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Islam, Secularism and the
Battle for Turkey’s Future
The following special report recounts how an Islamist-oriented Anatolia has emerged to challenge the
secular foundation of the modern Turkish state. While those looking at Turkey from the outside are
often unaware of Turkey’s internal tumult, a labyrinthine internal power struggle influences virtually
every move Turkey makes in its embassies, schools, courts, news agencies, military bases and
boardrooms. Though the Turkish identity crisis will not be resolved by this power struggle, the battle
lines drawn during the fight will define how the country operates for years to come.
Turkey, then the multiethnic Ottoman Empire, found itself in the latter position at the end of World
War I. With the aid of the victorious European powers, currents of ethnic nationalism surged through
the empire, dissolving the bonds of Ottoman control. The final blow to the Ottoman core came via the
1920 Treaty of Sevres, which dismembered the empire by ceding territory to the leading Allied powers
and to the Greeks, Armenians and Kurds — a period of history that continues to haunt Turks to this
day.
Times of crisis call for great leaders; for Turkey, that leader was Mustafa Kemal — who earned the
honorific “Ataturk,” Turkish for “Father of the Turks” — and whose face still graces statues, currency,
paintings and emblems in every corner of the country. Ataturk sought to save the Turkish ethnic core
from Sevres syndrome, as it is known in Turkey today, and to create a true nation-state. His tool of
choice was nationalism, though his definition of Turkish nationalism rejected Pan-Islamism and instead
concerned itself primarily with those Turkish citizens living in the Ottoman core that would become the
new and modern republic. Kemalist nationalism was also deeply steeped in secularism, with an
uncompromising separation of mosque and state.
To preserve his vision of the Turkish republic, Ataturk bolstered a secular elite that would dominate
the banks and industry and maintain a firm grip over the country’s armed forces. Ataturk regarded the
Turkish military as the guardian of the Kemalist state, a responsibility that Turkish generals have
frequently exploited to mount coups against the civilian political authority. For decades, this secularist-
Kemalist model prevailed in Turkey while a more traditional, Islamist-minded Anatolian class watched
in frustration as it largely remained sidelined from the corridors of power.
The post-World War I era saw Turkish expansion into Europe effectively blocked, leading Turkey to
turn its attention inward toward the Anatolian Peninsula, focusing on consolidating power from within.
Though it would take several decades to manifest itself, the rise of Anatolian forces that would
challenge the supremacy of the Istanbul elite in many ways was inevitable.
The Kemalists have long viewed the Gulen movement as a critical threat to the secular nature of the
Turkish republic. When Fethullah Gulen left Turkey for the United States in 1998, the court documents
that had been issued against him included sermons in which he called on his followers to “move in the
arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers.”
He also said that “the time is not yet right. You must wait for the time when you are complete and
conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it.”
More than a decade later, the Gulen movement has a presence in virtually all Turkey’s power centers.
In its earlier years, the movement moved much more discreetly, focusing on moving into the “arteries
of the system” without drawing attention to itself. Since 2007, however, when the AKP was elected
with 47 percent of the popular vote, conditions have ripened such that the Gulen movement can be
much more open about its activities in the country. Gulenists now transmit a strong sense of
confidence and achievement in their discussions with outsiders, as the movement knows this is its
moment and that decades of quiet work aimed at transforming Turkish society are paying off.
For its part, AKP does not walk in lockstep with the Gulen movement, nor does it want to become
overly dependent on the Gulenists. The party does not see eye to eye with the Gulenists on a number
of issues, and consciously attempts to keeps its distance from the group for fear of reinforcing
secularist allegations that the AKP is pursuing a purely Islamist agenda. Likewise, the Gulenist
movement will occasionally, albeit rarely, air its disagreements with the AKP. For instance, in the wake
of the Turkish-Israeli flotilla crisis, in which nine Turkish citizens were killed during a raid by Israeli
special operations forces on a flotilla full of pro-Palestinian activists, Fethullah Gulen said in an
interview that the Insani Yardim Vakfi (IHH) aid group that led the flotilla had defied authority for
failing to seek permission from Israel before attempting to deliver aid to Gaza. Gulen’s criticism of the
aid organization came in stark contrast to the AKP’s denunciations of Israel’s actions and strong, public
support for the IHH. Gulen apparently used the flotilla crisis as an opportunity to alter outside
perceptions of his organization, showing that his pragmatism in responding to the situation has more
in common with the West against critics who accuse the movement of being too strictly Islamist and
extreme in its views. Yet Gulen’s comments also caused an outrage amongst much of the Turkish
public (not to mention within the AKP), leading one of the movement’s leaders to retract the
statements the next day. Clearly, tension exists between the AKP and Gulenists, but the two sides also
need each other and share a desire to replace the traditional secular elite. This objective, along with
the common threat they face from the secularist establishment, forms the basis of their symbiotic
Turkey’s wrenching struggle for national identity reaches every corner of society. In the education
realm, the Gulen movement is a powerful force, creating schools across the globe to extend Turkish
influence and intelligence capabilities as the number of Turkish embassy staffers educated in Gulenist
schools continues to rise. The struggle is fiercest in the security arena, with generals regularly being
jailed over murky coup allegations. In the media arena, Turkey’s media giants wage war via editorials
and lawsuits. In the world of business, the secularist Istanbul giants continue to dominate, though an
emerging Anatolian merchant class is rapidly gaining prominence. Within the judiciary, the secularists
of the high courts are locked into a battle against AKP allies in the lower courts over a series of thorny
constitutional reforms that would go far to undermine Kemalist legal dominance. And on the street,
Turkish citizens debate whether drinking raki (an anise-flavored liqueur) is offensive to the country’s
Islamic culture and whether it is “too Islamic” to order halal meat when traveling outside of Turkey.
The AKP-run government distributes free textbooks published by a firm close to the Gulen movement
in primary and high schools. Gulen-funded schools are increasing in number, along with thousands of
public Imam Hatip schools and state-run Quran schools for high school education.
The Gulen movement claims the majority of Turkish students are enrolled in its private and public
schools. The Gulenist schools are not madrassas; in fact, they focus heavily on the sciences and math.
That said, religious classes and customs can make their way into the curriculum and daily activities,
especially in countries with existing Islamic links.
The Gulenist educational institutions are easily identified because they typically have newer facilities
and better equipment than most schools, and they offer the most intensive preparation courses for
university entrance exams. These exams will make or break a Turkish student’s career, and are
something most Turkish youths remember as the most dreaded and stressful experience of their
academic lives. Many Turkish parents are willing to pay a great deal of money to ensure that their
children receive the preparation they need to pass their exams and get into a good university.
Consequently, the Gulen movement has strategically developed private courses and Isik Evleri, or
Lighthouses, which are tuition centers that arguably offer the best preparation for university exams for
students and the best recruiting grounds for the Gulenists. For those exceptionally bright students that
come from low-income families, private courses are offered for free.
Students who have taken these courses describe how the “elder brothers” who run these Lighthouses
maintain an intense curriculum that keeps the students at school late and on the weekends instead of
out socializing and engaging in behavior frowned upon by religious conservatives. Students may start
going to Lighthouses two to three times a week, but can find themselves attending nearly every day of
the week by the time they reach the end of the course. Based on their participation, attendance and
performance in the courses, the Gulenist brothers are able to pick out the brightest and most loyal
students as potential recruits. To test their loyalty, a student may be called late in the evening or early
on a weekend morning and asked by his or her mentor to attend a function or perform community
service. This is intended to help the Gulenists evaluate whether the student will respond to orders from
his or her Gulenist mentors.
The Gulen movement and AKP have carried their presence to the university level as well. The pivot of
the university battle is an institution called the Higher Education Council (YOK). YOK was created by
the 1982 Turkish Constitution to keep a lid on political dissent in the universities, since prior to the
1980 military coup, universities were the driving forces behind the political violence between right-
and left-wing activists that marred the 1970s in Turkey. Up until 2007, YOK was a bastion for hardcore
secularists in Turkey to ensure their dominance over the universities and prevent the entrenchment of
Islamists in Turkey’s higher education institutions.
When the last secular president of YOK retired in 2007, the AKP had its chance to appoint one of its
own, professor Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, an AKP loyalist and sympathizer of the Gulen movement. Since then,
YOK has been at the forefront of the highly polarizing headscarf issue in Turkey and has used its
powers to appoint religious conservatives to university presidencies. Under the AKP’s watch, and
particularly since 2007, 37 public universities and 22 new private universities have been built, many of
them in Anatolian cities such as Konya, Kayseri and Gaziantep where the Anatolian business class is
concentrated or in less-populated and impoverished cities where young Turks have traditionally lacked
access to higher education. The private universities are mostly funded by Gulenist businessmen.
Strategic Placement
But the Gulen movement and AKP do not only want loyal students to attend Gulen-run universities.
Indeed, a core part of their strategy is to ensure the placement of their students in a variety of secular
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Over the past few decades the Gulen movement has spread to virtually every corner of the globe
through its expansive education network. The Gulenist international footprint comprises 1,000 private
schools (according to Gulen estimates) spanning 115 countries, including 35 African countries. These
Gulenist schools can be found in small towns everywhere from Ethiopia, Bosnia, Cambodia, India,
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Cote d’Ivoire, Azerbaijan — and even the United States, where according to
some estimates, the movement runs more than 90 charter public schools in at least 20 states.
Like their counterparts in Turkey, the facilities and quality of instruction at these schools are excellent,
making them attractive places for elite families of various ethnicities to send their children to receive
an education. Gulenist businessmen provide the majority of these schools’ funding. Such donors have
given a portion of their incomes to schools in an assigned region in exchange for help finding business
deals. The teachers of the schools are typically devout Gulenist followers willing to live far away from
home in foreign lands for what they see as the greater mission of the Gulenist cause.
The curriculum at these schools includes math, science, and Turkish- and English-language instruction,
but there is a deeper agenda involved than pedagogy. Graduates of these schools can usually speak
Turkish fluently, have been exposed to Turkish culture and history, and are prepared for careers in
high places. In regions like Africa and Central Asia in particular, where quality education is difficult to
come by, the children of the political elites who attend these schools usually have developed a deep
affinity for Turkish culture. As a result, the Gulenists are able to raise a generation of diplomats,
security professionals, economists and engineers who are more likely to take Turkish national interests
into account when they reach positions of influence.
The Gulenists have made a conscious attempt to avoid the perception that they are proselytizing to
students through these schools, however. Lessons in Islam tend to be more prevalent in Gulenist
schools where the religion already has a foothold. For example, Islam has a deep history in the
Caucasus and Central Asia, though the religion was severely undermined by decades of Communist
rule. Many Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and other descendants of the Soviet Union do not identify
with Islam; the Gulenist schools in these regions aim to revive moderate Islam in the former Soviet
territories. This is not to say that the Gulenists are radicalizing these countries, however. In fact, the
Gulenists emphasize that the Turkish version of Islam that they teach is moderate in its approach and
distinct from the strict Islamic practices of Saudi Arabia and Iran.
As such, the Gulenists are not welcome everywhere they would like to set up. Iran and Saudi Arabia,
neither of which wants a foreign strand of Islam influencing its people, have both shut the Gulenist
schools out. In the Netherlands, where concerns over the growth of Islam run particularly high, the
government has tried to force out Gulenist institutions. For its part, Russia — a natural competitor to
Turkey — is extremely wary of this channel of influence, and has reportedly shut down at least 16
Gulenist schools so far. Russia is also heavily reasserting its influence in the former Soviet Union; to
this end; it wishes to block the Gulenist movement from expanding in places like Central Asia and the
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Such resistance is likely to increase as the movement’s profile rises and as countries grow nervous
over Turkey’s expanding influence. In places like Africa, however, where countries are desperate for
development, Muslims are in abundance, chaotic conditions prevail and foreign competition lacks the
intensity it has in strategic battlegrounds like Central Asia, the Gulen movement has far more room to
expand its educational, business and political ties.
Turkey’s Islamists knew that if they had any chance of overturning the power balance of the state,
they would have to take on the armed forces. The process would be slow, quiet and deliberate, but
would ultimately see the military stripped of its long-held untouchable status.
The Gulen movement began this task with the police intelligence services. The Turkish police force had
long been the weakest institution within the security apparatus, largely a reflection of the country’s
rural-urban divide through much of the 20th century. In the early part of the century, the rural
population comprised two-thirds of the country, giving the gendarmerie, the branch of the armed
services responsible for the security of the countryside, far more influence than the police, which
patrolled urban areas. As more Turks began moving to the cities in the latter half of the century and
eventually came to outnumber the rural population, however, the police steadily gained clout,
providing the Gulen movement with a rare opportunity. Since the police were not a powerful force at
the time, secularists within the security establishment did not scrutinize them as carefully. As a result,
background checks for Islamist tendencies in police officers were more lax, allowing religious
conservatives to gradually increase their presence in the institution under the Gulen movement’s
guidance. Within three decades, the police, and particularly police intelligence, came under the
umbrella of the AKP and Gulen movement.
The Islamists now had a powerful tool with which to undercut their secularist rivals. Not only did they
enjoy the pervasiveness of a security network that patrols the vast majority of Turkey’s population and
the wiretapping capabilities to investigate the bowels of the security establishment, they also had a
powerful machine in the form of the AKP to uproot the Deep State and neutralize the military’s grip
over the government. The AKP spent its first five years in power from 2002 to 2007 trying to establish
a working relationship with the Turkish General Staff as it made inroads into the National Security
Council and started playing a role in the appointment of senior military leaders. In summer 2007, as
the party prepared itself for a landslide election victory, the AKP’s moves against the military took a
bold turn in the form of the now-infamous Ergenekon probe.
Ergenekon is an investigation launched in June 2007 upon the discovery of a few grenades in the
slums of Istanbul. As word of the investigation hit the newsstands, allegations began flying about how
the Deep State was at work again to overthrow the AKP government. Alleged anti-AKP conspirators
had their phones tapped, and purported transcripts of their conversations were published in the
(mostly Gulenist-backed) media. Meanwhile, hundreds of suspects, including journalists, retired
soldiers, academics and everyday criminals, were arrested in predawn raids for allegedly taking part in
this conspiracy.
Though there is little doubt that elements of the Deep State were legitimately rolled up in this
Ergenekon probe, there is also reason to believe that this probe took on a life of its own — and
increasingly became a tool with which to quash political dissent. The AKP defended the probe to the
outside world as a sign of Turkey’s democratization, arguing that Turkey was finally evolving to a point
where the military could be brought under civilian control. But as the Ergenekon probe continued to
grow, the legitimacy of the indictments began to be questioned with greater frequency. By late 2009,
the investigations began to slow down. Then, in January 2010, another purported conspiracy was
uncovered.
A new and even more politically explosive coup plot was revealed in January by Taraf, a newspaper
regularly praised by Gulenists. The plot, called “Balyoz,” Turkish for “Sledgehammer,” allegedly
involved 162 members of the armed forces, including 29 generals. The group reportedly composed a
5,000-page document in 2003, shortly after the AKP came to power, detailing plans to sow violence in
the country and create the conditions for a military takeover to “get rid of every single threat to the
secular order of the state.” The plot allegedly included crashing a Turkish jet over the Aegean Sea in a
dogfight with a Greek jet to create a diplomatic crisis with Athens and bombing the Fatih and Beyazit
mosques in Istanbul. By late February, more than 40 military officers were arrested, including four
admirals, a general, two colonels and former commanders of the Turkish navy and air force.
While the AKP and Gulen movement already have de facto ownership of the country’s police
intelligence, they are also making significant inroads into MIT, the national intelligence service. Long
dominated by the secularist establishment, MIT historically spent a good portion of its time keeping
tabs on domestic political opponents like the AKP. The Turkish National Security Council in late May
appointed 42-year-old bureaucrat Hakan Fidan as the new MIT chief. Though Fidan has both a civilian
and military background, making him more palatable to the army and civilian government, his
sympathies appear to lean heavily toward the AKP. This has not gone unnoticed by Israel, which has
launched a campaign to defame Fidan in various media outlets, alleging that he would be more prone
to sharing intelligence with countries like Iran. Notably, Fethullah Gulen publicly praised Fidan for his
previous work as leader of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA),
which works closely with the Gulen movement abroad. Fidan plans to increase MIT’s capabilities and
focus on foreign intelligence collection, allowing more room for the police intelligence (already under
heavy AKP and Gulen influence) to
operate at home. By drawing a more
distinct line between foreign and domestic
intelligence and shifting the MIT’s focus
outward, the AKP and Gulen movement
are advancing their aims of using
intelligence as a foreign policy tool to
promote Turkish expansion abroad while
slowly denying the secularists the ability
to use MIT for domestic espionage
purposes.
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Turkey’s media sits at the center of the country’s power struggle. Newspapers are the source of leaks
that have thrown generals in jails, courtrooms are filled with legal battles between media agencies and
op-eds spar daily over which ideological direction the country should take.
The media is an especially potent tool in the Gulenist and AKP fight against the armed forces. The vast
majority of leaks in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer probes mysteriously emanated from a single
newspaper, Taraf. Taraf was founded in 2007 as a paper for liberal democrats shortly before the
Ergenekon probe was launched. The Gulenists hail Taraf as Turkey’s “most courageous” news outlet
for its detailed coverage of Deep State. It printed everything from telephone transcripts of alleged
coup plotters to satellite imagery of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants crossing the Iraqi-Turkish
border to document alleged military negligence. While the Gulenists claim Taraf’s success in
investigative journalism is due to brave, disillusioned soldiers willing to leak information, others within
the secularist camp suspect the transfers of sensitive information to Taraf have arisen due to years of
successful infiltration of the armed forces by the Gulen movement.
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The most prominent media war in this power struggle is being played out between Dogan Media,
owned by one of Turkey’s leading business conglomerates, and Feza Yayincilik media group, with
Dogan’s Hurriyet and Feza’s Zaman newspapers respectively at the epicenter of the battle. Dogan
Media is extremely uncomfortable with the shift toward one-party rule under the AKP, and has publicly
proclaimed the need to balance against the rapid growth of pro-AKP/Gulenist news. After the Dogan
group devoted considerable coverage to a corruption scandal involving money laundering through
Islamist charities in Germany by senior members of the Erdogan government in 2008, the media
group soon found itself slapped with a $2.5 billion fine for alleged unpaid back taxes.
While tax fraud is relatively common in Turkey’s media sector across the political spectrum, and Dogan
Media was no exception, suspicions run deep that Dogan was singled out as an example to other
media of what can happen to a powerful business tycoon who challenges the AKP. Members within the
pro-AKP/Gulenist media camp counter that Dogan got what it deserved, and cite the fining of the
group as an example of a more democratic society that no longer shies away from punishing powerful
offenders. At this point, Turkey’s media battles intersect the corporate arena, where a quiet and
brooding competition is being played out between the old Istanbul elite and the rising Anatolian tigers.
A handful of secular family conglomerates based in Istanbul have dominated Turkey’s business sector
for decades, serving as Turkey’s economic outlet to the rest of the world. On the other side of the
struggle stand the millions of small- and medium-sized businesses with roots in more religiously and
socially conservative Anatolia. While the secular-nationalists still enjoy the upper hand in the business
world, the Anatolian tigers are slowly gaining ground.
At present, the Turkish economy is dominated by names like Sabanci, Koc, Dogan, Dogus, Zorlu and
Calik. Dogan Media occupies the staunchly secular niche of the business sector at odds with the AKP’s
Islamist-rooted vision, and has taken a public stand against the ruling party. Sabanci and Dogus also
belong in the staunchly secular group, but tend to exhibit a more neutral stance in public toward the
AKP for business reasons, such as avoiding the sort of legal battles Dogan has faced. Calik and Zorlu
groups are far more opportunistic: They keep close political connections to the AKP to secure business
contracts and tolerate the Gulen movement, though they are not considered true believers in the
Islamist agenda. The last category consists of business conglomerates legitimately pro-AKP and
Gulenist, such as Ulker Group and Ihlas Holding.
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This intersection between politics and business can also be seen in the energy sector. The AKP has a
strategy to boost four energy firms in the country that have aligned themselves with the ruling party.
The firms are divided among Turkey’s four main energy areas of interest: Ciner’s Park Teknik in
Russia, SOM in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Inci in Iraq, and AKSA in Turkey. Park Teknik and AKSA
are expected to work together to pursue a deal with Russia to build Turkey’s first nuclear power plant.
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The AKP and Gulen movement recognize the lack of space for competition with the Western-oriented
trade markets ruled by Koc, Sabanci and the other secularist business elites. Instead, the Islamist
forces have created their own business model, one that speaks for Anatolia and focuses on accessing
markets in places like the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region.
The drivers behind this business campaign are Turkey’s Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s
Association (MUSIAD) and Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), made
up of thousands of small- and medium-sized business owners. TUSKON has existed for just five years,
but is slowly emerging as an alternative to the larger, and more well-established business associations
like Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD), which represent big-name firms
like Sabanci, Koc and Dogan (and, which as expected, support the secularists).
A small-business owner from the eastern Anatolian city of Gaziantep makes a living manufacturing and
selling shirt buttons. A Gulenist invites the buttonmaker to a TUSKON business conference in Africa,
where he will be put into contact with a shirtmaker from Tanzania who will buy his buttons. The
Turkish buttonmaker and the Tanzanian shirtmaker are then incorporated into a broader supply chain
that provides both with business across continents, wherever the Gulenists operate. In short, the
Anatolian buttonmaker can expand his business tenfold or more if he belongs to the Gulenist network.
In return, the Gulen movement will ask the buttonmaker to provide financial support for the
development of Gulenist programs and schools in Tanzania. The end result is a well-oiled and well-
financed business and education network spanning 115 countries across the globe. Not only do these
business links translate into votes when elections roll around, they also (along with the schools) form
the backbone of the AKP’s soft power strategy in the foreign policy sphere.
Members of the secularist camp historically have dominated Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They
continue to maintain a strong presence in Turkish embassies, since Turkish diplomats, as in many
countries, generally must serve an average of 20 years before they reach a position of influence. But
this, too, is gradually shifting under AKP rule: Foreign Ministry sources report than an increasing
number of graduates from Gulenist schools are being recruited into the diplomatic service. To help
speed up the Islamist integration with the Foreign Ministry, the AKP-led government has passed
legislation to allow Turks to become ambassadors at younger ages — lowered from 45 to 35. Turkey
has also accelerated the opening of embassies in countries where the Gulen movement has a strong
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The Turkish Cooperation Development Agency (TIKA) is also key to these foreign policy efforts. The
Turkish government created TIKA in the early 1990s to forge ties with former Soviet countries with
which it enjoyed a shared Turkic heritage, though TIKA did not make much headway initially. The AKP,
however, reinvigorated the TIKA in recent years for use as a public diplomacy tool, transforming it into
a highly active development agency. Davutoglu has even referred to TIKA as a second foreign
ministry. TIKA’s development projects, particularly in Central Asia and Africa, overlap heavily with the
Gulen movement. As mentioned, Turkey’s new national intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan — who shares
the AKP’s vision for an expansionist foreign policy — formerly headed TIKA.
Some Gulenists privately boast that their institutions abroad, whether schools, hospitals or other types
of developmental agencies, serve as useful intelligence satellites for the Foreign Ministry. If a problem
erupts in a country in Central Asia, for example, where press freedoms are nonexistent and
information is extremely difficult to come by, the Foreign Ministry can tap local Gulenist contacts for
information and to facilitate government contacts. Gulenists abroad often learn local languages,
allowing them to act as Turkish translators. They have also developed close relationships with foreign
governments through their work as well as their students, who often are sons and daughters of the
local political elite.
AKP officials often deny Gulenist claims of serving as intelligence satellites for fear the AKP could be
seen as pursuing a subversive global Islamist agenda. Indeed, some on the far left in Turkey have
characterized the Gulen movement as a group of violent Islamist extremists ultimately aiming to
impose Shariah in Turkey. Though inaccurate, this view belongs to a fringe group within the secularist
camp that wants to reverse Turkey’s trajectory.
For this reason, the AKP has made a considerable effort to pursue negotiations with the European
Union for full-fledged membership despite the high probability such talks are unlikely to lead
anywhere. Poll numbers reveal how Turks increasingly are realizing that the chances of EU
membership have become a distant possibility. Yet the AKP cannot afford to allow that disillusionment
to seep into its foreign policy. Candidates for EU membership must have a modern economy, a military
under civilian control and an image of secularism. Privately, AKP officials agree that unanimous EU
approval for Turkish membership would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to attain. But
were Turkey to drop its bid, turned its gaze solely toward Asia, and proceeded with a Pan-Islamic
foreign policy, the party would have a much more difficult time arguing that it is not the threatening
Islamist power the secularists have sought to paint it as being. Instead, the AKP and the Gulenists
want to portray themselves as having everything in common with the liberal, democratic values of the
West — and that these very values have driven its efforts to bring the military under civilian control.
Image control becomes especially important in Turkey’s relationship with the United States.
Conspiracy theories run rife in Turkey, and both sides of the power struggle will argue that the United
States is backing one faction against the other. For example, some secularists point to Gulen’s
Pennsylvania residency and his political asylum in the United States as “evidence” the U.S.
government supports the AKP’s rise. At the same time, the Islamists will claim that the United States
backs the secularists, and provided covert support for the 2007 “soft coup” attempt by the secularist-
dominated courts to ban the AKP. Despite these charges being contradictory, the AKP is very
conscious of the need to present itself as a nonthreatening, democratic power with an Islamist
background capable of facilitating U.S. objectives in the Islamic world. This explains why, despite its
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Keeping Turkey’s EU bid alive and relations with Washington on an even keel will thus help the
Islamists undermine secularist efforts to portray the AKP in a negative light abroad. Though the AKP
will continue to keep a fair bit of distance from the Gulen in its dealings abroad to protect this image,
the Gulenist transnational network undeniably gives the AKP economic reach, social influence and
political linkages vital to Ankara’s foreign policy.
The dividing line in the judiciary lies between the secularist-dominated high courts and the AKP-
influenced low courts. This division results in a dizzying judicial system in which court rulings are often
mired in political mayhem.
The high judiciary in Turkey is made up of the Constitutional Court (or “Anayasa Mahkemesi” in
Turkish), the High Court of Appeals (“Yargıtay”), the State Council (“Danistay”), and the High Panel
Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). The seven-member HSYK plays an instrumental
role in the appointment of judges and prosecutors. In the current system, the HSYK is composed of
the justice minister, the justice minister’s undersecretary, three members appointed by Yargitay and
two by Danistay. The secularists have long controlled the most powerful judicial institutions.
The headscarf controversy is perhaps the best illustration of the struggle between religious and
secularist forces in the judiciary. Turkey’s secularist-dominated State Council has long barred Turkish
women from wearing the headscarf in the public sector, making it difficult for religious females in
Turkey to seek a university education or a career in the government, judiciary or state-run education
system. The AKP obtained sufficient votes for a proposed amendment in 2008 to lift the headscarf ban,
but the secularist-controlled Constitutional Court annulled the proposed amendment four months later
in a non-appealable decision. Shortly thereafter, the two sides butted heads again when the
Constitutional Court threatened to ban the AKP on the charge of being “the focus of activities against
secularism.” The AKP escaped the ban, but at the cost of backing off from the headscarf ban for now.
Secularists continue to hold the upper hand against the Islamists in the judiciary. Through their
dominance of the high courts, the secularists hold the single most potent weapon in this struggle: The
ability to ban political parties for violating the secular tradition of the state. The AKP is all too familiar
with this threat. The Constitutional Court has banned three AKP predecessors — Milli Selamet Partisi
(in 1980), Refah Partisi (in 1998) and Fazilet Partisi (in 2001) — for “becoming the focus of anti-
secularist activities.” Though the AKP is far more moderate in its approach than its predecessors, it
just barely escaped a ban in 2008 over the headscarf issue over the same charge. So far, each time
the court has struck the party, the AKP has come back even more resolute in its determination to
undermine the secularists. Now, the AKP is ready to take on the judiciary with a package of
constitutional amendments designed to strip the secularists of their judicial control.
With some modifications, this package of constitutional amendments calls for several critical changes.
One is the restructuring of the Constitutional Court and HSYK, ending the secularist monopoly and
giving the lower judiciary more clout. For example, the HYSK reforms call for increasing its
membership from seven to 21, 10 of whom would be selected by 12,000 judges and prosecutors in
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As expected, secularists in the high courts and the parliament — with behind-the-scenes military
backing — strongly oppose these changes, charging that they will eliminate checks and balances in the
government. They also claim that the reforms are illegal, as Article 4 of Turkey’s 1982 Constitution
states that amendments to the first three articles of the Constitution — articles which declare Turkey a
Turkish-speaking, democratic and secular republic loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk — cannot be
proposed, much less implemented. Once again, both sides are seeking to seize the mantel of
democracy, as the Islamists counter that an unelectable cabal runs the judiciary, and that these
constitutional reforms are necessary to make Turkey more pluralistic and in line with Western
standards of government.
The package of constitutional amendments got approval from the Constitutional Court and barely
made it through Turkey’s parliament on May 7, with 336 votes in favor. While this passed the 330
threshold needed for the government to put the proposals to a referendum, the parliamentary vote fell
short of the two-thirds majority needed to adopt the amendments without a referendum. The public
referendum will be held Sept. 12, the anniversary of the 1980 military coup.
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