FIRST DIVISION

Consequently, an Information for Slight Physical Injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-

DAVID TIU, G.R. No. 162370 412, and an Information for Grave Threats, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-413, were filed
Petitioner,
Present: with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City. The Informations read as follows:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
-versus- CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and Criminal Case No. 96-412 (Slight Physical Injuries)
BERSAMIN, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS and Promulgated:
EDGARDO POSTANES, That on or about the 2nd day of November 1995, in Pasay City Metro
Respondents. April 21, 2009 Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x the above-named accused, Remegio Pasion, there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person
DECISION of one Edgardo Postanes y Talara thereby inflicting physical injuries to
the latter, which injuries required and will require medical attendance for
a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated and will
CARPIO, J.: incapacitate him from performing his habitual work and/or activities
during the same period of time.

The Case Contrary to law.[5]

Criminal Case No. 96-413 (Grave Threats)

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 29 October 2003 Decision[2] and 24
[3]
February 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64783. The Court of
Appeals annulled the 6 November 2000 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
115, Pasay City on the ground of violation of the right of the accused against double
jeopardy. The RTC declared void the acquittal by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
That on or about the 2nd day of November 1995, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Edgardo Postanes y Talara, without
justifiable cause, by creating in the minds of the complainants Genes
Carmen y Motita and David S. Tiu that the threats will be carried out,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threatened to
inflict bodily harm on the latters person by poking a gun and uttering the
following threatening words, to wit:

Branch 44, Pasay City, of respondent Edgardo Postanes for the crime of grave threats.

The Facts
PUTANG INA NINYO MGA HINDOT KAYO
PAGBABABARILIN KO KAYO.

The instant controversy stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by Contrary to law.[6]

respondent Edgardo Postanes (Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand,
Upon motion of Pasion, Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413 were consolidated and jointly
petitioner David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge for grave threats against Postanes.
heard before the MeTC of Pasay City, Branch 44.

During the trial, Postanes testified as a witness, together with his eyewitnesses Jose Aynaga
(Aynaga) and Aristotle Samson (Samson). Postanes testimony was also offered to prove his
innocence as the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-413, thus:
ATTY. VALDEZ: The purposes in presenting the testimony of this
witness your Honor, is [sic] to affirm and confirm his Affidavit or Sworn
Statement earlier submitted to this Honorable Court as his direct
testimony pursuant to the Rules of Summary Procedure; second, to
affirm and confirm his Affidavit or his Sworn Statement as part of
his controverting evidence on the counter charge on Criminal
Case No. 96-413 also pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure;
third, to identify the accused; and [fourth] to prove that the accused is
guilty of the crime charged; and [fifth] to prove that the witness
Edgardo Postanes is innocent in the charges in Criminal Case No.
96-413.[7](Emphasis supplied)
On 3 April 1997, Postanes formally offered his evidence, as the private complainant in
Criminal Case No. 96-412. Postanes offered, among others, his affidavit and the affidavits of
his witnesses, Aynaga and Samson, which were correspondingly marked as Exhibits A, C, and
D.
On 17 April 1997, the MeTC admitted all of Postanes documentary evidences.
In Criminal Case No. 96-413, where he stood as the accused, Postanes adopted his testimony
and his witnesses testimonies which were formally offered and admittedin Criminal Case No.
96-412. Accordingly, the MeTC issued an Order dated 13 October 1998, which pertinently
states:
Atty. Paul Edwin D.S. Bautista, counsel for the accused manifested that
the witness to be presented today in the person of Norlie B Ubay cannot
be located by Mr. Postanes. Atty. Bautista further manifested that he
is adopting the testimonies of their witnesses, Aristotle Samson and
Jose Aynaga in Criminal Case No. 96-412 for Slight Physical
Injuries wherein Edgardo Postanes is the private complainant
against Remigio Pasion, Jr., their testimonies and other evidences
introduced as evidence for the accused.[8] (Emphasis supplied)
Postanes requested more time to submit a formal offer of evidence in Criminal Case No. 96-
413. However, Postanes counsel filed a formal offer of evidence belatedly.In its Order dated 22
December 1998, the MeTC denied Postanes motion to admit formal offer of evidence and
ordered it expunged from the records.[9]
In its Decision dated 26 January 1999,[10] the MeTC dismissed both Criminal Case Nos. 96-412
and 96-413. The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the charge for Slight Physical Injuries against
Remegio Pasion, Jr. and the counter-charge of Grave Threats against
Edgardo Postanes DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the MeTC in its Order dated 11
March 1999.
On 29 March 1999, Tiu, through his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of
Pasay City.
On 6 November 2000, the RTC, Branch 115, Pasay City rendered a Decision declaring void
the judgment of the MeTC. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, granting certiorari, the Decision of Acquittal dated
January 26, 1999 of the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 96-413,
with respect to accused Edgardo Postanes, is declared NULL AND
VOID.
This case is remanded to the Court of origin for reconsideration of its
Decision.[12]
 In a Resolution promulgated on 16 September 2003, the Court of Appeals stated that action on

Postanes moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its Order dated 3 April the Motion to Dismiss Petition filed by the private respondents, together with the petitioners

2001.[13] Opposition thereto, and private respondents Reply to Opposition shall be included in the

preparation of the decision in the present petition.[17]

On 22 May 2001, Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari (with prayer

for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order), On 29 October 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, reversing the RTC

challenging the decision of the RTC which annulled the judgment of the MeTC dismissing Decision and affirming the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-413. The dispositive portion of

Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413. the appellate courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated

November 6, 2000 and the Order dated April 3, 2001 of the public
In a Resolution promulgated on 5 January 2001, the Court of Appeals directed respondents respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

(Tiu and Judge Francisco G. Mendiola of RTC Pasay, Branch 115) to file their Comment on SO ORDERED.[18]

the petition. The Court of Appeals found no reason to justify the issuance of a temporary

restraining order.[14] On 24 February 2004, the Court of Appeals denied Tius motion for reconsideration. [19]

Meanwhile, Tiu, through his counsel, filed with the MeTC a Motion for Compliance asking the Hence, this petition.

MeTC to enforce the RTC decision. He also filed a motion to inhibit MeTC Presiding Judge

Estrellita M. Paas. Postanes, on the other hand, filed a motion to suspend the proceedings and

an Opposition to the motion for compliance. The Court of Appeals Ruling

On 3 September 2001, the MeTC issued an Order[15] granting Postanes motion to suspend the In annulling the RTC decision, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC has granted upon the

proceedings. Presiding Judge Estrellita M. Paas also inhibited herself from further hearing the State, through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of

case. acquittal which right the government does not have.

On 3 January 2002, Tiu filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Dismiss Petition[16] on the The Court of Appeals stated that the prosecution had not been denied by the MeTC of its right

ground of forum shopping. to due process. Hence, it was wrong for the RTC to declare the findings of the MeTC as having
been arrived at with grave abuse of discretion, thereby denying Postanes of his Constitutional through his counsel. Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend

right against double jeopardy. actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal

proceedings before this Court and the Court of Appeals.[20] Tiu, the offended party in Criminal

The Court of Appeals opined that the MeTC evaluated and passed upon the evidence presented Case No. 96-413 is without legal personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals

both by the prosecution and the defense. The MeTC, however, believed that the evidence of the before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the People

prosecution was not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition must fail.

Postanes, thus acquitted him based on reasonable doubt.

However, the Court opts to resolve the question of double jeopardy to finally put an end to this

The Issues controversy.

The main issues in this case are: The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form

and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been

1. Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was

certiorari questioning the acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC; and dismissed without his express consent.[21]

These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against

2. Whether there was forum shopping when Postanes filed a Motion to Postanes was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had

Suspend Proceedings in the MeTC when the Court of Appeals already jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-

denied Postanes prayer for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the guilty plea;[22] and (4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of

enforcement of the decision of the RTC. insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be

had.[23] Clearly, for this Court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to reconsider its
The Ruling of this Court
decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional

proscription not to put any person twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same
The petition lacks merit.
offense.[24] Further, as found by the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that the prosecution

or the State was denied of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor
MeTC, which would have allowed an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of
General. Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 96-413,
the criminal case.[25]
 In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no need to discuss the forum shopping issue.

Tiu also contends that since the defense in Criminal Case No. 96-413 failed to submit a formal

of evidence, the defense in effect had no evidence to dispute the charge against Postanes. Tiu WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 29 October 2003

insists that though Criminal Case Nos. 96-412 and 96-413 were consolidated, the MeTC should Decision and 24 February 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64783.

not have considered the evidence offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 to dismiss Criminal Costs against petitioner.

Case No. 96-413. In doing so, the MeTC allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion

rendering its dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-413 (grave threats case) void. SO ORDERED.

Tius arguments fail to convince us. There is nothing in the Revised Rules on Summary

Procedure prohibiting the MeTC from appreciating the evidence presented and formally

offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in resolving Criminal Case No. 96-413, inasmuch as these

two criminal cases were properly consolidated and jointly tried. In fact, the MeTCs act of

assessing the evidence in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in deciding Criminal Case No. 96-413 is

consistent with the avowed objective of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure to achieve

an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases covered by these Rules. Besides,

the testimonies of Postanes, Aynaga,[26] and Samson[27] were properly offered at the time when

these witnesses were called to testify.[28] Hence, while the affidavits as documentary evidence

were not formally offered, there were testimonial evidences supporting Postanes defense in

Criminal Case No. 96-413.

Contrary to the RTCs finding, there is nothing capricious or whimsical in the act of the MeTC

of considering the evidence formally offered in Criminal Case No. 96-412 in resolving the

consolidated Criminal Case No. 96-413. Therefore, the MeTC committed no grave abuse of

discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-413 for insufficient evidence.

 EN BANC

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
ARNEL COLINARES, G.R. No. 182748
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J., DECISION

CARPIO,
ABAD, J.:
VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it
- versus - PERALTA,
takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c) when an
BERSAMIN, accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,
The Facts and the Case
VILLARAMA, JR.,
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares
PEREZ,
(Arnel) with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines
MENDOZA, Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.[1]

SERENO,

REYES, and
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25,
PERLAS- 2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way,
BERNABE, JJ. Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in
diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
Respondent. Promulgated:

December 13, 2011

Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by
the roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right
temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two
years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day
of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the
law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.

Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be
smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino
to the hospital. Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and,
alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the
consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC
decision but deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it.[3] Not
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate[2] showing that Rufino suffered two
satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.
lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these
injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.

In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the
Solicitor General to submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-
committed only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of
defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus,
imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months
and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of
of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the
Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then
case to the trial court.
boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked
up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this,
he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack
and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sisters house. On Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply
September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station. for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense
probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The
Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application for
probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the
of conviction.
night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw
the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
 The Issues Presented In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense
requires (1) that the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful
aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did not act with
The case essentially presents three issues:
sufficient provocation.[5]

1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head
with a stone;
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has
nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis
for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of
attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is
frustrated homicide; and
not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a
weapon.[6]

3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a
reduced probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of
the case to the trial court.
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino
and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnels testimony that it was Rufino who
The Courts Rulings started it. Arnels only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved
having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he
certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his
merely acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
companions.[7]

When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he
In contrast, the three witnessesJesus, Paciano, and Ananiastestified that Arnel was
was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish
the aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not
the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the
detract from their core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how
otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent
he did it. Compared to Arnels testimony, the prosecutions version is more believable and
of the accused.[4]
consistent with reality, hence deserving credence.[8]
 Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
liable for frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds
fatal and could not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?
actually are not fatal on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from
becoming fatal. But on that case the patient preferred to
go home at that time.
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent to
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers
take his victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude to the length of the wound not the depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of
every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent.[9] And the intent to kill is often inferred from, scalp.
among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
wounds he inflicted on his victim.[10] A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken
up the label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it
lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not
measure the depth.[13]

Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful
that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced,
Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that
and the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that
his skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The
he intended to kill him.
wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven

or eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require
surgery?
frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People,[11] we ruled that when the accused intended to
A: Yes, Madam.
kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the
Q: The injuries are slight?
victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give
frustrated homicide. If the victims wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder antibiotics and antit[e]tanus the problem the contusion
that occurred in the brain.
or attempted homicide.
xxxx

Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?

A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and wounds.
severity of the victims wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that head injuries are always very Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
serious,[12] he could not categorically say that Rufinos wounds in this case were fatal. Thus: A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of
them would rather go home and then come back.
 Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.[14]
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the
prosecutions claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the
Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having
appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide
and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to
imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months
of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him
the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege
granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD
968) provides: That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant
has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.[15] Since Arnel appealed his
conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from
applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that
Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to
apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and
4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is
still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking
into account the full circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the judgment
of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it
happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for
frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He will not
be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on
him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter
penalty will also have to bend over to the trial courts judgmenteven if this has been found in
error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment
with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit
ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply
for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[16] that the
probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can
avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.
 In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the
guilty of grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day law would allow him to apply for probation.
to one year and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable
penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly
waiving his right to apply for probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted
In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide,
probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served him right that he wanted to save
but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on
his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and probation.
him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found
him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four
months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation
have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement
through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the
appealthat when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at
statutory provisions.[18] As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the
hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape
Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only
hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate courts affirmance of his conviction.[17]
where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the
teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not
because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.[19]
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed
him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was
not in a position to say, By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation. The stiff
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply
penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would
for probation after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction would not be
allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute
consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to
the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of
provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who
conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that
appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
privilege.

This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty
conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that
imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for
carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way,
crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit?He only committed attempted remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal
homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Case T-2213.

SO ORDERED.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the
reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the
chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of
the probation law.

At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on

Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right

to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of

the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind

precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the

right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the

one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the

Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner

Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide,

and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor,

as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay

Rufino P. Buena the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner

applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been
 Republic of the Philippines Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed
SUPREME COURT by petitioners People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
Manila (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014 February 2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon),
vs. Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering
x-----------------------x the criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict
G.R. No. 154954 against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of
vs. the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide.3
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA,
DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON
G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of
VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona),
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE
Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano
PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO
(Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS,
is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5
JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101 WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner, Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The
vs. appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight
x-----------------------x physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting
vs. in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents. term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused
are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex
RESOLUTION
delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus
legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of
SERENO, CJ: this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.

We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo
"Lenny" Villa due to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments
raised by the parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration,
we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these
matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals
judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony
D. Arna (Arna), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are
concerned; the question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the
validity of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that
allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby
AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise
AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition
in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio
Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-
Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or
alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would
increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present
case:6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido
"Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix
Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded
to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael
Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the
initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that
they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days.
After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for
the commencement of their initiation.
head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The
fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes
heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the
neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these
rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that
Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They
removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When
his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35
Aquilans:

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked
towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered
physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of 1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the 2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows 3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor 4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, 5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the 6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending 7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist 8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the 9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
"Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict 10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also 11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation. 12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
16. Antonio General (General)
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
day officially ended.
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
(Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The 25. Adel Abas (Abas)
 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly
tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case
No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November
1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced
anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the
criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused
De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the
remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero,
Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo,
Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola
(Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama,
Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were
found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days
of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the
victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal–
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal.
They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of
₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied
the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial
court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were
individually brought before this Court. (Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection with
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and
Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the
accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right within a reasonable
period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion,
respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the
time that the original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again
emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years
from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of incidents
attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She
then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy
trial of the accused was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that
accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus
interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it
concedes that the mode in which the accused committed the crime was through fault
(culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have been equivalent to
that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It
argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the
accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby
considering the act as one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the
accused conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that
it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to malice
aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
acquittal may also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No.
15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted like
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal
their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former
assertions raised by petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration
also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to his
concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered
death.
and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February
2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al. al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to
an acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a
violation of their right against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No.
acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the
discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA’s Decision
effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence are
dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after the
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment
CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from the
constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a
crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in
injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
result, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases
reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and
against them closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their
so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice." 18 Thus, grave
Applications for Probation on various dates in January 200211 pursuant to Presidential
abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19
that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their
respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon their completion
of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s
criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April 2003.13 arguments and found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were
sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective
the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.
Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications,
discharging them from probation, and declaring the criminal case against them
terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived their right to
appeal and applied for probation.
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with
respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
ISSUES Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the
earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained
Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial of was born of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on
account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of
a felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded
means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act
to that for intentional felonies
performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code expresses
thusly:
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of
their probation discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
terminated the cases against them DISCUSSION
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in
which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest. (Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate
malicious intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion
on the matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x
x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what
the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act
be committed by means of doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus
– is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It
refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.It
does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the
result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a
definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.
On the other hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together, the
requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a
vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise,
intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus– that the act or omission be
done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice
aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is
required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient
in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se,
the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi–
cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of
accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without
malice or criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the
act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in
homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental,
since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis
consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an
intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code,
there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against
the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the
victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely
satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The
commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical
injuries, absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an
intentional felony.x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised
Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa).
According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice,
from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason
of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person
committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the
actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without
grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack
of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as
follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take
precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness,
the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger
involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to
another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of
conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In
contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that there
are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual,
"from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each
particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
existence of malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable
for committing an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we
cannot agree with the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for
intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground that the
nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony
already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the
imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the one hand
and felonies committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions
it has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and
Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the
imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles
246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a result of
the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These
imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the
court. We have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon and
Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical
pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents
Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA
finding them guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result
of their respective availments of the probation program and their ultimate discharge
therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude to our
Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the CA judgment can no
longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the
former had timely filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65
petition is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that
a petition for certiorarialso prevents the case from becoming final and executory until
after the matter is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment
once the accused applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion
of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing his
right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled
from the foregoing provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of
a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the
judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional
edict27against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the
state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to
increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when
applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory.
Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating:28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred
because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove
the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final
judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on
multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s
already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of
conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial
initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the
State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be
allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while
strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where
the government’s power and resources are once again employed against the
defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does
not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and
conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule
120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already
explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this
rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court
that issued the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is articulated
in Nazareno, from which we quote:30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner
done in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the
judgment is per sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was
rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate
jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether there
has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or
correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very
heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the
presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this
Court’s Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a
criminal judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, we point out that what
the state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification of the penalty, and not a
Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct and
separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is whether the
accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is
whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly
speaking, there is nomodification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose
resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits of the case in order to
determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any
resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of lack
of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be
that it is inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed
through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal
judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a regular
appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal
would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the partial
annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the
judgment therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and
parcel of our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to
adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity
of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it. 31 That
power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a
punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein accordance
with law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of
Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not
have competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not
the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that
originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of
the Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by
said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall
be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for
probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant,
meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and
sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 –
of the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson
et al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special authority
that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken
cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a
previous case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the
ruling was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused
Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications
with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that
applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as
the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely
procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings were premised on
an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with
the court in which the criminal action has been properly instituted. 37 If a party appeals
the trial court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate
court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is
concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the
moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the
court of origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution pending appeal
– the moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate
court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the
power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions
and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the
appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by
any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In September 2002,
or almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002
granting the probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File
Petition for Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the
CA judgments by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November
2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file a comment
thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually
required all parties to file their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of the case
remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008.57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on
the probation applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to
suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge, and
eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux
pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded one-
upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to which this
Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied
for it. Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified
offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal.
In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state
affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making them
undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to
help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self respecting
individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.

According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is
except by virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the an act of grace orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of
accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the following conditions Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:
among others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the
accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed
the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the
by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion
accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final
of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and
order is entered in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should not
appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be
therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s
attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court
prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is
from which the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction
clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not
over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of origin may
clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)
settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution
thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et
al.60 It points out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its
RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4
jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the
of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).
Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their
respective applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before
the CA48 and the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven months
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by
said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall
be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a
fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use
of authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As
a consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et
al. and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and
void for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in
Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied) A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested.
Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it
are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have
all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)
appealed the conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court
was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation even after
the trial court has imposed a non probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, al. from probation did not totally
the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years of prisión extinguish their criminal liability.
mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became
eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been
to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional.
extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination
of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:
accused was ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In
Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is
and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis that
totally extinguished:
all offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for
appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court
enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of the 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to the offender occurs before final judgment.
probationable.
2. By service of the sentence.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
issued its various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in
Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for
Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch 4. By absolute pardon.
130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents were
originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded 5. By prescription of the crime.
their conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto
menor, which made the sentence fall within probationable limits for the first time, the 6. By prescription of the penalty.
RTC should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.
 7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this
Code. (Emphasis supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally
speaking, it is as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment
of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation
proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we
find it inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely
to "suspend the execution of the sentence,"66 and not to replace the original sentence
with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia: 67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
"interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a
final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by
a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand
modified our pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who
appeal their conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En
Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following once and for all: 69
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the
judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,now set
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He
will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment
imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser
offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment —
even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay
for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the
carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the
probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before
he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between
Franciscoand this case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas
not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation."
The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a
ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly
diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those
who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but
only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on
him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two
years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for
probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through
no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the
statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco,
the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the
accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to
disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in
favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent
purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on
Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad
the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have
availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even
have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel
the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is,
unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
(Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et
al.ultimately liable for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant
to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor
in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión correccional
in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al., we rule
that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was
convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which
granted the Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al.
have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and have
eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the
trial court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in
resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining the
terms, conditions, and period thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the
minimum term of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While
this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to
discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads
as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prisión correccional, as maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next
lower" than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must be
removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth
sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
correccional, as maximum. In this instance, we further find it important to clarify the
accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et
al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding
accessory penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal
penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is
determined by using as reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before the
prison sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL. 72 This determination is made
in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It must
be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties specifically
allude to the actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence"74 set by a court.
We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two
distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same offense.75 The two penalties are only
relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which
the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of the prison
term.76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prisión correccionalin its medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion
tolay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned
range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and Tecson
et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión
correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión
correccional automatically carries with it80 the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE
43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right
tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months.
The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned
as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty
sans the ISL; that is, for four years and two months81 or until they have served their
sentence in accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the
judgment of conviction becomes final.82
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they
shall furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Under Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall
forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election for
any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public office. 83 Any
public office that they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of the
judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if
expressly remitted in a pardon.85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of
probation, shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in
Baclayon,86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point SO ORDERED.
in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation
is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence.
We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension
from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the
order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from
continuing with her teaching profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed
upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x.
During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed
upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of

petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby
DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED.

The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano

Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise
DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned
Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and
SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in connection thereto. We,
however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato
Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for
probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the
Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any.

Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision

dated 1 February 2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the
fourth sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows:
"They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n
correccional, as maximum."
 Republic of the Philippines DECISION

Supreme Court

Manila

PERALTA, J.:

THIRD DIVISION

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO, G.R. No. 176077
Decision[1] dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846,
Petitioner, Present:
which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
120, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66765 convicting petitioner of Violation of Section
PERALTA,
11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
ABAD,
2002.
- versus - MENDOZA, and

SERENO,* JJ. The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Promulgated:

In an Information[2] dated November 11, 2002, petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, August 31, 2011 was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of

Respondent. which reads:

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

That on or about the 08th day of November 2002, in

Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the authority of
 law, did then and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control [METHAMPHETAMINE] HYDROCHLORIDE
(SHABU)weighing 0.24 gram, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug
under the provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)[3]
Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie Abadilla
Dela Rosa (P/Insp Dela Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police Station and Police Officer 3 Rodrigo Antonio
(PO3 Antonio) of the Caloocan Police Station Drug Enforcement Unit. The testimony of the
police investigator, PO3 Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), was dispensed with after petitioners
counsel admitted the facts offered for stipulation by the prosecution.
On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness. The
testimonies of Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father and sister,
respectively, of the petitioner was dispensed with after the prosecution agreed that their
testimonies were corroborative in nature.
Evidence for the Prosecution
First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla
Dela Rosa, Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, NPD-
CLO, Caloocan City Police Station who, on the witness stand, affirmed
his own findings in Physical Science Report No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. D, D-1,
and D-2) that per qualitative examination conducted on the specimen
submitted, the white crystalline substance weighing 0.05 gram, 0.06
gram, 0.07 gram, and 0.06 gram then contained inside four (4) separate
pieces of small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets (Exhs. D-4 to D-
7) gave positive result to the test for Methylamphetamine (sic)
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the
Caloocan Police Station-Drug Enforcement Unit, Samson
Road, Caloocan City, the prosecution further endeavored to establish
the following:
At about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002,
P/Insp. Jose Valencia of the Caloocan City Police Station-SDEU called
upon his subordinates after the (sic) receiving an INFOREP Memo from
Camp Crame relative to the illicit and down-right drug-trading activities
being undertaken along Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City
involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias Bokbok and one Mic or Jojo (Exhs. E, E-
1, and (sic) E-3, and E-4). Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a
surveillance team headed by SPO4 Ernesto Palting and is composed of
five (5) more operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit, namely: PO3
Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De Ocampo, and herein witness PO3
Antonio. After a short briefing at their station, the team boarded a
rented passenger jeepney and proceeded to the target area to verify
the said informant and/or memorandum.
 When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring father, they were boarded inside the police vehicle. That on their way
II, Caloocan City at around 3:50 oclock that same afternoon, they were to the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3 Pagsolingan showed to
[at] once led by their informant to the house of one Alias Abe. PO3 [petitioner] a small piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline
Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while substances allegedly recovered by the raiding police team from their
the rest of the members of the group deployed themselves house. At around 9:00 oclock in the evening, [petitioner] was
nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 transferred to the Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally
Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1 meters, he saw Abe detained. That upon [petitioners] transfer and detention at the said
arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be headquarters, his father was ordered to go home.[5]
containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched his way in by gently
pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the same. Upon
gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police
officer while Abe, on the other hand, after being informed of such
authority, voluntarily handed over to the former the four (4) pieces of
small plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio
immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him and the On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the
four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
elements of the offense charged, rendered a Decision[6] convicting petitioner of Violation of
to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Fernando Moran
for proper disposition. The suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat y
Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Cerbo a.k.a ABE, 19 years old, single, jobless and a resident
of Maginhawa Village, Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.[4]

WHEREFORE, from the facts established, the Court finds the

accused ABRAHAM MICLAT Y CERBO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
Evidence for the Defense of the crime of possession of a dangerous drugs (sic) defined and
penalized under the provision of Section 11, sub-paragraph No. (3),
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment, in view of the absence of aggravating
On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of
circumstances. The Court likewise orders the accused to pay the
the incident completely opposed to the theory of the prosecution. On
amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php300,000.00) as fine.
the witness stand, he alleged that at about4:00 oclock in the afternoon
of November 8, 2002, while he, together with his sister and father,
were at the upper level of their house watching the television soap
Cindy, they suddenly heard a commotion downstairs prompting the
Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be
three (3) of them to go down. There already inside were several male
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and to be turned
individuals in civilian clothes who introduced themselves as raiding
over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.
police operatives from the SDEU out to effect his (Abe) arrest for
alleged drug pushing. [Petitioner] and his father tried to plead his case
to these officers, but to no avail. Instead, one of the operatives even
kicked [petitioner] at the back when he tried to resist the SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[7]
arrest. Immediately, [petitioner] was handcuffed and together with his
 Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal was later Hence, the petition raising the following errors:

docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 28846.

1. WHETHER OR NOT A POLICE SURVEILLANCE TEAM SENT TO

DETERMINE THE VERACITY OF
A CAMP CRAME MEMORANDUM OF SHABU TRADING
ACTIVITY AT CALOOCAN CITY, WHICH CONVERTED
On October 13, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision[8] affirming in toto the decision of
THEIR MISSION FROM SURVEILLANCE TO A RAIDING TEAM,
CAN VALIDLY MAKE AN ARREST AND SEARCH WITHOUT A
the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads: VALID WARRANT HAVING BEEN FIRST OBTAINED FROM A
COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION.

2. WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED

WINDOW IS WITHIN THE MEANING OF PLAIN VIEW
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is DOCTRINE FOR A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.
hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE BELIEF OF PO3 ANTONIO THAT THE
against the accused-appellant. FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC SACHETS ALLEGEDLY BEING
ARRANGED BY PETITIONER CONTAINED SHABU JUSTIFIED
HIS ENTRY INTO THE HOUSE AND ARREST PETITIONER
WITHOUT ANY WARRANT.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)[9]
4. WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC
SACHETS CONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE MEANING
OF SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

5. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED

(SIC) OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF
THE CAUSE AND NATURE OF HIS ARREST AND RIGHT TO BE
ASSISTED BY COUNSEL DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST
In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the
AND CONTINUED DETENTION.

evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible against him.Moreover, it was 6. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONVICTION BY THE LOWER COURT
OF THE PETITIONER, AS AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE
established that he was informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. Hence, COURT OF APPEALS, ON THE BASIS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH
AND ARREST, IS CORRECT.[10]
the CA opined that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements

necessary for the conviction of the petitioner for the offense of illegal possession of

dangerous drugs. Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the subsequent

seizure of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous drugs from

him. Petitioner insists that he was just watching television with his father and sister when
police operatives suddenly barged into their home and arrested him for illegal possession Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his

of shabu. constitutional rights at any time during or after his arrest and even during his

detention. Hence, for this infraction, the arresting officer should be punished accordingly.

Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic sachets

inside their house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping through a window is not The petition is bereft of merit.

sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his house without a valid search warrant

and/or warrant of arrest. Arguing that the act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in

itself is not a crime per se, petitioner maintains that the entry of the police surveillance team At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity

into his house was illegal, and no amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of

validly issued search warrant. Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the

be contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering the warrantless jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.[11] An accused is

arrest unlawful. estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move

for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any

objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired

Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs was jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;

highly questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not marked at the place of the otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.[12]

arrest and no acknowledgment receipt was issued for the said evidence.

In the present case, at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no objection

raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the

proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived
defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;[14]
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not

even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.[13]

For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that

True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part: two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act

indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no officer.[15]
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
In the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, he was caught in flagrante

delicto and the police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest.The established

facts reveal that on the date of the arrest, agents of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit

However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated (SDEU) of the Caloocan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance operation in the

provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require area of Palmera Spring II to verify the reported drug-related activities of several individuals,

a previously issued warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under which included the petitioner. During the operation, PO3 Antonio, through petitioners

Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: window, saw petitioner arranging several plastic sachets containing what appears to

be shabu in the living room of their home. The plastic sachets and its suspicious contents

were plainly exposed to the view of PO3 Antonio, who was only about one and one-half
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. a peace office
of a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: meters from where petitioner was seated. PO3 Antonio then inched his way in the house by
gently pushing the door. Upon gaining entrance, the operative introduced himself as a police Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent

officer. After which, petitioner voluntarily handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and

sachets. PO3 Antonio then placed petitioner under arrest and, contrary to petitioners any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any

contention, PO3 Antonio informed him of his constitutional rights.[16] PO3 Antonio then took proceeding.[17] The right against warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal

the petitioner and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets to their headquarters and turned and judicial exceptions, namely:

them over to PO3 Moran. Thereafter, the evidence were marked AMC 1-4, the initials of the

name of the petitioner. The heat-sealed transparent sachets containing white crystalline
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
substance were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug examination, which later
2. Search of evidence in "plain view";
yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
drug under RA No. 9165.
4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]
the petitioner, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing

a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting officer.

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is

As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,

established exceptions. including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,

the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the

character of the articles procured.[19]

 the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in

evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the offense charged.

It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed

plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon

learning that he is a police officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic
As to petitioners contention that the police failed to comply with the proper
sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within
procedure in the transfer of custody of the seized evidence thereby casting serious doubt on
the purview of the plain view doctrine.
its seizure, this too deserves scant consideration.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to

be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without
a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The plain view Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.
shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody
and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
exposed to sight. Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items
of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from
 the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
and any elected public official who shall be seizures of and custody over said items.
required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof;

x x x x.[21]

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon

confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
strictly with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioners arrest illegal nor the evidence

adduced against him inadmissible.[22] What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and

x x x x.
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination

of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[23]

Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the

Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:
integrity of the drugs seized from the petitioner was preserved. More importantly, an

unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs taken from the petitioner was sufficiently

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the established. The factual antecedents of the case reveal that the petitioner voluntarily
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or surrendered the plastic sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was arrested. Together with
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and petitioner, the evidence seized from him were immediately brought to the police station and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy upon arriving thereat, were turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating officer. There the
thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidence was marked. The turn-over of the subject sachets and the person of the petitioner
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
were then entered in the official blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU, Police Senior
Inspector Jose Ramirez Valencia, endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to the satisfactory explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to

National Police District PNP Crime Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.[27]

received by Police Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa.[24] After a qualitative examination of the

contents of the four (4) plastic sachets by the latter, the same tested positive for

methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[25] It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for

they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.[28] Although not

An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been established constrained to blindly accept the findings of fact of trial courts, appellate courts can rest

by the prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to the assured that such facts were gathered from witnesses who presented their statements live

forensic chemist. There is no doubt that the items seized from the petitioner at his residence and in person in open court. In cases where conflicting sets of facts are presented, the trial

were also the same items marked by the investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, courts are in the best position to recognize and distinguish spontaneous declaration from

and later on tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. rehearsed spiel, straightforward assertion from a stuttering claim, definite statement from

tentative disclosure, and to a certain degree, truth from untruth.[29]

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following

elements must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object In the present case, there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of fact of

identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; the trial court. No evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in the narration of

and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the the prosecution witnesses of the events which transpired and led to the arrest of

drug.[26] Based on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the above elements were duly petitioner. After a careful evaluation of the records, We find no error was committed by the

established in the present case. Mere possession of a regulated drug per se constitutes prima RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime

facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a charged against him.
 Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely denied

x x x x.
the accusations against him and raised the defense of frame-up. The defense of denial and

frame-up has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos
Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous
strong and convincing evidence.[30]
drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin
oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu",
or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited
As to the penalty, while We sustain the amount of fine, the indeterminate to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB,
and those similarly designed or newly-introduced
sentence imposed should, however, be modified. drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is
far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less
Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.[31]

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, provides:

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The penalty of

life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12)
possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of
the degree of purity thereof: years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand

Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00).The evidence adduced by

x x x x. the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his possession
0.24 gram of shabu, or less than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal

authority.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable

penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not

exceed the maximum period allowed under the law; hence, the imposable penalty should be

within the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)

months.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision

dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846 is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)

years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188611 June 16, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144, finding
appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was charged in an Information, dated November 7,
2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed
as follows:
"That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel,
Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without the
necessary permit or authority from the proper government agency or office.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During
the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:
"1. Accused admits that she is the same person identified in the information
as Belen Mariacos;
2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy, San Gabriel, La Union;
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just alighted
from a passenger jeepney;
4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the possession of the accused
contained in two (2) bags were submitted for examination to the Crime Lab;
5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005, the alleged drug submitted
for examination gave positive result for the presence of marijuana;
6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic) and
submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;
7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a counter-affidavit executed by
the accused; and
8. The existence of the affidavits executed by the witnesses of the accused
family (sic): Lyn Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena Carino."
During the trial, the prosecution established the following evidence:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel,
La Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept
a suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La
Union. The group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2
Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not
yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed
to Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a
secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage
of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the
poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further,
the agent described a backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then
boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was
in motion, he found the black backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its
contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then
asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no
one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the
other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from
atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3)
other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2)
women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told
them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-
appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the
investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags.
When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and
three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of
marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper,
were recovered.
Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated
marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination showed
that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
When it was accused-appellant’s turn to present evidence, she testified that:
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with
Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the
jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-
ang"), her neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top
of the jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded later when
she was told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the
poblacion, Lao-ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the
bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was
upon them, arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police
station. When they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also
at the police station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the bags
which she was asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags
and that she did not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic)
she executed a Counter-Affidavit.3
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and
sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.00.
The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court
personnel and media.
SO ORDERED.4
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred in
considering the evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility. 5 She claimed
that her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by Police Officer
(PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag, assuming it was hers, without a
search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that PO2 Pallayoc’s
purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was the same
one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant contended that there was
no probable cause for her arrest.6
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
crime.7 She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated Dangerous Drugs
Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2,
Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and
regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said regulation directs
the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs and/or
paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant or her representative, who
shall be required to sign copies of the inventory. The failure to comply with this
directive, appellant claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of the items allegedly
confiscated from her. She, likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to prove that
the items allegedly confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the
chain of custody over the same.
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of
marijuana were valid and legal,8 justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It averred
that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had committed the
crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information from their agent,
which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled the distinctive odor
of marijuana.9 The OSG also argued that appellant was now estopped from
questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily entered a plea of "not
guilty" upon arraignment and participated in the trial and presented her
evidence.10 The OSG brushed aside appellant’s argument that the bricks of marijuana
were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or that of her counsel
immediately after confiscation, positing that physical inventory may be done at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team, whichever
was practicable.11
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision in toto.12It held that the prosecution had successfully
proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of bags which, when
inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto of "carrying and conveying" the bag that contained the
illegal drugs, and thus held that appellant’s warrantless arrest was valid. The appellate
court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags
when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper.
That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified
destination was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for himself to
whom those bags belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying the bags,
PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-
appellant.
xxxx
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the
suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop
the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation
of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is
valid. These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section
12 [now Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;

Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
been trying to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no
avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
as possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.
duties;

Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
of a moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
had the right to be where they are;
makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to
secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use
because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.13
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing her conviction.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the State’s agents vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
to conduct searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down the rules its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
on searches and seizures, providing, more or less, clear parameters in determining amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
which are proper and which are not.1avvphi1 activity;

Appellant’s main argument before the CA centered on the inadmissibility of the 4. Consented warrantless search;
evidence used against her. She claims that her constitutional right against
unreasonable searches was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer.
5. Customs search;

Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there would have
been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant. 6. Stop and Frisk; and

Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution provides: 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.14

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that the
search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to
the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of
a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable
cause.15
In People v. Bagista,16 the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in
plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground
that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to
move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search
has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the
requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or
seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential
requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted.17 Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be
admitted in evidence against the person arrested.18
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of
such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are
in the place to be searched.19
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 20
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This
is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge – a
requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where moving vehicle is
used to transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. 21
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may readily be obtained when
the search is made in a store, dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is
impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on
an aircraft, or in other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.22
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this case is valid.
The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2
Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to
require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the
circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no
time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before
the same left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before appellant’s arrest, the
police received information that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay
Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects.
At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay
Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a
passenger jeepney about to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable
cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.23
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest. Although,
generally, a warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the
exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
 (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. 24
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police has probable cause to make the arrest at
the outset of the search.25
Given that the search was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that search is also valid.
Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:
SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to
Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and
essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not belong
to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This contention,
however, is of no consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited
drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the
confiscated marijuana is not necessary.26
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of
criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime
charged is malum prohibitum, as in this case.27 Mere possession and/or delivery of a
prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs
Act.28
Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are regulatory statutes. They are rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and
their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita. Laws defining crimes mala prohibita
condemn behavior directed not against particular individuals, but against public
order.29
Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to
another."30 There is no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited
drug. When the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and
the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to the perpetration of
the criminal act.31The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding
that the act of transporting was committed and it is immaterial whether or not the place
of destination is reached.32
Moreover, appellant’s possession of the packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to
the disputable presumption33that she is the owner of the packages and their
contents.34 Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack
of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her possession is insufficient.
Appellant’s narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang
merely asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical to first
ask what the packages contained and where these would be taken. Likewise, if, as
appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from the jeepney, appellant
and her companion should have ran after him to give him the bags he had left with
them, and not to continue on their journey without knowing where they were taking the
bags.
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
crime. In particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to follow
the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments,
apparatuses, and articles.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of all
dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very
corpus delicti of that crime.35
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and
disposition of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that appellant
was not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the media and the
DOJ were present. However, this Court has already previously held that non-
compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal,
or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.37
Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellant’s arrest, she was immediately
brought to the police station where she stayed while waiting for the Mayor. It was the
Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs, which were thereafter
marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the following day. Contrary to
appellant’s claim, the prosecution’s evidence establishes the chain of custody from the
time of appellant’s arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime
laboratory.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides: While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the justifiable ground
for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily mean that appellant’s
arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible. The justifiable ground will
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
remain unknown because appellant did not question the custody and disposition of the
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
items taken from her during the trial.38 Even assuming that the police officers failed to
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
abide by Section 21, appellant should have raised this issue before the trial court. She
Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
could have moved for the quashal of the information at the first instance. But she did
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any objection on the matter.
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment
so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner: Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules on the
chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of police authorities,
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
as they are presumed to be performing their duties regularly, absent any convincing
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
proof to the contrary.39
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who In sum, the prosecution successfully established appellant’s guilt. Thus, her conviction
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: must be affirmed.
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render SO ORDERED.
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending appellant, he immediately brought her
to the police station. At the station, the police requested the Mayor to witness the
opening of the bags seized from appellant. When the Mayor arrived, he opened the
bag in front of appellant and the other police officers. The black bag yielded three
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag yielded two bundles
of marijuana and two bricks of marijuana fruiting tops.36 PO2 Pallayoc identified the
bricks. He and PO3 Stanley Campit then marked the same. Then the seized items
were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
 Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court DECISION

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 176066

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
For review is the Decision[1] dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in

CORONA, C.J., CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] dated April 9,
- versus
Chairperson, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Estela

Tuan y Baludda guilty in Criminal Case No. 17619-R, of illegal possession of marijuana under
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA,
Accused-Appellant. Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of
BERSAMIN,*
1972, as amended; and in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, of violating Presidential Decree No.
DEL CASTILLO, and
1866, otherwise known as the Illegal Possession of Firearms, as amended.
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
On April 5, 2000, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC against

accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of firearm. The

August 11, 2010 Informations read:

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

Criminal Case No. 17619-R

 The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y and there willfully and unlawfully have in her possession, custody, and
BALUDDA of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 8, ART. II OF REPUBLIC control one (1) Cal. .357 S & W revolver, a high-powered firearm,
ACT 6425, AS AMENDED (Illegal Possession of Marijuana), committed as without any license, permit or authority duly issued by the government
follows: to possess or keep the same in violation of the above-cited law.[4]

That on or about 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay

Gabriela Silang, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then
and there willfully and unlawfully have in her possession, custody, and Upon her arraignment on April 18, 2000, accused-appellant, assisted by her
control the following, to wit:
counsel de parte, pleaded NOT GUILTY to both charges.[5] Pre-trial and trial proper then

ensued.

a) Nine (9) bricks of dried Marijuana leaves with an

approximate total weight of 18.750 kgs., and

During trial, the prosecution presented four witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO)
b) One (1) plastic bag containing dried Marijuana
leaves weighing approximately .3 kg. 1 Modesto F. Carrera (Carrera), Police Officer (PO) 2 Jaime Chavez (Chavez), SPO2 Fernando

Fernandez (Fernandez), and Forensic Chemist II Marina Carina Madrigal (Madrigal).

without any authority of law to do so in violation of the above-cited

provision of law.[3]

The events, as recounted by the prosecution, are as follows:

Criminal Case No. 17620-R

The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y
BALUDDA of the crime of VIOLATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1866,
AS AMENDED (Illegal Possession of Firearm), committed as follows:
At around nine oclock in the morning on January 24, 2000, two male informants namely, Jerry
Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived at the office of the 14th Regional CIDG
(Criminal Investigation and Detention Group) at DPS Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and

reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a
That on or about the 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay
Gabriela Silang, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the certain Estela Tuan had been selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then

City. Present at that time were Police Superintendent Isagani Neres, Regional Officer of the
14th Regional CIDG; Chief Inspector Reynaldo Piay, Deputy Regional Officer; and other police
officers.[6]
SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. At around one oclock in
the afternoon of the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and
then accompanied the two informants to the accused-appellants house. Tudlong and Lad-ing
entered accused-appellants house, while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. After
thirty minutes, Tudlong and Lad-ing came out of accused-appellants house and showed SPO2
Fernandez the marijuana leaves they bought. After returning to the CIDG regional office,
SPO2 Fernandez requested the laboratory examination of the leaves bought from accused-
appellant.When said laboratory examination yielded positive results for marijuana, SPO2
Fernandez prepared an Application for Search Warrant for accused-appellants house.
SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a
Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV, at about one oclock in the afternoon on
January 25, 2000. Two hours later, at around three oclock, Judge Cortes personally examined
SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being
satisfied of the existence of probable cause. The Search Warrant read:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned of the existence of
facts upon which the application for Search Warrant is based, after
personally examining by searching questions under oath SPO2
Fernando V. Fernandez of the CAR Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group with office address at DPS Compound, Utility Road, Baguio City
and his witnesses namely: Frank Lad-ing of Happy Hallow, Baguio City
and Jerry Tudlong, of Barangay Kitma, Baguio City, after having been
duly sworn to, who executed sworn statements and deposition as
witneses, that there is a probable cause to believe that a Violation of
R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 has been committed and that there
are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Estela Tuan, has in her
possession and control at her resident at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio
City, the following:
- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried
Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish
xxxx
which are subject of the offense which should be seized and brought to
the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at anytime
in the day the house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang,
Baguio City, and forthwith seize and take possession of the following:
- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried
Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish
 MTCC, Branch IV[7]

x x x nothing follows x x x

and bring said items to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law
directs. Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, his team supervisor Police

Senior Inspector Rodolfo Castel, SPO1 Carrera, Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez and

PO2 Chavez implemented the warrant. Before going to the accused-appellants house, SPO2
This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue,
thereafter, it shall be void. Fernandez invited barangay officials to be present when the Search Warrant was to be

served, but since no one was available, he requested one Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accused-

The officers must conduct the search and seize the above-mentioned appellants neighbor, to come along.
personal items in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of her family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of
The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-appellants house. Even though
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality. accused-appellant was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house by

Magno Baludda (Magno), accused-appellants father, after he was shown a copy of the Search

The officers seizing the items must give a detailed receipt for the same Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez and Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez guarded the
to the lawful occupant of the house in whose presence the search and
seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the surroundings of the house,[8] while SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched inside.
presence of the 2 witnesses mentioned, leave a receipt in the place in
which the seized items were found; thereafter, deliver the items seized
to the undersigned judge together with a true inventory thereof duly
verified under oath.
SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez began searching the rooms on the first floor in the

presence of Magno and Pascual. They continued their search on the second floor. They saw a
Baguio City, Philippines, this 25th day of January, 2000.
movable cabinet in accused-appellants room, below which they found a brick of marijuana

and a firearm. At around six oclock that evening, accused-appellant arrived with her son. The

police officers asked accused-appellant to open a built-in cabinet, in which they saw eight

(SGD)ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES more bricks of marijuana.[9]PO2 Chavez issued a receipt for the items confiscated from

Executive Judge
accused-appellant[10] and a certification stating that the items were confiscated and recovered children play.[13] Accused-appellant alleged that a Search Warrant was issued for her house

from the house and in accused-appellants presence. because of a quarrel with her neighbor named Lourdes Estillore (Estillore). Accused-appellant

filed a complaint for the demolition of Estillores house which was constructed on the road.[14]

The nine bricks of marijuana were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI) for examination. Beniasan supported the testimony of his wife, accused-appellant. He narrated that

he and accused-appellant were at their Hangar Market stall when two police officers came

and asked them to go home. Beniasan and accused-appellant arrived at their residence at

The defense, on the other hand, had an entirely different version of what transpired that around six oclock in the evening and were shown the marijuana the police officers supposedly

day. It presented four witnesses, namely, accused-appellant herself; Beniasan Tuan got from the first floor of the house. The police officers then made Beniasan sign a

(Beniasan), accused-appellants husband; Magno, accused-appellants father; and Mabini certification of the list of items purportedly confiscated from the house.[15]

Maskay (Maskay), the Barangay Captain of Barangay Gabriela Silang.

Magno testified that he resided at the first floor of accused-appellants

In her testimony, accused-appellant declared that she worked as a vendor at residence. He was present when the search was conducted but denied that the Search

Hangar Market. Sometime in January 2000, while she was selling vegetables at Hangar Warrant was shown to him.[16] He attested that the confiscated items were found from the

Market, her son arrived with two police officers who asked her to go home because of a letter vacant room at the first floor of accused-appellants house which was previously occupied by

from the court.[11] At about six oclock in the afternoon, she and her husband Beniasan boarders. Said room was padlocked but was forced open by the police officers. In the course

reached their residence and found a green paper bag with marijuana in their sala. According of the police officers search, they pulled something from under the bed that was wrapped in

to the police officers, they got the bag from a room on the first floor of accused-appellants green cellophane, but Magno did not know the contents thereof.[17] The police officers also

house. Accused-appellant explained that the room where the bag of marijuana was found searched the rooms of accused-appellant and her children at the second floor of the house,

was previously rented by boarders.The boarders padlocked the room because they still had during which they allegedly found a gun under the cabinet in accused-appellants

things inside and they had paid their rent up to the end of January 2000.[12] The police officers room. Magno claimed that he did not personally witness the finding of the gun and was

also informed accused-appellant that they got a gun from under a cabinet in the latters room, merely informed about it by the police officers.[18]

which accused-appellant disputed since her room was always left open and it was where her

Maskay, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, was the
last to testify for the defense. He corroborated accused-appellants allegation that the latter
had a quarrel with Estillore, and this could be the reason behind the filing of the present
criminal cases. He further remembered that the members of the CIDG went to his office on
January 24, 2000 to ask about the location of accused-appellants house.[19]
The RTC, in its Decision dated April 9, 2002, found accused-appellant guilty as
charged and adjudged thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 17619-R, the Court finds the accused
Estela Tuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal
possession of marijuana (nine [9] bricks of dried marijuana leaves with
an approximate weight of 18.750 kilograms and the one [1] plastic bag
containing the dried marijuana weighing about .3 kilograms) in violation
of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Section
13 of Republic Act 7659 as charged in the information and sentences
her to the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay a fine
of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The nine (9) bricks of dried marijuana leaves with an
approximate weight of 18.750 kilograms and one (1) plastic bag
containing dried marijuana leaves weighing approximately .3 kilograms
(Exhibit F, F-1, F-1-A to F-1-J) are ordered confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law.
The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is entitled to be
credited 4/5 of her preventive imprisonment in the service of her
sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 17620-R, the Court finds the accused
Estela Tuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal
possession of firearms (one [1] caliber .357 S & W revolver), a high
powered firearm, without any license, permit or authority issued by the
Government to keep the same in violation of Section 1, Republic Act
No.8294 which amended Section 1 of PD 1866 as charged in the
information and hereby sentences her, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, to imprisonment ranging from 4 years 9 months and 10
days of prision correccional in its maximum period as Minimum to 6
years and 8 months of prision mayor in its minimum period as
Maximum and a fine of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
The firearm caliber .357 S & W revolver without serial
number is ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be disposed of
immediately in accordance with law.
The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is
entitled to be credited 4/5 of her preventive imprisonment in the
service of her sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.[20]
The records of the two criminal cases were forwarded to this Court by the RTC, but
the Court issued a Resolution[21] dated October 13, 2004 transferring said records to the Court
of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.[22]
 On September 21, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY

The Court of Appeals held that the contested search and consequent seizure of the
marijuana bricks were done pursuant to the Search Warrant validly issued by the
MTCC. There was no showing of procedural defects or lapses in the issuance of said Search
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 6,
dated April 9, 2002, is hereby MODIFIED such that the conviction of
accused-appellant for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, RA 6425, as
amended, is AFFIRMED while her conviction for Violation of PD 1866, as
amended, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is accordingly
ACQUITTED of the latter offense.[23]

Warrant as the records support that the issuing judge determined probable cause only after

conducting the searching inquiry and personal examination of the applicant and the latters

witnesses, in compliance with the requirements of the Constitution. Hence, the appellate
In its Resolution dated October 20, 2006, the Court of Appeals gave due course to accused-
court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana.
appellants Partial Notice of Appeal and accordingly forwarded the records of the case to this

Court.

The Court of Appeals, however, modified the appealed RTC judgment by acquitting

accused-appellant of the charge for illegal possession of firearm. According to the appellate
This Court then issued a Resolution[24] dated February 28, 2007 directing the
court, the records were bereft of evidence that the gun supposedly confiscated from accused-
parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from
appellant was unlicensed. The absence of a firearm license was simply presumed by the police
notice. Accused-appellant[25] opted not to file a supplemental brief and manifested that she
officers because the gun was a defective paltik with no serial number. That the said condition
was adopting her arguments in the Appellants Brief since the same had already assiduously
of the gun did not dispense with the need for the prosecution to establish that it was
discussed her innocence of the crime charged. The People[26] likewise manifested that it
unlicensed through the testimony or certification of the appropriate officer from the Board of
would no longer file a supplemental brief as the issues have all been addressed in its
the Firearms and Explosives Bureau of the Philippine National Police.
Appellees Brief.

In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed: Accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors in her Brief: [27]

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE
TO THE INCREDIBLE AND CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE
OFFICERS.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING AS VOID THE SEARCH
WARRANT ISSUED AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Given that accused-appellant was already acquitted of the charge of violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 on the ground of reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 17620-
R, her instant appeal relates only to her conviction for illegal possession of prohibited or
regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The Court can no longer pass upon the
propriety of accused-appellants acquittal in Criminal Case No. 17620-R because of the rule
that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory upon its
promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the
accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double
jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the Court of Appeals.[28]
In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, such as Criminal Case
No. 17619-R, a case becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. In
such a situation, this Court generally relies upon the assessment by the trial court, which had
the distinct advantage of observing the conduct or demeanor of the witnesses while they
were testifying. Hence, its factual findings are accorded respect even finality absent any
showing that certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.[29]
The Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule in the case at bar.
Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the
following elements concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.[30]
All the foregoing elements were duly proven to exist in Criminal Case No.
17619-R. The search conducted by SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez in accused-appellants
house yielded nine bricks of marijuana. Marijuana is a prohibited drug, thus, accused-
appellants possession thereof could not have been authorized by law in any
way. Accused-appellant evidently possessed the marijuana freely and consciously, even
 offering the same for sale. The bricks of marijuana were found in accused-appellants inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion

residence over which she had complete control. In fact, some of the marijuana were that the testimonies have been rehearsed.[32]

found in accused-appellants own room.

Accused-appellant further questions the non-presentation as witnesses of Lad-ing

Accused-appellant challenges the judgment of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of
and Tudlong, the informants, and Pascual, the neighbor who supposedly witnessed the
Appeals, finding her guilty of illegal possession of marijuana, by pointing out certain
implementation of the Search Warrant, during the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. 17619-R
inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that supposedly manifested their
and 17620-R before the RTC. This Court though is unconvinced that such non-presentation of
lack of credibility, i.e., the date of the test buy and the manner by which the doors of the
witnesses is fatal to Criminal Case No. 17619-R.
rooms of the house were opened.

The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as

These alleged inconsistencies and contradictions pertain to minor details and are
witnesses. The prosecution need not present each and every witness but only such as may be
so inconsequential that they do not in any way affect the credibility of the witnesses nor
needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
detract from the established fact of illegal possession of marijuana by accused-appellant at
reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with
her house. The Court has previously held that discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
if they are merely corroborative in nature. The Court has ruled that the non-presentation of
testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the
corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the
central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of witnesses need only
prosecutions case.[33]
corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal

occurrence.[31]

Although Criminal Case No. 17619-R involves illegal possession of marijuana, the

following pronouncement of this Court in People v. Salazar,[34] relating to the illegal sale of the
Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
same drug, still rings true:
credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such minor

Neither is her right to confront witnesses against her
affected by the prosecution's failure to present the informer who
pointed to her as a drug pusher. The presentation of an informant in
an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it
indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony
would be merely corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving the
sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is
the fact of the sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the
marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-presentation of
the informer on the witness stand would not necessarily create a hiatus
in the prosecutions' evidence. (Emphasis ours.)
Lastly, accused-appellant insists that the items allegedly seized from her house are
inadmissible as evidence because the Search Warrant issued for her house was invalid for
failing to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements. Accused-appellant
specifically pointed out the following defects which made said Search Warrant void: (1) the
informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, made misrepresentation of facts in the Application for
Search Warrant filed with the MTCC; (2) Judge Cortes of the MTCC failed to consider the
informants admission that they themselves were selling marijuana; and (3) the Search
Warrant failed to particularly describe the place to be searched because the house was a two-
storey building composed of several rooms.
The right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizure is recognized and
protected by no less than the Constitution, particularly, Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III which
provide:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. (Emphases ours.)
Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure laid down the following requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
 searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.

In People v. Aruta,[36] the Court defined probable cause as follows:

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following
factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete
definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence
of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.

determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.[35]
There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a validly issued
It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his
knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of
common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same
quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative
to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by
substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue
of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be
found in the place to be searched.

search warrant were complied with, i.e., personal determination of probable cause by Judge

Cortes; and examination, under oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and the two

informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, by Judge Cortes. What is left for the Court to determine is
A magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search
compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular
warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for
description of the place to be searched and things to be seized.
that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge

brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the
offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.[37] Such substantial basis
exists in this case.
Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for
accused-appellants residence after said judges personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the
applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants.
SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not only on the
information relayed to him by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy and
conducted surveillance of accused-appellant. He testified before Judge Cortes:
COURT:
Q. You are applying for a Search Warrant and you alleged in your
application that Estela Tuan of Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio
City, is in possession of dried marijuana leaves and
marijuana hashish, how did you come to know about this
matter?
A. Through the two male persons by the name of Frank Lad-ing and
Jerry Tudlong, Your Honor.
Q. When did these two male persons report to your office?
A. January 22, Your Honor.
Q. This year?
A. Yes, your honor.
Q. To whom did they report?
A. To me personally, Your Honor.
Q. How did they report the matter?
A. They reported that a certain Estela Tuan is selling dried Marijuana
leaves and marijuana hashish, Your Honor.
Q. What else?
A. She is not only selling marijuana but also selling vegetables at the
Trading Post in La Trinidad, Your Honor.
Q. They just told you, she is selling marijuana and selling vegetables,
that is already sufficient proof or sufficient probable cause
she is in possession of marijuana, what else did they report?
A. That they are also selling marijuana in large volume at their house.
Q. What did you do when you asked them regarding that matter?
A. They had a test buy and they were able to buy some commodities
yesterday, Your honor.
Q. Who bought?
A. Tudlong and Lad-ing, Your Honor.
Q. How did you go about it?
A. I accompanied the said persons and kept watch over them and gave
them money after which, they were able to purchase and
when they purchased the said items or drugs, they were
even informed that if you wanted to sell then you could
come and get. Your Honor.
COURT:
Q. Where is that P300.00?
A. It is with them, Your Honor.
Q. You did not entrap her?
A. No, Your Honor, because it is only a test buy.
Q: And that was January 22. Why did you not apply immediately for
search warrant?
A: Because we still have to look at the area and see to it that there are
really some buyers or people who would go and leave the
place, Your Honor.
Q: What did you observe?
A: Well, there are persons who would go inside and after going inside,
they would come out bringing along with them something
else.
 Q: Did you not interview these people? Q: How big?
A: No, Your Honor. We did not bother.[38] A: A dimension of 10 x 4 inches, Your Honor.

Q: With that size, where did she show you the box of this cellophane?
Lad-ing and Tudlong affirmed before Judge Cortes that they were the ones who A: At the place where we were sitted at the receiving room, Your
informed SPO2 Fernandez that accused-appellant was keeping and selling marijuana at her Honor.
house, and that they took part in the test buy.
Q: In other words, she went to get it and then presented or showed it
to you?
Lad-ing narrated: A: Yes, Your Honor.

COURT: Q: Where did she go, if you know?

Q: Mr. Lad-ing, you said that you are working at the Trading Post. What
kind of work do you have there?
A: I am a middleman of the vegetable dealers, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: Did you come to know of this person Estela Tuan?
A: Yes, Your Honor, because there was an incident wherein we were
conducting our line of business when they came and joined
us and we became partners, Your Honor.
A: Because at the sala, there is a certain room located at the side that is
the place where she got the same, Your Honor.
Q: Where is this house of Estela Tuan located, is it along the road or
inside the road or what?
A: It is near the road but you have to walk in a little distance, Your
Honor.
Q: Will you describe the place where Estela Tuan is residing?
A: Well, it is a two storey house, the walls are made of galvanized iron
Sheets, Your Honor.

Q: You said, they, how many of you? COURT:

A: A certain Jerry Tudlong, Estela Tuan and myself, Your Honor.
Q: Do you know who are staying there?
Q: In other words, Estela Tuan went with you and later on she became A: I do not know who is living with her, however, that is her residence,
your partner in that business? Your Honor.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How many times did you go there?
Q: And so what happened when she became a partner of your A: It was my second time to go at that time we were sent by PO
business? Fernandez to purchase marijuana, Your Honor.
A: When we were about to divide our profit, we then went at their
residence at Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, Your Honor. Q: Where is the marijuana now?
A: It is in the possession of PO Fernandez, Your Honor.
Q: What happened?
A: While we then sitted ourselves at the sala, she told us that if we Q: Where is the marijuana placed?
wanted to earn some more, she told us that she has in her A: In a newspaper, Your Honor.
possession marijuana which could be sold, Your Honor.
Q: What happened next?
Q: And so, what happened? A: We handed to her the amount of P300.00, your Honor.
A: After which, she showed the marijuana, Your Honor.
Q: And she gave you that marijuana?
Q: Where was the marijuana? A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: It was placed in a cellophane, in a newspaper, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q: How many rooms are there in the first floor of the house of Estela
Tuan?
A: Three rooms, Your Honor, it has a dining room and beside the place
is the receiving room where we sitted ourselves, Your
Honor.
Q: When you already bought marijuana from her, what did she tell you,
if any?
A; Well, if we would be interested to buy more, I still have stocks here,
Your Honor.[39]
Tudlong recounted in more detail what happened during the test buy:
COURT:
Q: My question is, when she told you that she has some substance for
sale for profit and you mentioned marijuana, did you talk
immediately with Frank or what did you do?
A: We reported the matter to the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, your Honor.
xxxx
Q: What time?
A: We went to the office at 9:00 9:30 oclock in the morning, Your
Honor.
Q: When you went there, what did you do?
A: The amount of P300.00 was given to Frank and we were instructed
to purchase, Your Honor.
Q: Did you go?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q: Will you tell what happened when you went to the house of the
woman?
A: Well, we were allowed to go inside the house after which, we were
made to sit down at the receiving area or sala, Your Honor.
Q: When you went there, you were allowed to enter immediately?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Who allowed you to enter?
A: The female person, Your Honor.
Q: What happened when you were asked to be sitted?
A: During that time, Frank and the female person were the ones
conferring, Your Honor.
Q: Did you hear what they were talking about?
A: That Frank was purchasing marijuana, Your Honor.
Q: What did the woman tell you?
A: After we handed the money, a plastic which was transparent, was
then handed to Frank, it was a plastic and there was a
newspaper inside, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q: So, you did not actually see what is in the newspaper?
A: No, Your Honor, however, I know that that is marijuana.
Q: Why?
A: Because that was our purpose, to buy marijuana, Your Honor.
Q: And you have not gotten marijuana without Estela Tuan informing
you?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Will you tell us what kind of materials were used in the house of
Estela Tuan?
A: Two storey, the walls are made of GI sheets, Your Honor.\
Q: Is the house beside the road or do you have to walk?
A: It is near the road. Upon reaching the road, you still have to walk a
short distance, Your Honor.
Q: Where did Estela Tuan get the newspaper placed in a transparent
plastic?
A: She got it from a room because were then made to wait at the sala,
Your Honor.
Q: Did she tell you how much she can sell marijuana?
A: She told us, Your Honor.
Q: What?
 A: Well, the marijuana that we purchased was
worth P300.00[.] However, we could divide it into two small A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
packs and we could sell it at P20.00 per piece so that you
can also have some gain. warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish

COURT: it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points out the place

Q: After that, to whom did you sell? to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
A: We did not sell the marijuana, Your Honor.
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.[41] In the case at bar, the
Q: I thought you are going to sell marijuana and so you went there?
A: We were just instructed by PO Fernandez to verify what we are address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific
telling him was true, Your Honor.[40]
enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-

appellants residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several

rooms.
Accused-appellants contention that MTCC Judge Cortes failed to consider the

informants admission that they themselves were selling marijuana is utterly without
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the Search Warrant for
merit. First, even after carefully reviewing the testimonies of Lad-ing and Tudlong before
accused-appellants house issued by MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items seized as a result of
Judge Cortes, this Court did not find a categorical admission by either of the two informants
the search conducted by virtue thereof, may be presented as evidence against the accused-
that they themselves were selling marijuana. In fact, Tudlong expressly denied that he and
appellant.
Lad-ing sold the marijuana, having only bought the same from the accused-appellant for the

test buy. Moreover, even if the informants were also selling marijuana, it would not have

affected the validity of the Search Warrant for accused-appellants house. The criminal
Since it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the accused-appellant is, indeed, guilty of
liabilities of accused-appellant and the informants would be separate and distinct. The
violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court shall now
investigation and prosecution of one could proceed independently of the other.
consider the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon her.

Equally without merit is accused-appellants assertion that the Search Warrant did

not describe with particularity the place to be searched.

Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 20(3), of Republic Act No. 6425, as

amended, provides:
 marijuana, for which she was properly sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the RTC, affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.- The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person In the same vein, the fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon accused-appellant by the
who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug
subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. (As amended by R.A. RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is also correct, as the same is still within the range of
7659)
fines imposable on any person who possessed prohibited drugs without any authority, under
Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties
for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14,
14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the
1. 40 grams or more of opium; Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or

methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
SO ORDERED.
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or

marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or

marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine

hydrocholoride; or

8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the

quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and
promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board,
after public consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Pursuant to Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, illegal
possession of 750 grams or more of the prohibited drug marijuana is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Accused-appellant had in her possession a total of 19,050 grams of
 THIRD DIVISION
which affirmed the July 28, 2003 Decision of Branch 116 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 convicting Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) for

SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES, G.R. No. 182010 violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous

Petitioner, Drugs Act of 2002) possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Present:
The accusatory portion of the Information dated December 12, 2002 indicting

petitioner reads:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2002 in Pasay
BERSAMIN, City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law,
VILLARAMA, JR., and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her
possession, custody and control 0.1224 gram of
SERENO, JJ. Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).[2] (underscoring supplied)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. August 25, 2010

At the trial, petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
x--------------------------------------------------x
documentary evidence of the prosecution, particularly the Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology

Reports issued by National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Forensic Chemist Antonino de Belen
DECISION
(de Belen),[3] subject to her defenses, to thus dispense with the testimony of de Belen.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

De Belen recorded the results of the laboratory examination of the contents of the

sachet in Dangerous Drugs Report No. DD-02-613,[4] viz:

Via petition erroneously captioned as one for Certiorari, Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner)

challenges the November 27, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27894
 xxxx

xxxx
SPECIMEN:

SPECIMEN:
White crystalline substance contained in a heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet marked SRE and further placed in bigger marked
transparent plastic sachet.
Urine of one SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES. 37 y/o, married, jobless, of
no. 1159 Bo. Bayanihan, Maricaban, Pasay City.

xxxx

xxxx

F I N D I N G S:

F I N D I N G S:

Net Weight of specimen = 0.1224 gram

Volume of urine = 60 mL.

pH of urine = 5.0
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen
gave POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, a
Appearance = yellow orange, turbid
dangerous drug. x x x

Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
gave POSITIVE RESULTS for the presence of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, and its
metabolite AMPHETAMINE. x x x

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

With respect to the examination of the urine of petitioner, de Belen recorded the

results thereof in Toxicology Report No. TDD-02-4128[5] reading:

 After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the

plastic sachet[7] on which he marked her initials SRE. With the seized item, petitioner was
Based on its documentary evidence and the testimony of PO1 Alvin Cruzin (PO1
brought for investigation to a Pasay City Police Station where P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza,
Cruzin),[6] a member of the Pasay City Police Station Special Operations Group (SOG), the
Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a memorandum[8] dated December 10, 2002
prosecution established its version as follows:
addressed to the Chief Forensic Chemist of the NBI in Manila requesting for: 1) a laboratory

examination of the substance contained in the plastic sachet to determine the presence

of shabu, and 2) the conduct of a drug test on the person of petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2
On the basis of an informants tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas (PO2
Aguas soon executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension[9] recounting the details of their
Aguas), proceeded at around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan St.,
intended surveillance and the circumstances leading to petitioners arrest.
Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious snatcher

operating in the area known only as Ryan.

Repudiating the charges, petitioner[10] gave the following tale:

As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to

the target area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away
At around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m. of the date in question, while she was sick and resting
and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed
at home, several policemen in civilian garb with guns tucked in their waists barged in and
transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the
asked her whether she knew one named Ryan who they claimed was a notorious snatcher
plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he
operating in the area, to which she replied in the negative. The police officers then forced her
began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and
to go with them to the Pasay City Police Station-SOG office where she was detained.
inquired about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of

replying, however, petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely

restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet
While she was under detention, the police officers were toying with a wallet which
from the cigarette case.
they claimed contained shabu and recovered from her.
 and ordered to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
In fine, petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was planted, stemming Agency (PDEA) for proper and appropriate disposition in accordance
from an all too obvious attempt by the police officers to extort money from her and her with the provisions of the law.[14] (underscoring supplied)

family.
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest without

warrant to thus render any evidence obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible.

Two other witnesses for the defense, petitioners daughter Josan Lee[11] and family

friend Ma. Stella Tolentino,[12] corroborated petitioners account. They went on to relate that
In its challenged Decision affirming petitioners conviction, the appellate court,
the police officers never informed them of the reason why they were taking custody of
citing People v. Chua,[15] held that the police officers had probable cause to search petitioner
petitioner.
under the stop-and-frisk concept, a recognized exception to the general rule prohibiting

warrantless searches.[16]

By Decision[13] of July 28, 2003, the trial court found petitioner guilty of illegal

possession of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, disposing as follows:

Brushing aside petitioners defense of frame-up, the appellate court noted that

petitioner failed to adduce evidence that the arresting officers were impelled by any evil

motive to falsely charge her, and that she was even found positive for substance abuse.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this
Court hereby renders judgment finding the accused Susan Esquillo y
Romines GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
par. 3 of Section 11, Article II of R. A. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and absent any
In her present petition, petitioner assails the appellate courts application of the
modifying circumstance to either aggravate or mitigate the criminal
liability of the same accused, and furthermore, applying the provisions stop-and-frisk principle in light of PO1 Cruzins failure to justify his suspicion that a crime was
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) being committed, he having merely noticed her placing something inside a cigarette case
years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8)
which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such legal principle could only be
months and One (1) day, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P350,000.00, Philippine Currency, plus costs. invoked if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the

suspicion.[17]

The 0.1224 gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu

involved in this case is declared forfeited in favor of the Government
 Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the affirmance That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid

of the appealed decision but seeks a modification of the penalty to conform to the pertinent search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:

provisions of R.A. No. 9165.

(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3)

searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs,
Appellants conviction stands. and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of
automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the
prohibited articles are in plain view; (7) searches of buildings and
premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) stop
and frisk operations.[20] (emphasis underscoring supplied)
Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest before her

arraignment. Neither did she take steps to quash the Information on such ground. Verily, she

raised the issue of warrantless arrest as well as the inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the

occasion thereof for the first time only on appeal before the appellate court.[18] By such
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
omissions, she is deemed to have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.[19]
seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or

seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into account, among other things, the uniqueness

of the circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place
engender the belief that a search on her was warranted. Recall that the police officers were
or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.[21]
on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts. When PO1 Cruzin saw

petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her cigarette

case, it was in his plain view. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive Elucidating on what includes stop-and-frisk operation and how it is to be carried

on his part to be drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by out, the Court in People v. Chua[22] held:

attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the

contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
. . . the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. The police
officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious
 conduct, in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers experience and weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.[23]
the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to
be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should
therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for this principle to apply.
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers

constituted a valid stop-and-frisk operation. The search/seizure of the

This principle of stop-and-frisk search was invoked by the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioners possession  later voluntarily exhibited[24] to
Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In said case, the policemen
chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying the police operative  was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a
manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the
cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And,
validity of the search as akin to a stop-and-frisk. In People v. Solayao,
we also found justifiable reason to stop-and-frisk the accused after at the time of her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted
considering the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the
accused and his companions, the fact that his companions fled when to flee after the police officer had identified himself.
they saw the policemen, and the fact that the peace officers were
precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed
persons w[h]ere roaming the vicinity. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted) It bears recalling that petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of

the Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports, subject, however, to whatever available

defenses she would raise. While such admissions do not necessarily control in determining

the validity of a warrantless search or seizure, they nevertheless provide a reasonable gauge

What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the by which petitioners credibility as a witness can be measured, or her defense tested.

police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person

who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about

him. Such a stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective It has not escaped the Courts attention that petitioner seeks exculpation by

crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, adopting two completely inconsistent or incompatible lines of defense. On one hand, she

under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for argues that the stop-and-frisk search upon her person and personal effects was unjustified as

purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) it constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Constitution. In the same breadth,

the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to however, she denies culpability by holding fast to her version that she was at home resting on

the date in question and had been forcibly dragged out of the house by the police operatives
and brought to the police station, for no apparent reason than to try and extort money from ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8)

her. That her two witnesses a daughter and a friend who were allegedly present at the time months and One (1) day, as maximum.

of her arrest did not do anything to report it despite their claim that they were not informed
Article II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 provides, however:
why she was being arrested, should dent the credibility of their testimony.

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

Courts have tended to look with disfavor on claims of accused, such as those of

petitioners, that they are victims of a frame-up. The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been
xxxx
held as a shop-worn defense of the accused in drug-related cases, the allegation being easily

concocted or contrived. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and

convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts of government Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities,
the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
officials. This it failed to do.

xxxx

Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense, the

presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court (3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand
with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over that of petitioner.[25]
pesos (P300,000) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to MDMA or ecstacy, PMA,
A word on the penalty.
TMA, LSD, GHB and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs
and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possesses is far behind therapeutic requirements; or less than
three hundred (300) grams of marijuana. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
While the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision, it overlooked the error

in the penalty imposed by the trial court. The trial court, applying the provisions of the

Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentenced petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment

 Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that when the offense is

punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to

an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed

by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

The prayer of the Office of the Solicitor General for a modification of the penalty is

thus in order.

The Court, therefore, imposes on petitioner the penalty of imprisonment of twelve

(12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with

the MODIFICATION that the penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12) years and one (1)

day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum. In all other respects, the decision of

the RTC in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.