WHAT IS SEI-IIOTICS?

Daniel L a f e r r i e r e
Tufts University

Simply put, semiotics i s the study of s i g n s . What i s a

sign? According to a somewhat precarious t r a d i t i o n
extending back through M o r r i s , P e i r c e , Saussure, Locke,
the S t o i c p h i l o s o p h e r s , and others, a SIGN i s something
thc.t stands f o r something e l s e ( " a l i q u i d s t a t pro a l i q u o "
- see Jakobson 1975 and Sebeok 1976 f o r h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l
remarks). That component o f the s i g n which has a
p h y s i c a l o r p e r c e p t i b l e impact on the i n t e r p r e t e r o f the
s i g n i s the SIGNIFIER (Saussure's s i g n i f i a n t , the Medi-
e v a l schoolman's s i g n a n s , the S t o i c ^n^^cCii/ov )• That
component i n the a l l e g e d "mind" of the i n t e r p r e t e r which
i s g e n e r a l l y known as an i d e a or concept, and which may
e v e n t u a l l y prove t o be a neurochemical e n t i t y , i s known
to the s e m i o t i c i a n as a SIGNIFIED ( s i g n i f i e , signatum,
^Kj/M^cv/^eyoi/ ) . F o r example, the E n g l i s h word " t r e e "
i s a p e r c e i v a b l e s i g n i f i e r l i n k e d together w i t h the
idea o f a " t r e e " t o form a s i g n of something that e x i s t s ,
may e x i s t , e t c . i n a world outside o f the i n t e r p r e t e r .
Note t h a t , c o n t r a r y t o common E n g l i s h usage, a s i g n i s
understood t o be not on]y a p h y s i c a l s i g n i f i e r , but both
a s i g n i f i e r and a c o n c e p t u a l s i g n i f i e d which together
stand f o r something e l s e . In an a c t o f SEMIOSIS the two
components of the s i g n , s i g n i f i e r and s i g n i f i e d are i n
some sense a c t i v a t e d i n t h e i n t e r p r e t e r who accepts them
as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e OBJECT (event). Semiosis thus
has two faces; i t i s both the presence o f the s i g n and
the absence of the o b j e c t .

Some s e m i o t i c i a n s , such as P e i r c e and Eco, see the

i n t e r p r e t e r as h i m s e l f n o t h i n g but a systematic complex
of semioses (Eco 1976, 314-317). For example, i f some-
one asks an " i d e a l " i n t e r p r e t e r what a t r e e i s (and there
are no trees i n the immediate v i c i n i t y ) , he w i l l be
o b l i g e d to say something l i k e "a t a l l , green o b j e c t . "
But then he may be asked what a t a l l , green object i s ,
and so on i n an u n l i m i t e d s e r i e s o f semioses u n t i l f i r s t
h i s e n t i r e s t o r e o f semioses about trees i s exhausted,
and then e v e n t u a l l y h i s e n t i r e s t o r e o f semioses about
h i m s e l f i s exhausted and he has definerd h i m s e l f as an
i n t e r p r e t e r e x c l u s v e l y b.y means o f a l l these semioses.
This "brain-washing" approach to the i n t e r p r e t e r i s
e s s e n t i a l l y what l i e s behind such claims as Buffon's
"Le s t y l e c'est I'homme meme" and P e i r c e ' s "My language
i s the sum t o t a l o f myself" or "Man i s a s i ^ n . "

In theory, a n y t h i n g i n the universe c m become

s e m i o t i c i z e d , anything could conceivably stand f o r some-
t h i n g e l s e , anything i n the universe hc.s the p o t e n t i a l
 - 3 ~

of b e i n g a s i g n . But there are signs and there are

"signs." B i o l o g i s t s , f o r example, know that the green
c o l o r of a l e a f i s a " s i g n " of c h l o r o p h y l l i n the l e a f .
Chemists know that the blue c o l o r of litmus " s i g n i f i e s "
an a l k a l i n e s o l u t i o n . Astronomers know that a red s h i f t
i n the spectrum of l i g h t emanating from a s t a r i s a " s i g n "
that the s t a r i s moving away. But b i o l o g i s t s , chemists,
astronomers, and other s c i e n t i s t s are " s e m i o t i c i a n s "
only i n a r a t h e r banal sense of the word. The r e l a -
t i o n s h i p s these s c i e n t i s t s study can p e r f e c t l y w e l l
e x i s t without them, i . e . , without i n t e r p r e t e r s tc semi-
o t i c i z e such r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Not so with the r e l a t i o n -
sh:.ps s t u d i e d by the p r o f e s s i o n a l s e m i o t i c i a n . The l a t t e r
i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the f u n c t i o n i n g of signs i n an i n t e r -
p r e t e r (or i n t e r p r e t e r s ) other than himself (unless he
i s studying h i m s e l f o b j e c t i v e l y , as another i n t e r p r e t e r ) .
Thus, f o r example, a s e m i o t i c i a n might study how b i o l o -
g i s t s make connections between ttie c o l o r s of leaves and
t h e i r n o t i o n s of the chemicals i n tne leaves. That i s ,
i t i s p o s s i b l e to do a semiotics of s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r p r e -
tation. More commonly, however, the. s e m i o t i c i a n s t u d i e s
signs that are imputed i n a c o m p l e x c u l t u r a l code rather
than signs which r e s u l t from s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o v e r i e s . Thus,
a s e m i o t i c i a n might take an i n t e r e s t i n how the c o l o r
green came to be a s s o c i a t e d with the notion "go" at a
t r a f f i c i n t e r s e c t i o n . Or he may t r y to determine how
and why green came to represent the psychologicaJ.
s t a t e of envy i n c e r t a i n c u l t u r e s . The e s s e n t i a l i n g r e -
dient i n h i s s t u d i e s , a s opposed to the studies of a
b i o l o g i s t , a chemist, e t c . , i s the i n t e r p r e t e r . Whereas
l i g h t of a wavelength p e r c e i v a b l e as green i s r e l a t e d to
c h l o r o p h y l l whether o r not the b i o l o g i s t i s present,
such l i g h t does not s i g n i f y "go" at a t r a f f i c i n t e r s e c t i o n
unless t h e r e i s an i n t e r p r e t e r present behind the wheel
of an automobile e n t e r i n g the i n t e r s e c t i o n . No semiosis
takes place i n the absence of an i n t e r p r e t e r . The tree
f a l l s i n the f o r e s t whether or not an i n t e r p r e t e r i s
present, but t h e f a l l does not s i g n i f y anything without
an i n t e r p r e t e r . b e m i o t i c s , then, i s not merely tiie s t u d y
of s i g n s , but i s the s t u d y of how i n t e r p r e t e r s a c t u a l i z e
the i n f i n i t e number of p o t e n t i a l l y semiotic r e l a t i o n s h i p s
that e x i s t i n t h e u n i v e r s e . Semiotics i s a highly prag-
matic e n t e r p r i s e . As P e i r c e i n s i s t e d , the sign always
stands f o r something to someone (even i f that someone i s
h i m s e l f a c o m p l e x of s i g n s ) . Or, i n zoosemiotic and other
systems n o t i n v o l v i n g the grammatical category of person,
the s i g n always stands f o r something to something. Thus
a c e r t a i n sound produced by a Wood Tlirush during the
b r e e d i n g season s i g n i f i e s s o T r e t h i n g p r e c i s e l y to i n d i -
v i d u a l s of t h e same species (or, i n rare instances, to
semioticians s t u d y i n g t h a t species).
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Armed with t h i s somewhat o v e r l y t e r s e d e f i n i t i o n

of s e m i o t i c s , the reader w i l l now h o p e f u l l y t u r n to a
few of the b a s i c t r e a t i s e s on s e m i o t i c theory.*

A RUDIMENTARY READING LIST IN GENERAL SEMIOTICS

Baran, Henryk (ed. & i n t r o d . ) . 1976. Semiotics and

S t r u c t u r a l i s m . White P l a i n s , N.Y.: I n t e r n a t i o n a l
A r t s & Sciences P r e s s .

Eco, Umberto. 1976. A Theory o f S e m i o t i c s . Blooming-

ton, Ind.: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press.

Jakobson, Roman. 1975. Coup d ^ o e i l sur l e developpement

de l a semiotique. -Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana
University Press.

Locke, John. 1960 (1694). Essay Concerning Humane Under-

s t a n d i n g . London: Thomas Basset.

M o r r i s , C h a r l e s . 1946. Signs, Language, and Behavior.

New York: George B r a z i l l e r .

P e i r c e , Charles Sanders. 1965-1966. C o l l e c t e d Papers

of Charles Sanders P e i r c e . Cambridge: Harvard
U n i v e r s i t y Press (8 v o l s . ) .

De Saussure, Ferdinand. 1973 (1915). Cours de linguis-

t i q u e generale. P a r i s : Payot.

Sebeok, Thomas A. 1976. C o n t r i b u t i o n s to the Doctrine

of Signs. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y
P r e s s . L i s s e : Peter de Ridder P r e s s .

* I wish to thank Barbara A. Shapiro f o r c o n s t r u c t i v e

comments on the f i r s t d r a f t of t h i s essay.