enough reason to reject the utility of the
the official seal of the Ministry and signature of one, Tanja documents for the purposes they were
Sorlie. The documents are accompanied by an intended to serve.
Authentication by the Consul, Embassy of the Republic of o Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were extracts from the
the Philippines in Stockholm, Sweden to the effect that, registry of births of Oslo, Norway issued on
Tanja Sorlie is duly authorized to legalize official March 23, 2004 and signed by Y. Ayse B.
Nordal, Registrar, and corresponded to
documents for the Ministry.
respondent Jonathan Christopher Harper and
 Exhibits "Q" and "R" are extracts of the register of births
victim Christian Fredrik Harper, respectively.
of both Jonathan Christopher Harper and the late Exhibit Q explicitly stated that Jonathan was the
Christian Fredrik Harper, respectively, wherein the former son of Christian Fredrik Harper and Ellen
explicitly declares that Jonathan Christopher is the son of Johanne Harper, while Exhibit R attested to the
Christian Fredrik and Ellen Johanne Harper. Said birth of Christian Fredrik Harper on December
documents bear the signature of the keeper, Y. Ayse B. 4, 1968.
Nordal with the official seal of the Office of the Registrar o Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were authenticated on
of Oslo, and the authentication of Tanja Sorlie of the March 29, 2004 by the signatures of Tanja
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, which were further Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
authenticated by Philippine Consul Marian Jocelyn R.
172 of 255 | P a g e
Norway as well as by the official seal of that  Herrera v. Alba - Four significant procedural aspects of a
office. In turn, Consul Marian Jocelyn R. Tirol of traditional paternity action that parties have to face:
the Philippine Consulate in Stockholm, Sweden o A prima facie case - exists if a woman declares
authenticated the signatures of Tanja Sorlie — supported by corroborative proof — that she
and the official seal of the Royal Ministry of had sexual relations with the putative father; at
Foreign Affairs of Norway on Exhibit Q and this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the
Exhibit R, explicitly certifying to the authority of putative father
Tanja Sorlie "to legalize official documents for o Affirmative defenses available to the putative
the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of father are:
Norway."  incapability of sexual relations with
 Petitioner urges the Court to resolve the apparent conflict the mother due to either physical
between the rulings in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of absence or impotency, or
Appeals (Cabais) and in Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of  that the mother had sexual relations
Appeals (Conti) establishing filiation through a baptismal with other men at the time of
certificate. conception
o Petitioner’s urging is not warranted, both o Presumption of legitimacy, and
because there is no conflict between the rulings o Physical resemblance between the putative
in Cabais and Conti, and because neither father and the child.
Cabais nor Conti is relevant herein.  Respondent presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness, who
o Conti did not treat a baptismal certificate, corroborated the former’s testimony that the petitioner
standing alone, as sufficient to prove filiation; and the respondent had intimate relationship.
on the contrary, Conti expressly held that a  On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had
baptismal certificate had evidentiary value to sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it
prove filiation if considered alongside other occurred on a much later date than the respondent
evidence of filiation. As such, a baptismal asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the
certificate alone is not sufficient to resolve a respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant
disputed filiation. already in September 1994 when he was informed of the
o Unlike Cabais and Conti, this case has pregnancy.
respondents presenting several documents, o However, the petitioner failed to substantiate
like the birth certificates of Harper and his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of
respondent Jonathan Harper, the marriage promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot
certificate of Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, be given credence for lack of evidentiary
and the probate court certificate, all of which support. The petitioner’s denial cannot
were presumably regarded as public overcome the respondent’s clear and
documents under the laws of Norway. Such categorical assertions.
documentary evidence sufficed to competently  Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of
establish the relationship and filiation under the
a witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety
standards of our Rules of Court.
instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering
a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and
CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner, vs. DIVINA BULING,
to anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In
Respondent.
ascertaining the facts established by a witness,
G.R. No. 165166 | August 15, 2012 (2D)
everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect
examinations must be calibrated and considered."
Facts:
o Evidently, the totality of the respondent's
 Respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint for
testimony positively and convincingly shows
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite,
that no real inconsistency exists. The
claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. respondent has consistently asserted that she
 In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity started intimate sexual relations with the
of Gliffze. petitioner sometime in September 1993.
 RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence  Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a
proving Gliffze’s filiation. matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his
 CA reversed RTC’s decision. Hence this petition. child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Issue: W/N it is sufficient for respondent to establish a prima facie JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner, vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent.
case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through a
testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, G.R. No. 190710 | June 6, 2011 (2D)
the petitioner, at the time of her conception
Facts:
Held: Yes  In a petition to establish legitimate filiation (with Motion for
 One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing), petitioner
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register alleged that when his mother, Elsie Uy, migrated to
or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public Manila, the latter got acquainted with respondent,
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed eventually got pregnant and gave birth to petitioner. The
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous name of petitioner’s father was not stated in petitioner’s
possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told
child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court petitioner that his father is respondent.
and special laws.  RTC dismissed the case. Petitioner failed to establish a
o We have held that such other proof of one's prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not
filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a personally declare that she had sexual relations with
judicial admission, a family bible in which his respondent, and petitioner’s statement as to what his
name has been entered, common reputation mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b)
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent;
the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of and (c) although petitioner used the surname of
proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules respondent, there was no allegation that he was treated
of Court." as the child of respondent by the latter or his family.

173 of 255 | P a g e
 On appeal, CA reversed RTC’s ruling. The CA remarked evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed
that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and
filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order to validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary
abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the
to show that the four significant procedural aspects of a available objections to the admission of DNA test results
traditional paternity action had been met. The CA further as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA
held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the evidence."
petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case o Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely
provides for conditions that are aimed to
Issue: W/N petitioner should first show that the four significant safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met DNA testing.
before DNA testing can be ordered o This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the
Held: No behest of any party, including law enforcement
 Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
Evidence does not require that there must be a prior proof commenced.
of filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds o This does not mean, however, that a DNA
that the CA erroneously relied on the four significant testing order will be issued as a matter of right
procedural aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated in if, during the hearing, the said conditions are
Herrera v. Alba. Petitioner avers that these procedural established.
aspects are not applicable at this point of the proceedings  It should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing
because they are matters of evidence that should be order remains discretionary upon the court. The court
taken up during the trial. may, for example, consider whether there is absolute
 The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the
requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court
direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be
stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno),
action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action Petitioner, vs. PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by
when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right JESUSA PUNO, Respondent
of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, G.R. No. 177066 | September 11, 2009
and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. Facts:
 The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied  Petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of
upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent. Carlos L. Puno, who was an incorporator of respondent
Respondent, however, contends that the allegations in Puno Enterprises, Inc., initiated a complaint for specific
the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioner’s performance against respondent.
personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of  Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased with
evidence that cannot be determined at this point but only the latter’s common-law wife, Amelia Puno.
during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence.  As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and
 The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent.
significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity  Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
case which parties have to face has been widely petitioner did not have the legal personality to sue
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. because his birth certificate names him as "Joselito Musni
o A party is confronted by these so-called Muno."
procedural aspects during trial, when the  The trial court granted the complaint.
parties have presented their respective  CA however ordered its dismissal: Petitioner was not able
evidence. They are matters of evidence that to establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L.
cannot be determined at this initial stage of the Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish intervention of and the participatory acknowledgment of
filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation paternity by Carlos L. Puno.
that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie
case—the first procedural aspect in a paternity Issue: W/N petitioner was able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to
case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie the deceased stockholder, thus, entitling him the right to inspect
case is built by a party’s evidence and not by respondent corporation’s books and receive dividends on the stocks
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading. owned by Carlos L. Puno
 Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss
the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA Held: No
testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by  A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is when there is no showing that the putative father had a
warranted considering that no such order has yet been hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil
issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
said case for hearing. illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
 At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to o As correctly observed by the CA, only
allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well petitioner’s mother supplied the data in the birth
taken and deserves the Court’s attention. In light of this certificate and signed the same. There was no
observation, we find that there is a need to supplement evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged
the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving petitioner as his son.
motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and  As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed
other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of that it can only serve as evidence of the administration of
whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court the sacrament on the date specified but not of the veracity
can issue a DNA testing order. of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity.
 The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the
Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA
174 of 255 | P a g e
 In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten
enumerate the persons who are entitled to the inspection instrument signed by the parent concerned.
of corporate books. o The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child
o Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do by his or her parent needs no further court
not automatically become stockholders of the action and is, therefore, not subject to the
corporation and acquire the rights and limitation that the action for recognition be
privileges of the deceased as shareholder of brought during the lifetime of the putative
the corporation. The stocks must be distributed parent.
first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the o Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other
transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate
books of the corporation. child of his parents and must be brought during
 Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this the lifetime of the presumed parents.
case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he  Petitioner’s thesis is essentially based on her contention
would still not be allowed to inspect respondent’s books that by Ismael Tayag’s death, respondent’s illegitimate
and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, filiation and necessarily, her interest in the decedent’s
absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the estate which the Rules require to be material and direct,
shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. may no longer be established. Petitioner, however,
This would only be possible if petitioner has been overlooks the fact that respondent’s successional rights
recognized as an heir and has participated in the may be established not just by a judicial action to compel
settlement of the estate of the deceased. recognition but also by proof that she had been voluntarily
VICTORIA C. TAYAG, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD A. TAYAG- acknowledged and recognized as an illegitimate child.
GALLOR, Respondent  Respondent in this case had not been given the
G.R. No. 174680 | March 24, 2008 (2D) opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had
been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her
Facts: deceased father because of petitioner’s opposition to her
 Respondent herein, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses.
petition for the issuance of letters of administration over There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is
the estate of Ismael Tayag, alleging that she is one of the actually one to compel recognition which had already
3 illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether
C. Angeles. indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain
 Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she the suit by reason of the decedent’s voluntary
purchased the properties subject of the petition using her acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation.
own money. She claimed that she and Ismael Tayag got  We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is
married in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA. an illegitimate child of the decedent suffices even without
o She also averred that it is necessary to allege further stating that she has been so recognized or
that respondent was acknowledged and acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of
recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate failure to state a cause of action in the complaint
child. There being no such allegation, the action hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein.
becomes one to compel recognition which o Assuming the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that
cannot be brought after the death of the respondent is the decedent’s illegitimate child,
putative father. her interest in the estate as such would
 The motion of petitioner was denied. CA upheld its denial. definitely be material and direct. The appellate
court was, therefore, correct in allowing the
Issue: W/N respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of proceedings to continue, ruling that,
administration sufficiently states a cause of action considering that "respondent still has the duty to prove the
respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of allegation (that she is an illegitimate child of the
the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or decedent), just as the petitioner has the right to
recognized as such by the latter disprove it, in the course of the settlement
proceedings."
Held: Yes
 Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner, vs. Minor JOANNE
the issuance of letters of administration must be filed by RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C.
an interested person. Diaz, respondent
o Saguinsin v. Lindayag: An interested party is G.R. No. 171713 | December 17, 2007 (3D)
one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the Facts:
estate, such as a creditor. This interest,  A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for
furthermore, must be material and direct, not support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne
merely indirect or contingent. Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and
 Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong.
the issuance of letters of administration is dependent on  RTC: Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant
a fact which has not been established or worse, can no Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should support
longer be established, such contingent interest does not plaintiff.
make her an interested party. Here lies the complication  CA: DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence
in the case which the appellate court had not discussed, affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method
although its disposition of the case is correct. of settling the present paternity dispute. Considering,
 Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of however, the untimely demise of defendant-appellant
administration is a suit for the settlement of the intestate during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in
estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field
maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is of DNA analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure
entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child of with whatever remaining DNA samples from the
the decedent which, in turn, may be established through deceased defendant alleged to be the putative father of
voluntary or compulsory recognition. plaintiff minor whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of
 Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a this action for support.
record of birth appearing in the civil register, a final

175 of 255 | P a g e
Issue: W/N DNA analysis, as ordered by the CA in remanding the (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to
case to the trial court, is proper in order to prove filiation of Joanne the case;
despite the fact of death of Rogelio (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now
Held: Yes requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to
 As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination DNA testing, but the results may require
of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor confirmation for good reasons;
of the said minor. (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
 Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to technique;
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as to produce new information that is relevant to
in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving the proper resolution of the case; and
paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which
father is the biological father of the child. the court may consider as potentially affecting
o There are four significant procedural aspects of the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
a traditional paternity action which parties have  From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the
to face: a prima facie case, affirmative petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate
physical resemblance between the putative biological samples of his DNA.
father and child.  Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological
 The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as samples as enumerated above as may be available, may
follows: be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not
shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of
by any of the following: DNA testing.

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, Petitioner, vs. MARIA CLARISSA
final judgment; or POSADA, in her own behalf, and as mother of minor VERNA AIZA
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public POSADA, CONSTANTINO POSADA and FRANCISCA POSADA,
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed Respondents.
by the parent concerned. G.R. No. 159785 | April 27, 2007 (2D)

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate Facts:


filiation shall be proved by:  Herein respondents filed a Complaint for Damages
coupled with Support Pendente Lite against petitioner,
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of alleging that the latter is the natural father of Verna Aiza
a legitimate child; or Posada.
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and  RTC granted the complaint. Verceles appealed to the
special laws. Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with
modification, specifying the party to whom the damages
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their was awarded.
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. Issues:
 There had been divergent and incongruent statements W/N paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for
and assertions bandied about by the parties to the present damages with support pendente lite
petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics,
and the availability of new technology, it can now be W/N filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is of petitioner was proven
the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
 Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA
analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the definitive Held: Yes; Yes
key to the resolution of the issue of support for minor  Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of
Joanne. Verna Aiza Posada as father and that it was respondent
 Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial Clarissa who placed his name on the birth certificate as
court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of the father without his consent. He further contends the
order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions
case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has of paternity but mere expressions of concern and advice.
already died.  It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give
o To our mind, the alleged impossibility of meaning to a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce
complying with the order of remand for the form and go into the substance thereof. In determining
purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the
than real. Petitioner’s argument is without basis averments in the petition and the character of the relief
especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence sought, that are controlling.
allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu  A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that
proprio or upon application of any person who although its caption states "Damages coupled with
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, Support Pendente Lite," Clarissa’s averments therein, her
thus: meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous
advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – of her child, his letters, her demand for support for her
The appropriate court may, at any time, either child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of
motu proprio or on application of any person paternity.
who has a legal interest in the matter in  We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
issue after due hearing and notice to the parties of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
upon a showing of the following: consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and
no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
176 of 255 | P a g e
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
not require a separate action for judicial approval.  CA: Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are
 The letters of petitioner are declarations that lead governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an
nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza. action for recognition to be filed within four years after the
Although petitioner used an alias in these letters, the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent
similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis the enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
annotation at the back of petitioner’s fading photograph
as a youth is unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye Issue: W/N CA erred in ruling that respondents had four years from
will come to the conclusion that they were all written by the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided
one and the same person, petitioner, as found by the in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by
courts a quo. the express provisions of the Family Code
 We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted
his affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters Held: No
between them, and his giving her money during her  Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an
pregnancy. illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the
 Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on
establishing filiation. They are as follows: whether the former was still a minor when the latter died.
Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established chance to dispute the claim, considering that "illegitimate
by any of the following: children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and
without the legitimate family being aware of their
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given
final judgment; or the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead."
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed  Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that
by the parent concerned. rights that have already vested prior to its enactment
should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by: ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
a legitimate child; or  The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was
special laws. granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already
vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their answer is affirmative.
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same  A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute,
evidence as legitimate children. complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no
 The action must be brought within the same period obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in
specified in Article 173, except when the action is based itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x."
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the  Respondent however contends that the filing of an action
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged for recognition is procedural in nature and that "as a
parent. general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from
 The letters are private handwritten instruments of procedural laws."
petitioner which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under o Fabian v. Desierto: In determining whether a
Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the
o In addition, the array of evidence presented by practice and procedure of the lower courts,
respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive
testimonies, to us, are convincing, and right, the test is whether the rule really
irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, regulates procedure, that is, the judicial
petitioner’s illegitimate child. process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as administering remedy and redress for a
guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent. disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes
G.R. No. 140500 | January 21, 2002 (3D) away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the
rule creates a right such as the right to appeal,
Facts: it may be classified as a substantive matter; but
 The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a if it operates as a means of implementing an
son with his secretary, herein respondent Carolina Alejo. existing right then the rule deals merely with
The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was procedure.
named Adrian Bernabe. o Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold
 Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a
also died the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to
surviving heir. file his petition for recognition within four years
 On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed a from attaining majority age. Therefore, the
complaint praying that Adrian be declared an Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s
acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as right to file an action for recognition, because
such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s that right had already vested prior to its
estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole enactment.
surviving heir.  To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the
 RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the action for recognition of "natural" children. Thus, petitioner
provisions of the Family Code, the complaint is now contends that the provision cannot be availed of by
barred. The trial court added that since the putative father respondent, because at the time of his conception, his
had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in parents were impeded from marrying each other. In other
writing, the action for recognition should have been filed words, he is not a natural child.
177 of 255 | P a g e
o A "natural child" is one whose parents, at the o In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved
time of conception, were not disqualified by any by (1) the open and continuous possession of
legal impediment from marrying each other. the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
o A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 means allowed by the Rules of Court and
has already been frowned upon by this Court in special laws.
the case of Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals,  The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of
which allowed minors to file a case for birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
recognition even if their parents were authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
disqualified from marrying each other. acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action
 Divinagracia v. Rovira: The Court said that the rules on is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just
voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for
 Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
successional rights over spurious ones. However, Rovira tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth,
treats them as equals with respect to other rights, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic
including the right to recognition granted by Article 285. writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of
 To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
minors at the time the Family Code took effect and acknowledgment.
whose putative parent died during their minority are  Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the
thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article deceased, presented to the trial court his Certificate of
285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years Live Birth and a photograph taken during the burial of the
from attaining majority age. This vested right was not deceased.
impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family  Regarding the genuineness and probative value of Exhibit
Code. "D", the trial court made the following findings, affirmed by
 Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the the Appellate Court:
vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on
their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live
respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum, the State Birth No. 477 in the name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the
as parens patriae should protect a minor’s right. original having been testified to by Rosita Vencer, exists
 Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the in the files of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner
Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged since birth enjoyed the open and continuous status of an
father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in acknowledged natural child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he
court. together with his mother was summoned to attend to the
burial as evidenced by a picture of relatives facing the
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE coffin of the deceased with petitioner and his mother in
JUAN "JHONNY" LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the picture. x x x. It was duly proven at the trial that the
the late Maria Locsin Araneta), the successors of the late LOURDES standard signatures presented by oppositors were not in
C. LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA public document and may also be called questioned
and the intestate estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR., document whereas in the certificate of live birth No. 477,
petitioners, vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR., respondent. the signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the original or
G.R. No. 146737 | December 10, 2001 (3D) primary evidence. The anomalous and suspicious
characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate of
Facts: live birth as alleged by oppositors was found was testified
 Respondent Juan Locsin filed with the RTC a "Petition for to and explained by Rosita Vencer of the office of the
Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed Local Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in 1957 and
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Juan requisitioned forms. However, the forms sent to them was
"Jhonny" Locsin, Sr., alleging that he is an acknowledged the 1958 revised form and that she said their office usually
natural child of the late Jhonny Locsin. paste the pages of the bound volume if destroyed. All the
 The heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester doubts regarding the authenticity and genuineness of the
Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, signatures of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and
filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters of the suspicious circumstances of the bound volume were
administration, averring that respondent is not a child or erased due to the explanation of Rosita Vencer.
an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin,  This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.
who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name. o Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to
 To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural Establish a Civil Register), the records of births
child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to be from all cities and municipalities in the
appointed administrator of the intestate estate, Philippines are officially and regularly
respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in
Live Birth, which contains information that respondent's Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars.
father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant Since the records of births cover several
of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures. decades and come from all parts of the country,
 RTC granted the petition. CA affirmed the trial court’s to merely access them in the Civil Registry
ruling. Hence this petition. General requires expertise. To locate one
single birth record from the mass, a regular
Issue: W/N the Certificate of Live Birth presented by respondent employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is
herein is sufficient to prove his filiation, thus entitling him to the highly unlikely that any of these employees in
issuance of the letters of administration Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a
particular 1957 birth record originating from the
Held: No Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
 The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children,  With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by
is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the
civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private those considered by the trial court should have been
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent presented by respondent.
concerned.
178 of 255 | P a g e
 A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the shapes.
Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation.  Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in
However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her
of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical
evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or signatures of petitioners.
nullity.  All these considered, we are constrained to rule that
o In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of
Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was
machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. RENATO CENIDO (deceased), represented by VICTORIA
Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that CENIDOSA, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES AMADEO APACIONADO
office was removed and substituted with a and HERMINIA STA. ANA, respondents.
falsified Certificate of Live Birth. G.R. No. 132474 | November 19, 1999

EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners, vs. Facts:


COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA  Respondent spouses Amadeo Apacionado and Herminia
DIAMANTE, respondents. Sta. Ana filed a complaint against petitioner Renato
G.R. No. 125901 | March 8, 2001 (2D) Cenido for, "Declaration of Ownership, Nullity, with
Damages."
Facts:  Petitioner Cenido answered claiming that he is the
 Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas illegitimate son of Bonifacio Aparato, the deceased owner
corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son, of the subject property and that as Aparato's sole
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., from respondent. surviving heir, he became the owner of the property.
 For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural  The court upheld petitioner Cenido's ownership over the
mother of the child. She said the birth of John Thomas property by virtue of the recognition made by Bonifacio's
was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas then surviving brother, Gavino.
Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4,  On appeal CA reversed the trial court’s decision: The
1989. recognition of Cenido's filiation by Gavino, Bonifacio's
 The trial court concluded that since Angelita and her brother, did not comply with the requirements of the Civil
common-law husband could not have children, the Code and the Family Code
alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside Issue: W/N filiation of Cenido was sufficiently proven
the decision rendered by the trial court.
Held: No
Issue: W/N Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one  The Tax Declaration of the subject property in petitioner
and the same person and is the son of petitioners Cenido's name was issued pursuant to the compromise
judgment of the MTC where Gavino Aparato, Bonifacio's
Held: Yes brother, expressly recognized petitioner Cenido as
 A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that Bonifacio's sole illegitimate son. The compromise
the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to judgment was rendered in 1985, three years after
establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing Bonifacio's demise.
son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.  Under the Civil Code, natural children and illegitimate
 First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children other than natural are entitled to support and
children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the successional rights only when recognized or
birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the acknowledged by the putative parent. Unless recognized,
Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas they have no rights whatsoever against their alleged
Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. parent or his estate.
 Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves  The filiation of illegitimate children may be proved by any
that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. of the forms of recognition of natural children. This
o Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his recognition may be made in three ways:
brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the o voluntarily, which must be express such as that
accident and that Tomas admitted to him that in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. court of record, or in any authentic writing
 Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of o legally, i.e., when a natural child is recognized,
John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of such recognition extends to his or her brothers
the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the and sisters of the full blood
alleged birth of the child. o judicially or compulsorily, which may be
o Under the law, the attending physician or demanded by the illegitimate child of his
midwife in attendance at birth should cause the parents
registration of such birth.  The action for compulsory recognition of the illegitimate
o Only in default of the physician or midwife, can child must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed
the parent register the birth of his child. The parents. This is explicitly provided in Article 285 of the
certificate must be filed with the local civil Civil Code.
registrar within thirty days after the birth.  The illegitimate child can file an action for compulsory
o Significantly, the birth certificate of the child recognition only during the lifetime of the presumed
stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent parent. After the parent's death, the child cannot bring
were legally married on October 31, 1974, in such action, except, however, in only two instances:
Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because o one is when the supposed parent died during
even private respondent had admitted she is a the minority of the child, and
"common-law wife". This false entry puts to o when after the death of the parent, a document
doubt the other data in said birth certificate. should be discovered in which the parent
 Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when recognized the child as his.
the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had

179 of 255 | P a g e
The action must be brought within four years the absence of strong, complete and
from the attainment of majority in the first case, conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.
and from the discovery of the document in the  On the contrary, a baptismal certificate, a private
second case. The requirement that the action document, which, being hearsay, is not a conclusive proof
be filed during the parent's lifetime is to prevent of filiation. It does not have the same probative value as
illegitimate children, on account of strong a record of birth, an official or public document.
temptations to large estates left by dead o In US vs. Evangelista, this Court held that
persons, to claim part of this estate without church registers of births, marriages, and
giving the alleged parent personal opportunity deaths made subsequent to the promulgation
to be heard. It is vital that the parent be heard of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of
for only the parent is in a position to reveal the Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor
true facts surrounding the claimant's are they kept by duly authorized public officials.
conception. o Thus, in this jurisdiction, a certificate of baptism
 In the case at bar, petitioner Cenido did not present any such as the one herein under controversy is no
record of birth, will or any authentic writing to show he was longer regarded with the same evidentiary
voluntarily recognized by Bonifacio as his illegitimate son. value as official records of birth. Moreover, on
o In fact, petitioner admitted on the witness stand this score, jurisprudence is consistent and
that he had no document to prove Bonifacio's uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of
recognition, much less his filiation. baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition.
o The voluntary recognition of petitioner's filiation  The unjustified failure to present the birth certificate
by Bonifacio's brother before the MTC does not instead of the baptismal certificate now under
qualify as a "statement in a court of record." consideration or to otherwise prove filiation by any of the
Under the law, this statement must be made means recognized by law weigh heavily against
personally by the parent himself or herself, not respondents.
by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the o In Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary this Court declared that a baptismal certificate
declaration by the parent, or if the parent is evidence only to prove the administration of
refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the the sacrament on the dates therein specified,
paternity or maternity of children born outside but not the veracity of the declarations therein
wedlock stated with respect to his kinsfolk. The same is
conclusive only of the baptism administered,
HEIRS OF PEDRO CABAIS, NAMELY: MAGDALENA BONTO according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by
CABAIS, ANTONIO CABAIS, PABLO CABAIS, ANDREA CABAIS, the priest who baptized subject child, but it does
EFREN CABAIS, AGAPITA CABAIS, and ANDRES CABAIS, not prove the veracity of the declarations and
represented by AVELINA CABAIS, petitioners, vs. THE statements contained in the certificate
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONSTANCIA concerning the relationship of the person
PAGLINAWAN, PAULINO LORIA, AUREA NICOLAS, ANTONIO baptized. It is indispensable that such
LO, SANTOS WANTON, ZENAIDA BATALLER, ISABEL LORIA, declarations and statements are shown by
ADELAIDA DAUS AND EMMA CARALI, respondents proof recognized by law.
G.R. No. 106314-15 | October 8, 1999 (3D)  There is thus no reason to further sustain respondents
stance in the face of the aforecited rulings explaining the
Facts: significance of baptismal certificates. The lower court
 Petitioners are legal heirs of Pedro Cabais, who died erred in giving too much credence on the baptismal
leaving a parcel of land. The said property was inherited certificate of Felipa Cañeta Buesa to prove that Felipa
by Pedro Cabais from his grandmother Eustaquia Cañeta was the daughter of one Gregoria Cañeta and not of
by right of representation. His mother, Felipa Cañeta Eustaquia Cañeta, the original registered owner of the
Buesa, who was the only daughter of Eustaquia Cañeta, property under controversy.
predeceased the latter, leaving him as the only legal heir  Furthermore, the above findings of the courts below
of Eustaquia. relying on the baptismal certificate in question to establish
 Shortly after Pedro Cabais had adjudicated to himself the the filiation of Pedro Cabais' mother must of necessity
property in question, a complaint for partition and yield to the inherent inconsistency and unbelievable
accounting was brought by Simon Bonaobra, Heirs of nature of the baptismal certificate in question. It appears
Victoria Cañeta and Heirs of Anastacio Cañeta against that said baptismal certificate of Felipa C. Buesa states
Pedro Cabais. that she was born on September 13, 1899, while the
 Having their petition denied, respondents presented a baptismal certificate of Gregoria Cañeta, the supposed
motion for reconsideration of the said disposition, which mother of Felipa, indicated that Gregoria was born on May
the trial court granted on the ground that the baptismal 9, 1898, or only a little more than one year ahead of her
certificate of Felipa C. Buesa does not show her to be the alleged daughter.
daughter of Eustaquia Cañeta.
 CA affirmed the decision. Hence this petition. BIENVENIDO RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and CLARITO AGBULOS, respondents.
Issue: W/N the Baptismal certificate of Felipa Buesa, showing that G.R. No. 85723 | June 19, 1995 (1D)
Eustaquia is not her mother, is sufficient to establish the parentage
and filiation of Pedro Cabais Facts:
 An action for compulsory recognition and support was
Held: No brought by respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against
 A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein.
facie evidence of filiation and a high degree of proof is  At the trial, Clarito presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos
needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained Haber, as first witness.
in such public document.  In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner
o This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official contended that Felicitas Agbulos Haber should not be
records made in the performance of his duty by allowed to reveal the name of the father of private
a public officer are prima facie evidence of the respondent because such revelation was prohibited by
facts therein stated. The evidentiary nature of Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
such document must, therefore, be sustained in

180 of 255 | P a g e
Issue: W/N respondent’s mother should be allowed to testify on the revealed in an action by the child to compel such other
identity of his father, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil parent to recognize him also.
Code of the Philippines and Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised  The action filed by private respondent herein was brought
Rules of Court under Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
which added new grounds for filing an action for
Held: Yes recognition: namely,
 Article 280 of the Civil Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
When the father or the mother makes the recognition
separately, he or she shall not reveal he name of the 3) When the child was conceived during the time when
person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
he or she state any circumstance whereby the other party 4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
may be identified. that the defendant is his father.
 Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provided:  Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines were repealed by the Family Code, which
In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to now allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the
recognize the child as his natural child: same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children (Art. 175).
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the  Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of children is by any of the following:
the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the the following:
latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
the mother cohabited with the supposed father; final judgment; or
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
that the defendant is his father. document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which a legitimate child; or
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
provided in these rules. special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
 Private respondent cannot invoke our decision in Navarro
v. Bacalla, 15 SCRA 114 (1965).  Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts
o While we ruled in Navarro that the testimony of the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the mother of the plaintiff in said case, could be that filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof that
used to establish his paternity, such testimony the defendant is his father."
was admitted during the trial without objection
and the defendant accepted the finding of the CHAPTER 3. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Articles 175-176); RA
trial court that he was the father of the plaintiff. 9255
 In the case at bench, petitioner timely objected to the
calling of the mother of private respondent to the witness Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation
stand to name petitioner as the father of said respondent. in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
 However, unlike in the Spanish Civil Code, wherein the The action must be brought within the same period specified in
progenitor of Article 280 followed immediately the Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
progenitor of Article 278, a new provision was inserted to paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
separate Article 280 from Article 278. The new provision, during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)
Article 279, provided:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
A minor who may contract marriage without parental under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
consent cannot acknowledge a natural child, unless the support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
parent or guardian approves the acknowledgment, or illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
unless the recognition is made in the will. legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in
 If the sequencing of the provisions in the Spanish Civil the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
Code were maintained in the Civil Code of the Philippines, (287a)
and Article 280 was numbered Article 279, it becomes
clear that the prohibition against the identification by the GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO,
parent acknowledging a child of the latter's other parent Respondent.
refers to the voluntary recognition provided for in Article G.R. No. 206248 | February 18, 2014 (EB)
278.
 Senator Arturo M. Tolentino is of the view that the Facts:
prohibition in Article 280 does not apply in an action for  Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent
compulsory recognition. According to him: Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at
The prohibition to reveal the name or circumstance of the that time already married to someone else.
parent who does not intervene in the separate recognition  Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre
is limited only to the very act of making such separate Lewis and Jerard Patrick.
recognition. It does not extend to any other act or to cases  When their relationship turned sour and Grande left for
allowed by law. Thus, when a recognition has been made the United States with her two children, Antonio filed
by one parent, the name of the other parent may be Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer

181 of 255 | P a g e
to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, over the minor children also goes to the mother,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors. unless she is shown to be unfit.
 RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent  Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the
Antonio. Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for the court a
reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the quo to order the change of the surname to that of
trial court respondent?
 On appeal, CA maintained that the legal consequence of o Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or
the recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the ruling will contravene the explicit and
father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family
universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, Code, as amended by RA 9255.
compels the use by the children of the surname o Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to
"ANTONIO." decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein
Issue: W/N Article 176 of the Family Code––as amended by respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive who is granted by law the right to dictate the
language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his surname of their illegitimate children.
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their
mother NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, vs. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM,
Respondent
Held: Yes G.R. No. 180284 | September 11, 2013 (1D)
 The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel
the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon Facts:
his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue  Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for
is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner),
phrased as follows: claiming that petitioner is the father of her son Christian
Paulo Salas.
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be  Trial court rendered decision in favor of respondent.
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be  On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The respondent satisfactorily established the illegitimate
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no
of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this error was committed by the trial court in granting
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code respondent’s prayer for support.
governing successional rights shall remain in force.
Issue: W/N the filiation of Christian Paulo was duly established
 This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by pursuant to Art. 175 of the Family Code
RA 9255 which now reads:
Held: No
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and  Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of  Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:
their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized
by their father through the record of birth appearing in the The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
civil register, or when an admission in a public document the following:
or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an action (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his final judgment; or
lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
(Emphasis supplied.) by the parent concerned.
 From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general
rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
his or her mother. filiation shall be proved by:
o The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case
his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
father through the record of birth appearing in a legitimate child; or
the civil register or when an admission in a (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
public document or private handwritten special laws.
instrument is made by the father. In such a  Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of
situation, the illegitimate child may use the Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner
surname of the father. appears as his father but which is not signed by him.
 In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial o Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up
approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children the entries and signed the said document
with the prayer for the correction or change of the though she claims it was petitioner who
surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a supplied the information she wrote therein.
public document acknowledged before a notary public  We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly
under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough identifying the putative father is not competent evidence
to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.
custody, and an official declaration of his children’s o Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth
surname as Antonio. certificate, the placing of his name by the
o Parental authority over minor children is lodged mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is
by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s incompetent evidence of paternity.
prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental o Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a
authority is given to the mother, then custody recognition in a public instrument and it has no

182 of 255 | P a g e
probative value to establish filiation to the respondent, respondent would pay petitioner
alleged father. and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although
 As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence
also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner
while baptismal certificates may be considered public also waived away her rights to future support
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the and future legitime as an illegitimate child of
administration of the sacraments on the dates so respondent.
specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence  Advincula v. Advincula has a factual background closely
of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s similar to the one at bar.
paternity. o Manuela Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the
 As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case
showing their exchange of affectionate words and No. 3553 for acknowledgment and support,
romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion
Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not of both parties, said case was dismissed. Not
signed by petitioner and contained no statement of very long after, Manuela again instituted,
admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. before the same court, Civil Case No. 5659 for
o Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they acknowledgment and support, against Manuel.
do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis This Court declared that although Civil Case
Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an the subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case
admission of filiation in a private handwritten No. 5659, asking for the same relief from
instrument signed by the parent concerned. Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for
 An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his acknowledgement, affecting a person’s civil
claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules status, which cannot be the subject of
of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a compromise.
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has  It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status
been entered, common reputation respecting his and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of policy demands that there be no compromise on the
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the
130 of the Rules of Court. lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
o Reviewing the records, we find the totality of established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence
respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of
that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo. the parties.
 Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner, vs. JOSE NGO CHUA, Compromise Agreement between petitioner and
Respondent. respondent is void for being contrary to law and public
G.R. No. 183965 | September 18, 2009 (3D) policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be
appreciated against her. The trial court is only reminded
Facts: that while petitioner’s admission may have evidentiary
 Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed a Petition for the value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack
issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against of filiation.
respondent, alleging that respondent, who was then
married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA
(Irene), petitioner’s mother. CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ,
 Hearings then ensued during which petitioner testified Petitioners, vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City
that respondent was the only father she knew; that he Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent
took care of all her needs until she finished her college G.R. No. 177728 | July 31, 2009 (2D)
education; and that he came to visit her on special family
occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to Facts:
prove her claim of illegitimate filiation.  Petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then
 It turned out that prior to the said petition, petitioner had Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique)
already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
of illegitimate affiliation against respondent, wherein the marriage.
parties eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement.  Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique’s parents,
 One of the terms included in the said agreement is that gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian
petitioner eclares, admits and acknowledges that there is Dela Cruz "Aquino".
no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and  Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using
her brother Allan on one hand and herein respondent on Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of the City
the other. Civil Registrar, in support of which she submitted the
o This declaration, admission or child’s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the
acknowledgement is concurred with petitioner’s Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed
brother Allan, who although not a party to the and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by
case, hereby affixes his signature to this Dominique’s father Domingo Butch Aquino.
pleading and also abides by the declaration  Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime
herein. of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet
unborn child, and that his paternity had never been
Issue: W/N the the compromise agreement entered into by the questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document
parties herein bars the filing of the present case entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during
his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, stating that he
Held: No got Jenie pregnant during their cohabitation.
 The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and  Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s
respondent obviously intended to settle the question of application for registration of the child’s name, on the
petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an ground that the child cannot use the surname of his father
illegitimate child of respondent. because he was born out of wedlock and the father
o In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more
acknowledging that they are not the children of capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either
183 of 255 | P a g e
through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 – Affidavit of o First, Dominique died about two months prior to
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the the child’s birth.
Authority to Use the Surname of the Father), citing RA o Second, the relevant matters in the
9255. Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by
 Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from
injunction/registration of name against respondent, the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.
alleging that the denial of registration of the child’s name o Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the
is a violation of his right to use the surname of his Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s
deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255. brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary
 The trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause rights could be affected by the registration of
of action" as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing the questioned recognition of the child.
paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography
Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN
R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten document" LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS
through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
child as follows:  In Herrera v. Alba, the Court summarized the laws, rules,
and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in
2.2 Private handwritten instrument – an instrument relevant part:
executed in the handwriting of the father and duly signed
by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
child.
 The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author Establishing Filiation
of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does not
contain any express recognition of paternity. The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as
follows:
Issue: W/N the unsigned handwritten statement of Dominique can
be considered as a recognition of paternity in a private handwritten ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
instrument within the contemplation of Art. 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
as amended by RA 9522 evidence as legitimate children.

Held: Yes xxxx


 Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255,
permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his by any of the following:
offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or through an admission made in a public or (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in final judgment; or
any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
separate action for judicial approval is necessary. by the parent concerned.
 Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not,
indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be
signed by the putative father. This provision must,
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of
however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of
a legitimate child; or
the Family Code which require that recognition by the
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
father must bear his signature, thus:
special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree.
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
evidence as legitimate children.
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or
xxxx
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established respect to the pedigree of another person related to him
by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where
by any of the following:
it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
final judgment; or such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed dates when and the places where these facts occurred,
and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
by the parent concerned.
family history intimately connected with pedigree.
xxxx
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding
 That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child
pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family
through a written instrument must affix his signature
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of
thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family
any one of its members, may be received in evidence if
Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of
the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family
"unduly expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed by
bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
petitioners.
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence
 In the present case, however, special circumstances exist of pedigree.
to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though unsigned
by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
184 of 255 | P a g e
 Pe Lim v. CA: Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the
voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the child, in which case the latter may file the action before
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, the expiration of four years from the attainment of his
or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of majority;
filiation must be made by the putative father himself and (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a
the writing must be the writing of the putative father. document should appear of which nothing had been
 In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier heard and in which either or both parents recognize the
quoted statements in Dominique’s Autobiography have child.
been made and written by him. Taken together with the
other relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique, during In this case, the action must be commenced within four
his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common- years from the finding of the document. (Emphasis
law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents’ supplied)
house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she  Bernabe v. Alejo: Illegitimate children who were still
was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose
2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave putative parent died during their minority are given the
birth to the child – they sufficiently establish that the child right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years
of Jenie is Dominique’s. from attaining majority age. This vested right was not
 In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family
sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the Code.
requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging  Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an child is established by a record of birth appearing in the
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of
made: filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
o Where the private handwritten instrument is the instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for
lone piece of evidence submitted to prove recognition may be brought by the child during his or her
filiation, there should be strict compliance with lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and
the requirement that the same must be signed continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
by the acknowledging parent; and child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special
o Where the private handwritten instrument is laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the
accompanied by other relevant and competent alleged parent.
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation  It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of
therein be shown to have been made and prescription depends on the type of evidence to be
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation.
is merely corroborative of such other evidence. o However, it would be impossible to determine
the same in this case as there has been no
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a
HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved
Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-
WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, blown trial.
respondents.  While the original action filed by private respondents was
G.R. No. 163707 | September 15, 2006 (1D) a petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not
precluded from receiving evidence on private
Facts: respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
 Private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized
Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including
Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of the determination of the status of each heir.
administration, alleging that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei (Rufino PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Guy Susim), who died intestate. RAYMUNDO MAGTIBAY y BACHOCO, accused-appellant.
 Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing G.R. No. 142985 | August 6, 2002 (1D)
that private respondents should have established their
status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Facts:
Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.  An information of rape of one Rachelle Recto y Rafal
 RTC denied petitioner’s MTD. On appeal, petitioner against accused-appellant was filed.
argues that private respondents do not have the legal  Dr. Ronaldo Fetalberto, the Municipal Health Officer of
personality to institute the petition for letters of Bongabong South, Oriental Mindoro, testified that
administration as they failed to prove their filiation during Rachelle was brought to his clinic by her relatives after
the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of they noticed that her abdomen was bulging. The
the Family Code. laboratory results showed that Rachelle was pregnant.
 In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was
Issue: W/N private respondents are barred by prescription from bedridden due to influenza.
proving their filiation  The lower court found Magtibay guilty of the crime
charged.
Held: No
 On private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court Issue: W/N a child born out of rape must still prove his filiation in
of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be premature order to be entitled for support and acknowledgment
considering that private respondents have yet to present
evidence. Held: No
 Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on  The record shows that when Rachelle’s mother, Gaudiosa
actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article Recto, discovered about her ordeal, Rachelle was already
285 of the Civil Code, to wit: eight months pregnant. She eventually gave birth to a
baby boy.
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural  These facts confirm the commission of rape sometime in
children may be brought only during the lifetime of the September 1997. There was no showing that Rachelle
presumed parents, except in the following cases: has previously been sexually abused or she had sexual
relations with other men during that time. Thus, with
185 of 255 | P a g e
respect to the acknowledgment and support of the child allowed by the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for
born out of rape our recent ruling in People v. Justiniano the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if
Glabo states: the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has
erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment
Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be
offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction
provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet
imposed on the offender: unable to understand her situation.
o indemnification,  This is not intended, however, to denigrate the important
o acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Indeed,
law should prevent him from so doing, and we have recognized that both parents "complement each
o in every case to support the offspring. other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care
which takes into account the physical, emotional,
With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the
acknowledged natural children and natural children by child." Neither does the law nor jurisprudence intend to
legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the downplay a father’s sense of loss when he is separated
specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is from his child:
vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother
and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion While the bonds between a mother and her small child are
perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother,
children, no "further positive act is required of the parent is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody.
as the law itself provides for the child’s status." Hence, One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than
accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering,
and support the victim’s child. However, the amount and pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare
terms of support shall be determined by the trial court of the child which is the paramount consideration.
after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article  For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the
201 of the Family Code. custody of her child who is below seven years of age for
"compelling reasons." Instances of unsuitability are
DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality,
EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the
G.R. No. 122906 | February 7, 2002 (2D) child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness.
o If older than seven years of age, a child is
Facts: allowed to state his preference, but the court is
 Petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith not bound by that choice. The court may
Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private exercise its discretion by disregarding the
respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. child’s preference should the parent chosen be
 A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the found to be unfit, in which instance, custody
United States of America where she found work as a may be given to the other parent, or even to a
registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her third person.
father (private respondent herein) and paternal  In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the
grandparents. temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it
 Petitioner then learned that a judgment was rendered appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the
appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the trial court have not been terminated, and no
minor, Gardin Faith. pronouncement has been made as to who should have
 Petitioner then filed a petition for relief from judgment and final custody of the minor.
a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her which o Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said
was granted. minor as the controlling factor, we find that the
 However on appeal, CA ordered status quo with respect appellate court did not err in allowing her father
to the physical custody of the child, Gardin Faith Belarde (private respondent herein) to retain in the
Tonog, is ordered. It is understood that the latter shall meantime parental custody over her.
remain with private respondent until otherwise adjudged. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched
from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into
Issue: W/N the custody of an illegitimate child should be with the a strange environment away from the people
mother and places to which she had apparently formed
an attachment.
Held: Yes, subject to exceptions  Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is
 Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special
the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled
of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on
her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess
 Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing
of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that
be under the parental authority of their mother. inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now
 Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that "no exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her
child under seven years of age shall be separated from preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice
the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to of which parent should have the custody over her person
order otherwise." It will be observed that in both
provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA.
This is specially evident in Article 213 where it may be IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A.
said that the law presumes that the mother is the best TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES,
custodian. As explained by the Code Commission: petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH
DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many G.R. No. 112193 | March 13, 1996 (1D)
a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away
from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother Facts:
who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception
186 of 255 | P a g e
 A complaint for Compulsory Recognition and instant case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code
Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed by private which provides:
respondent herein against petitioners, alleging that the
late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does
relationship with Luz M. Fabian, private respondent’s not prejudice or impair vested of acquired rights in
mother. accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
 The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is  The basic question that must be resolved in this case,
their alleged "open and continuous possession of the therefore, appears to be: Should the provisions of the
status of illegitimate children", which includes the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary
following instances: Will the application of the Family Code in this case
o Regular support and educational expenses; prejudice or impair any vested right of the private
o Allowance to use his surname; respondent such that it should not be given retroactive
o Payment of maternal bills; effect in this particular case?
o Payment of baptismal expenses and  Tayag vs. Court of Appeals: The right of action of the
attendance therein; minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint
o Taking them to restaurants and department in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the
stores on occasions of family rejoicing; effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling
o Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs; in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court
o Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every of Appeals, et. al. where we held that the fact of filing of
now and then; the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file
o Introducing them as such children to family it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in
friends. accordance with the law in force at the time, and such
right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
Issue: W/N private respondent timely filed the action for compulsory enactment of a new law.
recognition on the ground of continuous possession of the status of
an illegitimate child xxx xxx xxx

Held: Yes Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no


 Petitioners submit that with the advent of the New Family proper application to the instant case since it will
Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent
over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents,
prescription, considering that under Article 175, both of which have been vested with the filing of the
paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in
Code, it is provided that an action for compulsory applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and
recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the "open in holding that private respondent's cause of action has
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate not yet prescribed.
child," must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged  Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench.
parent without any exception, otherwise the action will be o The action brought by private respondent
barred by prescription. Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and
 The law cited reads: enforcement of successional rights which was
filed prior to the advent of the Family Code,
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil
established by any of the following: Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code.
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a o The present law cannot be given retroactive
final judgment; or effect insofar as the instant case is concerned,
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public as its application will prejudice the vested right
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed of private respondent to have her case decided
by the parent concerned. under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right
was vested to her by the fact that she filed her
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate action under the regime of the Civil Code.
filiation shall be proved by: o Prescinding from this, the conclusion then
ought to be that the action was not yet barred,
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of notwithstanding the fact that it was brought
a legitimate child; or when the putative father was already
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and deceased, since private respondent was then
special laws. still a minor when it was filed, an exception to
the general rule provided under Article 285 of
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their the Civil Code.
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same o Hence, the trial court, which acquired
evidence as legitimate children. jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the
complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same
The action must be brought within the same period despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also
specified in Article 173 [during the lifetime of the child], known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
except when the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON
during the lifetime of the alleged parent. R. VILLAR, respondents
 In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the G.R. No. 111180 | November 16, 1995 (2D)
complaint of private respondent and her alleged sister
was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after Facts:
the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the  Petitioner had an intimate relationship with private
action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as respondent, a married man and father of 4 children.
provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain  As a result of the relationship of the parties, Christopher
that even if the action was filed prior to the effectivity of J., was born.
the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the  In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family

187 of 255 | P a g e
to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid
to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled marriage between parents. The annulment of a viodable marriage
Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next shall not affect the legitimation. (270a)
school year.
 Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as
Christopher. This was granted by the trial court but legitimate children. (272a)
however was reversed by CA on appeal.
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the
Issue: W/N the custody of Christoper J., an illegitimate child, should child's birth. (273a)
be with his mother, petitioner herein
Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration
Held: Yes of the marriage shall benefit their descendants. (274)
 Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ
of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person of action accrues. (275a)
is withheld from the person entitled thereto."
 It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner, vs. HON. ADORACION
the determination of the right to the custody of minor G. ANGELES, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE
married to each other, are for some reason separated SANTOS, respondents
from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot G.R. No. 105619 | December 12, 1995 (EB)
arise in any other situation. For example, in the case of
Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas Facts:
corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain  Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union
the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be was blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria
in the custody of a third person of her free will because Rosario de Santos.
the parents were compelling her to marry a man against  Antonio then fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita
her will. Talag, private respondent herein. Obviously aware that
 Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of the decree of dissolution obtained from Nevada court was
his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction which then,
Villar, was married to another woman other than the as now, did not recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded to
child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Tokyo, Japan in to marry private respondent. This union
Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his produced eleven children.
mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of  Sofia then died. Less than a month later, Antonio and
such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay
admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful City celebrated under Philippine laws.
custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled  When Antonio died, private respondent ask for the
to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. issuance of letters of administration in her favor in
 Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the connection with the settlement of her late husband's
case of a mother who is separated from her husband and estate.
is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother  Petitoner then argued inter alia that private respondent's
of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole children were illegitimate.
parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody  The court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion,
of her child. declaring that private respondent's ten children
 The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them,
child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs
the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under of Antonio de Santos.
Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother unless the Issue: W/N private respondent’s children with the late Antonio be
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." legitimized
 In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out,
Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least Held: No
at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be  Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states:
taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child
is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated.
will have to be upheld because the child categorically Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time
expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by
213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent  In other words, a child's parents should not have been
chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception
mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. for him to qualify as a "natural child."
Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not  It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under
condition the grant of support for him on the award of his the general heading of "Paternity and Filiation,"
custody to him (private respondent). specifically deals with "Legitimated Children," Article 89,
a provision subsumed under the general title on
CHAPTER 4. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN (Articles 177 – 182); RA "Marriage," deals principally with void and voidable
9858 marriages and secondarily, on the effects of said
marriages on their offspring. It creates another category
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of of illegitimate children, those who are "conceived or born
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not of marriages which are void from the beginning," but
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be because there has been a semblance of marriage, they
legitimated. (269a) are classified as "acknowledged natural children" and,
accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and obligations
as such kind of children.

188 of 255 | P a g e
o In the case at bench, the marriage under respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with
question is considered "void from the a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his
beginning" because bigamous, contracted legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela.
when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting.  In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant
It follows that the children begotten of such claims that respondent caused to be registered as
union cannot be considered natural children "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla
proper for at the time of their conception, their Baybayan
parents were disqualified from marrying each
other due to the impediment of a prior Issue: W/N private respondent can validly register as legitimate his
subsisting marriage. children with Priscilla despite of an existing marriage with Teresita
 What term should then be coined to distinguish them from at the time these children were born
natural children proper (those "born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, Held:
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each  An examination of the birth certificates of respondent's
other")? three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly
o A legal fiction had to be resorted to, that device indicate that these children are his legitimate issues. It
contrived by law to simulate a fact or condition was respondent who caused the entry therein.
which, strictly and technically speaking, is not  As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that,
what it purports to be. despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three
o In this case, the term "natural children by legal children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be
fiction" was invented, thus giving rise to another considered legitimate since at the time they were born,
category of illegitimate children, clearly not to there was an existing valid marriage between respondent
be confused with "natural children" as defined and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.
under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be  The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article
equated with acknowledged natural children 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as
and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights amended) which provides:
and obligations of the latter.
 The question that must be confronted next is: How are the Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated.
offspring of the second union affected by the first wife's Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
death and the ensuing celebration of a valid marriage time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified
between her widower and his ostensible second wife? by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
o Natural children by legal fiction cannot be  Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot
legitimized in this fashion. include those born of adulterous relations. The Family
o Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of Code: (Executive Order, No. 209), which took effect on
legitimation to natural children as defined August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision
thereunder. There was, therefore, from the thus:
outset, an intent to exclude children conceived
or born out of illicit relations from the purview of
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of
the law.
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
o Another point to be considered is that although
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
natural children can be legitimized, and natural
marry each other may be legitimated.
children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of
acknowledged natural children, this does not  The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:
necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural o The rationale of legitimation would be
children by legal fiction can likewise be destroyed;
legitimized. As has been pointed out, much o It would be unfair to the legitimate children in
more is involved here than the mere privilege to terms of successional rights;
be legitimized. The rights of other children, like o There will be the problem of public scandal,
the petitioner in the case at bench, may be unless social mores change;
adversely affected as her testamentary share o It is too violent to grant the privilege of
legitimation to adulterous children as it will
may well be reduced in the event that her ten
destroy the sanctity of marriage;
surviving half siblings should be placed on par
o It will be very scandalous, especially if the
with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled
parents marry many years after the birth of the
to only half of her share.
child
 The hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by law
 It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old
and the corresponding gradation of their rights may
or new, can give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the
conceivably be shattered by elevating natural children by
respondent.
legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate children to
the level of natural children proper, whose filiation would TITLE VII. ADOPTION
otherwise be legitimate had their parents blessed their
union with a valid marriage. See also Domestic Adoption Act of 1988 (RA 8552) as amended
 Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case by RA 9523 (March 2009)
has been decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC Re: Proposed Rule on Domestic Adoption
not the Family Code which now recognizes only two Inter Country Adoption Act of 1955 (RA 8043)
classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural Amended IRR on Inter Country Adoption (January 8, 2004)
children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,
MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. MONINA P. LIM
TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC, Manukan and Jose G.R. Nos. 168992-93 | May 21, 2009 (1D)
Dalman, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte,
respondent FACTS:
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 | October 25, 1995 (EB)  Petitioner married Primo Lim  childless
 Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were
Facts:
entrusted to them by Lucia Ayuban
 Complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross
immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that

189 of 255 | P a g e
 Petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it respect to the ward after the termination of the
appear that they were the children’s parents  named guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
Michelle and Michael Jude accountabilities.
 28 Nov 1998:b Primo Lim died  Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
 27 Dec 2000: petitioner married Angel Olario, an following cases:(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
American citizen legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse
 Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
simulated the birth of a child  petitioner filed separate his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael (At the separated from each other.
time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was  In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
25yo and already married, while Michael was 18 yo and adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
seven months old) parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
 Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the  The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision
adoption; Michael also gave his consent to his adoption. means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
 RTC dismissed the petitions  since petitioner had mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly parental authority over the child which is the ideal
with her new husband; Petitioner’s argument that mere situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the
consent of her husband would suffice was untenable level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
because, under the law, there are additional spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
requirements, such as residency and certification of his between the spouses.
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made  THUS Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
a party in this case, must comply. As to the argument that petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since
the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court
trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this
purpose of exercising parental authority because an ground.
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents  The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as
and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities. shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There
are certain requirements that Olario must comply being
ISSUE: WON petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt. an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
HELD: NO. that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic
 Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the
relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
be adopted  joint parental authority is not necessary in such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4)
this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5)
Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as
Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications
is not anymore necessary since they have been were shown and proved during the trial.
emancipated having attained the age of majority.  Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not
 The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads: anymore necessary since the children have been
Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt: (a) Any emancipated having reached the age of majority  This
Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil is untenable. Parental authority includes caring for and
capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, and the development of their moral, mental and physical
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for character and well-being. The father and the mother shall
children, at least 16 years older than the adoptee, and jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
who is in a position to support and care for his/her children common children. Even the remarriage of the surviving
in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement parent shall not affect the parental authority over the
of 16 year difference between the age of the adopter and children, unless the court appoints another person to be
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological the guardian of the person or property of the children.
parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s  Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
parent; (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of
as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That adoption, thus: Adoption has, thus, the following effects:
his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s)
of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
Philippines for at least 3 continuous years prior to the filing spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a
of the application for adoption and maintains such legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office relationship of parent and child, including but not limited
or any appropriate government agency that he/she has to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child
the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and
his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
further, That the requirements on residency and authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her of the adopter with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such
country may be waived for the following: (i) a former as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother;
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or (ii) one entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the
Filipino spouse; or (iii) one who is married to a Filipino adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological
citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or rights.
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or (c) The guardian with
190 of 255 | P a g e
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action
(previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it
G.R. No. 143989 | July 14, 2003 (1D) has been exercised.
 While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an
FACTS: adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption
 Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom took into their decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly
care Isabelita's nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
 In 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption bounden duty of the Court to apply the law.
 05 May 1972: RTC granted the petition "  It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while
 December 1999: Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
rescind the decree of adoption  averred that respondent always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For
the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter
the latter died, and even before his death he had made may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will
known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but and testament, may freely exclude him from having a
was prevented by petitioner's supplication, however with share in the disposable portion of his estate.
his further request upon petitioner to give to charity
whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. CLAUDE A.
in the future. MILLER and JUMRUS S. MILLER, respondent
 Prior to the institution of the case, RA 8552, also known G.R. No. 125932 | April 21, 1999 (1D)
as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect  deleted
from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of FACTS:
adoption.  Sec 19 of Article VI of RA 8552: Upon petition  July 29, 1988: spouses Miller filed a verified petition to
of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag
minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is  Respondents adduced evidence showing that: Claude, 38
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be years old and Jumrus, 40 years of age, both American
rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by citizens, are husband and wife, having been married on
the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal June 21, 1982; They do not expect to have sibling out of
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone their union on account of a medical problem of the wife;
counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) The family maintains their residence in Angeles City,
sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure since 1985; Michael Magno Madayag is the legitimate son
to comply with parental obligations. "Adoption, being in of Marcelo Madayag, Jr. and Zenaida Magno, and has
the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to been in the custody of respondents since August 1987, a
rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) month after he was born; They executed affidavits giving
may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article their irrevocable consent to the adoption by respondents
919 of CC”  DSWD recommended approval of the petition
 Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal: the proscription in  RTC granted the petition for adoption
R.A. No. 8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases
where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested ISSUE: WON the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child
under the regime of then Article 348 of CC and Art 192 of despite the prohibition under FC effective on Aug 3, 1988 when the
FC petition for adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision
 RTC dismissed the petition of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed aliens to adopt.
 Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552
should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption HELD: YES.
decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear  An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth
the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing
Family Code, the laws then in force. of the petition, acquired a vested right (VR) which could
not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new
ISSUE: May the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by law disqualifying him.
an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?  Consequently, the enactment of FC will not impair the
right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino
HELD: NO. child because the right has become vested at the time of
 It was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that herein filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by
petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption the law then in force.
granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already  VR is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not
abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under CC depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder;
and FC to rescind a decree of adoption expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in
 THUS the action for rescission of the adoption decree, right reason and natural justice should be protected
having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
come into force, no longer could be pursued imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive
 Even before the passage of the statute, an action to set to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny
aside the adoption is subject to the five-year bar rule  include not only legal or equitable title to the
under Rule 100 of ROC and that the adopter would lose enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from
the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of new obligations created after the right has vested
that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive  As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form
period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements and substance in accordance with the law in governance
of a vested right entitled to protection. at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and
 While adoption has often been referred to in the context retains it until it fully disposes of the case
of a "right," the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally  THUS, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the
innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by effective of FC, although denied the right to adopt under
statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the state's Art. 184, may continue with his petition under the law
determination on what it may deem to be for the best prevailing before FC
interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to  Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to consideration  designed to provide homes, parental
care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
191 of 255 | P a g e
children and give them the protection of society and family  EO 91 amended Art 31 of the Child and Youth Welfare
in the person of the adopter, as well as childless couples Code. As thus amended: The written consent of the
or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1) The
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over; (2)
manifestation of their natural parent instincts The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after
receiving counselling and appropriate social services
HERBERT CANG, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and from the Ministry of Social Services and Development or
Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, from a duly licensed child-placement agency; (3) The
respondent Ministry of Social Services and Development or any duly
G.R. No. 105308 | September 25, 1998 (3D) licensed child-placement agency under whose care and
legal custody the child may be; (4) The natural children,
FACTS: fourteen years and above, of the adopting parents.
 Herbert and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on (Emphasis supplied)
Jan 27, 1973, begot 3 children, namely: Keith,  The established rule is that the statute in force at the time
Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony, of the commencement of the action determines the
 Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital jurisdiction of the court  when PR filed the petition for
affair with Wilma Soco  Anna Marie filed a petition for adoption on Sept 25, 1987, the applicable law was PD
legal separation which the RTC granted 603
 Petitioner then left for the US where he sought and later  Article 256 of FC provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it
received a divorce from Anna Marie  also granted sole does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." As
 Meanwhile, Ronald Clavano and Maria Clara Diago amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on
Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of consent for adoption now reads: The written consent of
Anna Marie, filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1) The
children  bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over; (2) The
signifying consent to his adoption; Anna Marie likewise parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the
filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had proper government instrumentality; (3) The legitimate and
"evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting
 Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner parent or parents; (4) The illegitimate children, ten years
immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said
opposition thereto, alleging that, although PR were parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and (5) The spouse,
financially capable of supporting the children while his if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted
finances were "too meager" compared to theirs, he could  It is thus evident that written consent of the natural parent
not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.
parental authority over his beloved children." Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of
 RTC issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in ROC: Sec. 3. Consent to adoption. — There shall be filed
effect, relinquished custody over the children and, with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed
therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not
 directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the incompetent, and by the child's spouse, if any, and by
minors to petitioner each of its known living parents who is not insane or
 RTC later issued a decree of adoption: the oppositor hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child,
Herbert Cang has abandoned his children. And or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum,
abandonment of a child by its parent is commonly children's home, or benevolent society or person, by the
specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with his proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society,
consent to its adoption. Indeed, in such case, adoption will or by such persons; but if the child is illegitimate and has
be allowed not only without the consent of the parent, but not been recognized, the consent of its father to the
even against his opposition adoption shall not be required.
 CA affirmed the decree of adoption stating: Art. 188 of the  Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
Family Code requires the written consent of the natural dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or
parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate.
however that the consent of the parent who has  In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the
abandoned the child is not necessary (Dayrit vs. Piccio; natural mother was attached to the petition for adoption.
Santos vs. Ananzanso). In adoption cases, abandonment Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking.
connotes any conduct on the part of the parent to forego Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of
parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the child, abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural
or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal father
obligations which parents owe their children (Santos vs.  The allegations of abandonment in the petition for
Ananzanso, supra), or the withholding of the parent's adoption, even absent the written consent of petitioner,
presence, his care and the opportunity to display sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since
voluntary affection. The issue of abandonment is amply abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of
covered by the discussion of the first error. the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence 16 dispense with the requirement of written
ISSUE: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent to the adoption of their minor children.
consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has  However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption
abandoned them? primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the
matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a
HELD: NO. proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment
 Art. 31 of PD 603: Whose Consent is Necessary. — The by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that
written consent of the following to the adoption shall be an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of
necessary: (1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of
of age or, over; (2) The natural parents of the child or his the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition
legal guardian of the Department of Social Welfare or any for adoption be considered on its merits.
duly licensed child placement agency under whose care  In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to
the child may be; (3) The natural children, fourteen years forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. In
and above, of the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied) reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act
of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which
192 of 255 | P a g e
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the
relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means general rule that aliens may not adopt.
"neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal  On her own, Rosalina cannot adopt her brother and sister
obligations of care and support which parents owe their for the law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife,
children." subject to exceptions. Art 29 of PD 603 (Child and Youth
 In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that
conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all husband and wife may jointly adopt.
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his  FC amended this rule by scrapping the optional character
children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical of joint adoption and making it now mandatory  Art
estrangement alone, without financial and moral 185:Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was illegitimate child; (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural legitimate child of the other.
and legal obligations of love, care and support for his  None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and
children. He maintained regular communication with his Rosalina, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's child
wife and children through letters and telephone. He used but her brother and sister.
to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.  Main purpose of adoption statutes: the promotion of the
 Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented welfare of children  Accordingly, the law should be
certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing that even construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather
prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied
deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. with compassion, understanding and less severity in view
of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care
and education for less fortunate children
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. HON.
CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, in her capacity as REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. HONORABLE
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Region, Branch 62, Angeles City and SPOUSES SAMUEL the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba,
ROBERT DYE, JR. and ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A.
G.R. No. 95551 | March 20, 1997 (2D) CLOUSE, respondent
G.R. No. 94147 | June 8, 1994 (2D)
FACTS:
 June 25, 1990: spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina FACTS:
Due Dye filed a petition to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin  Feb 21, 1990: Spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor,
R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger Solomon Joseph Alcala (12 yo), the younger brother of
siblings of Rosalina. PR Evelyn
 Samuel is an American citizen married to Rosalina, who  Alvin is a natural born citizen of USA married to Evelyn, a
became a naturalized American  they have 2 children Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City
 Both Maricel and Alvin, as well as their natural parents,  Aug 19, 1988: Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of
gave their consent to the adoption USA in Guam
 RTC granted the petition and declared Alvin and Maricel  Since 1981 to 1984, then from Nov 2, 1989 up to the
to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption  present, Solomon was and has been under the care and
disregarded the 16-year age gap requirement of the law, custody of PR  Solomon and his mother gave their
the spouses being only 15 years and 3 months and 15 consent to the adoption
years and 9 months older than Maricel Due  RTC granted the petition for adoption
 Republic filed this PFR on a pure question of law,
contending that the spouses Dye are not qualified under ISSUE: WON PR are qualified to adopt Solomon.
the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin
HELD: NO.
ISSUE: WON Spouses Sye are qualified to adopt Maricel and Alvin.  Under Art 184 and 185 of FC, spouses Clouse are clearly
barred from adopting Solomon
HELD: NO.  Article 184, paragraph (3) of FC expressly enumerates
 GR: aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:An alien,
proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code which except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
states: The following persons may not adopt:An alien, relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the
except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One
relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity
who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt of the latter.
jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity  Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt
of the latter. Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-
 Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt country adoption as may be provided by law.
Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-  In the first place, Alvin is not a former Filipino citizen but
country adoption as may be provided by law. a natural born citizen of USA. In the second place,
 Samuel who is an American and, therefore, an alien is Solomon is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the
disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when
Due because he does not fall under any of the three private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the
aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law  He is not petition to adopt Solomon on Feb 21, 1990, Evelyn was
a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the
legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife United States in 1988.
her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a  Evelyn, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant
Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
him from the coverage of the exception. The law here brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be
does not provide for an alien who is married to a former
Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her
193 of 255 | P a g e
granted in her favor alone without violating Art 185 which (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate
mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the
 Art 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, legitimate child of the other.
a condition that must be read along together with Art 184  It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code,
 The historical evolution of this provision is clear. PD on the subject of parental authority, can aptly find
603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), provides that governance  In case husband and wife jointly adopt or
husband and wife "may" jointly adopt. EO 91 issued on one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint
Dec 17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in
demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt accordance with this Code.
if one of them is an alien. It was so crafted to protect  The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption
Filipino children who are put up for adoption. FC reiterated by the lower court, has theorized that James Anthony
the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party"
adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the in the proceedings  cannot be sustained
said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is  Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights
parental authority over the child, which is the ideal and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as,
situation. but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental
authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. THE as well as support and successional rights. These are
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the SPOUSES JAMES matters that obviously cannot be considered
ANTHONY HUGHES and LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES, inconsequential to the parties.
respondent  Although an adoption can bring not so much for the
G.R. No. 100835 | October 26, 1993 (3D) prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children
themselves, paramount consideration is given to the
FACTS: physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the
 James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of USA, adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first
married Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who place been designed. When, however, the law is clear
herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. and no other choice is given, we must obey its full
 29 June 1990: spouses jointly filed a petition to adopt Ma. mandate
Cecilia, Neil and Maria, minor niece and nephews of
Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior to REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. COURT OF
the filing of the petition  minors, as well as their parents, APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, respondents
gave consent to the adoption G.R. No. 97906 | May 21, 1992 (2D)
 RTC granted the petition; CA affirmed RTC
FACTS:
ISSUE: WON PR are qualified to adopt the minors herein  Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr.
and Segundina Alcala
HELD: NO.  When he was but 2yo and his sister Margaret Alcala, was
 James Anthony is not qualified to adopt  Art. 184. The then 9yo, they were adopted by spouses Hoong Wong
following persons may not adopt : (1) The guardian with and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos
respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final  Upon reaching the age of 22, herein PR, by then married,
accounts rendered upon the termination of their filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr
guardianship relation; (2) Any person who has been  averred that his use of the surname Wong
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (3) An embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and
alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when
adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a
adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to whatsoever of alien nationality;
adopt jointly with his or her Filipino spouse a relative by  RTC: petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo
consanguinity of the latter. Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted.
 Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt
Filipino children in accordance with the rules in inter- ISSUE: WON the reasons given by PR in his petition for change of
country adoption as may be provided by law. name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said
 While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to petition
adopt, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to par (3)(a)
BUT the problem in her case lies, instead, with Art 185: HELD: YES.
Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the  PR argues that he did as the law required, that is, upon
following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his adoption he used the surname of the adopter. However,
own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to being already emancipated, he can now decide what is
adopt the legitimate child of the other. best for and by himself. It is at this time that he realized
 Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires that the Chinese name he carries causes him undue
a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition ridicule and embarrassment and affects his business and
that must be read along together with Article 184. social life. In fact, his adoptive mother, being aware of his
 History: PD. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), predicament, gave her consent to the petition for change
exactly adopted that found in then Art 336 of CC: of name, albeit making it clear that the same shall in no
Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, way affect the legal adoption, and even underwent the
parental authority shall be exercised as if the child were rigors of trial to substantiate her sworn statement.
their own by nature. The provision was later amended by  For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the
EO 91, dated 17 Dec 1986 thus — Husband and wife may designation by which he is known and called in the
jointly adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be community in which be lives and is best known  defined
exercised as if the child were their own by nature. If one as the word or combination of words by which a person is
of the spouses is an alien, both husband and wife shall distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label
jointly adopt. Otherwise, the adoption shall not be or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the
allowed. FC has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article world at large addressing him, of in speaking of or dealing
185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint with him
adoption by the spouses except in only two instances —
194 of 255 | P a g e
 The names of individuals usually have two parts: the of other persons would result in the change of petitioner's
given name or proper name, and the surname or family name. 23
name. The given or proper name is that which is given to  While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of
the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall
other individuals. The name or family name is that which bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be
identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued borne in mind that the change of the surname of the
from parent to child. The given name may be freely adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of
selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to adoption proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status,
which the child is entitled is fixed by law. viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act
 A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It by which relations of paternity and affiliation are
is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being recognized as legally existing between persons not so
confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into
respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, one's family of the child of another as son or daughter and
unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges
be changed only for good cause and by judicial of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to
proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, effect this new status of relationship between the child
therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter and its adoptive parents, the change of name which
vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible. frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident
 Art 365 of CC: "(a)n adopted child shall bear the surname than the object of the proceeding. The welfare of the child
of the adopter," in correlation with Art 341 on the effects is the primary consideration in the determination of an
of adoption, among which is to"entitle the adopted person application for adoption. On this point, there is unanimous
to use the adopter's surname." This same entitlement of agreement.
an adopted child is maintained in Article 39(3), Title II of  It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer
PD 603. More recently, EO 209, as amended by the FC, from the natural parents to the adoptive parents the
echoes the same statutory right of an adopted child to use custody of the child's person, the duty of obedience owing
the surname of the adopter. by the child, and all other legal consequences and
 Clearly, from the very wordings of the law, it may be incidents of the natural relation, in the same manner as if
inferred that this use of the surname of the adopter by the the child had been born of such adoptive parents in lawful
adopted child is both an obligation and a right. wedlock, subject, however, to such limitations and
 Art 376: "no person can change his name or surname restrictions as may be by statute imposed. 33 More
without judicial authority"  The application for change specifically under the present state of our law, the Family
of name thereunder involves a special proceeding Code, superseding the pertinent provisions of the Civil
governed by and conducted under the strictures of Rule Code and of the Child and Youth Welfare Code on the
103 of ROC and one which involves substantial changes, matter, relevantly provides in this wise with regard to the
with the declared objective of such judicial proceedings issue involved in this case:
being the prevention of fraud. The purpose of the statutory  Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects: (1) For
procedure authorizing a change of personal name is civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be the
simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, court reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
to which application is made should normally make its relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
decree recording such change of name. adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
 Guided by the jurisprudential dictum that the State has an  It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private
interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for respondent to the use of the name of his parents by nature
the purpose of identification, and a change of name is not as cross ingratitude.
a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of reasons adduced and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. COURT OF
consequences that will likely follow; it is a privilege which APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondent
may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or G.R. No. 92326 | January 24, 1992 (2D)
reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor. 20
 The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as FACTS:
contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules  Feb 2, 1988: Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to
of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his adopt Jason Condat, then 6yo and who had been living
personality and to provide his best interest. In granting or with her family since he was 4 months old
denying the petition for change of name, the question of  RTC granted the petition in favor of spouses Dioscoro and
proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be
court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the
to the court and not all the best evidence available is petitioner
required.  CA affirmed the aforesaid decision
 From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his  Petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should
adopter mother, appellee was prompted to file the petition be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private
for change of name because of the embarrassment and respondent without joining her husband, in violation of
ridicule his family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint
his relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code
living in a Muslim community. Another cause is his desire must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
to improve his social and business life. It has been held Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to
that in the absence of prejudice to the state or any adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for
individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to adoption.
erase signs of a former alien nationality which only
hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and ISSUE: WON Zenaida can file the petition for adoption on her own.
reasonable cause for change of name
 Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to HELD: YES.
improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he  The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent
does not cause prejudice or injury to the interest of the Zenaida when the law applicable was PD 603, the Child
State or other persons (Calderon vs. Republic, supra). and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for
Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this case adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both
that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of them. However, after the trial court rendered its
195 of 255 | P a g e
decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the
Court of Appeals, the Family Code, took effect. Under the Section 1. Application. — At the commencement of the proper action
said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a
mandatory. verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any
 Art 246 of FC provides for retroactive effect of appropriate party stating the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions
relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification of both parties, and accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other
that such retrospective application will not prejudice or authentic documents in support thereof. (1a)
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws. Section 2. Comment. — A copy of the application and all supporting
 A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and documents shall be served upon the adverse party, who shall have
extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of five (5) days to comment thereon unless a different period is fixed
the holder. The term expresses the concept of present by the court upon his motion. The comment shall be verified and
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice shall be accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic
should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an documents in support thereof. (2a, 3a)
innately just and imperative right which enlightened free
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual Section 3. Hearing. — After the comment is filed, or after the
rights, cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal expiration of the period for its filing, the application shall be set for
or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also hearing not more than three (3) days thereafter. The facts in issue
an exemption from new obligations created after the right shall be proved in the same manner as is provided for evidence on
has vested. motions. (4a)
 Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, PR had the
right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without Section 4. Order. — The court shall determine provisionally the
joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her pertinent facts, and shall render such orders as justice and equity
petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional may require, having the regard to the probable outcome of the case
right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper resolution of
file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to the question involved. If the application is granted, the court shall fix
final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the amount of money to be provisionally paid or such other forms of
the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or support as should be provided, taking into account the necessities
impaired by the enactment of a new law. of the applicant and the resources or means of the adverse party,
 When private respondent filed her petition in Special and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If the
Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction application is denied, the principal case shall be tried and decided
thereover in accordance with the governing law. as early as possible. (5a)
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is Section 5. Enforcement of order. — If the adverse party fails to
determined by the statute in force at the time of the comply with an order granting support pendente lite, the court shall,
commencement of the action. motu proprio or upon motion; issue an order of execution against
 Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the him, without prejudice to his liability for contempt. (6a)
petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his When the person ordered to give support pendente lite refuses or
affidavit of consent, attached to the petition and expressly fails to do so, any third person who furnished that support to the
made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself applicant may, after due notice and hearing in the same case obtain
actually joined his wife in adopting the child  sufficient a writ of execution to enforce his right of reimbursement against the
to make him a co-petitioner. person ordered to provide such support. (h)
 It is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well
as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be Section 6. Support in criminal cases. — In criminal actions where
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the civil liability includes support for the offspring as a consequence
the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in of the crime and the civil aspect thereof has not been waived,
the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the reserved and instituted prior to its filing, the accused may be ordered
adoption. The modern tendency of the courts is to hold to provide support pendente lite to the child born to the offended
that there need not be more than a substantial compliance party allegedly because of the crime. The application therefor may
with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the be filed successively by the offended party, her parents,
proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a grandparents or guardian and the State in the corresponding
narrow and technical construction of the statute as to criminal case during its pendency, in accordance with the procedure
defeat its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate established under this Rule. (n)
proceedings where every material requirement of the
statute was complied with. Section 7. Restitution. — When the judgment or final order of the
court finds that the person who has been providing support
 Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
pendente lite is not liable therefor, it shall order the recipient thereof
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
to return to the former the amounts already paid with legal interest
consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
from the dates of actual payment, without prejudice to the right of
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
the recipient to obtain reimbursement in a separate action from the
orphaned children and give them the protection of society
person legally obliged to give the support. Should the recipient fail
and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow
to reimburse said amounts, the person who provided the same may
childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
likewise seek reimbursement thereof in a separate action from the
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of
person legally obliged to give such support. (n)
the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and SUSAN LIM-LUA, petitioner vs. DANILO Y. LUA, respondent
compassionate objectives of the law. G.R. Nos. 175279-80 | June 5, 2013 (1D)

TITLE VIII. SUPPORT FACTS:


 Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the
RA 9262 & IRR; Arts. Contracts, Quasi-Contracts; Rule 61, declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent
Rules of Court; Danilo Y. Lua
A.M. 02-11-12 SC  In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her
two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00
RULE 61 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings
Support Pendente Lite
196 of 255 | P a g e
from salaries and dividends in several companies and by the children alone but shared with their mother. As to
businesses here and abroad the Volkswagen Beetle and BMW 316i respondent bought
 RTC granted support pendente lite, as follows: P250,000 for his daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan
would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the Lua, respectively, these, too, are to be considered
plaintiff. This amount excludes the P135,000 for medical advances for support, in keeping with the financial
attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation capacity of the family. Respondent stressed that being
of both her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct children of parents belonging to the upper-class society,
of such operation. The amounts already extended to the Angelli and Daniel Ryan had never in their entire life
two (2) children, being a commendable act of defendant, commuted from one place to another, nor do they eat their
should be continued by him considering the vast financial meals at "carinderias". Hence, the cars and their
resources at his disposal.  According to Art. 203 of the maintenance are indispensable to the children’s day-to-
Family Code, support is demandable from the time day living, the value of which were properly deducted from
plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the arrearages in support pendente lite ordered by the trial
the date of judicial demand. Since the instant complaint and appellate courts.
was filed on 03 September 2003, the amount of P250,000  As a matter of law, the amount of support which those
should be paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to related by marriage and family relationship is generally
such date until the hearing of the support pendente lite. obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
P250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the 7 months that resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
lapsed from September, 2003 to March 2004 would recipient. Such support comprises everything
tantamount to a total of P1,750,000; Thereafter, starting indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
the month of April 2004, until otherwise ordered by this attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
Court, defendant is ordered to pay a monthly support of the financial capacity of the family.
P250,000 payable within the first 5 days of each  In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite
corresponding month pursuant to the third paragraph of for petitioner and her two children was determined after
Art. 203 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by
monthly support of P250,000.00 is without prejudice to the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court
any increase or decrease thereof that this Court may was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support
grant plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e. pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was
depending on the proof submitted by the parties during intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her
the proceedings for the main action for support. children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house
 Respondent filed MFR questioning the P1,750,000.00 helpers, and other household expenses. Petitioner’s
retroactive support. testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for
 CA nullified and set aside and RTC: ordered petitioner to her scoliosis and vitamins/medicines.
pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of  Controversy between the parties resurfaced when
P115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005 and every respondent’s compliance with the final CA decision
month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof; to indicated that he deducted from the total amount in
pay the private respondent the amount of P115,000.00 a arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16,
month multiplied by the number of months starting from representing the value of the two cars for the children,
September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount their cost of maintenance and advances given to
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent petitioner and his children.
as her and their two (2) children monthly support;  The  Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as
appellate court said that the trial court should not have fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is
completely disregarded the expenses incurred by no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness.
respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance The dispute concerns the deductions made by
of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, respondent in settling the support in arrears.
and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry  On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses
goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not against accrued support, we find as relevant the following
only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as rulings by US courts.
well.  In Bradford v. Futrell, appellant sought review of the
decision of the Circuit Court which found him in arrears
ISSUE: WON certain expenses already incurred by the respondent with his child support payments and entered a decree in
may be deducted from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner favor of appellee wife. He complained that in determining
and her children the arrearage figure, he should have been allowed full
credit for all money and items of personal property given
HELD: by him to the children themselves, even though he
 Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable referred to them as gifts. The Court of Appeals of
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine amount of
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial arrears due the divorced wife under decree for support of
capacity of the family. The education of the person minor children, the husband (appellant) was not entitled
entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding to credit for checks which he had clearly designated as
paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for an automobile given
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of to the oldest son or a television set given to the children.
majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going Thus, if the children remain in the custody of the mother,
to and from school, or to and from place of work. the father is not entitled to credit for money paid directly
 Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to the children if such was paid without any relation to the
to have allowed the deduction of the value of the two cars decree.
and their maintenance costs from the support in arrears,  Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses
as these items are not indispensable to the sustenance of incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued
the family or in keeping them alive. support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly
 Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing support pendente lite granted by the trial court was
the subject deductions would result in unjust enrichment, intended primarily for food, household expenses such as
thus making him pay for the same obligation twice. Since salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also
petitioner and the children resided in one residence, the petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value
groceries and dry goods purchased by the children using of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his
respondent’s credit card, totalling P594,151.58 for the children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of
period September 2003 to June 2005 were not consumed petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of
197 of 255 | P a g e
items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing)
(Groceries and Dry Goods) 228,869.38
should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to
Credit Card purchases of Daniel
the judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is
Ryan
true that the dispositive portion of the executory decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to Php 648,102.29
TOTAL
pay the support in arrears "less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent
as her and their two (2) children monthly support," the MA. CARMINIA C. CALDERON represented by her Attorney-In-
deductions should be limited to those basic needs and Fact, Marycris V. Baldevia, petitioner vs. JOSE ANTONIO F.
expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. ROXAS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions G.R. No. 185595 | January 9, 2013 (1D)
from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her
children, while correct insofar as it commends the FACTS:
generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly  Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private
inconsistent with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married on
No. 84740. More important, it completely ignores the December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children.
unfair consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended
well-being, was given due regard by the trial and appellate Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on
courts. This is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order the ground of psychological incapacity.
granting support pendente lite to petitioner and her  On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order granting
children, when the trial court observed: petitioner’s application for support pendente lite:
 While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to contribute
giving some forms of financial assistance to his two (2) to the support of the above-named minors, (aside from
children via their credit cards and paying for their school 50% of their school tuition fees which the defendant has
expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of agreed to defray, plus expenses for books and other
spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, school supplies), the sum of P42,292.50 per month,
while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard, effective May 1, 1998, as his share in the monthly support
it is incumbent upon the defendant, considering the of the children, until further orders from this Court. The
physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the first monthly contribution, i.e., for the month of May 1998,
overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support shall be given by the defendant to the plaintiff within five
unto the latter. x x x (5) days from receipt of a copy of this Order. The
 In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has succeeding monthly contributions of P42,292.50 shall be
been admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the directly given by the defendant to the plaintiff without need
expenses of their two (2) children’s schooling, he gave his of any demand, within the first five (5) days of each month
two (2) children two (2) cars and credit cards of which the beginning June 1998. All expenses for books and other
expenses for various items namely: clothes, grocery items school supplies shall be shouldered by the plaintiff and
and repairs of their cars were chargeable to him which the defendant, share and share alike. Finally, it is
totaled an amount of more than One Hundred Thousand understood that any claim for support-in-arrears prior to
(P100,000.00) for each of them and considering that as May 1, 1998, may be taken up later in the course of the
testified by the private respondent that she needs the total proceedings proper.
amount of P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the  On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trial court issued an
household and other miscellaneous expenses and Order dated October 11, 2002 directing private
considering further that petitioner can afford to buy cars respondent to give support in the amount of P42,292.50
for his two (2) children, and to pay the expenses incurred per month starting April 1, 1999 pursuant to the May 19,
by them which are chargeable to him through the credit 1998 Order.
cards he provided them in the amount of P100,000.00  On February 11, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion
each, it is but fair and just that the monthly support to Reduce Support citing, among other grounds, that the
pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by
fixed as of the present in the amount of P115,000.00 the court was even higher than his then P20,800.00
which would be sufficient enough to take care of the monthly salary as city councilor.
household and other needs. This monthly support  RTC issued an Order granting the motion to reduce
pendente lite to private respondent in the amount of support and denying petitioner’s motion for spousal
P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred support, increase of the children’s monthly support
ThirtyFive (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical pendente lite and support-in-arrears. The trial court
attendance expenses needed by private respondent for considered the following circumstances well-supported by
the operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon documentary and testimonial evidence: (1) the spouses’
the conduct of such operation. Likewise, this monthly eldest child, Jose Antonio, Jr. is a Sangguniang Kabataan
support of P115,000.00 is without prejudice to any Chairman and is already earning a monthly salary; (2) all
increase or decrease thereof that the trial court may grant the children stay with private respondent on weekends in
private respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e. their house in Pasay City; (3) private respondent has no
depending on the proof submitted by the parties during source of income except his salary and benefits as City
the proceedings for the main action for support. Councilor; (4) the voluminous documents consisting of
 Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent official receipts in payment of various billings including
may be allowed as deductions from the accrued support school tuition fees, private tutorials and purchases of
pendente lite for petitioner and her children: children’s school supplies, personal checks issued by
private respondent, as well as his own testimony in court,
Medical expenses of Susan Php 42,450.71 all of which substantiated his claim that he is fulfilling his
Lim-Lua obligation of supporting his minor children during the
pendency of the action; (5) there is no proof presented by
Dental Expenses of Daniel 11,500.00 petitioner that she is not gainfully employed, the spouses
Ryan being both medical doctors; (6) the unrebutted allegation
of private respondent that petitioner is already in the
Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.201âwphi1 United States; and (7) the alleged arrearages of private
respondent was not substantiated by petitioner with any
evidence while private respondent had duly complied with
his obligation as ordered by the court through his
198 of 255 | P a g e
overpayments in other aspects such as the children’s compliance by a party to its directive, as what petitioner
school tuition fees, real estate taxes and other suggests. It is also important to emphasize the temporary
necessities. or provisional nature of the assailed orders.
 RTC then declared null and void the marriage between  Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give monthly
plaintiff Ma.Carmina C. Roxas and defendant Jose support in the amount fixed by the RTC in the assailed
Antonio Roxas; awarded the custody of the parties’ minor orders may be enforced by the court itself, as what
children Maria Antoinette Roxas, Julian Roxas and transpired in the early stage of the proceedings when the
Richard Roxas to their mother herein petitioner, with the court cited the private respondent in contempt of court
respondent hereby given his visitorial and or custodial and ordered him arrested for his refusal/failure to comply
rights and ordered Jose Antonio Roxas to provide support with the order granting support pendente lite.21 A few
to the children in the amount of P30,000.00 a month years later, private respondent filed a motion to reduce
 CA dismissed the appeal support while petitioner filed her own motion to increase
the same, and in addition sought spousal support and
ISSUE: WON the March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 Orders on the support in arrears. This fact underscores the provisional
matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or final. character of the order granting support pendente lite.
Petitioner’s theory that the assailed orders have ceased
HELD: interlocutory to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred by private
 Distinction between interlocutory and final orders, as respondent is therefore untenable.
follows: x x x A "final" judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by
the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the CHARLES GOTARDO, petitioner vs. DIVINA BULING, respondent
merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at G.R. No. 165166 | August 15, 2012 (2D)
the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are and which party is in the FACTS:
right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on  Sept 6, 1995: respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint
the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite,
Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze
deciding the controversy or determining the rights and  testified that petitioner started courting the respondent
liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more in the third week of December 1992 and they became
remains to be done by the Court except to await the sweethearts in the last week of January 1993; Sometime
parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual
the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the relations with the respondent; sexual encounters
taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause occurred twice a month and became more frequent in
the execution of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent
to use the established and more distinctive term, "final found out that she was pregnant
and executory."  When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and
 The assailed orders relative to the incident of support made plans to marry the respondent; in fact applied for a
pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term marriage license; Subsequently, however, the petitioner
suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the backed out of the wedding plans
decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of  The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9,
marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not 1995
finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final  The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for
adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he
ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first
child custody, support and conjugal assets. week of August 1994 and she could not have been
 The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when
support pendente lite which may be availed of at the he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15,
commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at 1994.
any time prior to the judgment or final order.  During the pendency of the case, the RTC granted a
 Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March
the interlocutory aspect of the assailed orders pertains 1995
only to private respondent’s motion to reduce support  RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence
which was granted, and to her own motion to increase proving Gliffze’s filiation: found the respondent’s
support, which was denied. Petitioner points out that the testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had
ruling on support in arrears which have remained unpaid, her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e.,
as well as her prayer for reimbursement/payment under "September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week
the May 19, 1998 Order and related orders were in the of January 1993" during her cross-testimony, and her
nature of final orders assailable by ordinary appeal reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had
considering that the orders referred to under Sections 1 refused the petitioner’s initial marriage proposal
and 4 of Rule 61 of the Rules of Court can apply only  CA reversed RTC: noted that the petitioner and the
prospectively. Thus, from the moment the accrued respondent had sexual relationship even before August
amounts became due and demandable, the orders under 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the
which the amounts were made payable by private petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that
respondent have ceased to be provisional and have the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had
become final. previous relationships with other men remained
 The word interlocutory refers to something intervening unsubstantiated  THUS ordered the petitioner to
between the commencement and the end of the suit recognize his minor son Gliffze and reinstated the RTC
which decides some point or matter but is not a final order granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child support
decision of the whole controversy.18 An interlocutory
order merely resolves incidental matters and leaves ISSUE: WON support shall be granted to Gliffze
something more to be done to resolve the merits of the
case. In contrast, a judgment or order is considered final HELD: YES.
if the order disposes of the action or proceeding  Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to
completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
action.19 Clearly, whether an order or resolution is final associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as
or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or non- in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden
199 of 255 | P a g e
of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provide P40,000
father is the biological father of the child. monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering
 One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability  clarified that petitioners
or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed because of the latter’s inability to give sufficient support
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous  Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing,
possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate among others, their liability to support respondents.
child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court Petitioners argued that while Edward’s income is
and special laws. insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing
 Such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal that legal support should be "in keeping with the financial
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his capacity of the family" under Article 194 of the Civil Code,
name has been entered, common reputation respecting as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family
[his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of Code of the Philippines).7
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule  CA affirmed the trial court
130 of the Rules of Court.
 Herrera v. Alba: four significant procedural aspects of a ISSUE: WON there is basis to hold petitioners, as Edward’s parents,
traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a liable with him to support respondents
prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the HELD: YES.
putative father and the child.35 We explained that a prima  The law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code
facie case exists if a woman declares — supported by is clear on this matter. Parents and their legitimate
corroborative proof — that she had sexual relations with children are obliged to mutually support one another and
the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence this obligation extends down to the legitimate
shifts to the putative father.36 We explained further that grandchildren and great grandchildren.
the two affirmative defenses available to the putative  In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3)
father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the of the Family Code clearly provides that should the person
mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or obliged to give support does not have sufficient means to
(2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at satisfy all claims, the other persons enumerated in Article
the time of conception.37 199 in its order shall provide the necessary support. This
 In this case, the respondent established a prima facie is because the closer the relationship of the relatives, the
case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to
through testimony that she had been sexually involved support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer
only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved
conception. to the next nearer relatives and so on.8
 Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a  By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of
matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much –
of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their
clothing, medical attendance, education and liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the provisions11 found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as
family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that
this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is their liability is activated only upon default of parental
made as the amount shall be in proportion to the authority, conceivably either by its termination or
resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the suspension during the children’s minority. Because at the
recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities exercised parental authority over their children,
of the recipient and the resources or means of the person petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s
obliged to support. offspring ends with them.
 In this case, we sustain the award of P 2,000.00 monthly  Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of
child support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the
motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first
arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in
the pendency of this case. Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not
the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, petitioners vs. MA. areas share a common ground in that parental authority
CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her minor children encompasses the obligation to provide legal support, they
LESTER EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE GRACE S. LIM, and differ in other concerns including the duration of the
MARIANO S. LIM, III, respondents obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing
G.R. No. 163209 | October 30, 2009 (3D) degrees.16 Thus, although the obligation to provide
support arising from parental authority ends upon the
FACTS: emancipation of the child,17 the same obligation arising
 In 1979, respondent married Edward Lim , son of from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during
petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to
III. Edward’s family business, which provided him with a parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination
monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support
expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income. passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the
 On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide
residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), sufficient support. As we observed in another case raising
after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she the ancillary issue of an ascendant’s obligation to give
caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak support in light of the father’s sufficient means:
 Cheryl sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano  Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot
for support. demand support directly from their grandparents if they
 The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are
of P6,000 pendente lite; then rendered judgment ordering
200 of 255 | P a g e
capable of supporting them. This is so because we introduced to each other and became known in the
have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children.
 Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to During petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his brother
discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative, and it was
to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed the latter who acted as father of the bride. Respondent’s
that the amount of support Edward is able to give to relatives even attended the baptism of petitioner’s
respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet daughter.
respondents’ basic needs. This inability of Edward and  Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with
Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.
portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest  Respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground
degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal19 that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch
lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been
otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to barred by res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-
sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme CEB before RTC-Branch 24.
material deprivation of children because of parental  It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding
inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one No. 12562-CEB, petitioner had already filed a similar
degree removed are more than able to fill the void. Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
 However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation affiliation against respondent  Petitioner and
extends only to their descendants as this word is respondent eventually entered into a Compromise
commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of Agreement therein which was approved by RTC
lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only  Under the Compromise Agreement: Petitioner declares
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano that there is no blood relationship or filiation between
III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein
support from the Lim family extends only to her husband respondent] on the other; Petitioner and her brother
Edward, arising from their marital bond. declare that they have absolutely no more claims, causes
 As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of of action or demands against respondent, his heirs,
the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended, successors and assigns and/or against the estate of
and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or
maintaining respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence. against all corporations, companies or business
The option is unavailable to petitioners. enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino
 The application of Article 204 which provides that — The Realty Investment and Development Corporation where
person obliged to give support shall have the option to defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA
fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, may have interest or participation.
or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the  With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21
person who has a right to receive support. The latter February 2000 Decision of RTC-Branch 9 in Special
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a Proceeding 8830-CEB was declared final and executory.
moral or legal obstacle thereto.  RTC granted respondent’s Demurrer: The instant case is
 Here, the persons entitled to receive support are barred by the principle of res judicata because there was
petitioners’ grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting a judgment entered based on the Compromise
petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the Agreement
grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also
force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the ISSUE: WON the Compromise Agreement entered into between
scene of her husband’s infidelity. While not rising to the petitioner and respondent, duly approved by RTC-Branch 9
level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryl’s charge constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still
against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for pending before RTC-Branch 24.
insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its
occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the HELD: NO
case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article  The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every
204, precluding its application. well- regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded
upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity,
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, petitioner vs. JOSE NGO CHUA, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should
respondents be an end to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium,
G.R. No. 183965 | September 18, 2009 (3D) and (2) the hardship of the individual that he should be
vexed twice for the same cause, nemo debet bis vexari
FACTS: pro eadem causa.16
 Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed a Petition for the  For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a
issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:
respondent: that respondent, who was then married, had (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court
an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter
Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the
petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended to merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases,
Irene when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.17
April 1959, and instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate  A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by
be filled out with the following names: "ALFREDO F. making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an
SURPOSA" as father and "IRENE DUCAY" as mother. end to one already commenced. In Estate of the late
Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court pronounced that
father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A
mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner and judgment based on a compromise agreement is a
Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly given judgment on the merits.
petitioner allowances before she got married. He also  It must be emphasized, though, that like any other
provided her with employment. When petitioner was still contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the
in high school, respondent required her to work at the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a)
Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family. She was consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that
later on able to work at the Gaisano- Borromeo Branch is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the
through respondent’s efforts. Petitioner and Allan were obligation that is established. And, like any other contract,
201 of 255 | P a g e
the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement FACTS:
must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public o Respondent Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for
policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that habeas corpus against petitioner Wilson Sy  prayed that
is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and said writ be issued ordering petitioner to produce their
vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah before the court
produces no legal effect at all. and that after hearing, their care and custody be awarded
 ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions to her as their mother
shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The o In his answer, petitioner prayed that the custody of the
validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground minors be awarded to him instead. Petitioner maintained
for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The that respondent was unfit to take custody of the minors.
jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. (Emphases He adduced the following reasons: firstly, respondent
ours.) abandoned her family in 1992; secondly, she is mentally
 The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and unstable; and thirdly, she cannot provide proper care to
respondent obviously intended to settle the question of the children.
petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an o RTC caused the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and
illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner awarded custody of the children to respondent; further
and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the orders the respondent to pay by way of monthly support
children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner for the minors, the amount of P50,000.00 payable to
and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it petitioner from [the] date of judgment for failure on the part
was a necessary consequence of said Compromise of respondent to show by preponderance of evidence that
Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to the petitioner is unfit to the custody of the minor children
future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child who are only 6 and 4 years old.
of respondent. o CA affirmed the decision of the trial court : As to the
propriety of the amount awarded, the appellate court was
 Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February
unwilling to alter the trial court’s conclusion for petitioner
2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the
did not forthrightly testify on his actual income. Neither did
prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
he produce income tax returns or other competent
 Public policy demands that there be no compromise on
evidence, although within his power to do so, to provide a
the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or fair indication of his resources. At any rate, the appellate
the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be court declared that a judgment of support is never final
judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its and petitioner is not precluded at any time from seeking a
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or modification of the same and produce evidence of his
agreement of the parties. claim.
 Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise ISSUE: WON the grant of support herein is proper.
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner HELD: YES.
and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and o Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation
creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. to give support is demandable from the time the person
The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even who has a right to receive the same needs it for
by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date
respective prestations. of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
 Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving o Jocson v. The Empire Ins. Co. and Jocson
the Compromise Agreement, in its Decision dated 21 Lagniton:Support does include what is necessary for the
February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, education and clothing of the person entitled thereto (Art.
already made said contract valid and legal. Obviously, it 290, New Civil Code). But support must be demanded
would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch and the right to it established before it becomes payable
9 to legalize what is illegal. (Art. 298, New Civil Code; Marcelo v. Estacio, 70 Phil.
 In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC- 215). For the right to support does not arise from the mere
Branch 24 is not barred by res judicata, since RTC- fact of relationship, even from the relationship of parents
Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision and children, but "from imperative necessity without which
dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830- it cannot be demanded, and the law presumes that such
CEB, petitioner and respondent’s Compromise necessity does not exist unless support is demanded
Agreement, which was contrary to law and public policy; (Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Tolentino, Vol.
and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000 1, p. 181, citing 8 Manresa 685). In the present case, it
in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void does not appear that support for the minors, be it only for
for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without their education and clothing, was ever demanded from
jurisdiction, could not have attained finality or been their father and the need for it duly established. The need
considered a judgment on the merits. for support, as already stated, cannot be presumed, and
 Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the especially must this be true in the present case where it
Compromise Agreement between petitioner and appears that the minors had means of their own.
respondent is void, the admission petitioner made therein o Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court permits the
may still be appreciated against her in Special Proceeding ventilation of the question regarding the care and custody
No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that of the children as an incident to any proceeding, even a
while petitioner’s admission may have evidentiary value, habeas corpus proceeding. Petitioner would have us
it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of believe, however, that since respondent’s petition did not
filiation. include a prayer for support of the children in accordance
 WhereforE, premises considered, the Resolution dated with the above-quoted Family Code provision, the trial
25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, court was not justified in awarding support in respondent’s
Branch 24, in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB is favor. In addition, petitioner claims that he did not give
REVERSED and set aside. This case is ordered consent to the trial and the threshing out of the issue as it
REMANDED to the said trial court for further proceedings was not raised in the pleadings. He claims that in fact, he
in accordance with the ruling of the Court herein. No testified on his financial status only to prove that he is
costs. financially able to provide for his children and not for the
purpose of determining the amount of support.25 Besides,
WILSON SY, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Regional Trial he contends that the trial court did not order the
Court of Manila, Branch 48, and MERCEDES TAN UY-SY, amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence
respondents presented pursuant to Section 5 Rule 10 of the 1997
G.R. No. 124518 | December 27, 2007 (2D)
202 of 255 | P a g e
Rules of Civil Procedure, an aspect that supports his to pay them P2, 496,000 PESOS in arrears from which
contention that the parties never consented, expressly or amount shall be deducted P124,000; CA affirmed RTC
impliedly, to try the issue of support.  Petitioner submits that he should not be made to pay
o Applying Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous
Procedure, since the issue of support was tried with the extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made
implied consent of the parties, it should be treated in all by the respondents invoking Article 203 which provides
respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. And that the obligation to give support shall be demandable
since there was implied consent, even if no motion had from the time the person who has a right to receive the
been filed and no amendment had been ordered, the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid
Court holds that the trial court validly rendered a judgment except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
on the issue.  To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the
o Bank of America v. American Realty Corporation: There aforequoted provision starts from the filing of Civil Case
have been instances where the Court has held that even No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be
without the necessary amendment, the amount proved at said that an effective demand for support was made upon
the trial may be validly awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos him.
(95 Phil. 106), where we said that if the facts shown
entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no ISSUE: WON Petitioner shall be made to pay support in arrears.
amendment to the complaint was necessary, especially
where defendant had himself raised the point on which HELD:YES
recovery was based. The appellate court could treat the  Petitioner’s above posture has little to commend itself. For
pleading as amended to conform to the evidence although one, it conveniently glossed over the fact that he veritably
the pleadings were actually not amended. Amendment is abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder
also unnecessary when only clerical error or non of the two could celebrate her second birthday. To be
substantial matters are involved, as we held in Bank of the sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the
Philippine Islands vs. Laguna (48 Phil. 5). In Co Tiamco sisters during their tender years to go through the motion
v. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed that the rule on of demanding support from him, what with the fact that
amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly where even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the
no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. And period material to get in touch with him. For another, the
in the recent case of National Power Corporation v. Court requisite demand for support appears to have been made
of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), we held that where there is sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no
a variance in the defendant’s pleadings and the evidence extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written
adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly
as amended to conform with the evidence. used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless,
o The Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 as what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely
support for the minor children  petitioner’s made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support
representations regarding his family’s wealth and his owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand
capability to provide for his family more than provided a because it came by way of a request or a plea. As it were,
fair indication of his financial standing even though he the trial court found that a demand to sustain an award of
proved to be less than forthright on the matter.
support in arrears had been made in this case and said
o In any event, this award of support is merely provisional
so in its decision, thus:
as the amount may be modified or altered in accordance
 From 1976, [respondents’] mother now and then went to
with the increased or decreased needs of the needy party
their [paternal] grandmother’s house by their father and
and with the means of the giver.
asked for support; this notwithstanding their father’s
EDWARD V. LACSON, petitioner vs. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON commitment for this purpose which the latter embodied in
and MAONAA DABAN LACSON, represented by their mother a note dated December 10, 1975. For twenty-one years
and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON, respondents that they needed support, [petitioner] complied with his
G.R. No. 150644 | August 28, 2006 (2D) obligation for only two (2) years.
 As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no
FACTS: reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at by the two
 The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban courts below, appearing as they do to be reasonable and
Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. proper. Arbitrariness respecting the determination of the
Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was final numbers cannot plausibly be laid on the doorsteps of
born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less the CA, and the trial court before it, considering that they
than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, fixed such amount based on the varying needs of the
petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, respondents during the years included in the computation
virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently and to the financial resources of the petitioner, as proved
for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a by the evidence adduced below. As a matter of law, the
month, they stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law, Alicia amount of support which those related by marriage and
Lacson, then with her (Lea’s) mother and then with her family relationship is generally obliged to give each other
brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
apartment only to return later to the house of Lea’s giver and to the needs of the recipient.
mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and
MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor
their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of
children REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL
eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to
DELGADO, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
another not their own.
JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge,
 In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two
RTC-Makati, Branch 149, FEDERICO C. DELGADO and
daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support,
FRANCISCO C. DELGADO, respondents
averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully
G.R. No. 125041|June 30, 2006 (1D)
employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands,
has not provided them support since 1976
FACTS:
 RTC granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa support
 Petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her
pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month
then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for
 Following trial, the RTC rendered judgment finding for the Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application
plaintiff sisters  ordered their defendant father Edward
for support pendente lite: alleged that petitioner and
respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married; As the
203 of 255 | P a g e
marriage was solemnized without the required consent large, the status of the twins as children of Federico
(due to their age), it was annulled cannot be denied. They had maintained constant
 On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the communication with their grandfather Francisco. As a
annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins matter of fact, respondent Francisco admitted having
Rica and Rina. wrote several letters to Rica and Rina . In the said letters,
 At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina particularly at the bottom thereof, respondent Francisco
were about to enter college in USA where petitioner, wrote the names of Rica and Rina Delgado. He therefore
together with her daughters and second husband, had was very well aware that they bear the surname Delgado.
moved to and finally settled in. Despite their admissions Likewise, he referred to himself in his letters as either
to universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially "Lolo Paco" or "Daddy Paco." In his letter of October 13,
incapable of pursuing collegiate education ( average 1989 (Exh. G-21), he said "as the grandfather, am
annual cost for college education in the US is about US extending a financial help of US 1,000.00." On top of this,
22,000/year) respondent Federico even gave the twins a treat to
 Additionally, Rica and Rina need general maintenance Hongkong during their visit to the Philippines. Indeed,
support each in the amount of US 3,000.00 per year or a respondents, by their actuations, have shown beyond
total of US 6,000 per year; Unfortunately, petitioner’s doubt that the twins are the children of Federico.
monthly income from her 2 jobs is merely US 1,200 after  ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to
taxes give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
 Petitioner also alleged that Rica and Rina are her persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2)
legitimate daughters by respondent Federico since the The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The
twin sisters were born within seven months from the date ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers
of the annulment of her marriage to respondent Federico. and sisters.
However, as respondent Federico failed to sign the birth  An eminent author on the subject explains that the
certificates of Rica and Rina, it was imperative that their obligation to give support rests principally on those more
status as legitimate children of respondent Federico, and closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote
as granddaughters of respondent Francisco, be judicially relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should
declared pursuant to Article 173 of the Family Code. the claimant prove that those who are called upon to
 As legitimate children and grandchildren, Rica and Rina provide support do not have the means to do so.
are entitled to general and educational support under  In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
Articles 174 and 195(b) in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2) held respondent Federico liable to provide monthly
and 199(c) of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that support pendente lite in the total amount of P10,000.00
under these provisions, in case of default on the part of by taking into consideration his supposed income of
the parents, the obligation to provide support falls upon P30,000.00 to P40,000.00 per month.
the grandparents of the children; thus, respondent  There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner
Federico, or in his default, respondent Francisco should and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and
be ordered to provide general and educational support for Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily
Rica and Rina in the amount of US 50,000.00, more or charged to support their children’s college education. In
less, per year. view however of their incapacities, the obligation to
 Petitioner also claimed that she was constrained to seek furnish said support should be borne by respondent
support pendente lite from private respondents - who are Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code,
millionaires with extensive assets both here and abroad - respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of
in view of the imminent opening of classes, the possibility Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
of a protracted litigation, and Rica and Rina’s lack of granddaughters in default of their parents. It bears
financial means to pursue their college education in the stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority
USA. stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of
 RTC: respondents are hereby directed to provide a Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and
monthly support (pendente lite) of P5,000.00 each or a manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate,
total of P10,000.00 for the education of Rebecca Angela and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight
and Regina Isabel Delgado to be delivered within the first forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and
five days of each month without need of demand. Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Shipping
 CA affirmed the holding of the trial court which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from
these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in
ISSUE:WON Francisco, as the grandfather, may be held liable for turn, owns real properties in different parts of the country.
support. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Isla Communication Co. and he owns shares of stocks of
HELD:YES Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here
 Rule 61, SECTION 1: At the commencement of the proper and abroad.41 It having been established that respondent
action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment Francisco has the financial means to support his
or final order, a verified application for support pendente granddaughters’ education, he, in lieu of petitioner and
lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds for the respondent Federico, should be held liable for support
claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and pendente lite.
accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic  Anent respondent Francisco and Federico’s claim that
documents in support thereof. they have the option under the law as to how they could
 Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina,
support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should
final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local
not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it universities. After all, the quality of education here,
can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is according to him, is at par with that offered in the USA.
tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of The applicable provision of the Family Code on this
evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve subject provides: Art. 204. The person obliged to give
the application. It is enough that the facts be established support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either
by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
the record. maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a
 Petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be
filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle
the twins’ entitlement to support pendente lite: By and thereto.
204 of 255 | P a g e
 Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies
choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give against private respondent
support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of  Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution of the
support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay judgment of support, which the trial court granted by
in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be issuing a writ of execution, citing as reason therefor
availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, private respondent's immediate need for
which should be considered. schooling.Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a
 In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco motor vehicle.
could not avail himself of the second option. From the  Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of CA imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for
this action, the relationship between respondent ordering the immediate execution of the judgment.
Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued
daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The despite the absence of a good reason for immediate
correspondences exchanged among them expressed enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there
another’s well-being. The photographs presented by should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution.
petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly  CA dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under
typical family celebrating kinship. All of these, however, Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and judgments for support are immediately executory and
the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the cannot be stayed by an appeal
relationships among the parties had certainly been
affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be ISSUE: WON a judgment for support which is subject of an appeal
the fact that those who they had considered and claimed cannot be executed absent any good reason for its immediate
as family denied having any familial relationship with execution.
them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina
moving back here in the Philippines in the company of HELD: NO.
those who have disowned them.  Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states
 Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in
our bearings from the provision of the law mandating the actions for support are immediately executory and cannot
amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal
Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco stays the execution of the judgment and that advance
liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons
by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for
by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial immediate execution of all judgments for support and
resources to pay this amount given his various business makes no distinction between those which are the subject
endeavors. of an appeal and those which are not. To consider then
 Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons
already been done with their education by the time of the for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the
promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to award clear and explicit language of the rule mandating
support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the immediate execution.
time they entered college until they had finished their  Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution
respective studies. on the ground that he was not notified of its issuance. We
are unable to accept such a plea for enough has been
AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN, petitioner vs. HON. ANTONIO C. done by petitioner to delay the execution of the writ.
REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 61,  We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice
Baguio City, ALBERT G. TOLENTINO, in his capacity as RTC of hearing can be disregarded. That is not so. It appears
Sheriff of Baguio City, and FRANCHESKA JOY C. PONDEVIDA, in this case that there has been too much temporizing in
assisted by BERNADETTE C. PONDEVIDA, respondents the execution of the writ which must not be allowed to
G.R. No. 145527 | May 28, 2002 (2D) thwart the constitutional mandate for speedy disposition
of cases. As has been said, a technicality should be an
FACTS: aid to justice and not its great hindrance and chief enemy.
 Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Truly, if the writ of execution would be voided on this
Caezar R. Gan demanding support for their "love child." ground alone, then procedural rules which were primarily
Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An drafted to protect parties in the realm of constitutional
exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the expense
her daughter a complaint against petitioner for support of equity and justice.
with prayer for support pendente lite.  In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are
 Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the always the paramount concerns. There may be instances
complaint failed to state a cause of action. He argued that where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a
since Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her father travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision
as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip
the claim of support.3 His motion, however, was denied away.
by the trial court.  De Leon v. Soriano: The money and property adjudged
 After finding that the claim of filiation and support was for support and education should and must be given
adequately proved, the trial court rendered its Decision on presently and without delay because if it had to wait the
12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize private final judgment, the children may in the meantime have
respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost
illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00 every years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot
month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month delay the payment of such funds for support and
starting 15 April 2000. Likewise petitioner was ordered to education for the reason that if paid long afterwards,
pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated however much the accumulated amount, its payment
arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the day she was cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The
born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for children with such belated payment for support and
expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and
15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as alimony unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger
205 of 255 | P a g e
and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the
and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to existence of filiation between the minor child and the
make up for the years they missed in school, due to non- putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that
payment of the funds when needed. such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming
support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and
MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. all future complaint for support.
JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN  The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the
CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian first case, which acknowledged that it would be useless to
VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents pursue its complaint for support, amounted to
G.R. No. 127578 | February 15, 1999 (3D) renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the
minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his
FACTS: putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the
 Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her agreement entered into between the petitioner and
capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil respondent's mother for the dismissal of the complaint for
Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal
support against Manuel de Asis, alleging that the of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which
defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition
father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and against any compromise of the right to support.
the former refused and/or failed to provide for the  The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for
maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. support is provisional because the amount may be
 Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent in a manifestation increased or decreased depending upon the means of the
the pertinent portion of which, reads; defendant (herein giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that
petitioner) has made a judicial admission/declaration that the right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can
defendant denies that the said minor child (Glen Camil) is it be transmitted to a third person neither can it be
his child he (petitioner) has no obligation to the plaintiff compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator
Glen Camil . . . That with the aforesaid judicial (Art .301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be
admission/declarations by the defendant, it seems futile waived or transferred to third parties and future support
and a useless exercise to claim support from said cannot be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v.
defendant.That under the foregoing circumstances it Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla,
would be more practical that plaintiff withdraws the p. 648; 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is indisputable that
complains against the defendant subject to the condition the present action for support can be brought,
that the defendant should not pursue his counterclaim in notwithstanding the fact the previous case filed against
the above-entitled case, . . . the same defendant was dismissed. And it also appearing
 By virtue of the said manifestation, RTC dismissed with that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an
prejudice adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the
 On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for right of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for
maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. support and acknowledgment is available, as her needs
de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has the right
Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D. to bring an action for support, for it is only then that her
Andres cause for action is accrues.. . .
 On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the  Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case
Complaint on the ground of res judicata Q-88-935 and the lower court's pronouncement that such
 RTC ruled that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for
support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support may still prosper.
support is prohibited by law; CA affirmed RTC
DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON
ISSUE: WON an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata. R. VILLAR, respondent
G.R. No. 111180 | November 16, 1995 (2D)
HELD: YES.
 The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor FACTS:
transmitted to a third person  Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private
 Article 301 of the Civil Code:The right to receive support respondent Ramon R. Villar,a married man had an illicit
cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third relationship, as a result of which a son, Christopher J.,
person. Neither can it be compensated with what the was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was
recipient owes the obligor. . . . followed by two more children, both girls, namely
 Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April
compromise. 24, 1988.
 Art. 2035:No compromise upon the following questions  The relationship became known to private respondent's
shall be valid:(1) The civil status of persons;(2) The wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at
validity of a marriage or legal separation;(3) Any ground Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and
for legal separation(4) Future support;(5) The jurisdiction introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
of courts;(6) Future legitime.  After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by
 The raison d' etre behind the proscription against Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by
renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the right his legal family.
to support is stated, thus: The right to support being  In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family
existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused
right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving to give back the child.
up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence,  Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of
support which is the means to attain the former, cannot Christopher J.
be renounced.  RTC: judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
 In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was petitioner: rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T.
the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was David is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein
withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support petitioner Daisie T. David; ordered to give a temporary
from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. support of P3,000.00 a month to the subject minor

206 of 255 | P a g e
Christopher J. T. David, Christine David and Cathy Mae earning a decent living and is able to support her children
David according to her means.
 CA reversed, holding that habeas corpus is not the proper  The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to
remedy: Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of
custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for
corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents support, after finding that private respondent did not give
are married to each other but are separated. This is so any support to his three children by Daisie, except the
because under the Family Code, the father and mother meager amount of P500.00 a week which he stopped
have joint parental authority over their legitimate children giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a rich man who
and in case of separation of the parents there is need to professes love for his children. In fact he filed a motion for
determine rightful custody of their children. The same the execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
does not hold true in an adulterous relationship, as in the alleging that he had observed his son "to be physically
case at bar, the child born out of such a relationship is weak and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of
under the parental authority of the mother by express the luxury and amenities he was accustomed to when in
provision of the law. Hence, the question of custody and the former custody of the respondent." He prayed that he
support should be brought in a case singularly filed for the be given the custody of the child so that he can provide
purpose. him with the "proper care and education."
 Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding
ISSUE: WON Habeas Corus can is an applicable remedy to enforce for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is
right for support. justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed
willingness to support the minor child. The order for
HELD:YES payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the
 Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the
of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person court or by receiving and maintaining in the family
is withheld from the person entitled thereto." dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in
 It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are TITLE IX. PARENTAL AUTHORITY
married to each other, are for some reason separated
from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot Rule on Custody of Minors & Writ of Habeas Corpus (SC AM
arise in any other situation. For example, in the case of 03-04-04)
Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with Law (2002)
corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain SC Rule on Guardianship of Minors (A.M. 03[02[05) SC
the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be Rule on Examination of Child Witness (2000)
in the custody of a third person of her free will because See RA 9262 (Anti Violence against Women and Children
the parents were compelling her to marry a man against [VAWC]) & IRR
her will. Re: Proposed Rule on Guardianship of Minors (SC AM No. 03-
 In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child 02-05)
since at the time of his conception, his father, private RA 8972 "Solo Parents' Welfare Act of 2000” & Implementing
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another Rules and Regulations of
woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant 2002
to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the See RA 9262 (Anti Violence against Women and Children
parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, [VAWC]); IRR
who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to Article 2176 & 2180; RA 6809
have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has
been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS (Articles 209-215)
private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus. Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the
 The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor person and property of their unemancipated children, parental
child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing
the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of
Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. (n)
of age shall be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." 3 Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced
 Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. (313a)
for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children,
especially considering that she has been able to rear and Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a
month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She judicial order to the contrary.
augments her income by working as secretary at the Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their
Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are
income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her under parental authority. (311a)
employer so that she can personally attend to her
children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent
make up for time lost during the day. That she receives present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage
help from her parents and sister for the support of the of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the
three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
compassion, love and concern for every member of the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)
family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind
the Filipino family and have made it what it is. Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall
 Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall
affluence that private respondent promises if the child take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice
lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is
207 of 255 | P a g e
of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
unfit. (n) the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
And if already over 7 years of age, the child’s choice as to
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit.
grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the Finally, in Perez v. Court of Appeals, We held that in
court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the
preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a) welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected in no
less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to which provides that “[i]n all actions concerning children,
testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
one parent against the other. (315a) legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
GEOFFREY BECKETT, petitioner vs. JUDGE OLEGARIO R. primary consideration.
SARMIENTO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City,  In the light of the foregoing, respondent judge cannot be
respondent held guilty of the charges hurled by the complainant
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326 (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3692-RTJ) against him for the reason that absent a finding of strong
January 30, 2013 THIRD DIVISION reasons to rule otherwise, the preference of a child over
7 years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall be
FACTS: respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously granted
 This case arose from a complaint filed by Geoffrey by a competent court in favor of a parent, is not, to
Beckett charging Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr. of the reiterate, permanent. In Espiritu, We ruled that:
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, with o x x x [T]he matter of custody is not permanent
gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and and unalterable. If the parent who was given
dereliction and neglect of duty allegedly committed in custody suffers a future character change and
relation to Sp. Proc. No. 18182-CEB involving the becomes unfit, the matter of custody can
complainant, while pending before that court. always be re-examined and adjusted x x x. To
 Geoffrey Becket, an Australian national, was previously be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the
married to Eltesa Densing Beckett, a Filipina, to whom benefit, and the good of the child must be
Geoffrey Jr. was born. The two eventually separated and, determined as of the time that either parent is
worse still, they sued each other. chosen to be the custodian. x x x
 In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against Beckett for violation  As Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu in Espiritu, Geoffrey,
for Jr., at the time when he persistently refused to be turned
Violence against Women and Children Act, followed by a over to his father, was already over 7 years of age. As
suit for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, such, he was very much capable of deciding, based on
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB -32254. Both cases his past experiences, with whom he wanted to stay.
ended in the sala of Judge Olegario Sarmiento, Jr. Noteworthy too are the results of the interviews which
(respondent or Judge Sarmiento). For his part, Beckett were reflected in the three reports previously mentioned,
commenced criminal charges against Eltesa, one of excerpts from which are hereunder quoted, to wit:
which was for adultery. Judge Sarmiento, rendered o x x x In so far as [Geoffrey, Jr.’s] account of
judgment based on a compromise agreement in which experience, being with his father’s custody is
Eltesa in which Eltesa and Beckett agreed and undertook, something that he is afraid of and something he
among others, to cause the dismissal of all pending civil does not want to happen again. However, being
and criminal cases each may have filed against the other. with his mother is the one (sic) he is looking to
They categorically agreed too that Beckett shall have full (sic) and aspires.
and permanent custody over Geoffrey, Jr., then five (5) xxxx
years old, subject to the visitorial rights of Eltesa. x x x Being in the custody of his mother is
something (sic) he feel (sic) secure and
 Beckett left for Australia, taking Geoffrey Jr. with him.
protected and this is manifested in the child’s
Moreover, as agreed upon, they would come and see
Eltesa in Cebu every Christmas. craving for his mother’s presence all the time
and the desire to be always with her that even
 In 2007, Beckett obtained a divorce from Eltesa in
(sic) he sleeps he wants his mother to embrace
Australia. The yearly Christmas visits continued. In the
and hug him and cries when he wakes up and
2010 visit, Beckett consented to have Geoffrey, Jr. stay
he cannot see his mother.
with Eltesa even after the holidays, provided she return
xxxx
the child on January 9, 2011. As the custody of their son
x x x [H]e locked me in the room. He always
remained with Eltesa even after the said period, Beckett
leave (sic) me. x x x they keep fighting, Daddy
filed a petition against Eltesa for violation of RA 7610
and his girlfriend ... they'll get angry with (sic)
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 18182-CEB which was raffled
me ... I'm scared with (sic) Daddy.
again to the sala of Judge Sarmiento. Beckett later
xxxx
applied for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Meanwhile, Ms. Barbo (the caregiver or yaya
 Beckett further relates that, during the March 1, 2011
of Geoffrey, Jr.), expressed peculiarities, "Sa
conference on the application for habeas corpus,
Daddy niya, [he] dd (sic) not fear his mom. Sa
Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed inside the
mommy niya, [he] fear (sic) his dad."
courtroom hysterical conduct, shouting and crying, not
 There is no reason to sustain the charge against
wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the
respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law. For
father, was a total stranger. This notwithstanding, Judge
clearly, absent any evidence to the contrary, Geoffrey, Jr.
Sarmiento ordered Eltesa to return Geoffrey Jr. to
chose to live with his mother for a reason, which
Beckett. However, the turnover did not materialize.
respondent judge, consistent with the promotion of the
best interest of the child, provisionally granted through the
ISSUE: Whether Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the
issuance of the disputed March 15, 2011 Order.
law when he awarded the custody to the mother based on the
preference of the minor child.
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, petitioners, vs.
MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her minor
HELD: NO
children LESTER EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE GRACE S.
 In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III, respondents
minor, the well-settled rule is that no child under seven (7)
208 of 255 | P a g e
G.R. No. 163209 | October 30, 2009 (3D) the ancillary issue of an ascendant’s obligation to give
support in light of the father’s sufficient means:
FACTS: o Professor Pineda is of the view that
 Cheryl Lim was married to Edward Lim, son of petitioners grandchildren cannot demand support directly
Prudencio and Filomena Lim. Cheryl and Edward had 3 from their grandparents if they have parents
children. (ascendants of nearest degree) who are
The family resided at the house of petitioners. Edward’s capable of supporting them. This is so because
monthly salary of P6,000 shouldered the family expenses we have to follow the order of support under
since Cheryl had no steady source of income. Art. 199. We agree with this view.
 Cheryl abandoned their residence, bringing the children xxxx
with her (then all minors) after a violent confrontation with There is no showing that private respondent
Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife in a is without means to support his son; neither
very compromising situation. is there any evidence to prove that petitioner,
 Cheryl, for herself and for her children, sued petitioners as the paternal grandmother, was willing to
and Edward, among others, in the RTC for support. voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal
 The trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and support. x x x (Emphasis supplied; internal
his parents to “jointly” provide monthly support to citations omitted)
respondents.  Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to
 Petitioners appealed to the CA assailing, among others, discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support
heir liability support respondents. to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed
 CA affirmed the trial court citing Arts. 195 and 200 par. (3) that the amount of support Edward is able to give to
of the FC which provide that parents and their legitimate respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet
children are obliged to mutually support one another and respondents’ basic needs. This inability of Edward and
this obligation extends down to the legitimate Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a
grandchildren and great grandchildren and that should the portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest
person obliged to give support does not have sufficient degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal
means to satisfy all claims, the other persons enumerated lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold
in Article 199 in its order shall provide the necessary otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to
support. sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme
 Petitioners filed the instant petition contending that their material deprivation of children because of parental
liability is activated only upon default of parental authority inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one
of the parents. degree removed are more than able to fill the void.
 However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with extends only to their descendants as this word is
Edward to provide support to respondents even without default commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of
of parental authority of the parents. lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
HELD: YES but only with respect to their grandchildren III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive
 We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the support from the Lim family extends only to her husband
appealed judgment by limiting petitioners’ liability to the Edward, arising from their marital bond. Unfortunately,
amount of monthly support needed by respondents Lester Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support the
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III only. trial court awarded cannot be determined from the
 By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to
ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants the trial court for this limited purpose.
is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much –
they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their WILSON SY, Petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Regional Trial
liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on Court of Manila,
provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, Branch 48, and MERCEDES TAN UY-SY, Respondents
on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their G.R. No. 124518 | Dec. 27, 2007 (2D)
liability is activated only upon default of parental authority,
conceivably either by its termination or suspension during FACTS:
the children’s minority. Because at the time respondents  Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus
sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental against Wilson Sy before the RTC praying that said writ
authority over their children, petitioners submit that the be issued ordering the latter to produce their minor
obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them. children, Vanessa and Jeremiah and that after hearing,
 Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of their care and custody be awarded to her as their mother.
jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the  In opposition, Wilson prayed that the custody of the
scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first minors be awarded to him instead on the grounds that
place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in Mercedes abandoned her family in 1992, that she is
Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not mentally unstable and that she cannot provide proper
the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both care to the children.
areas share a common ground in that parental authority  RTC  awarded custody of the children to Mercedes
encompasses the obligation to provide legal support, they without prejudice to the visitorial rights of Wilson and
differ in other concerns including the duration of the ordered Wilson to provide monthly support for the minors
obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing in the amount of P50,000 for failure to show by
degrees. Thus, although the obligation to provide support preponderance of evidence that Mercedes is unfit to the
arising from parental authority ends upon the custody of the minor children who are only 6 and 4 years
emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising old.
from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during  Wilson appealed to the CA
the obligee's lifetime. Also, while parental authority under o CA  affirmed the decision of the trial court and
Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to held that Wilson failed to prove that Mercedes
parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination was unfit to take custody of the children
or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support  Wilson filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the asserting that the CA had no jurisdiction to award
parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide
sufficient support. As we observed in another case raising
209 of 255 | P a g e
ISSUE: Who should properly be awarded custody of the children may be raised and adjudicated as an incident to
children. any proceeding, such as a case for habeas corpus.
 Evidently, absent any compelling reason to the contrary,
HELD: Mercedes (the mother) the trial court was correct in restoring the custody of the
 The applicable provision is Section 213 of the Family children to the mother, herein respondent, the children
Code which states that: being less than seven years of age, at least at the time
o Section 213. In case of separation of the the case was decided. Moreover, petitioner’s contention
parents, parental authority shall be exercised that respondent is unfit to have custody over the minor
by the parent designated by the Court. The children has not been substantiated as found by both
Court shall take into account all relevant courts below. Thus, it is already too late for petitioner to
considerations, especially the choice of the reiterate the assertion for only questions of law may be
child over seven years of age, unless the parent raised before this Court. Furthermore, the determination
is unfit. of whether the mother is fit or unfit to have custody over
No child under seven years of age shall be the children is a matter well within the sound discretion of
separated from the mother, unless the court the trial court, and unless it is shown that said discretion
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. has been abused the selection will not be interfered with.
 In case of legal separation of the parents, the custody of
the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent FELIPE N. MADRIÑAN, Petitioner, vs. FRANCISCA R.
spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the MADRIÑAN, Responden
interest of the minor children. But when the husband and G.R. No. 159374 | July 12, 2007 (1D)
wife are living separately and apart from each other,
without decree of the court, the court shall award the care, FACTS:
custody, and control of each child as will be for his best  Husband and wife, Felipe and Francisca Madriñan were
interest, permitting the child to choose which parent he blessed with 3 sons and a daughter - Ronnick, born on
prefers to live with if he is over seven (7) years of age January 30, 1994; Phillip, born on November 19, 1996;
unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann,
child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness born on December 12, 2000.
or poverty.  After a bitter quarrel in May 2002, Felipe allegedly left
 In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the their conjugal abode and took their 3 sons with him to
sole and foremost consideration is the physical, Albay and subsequently to Laguna. The efforts of
educational, social and moral welfare of the child Francisca to patch things up with her husband, however,
concerned, taking into account the respective resources proved futile.
and social and moral situations of the contending parents.  Francisca then filed a petition for habeas corpus for her 3
 However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and sons in the CA alleging Felipe’s act of leaving the conjugal
proper person to have custody of her children so that they dwelling disrupted the education of their children and
may not only receive her attention, care, supervision but deprived them of their mother’s care.
also have the advantage and benefit of a mother’s love  Disregarding their initial agreement that he would return
and devotion for which there is no substitute. Generally, the custody of their sons to Francisca, Felipe filed his
the love, solicitude and devotion of a mother cannot be memorandum alleging that Francisca was unfit to take
replaced by another and are worth more to a child of custody of their 3 sons because she was habitually drunk,
tender years than all other things combined. The Civil frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of
Code Commission, in recommending the preference for the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and
the mother, explained, thus: neglected her duties as a mother and that it was she who
o The general rule is recommended in order to left in May 1992 and who took their daughter. For her part,
avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen Francisca averred that she was did not leave their home
her baby torn away from her. No man can in May 1992 but she was driven out by Felipe, that it was
sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is him who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict.
deprived of her child of tender age. The  CA  citing Art. 213 of the FC awarded to Francisca the
exception allowed by the rule has to be for custody of Philip and Francis Angelo who were at that
“compelling reasons” for the good of the child: time aged 6 and 4, respectively, subject to visitation rights
those cases must indeed be rare, if the of Felipe; with respect to Roonick who was the 8 years
mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she old, it ruled that his custody should be determined by the
has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty proper family court.
of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce  Felipe filed the instant petition challenging the jurisdiction
decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment of the CA over the petition for habeas corpus and insisting
for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts
have any effect upon the baby who is as yet under Sec. 5(b) of RA 8369.
unable to understand the situation.
 This preference favoring the mother over the father is ISSUE: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the petition for habeas
even reiterated in Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court corpus involving custody of minors.
(the Rule on Adoption and Custody of Minors)
underscoring its significance, to wit: HELD: YES
o SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents  In Thornton v. Thornton, this Court resolved the issue of
are separated. Appeal. ― When husband and the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
wife are divorced or living separately and apart corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of
from each other, and the question as to the the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive
care, custody and control of a child or children original jurisdiction over such petitions:
of their marriage is brought before a Regional o The Court of Appeals should take
Trial Court by petition or as an incident to cognizance of the case since there is
any other proceeding, xxx xxx xxx xxx No nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its
child under seven years of age shall be jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
separated from its mother, unless the court involving the custody of minors.
finds there are compelling reasons therefor. xxxxxxxxx
(Emphasis supplied) We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest
 The above-quoted provision expressly acknowledges and the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
authorizes that the matter of care and custody of the
210 of 255 | P a g e
of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus enforceable only in their respective territorial
cases involving the custody of minors. jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being
xxxxxxxxx transferred from one place to another,
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest which seems to be the case here, the
intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be
Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of left without legal remedy. This lack of
habeas corpus relating to the custody of recourse could not have been the intention
minors. Further, it cannot be said that the of the lawmakers when they passed [RA
provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act 8369].
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of  Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369
Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary reveals that family courts are vested with original
Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas
incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of
from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be
involving the custody of minors. Thus, the availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of
provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. In other
with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court custody case pending before the family court. The writ
of Appeals and the Supreme Court in must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of
petitions for habeas corpus where the jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-
custody of minors is at issue. (emphases equal court and judicial instability.
supplied)  The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred
 The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes
habeas corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03- and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors employed by such court or officer. Once a court acquires
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to
Minors: the exclusion of all other courts, including related
o In any case, whatever uncertainty there was incidents and ancillary matters.
has been settled with the adoption of A.M.
No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of MARIA SHEILA ALMIRA T. VIESCA, Petitioner, vs. DAVID
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in GILINSKY, Respondent
Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of G.R. No. 171698 | July 4, 2007 (3D)
the rule provides that:
 Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas FACTS:
corpus. – A verified petition for a writ  Petitioner and respondent, a Canadian citizen, had a son
of habeas corpus involving custody Louis Maxwell (born on Oct. 22, 2001). Respondent
of minors shall be filed with the executed an Affidavit/Acknowledgment /Admission of
Family Court. The writ shall be Paternity of the child. Subsequently, the Civil Registrar of
enforceable within its judicial region Makati City issued a Certification granting the change of
to which the Family Court belongs. Louis Maxwell’s surname from “Viesca” to “Gilinsky.”
xxxxxxxxx  Unfortunately, the two parted ways in 2003.
The petition may likewise be filed  Feb. 6, 2004  Respondent filed a Petition praying that
with the Supreme Court, Court of he be entitled to the company of Louis Maxwell at any time
Appeals, or with any of its members of any given day; he be entitled to enjoy the company of
and, if so granted, the writ shall be Louis Maxwell during weekends and on such occasions
enforceable anywhere in the the child shall be allowed to spend the night with his
Philippines. The writ may be made father; and he be entitled to enjoy a yearly three-week
returnable to a Family Court or to any vacation in any destination with his child. The case was
regular court within the region where raffled off to public respondent’s sala and was docketed
the petitioner resides or where the as SP Proc. Case No. No 5785.
minor may be found for hearing and  During the pendency of respondent’s petition, the parties
decision on the merits. arrived at a compromise agreement. This compromise
agreement was submitted before the trial court and
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that became the basis of the Compromise Judgment issued
the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
on May 12, 2004.
have concurrent jurisdiction with family
o Compromise Agreement  Clause II.
courts in habeas corpus cases where the
VISITATION RIGHTS
custody of minors is involved. (emphases
 As the child will continue to be in the
supplied)
custody of the mother, the father, as
 We note that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque the non-custodial parent shall be
residence on May 18, 2002, he twice transferred his sons entitled to the following supervised
to provinces covered by different judicial regions. This visitation rights, to wit:
situation is what the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369’s a. He shall be entitled to the
provision on jurisdiction precisely addressed: company of the child every Saturday
o [The reasoning that by giving family courts and/or Sunday afternoon;
exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus b. The child shall be allowed to spend
cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the the night with the father once a week;
sole courts which can issue writs ofhabeas c. Nothing herein shall prevent the
corpus] will result in an iniquitous situation, father from visiting the child during
leaving individuals like [respondent] without reasonable hour in the afternoon of
legal recourse in obtaining custody of their any day of the week at the mother’s
children. Individuals who do not know the residence in the presence of the
whereabouts of minors they are looking for mother or her duly designated
would be helpless since they cannot seek representative, and with prior notice
redress from family courts whose writs are
to the mother.
211 of 255 | P a g e
 One year after the signing of this addition, she contends that by designating the Deputy
agreement, the parties shall meet to Sheriff of the court to act as the accompanying guardian
discuss and resolve the matter of the child during the latter’s sleepovers, the trial court
pertaining to the entitlement of the again disregarded the terms of the Compromise
father to enjoy a yearly, three-week Judgment with respect to the appointment of Louis
vacation in any destination with the Maxwell’s guardian whenever he visits with respondent.
child. Petitioner also insisted that Judge Mariano should desist
 In the exercise and/or enjoyment of from further hearing the case.
the above rights, the mother shall  CA  affirmed with modification the June 16, 2005 Order
have the right to designate any rendered by the RTC
person of suitable age to accompany  Petitioner’s MR was denied
the child.  Hence, the instant petition.
 Respondent filed an “Urgent Motion for the Issuance of
Writ of Execution” since petitioner had repeatedly refused ISSUE: Whether the trial court amended or altered the terms of the
to abide by the terms of the compromise judgment, compromise judgment without the concurrence of both parties
particularly the provision allowing Louis Maxwell to spend thereto.
a night with him at any day of the week. Petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. Judge Mariano denied HELD:
the motion to quash and granted the prayer of the  A compromise agreement has been described as a
respondent. contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
 Petitioner filed an “Ex-Parte Reiterative Motion to Inhibit” concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one
claiming that Judge Mariano could no longer handle the already commenced. A compromise agreement that is
case “with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge”. intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is
 Respondent, once again, filed a Motion for the Issuance normally called a judicial compromise. Once it is stamped
of a Writ of Execution, contending that petitioner had with judicial imprimatur, it becomes more than a mere
repeatedly failed to comply with their agreement as contract binding upon the parties. Having the sanction of
regards his visitorial rights over Louis Maxwell. the court and entered as its determination of the
 Respondent requested that his Very Urgent Motion to controversy, it has the force and effect of any other
Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights be heard on June 1, judgment. Such agreement has the force of law and is
2005 notwithstanding the 3-day notice rule required under conclusive between the parties. It transcends its identity
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto,
 June 1, 2005 Judge Mariano rendered the following for it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in
Order: accordance with the Rules. Thus, a compromise
o xxx xxx WHEREFORE, the court ruled that the agreement that has been made and duly approved by the
[herein respondent] can exercise his visitorial court attains the effect and authority of res judicata,
right today at 6:00 o’clock in the evening to be although no execution may be issued unless the
accompanied by the sheriff of this court. If the agreement receives the approval of the court where the
[herein petitioner] is not available nor the litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of the
grandmother to accompany the minor child, the agreement is decreed.
court instructed the [herein petitioner] to  The settlement of disputes brought before the courts is
appoint another person who can accompany encouraged. In fact, in the Civil Code and in the Revised
the child so as not to avoid any delay in fetching Rules of Court, courts are directed to persuade the
the minor child. litigants in civil cases to agree upon some fair
 June 16, 2005  Judge Mariano resolved respondent’s compromise.
very urgent motion:  Unfortunately in the case before us, the compromise
o xxx xxx xxx agreement entered into between the parties fell way short
Accordingly, [herein petitioner] is ordered to of its objective of finally putting an end to their dispute.
perform the following, to wit: The sheer number of incidents which cropped up shortly
1. Allow [herein respondent] to enjoy the after the trial court’s approval of the compromise
company of Louis Maxwell on 24 June 2005 agreement reveals that the compromise judgment failed
and on every Friday of each week starting from to bring peace to the parties. Interestingly enough, the
6:00 pm to 9:00 am of the following day, only points of disagreement are Clause II(b) of the
pursuant to Clause II of the compromise Compromise Judgment which pertains to the overnight
Judgment dated 12 May 2004; visits of Louis Maxwell with respondent and the last
2. The Deputy Sheriff of this court is hereby paragraph of the same clause regarding the appointment
designated to act as the accompanying of the child’s accompanying guardian.
guardian of Louis Maxwell Viesca Gilinsky  Clause II(b) states that “(t)he child shall be allowed to
during the implementation of the prayed for spend the night with the father once a week.” The
relief under paragraph 1 hereof; sentence seems simple enough to be understood by a
xxx xxx layman. Petitioner claims that the parties did not specify
 Petitioner elevated the case to the CA seeking the the day and time of the week when private respondent
reversal and setting aside of the June 16, 2005 Order of could enjoy the overnight company of Louis Maxwell in
the trial court order to give the parties “some flexibility” and to give them
 Petitioner contended that the assailed Order dated 16 the opportunity to arrange the schedule themselves. But
June 2005 altered or amended the Compromise the parties have overstretched the indeterminate
Judgment. She asserted that by approving respondent’s language of said provision. Indeed, the parties have been
prayer that he be given the right to enjoy Louis Maxwell’s at odds over the interpretation and implementation of this
company “every Friday of each week starting from 6:00 plain provision of the Compromise Judgment and this
p.m. to 9:00 a.m. of the following day,” Judge Mariano could have caused much confusion in the mind of the
altered Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment which young Louis Maxwell who had to be brought from one
states that “(t)he child shall be allowed to spend the night place to another at such unholy hours of the night only to
with the father once a week.” As the Compromise be awakened from deep slumber in the early hours of the
Judgment did not specifically provide for the day and time morning to be taken to another place. And yet, all of these
of the week when Louis Maxwell should be in the could have been avoided had the parties opted to be more
company of respondent, the trial court exceeded its specific in their agreement. The question thus becomes:
jurisdiction when it rendered its 16 June 2005 Order. In
212 of 255 | P a g e
can the trial court modify, by motion of one of the parties, WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner vs. MARIA CARMEN D.
a Compromise Judgment? We hold in the negative. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-
 To reiterate, a compromise judgment has the force of res SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149,
judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed respondents
except for vices of consent or forgery which private G.R. No. 142820 | June 20, 2003 (2D)
respondent does not allege in this case.
 More importantly and as correctly pointed out by FACTS:
petitioner, it is settled that neither the courts nor quasi-  Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen and resident of
judicial bodies can impose upon the parties a judgment Germany, married Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, in
different from their compromise agreement or against the Hamburg, Germany. They had 2 children – Carolynne,
very terms and conditions of their agreement without born on Nov. 18, 1981, and Alexandra Kristine, born on
contravening the universally established principle that a Oct. 25, 1987.
contract is the law between the parties. The courts can  In Aug. 1996, Rodriguez filed a petition for declaration of
only approve the agreement of parties. They cannot make nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati City. Roehr
a contract for them. filed a motion to dismiss the same but was denied by the
 Nevertheless, we cannot totally blame the trial court for trial court and also by the appellate court.
having granted respondent’s Very Urgent Motion to  Meanwhile, Roehr obtained a decree of divorce from the
Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights. Perhaps, in its desire CFI of Hamburg, Germany.
to finally put to rest the bothersome issue concerning  In view of said decree, Roehr filed a second motion to
Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment and to prevent dismiss which was granted by respondent judge. Acting
future disagreements between the parties, the trial court on the motion for partial reconsideration filed by
saw the wisdom, as this Court does, in providing the Rodriguez, the respondent judge issued the assailed
specifics in the said indefinite portion of the Compromise order partially setting aside her earlier order for the
Judgment. As we previously held in the case of purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the
Hernandez v. Colayco– spouses as well as support and custody of their children.
o This is not the first unfortunate instance that a
compromise judgment of a trial court has given ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to
rise to subsequent prolonged controversy, only determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children
because the trial judge failed to exercise the despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce
required degree of care in seeing to it that decree from a German court.
neither ambiguity nor incompleteness of details
should characterize the agreement, much less HELD: YES
the judgment rendered on the basis thereof.  In Garcia v. Recio,Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., and Llorente
The expressed desire of the parties to end their v. Court of Appeals, we consistently held that a divorce
judicial travails by submitting to a compromise obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
deserves the utmost attention from the court, jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
and no effort should be spared in helping them national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case
arrive at a definite and unequivocal termination is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, where this Court specifically
of their problems and differences. It is high time recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German
that the matter-of-fact treatment usually citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany.
accorded by trial courts to motions to approve We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal
compromises were abandoned in favor of the effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
more positive activist attitude the situation respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
demands. In acting in such a situation, the principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
judge should bear in mind that the objective is  In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German
to end the disagreement between the parties, court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged
not to begin a new one. Thus, if the parties and by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of
their counsel are unable to do it, the judge is parental custody, even the trial court recognized said
expected to assist them in attaining precision decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private
and accuracy of language that would more or respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present
less make it certain that any disputes as to the controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of
matters being settled would not recur, much their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to
less give rise to a new controversy. (Emphasis petitioner.
supplied.)  As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners
 Resultantly, a remand of this case is necessary to allow in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but
the parties themselves to resolve the matter regarding the the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support
implementation of Clause II(b) of the Compromise of the children, must still be determined by our courts.
Judgment. In this regard, the rule on immutability for Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
purposes of execution does not attach to a judgment that foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
is materially equivocal or which suffers from either patent petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the
or latent ambiguity. To obviate further discord between parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
them and to preclude their recourse to the trial court every opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
time one of them perceives a violation committed by the Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section
other of Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment, we 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
direct the trial court to be on guard and ensure that the o SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The
parties would lay out in concrete, specific details the terms effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign
of their agreement as to this specific matter as well of the country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
appointment of Louis Maxwell’s accompanying guardian. judgment is as follows:
 The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing,
90285 dated 19 October 2005, is hereby REVERSED and the judgment is conclusive upon the title to
SET ASIDE insofar as it affirmed the Order dated 16 June the thing;
2005 of the RTC, Branch 136, Makati City in SP Proc. (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the
Case No. M-5785, amending Clause II(b) of the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right
Compromise Judgment and the last paragraph of Clause as between the parties and their successors
II. in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a
213 of 255 | P a g e
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the parties further agreed to submit the case for resolution
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law after the trial court’s receipt of the results of their
or fact. psychiatric examination.
 It is essential that there should be an opportunity to  After the receipt of the results of their psychiatric
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in examination, the trial court rendered the assailed decision
this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this awarding the custody of the three children to Lourdes and
jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with giving visitation rights to Raymond.
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from  Lourdes then filed the instant petition for review on
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes certiorari.
prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party
and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. ISSUE: Whether the trial court considered the paramount
 In the present case, it cannot be said that private interest and welfare of the children in awarding their custody to
respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the Lourdes.
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for
declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the HELD: NO
rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two  In controversies involving the care, custody and control of
children. The proceedings in the German court were their minor children, the contending parents stand on
summary. As to what was the extent of private equal footing before the court who shall make the
respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the selection according to the best interest of the child. The
German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce child if over seven years of age may be permitted to
decree itself states that neither has she commented on choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the
the proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen
Social Services Office. Unlike petitioner who was is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration
represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of
counsel to assist her in said proceedings. More the child concerned, taking into account the respective
importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner resources as well as social and moral situations of the
by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect opposing parents.
that when a couple lived separately for three years, the  In Medina v. Makabali, we stressed that this is as it should
marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions, the
not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse patria potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae
was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to ac necis(right of life and death) of the Roman law, under
obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents,
in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of into a radically different institution, due to the influence of
parental custody, care, support and education mindful of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is
the best interests of the children. This is in consonance now supreme. There is no power, but a task; no complex
with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code rights of parents but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but
that the child’s welfare is always the paramount a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
consideration in all questions concerning his care and  Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo
custody. should have conducted a trial notwithstanding the
 The trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution
parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr.
support and education of the children, namely Carolynne Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from
and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case questioning the absence of a trial considering that said
be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of psychiatric report, which was the court’s primary basis in
appropriate proceedings. awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify
the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to
promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be
REYMOND B. LAXAMANA, petitioner vs. MA. LOURDES D. disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes
LAXAMANA, respondent G.R. No. 144763 | September 3, 2002 which involve the family and the youth. While petitioner
(1D) may have a history of drug dependence, the records are
inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-
FACTS: being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing
 Raymond and Ma. Lourdes Laxamana had 3 children – that he is not yet “completely cured” may render him unfit
twin brothers, Joseph and Vincent, born on March 15, to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to
1985 and Michael, born on June 19, 1986. show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with
 Unfortunately, Raymond became a drug dependent and adequate support, education, as well as moral and
he underwent several confinements for treatment and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the
rehabilitation. children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time
 Despite several confinements, Lourdes claimed that of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not
Raymond was not fully rehabilitated and his drug ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live
dependence even worsened. He allegedly became with.
violent and irritable to the point that he even physically  In Lacson v. Lacson, the case was remanded to the trial
assaulted Lourdes on some occasions. Hence, Lourdes court with respect to the issue of custody. In the said case,
and her 3 children abandoned Raymond. the court a quo resolved the question of the children’s
 In Aug. 1999, Raymond filed with the RTC, the instant custody based on the amicable settlement of the spouses.
petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his 3 Stressing the need for presentation of evidence and a
children. Lourdes opposed the petition citing the drug thorough proceedings, we explained –
dependence of Raymond. o It is clear that … every child [has] rights which
 Meanwhile, Lourdes filed a petition for annulment of are not and should not be dependent solely on
marriage with the RTC. the wishes, much less the whims and caprices,
 In Sept. 1999, Raymond filed in the habeas corpus case, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject
a motion seeking visitation rights over his children. After to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement
the parties reached an agreement, the court issued an alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are
order granting visitation rights to Raymond and directing already separated in fact, the courts must step
the parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological in to determine in whose custody the child can
examination by a psychiatrist of their common choice. The better be assured the rights granted to him by
214 of 255 | P a g e
law. The need, therefore, to present evidence to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals,
regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A this Court held:
careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no o “Of considerable importance is the rule long
such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents
latter court relied merely on the mutual to the custody of their minor children is one of
agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right
this was not sufficient basis to determine the supported by law and sound public policy. The
fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the right is an inherent one, which is not created by
children. A careful scrutiny of the records the state or decisions of the courts, but derives
reveals that no such evidence was introduced from the nature of the parental relationship.”
in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the  In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To o “The law vests on the father and mother joint
be sure, this was not sufficient basis to parental authority over the persons of their
determine the fitness of each parent to be the common children. In case of absence or death
custodian of the children. of either parent, the parent present shall
 The instant is remanded to the RTC for the purpose of continue exercising parental authority. Only in
receiving evidence to determine the fitness of petitioner case of the parents’ death, absence or
and respondent to take custody of their children. Pending unsuitability may substitute parental authority
the final disposition of this case, custody shall remain with be exercised by the surviving grandparent.”
respondent but subject to petitioner’s visitation rights.  Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise
substitute parental authority only in case of death,
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner vs. HELEN G. BELMES, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that
respondent respondent is very much alive and has exercised
G.R. No. 132223 | June 19, 2001 (3D) continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner
has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s
FACTS: guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner, however,
 During his lifetime, Reeder Vancil had 2 children named has not proffered convincing evidence showing that
Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent.
Belmes. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit
 In May 1987, Bonifacia Vancil, mother of the deceased as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondent’s)
Reeder, commenced before the RTC a guardianship live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie,
proceedings over the persons and properties of minors being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this
Valerie and Vincent. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years guardianship proceeding.
old while Vincent was 2-year old child.  Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of
 Belmes, the natural mother of the minors submitted an minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute
opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American
claiming that she had already filed a similar petition for citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not
guardianship. Thereafter, Belmes filed a motion to be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations
remove and/or disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of the required of a guardian.
minors which motion was denied by the trial court.
 On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC order. CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
o CA  Stress should likewise be made that our and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents
Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in G.R. No. 114742 | July 17, 1997 (1D)
the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of
her minor children. The law on parental
authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY, petitioner vs. FOUZI ALI
now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the BONDAGJY, JUDGE BENSAUDI I. ARABANI, SR., in his
Family Code) ascribe to the same legal capacity as presiding judge of the 3rd Shari’a District Court,
pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Shari’a Judicial District, Zamboanga City, respondents
Revised Rules of Court confirms the G.R. No. 140817 | December 7, 2001 (1D)
designation of the parents as ipso facto
guardian of their minor children without need of FACTS:
a court appointment and only for good reason  Respondent Fouzi and Sabrina were married under
may another person be named. Islamic rites. Out of their union they begot two children
 In March 1998, Bonifacia filed the present petition before who were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Sabrina became
the SC. Considering that Valerie is already of major age, a Muslim by conversion which was, however, not
this petition has become moot with respect to her. registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor  At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner,
Vincent should be his guardian. respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman
whom he later divorced.
HELD: Mother (Helen)  Sometime thereafter, the children lived in the house of
 We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that Sabrina’s mother. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his
respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the children until he got an order from the court. Even with a
preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. court order, he could only see his children in school at De
This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code La Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.
which provides:  Sabrina later had the children baptized as Christians.
o “Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly  Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina
exercise parental authority over the persons of was seen with different men at odd hours in Manila, and
their common children. In case of that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and
disagreement, the father’s decision shall bathing suits. Such clothing are detestable under Islamic
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the law on customs.
contrary. xxx.”  Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their
 Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, neighbor’s house for a fee of P40.00 after the children
respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in
school, the children would be happy to see him but they
215 of 255 | P a g e
were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the  Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents
jeepney in going home from school. are not divorced or legally separated, the father and
 Fouzi filed with the Shari’a District Court an action to mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental
obtain custody of his two minor children – then 10 and 9 authority and fulfill their responsibility over their legitimate
years old. children.
 The Shari’a District Court found Sabrina unworthy to care  In Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals, we stated:
for her children, thus – o “xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and
o “A married woman, and a mother to growing obligations which the law grants to parents for
children, should live a life that the community in the purpose of the children’s physical
which she lives considers morally upright, and preservation and development, as well as the
in a manner that her growing minor children will cultivation of their intellect and the education of
not be socially and morally affected and their heart and senses. As regards parental
prejudiced. It is sad to note that respondent has authority, ‘there is no power, but a task; no
failed to observe that which is expected of a complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
married woman and a mother by the society in sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
which she lives. xxx The evidence of this case the minor.’
shows the extent of the moral depravity of the “xxx
respondent, and the kind of concern for the o “The father and mother, being the natural
welfare of her minor children which on the basis guardians of unemancipated children, are
thereof this Court finds respondent unfit with dutybound and entitled to keep them in their
the custody of her minor children. custody and company.”
o “xxx Under the general principles of Muslim  We do not doubt the capacity and love of both parties for
law, the Muslim mother may be legally their children, such that they both want to have them in
disentitled to the custody of her minor children their custody.
by reason of ‘wickedness’ when such  Either parent may lose parental authority over the child
wickedness is injurious to the mind of the child, only for a valid reason. In cases where both parties cannot
such as when she engages in ‘zina’ (illicit have custody because of their voluntary separation, we
sexual relation); or when she is unworthy as a take into consideration the circumstances that would lead
mother; and, a woman is not worthy to be us to believe which parent can better take care of the
trusted with the custody of the child who is children. Although we see the need for the children to
continually going out and leaving the child have both a mother and a father, we believe that petitioner
hungry. (A. Baillie, Muhammadan Law, p. 435; has more capacity and time to see to the children’s needs.
citing Dar-ul-Muktar, p. 280). Respondent is a businessman whose work requires that
 The SDC awarded the custody of the minor children to he go abroad or be in different places most of the time.
their natural father, Fouzi and ordered Sabrina to turnover Under P.D. No. 603, the custody of the minor children,
the care of said minors to the former. absent a compelling reason to the contrary, is given to the
 Hence, the instant petition. mother.
 However, the award of custody to the wife does not
ISSUE: Whether a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before deprive the husband of parental authority. In the case of
her marriage to a Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon Silva v. Court of Appeals, we said that:
their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the o “Parents have the natural right, as well as the
determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children. moral and legal duty, to care for their children,
see to their upbringing and safeguard their best
HELD: NO interest and welfare. This authority and
 The burden is upon respondent to prove that petitioner is responsibility may not be unduly denied the
not worthy to have custody of her children. We find that parents; neither may it be renounced by them.
the evidence presented by the respondent was not Even when the parents are estranged and their
sufficient to establish her unfitness according to Muslim affection for each other is lost, the attachment
law or the Family Code. and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain
 The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow
however, is not restricted to Muslim laws. The Family this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real,
Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding grave and imminent threat to the well-being of
whether a non-Muslim woman is incompetent. What the child.”
determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the  Thus, we grant visitorial rights to respondent as his
Family Code now that she is not a Muslim. Constitutionally protected natural and primary right.
 Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the
ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral NERISSA Z. PEREZ, petitioner vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ, respondents
healthy environment as well as physical and financial G.R. No. 118870 | March 29, 1996 (2D)
support taking into consideration the respective resources
and social and moral situations of the parents. FACTS:
 The record shows that petitioner is equally financially  Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa,
capable of providing for all the needs of her children. The his wife, is a registered nurse. After six miscarriages, two
children went to school at De La Salle Zobel School, operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave
Muntinlupa City with their tuition paid by petitioner birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992.
according to the school’s certification.  Nerissa who began working in the US in Oct. 1988
 The welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration became a resident alien thereof. Ray stayed with her in
on the issue. the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became
 In ascertaining the welfare and best interest of the pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist
children, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take visa and was not employed.
into account all relevant considerations.  On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in
 Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a vacation
persons of their common children. and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her
husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and
promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray,
216 of 255 | P a g e
they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines character. It prohibits in no uncertain terms the
but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind separation of a mother and her child below
and continued working. seven years, unless such separation is
 When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first grounded upon compelling reasons as
birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. determined by a court.”
Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely  The rationale for awarding the custody of children
solely on her husband’s meager income of P5,000.00. On younger than seven years of age to their mother was
the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could explained by the Code Commission:
raise his son even as he practiced his profession. Despite o “The general rule is recommended in order to
mediation by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile. avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen
 Nerissa filed a petition for habeas corpus to surrender the her baby torn away from her. No man can
custody of their son to her. sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
 The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to deprived of her child of tender age. The
Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the exception allowed by the rule has to be for
Family Code which provides that no child under seven ‘compelling reasons’ for the good of the child;
years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless those cases must indeed be rare, if the
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she
 Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty
the trial court’s order and held that granting custody to the of imprisonment and the divorce decree
boy’s father would be for the child’s best interest and (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient
welfare. punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction
will not have any effect upon the baby who is
ISSUE: Who should have rightful custody of the child. as yet unable to understand her situation.”
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 12)
HELD: Nerissa  The Family Code, in reverting to the provision of the Civil
 When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 Code that a child below seven years old should not be
of the Family Code is the applicable law. It provides: separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly
o “ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, repealed the earlier Article 17, paragraph three of the
parental authority shall be exercised by the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No.
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall 603) which reduced the child’s age to five years.
take into account all relevant considerations,  The general rule that a child under seven years of age
especially the choice of the child over seven shall not be separated from his mother finds its raison
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. d’etre in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving
No child under seven years of age shall be care. Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the
separated from the mother, unless the court court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise
(Italics supplied) sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds
 Since the Code does not qualify the word “separation” to have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mean “legal separation” decreed by a court, couples who mother of custody and parental authority: neglect,
are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private abandonment, unemployment and immorality,habitual
respondent, are covered within its terms. drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
 The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of  It has long been settled that in custody cases, the
Minors) provides: foremost consideration is always the Welfare and best
o “SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international
are separated. Appeal. - When husband and instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
wife are divorced or living separately and apart provides: “In all actions concerning children, whether
from each other, and the questions as to the undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
care, custody, and control of a child or children courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
of their marriage is brought before a Court of bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
First Instance by petition or as an incident to consideration.”
any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing  Courts invariably look into all relevant factors presented
the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award by the contending parents, such as their material
the care, custody, and control of each such resources, social and moral situations.
child as will be for its best interest, permitting  In the case at bench, financial capacity is not a
the child to choose which parent it prefers to determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the demonstrated that they have ample means. The records
parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the show that she is employed in a New York hospital and
child by reason of moral depravity, habitual was, at the time the petition was filed, still abroad.
drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No Nerissa’s present work schedule is not so unmanageable
child under seven years of age shall be as to deprive her of quality time for Ray II. Quite a number
separated from its mother, unless the court of working mothers who are away from home for longer
finds there are compelling reasons therefor.” periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying
(Italics supplied) time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating
 The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-
a child under seven years of age shall not be separated care centers does not detract from being a good mother,
from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our
to order otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article culture, children are often brought up by housemaids or
213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the “yayas” under the eagle eyes of the mother.
Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.  Although Ray is a general practitioner, the records merely
In the case of Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, the Court show that he maintains a clinic, works for several
declared: companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time.
o “The use of the word shall in Article 363 of the Hence, respondent court’s conclusion that “his work
Civil Code, coupled with the observations made schedule is flexible (and h)e can always find time for his
by the Code Commission in respect to the said son” is not well-founded.
legal provision, underscores its mandatory
217 of 255 | P a g e
 Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. grandparent. The situation obtaining in the case at bench
is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is
working in the United States while the father, petitioner
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they physically apart
APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, but are also emotionally separated. There has been no
respondents-appellees decree of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to
G.R. No. 113054 | March 16, 1995 obtain an annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity of his wife has failed.
Facts:  We find the aforementioned considerations [by the CA]
 From birth until sometime thereafter, petitioner Leouel insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the
Santos Sr. and his wife’s son (born July 18, 1987) has concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel
been in the care and custody of the latter’s parents, Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to
respondents Spouses Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. The be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents'
latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
as the subsequent support of the boy because his father notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over
could not afford to do so. the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding
 The boy’s mother left for the United States to work. factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
Santos Sr. alleged that he did not know her whereabouts present time, petitioner is in no position to support the
in the US and could not locate her. The spouses Bedia boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable
claim, however, that their daughter had been giving and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be
financial support to them for her son. construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
 When the father visited the then 3-year old boy, the decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child
maternal grandparents contend that the former took the in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify
boy away without their permission. his past misdeeds.
 The maternal grandparents filed a petition for the custody  His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him
of the boy before the RTC in which the custody was custody over the boy. It is not just to deprive our soldiers
awarded to them. of authority, care and custody over their children merely
 Santos Sr. appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial because of the normal consequences of their duties and
court’s order on the grounds, among others, that the assignments, such as temporary separation from their
maternal grandparents demonstrated love and affection families.
to their grandson while the natural father has shown little  Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his
interest; the former are well-off financially while the latter boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not
had never given financial support to his son, and; the a ground to wrest custody from him.
father being a soldier will be assigned to different places  Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to
and would not be able to attend to his son. his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.
 Santos Sr. filed the instant petition for review in the SC.
CHAPTER 2. SUBSTITUTE & SPECIAL PARENTAL
Issue: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor. AUTHORITY (Arts 216-219); Arts. 2176, 2180

HELD: The father Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the
 The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the
exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria child in the order indicated:
potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby (1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
parents rightfully assume control and protection of their (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unemancipated children to the extent required by the unfit or disqualified; and
latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age,
the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children's unless unfit or disqualified.
physical preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property
and senses. As regards parental authority, "there is no of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall
power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
the minor." Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused
 Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall
may not be transferred or renounced except in cases be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's
authorized by law. The right attached to parental homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver proper government agency. (314a)
of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special
a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under
a document, what is given is merely temporary custody their supervision, instruction or custody.
and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
law still disallows the same. whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
 The father and mother, being the natural guardians of institution. (349a)
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to
keep them in their custody and company. The child's Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
welfare is always the paramount consideration in all preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
questions concerning his care and custody. damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
 The law vests on the father and mother joint parental minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
authority over the persons of their common children. In substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
case of absence or death of either parent, the parent liable.
present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only
in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may
218 of 255 | P a g e
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the custody.
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.  However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as negligent
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n) negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.
o “In order that there may be a recovery for an
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the injury, however, it must be shown that the
‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) connection between the negligence and the
injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. the proximate cause of the injury. For,
‘negligence, no matter in what it consists,
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY, petitioner vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS cannot create a right of action unless it is the
and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL proximate cause of the injury complained of.’
II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that
respondents cause, which, in natural and continuous
G.R. No. 143363 | February 6, 2002 (1D) sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and
FACTS: without which the result would not have
 St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment campaign occurred.’”
involving visitation of schools from where prospective  In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel
enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the exhibits establishing that the cause of the accident was
campaigning group. Sherwin, along with other high school the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Hence, the cause of the accident was not the
defendant Vivencio Villanueva . The jeep was driven by recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect
James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including
same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the deceased Sherwin
reckless manner and the jeep encountered an accident Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the
wherein Sherwin died as a result of the injuries he traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the
sustained. accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide
 The parents of Sherwin, William and Lucia Carpitanos, that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
filed a claim for damages for the death of their son against  Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to
James Daniel II and his parents, James Sr. and Guada show that the proximate cause of the accident was the
Daniel, the vehicle owner, Villanueva, and St. Mary’s negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless
Academy before the RTC. driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents’
 The RTC ordered St. Mary’s Academy to pay damages to reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that “those
the Carpitanos. James Sr. and Guada Daniel are ordered given the authority and responsibility under the preceding
to pay the amount of damages in case of insolvency of Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
the principal obligor, St. Mary’s as their liability being only damages caused by acts or omissions of the
subsidiary. James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of unemancipated minor” was unfounded.
the commission of the tort and who was under the special  Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school
parental authority of St. Mary’s is absolved from paying allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
the damages. Villanueva is also absolved of any liability. respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva,
 On appeal, the CA promulgated a decision reducing the grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
actual damages but otherwise affirming the decision a possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the
quo, in toto. vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive
 CA denied the MR of St. Mary’s the jeep at the time of the accident.
 St. Mary’s filed the instant appeal.  Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the
negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment
ISSUE: Whether St. Mary’s Academy is liable for the death of of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on
Sherwin under Arts. 218 and 219 of the FC. the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner
St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the
HELD: NO accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
 Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the
have special parental authority over a minor child while detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the o “The proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the which, in natural and continuous sequence,
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
special parental authority and responsibility applies to all produces the injury, and without which the
authorized activities, whether inside or outside the result would not have occurred.”
premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such  In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not
authority and responsibility applies to field trips, attributable to petitioner.
excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students  Incidentally, there was no question that the registered
outside the school premises whenever authorized by the owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never
school or its teachers. denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that
 Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
custody is a minor, those exercising special parental public service, would primarily be responsible to the public
authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.”
Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by
219 of 255 | P a g e
petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the the Regional Trial Court of Medina, Misamis Oriental,
accident occurred because of the detachment of the Branch 26, of unjustly dismissing Criminal Case No.
steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but 1401-M (2000) for rape, entitled “People v. Dexter Z.
the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held Acenas.”
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin  Complainant averred that he and his wife assisted their
Carpitanos. 14-year old daughter, Licel Obedencio, in filing with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Hall of Justice in
CHAPTER 3. EFFECT OF PARENT AUTHORITY UPON THE Cagayan de Oro City, a criminal complaint for rape
PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN (Arts. 220-224) allegedly committed upon her when she was 11 years old
by her uncle, Dexter Acenas. After the preliminary
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall investigation, which the accused did not attend, the case
have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards the was filed in respondent judge’s sala.
following rights and duties:  Following Licel’s abduction from their house, complainant
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct sought to secure from the court a copy of the warrant of
them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their arrest issued against the accused. To his great surprise,
upbringing in keeping with their means; respondent judge told him that the case had already been
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, dismissed three days earlier. According to respondent
companionship and understanding; judge, Licel had come to court, accompanied by her
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in maternal grandparents and Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and Emmanuel Hallazgo. There she was presented to affirm
thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them her affidavit of desistance.
compliance with the duties of citizenship;  Complainant claims that the dismissal was marred by
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, serious irregularities. He specifically lamented the
supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, absence of any subpoena or notice of hearing from the
protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring court to him, his wife, or their counsel. He believes that
habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals; since Prosecutor Hallazgo, Licel’s maternal
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests; grandparents, and the accused are relatives, this fact
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience; contributed to the unjust dismissal of the case.
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the  The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through
circumstances; and Deputy Court Administrator found respondent judge liable
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon for ignorance of the law for unjustly dismissing Criminal
parents and guardians. (316a) Case No. 1401-M (2000).

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority ISSUE: Whether the dismissal by the respondent judge of the
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts criminal complaint filed by a minor was proper on the basis of an
or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company affidavit of desistance affirmed by the minor with the assistance of
and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate her grandparents and not her parents.
defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
HELD: NO
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property  Article 220(6) of the Family Code gives to complainant
or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so and his wife the right and duty to represent Licel in all
requires. (317) matters affecting her interest. Thus, they were entitled to
be notified and to attend every hearing on the case. As a
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the judge, respondent is duty-bound to acquaint himself with
individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may the cases pending before him. He should have known that
petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an Licel filed the criminal complaint with the assistance of her
order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child parents, who are her natural guardians. It was incumbent
shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or upon respondent judge to inquire into the reason behind
appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted their nonappearance before the court instead of simply
wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. relying on the bare explanation of the defense counsel
that he and his client could not find Licel’s parents.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at Respondent judge ought to remember that the accused,
fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the Dexter Acenas, is the maternal uncle of the victim. That
circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation Licel came to court with her maternal grandparents, and
or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures not her parents, on the day she was examined to affirm
as it may deem just and proper. (318a) her affidavit of desistance, should have alerted
respondent judge to be more circumspect. Being still a
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may minor, Licel cannot fully comprehend for herself the
include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in impact and legal consequence of the affidavit of
entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes desistance. Given her tender age, the probability is that
duly accredited by the proper government agency. Licel succumbed to illicit influence and undue pressure on
her to desist from pursuing her complaint.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the  Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a minor, on May 22,
care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his 2001, when she was presented before respondent’s sala
support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may to affirm the execution of her affidavit of desistance. This
terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper. being the case, said affidavit should have been executed
(391a) with the concurrence of her parents. Licel could not validly
give consent to an affidavit of desistance, for a minor is
CAPISTRANO OBEDENCIO, JR., complainant, vs. JUDGE incompetent to execute such an instrument. Yet,
JOAQUIN M. MURILLO, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 26, notwithstanding the absence of her parents’ conformity to
MEDINA, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, respondent. the affidavit of desistance and lack of notice to them or
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1753 | February 5, 2004 (2D) their lawyer of the scheduled hearing, respondent judge
dismissed the criminal case. Truly, he should have
FACTS: exercised more prudence and caution instead of
 Complainant Capistrano Obedencio Jr. charged perfunctorily dismissing the case, considering the nature
respondent Judge Joaquin M. Murillo, Presiding Judge of and gravity of the offense charged.
220 of 255 | P a g e
 At the very least, herein respondent should have FACTS:
appointed a guardian ad litem for Licel, to protect her  During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had
welfare and interest, instead of hastily dismissing the rape seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with
case. The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria,
took effect on December 15, 2000, governs the and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri
examination of child witnesses who are victims of, (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas
accused of, or witnesses to a crime. In the absence or and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique
incapacity of the parents to be the guardian, Section 5 (a) and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead
of said rule provides that the court may appoint a guardian properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters
ad litem to promote the best interests of the child. This located in Samal, Davao del Norte embraced by OCTs
rule was already in effect when respondent judge issued on February 15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July
dismissed the rape case on May 22, 2001. 7, 1967.
 The respondent Judge Joaquin M. Murillo, Presiding  On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Medina, Misamis husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural
Oriental, Branch 26, is found LIABLE for gross ignorance guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas,
of the law in connection with the unjust dismissal of together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an
Criminal Case No. 1401-M (2000). He is ORDERED to Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
pay the fine of P10,000 and ADMONISHED to be more Deed of Sale on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among
circumspect in the performance of his judicial duties and themselves the said homestead properties, and
functions. He is further warned sternly that a repetition of thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Hadji
the same or similar offense would be dealt with more Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy) for a
severely. consideration of ₱80,000.00.
 On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a
CHAPTER 4. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead
PROPERTY OF THE CHILDREN (Articles 225-227) properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by their
heirs )before the RTC assailing the validity of the sale for
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal having been sold within the prohibited period. The
guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and
without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of Victoria as additional plaintiffs for having been excluded
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion
judicial order to the contrary. from her first marriage.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the  In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of
child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year
furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead
less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and
income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed Victoria’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and
for general guardians. sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper defenses of prescription and laches.
court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in  RTC  annulled the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale and ruled that while the
or any part thereof is situated. sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were
which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no
obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children,
be heard and resolved. Rosa and Douglas.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory  On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of
except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the the RTC
guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the o CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and
ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a) the subsequent sale valid and binding with
respect to Enrique and his children, holding that
Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of
acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title their respective shares as they consider
shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted necessary or fit. While recognizing Rosa and
exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or Douglas to be minors at that time, they were
transfer provides otherwise. deemed to have ratified the sale when they
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's failed to question it upon reaching the age of
property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and majority.
secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a, 323a)
ISSUE: Whether the sale of the subject properties by Enrique in
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of behalf of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas is void.
any of their properties to an unemancipated child, the net proceeds
of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given HELD: YES but with respect to Douglas only
a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that  With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the
which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their
stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in
In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws
charged to the child's legitime. (322a) prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with
powers of administration and bereft of any authority to
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother,
D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. Anunciacion.
NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D.  Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force
ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners, at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale,
vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, provide:
Respondents. o ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the
G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012 Second Division mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental
221 of 255 | P a g e
authority. If the property is worth more than two sisters and brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa
a bond subject to the approval of the Court of Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the
First Instance. same was voluntary and freely made by all of
o ART. 326. When the property of the child is us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid
worth more than two thousand pesos, the father and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this
or mother shall be considered a guardian of the case are concerned;"
child’s property, subject to the duties and  In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,Napoleon and Rosa
obligations of guardians under the Rules of also alleged:
Court. o "That we are surprised that our names are
 Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also included in this case since we do not have any
provides: intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy
o SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the and Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their family and we
property of the child under parental authority is respect and acknowledge the validity of the
worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
the mother, without the necessity of court Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 7, 1979;"
appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When Clearly, the foregoing statements constituted
the property of the child is worth more than two ratification of the settlement of the estate and
thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the
be considered guardian of the child’s property, defects existing at the time of its execution and
with the duties and obligations of guardians legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16
under these Rules, and shall file the petition share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses
required by Section 2 hereof. For good Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect
reasons, the court may, however, appoint to Douglas for lack of evidence showing
another suitable persons. ratification.
 Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the  Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with
property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia,
purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique,
or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead
child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father properties have effectively been disposed in favor of
or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under spouses Uy.
parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or  Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs
encumber the property of the latter. Such power is became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead
granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s properties with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who
property and even then only with courts’ prior approval retained title to their respective 1/16 shares.
secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by
the Rules of Court. NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES, petitioners vs. COURT
 Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION FELIANO,
in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial respondents
authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age G.R. No. 162421 | August 31, 2007 (1D)
of majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Articles
1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide: FACTS:
o ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name  Rufino Cabales died leaving a parcel of land to his
of another without being authorized by the latter surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino,
or unless he has by law a right to represent him. Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.
A contract entered into in the name of another  Brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto
by one who has no authority or legal sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for
representation, or who has acted beyond his P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within 8 years. The 3
powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among
ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on themselves, each getting a share of P666.66.
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is
 In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner
revoked by the other contracting party. Nelson.
o ART. 1403. The following contracts are
 Within the redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
tendered their payment of P666.66 each to Dr.
(1) Those entered into the name of another
Corrompido. Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased
person by one who has been given no authority
son, Alberto including his “vale” of P300.
or legal representation, or who has acted
 Upon redemption of the property, Saturnina and her 4
beyond his powers;
children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold
 Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily
the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus
adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or
and Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. The Deed of Sale
defective proceeding, which without his sanction would
provided in its last paragraph, thus:
not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice,
o It is hereby declared and understood that the
knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what
amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00)
authorized act of the party so making the ratification. corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of
Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the Alberto Cabales and to Rito Cabales who are
person knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is still minors upon the execution of this
cleansed from all its defects from the moment it was instrument are held in trust by the VENDEE and
constituted, as it has a retroactive effect. to be paid and delivered only to them upon
 Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the reaching the age of 21.
extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed  The Register of Deeds then issued an OCT in the names
of sale. In Napoleon and Rosa’s Manifestation before the of respondents-spouses.
RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated:
 Saturnina and her 4 children executed an affidavit to the
o "Concerning the sale of our parcel of land
effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the
executed by our father, Enrique Neri concurred
amount of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he
in and conformed to by us and our other two
reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr.
222 of 255 | P a g e
Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner the mother, without the necessity of court
Nelson’s late father Alberto, i.e.,P666.66 for his share in appointment, shall be his legal guardian x x x x
the redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as  Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito’s legal guardian
his “vale” of P300.00. without necessity of court appointment considering that
 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt the amount of his property or one-seventh of subject
of the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand
representing the former’s share in the proceeds of the pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1[10] provides that:
sale of subject property. o Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend.
 In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson learned in that – A guardian appointed shall have the care and
same year of the sale of subject property. He then custody of the person of his ward, and the
signified his intention to redeem the subject land during a management of his estate, or the management
barangay conciliation process that he initiated. of the estate only, as the case may be. The
 Contending that they could not have sold their respective guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall
shares in subject property when they were minors, have the management of all the estate of the
petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint for ward within the Philippines, and no court other
redemption of the subject land plus damages. than that in which such guardian was appointed
 Respondents-spouses claimed that petitioners were shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship.
estopped from claiming any right over subject property  Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of
considering that (1) petitioner Rito had already received administration of the minor’s property. It does not include
the amount corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the power of alienation which needs judicial authority.
the sale of subject property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito,
failed to consign to the court the total amount of the sold the latter’s pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did
redemption price necessary for legal redemption. not have the legal authority to do so.
 The trial court ruled against petitioners.  Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
 On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the trial court o Art. 1403. The following contracts are
and held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Rito’s unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
undivided share to the property was unenforceable for (1) Those entered into in the name of another
lack of authority or legal representation but that the person by one who has been given no authority
contract was effectively ratified by petitioner Rito’s receipt or legal representation, or who has acted
of the proceeds. The appellate court also ruled that beyond his powers;
petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the extent of one-seventh xxxx
(1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was not subrogated  Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso
to Alberto’s rights when she repurchased his share to the share of petitioner Rito was unenforceable. However,
property. It further directed petitioner Nelson to pay the when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale
estate of the late Saturnina Cabales the amount of on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This
P966.66, representing the amount which the latter paid act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to
for the obligation of petitioner Nelson’s late father Alberto. him.
Finally, however, it denied petitioner Nelson’s claim for  With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the
redemption for his failure to tender or consign in court the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of
redemption money within the period prescribed by law. the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners
 Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to
alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who
ISSUE: Whether the sale of the subject property by Saturnina in was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the
behalf of Rito and Nelson Cabales is void. courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the
property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and
HELD: YES but with respect to Nelson only the others sold the subject property in its entirety to
 As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was respondents-spouses, they only sold and transferred title
unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which
Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code state that: pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother.
o Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained
mother, is the legal administrator of the ownership over their undivided share of subject property.
property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give
a bond subject to the approval of the Court of
First Instance. LUZ PINEDA, MARILOU MONTENEGRO, VIRGINIA ALARCON,
o Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth DINA LORENA AYO, CELIA CALUMBAG and LUCIA LONTOK,
more than two thousand pesos, the father or petitioners vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE INSULAR
mother shall be considered a guardian of the LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED, respondents
child’s property, subject to the duties and G.R. No. 105562 | September 27, 1993 (1D)
obligations of guardians under the Rules of
Court. FACTS:
 In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother,  Prime Marine Services, Inc. (PMSI), a crew/manning
is considered legal administrator of the property outfit, procured a group policy from Insular Life Assurance
pertaining to the child under his or her parental authority Co., Ltd. to provide life insurance coverage to its sea-
without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the based employees enrolled under the plan.
property of the child does not exceed two thousand  During the effectivity of the policy, 6 covered employees
pesos. Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised of the PMSI perished at sea when their vessel sunk. They
Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, were survived by the petitioners, the beneficiaries under
automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the policy.
the child without need of any judicial appointment in case  For the purpose of claiming the death benefits due them,
the latter’s property does not exceed two thousand pesos, the petitioners approached the President and General
thus: Manager of PMSI, Capt. Roberto Nuval. They were thus
o Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. – When the made to execute, with the exception of the spouses
property of the child under parental authority is Alarcon, special powers of attorney authorizing Capt.
worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or Nuval to, among others, "follow up, ask, demand, collect
223 of 255 | P a g e
and receive" for their benefit indemnities of sums of need of either court appointments as guardian or the posting of a
money due them relative to the sinking of the vessel. bond.
 By virtue of these written powers of attorney, petitioners
were able to receive their respective death benefits. HELD: NO
Unknown to them, however, the PMSI, in its capacity as  Even granting for the sake of argument that the special
employer and policyholder of the life insurance of its powers of attorney were in due form, Insular Life was
deceased workers, filed with Insular Life formal claims for grossly negligent in delivering the checks, drawn in favor
and in behalf of the beneficiaries, through its President, of the petitioners, to a party who is not the agent
Capt. Nuval. Among the documents submitted by the mentioned in the special power of attorney.
latter for the processing of the claims were five special  Nor can we agree with the opinion of the public
powers of attorney executed by petitioners. On the basis respondent that since the shares of the minors in the
of these and other documents duly submitted, Insular Life insurance proceeds are less than P50,000.00, then under
drew 6 checks - four for P200,000 each, one for P50,000 Article 225 of the Family Code their mothers could receive
and another for P40,000, payable to the order of the such shares without need of either court appointments as
petitioners. These checks were released to the treasurer guardian or the posting of a bond. It is of the view that said
of PMSI upon instructions of Capt. Nuval Article had repealed the third paragraph of Section 180 of
 After petitioners learned that they were entitled, as the Insurance Code. The pertinent portion of Article 225
beneficiaries, to life insurance benefits under a group of the Family Code reads as follows:
policy with Insular Life, they sought to recover these o Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly
benefits from Insular Life but the latter denied their claim exercise legal guardianship over the property of
on the ground that the liability to petitioners was already their unemancipated common child without the
extinguished upon delivery to and receipt by PMSI of the necessity of a court appointment. In case of
six (6) checks issued in their names. disagreement, the father's decision shall
 Petitioners filed an administrative complaint against prevail, unless there is judicial order to the
Insular Life with the Insurance Commission. contrary.
 IC  rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners and Where the market value of the property or
held that: the annual income of the child exceeds
o Respondent company erred in appreciating P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
that the powers of attorney executed by the required to furnish a bond in such amount as
beneficiaries convey absolute authority to Capt. the court may determine, but not less than ten
Nuval. per centum (10%) of the value of the property
o Insular Life did not observe Sec. 180 of the or annual income, to guarantee the
Insurance Code when it issued 2 checks in the performance of the obligations prescribed for
amount of P150,000 for the 3 minor children of general guardians.
Dina Ayo and another check of P40,000 for the  It is clear from the said Article that regardless of the value
minor daughter of Lucia Lontok, there being no of the unemancipated common child's property, the father
showing of any court authorization presented or and mother ipso jure become the legal guardian of the
the requisite bond posted. child's property. However, if the market value of the
 Section 180 is quotes [sic] partly as property or the annual income of the child exceeds
follows: P50,000.00, a bond has to be posted by the parents
. . . In the absence of a judicial concerned to guarantee the performance of the
guardian, the father, or in the latter's obligations of a general guardian.
absence or incapacity, the mother of  It must, however, be noted that the second paragraph of
any minor, who is an insured or a Article 225 of the Family Code speaks of the "market
beneficiary under a contract of life, value of the property or the annual income of the child,"
health or accident insurance, may which means, therefore, the aggregate of the child's
exercise, in behalf of said minor, any property or annual income; if this exceeds P50,000.00, a
right, under the policy, without bond is required. There is no evidence that the share of
necessity of court authority or the each of the minors in the proceeds of the group policy in
giving of a bond where the interest of question is the minor's only property. Without such
the minor in the particular act evidence, it would not be safe to conclude that, indeed,
involved does not exceed twenty that is his only property.
thousand pesos . . . .
 Insular Life appealed the decision to the CA which held ELENA, OSCAR, CELIA, TERESITA and VIRGILIO, all surnamed
that: LINDAIN, petitioners vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
o The powers of attorney relied upon by Insular SPOUSES APOLINIA VALIENTE and FEDERICO ILA,
Life were sufficient to authorize Capt. Nuval to respondents
receive the proceeds of the insurance. G.R. No. 95305 August 20, 1992 (1D)
o Insofar as the minor children of Dina Ayo and
Lucia Lontok were concerned, it ruled that the FACTS:
requirement in Section 180 of the Insurance  When the plaintiffs were still minors, they were already the
Code has been amended by the Family Code registered owners of a parcel of land. On November 7,
which grants the father and mother joint legal 1966, their mother, Dolores Luluquisin, then already a
guardianship over the property of their widow and acting as guardian of her minor children, sold
unemancipated common child without the the land for P2,000 under a Deed of Absolute Sale of
necessity of a court appointment; however, Registered Land to the defendants spouses Apolonia
when the market value of the property or the Valiente and Federico Ila. The Deed of Absolute Sale was
annual income of the child exceeds registered in the office of the Register of Deeds and a TCT
P50,000.00, the parent concerned shall be was issued in the name of the vendees, spouses Ila.
required to put up a bond in such amount as the  The defendants admitted that the property in question
court may determine. was sold to them by the mother of the minors and
 Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. although at first they were reluctant to buy the property as
the sale would not be legal, the registered owners thereof
ISSUE: Whether the shares of the minors in the insurance proceeds, being all minors, upon advice of their counsel and the
being less than P50,000 could be received by their mothers without counsel of Dolores Luluquisin, who notarized the
documents, that the property could be sold without the
224 of 255 | P a g e
written authority of the court, considering that its value property, as her powers as the natural guardian
was less than P2,000. covers only matters of administration and
 Petitioners contend, however, that the sale of the lot by cannot include the power of disposition, and
their mother to the defendants is null and void because it she should have first secured court approval
was made without judicial authority and/or court approval. before alienation of the property.
The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the sale  The above ruling was a reiteration of Inton vs. Quintana,
was valid, as the value of the property was less than 81 Phil. 97.
P2,000, and, considering the ages of plaintiffs now, the  The petition is granted. The decision of the CA is set aside
youngest being 31 years old at the time of the filing of the and that of the RTC is reinstated.
complaint, their right to rescind the contract which should
have been exercised four (4) years after reaching the age CHAPTER 5. SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
of majority, has already prescribed. AUTHORITY (Arts. 228-233)
 The RTC rendered a decision for the petitioners declaring
the sale of the property to be null and void. Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
 On appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed and the (1) Upon the death of the parents;
sale was upheld. (2) Upon the death of the child; or
 Petitioners thereupon filed this petition for review. (3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)

ISSUE: Whether judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental
minors’ property by their mother. authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
HELD: YES (2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
 Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was already in force (3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case
when the assailed transaction occurred, provides: filed for the purpose;
o Art. 320.— The father, or in his absence the (4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party
mother, is the legal administrator of the concerned of parental authority; or
property pertaining to the child under parental (5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person
authority. If the property is worth more than two exercising parental authority. (327a)
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give
a bond subject to the approval of the Court of Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the
First Instance. parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which carries
 Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically
distinguished from judicial) administrator of the property reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of
of his/her minor children, does not have the power to the offender. (330a)
dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children
without judicial approval. The powers and duties of the Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case
widow as legal administrator of her minor children's may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person
property as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court exercising the same:
entitled, "General Powers and Duties of Executors and (1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
Administrators" are only powers of possession and (2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
management. Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or (3) Compels the child to beg; or
otherwise dispose of the property of her minor children (4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of
must proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which lasciviousness.
requires court authority and approval.
 In the case of Visaya, et al. vs. Suguitan, et al., G.R. No. The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which
L-8300, November 18, 1955, we held that: have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person
o It is true that under Art. 320 of the new Civil exercising parental authority.
Code the mother, Juana Visaya, was the legal
administrator of the property of her minor If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child
children. But as such legal administrator she so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental
had no power to compromise their claims, for authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the
compromise has always been deemed circumstances.
equivalent to an alienation (transigere est
alienare), and is an act of strict ownership that The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental
goes beyond mere administration. Hence, Art. authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same
2032 of the new Civil Code provides: proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and
 The Court's approval is necessary in will not be repeated. (33a)
compromises entered into by
guardians, parents, absentee's Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected
representatives and administrators the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such
or executors of decedent's estates. person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority.
(Emphasis supplied.) (n)
o This restriction on the power of parents to
compromise claims affecting their children is in Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall
contrast to the terms of Art. 1810 of the old Civil have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents.
Code that empowered parents to enter into
such compromises, without requiring court In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual
approval unless the amount involved was in engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict
excess of 2000 pesetas. At present, the corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Court['s] approval is indispensable regardless
of the amount involved. (Emphasis ours.) SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY, petitioner vs. FOUZI ALI
 In the recent case of Badillo vs. Ferrer, 152 SCRA 407, BONDAGJY, JUDGE BENSAUDI I. ARABANI, SR., in his
409, this Court stated. capacity as presiding judge of the 3rd Shari’a District Court,
o Surviving widow has no authority or has acted Shari’a Judicial District, Zamboanga City, respondents
beyond her powers in conveying to the vendees G.R. No. 140817. December 7, 2001 (1D)
the undivided share of her minor children in the
225 of 255 | P a g e
FACTS:  The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof,
 Respondent Fouzi and Sabrina were married under however, is not restricted to Muslim laws. The Family
Islamic rites. Out of their union they begot two children Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding
who were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Sabrina became whether a non-Muslim woman is incompetent. What
a Muslim by conversion which was, however, not determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the
registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim.
Philippines.  Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the
 At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral
respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a
whom he later divorced. healthy environment as well as physical and financial
 Sometime thereafter, the children lived in the house of support taking into consideration the respective resources
Sabrina’s mother. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his and social and moral situations of the parents.
children until he got an order from the court. Even with a  The record shows that petitioner is equally financially
court order, he could only see his children in school at De capable of providing for all the needs of her children. The
La Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa City. children went to school at De La Salle Zobel School,
 Sabrina later had the children baptized as Christians. Muntinlupa City with their tuition paid by petitioner
 Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina according to the school’s certification.
was seen with different men at odd hours in Manila, and  The welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration
that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and on the issue.
bathing suits. Such clothing are detestable under Islamic  In ascertaining the welfare and best interest of the
law on customs. children, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take
 Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their into account all relevant considerations.
neighbor’s house for a fee of P40.00 after the children  Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and
come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
school, the children would be happy to see him but they persons of their common children.
were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the  Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents
jeepney in going home from school. are not divorced or legally separated, the father and
 Fouzi filed with the Shari’a District Court an action to mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental
obtain custody of his two minor children – then 10 and 9 authority and fulfill their responsibility over their legitimate
years old. children.
 The Shari’a District Court found Sabrina unworthy to care  In Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals, we stated:
for her children, thus – o “xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and
o “A married woman, and a mother to growing obligations which the law grants to parents for
children, should live a life that the community in the purpose of the children’s physical
which she lives considers morally upright, and preservation and development, as well as the
in a manner that her growing minor children will cultivation of their intellect and the education of
not be socially and morally affected and their heart and senses. As regards parental
prejudiced. It is sad to note that respondent has authority, ‘there is no power, but a task; no
failed to observe that which is expected of a complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
married woman and a mother by the society in sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
which she lives. xxx The evidence of this case the minor.’
shows the extent of the moral depravity of the “xxx
respondent, and the kind of concern for the o “The father and mother, being the natural
welfare of her minor children which on the basis guardians of unemancipated children, are
thereof this Court finds respondent unfit with dutybound and entitled to keep them in their
the custody of her minor children. custody and company.”
o “xxx Under the general principles of Muslim  We do not doubt the capacity and love of both parties for
law, the Muslim mother may be legally their children, such that they both want to have them in
disentitled to the custody of her minor children their custody.
by reason of ‘wickedness’ when such  Either parent may lose parental authority over the child
wickedness is injurious to the mind of the child, only for a valid reason. In cases where both parties cannot
such as when she engages in ‘zina’ (illicit have custody because of their voluntary separation, we
sexual relation); or when she is unworthy as a take into consideration the circumstances that would lead
mother; and, a woman is not worthy to be us to believe which parent can better take care of the
trusted with the custody of the child who is children. Although we see the need for the children to
continually going out and leaving the child have both a mother and a father, we believe that petitioner
hungry. (A. Baillie, Muhammadan Law, p. 435; has more capacity and time to see to the children’s needs.
citing Dar-ul-Muktar, p. 280). Respondent is a businessman whose work requires that
 The SDC awarded the custody of the minor children to he go abroad or be in different places most of the time.
their natural father, Fouzi and ordered Sabrina to turnover Under P.D. No. 603, the custody of the minor children,
the care of said minors to the former. absent a compelling reason to the contrary, is given to the
 Hence, the instant petition. mother.
 However, the award of custody to the wife does not
ISSUE: Whether a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before deprive the husband of parental authority. In the case of
her marriage to a Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon Silva v. Court of Appeals, we said that:
their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the o “Parents have the natural right, as well as the
determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children. moral and legal duty, to care for their children,
see to their upbringing and safeguard their best
HELD: NO interest and welfare. This authority and
 The burden is upon respondent to prove that petitioner is responsibility may not be unduly denied the
not worthy to have custody of her children. We find that parents; neither may it be renounced by them.
the evidence presented by the respondent was not Even when the parents are estranged and their
sufficient to establish her unfitness according to Muslim affection for each other is lost, the attachment
law or the Family Code. and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain
unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow
this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real,
226 of 255 | P a g e
grave and imminent threat to the well-being of (2) Puericulture and similar centers;
the child.” (3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and
 Thus, we grant visitorial rights to respondent as his (4) Juvenile courts.
Constitutionally protected natural and primary right.
Article 360. The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after
the welfare of children in the municipality. It shall, among other
CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS functions:
and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents G.R. No. 114742. July (1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality;
17, 1997 (1D) (2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents;
(3) Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and
TITLE X. FUNERAL (Articles 305-310, NCC) orphans;
(4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency;
Article 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the (5) Adopt measures for the health of children;
funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established (6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds;
for support, under article 294. In case of descendants of the same (7) Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to the welfare
degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In of children, and secure their cooperation.
case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
Article 361. Juvenile courts will be established, as far as practicable,
Article 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position in every chartered city or large municipality.
of the deceased.
Article 362. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the
Article 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed father, mother, or guardian may in a proper case be judicially
wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his admonished.
religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case
of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person Article 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and
obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the property of children the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No
other members of the family. mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
Article 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed
of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in TITLE XIII. USE OF SURNAMES (Articles 364-380, NCC)
articles 294 and 305.
RA 9255 – “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the
Article 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or Surname of their Father (Amending Art. 176 of the Family
wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of the Code)”; IRR of 9255; Passport Law (RA 8239)
deceased for damages, material and moral.
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, vs. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO,
Article 310. The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be Respondent.
deemed a part of the funeral expenses, and shall be chargeable to G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
the conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the
spouses. FACTS:
 Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent
TITLE XII. CARE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN (Arts. 356- Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
363, NCC) together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at
that time already married to someone else. Out of this
PD 603 – The Child and Youth Welfare Code illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on
RA 9262 (Anti Violence Against Women and Children [VAWC]) February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13,
and IRR; RA 9523 1999).
 The children were not expressly recognized by
Article 356. Every child: respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the
(1) Is entitled to parental care; children in the Civil Registry.
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;  The two eventually parted ways and Grande left for the
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian; US with her 2 children.
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical,  Respondent Antonio then filed a Petition for Judicial
moral and intellectual development. Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change
Article 357. Every child shall: of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of
(1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian; Preliminary Injunction before the RTC
(2) Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons holding  RTC  rendered a decision in favor of Antonio; ordering,
substitute parental authority; among others:
(3) Exert his utmost for his education and training; o The Office of the City Registrar of the City of
(4) Cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the good Makati to cause the entry of the name of
of the same. [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned
minors in their respective Certificate of Live
Article 358. Every parent and every person holding substitute Birth and causing the correction/change and/or
parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the child are annotation of the surnames of said minors in
respected and his duties complied with, and shall particularly, by their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to
precept and example, imbue the child with highmindedness, love of Antonio
country, veneration for the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as  Grande filed a MR which was denied by the trial court
a way of life, and attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace.  Petitioner then filed an appeal with the CA which partly
granted the appeal. The appealed decision states, among
Article 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties others:
of every child. For this purpose, the government will establish, o The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and
whenever possible: the City Civil Registrar of Makati City are
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as
religious instruction shall be taught as part of the curriculum at the the surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis,
option of the parent or guardian;
227 of 255 | P a g e
in their respective certificates of live birth, and The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
record the same in the Register of Births; discretion upon the illegitimate children.
 Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,  It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it which policies affecting children are to be measured is
decreed the change of the minors’ surname to "Antonio." their best interest. On the matter of children’s surnames,
 Her MR having been denied, Grande filed the present this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the
petition contending that Article 176 of the Family Code–– use of the father’s surname serves the best interest of the
as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as minor child. In Alfon v. Republic, for instance, this Court
it is in permissive language––may not be invoked by a allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the
father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate
surname without the consent of their mother. father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal
obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her
ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v.
his surname by his illegitimate children upon recognition of their Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the
filiation. child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname
different from the surnames of the child’s father or mother.
HELD: NO Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is
 Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed
the Family Code, originally phrased as follows: in the best possible situation considering his
o Illegitimate children shall use the surname and circumstances.
shall be under the parental authority of their  In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote, We gave due
mother, and shall be entitled to support in deference to the choice of an illegitimate minor to use the
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest,
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the thus:
legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this o The foregoing discussion establishes the
modification, all other provisions in the Civil significant connection of a person’s name to his
Code governing successional rights shall identity, his status in relation to his parents and
remain in force. his successional rights as a legitimate or
 This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by illegitimate child. For sure, these matters
RA 9255 which now reads: should not be taken lightly as to deprive those
o Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the who may, in any way, be affected by the right
surname and shall be under the parental to present evidence in favor of or against such
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled change.
to support in conformity with this Code. o The law and facts obtaining here favor
However, illegitimate children may use the Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the
surname of their father if their filiation has been proper remedy, a petition for change of name
expressly recognized by their father through under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, complied with all the procedural requirements.
or when an admission in a public document or After hearing, the trial court found (and the
private handwritten instrument is made by the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence
father. Provided, the father has the right to presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s
institute an action before the regular courts to petition sufficiently established that, under Art.
prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist change his name as he was never recognized
of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. by his father while his mother has always
(Emphasis supplied.) recognized him as her child. A change of name
 From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general will erase the impression that he was ever
rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of recognized by his father. It is also to his best
his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended
in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the petition to have him join her in the United
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil States. This Court will not stand in the way of
register or when an admission in a public document or the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In supplied.)
such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the  An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the
surname of the father. mandatory use of the father’s surname upon his
 Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the
change of the surname to that of respondent? Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,
 Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will which states:
contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. o Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the
176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255. Surname of the Father
 Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if 7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is 7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the
not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein surname of the father if a public document is
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the executed by the father, either at the back of the
surname of their illegitimate children. Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate
 Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear document.
and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it 7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through
says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any a private instrument, the child shall use the
interpretation. Respondent’s position that the court can surname of the father, provided the registration
order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no is supported by the following documents:
legal basis. xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the
 On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity.
And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its Surname of the Mother
words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily 7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized
by the father, the child shall use the surname of
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. the father upon the submission of the
228 of 255 | P a g e
accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the FACTS:
Surname of the Father].  Petitioner Maria Virginia Remo, whose marriage to one
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly Francisco Rallonza still subsists, applied for the renewal
recognized by the father, the child shall use the of her passport with the DFA office in Chicago, Illinois,
surname of the father upon submission of a USA, with a request to revert to her maiden name and
public document or a private handwritten surname in the replacement passport.
instrument supported by the documents listed  Petitioner’s request having been denied, a lawyer
in Rule 7.1.2. representing petitioner wrote the Secretary of Foreign
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the Affairs Domingo Siason expressing similar request.
illegitimate child is required if he/she has  DFA  denied the request
reached the age of majority. The consent may o This Office is cognizant of the provision in the
be contained in a separate instrument duly law that it is not obligatory for a married woman
notarized. to use her husband’s name. Use of maiden
xxxx name is allowed in passport application only if
o Rule 8. Effects of Recognition the married name has not been used in
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered previous application. The Implementing Rules
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of
entered as the last name of the child in the 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a
Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live woman applicant may revert to her maiden
Birth shall be recorded in the Register of Births. name, that is, only in cases of annulment of
xxxx marriage, divorce and death of the husband.
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Ms. Remo’s case does not meet any of these
Surname of the Mother conditions.
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either  Petitioner’s MR having been denied, she appealed with
at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in the OP
a separate public document or in a private  OP  dismissed the appeal and ruled that Section 5(d) of
handwritten document, the public document or Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine
AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Live Passport Act of 1996 “offers no leeway for any other
Birth and the Register of Births as follows: interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment,
"The surname of the child is hereby changed or declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married
from (original surname) to (new surname) woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes.
pursuant to RA 9255."  OP denied petitioner’s MR
The original surname of the child appearing in  Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review
the Certificate of Live Birth and Register of  CA  denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the
Births shall not be changed or deleted. OP
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at o The Court of Appeals held that for passport
the time of registration, the public document or
application and issuance purposes, RA 8239
AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal
limits the instances when a married woman
Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made applicant may exercise the option to revert to
in the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register the use of her maiden name such as in a case
of Births as follows: of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). of nullity of marriage. Since there was no
The surname of the child is hereby changed showing that petitioner's marriage to Francisco
from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to Rallonza has been annulled, declared void or a
RA 9255." (Emphasis supplied.) divorce decree has been granted to them,
 Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative petitioner cannot simply revert to her maiden
issuance cannot amend a legislative act. name in the replacement passport after she
 Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted had adopted her husband’s surname in her old
provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the passport. Petitioner’s MR with the CA was also
mandatory use by illegitimate children of their father’s denied
surname upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity.  Hence, this petition.
 To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA
9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and ISSUE: Whether petitioner, who originally used her husband’s
unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden
an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her
and illegitimate children are given the choice on the marriage.
surnames by which they will be known.
 At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by
the children, now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years
old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their HELD: NO
names changed to "Antonio." However, since these  Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames.
letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial In the case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil
court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway Code provides:
this Court to rule for or against petitioner. A proper inquiry o ART. 370. A married woman may use:
into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's (1) Her maiden first name and surname and
choice of surname by the trial court is necessary. add her husband’s surname, or
 The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's
Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of surname, or
determining the surname to be chosen by the children (3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis. word indicating that she is his wife, such as
“Mrs.”
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner, -versus- THE  We agree with petitioner that the use of the word “may” in
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, the above provision indicates that the use of the
Respondent. husband’s surname by the wife is permissive rather than
G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010 obligatory. This has been settled in the case of Yasin v.
Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court.
229 of 255 | P a g e
 However, Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name
Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married
former husband is already married to another woman, woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must
petitioner’s marriage remains subsisting. Another point, be based only on the severance of the marriage.
Yasin did not involve a request to resume one’s maiden  Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the
name in a replacement passport, but a petition to resume provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically
one’s maiden name in view of the dissolution of one’s dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the
marriage. provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the
 The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in
applicable provision in this case is Section 5(d), which statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a
states: general law.
o Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of
Passport. — No passport shall be issued to an
applicant unless the Secretary or his duly JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA
authorized representative is satisfied that the CRUZ “AQUINO,” represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA
applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his
with the following requirements: x x x capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent.
(d) In case of a woman who is married, G.R. No. 177728 | July 31, 2009
separated, divorced or widowed or whose
marriage has been annulled or declared by FACTS:
court as void, a copy of the certificate of  For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner
marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old
annulment or certificate of death of the Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique)
deceased spouse duly issued and lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
authenticated by the Office of the Civil Registrar marriage.
General: Provided, That in case of a divorce  Sept. 4, 2005  Dominique died
decree, annulment or declaration of marriage  Nov. 2, 2005  Jenie gave birth to her herein co-
as void, the woman applicant may revert to the petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz “Aquino”
use of her maiden name: Provided, further,  Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using
That such divorce is recognized under existing Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of the City
laws of the Philippines; x x x (Emphasis Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she
supplied) submitted the child’s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to
 Section 1, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had
Regulations of RA 8239 provides: executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment
o The passport can be amended only in the executed by Dominique’s father Domingo Butch Aquino.
following cases: Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime
a) Amendment of woman’s name due to of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet
marriage; unborn child, and that his paternity been questioned.
b) Amendment of woman’s name due to death Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled “had
of spouse, annulment of marriage or divorce never AUTOBIOGRAPHY” which Dominique, during his
initiated by a foreign spouse; or lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting.
c) Change of surname of a child who is  The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S.
legitimated by virtue of a subsequent marriage Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s application for
of his parents. registration of the child’s name citing Rule 7 of the AO No.
 Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, 1, S. of 20014 (IRR of RA 9255 “An Act Allowing
placing her case outside of the purview of Section 5(d) of Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father,
RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married woman may Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order
revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not No. 209, otherwise Known as the ‘Family Code of the
resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Philippines”)
This prohibition, according to petitioner, conflicts with and, o In summary, the child cannot use the surname
thus, operates as an implied repeal of Article 370 of the of his father because he was born out of
Civil Code. wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior
 Petitioner is mistaken. The conflict between Article 370 of to his birth and has no more capacity to
the Civil Code and Section 5(d) of RA 8239 is more acknowledge his paternity to the child (either
imagined than real. RA 8239, including its implementing through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 –
rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of
from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname
recognition of this right, the DFA allows a married woman of the Father).
who applies for a passport for the first time to use her  Jenie and the child filed a complaint for
maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt injunction/registration of name against respondent before
her husband's surname. the RTC alleging that
 In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may the denial of registration of the child’s name is a violation
either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use of his right to use the surname of his deceased father
her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by
surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255.
requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the o Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue surname and shall be under the parental
using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden to support in conformity with this Code.
name. However, illegitimate children may use the
 However, once a married woman opted to adopt her surname of their father if their filiation has been
husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to expressly recognized by the father through the
the use of her maiden name, except in the cases record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances when an admission in a public document or
are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or private handwritten instrument is made by the
(4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage to her father. Provided, the father has the right to
230 of 255 | P a g e
institute an action before the regular courts to  In the present case, however, special circumstances exist
prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though unsigned
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.  First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s
 Petitioners maintained that the Autobiography executed birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography,
by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to
“private handwritten instrument” within the contemplation the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie
of the above-quoted provision of law. proffered. Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the
 RTC  dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father
as the Autobiography was unsigned citing paragraph 2.2, Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph
Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected
No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations by the registration of the questioned recognition of the
Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s
defines “private handwritten document” paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
o 2.2 Private handwritten instrument – an Autobiography that “JENIE DELA CRUZ” is “MY WIFE” as
instrument executed in the handwriting of the “WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER” and “NOW
father and duly signed by him where he SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
expressly recognizes paternity to the child. TOGETHER.”
 Hence, this direct resort to the SC via petition for review  In Herrera v. Alba, the Court summarized the laws, rules,
on certiorari. and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in
 Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, relevant part:
as amended, does not expressly require that the private o Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing
handwritten instrument containing the putative father’s Filiation
admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add o The relevant provisions of the Family Code
that the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography, though provide as follows:
unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the  ART. 175. Illegitimate children may
above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order establish their illegitimate filiation in
that the admission/recognition must be “duly signed” by the same way and on the same
the father is void as it “unduly expanded” the earlier- evidence as legitimate children.
quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code. xxxx
 ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate
ISSUE: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten statement of children is established by any of the
the deceased father of minor Christian Dela Cruz can be following:
considered as a recognition of paternity in a “private (1) The record of birth appearing in
handwritten instrument” within the contemplation of Article 176 the civil register or a final judgment;
of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, which entitles or
the said minor to use his father’s surname. (2) An admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a
HELD: private handwritten instrument and
 Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, signed by the parent concerned.
permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her In the absence of the foregoing
father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil be proved by:
register, or through an admission made in a public or (1) The open and continuous
private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in possession of the status of a
any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act legitimate child; or
of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no (2) Any other means allowed by the
separate action for judicial approval is necessary. Rules of Court and special laws.
 Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, o The Rules on Evidence include provisions on
indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130
instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be provide:
signed by the putative father. This provision must,  SEC. 39. Act or declaration about
however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of pedigree. — The act or declaration of
the Family Code which require that recognition by the a person deceased, or unable to
father must bear his signature, thus: testify, in respect to the pedigree of
o Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish another person related to him by
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on birth or marriage, may be received in
the same evidence as legitimate children. evidence where it occurred before
xxxx the controversy, and the relationship
o Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is between the two persons is shown
established by any of the following: by evidence other than such act or
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil declaration. The word "pedigree"
register or a final judgment; or includes relationship, family
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a genealogy, birth, marriage, death,
public document or a private handwritten the dates when and the places where
instrument and signed by the parent these facts occurred, and the names
concerned. of the relatives. It embraces also
xxxx facts of family history intimately
 That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child connected with pedigree.
through a written instrument must affix his signature  SEC. 40. Family reputation or
thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family tradition regarding pedigree. — The
Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of reputation or tradition existing in a
2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not family previous to the controversy, in
“unduly expand” the import of Article 176 as claimed by respect to the pedigree of any one of
petitioners. its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying
231 of 255 | P a g e
thereon be also a member of the State as parens patriae affords
family, either by consanguinity or special protection to children from
affinity. Entries in family bibles or abuse, exploitation and other
other family books or charts, conditions prejudicial to their
engraving on rings, family portraits development.”
and the like, may be received as  In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father
evidence of pedigree. bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor
 This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts child’s best interests to allow him to bear the surname of
are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth
v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the certificate.
issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating TITLE XIV. ABSENCE (Articles 381-396 NCC);
verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under See Article 41 FC; Rules (Section 4) 73, 74, 107, Revised Rules
Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition of Court;
by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a Arts. 774 & 777; Art. 1456, Arts. 22, 2142-2175; Wills &
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic Succession
writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made
by the putative father himself and the writing must be the Chapter 1. Provisional Measures in Case of Absence
writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to Chapter 2. Declaration of Absence
support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative Chapter 3. Administration of the Property of the Absentee
father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the Chapter 4. Presumption of Death
mother vowing to be a good father to the child and Chapter 5. Effect of Absence Upon the Contingent Rights of the
pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various Absentee
occasions, together with the certificate of live birth, proved
filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written Civil Code
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract
where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken Article 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his
as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an agent to
of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested
filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him
 In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier in all that may be necessary.
quoted statements in Dominique’s Autobiography have This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances
been made and written by him. Taken together with the the power conferred by the absentee has expired. (181a)
other relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique, during
his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common- Article 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article
law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents’ having been made, the judge shall take the necessary measures to
house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee and shall specify
was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, the powers, obligations and remuneration of his representative,
2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave regulating them, according to the circumstances, by the rules
birth to the child – they sufficiently establish that the child concerning guardians. (182)
of Jenie is Dominique’s.
 In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court Article 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse
sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the present shall be preferred when there is no legal separation.
requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor,
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an any competent person may be appointed by the court. (183a)
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
made: Article 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in case
piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his
be strict compliance with the requirement that the same property, his absence may be declared. (184)
must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is Article 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:
accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, (1) The spouse present;
it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to (2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy
have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging of the same;
parent as it is merely corroborative of such other (3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;
evidence.
 Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the (4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some
“paramount consideration” in resolving questions right subordinated to the condition of his death. (185) Article 386.
affecting him. Article 3(1) of the United Nations The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six
Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the months after its publication in a newspaper of general
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic: circulation. (186a)
o Article 3
 1. In all actions concerning children, Rules of Court
whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, Settlement Of Estate Of Deceased Persons
courts of law, administrative RULE 73 Venue and Process
authorities or legislative bodies, the
best interests of the child shall be a Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the
primary consideration. decedents is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
(Underscoring supplied) whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
 It is thus “(t)he policy of the Family administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Code to liberalize the rule on the Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
investigation of the paternity and and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
filiation of children, especially of Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
illegitimate children x x x.” Too, “(t)he taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
232 of 255 | P a g e
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not capacity, or by their
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise,
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession
on the record. of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The
court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of
Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in
When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and
the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be
liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate recorded in the proper register's office.
proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate Section 3. Bond to be filed by distributees. — The court, before
proceedings of either. allowing a partition in accordance with the provisions of the
preceding section, my require the distributees, if property other than
Section 3. Process. — In the exercise of probate jurisdiction, Courts real is to be distributed, to file a bond in an amount to be fixed by
of First Instance may issue warrants and process necessary to court, conditioned for the payment of any just claim which may be
compel the attendance of witnesses or to carry into effect theirs filed under the next succeeding section.
orders and judgments, and all other powers granted them by law. If
a person does not perform an order or judgment rendered by a court Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at
in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, it may issue a warrant for any time within two (2) years after the settlement and distribution of
the apprehension and imprisonment of such person until he an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two
performs such order or judgment, or is released. sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such
Section 4. Presumption of death. — For purposes of settlement of other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts
his estate, a person shall be presumed dead if absent and unheard in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such
from for the periods fixed in the Civil Code. But if such person proves lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it
to be alive, he shall be entitled to the balance of his estate after shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate
payment of all his debts. The balance may be recovered by motion which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been
in the same proceeding. unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the
RULE 74 court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose,
Summary Settlement of Estate after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation
and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding
or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both.
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate
the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they that may have been made.
may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, Section 5. Period for claim of minor or incapacitated person. — If on
he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an the date of the expiration of the period of two (2) years prescribed in
affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an the preceding section the person authorized to file a claim is a minor
extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by or mentally incapacitated, or is in prison or outside the Philippines,
stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who he may present his claim within one (1) year after such disability is
adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall removed.
file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of
the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of RULE 107 Absentees
the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the
said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the Section 1. Appointment of representative. — When a person
personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and
concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that without having left an agent to administer his property, or the power
may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that conferred upon the agent has expired, any interested party, relative
the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of or friend may petition the Court of First Instance of the place where
administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent. the absentee resided before his dis-appearance, for the
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be appointment of a person to represent him provisionally in all that
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner may be necessary. In the City of Manila, the petition shall be filed in
provided in the nest succeeding section; but no extrajudicial the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. Section 2. Declaration of absence; who may petition. — After the
lapse of two (2) years from his disapperance and without any news
Section 2. Summary settlement of estate of small value. — about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, or of five
Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, (5) years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the
whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand administration of his property, the declaration of his absence and
pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance appointment of a trustee or administrative may be applied for by any
having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested of the following:
person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) (a) The spouse present;
month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last (b) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy
publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for of the same.
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in (c) The relatives who would succeed by the law of intestacy; and
the province, and after such other notice to interest persons as the (d) Those who have over the property of the absentee some right
court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the subordinated to the condition of his death.
appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to
grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine Section 3. Contents of petition. — The petition for the appointment
who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and of a representative, or for the declaration of absence and the
to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such

233 of 255 | P a g e
appointment of a trustee or an administrator, must show the Article 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to
following: the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be
(a) The jurisdictional facts; unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. (n)
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs instituted in the
will, copy of which shall be presented, and of the relatives who would Article 2143. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do
succeed by the law of intestacy; not exclude other quasi-contracts which may come within the
(c) The names and residences of creditors and others who may have purview of the preceding article. (n)
any adverse interest over the property of the absentee;
(d) The probable value, location and character of the property SECTION 1
belonging to the absentee. Negotiorum Gestio

Section 4. Time of hearing; notice and publication thereof. — When Article 2144. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or
a petition for the appointment of a representative, or for the management of the business or property of another, without any
declaration of absence and the appointment of a trustee or power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the
administrator, is filed, the court shall fix a date and place for the termination of the affair and its incidents, or to require the person
hearing thereof where all concerned may appear to contest the concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so.
petition. This juridical relation does not arise in either of these instances:
Copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for the hearing shall (1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned;
be served upon the known heirs, legatees, devisees, creditors and (2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner.
other interested persons, at least ten (10) days before the day of the In the first case, the provisions of articles 1317, 1403, No. 1, and
hearing, and shall be published once a week for three (3) 1404 regarding unauthorized contracts shall govern. In the second
consecutive weeks prior to the time designated for the hearing, in a case, the rules on agency in Title X of this Book shall be applicable.
newspaper of general circulation in the province or city where the (1888a)
absentee resides, as the court shall deem best.
Article 2145. The officious manager shall perform his duties with all
Section 5. Opposition. — Anyone appearing to contest the petition the diligence of a good father of a family, and pay the damages
shall state in writing his grounds therefor, and serve a copy thereof which through his fault or negligence may be suffered by the owner
on the petitioner and other interested parties on or before the date of the property or business under management. The courts may,
designated for the hearing. however, increase or moderate the indemnity according to the
Section 6. Proof at hearing; order. — At the hearing, compliance circumstances of each case. (1889a)
with the provisions of section 4 of this rule must first be shown. Upon
satisfactory proof of the allegations in the petition, the court shall Article 2146. If the officious manager delegates to another person
issue an order granting the same and appointing the representative, all or some of his duties, he shall be liable for the acts of the
trustee or administrator for the absentee. The judge shall take the delegate, without prejudice to the direct obligation of the latter
necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interests of the toward the owner of the business.
absentee and shall specify the powers, obligations and The responsibility of two or more officious managers shall be
remuneration of his representative, trustee or administrator, solidary, unless the management was assumed to save the thing or
regulating them by the rules concerning guardians. business from imminent danger. (1890a)
In case of declaration of absence, the same shall not take effect until
six (6) months after its publication in a newspaper of general Article 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous
circulation designated by the court and in the Official Gazette. event:
Section 7. Who may be appointed. — In the appointment of a (1) If he undertakes risky operations which the owner was not
representative, the spouse present shall be preferred when there is accustomed to embark upon;
no legal separation. If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse (2) If he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner;
present is a minor or otherwise incompetent, any competent person (3) If he fails to return the property or business after demand by the
may be appointed by the court. owner;
In case of declaration of absence, the trustee or administrator of the (4) If he assumed the management in bad faith. (1891a)
absentee's property shall be appointed in accordance with the
preceding paragraph. Article 2148. Except when the management was assumed to save
Section 8. Termination of administration. — The trusteeship or property or business from imminent danger, the officious manager
administration of the property of the absentee shall cease upon shall be liable for fortuitous events:
order of the court in any of the following cases: (1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the management;
(a) When the absentee appears personally or by means of an agent; (2) If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from
(b) When the death of the absentee is proved and his testate or taking up the management. (n)
intestate heirs appear;
(c) When a third person appears, showing by a proper document Article 2149. The ratification of the management by the owner of the
that he has acquired the absentee's property by purchase or other business produces the effects of an express agency, even if the
title. business may not have been successful. (1892a)
In these cases the trustee or administrator shall cease in the
performance of his office, and the property shall be placed at the Article 2150. Although the officious management may not have been
disposal of whose may have a right thereto. expressly ratified, the owner of the property or business who enjoys
the advantages of the same shall be liable for obligations incurred
Civil Code in his interest, and shall reimburse the officious manager for the
necessary and useful expenses and for the damages which the
Article 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which latter may have suffered in the performance of his duties.
the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another management had for its purpose the prevention of an imminent and
or others either by his will or by operation of law. (n) manifest loss, although no benefit may have been derived. (1893)

Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the Article 2151. Even though the owner did not derive any benefit and
moment of the death of the decedent. (657a) there has been no imminent and manifest danger to the property or
business, the owner is liable as under the first paragraph of the
preceding article, provided:
CHAPTER 1 Quasi-contracts (1) The officious manager has acted in good faith, and
(2) The property or business is intact, ready to be returned to the
owner. (n)

234 of 255 | P a g e
Article 2165. When funeral expenses are borne by a third person,
Article 2152. The officious manager is personally liable for contracts without the knowledge of those relatives who were obliged to give
which he has entered into with third persons, even though he acted support to the deceased, said relatives shall reimburse the third
in the name of the owner, and there shall be no right of action person, should the latter claim reimbursement. (1894a)
between the owner and third persons. These provisions shall not
apply: Article 2166. When the person obliged to support an orphan, or an
(1) If the owner has expressly or tacitly ratified the management, or insane or other indigent person unjustly refuses to give support to
(2) When the contract refers to things pertaining to the owner of the the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy
business. (n) individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to
give support. The provisions of this article apply when the father or
Article 2153. The management is extinguished: mother of a child under eighteen years of age unjustly refuses to
(1) When the owner repudiates it or puts an end thereto; support him.
(2) When the officious manager withdraws from the management,
subject to the provisions of article 2144; Article 2167. When through an accident or other cause a person is
(3) By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the owner injured or becomes seriously ill, and he is treated or helped while he
or the officious manager. (n) is not in a condition to give consent to a contract, he shall be liable
to pay for the services of the physician or other person aiding him,
SECTION 2 Solutio Indebiti unless the service has been rendered out of pure generosity.

Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to Article 2168. When during a fire, flood, storm, or other calamity,
demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the property is saved from destruction by another person without the
obligation to return it arises. (1895) knowledge of the owner, the latter is bound to pay the former just
compensation.
Article 2155. Payment by reason of a mistake in the construction or
application of a doubtful or difficult question of law may come within Article 2169. When the government, upon the failure of any person
the scope of the preceding article. (n) to comply with health or safety regulations concerning property,
undertakes to do the necessary work, even over his objection, he
Article 2156. If the payer was in doubt whether the debt was due, he shall be liable to pay the expenses.
may recover if he proves that it was not due. (n)
Article 2170. When by accident or other fortuitous event, movables
Article 2157. The responsibility of two or more payees, when there separately pertaining to two or more persons are commingled or
has been payment of what is not due, is solidary. (n) confused, the rules on co-ownership shall be applicable.

Article 2158. When the property delivered or money paid belongs to Article 2171. The rights and obligations of the finder of lost personal
a third person, the payee shall comply with the provisions of article property shall be governed by articles 719 and 720.
1984. (n)
Article 2172. The right of every possessor in good faith to
Article 2159. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment, shall reimbursement for necessary and useful expenses is governed by
pay legal interest if a sum of money is involved, or shall be liable for article 546.
fruits received or which should have been received if the thing
produces fruits. Article 2173. When a third person, without the knowledge of the
He shall furthermore be answerable for any loss or impairment of debtor, pays the debt, the rights of the former are governed by
the thing from any cause, and for damages to the person who articles 1236 and 1237.
delivered the thing, until it is recovered. (1896a)
Article 2174. When in a small community a majority of the
Article 2160. He who in good faith accepts an undue payment of a inhabitants of age decide upon a measure for protection against
thing certain and determinate shall only be responsible for the lawlessness, fire, flood, storm or other calamity, any one who
impairment or loss of the same or its accessories and accessions objects to the plan and refuses to contribute to the expenses but is
insofar as he has thereby been benefited. If he has alienated it, he benefited by the project as executed shall be liable to pay his share
shall return the price or assign the action to collect the sum. (1897) of said expenses.

Article 2161. As regards the reimbursement for improvements and Article 2175. Any person who is constrained to pay the taxes of
expenses incurred by him who unduly received the thing, the another shall be entitled to reimbursement from the latter.
provisions of Title V of Book II shall govern. (1898)
ANGELITA VALDEZ, petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
Article 2162. He shall be exempt from the obligation to restore who, PHILIPPINES, respondent
believing in good faith that the payment was being made of a G.R. No. 180863 | September 8, 2009 (3D)
legitimate and subsisting claim, destroyed the document, or allowed
the action to prescribe, or gave up the pledges, or cancelled the FACTS:
guaranties for his right. He who paid unduly may proceed only  Petitioner married Sofio on Jan 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal.
against the true debtor or the guarantors with regard to whom the  March 1972: Sofio left their conjugal dwelling  Petitioner
action is still effective. (1899) and their child waited for him to return but, finally, in May
1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents’ home
Article 2163. It is presumed that there was a mistake in the payment in Tarlac.
if something which had never been due or had already been paid  Oct 1975: Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st  He and
was delivered; but he from whom the return is claimed may prove petitioner agreed to separate and executed a document
that the delivery was made out of liberality or for any other just to that effect
cause. (1901)  Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married
Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985
SECTION 3 Other Quasi-Contracts *  Subsequently, however, Virgilio’s application for
naturalization was denied because petitioner’s marriage
Article 2164. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to to Sofio was subsisting
give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to  Mar 29, 2007: petitioner filed a Petition seeking the
claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it out declaration of presumptive death of Sofio
of piety and without intention of being repaid. (1894a)  RTC dismissed the Petition for lack of merit  Angelita
"was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her
235 of 255 | P a g e
husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." This belief, o Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect
the RTC said, must be the result of proper and honest-to- insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
whereabouts of the absent spouse. Code or other laws.
 OSG recommended that the Court set aside the assailed  To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code
RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will,
presumptively dead  the requirement of "well-founded ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second
belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code is not marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated.
applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner could Such a situation would be untenable and would go against
not be expected to comply with this requirement because the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
it was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio
Reyes in 1985; contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code TITLE XV. EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY; See RA
was not repealed by Article 41 of the Family Code 6809; 2176 & 2180 NCC

ISSUE: Whether Art 41 of the FC shall be applied in this case. Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
HELD: NO. damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
 It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under
the auspices of the Civil Code. Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
 Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such those of persons for whom one is responsible.
person with any person other than such first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The TITLE XVI. CIVIL REGISTER (Articles 407-413)
first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first See RA 10172 (amending RA 9048; Expanded Clerical Error
spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at Law) & IRRs
the time of the second marriage without the spouse See Rules 103 & 108, Revised Rules of Court
present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven Article 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. (325a)
so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed Article 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
declared null and void by a competent court. from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
 Article 390 of the Civil Code: After an absence of seven acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss,
years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
for those of succession. The absentee shall not be and (16) changes of name. (326a)
presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession
till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after Article 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and
the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years other judicial orders mentioned in the preceding article, it shall be
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain
opened. whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been
 For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not done, to send a copy of said decree to the civil registry of the city or
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared municipality where the court is functioning. (n)
an absentee. The declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for Article 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents
its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be
precautions for the administration of the estate of the prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. (n)
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however,
the law only requires that the former spouse has been Article 411. Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the unauthorized alteration made in any civil register, to any person
second marriage, that the spouse present does not know suffering damage thereby. However, the civil registrar may exempt
his or her former spouse to be living, that such former himself from such liability if he proves that he has taken every
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse reasonable precaution to prevent the unlawful alteration. (n)
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Article 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
 Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is without a judicial order. (n)
established by law and no court declaration is needed for
the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to Article 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio status shall be governed by special laws. (n)
is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.
 Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriage to
RULE 103 Change of Name
Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’s
capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under
Section 1. Venue. — A person desiring to change his name shall
paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in
 Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
proof of "well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner Domestic Relations Court.
could not have been expected to comply with this
requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect Section 2. Contents of petition. — A petition for change of name
at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name
the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
The Family Code itself states:

236 of 255 | P a g e
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province Section 7. Order. — After hearing, the court may either dismiss the
where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
of such filing; prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotated the
sought; same in his record.
(c) The name asked for.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. MERLINDA L.
Section 3. Order for hearing. — If the petition filed is sufficient in OLAYBAR, respondent
form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of G.R. No. 189538 | February 10, 2014
the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and
shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing FACTS:
at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some  Respondent Merlinda Olaybar requested from the NSO a
newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the CENOMAR from which she discovered that she was
court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) month after the national, on June 24, 2002 at the Office of the MTCC,
last publication of the notice. Palace of Justice.
 Respondent, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Section 4. Hearing. — Any interested person may appear at the Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in
hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper the wife portion thereof. She impleaded the Local Civil
provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband,
the Republic. as parties to the case.
 During trial, respondent testified on her behalf, explaining
Section 5. Judgment. — Upon satisfactory proof in open court on and completely denying to have contracted the alleged
the date fixed in the order that such order has been published as marriage to Ye Son Sune. She also presented an
directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the
shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their
name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared
accordance with the prayer of the petition. was definitely not the respondent. Lastly, a document
examiner testified that the signature appearing in the
Section 6. Service of judgment. — Judgments or orders rendered in marriage contract was forged.
connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the  RTC rendered the assailed decision in favor of Olaybar
municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who and directed the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City to
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register. cancel all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged
marriage contract of Olaybar and Ye Son Sune.
RULE 108 Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil  On denial of its MR, petitioner filed the instant petition for
Registry review on certiorari asserting that Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court applies only when there are errors in the
Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any entries sought to be cancelled or corrected and that
act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons granting the cancellation of “all the entries in the wife
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified portion of the alleged marriage contract,” is in effect
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating declaring the marriage void ab initio.
thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage
contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon in a Rule 108 proceeding.
good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may
be cancelled or corrected: (a) births: (b) marriage; (c) deaths; (d) HELD: YES
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)  Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; The proceedings may either be summary or adversary.
(j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil o If the correction is clerical, then the procedure
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary to be adopted is summary.
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. o If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
Section 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who adversary.
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be o Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia
made parties to the proceeding. in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that
"even substantial errors in a civil registry may
Section 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, be corrected through a petition filed under Rule
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of 108, with the true facts established and the
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the parties aggrieved by the error availing
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order themselves of the appropriate adversarial
to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a proceeding."
newspaper of general circulation in the province. o An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is
Section 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having one where the trial court has conducted
or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or proceedings where all relevant facts have been
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the fully and properly developed, where opposing
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his counsel have been given opportunity to
opposition thereto. demolish the opposite party’s case, and where
the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
Section 6. Expediting proceedings. — The court in which the considered.
proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings,  It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and
and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is]
rights of the parties pending such proceedings. granted upon mere application or motion. However, a
special proceeding is not always summary. The
237 of 255 | P a g e
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
proceeding per se. where the corresponding civil registry is
o It requires publication of the petition; it located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
who may claim interest which would be affected changing his entry of marriage in the civil
by the cancellation or correction; it also requires registry.
the civil registrar and any person in interest to  Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence
file their opposition, if any; and it states that was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather,
although the court may make orders expediting respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no
the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court marriage was entered into and that she was not even
shall either dismiss the petition or issue an aware of such existence. The testimonial and
order granting the same. documentary evidence clearly established that the only
o Thus, as long as the procedural requirements "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate
in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be
adversary proceeding to effect substantial availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot
corrections and changes in entries of the civil nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the
register. parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
 In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed,
certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal and all the evidence of the parties had already been
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not
that her signature was forged and she was not the one the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage
other words, she claims that no such marriage was to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
entered into or if there was, she was not the one who  Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject
entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the
appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife
portion of the marriage certificate. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. DR. NORMA S.
 In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, LUGSANAY UY, respondent
respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, G.R. No. 198010 | August 12, 2013 (3D)
as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-
respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural FACTS:
requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.  Respondent filed with the RTC a Petition for Correction of
The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. Impleaded as
the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City.
Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and
importantly, trial was conducted where respondent is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera
herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged Lugsanay. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full
marriage was conducted, as well as a document name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to
examiner, testified. Several documents were also her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She
considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other further claimed that her school records, Professional
evidence presented, the trial court found that the Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate Certificate, and passport bear the name "Norma S.
was different from respondent’s signature appearing in Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate
some of her government issued identification cards.23 The child considering that her parents were never married, so
court thus made a categorical conclusion that she had to follow the surname of her mother. She also
respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese,
hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are
established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such all Filipinos.
marriage was celebrated.  Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with the
 Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent publication requirement.
case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay,  RTC  granted the petition and ordered the City Civil
Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the correction or
and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the change the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of
National Statistics Office that: petitioner’s name and citizenship to Norma Sy Lugsanay
o To be sure, a petition for correction or and Filipino, respectively.
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry  CA  affirmed in toto the RTC Order and held that
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable
marriage. A direct action is necessary to parties was cured upon the publication of the Order
prevent circumvention of the substantive and setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general
procedural safeguards of marriage under the circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG
related laws. Among these safeguards are the and the City Prosecutor’s Office.
requirement of proving the limited grounds for  Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the
the dissolution of marriage, support pendente petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable
lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, parties.
partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses and the investigation of the public ISSUE: Whether the failure to implead indispensable parties was
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct cured upon the publication of the notice of hearing.
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent HELD: NO
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family  Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for  In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her
238 of 255 | P a g e
first name, surname and citizenship. The changes, granted respondent’s petition deleting the entry on the
however, are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on date and place of marriage of parties; correcting his
respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng"; deleting the
surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and deleting the entry
"Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his father.
effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG,
and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the
the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. corrections made on respondent’s birth certificate had the
Clearly, the changes are substantial. effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to
 It has been settled in a number of cases starting with illegitimate and must only be effected through an
Republic v. Valencia that even substantial errors in a civil appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the
registry may be corrected and the true facts established RTC decision for respondent’s failure to comply strictly
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding The Court. Aside from the wrong remedy availed of by
pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating: respondent as he filed a petition for Change of Name
o It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming that he
of a petition is not for the correction of clerical filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but remedy, the petition still failed because of improper venue
one involving nationality or citizenship, which is and failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City
indisputably substantial as well as and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be  In Ceruila v. Delantar, the Ceruilas filed a petition for the
granted in a proceeding summary in nature. cancellation and annulment of the birth certificate of
However, it is also true that a right in law may respondent on the ground that the same was made as an
be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and,
long as the appropriate remedy is used. This therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material
Court adheres to the principle that even entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting the case
substantial errors in a civil registry may be for hearing with a directive that the same be published
corrected and the true facts established and that any person who is interested in the petition may
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail interpose his comment or opposition on or before the
themselves of the appropriate adversary scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to the
proceeding. x x x Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court granted
 What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" the petition and nullified respondent’s birth certificate.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding" as Few months after, respondent filed a petition for the
follows: annulment of judgment claiming that she and her
o One having opposing parties; contested, as guardian were not notified of the petition and the trial
distinguished from an ex parte application, one court’s decision, hence, the latter was issued without
of which the party seeking relief has given legal jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The
warning to the other party, and afforded the Court annulled the trial court’s decision for failure to
latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the
adoption proceeding. non-impleading of respondent herself whose birth
 In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the certificate was nullified.
Court’s conclusion in Republic v. Kho, Alba v. Court of  In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, petitioner filed a petition for
Appeals, and Barco v. Court of Appeals, that the failure to the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her
implead indispensable parties was cured by the children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V.
publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic status from "married" to "single," and the date and place
v. Kho, petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The
granting the petition for correction of entries despite Court modified the trial court’s decision by nullifying the
respondents’ failure to implead the minor’s mother as an portion thereof which directs the change of petitioner’s
indispensable party. The Court, however, did not strictly civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it
apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was the OSG only that was made respondent and the
was highly improbable that the mother was unaware of proceedings taken was summary in nature which is short
the proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s of what is required in cases where substantial alterations
birth certificates especially since the notices, orders and are sought.
decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence  Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is
she shared with them. Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate
 In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition,
Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the however, she seeks the correction of her first name and
petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and
her petition and allowed the correction sought by her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus,
respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the respondent should have impleaded and notified not only
CA. the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings
 We do not agree with the RTC and the CA. as the persons who have interest and are affected by the
 This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
the issue involved in this case. Aside from Kho, Alba and  The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a
Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v. newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was
Coseteng-Magpayo, Ceruila v. Delantar, and Labayo- served upon the State will not change the nature of the
Rowe v. Republic. proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule
 In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, claiming that his 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate
parents were never legally married, respondent therein two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one
filed a petition to change his name from "Julian Edward given to the persons named in the petition and another
Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in his given to other persons who are not named in the petition
birth certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for hearing was parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to
court issued an order of general default and eventually comply with the requirements of fair play and due process
239 of 255 | P a g e
to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect o Corpuz v. Santo Tomas: The recognition of the
his interest if he so chooses. foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
 While there may be cases where the Court held that the 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
failure to implead and notify the affected or interested proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in status or right of a party or a particular fact.
bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such o While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce
failure was likewise excused where the interested parties decree, in the present case the Japanese
themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when Family Court judgment also affected the civil
there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is
existence of the interested parties; or when a party is a Filipino citizen.
inadvertently left out. o The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of
 It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning
register involves substantial and controversial alterations, the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the
the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
mandated. legal consequences upon a person’s legal
capacity and status x x x." The Japanese
 The petition is hereby granted.
Family Court judgment directly bears on the
civil status of a Filipino citizen and should
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA
therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108
MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
proceeding.
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
Issue: W/N the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-
G.R. No. 196049 | June 26, 2013 (2D)
10-SC) is applicable
Facts:
Held: No
 Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who
 The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
his wife to Japan where he resides.
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
 In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
 For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved,
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only
Quezon City, Philippines.
needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the
 Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
which declared the marriage between Marinay and Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
 A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
 Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
Nullity of Marriage)."
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in
 RTC dismissed the petition, citing the provisions of the the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11- and other mandatory laws.
10-SC) which provides that a petition for declaration of
 A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
marriage void does not require relitigation under a
husband or the wife, in this case either Maekara or
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
Marinay.
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
 Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753) in relation to foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
Article 413 of the Civil Code. state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the
o The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment evidence.
of marriage to send a copy of the final decree
 Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that
of the court to the local registrar of the
a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates
municipality where the dissolved or annulled
a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
marriage was solemnized."
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title."
o Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the
the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
"judgments declaring marriages void from the want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
beginning" are subject to cancellation or fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
correction. The petition in the RTC sought courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments.
(among others) to annotate the judgment of the Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of judgment.
marriage between Marinay and Maekara.  Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine
 The Solicitor General contended that the petition to courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully
made in a Rule 108 proceeding. proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves

240 of 255 | P a g e
the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and
procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of preserving the property regime of the marriage.
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a  The case of Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental where the Court
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
a divorce decree abroad is not applicable in the case at bar because Braza does
 There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on of the foreign country.
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no  To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
marriages are declared void from the beginning under prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court  A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Court. Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
Issue: W/N the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in corresponding civil registry is located." In other words, a
the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
Held: Yes registry.
 Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires  However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special There is neither circumvention of the substantive and
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law,
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
 Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action
life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
State has an interest in recording. As noted by the under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact." REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. JULIAN
 Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN
o Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), respondent
interested in any act, event, order or decree G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011
concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a FACTS:
verified petition for the cancellation or  Claiming that his parents were never legally married,
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial
Regional Trial Court of the province where the Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his
corresponding civil registry is located. name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
(Emphasis supplied)  In support of his petition, respondent submitted a
 Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the certification from the National Statistics Office stating that
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage his mother Anna Dominique “does not appear in [its]
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also submitted
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married his academic records from elementary up to college
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality showing that he carried the surname “Coseteng,” and the
to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of birth certificate of his child where “Coseteng” appears as
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections,
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon
Court. City’s 3rd District using the name “JULIAN M.L.
 There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal COSETENG.”
and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the  Respondent amended his petition by alleging therein
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil  The notice setting the petition for hearing was published
registry, which compromises the public record of his in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited 14-20, 2008. A copy of the notice was furnished the OSG.
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to  No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law of general default was entered by the trial court which
the moment he contracts marriage. These property then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte.
241 of 255 | P a g e
 The trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed o SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or
the Civil Registrar of Makati City to: correction of an entry in the civil register is
o Delete the entry “March 26, 1972” in Item 24 for sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
“DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF have or claim any interest which would be
PARTIES” [in herein respondent’s Certificate of affected thereby shall be made parties to the
live Birth]; proceeding.
o Correct the entry “MAGPAYO” in the space for o SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing
the Last Name of the [respondent] to of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
“COSETENG”; the time and place for the hearing of the same,
o Delete the entry “COSETENG” in the space for and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
Middle Name of the [respondent]; and given to the persons named in the petition. The
o Delete the entry “Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr.” court shall also cause the order to be published
in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]… once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in
 The Republic filed a MR but it was denied, hence, it a newspaper of general circulation in the
lodged the present petition for review. province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
ISSUE: Whether the deletion of the entry on the date and place of  Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns
marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in
effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected –
hence, involving a change in civil status of a person which should that of Makati in the present case, and “all persons who
be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby” should be made parties to the proceeding.
HELD:  As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was
 A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was
(CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-
grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence such father and mother were made parties thereto.
as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; Republic v. Belmonte, illuminates, however:
(d) when one has continuously used and been known o The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding
since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of change of name and in Rule 108 concerning
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino the cancellation or correction of entries in the
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith civil registry are separate and distinct. They
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the may not be substituted one for the other for the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent would render nugatory the provisions of the
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice Rules of Court allowing the change of one’s
public interest. Respondent’s reason for changing his name or the correction of entries in the civil
name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . .
recognized grounds, however. (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring
 The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. supplied)
Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the  Even assuming arguendo that respondent had
therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies,
had been known since childhood in order to avoid respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied
confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from
She merely sought to use the surname of her mother improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of
which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use  As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108
her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of provides:
confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. o SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the
In the present case, however, respondent denies his filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
legitimacy. fix the time and place for the hearing of the
 The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to
far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It be given to the persons named in the petition.
seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule The court shall also cause the order to be
103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s published once a week for three (3)
supplication. consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
 Labayo-Rowe v. circulation in the province.
RepublicC:\Users\ramosjg\Downloads\Attachments_201 o SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and
535\Civil Law Review 1\Civil Law Review 1\CRLI Notes\l any person having or claiming any interest
categorically holds that “changes which may affect the under the entry whose cancellation or
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
substantial and controversial alterations which can only days from notice of the petition, or from the last
be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . .” date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto. (emphasis and
 Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status
underscoring supplied)
from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:
o SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any  A reading of these related provisions readily shows that
person interested in any act, event, order or Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different
decree concerning the civil status of persons “potential oppositors.” The first notice is that given to the
which has been recorded in the civil register, “persons named in the petition” and the second (which is
may file a verified petition for the cancellation or through publication) is that given to other persons who are
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
[RTC] of the province where the corresponding considered interested or affected parties, such as
civil registry is located. creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under
xxxx the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the
subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides

242 of 255 | P a g e
for two periods (for the two types of “potential oppositors”) corrected or distinguished on the
within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or basis of the effect that the correction
from the last date of publication). or change may be. Such entries
 What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory include not only those clerical in
directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil nature but also substantial errors.
registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally After all, the role of the Court under
be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to
cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as ascertain the truths about the facts
party-respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is recorded therein.
not established to be known by the petitioner to be  Hence, the OSG filed the present petition.
affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates
in the proceeding is notified through publication. ISSUE: Whether the conversion of spelling of petitioner’s given
 IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of name from “MARILYN” to “MERLYN” is a material correction and
an entry in the civil register involves substantial and should have been filed under Rule 103 and not under Rule 108.
controversial alterations including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of HELD: NO
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of  Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to
Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. MERLYN procedure for an independent special proceeding in court
MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, to establish the status of a person involving his relations
respondent with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to,
G.R. No. 186027 | December 8, 2010 the rest of the community. In petitions for change of name,
a person avails of a remedy to alter the “designation by
FACTS: which he is known and called in the community in which
 Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister he lives and is best known.” When granted, a person’s
and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new
(Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it “label or appellation for the convenience of the world at
appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L. large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with
Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the him.” Judicial permission for a change of name aims to
Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by
Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048). virtue of a court decree.
 The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City,  The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem
however, refused to effect the correction unless a court which requires publication of the order issued by the court
order was obtained “because the Civil Registrar therein is to afford the State and all other interested parties to
not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision
can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world.
office as mandated by Republic Act 9048.” As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all
 Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For who might make an objection. “It is the publication of such
Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case
of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the RTC. and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.”
 There being no opposition, counsel for Mercadera moved  Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a
for leave of court to present evidence ex parte The change of one’s existing family relations or in the rights
testimony of Oga and several photocopies of documents and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one’s legal
were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove capacity or civil status. However, “there could be
that Mercadera never used the name “Marilyn” in any of instances where the change applied for may be open to
her public or private transactions. objection by parties who already bear the surname
 RTC  granted Mercadera’s petition and directed the desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby
Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct acquire certain family ties with them but because the
her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on
Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. the public mind.” Hence, in requests for a change of
 OSG interposed an appeal with the CA  The correction name, “what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance
in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name might seem or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation
innocuous enough to grant but “it is in truth a material of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications
correction as it would modify or increase substantive advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in the
rights.” What the lower court actually allowed was a event of its grant x x x.”
change of Mercadera’s given name, which would have  Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial
been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in
proved any of the grounds therefor. the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code.
 CA  affirmed the RTC’s order Entries in the civil register refer to “acts, events and
o Appellant’s insistence that the petition should judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons,”
have been filed under Rule 103 and not Rule also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law.
108 of the Rules of Court is off the mark. In Co Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and
v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry may be
February 23, 2004, the High Court reiterated corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting
the distinction between the phrases “to correct” the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are
and “to change.” Said the High Court: beyond the ambit of the rule. In the abandoned case of
 To correct simply means "to make or Chua Wee v. Republic, this Court declared that,
set a right; to remove the faults or o x x x if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
error from." To change means "to innocuous or harmless changes or corrections
replace something with something of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious
else of the same kind or with to the understanding, so as to comprehend
something that serves as a substantial and controversial alterations
substitute. Article 412 of the New concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity
Civil Code does not qualify as to the or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule
kind of entry to be changed or 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for
243 of 255 | P a g e
it would be increasing or modifying substantive change of name which entails a modification or increase
rights, which changes are not authorized under in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial
Article 412 of the new Civil Code." error that requires compliance with the procedure under
 In the latter case of Wong v. Republic, however, Justice Rule 103, and not Rule 108.
Vicente Abad Santos, in a separate concurrence, opined  The “change of name” contemplated under Article 376
that Article 412, which Rule 108 implements, and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and
contemplates all kinds of issues and all types of Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can
procedures because “the provision does not say that it be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to
applies only to non-controversial issues and that the justify a request for change of name, there must be a
procedure to be used is summary in nature.” In Republic proper and compelling reason for the change and proof
v. Judge De la Cruz, the dissenting opinion penned by that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of
Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the same view: his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds
o It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
rendered unconstitutional if it would allow the  In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling,
correction of more than mere harmless clerical typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
error, as it would thereby increase or modify registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration
substantive rights which the Constitution in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes “changes of name,”
expressly forbids because Article 412 of the the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered
Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in
implemented by Rule 108, allows only the one’s name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for
correction of innocuous clerical errors not those clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
affecting the status of persons. As was stressed  This rule in “names,” however, does not operate to
in the dissent on the aforesaid Wong Case, entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in
Article 412 does not limit in its express terms civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As
nor by mere implication, the correction explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for
authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors. x allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship,
x x it would be reasonable and justified to rule civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108
that Article 412 contemplates of correction of provided there is an adversary proceeding. “After all, the
erroneous entry of whatever nature, procedural role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths
safeguards having only to be provided for, as about the facts recorded therein.”
was the manifest purpose of Rule 108.  A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of
o x x x proceedings for the correction of support to the OSG’s assumption that Mercadera
erroneous entry should not be considered as intended to change her name under Rule 103. All that the
establishing one's status in a legal manner petition propounded are swift arguments on the alleged
conclusively beyond dispute or controversion, x procedural flaws of Mercadera’s petition before the RTC.
x x the books making up the civil register and In the same vein, no concrete contention was brought up
all documents relating thereto x x x shall be to convince this Court that the dangers sought to be
prima facie evidence of the facts therein prevented by the adversarial proceedings prescribed in
contained. Hence, the status as corrected Rule 103 are attendant in this case. Instead, the RTC
would not have a superior quality for evidentiary found the documents presented by Mercadera to have
purpose. Moreover, the correction should not satisfactorily shown that she had been known as
imply a change of status but a mere rectification MERLYN ever since, discounting the possibility that
of error to make the matter corrected speak for confusion, or a modification of substantive rights might
the truth. x x x arise. Truth be told, not a single oppositor appeared to
 Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above stated views contest the petition despite full compliance with the
were adopted by this Court insofar as even substantial publication requirement.
errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and  Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC
the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply
proceeding. “If the purpose of the petition is merely to means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or from.” To change means “to replace something with
obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a something else of the same kind or with something that
summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of serves as a substitute.” From the allegations in her
a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court “to
which may affect the civil status from legitimate to remove the faults or error” from her registered given name
illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and “MARILYN,” and “to make or set aright” the same to
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after conform to the one she grew up to, “MERLYN.” It does not
appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its
nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling.
civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed
character and should be threshed out in a proper action by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the
depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, expediency which the law provides and was constrained
and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the to take court action to obtain relief.
entries are notified or represented and evidence is  Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes
submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and similar to Mercadera’s case which recognize the same a
proof to the contrary admitted x x x.” “Where such a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic it was held that “to
change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a change ‘Sincio’ to ‘Sencio’ which merely involves the
substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an substitution of the first vowel ‘i’ in the first name into the
erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. vowel ‘e’ amounts merely to the righting of a clerical
In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the error.” In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, it was held that the
procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of change of petitioner’s name from “Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz
the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Labayu” to “Emperatriz Labayo” was a mere innocuous
Code and so does not violate the Constitution.” alteration wherein a summary proceeding was
 In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B.
from “MARILYN” to “MERLYN” is not a correction of an Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto, the correction involved
innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a the substitution of the letters “ch” for the letter “d,” so that
244 of 255 | P a g e
what appears as “Midael” as given name would read wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
“Michael.” In the latter case, this Court, with the disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error petition for divorce, which was granted.
was plainly clerical, such that, “changing the name of the  Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the
child from ‘Midael C. Mazon’ to ‘Michael C. Mazon’ cannot Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
possibly cause any confusion, because both names can Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the
and tone (tono, tunog, himig).” registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
 In this case, the use of the letter “a” for the letter “e,” and National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the
the deletion of the letter “i,” so that what appears as marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
“Marilyn” would read as “Merlyn” is patently a rectification Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
of a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
between “Marilyn” and “Merlyn” may well be the object of Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
a mix- up that blemished Mercadera’s Certificate of Live 1982.
Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the  Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition
same. of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
 The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled  RTC denied the petition.
given name which she had been using ever since she o Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the
could remember. action for judicial recognition of the foreign
 It is worthy to note that the OSG’s reliance on Republic divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
vs. Hernandez, is flawed. In that case, this Court said that citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
“a change in a given name is a substantial matter” and avail of the remedy, under the second
that it “cannot be granted by means of any other paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in
proceeding that would in effect render it a mere incident order for him or her to be able to remarry under
or an offshoot of another special proceeding.” While this Philippine law.
Court stands true to the ruling in Hernandez, the said
pronouncement therein was stated in a different tenor Issue: W/N the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
and, thus, inapplicable to this case. Hernandez was extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
decided against an entirely different factual milieu. There the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
was a petition for adoption that must not have led to a
corresponding change in the adoptee’s given name Held: No
because “it would be procedurally erroneous to employ a  The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
absence of a corresponding petition for the latter relief at substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
law.” In the present case, the issue is the applicability of spouse
either Rule 103 or Rule 108 and the relief sought by  The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
Mercadera can in fact be granted under the latter. This legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph
Court finds no attempt on the part of Mercadera to render of Article 26 of the Family Code.
the requirements under Rule 103 illusory as in  Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
Hernandez. marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
 Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
that compliance with the procedural requirements under powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted
Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still cannot be Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the
denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for Family Code to its present wording.
an adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The  Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this
newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v.
the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia Ibay-Somera.
of an adverse proceeding. The fact that no one opposed o In both cases, the Court refused to
the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of
of its jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce
proceeding less adversarial in nature. Considering that decree between the alien and the Filipino.
the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to  As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in
present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
the lower court were procedurally defective. Indeed, it has obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
become unnecessary to further discuss the reasons why spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the
the CA correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
especially in admitting and according probative value to settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
the evidence presented by Mercadera. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents. considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
G.R. No. 186571 | August 11, 2010 (3D) remarry.
 Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of
Facts: Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
 Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds
who acquired Canadian citizenship through that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
naturalization. the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
 Gerbert then married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, capacitated to contract another marriage.
a Filipina, in Pasig City. o No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make
 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other
left for Canada soon after the wedding. than that already established by the decree),
 He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to whose status and legal capacity are generally
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his governed by his national law.
245 of 255 | P a g e
 Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and
the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
 The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a
right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for
its recognition in this jurisdiction
 We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC.
o In other words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
o The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgments.
 Petition was granted. Remand of the case to the trial court
was ordered.

246 of 255 | P a g e
NIEVES ESTARES BALDOS,substituted by FRANCISCO of any kind. Babies born after the effectivity of
BALDOS and MARTIN BALDOS, Petitioners, - versus - COURT this decree must be registered in the office of
OF APPEALS and REYNALDO PILLAZAR a.k.a. REYNALDO the local civil registrar of the place of birth within
ESTARES BALDOS, Respondents. thirty (30) days after birth, by the attending
G.R. No. 170645, July 9, 2010 (2D) physician, nurse, midwife, hilot or hospitals or
clinic administrator or, in default of the same, by
FACTS: either parent or a responsible member of the
 Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on family or any person who has knowledge of the
October 30, 1948. However, his birth was not registered birth.
in the office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36 years The parents or the responsible member of
later or on February 11,1985. His certificate of live birth the family and the attendant at birth or the
indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and Bartolome hospital or clinic administrator referred to above
Baldos as his father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the shall be jointly liable in case they fail to register
informant on the certificate of live birth. the new born child. If there was no attendant at
 Nieves Baldos filed in the RTC of Olongapo City a birth, or if the child was not born in a hospital or
complaint for the cancellation of the late registration of maternity clinic, then the parents or the
Reynaldo’s birth. She claimed that Reynaldo was not responsible member of the family alone shall be
really her son. primarily liable in case of failure to register the
 RTC  dismissed the petition for lack of merit new born child. (Emphasis supplied)
o A thorough examination of the evidence  Presidential Decree No. 766[12] amended P.D. No. 651
adduced by the plaintiff vis-a-vis the evidence by extending the period of registration up to 31 December
of the defendant shows that apart from the 1975. P.D. No. 651, as amended, provided for special
scornful denial of plaintiff that defendant is her registration within a specified period to address the
son, all documentary evidence available points problem of under-registration of births as well as deaths.
to the contrary. The declaration of two It allowed, without fine or fee of any kind, the late
disinterested persons, who were neighbors of registration of births and deaths occurring within the
the petitioner and his deceased husband, has period starting from 1 January 1974 up to the date when
never been refuted. the decree became effective.
 Nieves appealed to the CA insisting that the late  Since Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, the late
registration of Reynaldo’s birth was contrary to PD 651 registration of his birth is outside of the coverage of P.D.
 CA  affirmed the RTC’s order; P.D. No. 651 did not No. 651, as amended. The late registration of Reynaldo’s
proscribe the late registration of births of persons born birth falls under Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the
before January 1, 1974 and explained that the purpose of Civil Registry Law, which took effect on 27 February 1931.
the decree was to encourage registration of births as well As a general law, Act No. 3753 applies to the registration
as deaths. of all births, not otherwise covered by P.D. No. 651, as
 When Nieves died, Francisco and Martin Baldos amended, occurring from 27 February 1931 onwards.
substituted for Nieves. Considering that the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth
 Reynaldo  P.D. No. 651 does not proscribe the late took place in 1985, National Census Statistics Office
registration of births of persons born before January 1, (NCSO) Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1983[13]
1974. He maintains that he has sufficiently proven, by governs the implementation of Act No. 3753 in this case.
clear and convincing evidence, the fact that he is the son  Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be
of Nieves and Bartolome Baldos. registered in the office of the local civil registrar within 30
days from the time of birth.[14] Any report of birth made
ISSUE: Whether the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth is valid. beyond the reglementary period is considered
delayed.[15] The local civil registrar, upon receiving an
HELD: YES application for delayed registration of birth, is required to
 Presidential Decree No. 651, otherwise known as An Act publicly post for at least ten days a notice of the pending
Requiring the Registration of Births and Deaths in the application for delayed registration.[16] If after ten days
Philippines which Occurred from 1 January 1974 and no one opposes the registration and the local civil
Thereafter, provides: registrar is convinced beyond doubt that the birth should
o Sec. 1. Registration of births. All babies born be registered, he should register the same.[17]
in hospitals, maternity clinics, private homes, or  Reynaldo’s certificate of live birth, as a duly registered
elsewhere within the period starting from public document, is presumed to have gone through the
January 1, 1974 up to the date when this process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It
decree becomes effective, irrespective of the was only on 8 March 1995, after the lapse of ten long
nationality, race, culture, religion or belief of years from the approval on 11 February 1985 of the
their parents, whether the mother is a application for delayed registration of Reynaldo’s birth,
permanent resident or transient in the that Nieves registered her opposition. She should have
Philippines, and whose births have not yet been done so within the ten-day period prescribed by law.
registered must be reported for registration Records[18] show that no less than Nieves herself
in the office of the local civil registrar of the informed the local civil registrar of the birth of Reynaldo.
place of birth by the physician, nurse, midwife, At the time of her application for delayed registration of
hilot, or hospital or clinic administrator who birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo was her son.
attended the birth or in default thereof, by either Between the facts stated in a duly registered public
parent or a responsible member of the family or document and the flip-flopping statements of Nieves, we
a relative, or any person who has knowledge of are more inclined to stand by the former.
the birth of the individual child.  Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a
The report referred to above shall be rigorous process. The books making up the civil register
accompanied with an affidavit describing the are considered public documents and are prima facie
circumstances surrounding the delayed evidence of the truth of the facts stated there. As a public
registration. document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the
o Sec. 2. Period of registration of births. The presumption of validity. It is not for Reynaldo to prove the
registration of the birth of babies referred to facts stated in his certificate of live birth, but for petitioners
in the preceding section must be done who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged falsity.
within sixty (60) days from the date of Petitioners miserably failed to do so. Thus, the trial court
effectivity of this decree without fine or fee and the Court of Appeals correctly denied for lack of merit
247 of 255 | P a g e
the petition to cancel the late registration of Reynaldo’s substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
birth. register.
 Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Respondent. typographical error. It is a substantial change for which
G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008 (2D) the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
FACTS:  The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
 Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna. In her petition, she alleged o ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was concerning the civil status of persons shall be
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but recorded in the civil register.
while growing up, she developed secondary male o ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital civil register:
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
characteristics. She then alleged that for all interests and judgments declaring marriages void from the
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
from female to male and her first name be changed from citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
Jennifer to Jeff. determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
 The petition was published in a newspaper of general emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was name.
posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court.  The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under
The Solicitor General entered his appearance and Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur
authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear after birth.
in his behalf.  Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition
 To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented causes the early or “inappropriate” appearance of male
the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this
of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone.
General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
stating that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening
 RTC  granted the petition and ordered the Civil Register at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more
of Pakil, Laguna to make the following corrections in the male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the
birth certificate of respondent: female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and
o By changing the name from Jennifer fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features
Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice,
o By changing the gender from female to MALE. facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1
 Hence, this petition by the OSG. in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
 CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex
ISSUE#1: Whether the requirements of Rule 103 and 108 of the anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted
Rules of Court have been complied with. the term “intersexuality” to apply to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female. The term is
HELD#1: YES now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
 The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective intersexuality “is the state of a living thing of a
for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,
of Court because respondent’s petition did not implead genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
the local civil registrar. Respondent, however, invokes determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that organism with intersex may have biological
courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their characteristics of both male and female sexes.”
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and  Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by
inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals
We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule have been expected to conform to either a male or female
108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to gender role. Since the rise of modern medical science in
the local civil registrar. Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous
external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically
ISSUE#2: Whether the correction of entry under Rule 108 allows modified to resemble either male or female genitals. More
change of “sex” or “gender” in the birth certificate while respondent’s commonly, an intersex individual is considered as
medical condition, i.e., congenital adrenal hyperplasia does not suffering from a “disorder” which is almost always
make her a “male.” recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or
by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the
HELD#2: individual as neatly as possible into the category of either
 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: male or female.
o ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be  In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate
changed or corrected without a judicial order. calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
 Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as “It has been suggested that there is some middle ground
clerical or typographical errors are involved. The between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals
correction or change of such matters can now be made who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’.” The current
through administrative proceedings and without the need state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed person be classified either as a male or as a female, but
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
248 of 255 | P a g e
 In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a augmentation and eventually, sex reassignment surgery.
female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact
certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on engaged to be married.
medical testimony and scientific development showing  Petitioner sought to have his name in his birth certificate
the respondent to be other than female, then a change in changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex
the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order. from “male” to “female.”
 Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed  The order setting the case for initial hearing was
(neither consistently and categorically female nor published in a newspaper of general circulation for 3
consistently and categorically male) composition. consecutive weeks. Copies of the order were sent to the
Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar
respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of Manila.
of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent  During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also
has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
male. reconstruction surgeon in the PH who issued a medical
 Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in undergone the procedure and his American fiancé,
his gender classification would be what the individual, like Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good  RTC  granted the petition
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of  The Republic of the PH, thru OSG, filed a petition for
himself as a male and considering that his body produces certiorari in the CA alleging that there is no law allowing
high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
preponderant biological support for considering him as sex alteration.
being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex  CA  rendered a decision in favor of the Republic
persons makes the gender classification at birth o There is no law allowing the change of either
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such name or sex in the certificate of birth on the
persons, like respondent, is fixed. ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
 In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not  Petitioner filed a MR but was denied
dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately  Hence, this petition.
private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much
less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to ISSUE: Whether the change of petitioner’s name and sex in his birth
reverse the male tendency due to CAH. Thus, to him certificate by reason of sex alteration is allowed under Articles 407
should belong the primordial choice of what courses of to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
action to take along the path of his sexual development and RA 9048.
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of HELD: NO
evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male
will harm other members of society who are equally A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as Sex Reassignment
valid and justified the respondent’s position and his  The State has an interest in the names borne by
personal judgment of being a male. individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A
 In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for
diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with change of name are controlled by statutes. In this
what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature o ART. 376. No person can change his name or
decision to be a male. surname without judicial authority.
 As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this  This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048
Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light provides:
of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will o SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of Typographical Error and Change of First Name
name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall
name to a masculine name. Considering the be changed or corrected without a judicial
consequence that respondent’s change of name merely order, except for clerical or typographical errors
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in and change of first name or nickname which
respondent’s change of name. Such a change will can be corrected or changed by the concerned
conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
from female to male. in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, Petitioner, - v e r s u s  RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests
- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. the power and authority to entertain petitions for change
G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007 (1D) of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction
FACTS: over applications for change of first name is now primarily
 Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers.
for the change of his first name and sex in his birth The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
The petition impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
respondent. the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless
 Petitioner alleged in his petition, among others, his name an administrative petition for change of name is first filed
was registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the
certificate of live birth (birth certificate) and his sex was corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the
registered as “male.” He further alleged that he is a male remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
and acts as a female” and that he had always identified  RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change
himself with girls since childhood. He underwent of first name may be allowed:
psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
249 of 255 | P a g e
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.
Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or (emphasis supplied)
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:  Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
write or pronounce; procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually  The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
community; or o ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
(3) The change will avoid confusion. concerning the civil status of persons shall be
 Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first recorded in the civil register.
name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his o ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the
first name compatible with the sex he thought he civil register:
transformed himself into through surgery. However, a Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name judgments declaring marriages void from the
on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
declared purpose may only create grave complications in naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
the civil registry and the public interest. citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
 Before a person can legally change his given name, he determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
must present proper or reasonable cause or any emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he name.
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true  The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under
and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the
using his true and official name. provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
 In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that  To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove
court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace
been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, something with something else of the same kind or with
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper something that serves as a substitute.” The birth
remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in therein, including those corresponding to his first name
the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is  Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the
kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed naturalization), events (such as births, marriages,
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as
name was concerned. legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations
of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial
To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment determination of filiation and changes of name). These
 The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
provides: sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is
o ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
changed or corrected without a judicial order. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law,
 Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision expressly or impliedly.
was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or  “Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal
typographical errors are involved. The correction or situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
change of such matters can now be made through incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and
administrative proceedings and without the need for a his family membership.
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit  The status of a person in law includes all his personal
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such
and corrections in entries in the civil register. as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married
 Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or or not. The comprehensive term status… include such
typographical error” is: matters as the beginning and end of legal personality,
o SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
this Act, the following terms shall mean: various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
xxx xxx xxx emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
(3) “Clerical or typographical error” refers to a succession. (emphasis supplied)
mistake committed in the performance of  A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity
typing an entry in the civil register that is and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled Code provides:
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, o ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
understanding, and can be corrected or special laws.
changed only by reference to other existing  But there is no such special law in the Philippines
record or records: Provided, however, That no governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal
correction must involve the change of to petitioner’s cause.
250 of 255 | P a g e
 Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties
provides: who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes
o SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
– The declaration of the physician or midwife in greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the will allow the union of a man with another man who has
declaration of either parent of the newborn undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws
birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall which apply particularly to women such as the provisions
be exempt from documentary stamp tax and of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain
shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws
parent of the newborn child. underscore the public policy in relation to women which
In such declaration, the person above could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were
mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) to be granted.
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality  It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o
of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason
parents or, in case the father is not known, of of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.”
the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial
place where the infant was born; and (f) such legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret
other data as may be required in the regulations the law, not to make or amend it.
to be issued.  To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied) change of first name and for correction or change of
 Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what
historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented
birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is conferment of that privilege.
immutable.
 When words are not defined in a statute they are to be REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus -
given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN,
of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” HEDDY MOIRA KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor),
and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws and KELLY DOGMOC KHO (Minor), Respondents.
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007 (2D)
should therefore be understood in their common and
ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the FACTS:
contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of  Carlito requested the correction in his birth certificate of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a the citizenship of his mother to “Filipino” instead of
male from a female” or “the distinction between male and “Chinese,” as well as the deletion of the word “married”
female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears opposite the phrase “Date of marriage of parents”
young” and male is “the sex that has organs to produce because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” (Epifania), were allegedly not legally married. The same
and “female” in everyday understanding do not include request to delete the “married” status of their parents from
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. their respective birth certificates was made by Carlito’s
Furthermore, “words that are employed in a statute which siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to  With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children,
have been used in that sense unless the context compels he prayed that the date of his and his wife’s marriage be
to the contrary.” Since the statutory language of the Civil corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the
Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains date appearing in their marriage certificate.
unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term “sex” as  The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded
used then is something alterable through surgery or as respondent.
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female  Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition in which it was
transsexual to be included in the category “female.” additionally prayed that Carlito’s second name of “John”
 For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded be deleted from his record of birth; and that the name and
in altering his body and appearance through the citizenship of Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the certificate be corrected from “John Kho” to “Juan Kho” and
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that “Filipino” to “Chinese,” respectively.
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the  As required the petition was published for 3 consecutive
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. weeks in in Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a
newspaper of general circulation.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or  In a letter, the city civil registrar stated her observations
Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity and suggestions to the proposed corrections in the birth
 The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in records of Carlito and his siblings but interposed no
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It objections to the other amendments.
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm,  Respondents presented documentary evidence showing
injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong. compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the
 The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and petition. They also presented testimonial evidence
wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his mother,
even the trial court itself found that the petition was but Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional
petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his correction in the birth certificates of Carlito’s children was
male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred requested to the effect that the first name of their mother
social institutions, is a special contract of permanent be rectified from “Maribel” to “Marivel.”
union between a man and a woman. One of its essential  By decision, the trial court directed/ordered the following:
251 of 255 | P a g e
o The local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct be affected by the entries are notified or
the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as represented, the door to fraud or other mischief
follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother would be set open, the consequence of which
from “Chinese” to “Filipino”; (2) delete “John” might be detrimental and far reaching. x x x
from his name; and (3) delete the word (Emphasis supplied)
“married” opposite the date of marriage of his  In Republic v. Valencia, however, this Court ruled, and
parents. The last correction was ordered to be has since repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in
effected likewise in the birth certificates of a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy under Rule 108.
Moira.  It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition
o The correction of the birth certificates of the is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and
minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
(Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
27, 1989, and the name “Maribel” as “Marivel.” proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true
o With respect to the marriage certificate of that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be
Carlito and Marivel, the corrections ordered remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This
pertained to the alteration of the name of Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors
Carlito’s father from “John Kho” to “Juan Kho” in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
and the latter’s citizenship from “Filipino” to established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
“Chinese.” avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
 Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA proceeding.
 CA  affirmed the decision of the trial court  What is meant by “appropriate adversary proceeding?”
o Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding[”]
outlines the proper procedure for cancellation as follows:
or correction of entries in the civil registry, was o One having opposing parties; contested, as
observed in the case.
distinguished from an ex parte application, one
o Regarding Carlito’s minor children Kevin and
of which the party seeking relief has given legal
Kelly, the the correction of their mother’s first
warning to the other party, and afforded the
name from “Maribel” to “Marivel” was made to
latter an opportunity to contest it. x x x
rectify an innocuous error.
 The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048,
o As for the change in the date of the marriage of
otherwise known as “An Act Authorizing the City or
Carlito and Marivel, the date would not affect
the minors’ filiation from “legitimate” to Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct
“illegitimate” considering that at the time of their a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or
respective births in 1991 and 1993, their father Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register
Carlito’s first marriage was still subsisting as it Without Need of Judicial Order,” has been considered to
had been annulled only in 1999. lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that
o That Marivel was not an indispensable party to substantial corrections to the civil status of persons
the case, the minors having been represented recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the
by their father as required under Section 5 of filing of a petition under Rule 108.
Rule 3[9] of the Revised Rules of Court.  Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito observed that
o Although Carlito failed to observe the the obvious effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make
requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, possible the administrative correction of clerical or
he had complied nonetheless with the typographical errors or change of first name or nickname
jurisdictional requirements for correction of in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in
Rules of Court. The petition for correction of appropriate adversarial proceedings.
entry in Carlito’s birth record, it noted, falls  When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are
under letter “o” of the enumeration under thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding
Section 2 of Rule 108. necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries
of the civil register is satisfied. The pertinent provisions of
ISSUES: Whether the changes sought by respondents are Rule 108 of the Rules of Court read:
substantial in nature, hence, could only be granted through an o SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or
adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as correction of an entry in the civil registrar is
Marivel and respondents’ parents, should have been notified or sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
impleaded. have or claim any interest which would be
Whether jurisdictional requirements to change Carlito’s affected thereby shall be made parties to the
name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not proceeding.
satisfied because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlito’s o SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the
prior three-year bona fide residence in Butuan City, and that the title filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
of the petition did not state Carlito’s aliases and his true name as fix the time and place for the hearing of the
“Carlito John I. Kho.” same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to
be given to the persons named in the petition.
HELD: The court shall also cause the order to be
 Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an published once in a week for three (3)
adversary proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic explains consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
the raison d etre: circulation in the province.
o x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement o SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and
lies in the fact that the books making up the civil any person having or claiming any interest
register and all documents relating thereto shall under the entry whose cancellation or
be prima facie evidence of the facts therein correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
contained. If the entries in the civil register days from notice of the petition, or from the last
could be corrected or changed through mere date of publication of such notice, file his
summary proceedings and not through opposition thereto. (Emphasis and
appropriate action wherein all parties who may underscoring supplied)

252 of 255 | P a g e
 There is no dispute that the trial court’s Order setting the priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and
petition for hearing and directing any person or entity Epifania had been living together as common law couple
having interest in the petition to oppose it was posted as since 1935 but have never contracted marriage legally.
well as published for the required period; that notices of  A certification from the office of the city registrar, which
hearings were duly served on the Solicitor General, the was appended to respondents’ Amended Petition,
city prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil registrar; and likewise stated that it has no record of marriage between
that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002 during which Juan Kho and Epifania. Under the circumstances, the
the public prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively deletion of the word “Married” opposite the “date of
participated by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania. marriage of parents” is warranted.
 What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to  With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate
implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered the trial of his name from “Carlito John” to “Carlito,” the same was
short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As
court’s judgment void. correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or
 A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of correction of entries involving changes of name falls
Appeals. That case stemmed from a petition for correction under letter “o” of the following provision of Section 2 of
of entries in the birth certificate of a minor, June Salvacion Rule 108:
Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father (Armando o Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
Gustilo) and to correspondingly change her surname. correction. — Upon good and valid grounds,
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also the following entries in the civil register may be
by Gustilo, however, sought to annul the trial court’s cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
decision, claiming that she should have been made a marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e)
party to the petition for correction. Failure to implead her judgments of annulment of marriage; (f)
deprived the RTC of jurisdiction, she contended. judgments declaring marriages void from the
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
petition for correction, as any judicial determination that naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
June was the daughter of Armando would affect her citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
ward’s share in the estate of her father. Yet, even though determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires  Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103
notice by publication x x x. x x x x The purpose precisely (which governs petitions for change of name) were not
of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the complied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the suffices to effect the correction sought for.
decision would cover even parties who should have been  More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of record from
impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were the Urious College in Butuan City, certificate of eligibility
inadvertently left out. from the Civil Service Commission, and voter registration
 Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an record satisfactorily show that he has been known by his
action against a thing and not against a person. The first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from
decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto the dropping of the second name.
but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated  The correction of the mother’s citizenship from Chinese to
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the Filipino as appearing in Carlito’s birth record was also
whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not
of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is deem fit to question her citizenship. Such failure to
the publication of such notice that brings in the whole oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was not
world as a party in the case and vests the court with respondents’ fault, does not in any way change the
jurisdiction to hear and decide it. adversarial nature of the proceedings.
 Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule  Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of
on whether Marivel or respondents’ parents should have Carlito’s siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of
been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It may not Epifania as “Filipino.” To disallow the correction in
be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing on Carlito’s birth record of his mother’s citizenship would
January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal circumstances of
representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the siblings who are unquestionably born of the same
the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as mother and father.
parties to the proceeding.  Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is
 With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and the correction of the name of Carlito’s wife from “Maribel”
Marivel, their certificate of marriage shows that indeed to “Marivel.” The mistake is clearly clerical or
they were married on January 21, 2000, not on April 27, typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is
1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date also obvious to the understanding considering that the
“April 27, 1989” was supplied by his helper, adding that name reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and
he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were his wife is “Marivel.”
born because his previous marriage was annulled only in
1999. Given the evidence presented by respondents, the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus –
CA observed that the minors were illegitimate at birth, ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA
hence, the correction would bring about no change at all BRINGAS BOLANTE, Respondent.
in the nature of their filiation. G.R. No. 160597 Promulgated: July 20, 2006 (2D)
 With respect to Carlito’s mother, it bears noting that she
declared at the witness stand that she was not married to FACTS:
Juan Kho who died in 1959. Again, that testimony was not  Oct. 18, 2000  Respondent filed a petition for change of
challenged by the city prosecutor. name before the RTC praying that her name in her record
 The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from of birth be changed from Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante
Carlito’s and his siblings’ birth certificates of the entry to Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante. She alleged that as far
“Married” opposite the date of marriage of their parents, as she can remember, she has been using the latter
moreover, consisted of a certification issued on name.
November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish
253 of 255 | P a g e
 The trial court ordered respondent, as petitioner thereat,  Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September
to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notice 25, 2001 initial hearing which, to reiterate is already
and publication, and set the hearing on Feb. 20, 2001 outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules,
 The notice of hearing was published in the November 23, the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection
and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000 issues of the as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or
Norluzonian Courier. sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the
 Respondent presented and marked in evidence several jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very
documents without any objection on the part of herein real sense, therefore, the petitioner Republic fully and
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Solicitor General (OSG), thru the duly deputized The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case and the
provincial prosecutor of Abra. requirements of fair dealing demand that we accord
 Thereafter the trial court has declared its acquisition of validity to the proceedings a quo.
jurisdiction over the case  On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of
 RTC  granted the petition name, we are guided by decisional law on the matter. As
 The Republic, through the OSG, appealed to the CA we have held, the State has an interest in the names
 CA  affirmed the RTC’s decision borne by individuals for purposes of identification, and
 Hence, the Republic’s present petition that changing one’s name is a privilege and not a right.
Accordingly, a person can be authorized to change his
ISSUES: Whether respondent’s submission for a change of name is name appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil
with proper and reasonable reason. registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or
Whether respondent's substantial compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 103 any compelling reason which may justify such change, but
of the Rules of Court is sufficient to vest the trial court with also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition a quo. official name. Jurisprudence has recognized certain
justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. Among
HELD: these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable
 Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
the procedural and jurisdictional requirements for a change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been
change of name. As we articulated in Republic v. Hon. continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Judge of Branch III of the CFI of Cebu, citing pertinent Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d)
jurisprudence, non-compliance with these requirements when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
would be fatal to the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear no showing that the desired change of name was for a
and determine a petition for change of name. fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will
prejudice public interest.
 It is the Republic’s posture that the fact that the hearing
took place on September 25, 2001, beyond the four-  The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of
month prohibited period, did not cure the jurisdictional name and the corollary issue of what is a proper and
defect since notice of the September 25, 2001 setting reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion
went unpublished. Pressing on, the Republic would state of the court. The evidence presented need only be
– and correctly so – that the in rem nature of a change of satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence
name proceeding necessitates strict compliance with all available. What is involved in special proceedings for
jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, in change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of
order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover. Appeals, “not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency
 The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required
and propriety of the justifications advanced in support
publication serves as notice to the whole world that the
thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of
proceeding in question has for its object to bar
its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection
determination being lodged in the courts.”
of any and against the right sought to be established. It is
the publication of such notice that brings in the whole  With the view we take of the case, respondent's
world as a party in the case and vests the court with submission for a change of name is with proper and
jurisdiction to hear and decide it. reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she started
schooling, used the given name and has been known as
 In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules,
Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on
publication is valid if the following requisites concur: (1)
her birth record. Her scholastic records, as well as records
the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date
in government offices, including that of her driver's
and place for the hearing must be published; (2) the
license, professional license as a certified public
publication must be at least once a week for three
accountant issued by the Professional Regulation
successive weeks; and, (3) the publication must be in
Commission, and the "Quick Count" document of the
some newspaper of general circulation published in the
COMELEC, all attest to her having used practically all her
province, as the court shall deem best. Another validating
life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being
heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4)  The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the
months after the last publication of the notice of the instant petition is granted. But beyond practicalities,
hearing. simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed
to avail himself of any opportunity to improve his social
 It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change
standing, provided he does so without causing prejudice
of name, any interested person may appear at the hearing
or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.
and oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or
his deputy shall appear on behalf of the Government. The  Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner
government, as an agency of the people, represents the failed to prove that the petition is not resorted to for an
public and, therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears illegal purpose due to her inability to present NBI as well
on behalf of the government, effectively represents the as police clearance to the effect that she has no
public. In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements of
provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of appearing Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a
in the trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial quantum of proof to establish the fact that a petitioner has
prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served
the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need upon the declaration and affirmation of the petitioner in
for a republication of the initial notice of the hearing. open court that the petition is not to further fraud but for a
legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any
oppositor to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence
254 of 255 | P a g e
requiring a petitioner in a petition for a change of name to
present NBI and police clearances to prove that the said
petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud. Until such
time, we see no urgency to impose the requirements
espoused by oppositor-appellant. (Word in bracket
added).

255 of 255 | P a g e

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen