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BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. HON. LOURDES F.

GATBALITE, as the Presiding


Judge, Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56, and COL. JAMES D. LABORDO, as the City
Jail Warden of Angeles City, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56, rendered on
January 31, 2000.[1]
The facts of this case are undisputed. The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in Criminal Case
No. 85-816, at the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3.
During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for
decision without offering any evidence, due to the petitioners constant absence at hearings.
On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve
a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court.
On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in the court of origin. Despite
due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner was returned unserved with
the notation that he no longer resided at the given address. As a consequence, he also failed to appear at
the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued an order directing the recording of the decision
in the criminal docket of the court and an order of arrest against the petitioner.[2]
Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the
Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
at the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. He impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief of Police of
Mabalacat, Pampanga.[3] Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds
that:
(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under
No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and
(b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminal
liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 [of the] Revised Penal Code.[4]
After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City on January 25, 2000, petitioner filed an Amended
Petition with the Regional Trial Court, impleading herein respondent Col. James D. Labordo, the Jail
Warden of Angeles City, as respondent.[5]
In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioners detention was pursuant to the order of commitment
(mittimus), issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk of Court III of the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles
City, Branch 3, dated January 25, 2000.[6]
On January 31, 2000, respondent Judge rendered the decision, which is the subject of this present
appeal, which pronounced:
The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the petitioner that the penalty imposed on him in the
decision adverted to above had already prescribed, hence, his detention is illegal for under Article 93 of
the Revised Penal Code:
The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be
captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or
should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.
The elements of prescription are:
1. That the penalty is imposed by final judgment;
2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence;
3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been
captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty, or
committed another crime;
4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from the date of the evasion
of the service of the sentence by the convict.
In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the evasion of the service of sentence is
absent. Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not served the penalty imposed on him in prison and that
during the service of the sentence, he escaped therefrom. Notably, at the trial of Crim. Case No. 85-816
in the Municipal Trial Court, Branch III, Angeles City and on the date set for the promulgation of the
affirmed decision, the petitioner failed to appear and remained at large.
There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this case, because such evasion presupposes
escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty. (Infante vs. Warden, 48
O.G. No. 122) (92 Phil. 310).
Corollarily, the detention of the petitioner in Angeles City Jail in compliance with the Order of
Commitment (Exhibit E) is not illegal for
A commitment in due form, based on a final judgment, convicting and sentencing the defendant in a
criminal case, is conclusive evidence of the legality of his detention, unless it appears that the court
which pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded it. (U.S. vs. Jayne, 24 Phil 90, 24
J.F. 94, Phil. Digest, Vol. 2, 1398).
WHEREFORE, for not being meritorious and well-founded, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Angeles City, January 31, 2000.[7]
From the above quoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on a question purely of
law and raised the following issue:
HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE SHALL COMMENCE TO RUN FROM THE DATE WHEN THE
CULPRIT SHOULD EVADE THE SERVICE OF SENTENCE IN ARTICLE 93 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES BE
CONSTRUED? PUT A LITTLE DIFFERENTLY, WHEN DOES THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF
PENALTIES BEGIN TO RUN?[8]
Petitioner claims that:
xxx the period for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins to
run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes final and the convict successfully evades,
eludes, and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.[9]
Petitioner supports his claim in the following manner:
The Decision subject of this appeal, which was based on the 1952 ruling rendered in Infante vs.
Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122, 92 Phil. 310, is, petitioner most respectfully submits, not good case law. It
imposes upon the convict a condition not stated in the law. It is contrary to the spirit, nature or essence
of prescription of penalties, creates an ambiguity in the law and opens the law to abuse by government.
THE INFANTE RULING IMPOSES A
CONDITION NOT STATED IN THE LAW.
It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an essential element, the convict must serve at least a
few seconds, minutes, days, weeks or years of his jail sentence and then escapes before the
computation of prescription of penalties begins to run. This, petitioner respectfully submits is not a
condition stated in Article 93, which states that, the prescription of penalties shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of sentence.
There is no dispute that the duty of government to compel the service of sentence sets in when the
judgment of conviction becomes final.
The dispute, however, is in the construction of the phrase should evade the service of sentence. When
does the period of prescription of penalties begin to run? The Infante ruling construes this to mean that
the convict must escape from jail because such evasion presupposes escaping during the service of the
sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.
Petitioner, with due respect, disagrees because if that were the intention of the law, then the phrase
should evade the service of sentence in Article 93 would have read: should escape during the service of
the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty. The legislature could have very easily written Article
93 to read this way
The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should
escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty, and it shall be
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country
with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription.
But they did not.
The legislature wrote should evade the service of sentence to cover or include convicts like him who,
although convicted by final judgment, were never arrested or apprehended by government for the
service of their sentence. With all the powers of government at its disposal, petitioner was able to
successfully evade service of his 2 months and 1 day jail sentence for at least nine (9) years, from
August 9, 1991 to January 20, 2000. This is approximately 3 years and 5 months longer than the 5-year
prescriptive period of the penalty imposed on him.
That, as the respondent RTC Judge noted, petitioner did not attend the trial at the Municipal Trial Court
and the promulgation of his judgment of conviction in August 9, 1991 is of no moment. His bond for
provisional release was surely cancelled and an order of arrest was surely issued against petitioner. The
undisputed fact is that on August 9, 1991 the judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia and
an order for petitioners arrest was issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch III.
The duty of government, therefore, to arrest petitioner and compel him to serve his sentence began on
August 9, 1991. The 5-year prescriptive period of his arresto mayor penalty also began to run on that
day considering that no relief was taken therefrom. Since petitioner never gave himself up [n]or was
[he], until January 20, 2000, ever captured, for the service of his sentence nor did he flee to some
foreign country with which [our] government has no extradition treaty, that 5-year prescriptive period
of his penalty ran continuously from August 9, 1991 when his judgment of conviction was promulgated
in absentia and was never interrupted.
For reasons known only to it, however, government failed or neglected, for almost nine (9) years, to
arrest petitioner for the service of his arresto mayor sentence [which] should not be taken against
petitioner. He was able to successfully evade service of his sentence for a period longer than the 5-year
prescriptive period of his penalty and, as such, is entitled to total extinction of his criminal liability.
To say, as was said in Infante, that the prescriptive period of the penalty never began to run in favor of
petitioner because he never escaped from jail during the service of his sentence imposes a condition not
written in the law. It also violates the basic principle that the criminal statutes are construed liberally in
favor of the accused and/or convict and is contrary to the spirit behind or essence of statutes of
limitations [and] prescription, in criminal cases.[10]
The Regional Trial Court based its decision on the case of Infante v. Warden[11]. In said case, Infante,
the petitioner, was convicted of murder and was sentenced to seventeen years, four months and one day
of reclusion temporal. After serving fifteen years, seven months and eleven days, he was granted a
conditional pardon. The condition was that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Ten years after his release on conditional pardon, Infante was found guilty by a Municipal
Court for driving without a license. Infante was immediately ordered rearrested for breach of the
condition of his pardon. One of the issues raised by Infante in his petition,
xxx was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner had been recommitted to jail one year and 11
days had prescribed. xxx [12]
The Court disagreed and reasoned out thus:
The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of
prescription of penalties commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of
his sentence. It is evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential element of
prescription. There has been no such evasion in this case. Even if there had been one and prescription
were to be applied, its basis would have to be the evasion of the unserved sentence, and computation
could not have started earlier than the date of the order for the prisoner's rearrest.[13]
A perusal of the facts in Infante v. Warden reveals that it is not on all fours with the present case. In
Infante, the convict was on conditional pardon when he was re-arrested. Hence, he had started serving
sentence but the State released him. In the present case, the convict evaded service of sentence from the
start, and was arrested eight years later.
The RTC decision, however, must stand, since it is in accord with applicable decisions of this Court.
The issue raised by petitioner is not novel. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code[14] has been interpreted
several times by the Court.
The case of Tanega v. Masakayan[15] falls squarely within the issues of the present case. In that case,
petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on the day of the execution of her sentence. On the same
day, respondent judge issued a warrant for her arrest. She was never arrested. More than a year later,
petitioner through counsel moved to quash the warrant of arrest, on the ground that the penalty had
prescribed. Petitioner claimed that she was convicted for a light offense and since light offenses
prescribe in one year, her penalty had already prescribed. The Court disagreed, thus:
xxx The period of prescription of penalties the succeeding Article 93 provides "shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". What then is the concept of
evasion of service of sentence? Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says
Article 157:
"ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by
escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. xxx"
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he
"is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence
by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a
convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of
final judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions
of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape
shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or
floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through
connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence
is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."
xxx
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to
commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who sentenced to imprisonment by final
judgment was thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her
favor.[16]
In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo[17], the Court cited and reiterated Tanega. Petitioner, Del Castillo, was
charged for violation of Section 178 (nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The trial court found Del Castillo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment
of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court in toto. During the execution of judgment on October 14, 1987, petitioner was not
present. The presiding Judge issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner was
never apprehended. Ten years later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on the
ground that the penalty imposed upon him had already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial
court. Del Castillo, on a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, questioned the denial by the
trial court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon denial of his Motion for
Reconsideration, Del Castillo raised the matter to this Court. The Court decided against Del Castillo
and after quoting the ratio decidendi of the Court of Appeals in full, it ratiocinated, thus:
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of this Court in Tanega
vs. Masakayan, et al., where we declared that, for prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to
commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason to deviate from our
earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case.
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to
run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his
sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed
only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of
Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.
Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of the
judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the
Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for
the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords
compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but
he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence and applicable laws. It
did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the pertinent laws. Because petitioner
was never placed in confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor.[18]
Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court pronounces that the prescription of penalties
found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to those who are convicted by final
judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription
of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000
and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his service, the period for
prescription never began.
Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months and one day of arresto
mayor and should forthwith be released unless he is being detained for another offense or charge.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 is AFFIRMED,
but petitioner is ordered released effective immediately for having fully served his sentence unless he is
detained for another offense or charge.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Pangan v. Gatbalite Digest


Pangan v. Gatbalite Digest

Facts:

1. On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to
serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on
October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Petitioner never got to serve his sentence
and hid for about nine years.
2. Then, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention
Cell. Four days thereafter, he filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the RTC of Angeles City,
impleading respondent (Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga). Petitioner contended that his
arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that, a) the straight penalty of two months and one day
of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and (b)
having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminalliability
has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

3. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied since there was no evasion of the service of the
sentence. Evasion presupposes escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation
of liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty already prescribed

HELD: NO.

The period of prescription of penalties – the succeeding Article 93 provides – "shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Article 157 of the RPC
discussed how evasion of service of sentence was perfected. It is provided therein that,

"The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any
convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment. To consider properly the meaning of evasion service of sentence, its
elements must be present these are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving
his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades
"service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment."

That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the second sentence of Article
157. It provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false
keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the
term "jail breaking."

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and
157 of the RPC means the unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one
who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In this case, the petitioner was never brought to prison. As the record would show, even before the
execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. He now begs for the
compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to
appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive.
The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be
rewarded therefor.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and FEDERICO
DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari is the order rendered by Judge Manuel Castañeda on January 28, 1976
dismissing Criminal Case No. D-868 of the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and the order rendered in the same
case on March 22, 1976 by his successor, the herein public respondent, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order of dismissal.
Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a
parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan, registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 47682.
On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon,
Jr., naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964, private respondent
mortgaged the parcel of land with the People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said special power of
attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special power of
attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 13, 1964. :- nad

After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account not having been paid, the mortgagee bank
foreclosed said mortgage and the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica and Vileta Quinto who were issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said property. In January, 1972, complainant allegedly discovered that their property was
already registered in the name of said Ramon Serafica when the latter filed on said date an action for the ejectment of the
former from the premises.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of a public document was filed against private
respondent in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the information reading as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the abovenamed accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a private individual, after having in his possession
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the
signature of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney, causing and making it appear that the said MARIANO
F. CARRERA, signed and affixed his signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a public document, when as a matter
of fact and in truth, said MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not in anyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof, nor gave his
permission, and in order to make good the acts of falsification, with intent of gain and by means of fraud and other deceits,
the said accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsified public document (Power of Attorney) did succeed in
securing the loan from the People's Bank and Trust Company in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the knowledge and consent of said MARIANO F. CARRERA, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount of P4,250.00, and other consequential damages." 2
After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case proceeded to trial and the prosecution presented
complainant Mariano F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig from the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan. Another witness, Col. Jose G. Fernandez, a handwriting expert, gave his partial testimony but the same was not
continued as counsel for private respondent moved for and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss.
On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was filed, wherein it was alleged that the crime charged would not lie due
to the partial testimony of complainant allegedly to the effect that he authorized private respondent to mortgage the said
one-half portion of the land owned by him and his brother. Said partial testimony of complainant was quoted, with the
emphasized portions, as follows:
"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your property at present?
A Yes, sir, I know.
Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?
A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.
Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know the reason why it was foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked me to sign a document as a
witness and I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on
the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said.
Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to you in Manila and asked you to sign a power of attorney
authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the one-half portion of that land owned by you and your brother. Do you have any
document to show that?
xxx
ATTY. DIAZ:
Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if shown to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document which is, your Honor, for the purpose of identification, and may we
request that it be marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This document consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the
first page be marked as Exhibit B and the second page be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two. Will you tell this Honorable
Court what is this?
A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me to sign, sir.
xxx
(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4
Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that there is no sufficient basis for the charge and this fact
warrants the dismissal of the case.
Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since more than ten (10) years had elapsed from the time the
crime was committed. Since the information charges the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document,
then the penalty shall be that for the more serious crime which shall be applied in its maximum period, as provided for by
Article 48 of the Penal Code. The more serious crime in the present case is the falsification of the public document which is
punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum period and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. Prision
correccional being a correctional penalty, the same prescribes in ten (10) years.
It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed in the case merely alleged the date of the commission of the
crime which was February 5, 1964 and the information was filed only on March 29, 1974. This being the case, private
respondent claims that more than ten (10) years has passed from the commission of the crime to the filing of the
information. No other allegation having been made as to the discovery of the alleged crime, private respondent claimed that
the period of prescription commenced on the day on which the crime was committed. He asserts that, from the date
appearing in the transfer certificate of title covering the land mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage documents were duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1984, hence the alleged crime became public
knowledge on the same date. To support his theory, private respondent made the following citation:
"The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the commission of the crime if it is known at the time of its
commission. :-cralaw

"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be discovered, because the entire series of transactions was by
public instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa committed in connection with said transaction was known to the
offended party when it was committed and the period of prescription commenced to run from the date of its commission.
People v. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967,
Vol. I, pp. 711-712)." 5
The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows that what was intended was an authority to
mortgage only the one-half portion pertaining to his brother and he was only quoting what his brother told him when he said
that ". . . this is an authority to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which
belongs to me, my brother said." 6
It further submitted that the information was not filed out of time since the date to be considered should not be the date of
registration of the alleged power of attorney on February 13, 1964. It argued that the crime was actually discovered only in
January, 1972 when Ramon S. Serafica filed an action to eject complainant from the premises, which fact was not alleged in
the information because it was considered by the prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter which would not be in accord
with the legal truism that an "information must allege only ultimate facts and not evidentiary matters." 7
With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private respondent, petitioner submits that "(t)he same has only a
persuasive effect and not to be considered as an interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code as the same is the
sole prerogative of the Supreme Court." 8
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castañeda of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed
the case on January 28, 1976 on the ground that the crime had prescribed. The People's motion for reconsideration was
denied by the succeeding Presiding Judge Felicidad Carandang Villalon.
On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from both orders of the trial court. In a resolution dated May 13,
1976, this Court required the prosecution to file a petition for review on Certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No.
5440. 9 Thereafter, said petition for review and the corresponding comment and reply of the parties having been filed, on
February 21, 1977 the Court resolved to treat said petition as a special civil action and required petitioner and private
respondent to submit their respective memoranda. 10
From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution of the following issues:
1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because the private respondent would thereby be placed in
double jeopardy;
2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document filed against the private respondent has sufficient
ground to exist in law and in fact; and,
3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is already extinguished by prescription. 11
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As enunciated in People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et
al.:
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information (Section 9, Rule 113).
However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not
constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2)
the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question
to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have
to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 12
On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in
law, we hold in the affirmative. The falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because before
the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial
documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document, hence,
the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa. 13
Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half
portion pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining to complainant, otherwise complainant would not have
quoted his brother's words. The theory of petitioner and the findings of public respondent are substantially the same. We
agree that the offense charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the findings of the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of complainant Mariano Carrera and of the record, as
regards the first ground, the court finds that the contention of the defense that the authorization given to him to mortgage the
whole property is not sustained by the evidence because a cursory study of the answer made by the witness complainant
clearly shows that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera,
excluding that portion pertaining to said complainant. (T.S.N.. pp. 8-10, hearing on June 18, 1974). In other words, the
alleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land referred to the
share of Severo Carrera only. This finding is based on the following quoted answer:
'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the bank
on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said.'
Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted testimony. He merely quoted his brother Severo Carrera to whom
the half portion of the land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted by Mariano Carrera, did not use the phrase `which belongs to
you.'" 14
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document,
the resolution of the issue on prescription is, however, determinative of the validity of the impugned orders of public
respondent.: nad

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a complex crime is that for the most serious component
offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. In the crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document, the
more serious crime is the falsification which carries with it the correctional penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine not more than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes punishable by
correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 of the Code, and Article 91 thereof states that the
prescriptive period commences to run "from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities,
or their agents . . ."
The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized special power of attorney registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Dagupan City on February 13, 1964 authorizing private respondent to mortgage a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 47682 in order to secure a loan of P8,500.00 from the People's Bank and Trust Company. The
information for estafa thru falsification of a public document was filed only on March 29, 1974. We reject petitioner's claim
that the ten-year period commenced when complainant supposedly discovered the crime in January, 1972 by reason of the
ejectment suit against him.
People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well established rule that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole
world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All
persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. On these considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in Cabral vs.
Puno, etc., et al., 16 to the effect that in the crime of falsification of a public document the prescriptive period commences
from the time the offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered with the
Register of Deeds is not without legal basis.
It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in interpreting the phrase "from the discovery" found in Article
1391 of the Civil Code which authorizes annulment, in case of mistake or fraud, within four years from the time of the
discovery of the same, the Court also held that the discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the
document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole world and
this should apply to both criminal and civil cases.: nad

We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the application of said rule on constructive notice in the
interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to private respondent herein, since
the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, that is, from the time the questioned documents
were recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was registered on February 13, 1964. The criminal information
against private respondent having been filed only on March 29, 1974, or more than ten (10) years thereafter, the crime with
which private respondent was charged has indubitably prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged orders of public respondent are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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