Iraq's WMD e a net assessment

IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

A NET ASSESSMENT

Contents
AN HISS
Page

The International Institute for strategic Studlea, About The Internahnnai Institute for StratefIle Studies Introduction : assessing Iraq's WMD capabilities 1-2
Anmdel House, I3-75 Arundel Street, The Intemabonal Insbtule for Slmteglc Studies a an
London WCzR 3DX, UK independent centre for researcb, tnfomtanon and debate A history of UN inspections in Iraq (1991-98) 3-14
httpJlwww .iiss.org on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have,
or potentrally have, an unportant m,btary content Iraq's nuclear weapons programme 15-28
The Counnl and Staff of the inshtute are miernatlonal
Direttor Dr John Chipman and us memberehtp as drawn from over qu countrres Iraq's biological weapons programme 29-40
The Institute is Independent and it alone deades what
Editor Dr Gary Samore activnhes to conduct It owes no allegiance to any Iraq's chemical weapons programme 41-54
govemment my group of gnvemmemts or any polihcal
Research AszirtantKristma ZeHerlund orother organisanon Thell55stresses ngarousresearch Iraq's ballistic missile programme 55-68
wuh a forwarddewlung puhcy oventation and places
Editorial James Greety James Hacker per4cular emphasi.a onbnngmg new perspecbves to the Conclusion : towards a net assessment 69-74
.Iestape debate
Designer Simon Nevnf Footnotes 75

Further reading 76-78

This publication has been prepsredby the Duector of the
Institute and Ins staff, who acrept full responabthty for Appendix - relevant UN Security Council Resolutions 79
its contents.

Red published 9 September aooz

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introduction : assessing Iraqrs WMD capabilities
A yegr 7sftqi the Tr September termriat attacks, there
s mcreaxd attentson to the threat posed by Iraq's
programmes to develop nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons and long-range bathetic missiles
Vutually no, one contends that Saddam Tiuaserrfs
appetite for such capabilities, has been sated, but there
are widely divergent views on the magnitude of the
threat and how to deal with it Some argue that Iraq's
weapons of mass destruchon (WbiD) capabilities,
crippled by a decade of precision art strikes, broad
economre sanctions, and robust UN inapec[nons, are best
contained by a strategy of 'smart' sanctions, mdttary
deterrence, and pressure on Baghdad to resume
Inspections . In this view, there ta no urgent need to
revmnve the iraqr, regune by force, and little danger that
Saddem Hussem will use his WMD capactties (either
directly or through surrogates) except as a last resnrt if
faced with a threat to destroy he. regmte.
Others argue that sarictions, corrections, and
diplomatic pressure only slow the threat, at best, and
may even provide false assurance, at went Given
Strident Hussd(s unshakable commttrrtent to WMD,
they argue, the only lasting solution is to replace him
with new leaders, who am willing to comply with lmq~s
intemational obligations and forego WtvII) In this view,
d is better to remove the threat now, while Iraq's
capabilities are still weak, than wait for the day (which
may mine sooner than expected) when louts WMD
capabilities come to fruthon and mose the stakes for
military action esimmously
The outcome of this debate may be today's
moat unportant foreign policy and define,, issue,
with dramatic near-term and profound long-term
consequences for the Middle Bast and International
security. To help inform and illuminate this debate, the
MS has produced this Strategs Dosser of Iraq's WMD
and missile programmes Our objective is to aasess, as
accurately and dispassionately as possible, Iraq's current
capabilities m the area of nuclear, chemical, and
biological ,.veapons as well as balltsde missiles The task
is challenging. Although UN inspectlons of Iraq
produced a tremendous amamrt of techmcal mformahon
on the development, objectives, and relative capabilities
of Imqa WMD and m~seHe programmes, Iraq made
every effort to obsenre its past, obstrocl dismantlement
elite present assets, and retam capabilities for the future
A great deal win learned, but not everything, and some
of the messrng pieces aft, vital
Bruce Iraq forced Inspections to end In December rgg8,
it has become even more difficult to learn about ne
activities and assess As capabilities. The full extent to
which Iraq was able to hide and retein capabdrhes
dum,g the years of UN mspeehons is not known . The
extent to which Inq has taken advantage of the absence
ofInspection tobegin reconsBtubngrmprogrammas,and
the extent to which these efforts have succeeded or
1 Iraq'sWeeponsMMass Destrucnon " An1155Strategic Dossier
Introduction. assessing Iraq's WMD capabilities
faded, is not known The extent to which Iraq has been
able to obtain vital foreign asaatance through cracks in
Over this rpgp¢d, the Insumte has developed a
reputahon for consistently providing an ob)echve record
and,.. and reviewers for them generous assstance and
willingness to share me . knowledge and experience
the sanchons regime Is not known Naturally, Western of worldwide military holdings The BSS has always The responsibility for the information and judgiineets
mtelhgence agencies have focused great energy on applied careful judgements in anaysing material in the that we present is, unambiguously, ours alone,
gathering mforuuhon ft, answer these questions, but public domain, and material offered to it by
reliable rnfrnmahon is hard to come by . With its governments, other organisaturns and individual experts
pervasive intelligence apparatus and closed society, Iraq with bpeaahsed expertise The Institute has relied on
Is a hard target Against sophisticated acerwillson . thet experience hi assessing the information it has sought
equipment, Iraq has developed skulls m the art of and gathered to complete this Dossier We thank the
deception and demal Periodically, defedora from Iraq
come forward with tantalising tales, but most of then
mformatron cannot be confirmed and their motivations
are someumes suspect .
Recogrusing these difficulties, the IISS has built in
assessurent on a finodk itnin of technical expertise We
have invited recagnised technical experts, with long
held experience in ONSCOM and IAEA inspections in
Iraq, m draft individual chapters on routs nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons and balhame missile
programmes Fach chapter deacrobee the historical
development of Iraq's technical capabilities and the
progress of its WMD and mmsde programmes, from
their mihabon in the uud-19700 through the Tran-Iraq
War (rg8o-88) to the end of Gulf War m rggr We then
assess the disarmament achievements and the rooming
issues left over from the period of UN inspections from
rgqr to 1998 Pmally, each chapter concludes with our
best assessment of Iraq s WMID capabilities since r998,
based on what assets it was probably able to retain from
before 1998 and what capabilrbes it may have been able
to reconstitute since then
AB of the technical chapters have undergone wommi
peer review by fellow technical experts, anat with
"action expenence on the ground m Iraq
On wine tssves, there was strong consensus. On others,
not surprrsurgly, there were different views it
dtsagreeumend To the extent possible, we have tried to
describe these issues accurately and fairly. It as impossible
to provide an exact accounting of lmq's current nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons and missile
capabilities. Therefore, wehave tried m present a range of
the most plausible possibilities, Assigning relative
likelihood to different assessments and specifying the
underlying sssumphoas that support our judgements.
Within ceftain parameters, it is possible to make a
reasoned net assessment of Iraq's probable current
capanhes, and we have atteumpted to do this, applying
due caution, for each component of Iraq's WMD
capabilities. We trust that this analysis and assessment
will ensme a more formed public debate on the critical
issues brought forth by Iraq's weapons of mass
destruchor, programmes
'Me IISS nas for over 40 years published annually The
Military Balance Title Is the only reliable, publicly
avadable mvmtory of the world's armed forces, rebel
groups, and orgsmsed non-state armed groups
Iraq'sWesponsofMassDesbuction " AnI1SS5tntegicDOSSier 2
 A history of UN inspections in Iraq (1991-98)
overviaw
February rggs, a US-led coabhon of allied forces
'nexpelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait, which Iraq had
invaded In August the previous year During the
amfhtt, coalrhon am forces focused much of Bad, atmcka
an known and suspect Iraqi nuclear, clienucal and
biological weopmvs and balbst¢ mtsvle faalrbes After the
Gaff War, the L1N Security Council was detentioned ho rid
the world of Iraq's weapons of maas destnrceon (WMD)'
Iraq's proven record of aggression against as naghbouses
and use of chemlcal weapons, Including against its
own people, made the task seem all the more urgent
The United Nations Security Council set out are, ambitious
goal of cautioning de objective within months . After more
then u years, that objective has sldl not been achieved
ln Mey r99s, the UN Special Co . . (111,TSCOM)
and the International Atomrc Energy Agency (IAEA) -
the orgamsahons entrusted with implementing the UN's
drseromament goals m Iraq - began to coondor, verify
and destroy Iraq's WAID entered it limit it, ballistic
misesle pragram. The next eight years of international
inspections, however, proved to be a rocky road
conked by friction between the UN and Baghdad as, Iraq
sought to retain as much of its WMD and ballistic
missile ®pabdrhes as it could- Suspicions, of Iraqi non-
compbance were venhed m August rggg aftm the
defection of Lt Gen Hussein Kernel, who had been
responsible for Iraq's weapons programmes Kamei's
defection prompted Iraq to reveal addthonal tnformahon
and release additional documents that had been hidden
since rggt . Nonetheless, Iraq continued to conceal
informuman and sought to limit Inspection rights,
explortmg political drwmons m the Security Co .] over
whether to bit someone against Baighdid.
In December rgg8, the UN withdrew its inspech,rs from
Iraq shortly before the US and UK launched a fom-day air
campaign m retsliattmt for Baghdad's failure to cooperate
with the inspecnmis . Drsprte Iraqi non-compliance and
consistent concealment efforts, the UN inspection left Iraq
with anImpressive list ofaccoamplrshrnenis,UNSCOMand
the IAEA destroyed or removed large quantities of WNM
and related buildings, materlal and equipment However,
a number of significant issues were unresolved, especrally
concerning brologtal weepons, and Iraq has relained the
expertise and personnel necessary to nxonahtnte rts WMD
and musdeprograpmtev. Since rgge, Baghdad has refused
to allow the resumption of UN inspections unless
sanctions are lifted The UN, on its pact, has rejected the
lifting of sene6ons mad. hat Ban fully courplass with its
dmarmament obligations The stalretrade continues as of
autumnaoos .
'On 3Aprd 1991,theSecurity Council passed Resolution 627, which establisheda formal cease-fire and
set out o number of long-term requirements on Iraq. Key among these cease-fire terms was the
prohibition against IraqS retaining acquiring or developing WMD, (nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons) and lona-ranae missiles'
3 Iraq's Weaons of Mass Destruction - An IISS Strateic Dossier
Setting thain.ga for Inspections
On z March sggr, the UN Security Comord adopted
Resolution 686, which imposed specific conditions on
Iraq following the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait
m Oteratmn Desert Stonn Iraq was required to cease aft
hoshte athe., release pnsoners of war, retain Kuwaiti
prop" and provide information and assistance In
Identifying Iraqi mores, booby traps and other explosives
as well as any chemical and bmtrilocal . .p. and
metesiallnKuwait On ;April rggr,theSecurity Council
Famed Resolution 687, which established a formal cease-
fire and set out a number of long-term requirements
on Iraq Key among these ceese-fire terms was the
prolubrhon in section C against Iraq's retammg,
acquiring or developing WMD, maidear, biological and
chemical wrapuns) and long-range recaulas Paragraphs
7-ro of SCR 687 dealt with charcoal and biological
weapons (CBW) and long-range missile delivery
systems Iraq was onconduhonally required to accept
the deshuchun, removal, or renderu+g harmlesv, under
international eupervtsmn of finally .11 CBW, star" of
agents and related subsystems and components, and all
research, development, support and manufacturing
facilities relevant to the development of CBW; and
secondly, of all balhshc mtsatles with a range greater than
Isolate, related main pads, and repair and production
fec,bhea, Paragraph. rr-a ; covered Iraqi nudear assets
Panamint to Imq's obligations under the nuclear Non,
proliferation Treaty (IVPI), Iraq was unconditionally
required to agree not to acquire or develop nuclear
weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material, any
snbsystems or components, or any related research,
developrtumt support or manufactunng facdmes
Procedurally, Iraq was required to entered to the
UN Secretary General and flee IARA Director General a
declamation, of .11 WMD sides and rte
. will. r5 days of
the adoption of the resolution. Will 45 days, the
Secretary General was to establish a special cranceression
to perform on-site weapons inspections, and together
with the IABA Director General was to develop and
submst plans to the Security Council for the destruction,
removal, or rendarmg bunnies. of if specified WMD
sites and items This special conurdssion - ulbmately
designated the UN Special Commwslon, or UNSCOM -
was to carry nut, within 45 days of the approval
of due subacession by the Sexually Crucial, on-site
Inspections of lraq's proscribed CEW and missile
assets and their subsequent destnrclion, removal or
operational neutmhsatton
The lAEA Director General was requested to
perform on-site Inspections of f:aq's nuclear capabilities
munedmtely following Fraq'c declarations and the
designannn of any n1dumn.] locations by the Special
Commesstoo. SCR 687 further ustructed the Secretary
General, in consultation with the Special Coccurossion,
and the G1EA Director General to develop plans for the
ongomg momtonng end verification (OMV) of Iraq's
compliance Time long-teron place were to be submitted
to the Security Council for approval within rao days of
the adoption of SCR 687. As is evident from this interee
schedule, the Secunty Council enwaged that wdhhr
some four months of the passage of SCR 687 all Iraq's
WMD capabrh4es would be accounted for and a
permanent monitoring system would be m place to
verify future acceptance Eleven years later,theseresults
have not been achieved
on 6 April rggr, Iraq factually rimified the Secretary
General and the Secvnty Council tlwt it had no choice
but to accept iheprow .von.s of SCR 687 On iv April iW1,
the president of the Security Cosmcd, formally, notmg
that the conditions estabhahed m the resoluhon had been
met and that the formal cease-fin, was in effect, accepted
Gaq's reentrance The IAEA set up a special 7AEA Iraq
Action reaoi tocarryoutristasksandSwedtshdtplomat
Rolf Ekeux was appointed Executive Chairman of
UNSCOM
Iraq subrmtted an initial dedaranon, as required under
SCR 687, haung some chemtrsl weapons and matenals,
as well as 53 al-HUsenn ar,it Scud class balletic in ... lea
It denied havmg a biological weapons programme,
nuclear weapons or weapon.a-grade nuclear contend
After the IAEA questioned the accuracy of the nuclear
declaration, Iraq tevtsed it to include nuclear materials
already subject to IABA safeguards it listed ficeddies at
Al-Tuwmtha and AIQaun Iraq also listed additional
dean,.] weapons and refined he mrvade declamhon .
On 17 June, the Security Council adopted SCR 699, which
approved the implementation plans that had been
provided by the Secretary General and the LkEA Director
General as required in SCR 687
Ian(, dareption twimicimas and practices
Fmm the start of the mspectons by UNSCOM m rgqr
through to the chances, of UNSCOM m rggg Iraq
practised a range of measures designed ta prevent
the UN mspectora from finding the full range and extent
Of tts proscribed WMU and mtssile programmes
'the Security Council envisaged that within some fourmonths ofthepassage ofSCR687 alllraq'sWMD
capabthues wouldbe accountedfor anda permanent monitoring system would be m place'
'From thestart of theinspections by UNSCOMIn 1991 through to the demise of UNSCOMIn 1998 Iraq
practineda range otmeasures designed to prevent the UN inspectors from finding the fulronge and
extent ofits proscribed WMIDandmissileprogrammes'
L
0 Ira'sWeaons of Mass Desiouction - An 1155 Strateic Dossier 4
A history of UN Inspections in Iraq (1991-98)
7hese measures ranged from those that were subtle,
., .fully planned and coorclouded to others that were
inmprovised, onroordutated and wits From the onset
Iraq decided on a plan of complete demal for
programmes that were not publicly known (nuclear and
biological weapons) and to Wmt as far as possible
divulging the status of the publicly known chemtcal
weapons and comele programmes
The UN mspechus found written instructions ft .
senior Iraqi officials to Iraq's research, development and
production establishments Ordering them to tmpede the
inspection effort At the highest level, the plan was to
deny the existence of the nuclear weapon and offensive
biological programme m what were supposed to be Full,
Final and Complete Declarahons (FFCD) required by
the UN Security Council. At lower levels, des effort
was attempted through obfuscation with misleading
mfonnannn, mnrealmg equipment, forging and hiding
dmvments and preventing access to key persom,ei
In order to support Iraq's concealment scums, the Iraqi
intelligence service embarked on n operation to
discover UNSCOM's intentions and assessments
This espionage effort involved subormrig UNSCOM shift
at UN headquarters m New York, tapping UNSCOM's
commurucahons belween New York and its held
operalrons I. Bahrain it gathering cru.nonsturn On
uapectora in Iraq daeff Through these ethics, Iraq was
somehmes able to forsworn fscllffies that Ought be
subject to inspection and learn the object of the
inspcchons m advance in order to be better able to
develop counter-measures .
In ihe case of the biological weapons pmgramme, the
Iraqis attempted to defeat the mapectcs with forged
documents. These docuumenb related to the hoped and
distribution of growth media, material used for culturing
biological organisms As part of its effort to identify all
the equipment end material Hut had a dual use, capability
for legrtunate civilian purposes or for a biological
weapons programme, UNSCOM found that in a single
year Iraq had imported 4o tomtes of growth media from
companies in Europe, a quanbty far more than would be
needed for several years for legitimate purposes Paced
with Ness evidence, baq clmmcd that thes material had
been distributed W regional hospitals Iraq was able to
account for only a secall portion of the material claiming
that the remainder had been destroyed in nots, firm and
 A history of UN Inspections in Iraq (1991-98)
other events When Iraq produced documents to ecconnt
for rd claimed distribution, UNSCOM found, after
forensic amrmnalion, that key docuuments relating to
this niatenal could not have been prepared on the dates
shown - they were forgenes. Still pracasing dismal, the
Iraqis said that the docuaients were'reconstructed' as the
originals were last as a result offices, having fallen off the
back of a truck. and other implausible circuumbarim
The increasingly desperate attempts at a cover-up m the
face of UNSCOM's persistent effort to follow-up on all
these esplanatrons became so Incredible that the cover
storycoBapsed m March rqq5 The Iraqis finally admitted
formally to an offensive biological weapons pmgramme
onrJWy :9g5,efterfourandahalfyearsofdenial (Even
then, however, Iraq =tinned to deny key aspects of their
biological weapons programme .)
The kind of elaborate obfuscation illustrated by
this case was reinforced by hatassment of inspectors,
for example by intrusive use of video cameras to
interfere with on-site Intaviews in the production of
'spontaneous' crowds to impede access or intimidate
inspectors into leaving a facility To be successful,
ulspecNon teams found that they had to devise special
measures to mean and remove doemeents of special
interest. These were cases of mepectorsbemg jostled and
loving such documents snatched h . their hands
Many inspections, of a rontme nature, or where it was
clear that nothing of sigmhcant mterest would be found,
were not interfered with in this way
When it was reabaed that the Iraqis were indulging in
elaborate dereptton plans f1NSCOM decided to set up a
special met to counter Irsq's efforts Such a research and
analysis effort should have been an invaluable support
for the inspection teama In the told Unfortunately, this
team developed into an isolated mission separate from
the general inspection effort and even mounted
Inspections Itself, Instead of remaining a back-moni
-support prolect In the latter years of UNSCOM's work,
there wan no eoordmated effort to defeat Iraqi deception
plans In which all the chief irtspecton and the planners
participated. The result was that to overcome the lraqt
concealment strategy, uidWldual Inspectors and
UNSCOM fuE-time staff at UN Headquarters had to use
their initiative as beat they cattle, hampered by not
having available in them all the Information to help
assure the success of their inspections
. While there
were some notable successea in defeating the Iraqi
nrealurent effurt, many -the. failed and some
resulted inunproductive confrontations This experience
demonshebasthat noon-stteinspectors ofIraq'sWMD
'While there were somenotablesuccesses In defeaung the Iraqi concealment effort, manyothers failed
and some resulted in unproductive confrontations This expenence demonstrates that no on-site
Inspections of Iraq's WMD programmes can succeed unless inspectors develop an imaginative and
1 carefullycoordmatedcounter<oncealmentstrategy' -- - -
t '
programmes can succeed urdess inspectors develop
an magi,'ative and carefully coordinated counter-
concealment strategy
Inspectionsahe earlyyean 1991-93
The IAEA and UNSCOM began their on-site inspections;
m May and June Iggr, respectvely At the end of June,
however, Iraq denied inapectors access to two stes,
Abu Chraib and pallulah. In a widely reported modent,
UNSCOM and L4EA inspectors then tred to intercept
Iraqi vehicles that were trying to, escape out of the
back exii of the pallu)ah facility The vehicles were
carrying nuclear-related components, and Iraqi security
personnel fired warning shots m the au m order to deter
the inspectors from approaching the veluclea The team,
however, was able to Obtain edensive photographs of
the veludes and thew cargoes, and the equipment was
latersetzed and destroyed These modem prompted the
Security Counol to despatch a high level nmusron to
Baghdad at the end of June rggr . The team, which
conststed of the Chairman, of UNSCOM, the Director
General of the IAEA ..it the UN Under Secretary"
General for Dtsarmsment Affairs, met with senior
offictals of the Iraqi government The subsequent report
of the mission included various assurances of full
cuoperabon from Baghdad .
By August, however, m became clear to the UN that
Iraq was still obstructing the work of UNSCOM and the
IkPe On z August rggr, Iraq admitted to the that
UNSCOM biological inspection team that it had run a
lunited biological weapons research programme but
worsted that it had been for defensive military purposes
only, which Is permitted under the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC) The inadequacy of Iraq's uuhal
WMD declarehons and numerous incidents of Iraqi
failure to cooperate with UNSCOM and the IAEA
prompted the Security Council to adopt SCR 707 on 15
August aqgr Thus resoluhon expressed concern over
Iraq's lack of cooperabon and condemned its non-
compliance with SCR 687 as a 'matenal breach' of us
obligations Iraq was called on to allow the inspection
Name of UNSCOM and the IAEA 'rmmedtate,
unconditional and unrestricted acome Furthermore,
SCR 707 demanded that Iraq provide an FFCD of its
proscribed WMD and missile programmes Although
Iraq claimed to be in compliance with the provisions of
SCR 707, it did Onto and has not thus far, formally
accepted the reselturom
UnderSCR707,UNSCOMandtheIAEAAction Team
were given theauthority tousethenownheBcopteraand
-- -----'
aircraft throughout Iraq for survedlance and logistical
purposes The first UNSCOM inspection team planning
to use heBcopters, however, wes prevented from doing
so by Iraq in the beginning of September At the end of
September r9qr, a team of IAEA Inspectors uncovered
documents on Iraq'a nuclear weapons programme at an
ofhce building in Baghdad When the inspectors refused
to reltnquesh the docmnents to Iraqi offinals, they were
detamed m the building's parking lot for four days The
team wes permitted to leave with the donmrents only
after theSecurity Counerlthreatened enforcement action
OnraOctober sgqr,theSecuntyCouncil adopted SCR
715, which approved the OMV plans submitted by the
Secretary General and the Director General of the IAEA
as requested m SCR 687 The plans crammed detailed
specrficauons of Iraq's Obligations and the rights,
m,.ludmg rights of access and requirements for
inspections Inparhcular,SCR715obliged Iraq todrscloee
mformauon on sites capable of contributing to WMD
programmes Iraq refused to accept SCR 715 for more
than two years At the end of January tgq ; a special
UNSCOM mission, was sent to Baghdad to secure Iraq's
unconditional acceptance oftheadopted resoluhons,but
Gaq rejected any obhgatsons unposed an it by SCR 707
and SCR 715 The Security Council subsequently
expressedits'graveconceni overIraq'sfaBuretocomply
and supported a deosron to dispatch an additional
special mission to Baghdad The second mussion,
however, also faded to secure Iraq's unconditional
acceptance of as obbgatmns under the UN resolutions
In March sggz, after UNSCOM confronted Baghdad
with evidence that it had retained prosmbed material,
Iraq revealed the extstence of additional and previously
undeclared matenals and weapons, including baWshc
nussiles and chemical warheads for these tmsad . .
However, Iraq explained B ent most of these items had
been unilaterally deshoyed m July rggr following the
inspection at Abu GhraBl m June, which had turned
ronfrontshonal This unilateral destruction campaign
was in clear vrolahon of SCR 687, and Iraq claimed them
were no records of the destruchon Extenswe UNSCOM
investigations into Iraq's destruction claims yielded
mixed resolts Some evidence supported the Iraqi
declarations, while others raised doubts A case m point
wss Iraq's account of the destruction of missile
launchers Until August 1997, Iraq maintained that
proscribed mlssBe launchers had been scrapped m July
tggl . Only when UNSCOM discovered evidence front
aerialsurveillanrermagerythatsuchdmtnschonhednot
Tenslons between Washington and Baghdadincreased following US airstrikes m June 1993 against
~ theheadquartera ofthe Iraqi intelligence senncesin Baghdadm response to an assassination attempt
agarnstformerPrestdentGeorgeBush .ThesetenstonseasedaRerIraqffnallyaccepted5CR715on26
November 1993 Iraq's formal acceptance of5CR715 opened theway forbeginning substantial efforts
I to design andestablIshrheOMVsystem .'
A history of UN Inspections in Iraq (1991-98)
taken place when Iraq claimed, did Iraq admit that the
destruchon had not occurred until October rggr . In the
CBW area, UNSCOM was never able to fully account for
the amount of agent and mumtions that Iraq dal= It
secretly destroyed In the summer of 19q, which has
supported suspicions that Iraq may still retem some of
these proscribed materials
Another conftontaaon with Iraq occursed ntjuly rqga,
when UNSCOM attempted to carry out in mspechon of
the Iraqi Mine" of Agriculmot, aimed with reliable
in formation that d housed documents on Iraqa long-
range balbhcmuvdeprogramme The inspectors were
denied access, and subsequently staged an rg-day
observation outside the building Pollowmg attacks by
mobs and mereaeingly violent demonstrations, the team
was finally forced to leave
At the beginning of 1993, Baghdad refused to permit
UNSCOM to we its own aircraft to fly into Iraq Iraq also
women mcurslons into the demilitansed zone between
Iraq and Kuwait and intensified its military onvity in
the no-By zones enforced by Airencen and allied nor
Once, The President of the Security Couned warned Iraq
of serious consequences if it continued to deny
UNSCOM clearance to use its own atcaaff On is
January, France, the UK and the US launched an on raid
on sites m southern Iraq linked to Iraq's WMD
pmgramme. On the same day, Iraq informed UNKOM
that d would be able to resume its flight, Another
showdown occnrred m the summer of 1993 when Iraq
refused m allow UNSCOM to tratall remnteoonholled
monitoring cameras at two missile test stands at Wadi
and Yawm al-Aztm. Mole coosultatlons between
IINSCOM and Iraq continued, UNSCOM tried to seal
thesites temporardy,butIraq rehsed Thestandoffwas
finally resolved when Ekeus managed in negotiate the
installation of cameras, which were uwtalled and
activated ou 25 September 1993
in the meantime, tensions between Washington and
Baghdad increased following US au strikes m June s993
agamst the headquarters of the Iraqi intalhipmes
services m Baghdad m response fo an assassuiafhon
attempt against farmer president George Bush . These
tensmns eased after Iraq finally accepted SCR 715 on xd
November 1993 . lraq's formal acceptance of SCR 715
opened the way for begundug; substantial efforts to
drsign and establish the OMV systeue However, Iraq
has yet to erect penal legislation against actividee
prohibited m SCR 657, SCR 707 and related
impleareming Instruments, as required by SCR 715
A history of UN Inspections In Iraq (1991-98)
19947996:chronlc crises
In late r994, Iraq complamed that despde its formal
acceptance of SCR 715, declared inlenhons to cooperate
and daily operehons of UN Inspection We= within its
leaders, there appeared to be 'no light at the end of
the tunnel', contrary to Ekeus'represetmnon M Baghdad
m September 1994 that Iraqi cooperation with the
mspechone would pave the way for hfbrg sanctions
UNSCOM Bull refused to close the dtsarmsmemt files,
pnmarily, citing senaus defraenaes m Iraqi declarations
of us biological weapons programme and mconeistenaes
in its declarations, on chemical weapons and ballistic
missiles . The IAEA continued to raise questions, about
the extent of Iraq's gas cannfuge . .in envchrvent
programme and nuclear weapons development
To increaseprssure. Baghdad umlateraily set a deadline
of ro October z994 for the unplementehon of paragraph
ax of SCR 687 calling for the bftmg of sanctions upon
compliance with weapons' obligations and began to
deploy troops and other military assets to the south, m
the duechon of Kuwait A reactive US military build-up
in Kuwait, however, was sufficiently robust W convince
Baghdad to refrain from further escalation. Iraq pulled
back its forces after the UN Security Council adopted, on
IS October, SCR 949, which demanded that all Iraqi
military umd deployed to southern Iraq be wiBWtawn
to it. original posruovs and barred Iraq from taking
'any other action to enhance its ordinary capacity In
southern Imq'.
Although the Security Council was =led in
opposing Iraqr threats against Kuwait, there were
growing divisions among the five permanent members
(United States, Ruasla, UK, Pmnm, and Chaos) over [he
continuation of sanctions against Iraq and the pressure
on the UN to do something to ralreve the plight of the
Iraqi people, who were bearing the brunt of sanctions-
On 14 April 1995, the Security Council passed SCR 986,
which set the terms of reference for the 'oil for food
programme'. SCR 986 permitted Iraq to sell up to US$z
turner worth of oil to an initial i&" .y period
Revenues firm these sales were controlled by the UN
Sanctions Committee, which, would release the funds at
Baghdad's request to purchase food and medical
supplies for Iraq
In response, to UNSGOM evidence, on t July 1995 Iraq
acknowledged fm the first time that it had an offensive
biological weapons (BW) programme, and bad produced
biological agents for weapons but denied that they had
put them into munitions. The evidence that forced
this admtsston was obtained m the face of an
elaborate deception plan involving forged docuarents,
As Iraq and UN Inspectors continued to play cat and mouse over Imq4 past WMDprogrammes, Iraq
was also seeking to evade UN sanctions on the procurement of new materials, equipment, and
components foritsprosaibedprogrammei'
constantly rhangmg and misleading statements, and the
concealment of materteL On 8 August 1995, Lt Gen
Husseur Kernel, Saddanis son-in-law and Minister of
Industry and Mineral. as well as former Duector of
Iraq's Military Industnahsabon Corporation (MIC),
defected to Jordan Hossetn Kernel, who had been
responsible for all of Iraq's weapons programmes,
subsequently provided information to UNSCOM,
the lAEA and foreign intelligence agencies about
Iraq's WMD programmes Shifting blame onto
Kernel personally, Baghdad cleared that he, acting
independently, had ordered important udormabon on
the WMD progrnmmes be withheld from UNSCOM and
the IARA Baghdad now admitted to a more extensive
BW programme than previously stated, acknowledging
that it had weapomsed BW agent, and deployed BW to
militaryumbmr99a-9r In arlditionleaq acknowledged
greater progress m its efforts to produce long-range
missiles indigenously and revealed additional
mformanon and docmvents on us CW and nuclear
weapons progmmmn
Crucially, Iraq handed over ta UIJSCOM and the
IAEA r5o crates, of documents from the Helder chicken
farm, which it claimed Hussein Kernel had been tudmg
The so~lled'etucken farm' documents cantered new
.formation on the production of venous cheaucal
agents, including VX nerve gas, and would lead lo
bather evidence of Iraq's development of nuclear
weapons . Nonetheless, UNSCOM concluded that nome
porecritbed materials and docaments existed UNSCOM
was able to detect from imagery of the farm that
numerous containers bad been removed from the arm
ehortly before the impreencers The documents Is. had
clear gaps, for example there were few documents
pertaining to the OW programme and no documents
related to the military or the Ministry of Defence, which
led UNSCOM to conclude that selected documents had
been weeded out before the bulk of the doctinuents were
provided to UNSCOM. One specific document acquired
m August returned to the Al-Afluer facility, which
was responsible for developing a nuclear device
The document showed how the officials operating the
facility had been instructed by a high-level Iraqi
committee in r99a to remove evidence, evacnate
documents and develop cover stones
As Iraq and UN Inspection continued to play cat and
mouse overlraq's past WMD programmes, Iraq was also
seeking m Cvade UN sanctiorea on the procurement of
new materials, eqmpmemt, and components for ds
proscribed progranmtes In November 1995, for
example, Jord=an authorities intercepted a large
shipment of lugh-grade mussde components, including
gyroscopes and accelerometers, desMed for Iraq from
Russia In response to Iraqi denials, an UNSCOM
mveengahon concluded thatlraq+authonhes and mresde
facilities had been involved in the acquisition of
advanced guidance and control components for
proscnbed missiles Similar missile components were
discovered in the Ttgns River near Baghdad m December
1995 On 27 March r996, m response to these and other
covert procurement affirm, the Security Councd adopted
SCR 1051, which appmved an expoct/unport momtonng
meabanum for Iraq applicable to potential dual-use
items to ensure that Iraq did net reconsbNte its WMD
programmes, Iraq and other involved governments were
required to powers, noohcaoon m advance of any
stupments, whlch were thm subled- to review and
approval by . UN Sanctums Commutes
In the early summer of 1996, Iraq repeatedly denied
tntemaborial Inspectors access to Brier, which Iraq
claimed were off-hound. because of natural securry
concerns On rz June, m respoave, the Security Courral
adopted SCR 1060 This resolubon stated that Iraq's
arm . were m clear emission of past resolutions and
demanded that Iraq grant'hurnerhate Bud
access to all same; designated for uupechon Despite SCR
1060, Iraq, on the following day, blocked access yet
again. Shortly thereafter, UNSCOM F.Beauve Chairman
Ekeus went to Baghdad to negotiate future access with
Deputy Prime Mmrster Tanq Aztz The outcome of the
negotiations was a ]unit 1996 Statement and a Joint
Programme of Action. UNSCOM gamed the right to
u~spect'sensitlve'sitesunder modahhes,whtchincluded
bi-monthly assessment meebnga between Ekeus and
Azlz, established m order to take into account Iraq's
'legitimate security concerns, which explicitly did not
include possesston of WMD
1997-1998: collapse of the inspection reglme
By the end of r996 and early 1997, ddivisions withor, the
Security Council over Iraq had become open Russia Bud
France, supported by Clone. pressed for'closmg'the files
on Imq's past WbID progreomtes, establishing the OMV
systesm and Idling ecvnooue sanctions . The United States,
supported by tM UK, resisted any cfford to declare that
Iraq's past WMD programmes had been accounted for
Although the debates were often tedmtrsl, the
utidedymg dispute was political . Wastungton Bought the
removal of Saddem Hussem, while Moscow and Parla
were prepared to accept his regime . As a result, the US
had every mcen4ve to demand high standards for
resolvmg disamtausart issues, in order to maintsm
'By the end of 1996 and early 1997, divisions within the Security Council over Iraq had become open
Russia and France, supported by China, pressed fortlosvng'the files on Iraq's past WM0 programmes,
establishing theOMVsystem and lifting economic sanctions '
A history of UN inspections m Iraq (1991-98)
ecmtoouc sanc4ons against Baghdad, while Moscow and
Pans were inclined to offer incentives and compromise
in disarmament issues m order to hit amen . and
resume nom,al relatons with Baghdad
Taking advantage of these divisions In the Security
Council, Iraq stepped up efforts to undermine UN
uiaperttons Despite the agreement between Ekeus and
Arm tin inspecting sensitive sites, senous frrcnon
continued, In November r996, UNSCOM vmspectors
discovered buried missile parts (including engines for
Scud-type missies) but were prevented by Iraqi officials
from removing them for in-depth analysis outside Iraq
The Security Council demanded that Iraq allow the
removal of the mMile engmes, wh¢h it delm February
1997 Iin early s ummer z997Iaq interfered with
LWSCOM's helicopter and mspectors were
again denied accces to certam Bites The Security Council,
on u Tune 1997, adopted SCR 1115, condemning Iraq's
actions and compelling Iraq to allow mspechon teams
'immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access'
The Counal aLso suspended penodtc sanchons and arms
embargo reviews until receiving and reviewing the next
consolidated progress report (due on is October 1997) on
Iraq's coopemhon with UNSCOM, Bud threatened to
'impose additional measurea on those categ .nes of Iraqi
offi¢els responsible for the non-comphance' Shoroly
thereafter, on r July r997, Australian diplomat Richard
Butler succeeded Rolf Bkeus as Execunve Ch. ..
of UNSCOM
Under Butler'e chairmanship, relanons between Iraq
and UNSCOM and between 11NSCOM and some
members of the Security Council berame even more
strained- in September 1997, Iraq handed over its fifth
PPCD for t4 BW programme, but an international expert
panel concluded that same month that the declaranon,
like Its four predecessors, was memoriam, inadequate
and technically flawed In September and October 1997,
UNSCOM was agatn prevented from accessing three
sttes, on the grounds that they were 'presidential' wha
not Subject to UN inspection On ry September, an lcacp
office] manhandled an UNSCOM inspector who was
trying to take photographs of unauthorLsed movement
inside a site desi gnated for inspection Four days later,
when trying to gam access to another site, mspectors
witnessed Iraqis moving files, burning dersoments and
dumping ash-filled waste cars into a nearby river
In another incident, an UNSCOM mspeclor reportedly
caught men rumung out the back door of a food
laboratory with smtcases, which turned out to contain
logbooks on the creation of bacteria and chemicals
On aj October r997. the Security Council adopted
 A history of UN inspections in Iraq (1991-98)
SCR 1134 Citing Iraq's 'flagrant violatimi of SCRs 687,
707,715 and'1060 and its non<ompluuce with SCR 1115,
ate new resolution demanded that Iraq cooperate fully
with UNSCOM and kept the suspension of the periodic
sanctions reviews m place, while indicating additional
sanctions would be =posed pending another report an
Iraq's cooperation with UNSCOM. b, pamctdar, SCR
1134 contemplated travel bans on obstructive Iraqi
officials not 'carrying out ban . fide diplomatic
assignments or missions' d non-cooperation ronanued
Tenasone between Iraq and UNSCOM heated up further
In a letter dated 29 October and signed by Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aztz, Imq Informed the Security Council
Build had decided nut to deal with American UNSCOM
personnel and demanded all American UNSCOM
memben leave Iraq wohm one week
Iraq also charged that U-2 surveillance planes,
provided by the US and vital to the work of the weapons
Inspectors, were being used for spying beyond the scope
af UNSCOM's mandate Five days later, on 3 November,
Iraq warned that it would shoot down any U-2
surveillance planes flying over its terntory. The new
impasse prompted the Security Council to adopt SCR
1137 on la November r997- The resolution noted with
'grave concern' the Iraqi letter and threats and
condemned Iraqe continued violation of its obligations
It also imposed travel resonators on Iraqi offlaats who
could be linked to uumncvs of non-compBance. The
following day, Iraq again insisted that all LINSCOM
personnel of US nationahty, leave Iraq immediately
UNSCOM decided to withdraw a majority of its
personnel from Iraq, wlthonly e taken staff remammg In
Baghdad to maintain premises; and equipmea ut The cries
was defused after Moscow, llttervened with Baghdad,
and LINSCOM personnel retumed on 20 November
In December 1997, Iraq again sought to restnet
UNSCOM's series by coasting five categories of innei
and designating two such categunes-proxidential end
sovereign - off-livmlts In total, ehrse sit" covered an
area of approximately 7o square lolometres. In lanuary
a9g8, Imq said It was ending IN corapareflun with an
InspecBOn team on the grounds that it had too many US
and 1JK nationals On a3 January 1998, Iraq accused
Scott Inner, the American leader of one vmspection Near,
of spying for the US The US and the UK threatermed an
stakes. Following a visit by UN See" General Kofi
Annum to Baghdad intended to forestall mill" acium,
the 11N and Iraq entered Into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOD) on 23 February The MoU
reiterated lraq's undertaking to cooperate fully with
UNSCOM and the JARA. The TIN confirmed IN
'In December 1997,Iraq again sought to restrict UNSCOM4 access by creating five categories of snes
and designating two such categories - presidential and sovereign - off-6mlts. In total, these sites
covered an area ofapproximately 70 square kdometres.'
commumetit to respect the sovereignty of Iraq and
provided for the establishment of spOcat procedures
that would apply to initial and subsequent inspections
of the eight presldenbal sites. On z March 1998, the
Security Council adopted SCR 1154, which endorsed the
provisions of the MuU.
Dutrng the first half of 1998, a series of expert
meehngs were convened to evaluate Iraqi declarations
In response to a request frous Iraq these meetings
included tndependent experts who had not been
involved m the mspechon process In early February,
two technical evaluation meanings (l'EA4) took place in
Baghdad to consider Iraq's declamd production of
chemical agent VX and special warheads for biological
and chenucal weapons The experts concluded that Iraq
had not provided sufficient infotutauon far UNSCOM to
deteruune that Iraq had undertaken all the disarnmement
steps requued in these arees Similarly, s TFM on
biological weapons ronvene.d m law March concluded
that Iraq's declaration with respect to its biological
weapons programme was mcomplete and madequate.
An additional meeting of mtemahonal biological expects
in July confirmed that conclusion. In late March
end early April, a two-week senes of inspechons,
which included the'pmsidentlal sites', proceeded, but on
9 April 1998 UNSCOM reported that it had made no
progress in verrfyasg whether Iraq had destroyed its
WMD On 24 )une, the UNSCOM peecejave Chairman
indicated that name of VX nerve gas had been found On
Iraql missile fragments, crmtraduting Iraqi assume.
that it had net weepoiitsed VX-
On 3 August 1998, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister
Terlq ALz told the UNSCOM Executive Ch.
Richard Butler to rate= the Security Coomed that the
requirements of section C of SCR 687 had been met
Butler responded that he wes not m a position to do so
Two days later, on 5 August, the Revolutionary
Command Council and the Baath Party Command
decided to suspend all cooperation. with UNSCOM and
the IABA unless the Ser:urrty Council lifted the ,
embargo and reorgardsed UNSCOML The Security
Cannot pronounced Iraq's actions totally unercepmble
and, on 9 September r998, adopted SCR 1194 Notmg
Iraq' . 'totally unacceptable contmvenhon of IN
obligations' under SCRe 687, 707, 715, 1060, 1115 and
1154, as Well as the MoU, SCR 1194 utummously
condemned fmrfs decision to suspend cooperation with
UNSCOM and the IAEA and cancelled the 6o-0ay,
sanctions reviews scheduled for October until Iraq
resumed cooperation On 31 t7etober Ig9B, Iraq stated it
would reasa ON forms of mteracNOn with t1NSCOM and
I I cruise missile and bombing campaign, Operation Desert Fbx, which included attacks on a number of
halt all UNSCOM activities inside Iraq, including
monitoring The Security Council condemned the
decision, and an g November adopted SCR 1205, which
demanded that Iraq immediately and unconditionally
.it in decisions of 5 August and 31 October
In response to UN pressure, and the threat of US
military snacks, Baghdad allowed the resumption of
UNSCOM inspections, but n soon became clear that full
couperanon, mcludmg unrestncted access to all sites,
would not be aBmved Neither Baghdad or Wash ington
was m my mood N comprovuse Washington calculated
that a auhtary confrontation would ether force Iraq to
resume cooperation with UNSCOM on more favourable
terms, or Iraq would make good on us threat to eject
utspedions, which would keep sanctions se,arely in
place Baghdad peLAapa thought that dnis. within the
Security Counol had created propitious conditions 0
Without UNSCOM, which was connnumg to press for
more details on Iraq's CBW and consde programmes
On 16 December r998, UNSCOM withdraw ma staff Iran
Iraq, and the US and UK began a lour-night cruise missile
and bombing campaign, Operation Desert Fox, which
included attacks an a number of facdihes that were
mvolved m iraq's permrtted r5okm range ~deproleds
Following the attack, Baghdad declared that d would no
longer deal with UNSCOM, wind, it accused ofprovtdmg
intelligence and targeting mformatron to the US
The birth of UNMOVIC
At the requeat of the UN Secretary General, Celso
Amonm, Bravl's ambassador to the UN and then
I'restdentaf the SecurIty Council, convened those panels
m February and March r999 to assess Iraq's fulfdment of
its obhgabons under SCR 687. One of the panels
concerned disarmament In a report submitted on 27
March, that panel concluded that while the bulk' of the
disarmament tasks had been eahefactonly completed,
'the cement absence of impactors has exponentially
increased the risk of compromismg the level af assucence
already achieved'. Accordingly, the panel rescurnmended
that arn mtrustve announcing system for former and
Potential Imp WMD facilities be put in place as soon as
possible
One year after UNBCOM left Iraq, an r7 December
1999, the Security Council adopted (with four
abstenbom, including those of permanent members
China, France and Rivals) SCR 1284. Reflecting the
i 'On 16 December 1998, UNSCOM withdrew its stafffrom Iraq, and the US and UK began a four-night
I _faahoes that were Involved in Iraq's permitted 150kmrange missileprojects.'
A history of UN inspections in Iraq (1991-98)
Amorim panel's concerns, the resolution reaffirmed
earlier resolutions, disbanded UNSCOM, and replaced it
with the United Nations Monitoring Verification and
lnspemon Commission (UNMOVIC) UNMOVIC was to
conhnue UNSCOM's m .date to d¢amr Iraq of itr
WMU and long-range caused . and to operate a system
of ongoing monitoring and vertfirahon to check Iraq's
compliance In paragraph 7, the Security Cousell
decided that UNMOVIC and the IABA, not later than 6o
days after they had started work in Iraq, would draw up
a'work pmgramme' for the diacherge of them mandates,
which would include both rmplementaeon of the
ongomg monitoring and verification (OMV) system m
Iraq and resolution of key mmairung disarmament
table, m be completed by Iraq ,n order to fulfil the
requlieements of SCR 687 Both work progmmmes were
Subject to approval by the Security Courn-il.
Once approved, these work programmes would
provide the basis for a mechanism to'suspend'ecomernic,
sanctions against Iraq In paragraph 73 of SCR 1284, the
Secunty Council expressed its mtenhon to suspend
sanctions for ran days onca it received reports fronm
UNMOVIC and the IABA that Iraq hadcooperamed In all
respects with UNMOVIC and the UdiXni fulfilling the
work pmgrammes fare period of rao days The rao-day
cooperation period could only begin after UNMOVIC
and IABA had reported to the Council that OMV system
was 'fully operational' 71te rao-day suepenslon of
sanettona was subject to raminval by the Council
In addition M coasting a path toward suspension of
sanctions, SRC 1284 removed the calling for the export of
Iraqi oil under the humanitarian 'food for oil'
programme
Dr Huts Bb., a former IAEA Director General, was
appointed to head IIIVMOVIC on i March 200C), end
UNMOVIC set up shop at the UN, Inheriting
UNSCOM's old office space and files, Since its
establishment, UNMOVIC has spent considerable effort
studying Irsq's weapons programmes form UNSCOM
ercluves and developing a compendium of issues that
could serve as a basis for determining 'key remaining
dt .samutment tasks', as requved by SCR 1284
UNMOVIC has also sought to train a new cadre of
uupeclars who could be available if Baghdad decades to
resume inspections Thus far, however, Iraq has
contended to reject SCR 1284, on the grounds that does
not set a timetable or dear criteria for h(Ung sanctions
A history of UN inspections In Iraq (1991-98)
cnncMSron refusal to cooperate left the job undone Iraq was fiistory of l1N Inspectians in Iraq 11g91-gg)
Over the course of nearly eight years, UN inspectors probably successful in ludutg some prohibited
made substantial progress m disarming iraq'e WMD and equipment and matenals during the years of inspection,
ballistic missile progranmtes .Ov¢aB, UNSCOM fielded
such as srucks of CBW agent and materiels and a small
more than 25o iftspecturn missions and supervised number of missiles More smpnrtantly, Iraqi screptists 3 April
the destruction Of 48 operational long-range missiles,
ehB have the necevary knowledge and torpsonsurne, to
almost 40,000 filled and empty chemical draccutions, 17 June
reconstruct Iraq's WAD and misidle progressions, and
six operational mobile launchers, 30 chemical unnalle 23-2BJUre
Iraq possesses dual use equipment and materials that
warheads, bgo homes of chemical weapons agent and 15 August
could be converted to support these programmes,
more than 3,0oo houses of precursor chemicals, the entire eapr .vaBy, for chemical and biological weapons Most
31-3a September
biological weapons production facility at Al-Halayuh and lmportant, there is no indication dust President Sarldmin
a variety of bsologsml materials and weapons production
Htsese.ur and the Iraqi leadership have changed their
equipment at other locations Between sq, and .998 the 11 October
masmsiment to retain and develop WMD and missal as
r°r?A Iraq Actlon 7eam conducted 3. lopectiona said a high priority for Iraq's foreign and deforroe objectives
conducted nsore than a.5oo OMV blspechonu largely The strength of Baghdad's mmmttment to possesa WMD 19 March
without prior notice In addition, the IAHA destroyed end baWshc missiles seems memorable by its efforts to 6-29 July
facilities, equipment and materials for the production of reslst [1N inspections from rggr to 1998
fissde malenal and the nuclear weapons, and removed
all nuclear weeposel-usable nuclear material from Iraq
Despite these accomplishments, however, Iraq's
15 October
14Apdl
I July
July
8August
March
27 March
June
12 June
13 June
19d2lune
Over the course of nearly eight years, UN inspectors made substantial progress In disarming Iraq's
WMD and ballistic missile programmes Despite these accomplishments, however, lraq's refusal to Navember
cooperate left thejob undone.' MORIMMENIMMEM
Febmary
21 June
21 J .
Ymqwasprobably successful In hiding some prohibited equipment and materials during the years of
lluly
Inspection, such as stocks of COW agent and materials and a small number of mnsrle.c More September/October
Importantly, IraQ1 scientists still have the necessary knowledge and experience to reconstruct Iraq4 330crobes
WMDand mlssfle programmes, andIraq possesses dual use equipment and materials that couldbe
290ctaber
converted to support theseprogrammes, especially forchemical and biological weapons.'
A history of UN Inspections In Iraq (1991-98)
ScB 696-5en out terms forccaseBre
SCR ae7-Stens masefire Btablidles UNSCOM and reqwres destruction, removal ., randmi.9 funnies, of
Inns, pragmatism for WMD and balintic missiles with a range over 1501m m
Sot 699-Approves plan by UN secremry General far UN5COM and the IAEA
confrontation when UN Inspecuons are denled acceu his Abu Grunt, and Fallu]ah
50 7o7-Beqmres Imq to pmvlde "hour furNerdWykII,that and camoral . dlsdmure IFFCDI of In
proscnbed wenpans and programmev
Despite confrontations with Iraq, IAEA teams acquire vital documents on Ireqb madcar weapons
pmgram
SCR 715-nAppranes IAEA andUNSCOM ongoing monitodngandvenflratlon (OMV) plans
Iraq meals unilateral desimctlon of WMDandrelated matedal In July 1991
Iraq denies UNSCOM inipecnon team amessmMinor, of A,datifiltur,
Iraq mlerts UNSCOM use of in own alanlt In Iraq Ireql Inruolons I..dermiumsed! now with Kuwait
France the UK and the US launch air imkes on skes in inhuman Iraq Iraq Informs UNSCOM ft an resume
flights
US air transit against NO of Iraqi Intelligence servlres in Rididid in retaliation for assassination plat against
former Pmident George Bush
Iraq accepts SCa 715 andOMVplans.
Iraq sets deadline or 10 October 199a for implementation of paragraph 22 of 5C8687 and bulich up con,
near Kuwalc US deploys forms; to KUMIL
KB 979- Demands thin to, wlthdraw military onto deplayed In southern Iraq m their original porhamrs.
Iraq pulb bsrkforces and resumes (it wish UNSCOM
SC89sti-Sets tevnsofrekrenceforkill foriood'programme,
Iraq arknowledges offenslve BIN programme bid denles weaponlsadnn
Iraq threatensto Once cooperation with theUN if no prograutoward lifting sanatlans and the oil embergo
by 31 August 1995
LLGen Nussein Kamel defects ta lordan AJtelwards,laq pmWdn UNSCOM and the IAFA with .dd,U .n.1
documents and reveals that weapoNSed and deployed BW agents before GulfWar
UN5COMteamsdenied access toBVeslms
SC81051-AppmvesexparVlmpommonitoring hiring
UNSCOMteamsdeAedacmsstoeltesInvolvedinconcealment mechanlim
SCRloao-Demands Iraq grant Immedletaandunresniaredaccess tnUNSCOM
Iraq derives Inspections team acceasroTnllltzrllysensldve'shes
IN9agIIdadUNSCOMEeerullveChalnnanEkeusreadlesagreementonJoIntProgrammeofACNan,
establohing modalides farinspectlonoPSensitive shes
IraqprevenuUNSCOMfrom removing mlsslkpairs farHouston rumors lraq.
IraqaIbwsUNSCOMremovalofmisukpaiKinlespansetoSenmtyCoundldemandt
UNSCOAItaamsdenledaccess tosites.
sCB1115-Demandsmust lrxqallow inspertinnteams acceutodisputed sites
around BUNersurreedsBOIFEbeusasEneruBVeClalrmanalUNSCOM .
UNSCOMteamsdenied acoessmthreePresldenual'sltes
5CB1134-DominatorIraq caoperalewhhUN5COM
ImqdeclaresbwillnotdealwlthU5UN5COMpersonnelanddemandsaIlUNSCOMpenunnelofUS
nationality I . . lug
Icanenaedonrwlawlrlgpage
 O
A history of UN inspections in Iraq (1991-98) A history of UN Inspections in Iraq (1991-98) 0
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Histary of UDI Inspectians in Iraq (1991-991 Cont .

3 November traqwarlssitwdlshaatdawnanyU-2surve711anceplanesBNn9overitstenhory .
12NOVember 5C711137-ImposestravelresMctbnsanIraqIofBdalslinkedtonon<ompllance
300ctober-22 November UN5COMandthelAEAwithdraw lnspectanFramIraq
21NOVember UNSCOMandlAFdpersannelretumaNerlntemivedlplomatl<acdvirybetweenIraqandNussla
December Iraqcteatesn cnteg desaisltes,designatlngtwoofthem-presidendalandsoverelgn-oRalm

12 James, rhe US and UK threaten air studies

23 Febmary UN and Iraq agree on procedure fix Impecda., of Presidential site,
1 Match SCN1154 -Endrrcses UN-Iraq agreement
3 Augurt Ma demands that Butler infarm Security Councilthat SCR 687 disarmament requlrements have been meL
5 August Ins, deddesta suspend caoperatlan worth UNSCOM and IAEA ..I. the Security Commit dis this cad
embargo and! reorganises, UNSCOM
95eptember SCR1191-Condemnslmq'sdecision msuspandwoperadon
31tkmber Iraq states swat haft aBUNSCOMacnNdesInside lnq,Including monitoring
5Naiember SCR1205-Carolinians tracts decision taceasecppperadon .
14 Novel IraqallawsresumpnonaFlmpectlons,buldenlasxcess
16 December UNSCOMwiHldrewsstaff frnmIraq
16-190ecember OperoNonDeserrine

27 March AmadmpanelsubrnttsreportsondisarmementandmanltudngandverificationIssuestothe5ecudty
Council.
17 December SCR1204-ReplaresUNSCOMbyUNMOVIGestablishespmcedurefarsaspendlngunctionslflraq
cooperates aid, UNSCOM and1AEA to implement OMV and resolve outstanding dr."anum, Issue .

"
 Iraq's nuclear weapons programme Iraq's nuclear weapons programme

ounervilev, KeyInqi nudear sites (799a-2W2) Key Iraqi nudear sites

oUowing the 1973 AmbAsyseh Win and the 1974
oureash, 1. the pace of ml, Iraq launched a
Fsenous effort US, acquire cracker werspons At first
it sought 5o -but- a plutomum'break out' capability by
pusehs .ving tumkey nudeu fadbttee (Imdm internatsmsal
safeguards) firm Ford . and Italy . 7he lN. .h Nor paid
in Iggr effectively ended this approach. In resistance,
Iraq turned to a massive clandestine programme to
produce highly muddied uramum (HEt1) through
various ennchment tedmologjes, first elantor-onagwr,
separatUm and then gas centrifuge On the eve of the Gulf
War, Imq's programme was on the Surge of producing
signtflrant qusntsues of HEU, Bud perhaps within ham or
three years, its first nuclear wropern
During the Gulf War, Isowever, coalition Iscombing,
devastated Iraq's overt and clandestine nuclear
htfraetructura Subsequent itsepecgoru and d5mrnwmmrt
efforts by the IAEA from jgqlyg removed all
known weapo.m-gnde Nuclear material from Iraq
and destroyed most of the mordifining clandestine
famirtres, equipment and materfall, for the production
of 3iEU and nuclaer weapons. Nonetheless, Iraq
rateined its nuclear persnnnel, and the momtorsng
system established by the fAEA could not reliably
detect or prevent Iraq from conducting wall-wale
research and further development work on nuclear
weapons and enrichment technology, such as gas
rmtttifuge On this besle, it u plausible to assume that
Iraq may have completed the necessity preparations to
build a nuclear weapon if it has acquired sufficient
ntidesrmaterial .
Since the end of inspections In rggg, it is cast known
whether Iraq Is seeking to build facilities capable of
producing sufficient fissile mythoud for nuclear weapons
Gas centrifuge elncllnient ts the most likely option for
lraq to chooae. Tslong 1998 es a ba9e Ime, lmwever, it US
audace.ly, that Iraq has slscceeded in, or is drove to
actdevmg, en indigenous capability to enrich enough
metertal for a nuclear weapon, given the technical
hurdles and the requirements for substantial foreign
eaistanre, materials, and equipment In thenry, Iraq
(SPP C(II:12Ul1V05lC2J
® was the main smre and produRlan base of raw matedal andIntedm Ittd produa for the
" aaavoadsYnW.anHl-9a)
i dm..berMaaorvworulEadndtoryaaNmaNHnnvundunY
Ormidrr1 W~
mxmepm..nurq.wdw3lva,amma~ar.rmwaw .mwawxe
~w..dwtarn~rnwvPb,ynwam,.eyr,i d,mxa,w.m rro
WxM~NMdrakwnmmwlanY4ed+dadux,Mopopmum,
Du[ WrM wnlaPanadN' Hw LIFALramrMvaedeWnmudY hms
rapewl,a.mWrvrermrnruwro~wrxarpepmwe
could produce a nuclear weapon on fairly short rsotsre if
it was somehow able to acquire sufficient nuclear
material from a foreign source, but flum, u, No evidence
that Iraq has done so. More readBy, Iraq could di vert in.
country radiossotopes or obtain radloortSve material
from foreign sources for a radiological weapon .
Assiauilttg such material is available, Iraq can probably
produce a crude radiological waapon, but how such a
weapon would be delivered, and its efforriverd,,,
renceds, op. to question.
AI-TUwaiNa The IAEC mseardi ceatre av7Ynvahha,which provided terhnial .,a, I K3 add EX a,
enrichment processesNesearch reactars and all significant nudear related Installations were
deatroyed In the 1991 alr camplgnother egulpmeat wasdestroyed under IAEA supervlslon
and all nuclear ruel was removed Involved in nonpmscribed artwhles as of 1999
AI-Kanhat Afullyoperadonalphosphatemlneandpdndpalsourceninamraluranmmlnlrag ThetAEA
sealed the mine shaft Cunent Stan, unknown .
Al-Caaim Afullyoperatlonalphosphatefert111rerproducuonplanUncorporaBngauranlumseparation
facility producing yellow cake The uranium extradion facility was disputed In the 1991 air
campaign, bid Me fertilizer plant unicans operational
AI-lasin A But, operational plant far commercial-scale, comenion of yellow caka to uranium dloxide
and a fully cammlsswned plant for the producuon,hnm uwnlum Mraide, of the uranium
tevaahloride had matenal for the EMIS process Irwpendva after damage caused by the 1991
air campaign inactive
AI-Tarmlya APC3EMIS plant vin th a design rapaoty of 75 kg HEU/a,the But stage of whlcb wanbeing
equlpped and commissioned in parallel and estimated to be lives, Wanaway from achievorig
In hall design capacity Inoperadve after damage caused by 1991 air ompalgn WISBeta
Separatorbuilding andotherrelated buildingsand equipment were removed under IAFA
sucerwdon InacrYe
AI-Sharqt A K3 EMIS plant under dWl engineering conanunion and having no installed ea,uIpment,
Marshall to be at least hasyearstaland Al ratings Construction terminated after damage
caused by 1991 Air campaign EMSfact separator building andothermated buildings and
equIpmantdestroyedunder IAEAsupenislort Waiting,
Rarhdlya Facillty where all of Me centnfuge development wark leading to Me suaesdul separation a
uranium Isotopes; took place It Was also Me location Bar the planned 5g-merhine cascade
Intended to re-enriCh uranium far the'oash pmgramme' Underconslmcdon at the Hashdlya
site was a centrifuge cascade hall that was planned to be used In preference to Unit atNeAl-
Furacfauhty-seebelow Inudve
AI-Furat An EX facility stig under conduction, desIgned for mad-production of centrifuge Machines
and pmvldlng fadlmes for Me assembly of a demonstration centnhge casadeKey
componenndestroyed bylAEA Insults,
AIQa as . thirty pnndpal facility for the producuon and storage of high erploshxs and Me War: of the
OhagrprojectrapansdilefarthedevelopmentofNeexplasivepedmpefwthelmploslon-
typenuclearweapan NemainsattlveinnonpmavIbNmIIRUyactNines .

Al-Athaar the PC3 msdearweapon dedgin andfabrication facility chat way nearing civil engineering
completion and wasIn theprocessof berg egWpped Sustainedtight damage in 1991 air
campaigr,An remainingbuildings and eaullanent of chairnudavweapons relewnre were
7mqE'ouldproduceanuclearweapononfairlyshortnotfceifitwassomehowabletoacqulresufBcient subsequently destroyed underIAEASUpervislon
nuclearmoterfalfrom a foreign sourcG butthereIs no evidence that Iraq has done so.'
Swrrcesrnrlude
CornegleEndowmenrlarlnremarlonal pe ace, 7racbngNudearPMiWOnon 1998
radeiatianorAmedcansc7enrlrl11A61mIdImgINUrlearweapanr
'More renddy, Iraq could divert in-country radioisotopes or obtain radioactive material from foreign
Ibid.MaprSttesArrorlandWINtrag'sPastWMOProgramme -UNSCOAf nationalist, 199r
sources fora radiological weapon.But how such a weapon wouldbe delivered, and its effectiveness,
WA repos, s"1997rw9romeunsenm7Yeounal
remain open to question.'

U
Iraq's nuclear programme prior to 1991
raq established an overt nuclear research programme
Iin 1956 with the formshon of the Iraq, Atomrc
Energy Conmussvon (IAEC), and by early r968 it had
rnmmusoned a Sovset~upphed IAT research Anactor of
two-megewatt thermal capacity -later upgraded m five
megawatt . Alan in 1968, Iraq ratified the Nuclear Nor,
proliferation Treaty (NIT) Under the terms of the NW,
Iraq rommrtted itself not m a cquire or develop nuclear
weapaos and agreed In, place all nuclear matenal in
as territory under intematuutal safeguards mspectlons
by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)
The degree of IAEA mapections vary with the type
and amount of nuclear material, with the highest level
of inspection reserved for nuclear weapons-usable
nuclear material - highly enriched uranium (HEU) and
separated plutonium. Iraqs safeguards agreement with
the IAEA entered Into force in z ypa.
After the 1973 AArab-larsell War and the substantial
increase In baql oil nweriues m 1974, Baghdad eambarked
on en bid . aprousurn of us safeguarded And.
research programme, which would have provided the
basic technology and fanEhet for the production and
separation of plutonium To that end, Iraq reached an
agreement with France In September 2975 fm the supply
of the Tammua research Antrim complex, Including a qo-
megawrtt thermal research reactor capable I producing
a significant amount of plutonium (6-ekg) annually.
The fuel for the reactor used 111113, winch was idar
weapons-usable To complement the French reactor, Iraq
also reached an agreement with Italy m 2976 to purchase
a series of Andean laboratories for umnlum processing,
bmrted fuel fabrication and smalf-scale separation of
plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. AE of these famhues,
located at the AI-Tuwaitba Nuclear Beeeardi Centre
nesr Baghdad, were under IAEA safeguards At the
tune, experts debated whether Iraq might attempt to use
these facilities to produce a significant amount of
plutmuum without detection, by the IAEA, nr whether
Iraq might withdraw from the NI'T and end IAEA
inspecdonv once the faahhes were operational This
debate was brought to an abrupt end by the Israeli air
attack on 7 July r98t, which destroyed tha large mactor
before it could be commissioned
Following the Ismelr mid, France decided against
Baghdad's appeals to rebuild the reador, and Iraq's
efforts to acquire a plutonium production capability
were effectively brought to an end when no other
suppliers came forward. Rather than abandon Its
pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, however, Iraq's
nuclear programme went underground- The
establishment of Ireq's clandestine nuclear weapons
'Following the Israelimid, rather than abandon ns pursuitofnuclearweapons capabdity, Iraq's nuclear
programme went underground The principal processes under development were gaseous diffusion
and electro-magnetic isotopic separation (EMIS).'
programme dates from the creation of IAEC Department
30D8 m May 298 3 Within the, department, there were
several programmes for the production of HEU. The
principal processes under development were gaseous
diffusion and electro-magnefic isotopic separation
(EMES), with lesser investment fin chemical and ton-
exchange enrichment methods, which were being
evaluated as potential producers of low enriched
uranium (LEU) feed material to enhance the
productivity of the EMU^ programme. Gaseous diffusion
was also viewed as a potential source of LEU m the
event that its utility as a source of HEU proved
Impracticable In addition, laser tandopic separation was
evaluated at a laboratory-scale but eventually relegated
to a'watdung-bnef status as a result of the perceived
technical complexity and difficulties in unparbsig the
necessary technical equipment
Despite the destruction of the Tammuz reactor,
Iraq also retained an interest in the plutonium Arne to
a bomb There can be little doubt that the Tammuz
reector complex would have been used to further a
plutonium production end separation programme
Indeed, following the lsmch mid, the IAEC established
pmject r8z to A,ifthgats, the indigenous construction of
a natural usamum-fuelled, plutonium production mactor
for this apenfic purpose . However, the IAEA found
no mdicahons that project r8z progressed beyond the
techrurai study stage
In April 1987, Depattment 300o was reorgamsed
into three groups Group z was responsible for the
gaseous diffusion programme, Group z for 1sT~0.q - the
HEU production technology of chance; and Group 3 for
engbreenngandprocurementeervlces ShortlythereaRer,
In August 1987, Group r was tmnsfened to the Mnustry
of Industry and Military Industrialisation (IvffMI),
which was headed by Lt Gen Hussem KameL Saddam
Hasseura son-in-lew, who was also responsible for
Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programmes
Along with Has transfer, Group 1 was rennmed the
Bnguucrfng Design Contra (p,DC) end relncded to e
facility near P.ashdlya on the northern outakliti of
Baghdad. The EDC was also given new orders to
focus on the development of cantriffige enrichment
terlumlo®es and to relegate further development of
diffusion tedmology In a secondary mission Further
consolidating Hussein Kamel'a control over Iraq's
chatdestme ..Is . weapons prugmmme, ronhul of
Department 300o and the EMIS programme was
transferred to MOVE in November 1988 and renamed
Petmrheuucal3 (PC3) an January 1989
In the couree of evaluating different technologies
for produomg-liEU, Iraq claimed that EMIS was
selected as the principal enrichment process
because, despite its htgh cast, muffameray, Oil large
physics' propomorzs, it was a relatively straightforward
technology, a 'bmte force approach well within baq s
mdtgenom capabdthea Moreover, the foreign supplus of
mdusbtel equipment and musical that Iraq purchasad for
as BAS programme did not need to include moral 'tell-
iale'componentsthetcouldmdtmtenudearuses Ireqalso
took a number of measures to conceal the purpose of Its
industrial-scale EMIS production facilities at Al-Termaya
and Al-Sharqat. Heavy-duty electrical harsousesur lines,
necessary to power the EMIS unIN, were burted
underground, and sophtstloeted an filam, were m a+eItnt
m production halls lo reduce uranium emtsslans Indeed,
it is remarkable that Western intelligence agenaes -
despite their longstandmg concern about rmq's nuclear
pmgravmme - completely faded to detect Iraqs massive
EM1S programme before the Gulf War
In contrast to EMS, Iraq recugtdsed that the gas
centnfuge ennchment process was a more attractive and
effiaent process, although technically more difficult an
master As a result, Iraq planned to build a centrifuge
facility to eventually replace Id Etv1IS programme
To ptuaue its centrifuge programoie, however, Iraq had
m tmpon spmnlfsed matenale and equipment, as well aa
hard to acquica'trade-cm it, which led the RUC to mount
eubstanBal foreign technical assurance from Gennan
centrifuge expects from 1988. This assustarow Involved
the supply of special ; ad madvne tools, a collection
of technical epeaficsuons and dmwmgs of centnfuge
machines and components', cartitfuge fast stands =it
direct physical help wdh the assembly ad nesfing of
centnfuge prototypes Even before the Gulf War, Iraq'a
interest m pursuing centrifuge technology was detected,
although the full extent of the programme was not
realised until after the confbct
Although Iraq's endeavours to produce weepon-
usable nuclear material were already well ixasiblushed,
Iraqi documeotauon indicates that A. practical a"
were taken to establish weaponisabon capabilities
unel the end of 1987 . The establishment of Gmup q
(weaposusation) in April 1988 as consistent with the
documentauon produced by that group and records of
related meehngs, particularly records of a meeting that
defuted the programme's primary goal of producing Its
that nuclear weapon within flues, years- that is, by the
Best half of in. The nuclear design team focused on
developing an implosion device, which would use high
explosive lens to spherically compmss a core of about
'By the end of 199Q Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme comprised an integrated network of
I
facilities for the production and conversion of natural uranium compounds to provide natural
;
uranmmfeedmaternalforEMIS(andeventuallycentrifuge) ennchmentfacilmes,whlchjotntlycould
I
have produced sufficient HEU fortwo nuclear weapons peryear.'
L-- _-
"
Iraq's nuclear programme prior to 1991
zokg o£ ffEU to lnggec a nuclear explosion. Estimates of
the son, and weight of the planned device provided the
basis for Iraqi efforts to develop a t,zookm range missile
With a r,u5amm diameter auframe and one mnne
payload capacity
By the end of a99o, Iraq's clandestine nuclear
programme comprised an integrated network of facBiees
for the production and conversion of ra dical Amanum
compounds to provide natural uranmm feed matenal for
EMIS (and eventually centnfuge) ennchment faobnes,
which jointly could have produced sufficient HEIJ for
two nuclear weapons per year' Natural uranium (yellow
cake) was aimed at Al-Kashat and separated from
phosphates at the AI-Qalm fer8lizec facdtty The natoral
uranium was then shipped fa faahtles at AI-)esrra for
convention into uranium dmxlde and then uranium
tetmchlorlde, the feed material for the EMS preems
The uranin. tetmchlonde feed was desYmed far two
large,scale EMIS production fedrhes at At-Tarmtya and
AI-Sharqat, each with a design capacity of producing
sskg of tIEU annually, core the plants were My
operational " Also under construction were (zabhei for
the mass production of cmtofuge machines; at Al-Funt
and a centrituge emuhment plant at R.Orhys, designed
to produce aokg of }fEU annually Field-teshng of
the nuclear weapon high explosives package web
underway at AI-Qa Qaa, and nudear weapons design
and fabncauon would take place at Al-Atheer.
Despite this impressive infrastructure, however, Iraq
had not yet crossed the nuclear goal line by late i9vo
It was on the threshuld of success in the production of
HEU through the EMIS process, in the production
and pilot cascading of singlecylmder subamhcal gas
centrifuge maeiones, and in the design =it fabrostion of
the explosion, package and associated electiorans, for an
implosion-type nuclear weapon, but it had not yet
achieved any of these objectives The Tarmtya EMIS
plant, though close to initial production of LEU, was snit
about three years away from aduevmgfull produchonof
t-EiU, and the AI-Sharqat EMIS plant was about two
years behind AI-Tarm£ya's schedule In the centrifuge
programme, BCD had successfully tested a prototype
machine (made entirely of imported parts), but it was at
least several years away from building the ipoo-machine
centrifuge eascade called for m EDC plans And required
a constant infusion of foreign experuse and assistance.
Though Iraqi weapons specialists had made substantial
progress m the design and testing of key components for
a nuclear device, such as the eledramcs system and high
explosive lines, they had not yet been able to Integrate the
 Iraq's nuclear programme prior to 1997
entire package or develop components for a device small
and light enough to be delivered by available rmseiles.
Clearly, Iraq would not have been able to acheve its
goal-set m early vqgg-lo produce a nuclear weapon by
early rqgr Hadtheprogramme continued unintetrupted,
however, it seems likely that Iraq could have produced its
But nuclear weapon within two or three years, assuming
that the AI-Tarmlya facility would have been able W
produce suffioent HEU by that time and that Iraqi
soathabwere able lamina outallthebugsinthevwespons
design. Furihennca, by the and-r99oe, the two EM
IraqiHEUoutputwouldhave been sufflclent to supportproducfton everyyearofiwo nuclearweapons
of the Iraqidesign In short had the Gulf War not intervened, lmq couldhave accumulated a nuclear
( stockpileofadozen orsoweaoonsbvtheendofthedecade'
plants would likely have been neanng design produchon
and yielding, collectively, some 3okg tiLqJ annually
Around the same tram, assuming foreign assistance
communal, the centrifuge sainchroard programme could
have progressed totMproduction smge,with apotential m
contribute an additional rokg HEU annually, Together,
Iraqi IIEU output would have been sufficient to support
production every year of two, nuclear weapons of the Iraqi
design In short, had the Gulf War not intervened, Iraq
could have accumulated anuclear stockpile ofadozen or
sa weapons by the end of the decade
The radiological weapon
Ithough not strictly part of Iraqs nuclear
...p. p .g,.e, Iraq .1 . briefly worked on
A developing a radiological weapon toward the end
of the Iran-Iraq War Based on Iraqi documents provided
to the IAEA and LBdSCOM after the defection of
Huseem Kamel in August 1995 and then made public',
the 1987 project involved the Iraqi Atomic Enerigy
CommLSston and the AI-Qa Qaa and AI-Muthanna
centres of the Muustry, of Industry and Military
Indushtallzahon (MQvtI), headed by Hussein Kamel
logether, they sought to develop an area demal weapon
that would achieve its objective through explosive
dispersion of a radioactive particulate aermad,
For radioactive metenal, Iraq chose rimmum, which
it elso used m the production of meendfary bombs
m the form of metal powder Cardsten; of zlrcomum
dioxide powder were irradiated m the BiT 5000 reactor
at AI-Tuwartha to produce zirconium-95, a re6,nvely
short-lived gamma<mrttlng am .] 2uCM. is I, .
nn stranger to the nuclear power industry where it is
a component of the alloy cladding ronunonly used to
contain the fuel pellets m reactor fuel fn reahty, tt would
be difficult to identify an element less suitable as an
irradiation target, and the principal contributor to die
radioactive content of the irradiated ziroonman was
derived from us one percent hafnium impurity
As a result, the production process investigated by
Iraq could not possibly produce sufficient raidlo .rhyfty
t0 aclueve an effect ive weapon Three field tests were
conducted at a bombing range in the western desert
using standard bomb casings modified to accommodate
the radroachve'payloed' In the design, the radioactive
zirconium dtmnde powder was encased m a thick lead
case, winch was placed inside a bomb rising with fuses
and explosives The intent was to disperse a cloud of
rad~oectme dust that would ause long-term health
risks for anyone who firdialed the radioactive particles,
In any event, the trsts did not result in significant
dispersion of radioactive material, and the project
was dropped
Iraq's nuclear programme in the Gulf War
W f all of lraq~s VMD programmes, the rudear
hen iraq invaded Kuwmt m August rqgo, the
no
Iraqi dear programme was strll a few
years away from producing its Beat nuclear
wespon . Soon after the invasion, however, Hussam
Kame7 issued orders far e 'cresh programme' to build
a nuclear device as soon as possible Documents
on the'crash programme' were provided by Iraq to the
IAEA in 1995 after Kernel's defection. To implement
Kamel's directive, Iraqi scientists planned to divert the
HEU contained in the safeguarded fuel elemmm of the
IRT and Temmuz research reactors at the AI-Tuwvtha
Nuclear liesearch Centre to fuel a nuclear weapon.
Using existing laboratory facilities at Al-Tuwatthe, Iraq
would process the fuel elements chemically to mm'act
mnrhed uranium, which Iraq then planned to ship to
Rashdiye for further emouhment in a planned 5o-
mach ine centnluge caseade that was to be specifically
conatrvcted fm this project, Combining the Bo% enriched
Soviet-supplied fuel who the q;% enriched Prench-
supplied fuel would give Iraq mom ihun enough HEII
for a single device at Iraqi design. Iraq might have been
able to reeova enough nuclear material far a second
device if it could reprocess and re-etrtirh some 45%
enrlched Soviet fuel at Tuwartha.
Parallel with thts effort to accelerate the acqmshon of
hIEU, the nuclear weapons design team was pressed to
accelerate their design and fabrication of an implosion
device for missile dehvery. Whims, the original
desfgn parameters, sct in Iqgg, envisaged a rmssde
delivery vehicle with a s,a5omm diametec airframe and
one tonne payload capacity, the only missile available to
the 'Crash programme wasthe al-Hussem, whrch had an
Business, diameter airframe and jookg payload capacity-
Clearly, the nuclear design team would have been
hard pressed to develop an Implosion design
.all and light enough to fit the al-Hussem
'Overall, Gulf War air strikes devastated Iraq's overt and covert nuclear facilities. All of the major
f
I facilities at the AI-Tuwaltha Research Centre, mcludtr,g all safeguarded research reactors and
-laboratorles, were damaged ordestroyed.'
Nonetheless, IAEA experts eshmated that Iraq could
have been able to cobble together a crude nuclear device
by the end of rgga had the plan proreeded
In any event, however, it. 'cmsh programme' never
got very far in December rggo, Iraqi lecluucsans wese
ready to begin recovering HEtI train the Soviet supplied
IRT research reactor fuel, but coalition mr strikes
destroyed the laboratory facilities at AI-Tuwmtha where
the work was m have been done In addrhmy efforts 1o
build a 5o-maclune centrifuge cascade at Rashdtya
floundered Inihesbeenceoflmq'sGemumexpens,lmqr
techrdcmns were unable to fabricate key centrifuge
mmpot~enm, such ae end caps, and Iraq was running
short on essential imported parts, such as carbon
fENre rotors
Overall, Gulf War eu strikes devasbted Iaq's overt
and covert mail. fadlihes Ali of the Meant facilities
at the Al-Tuwartha Research Centre, Including all
safeguarded research reacturs and most laboratories,
were damaged or destroyed The natural uranium
separation plant at the AIQeim phosphate facility and
several nranfum proceserng plants at the Al-jesua
site were also destroyed In eddittoo, the EM15 plaaLS el
AI-Tarmiya and AI-Sharqat were heavily bombed
Evmrelly, maim
. intelligence, servrres did not know at
the hme that AI-Tamdya and A1Sherqat were involved in
clandestine nuclear activities They Wereor thought
to have eoaae connectron to Imq's WMD uuesde
programmes, but their exact function was unSnown
The funchan of the Al-Jesra facility was also ur1miown
at the ins, Some key facilities escaped heavy damage,
however. AI-Altheer (the headquarters for nuclear
weapons design) received only light damage while
Iteshdlya (the came for mucilage research and the
planned lo®NOn for the centnfuge plent) and Al-Ford
(responsibleforrentrlfugeproduchon)esopedaltogether
most
"
Iraq's nuclear programme under inspections
(1991-98)
weapons programme was the wrot difficult for
0 Iraq to protect and preserve after the Gulf War
Unld:e the CW or BW programmes, no nuclear weapons
or srgmheant nuclear material had actually been
produced which Iraq could attempt to hide from UN
inspectors Moreover, Iraq's principal nuclear faalihes
involved relatively specialised, smgle-use technology,
difficult to e+plain away or lushfy, unlike the imemody
dual-use nature of many CBW technologies Finally, by
happenstance, several key Iraqi nuclear personnel
defected soon after the Gulf War resse-fire, offering
asmn~sh,ngudormehonaboutlmq'smassivedandeshne
nuclear programme and lips on where to lack for werat
faahhes and stashes of doruments
Nonetheless, Iraq Initially sought to deny any
clandestine nuclear weapons programme whatsoever
Iraq's mm .l declination lo the IAFA on response to
the SCR 687 obhgelron to provide '. doclawatiom of the
locations, amounts, and types of all nuclear weapons
or nuclear-weapon-usable nuclear material or any
subsystems or components or my research, development,
support 'wasasunpleasseruanofhavmgpoesessedno
such assets Seem Iraq'e prevtously declared holdings of
HEU at the AI-Tuwadha Nuclear Research Cmtre were
obviously lughly relevant assets, the TAFA immediately
requested! Iraq to resubmit do dedarahon Tbe resulting
second declaration provided a reasonably accurate listing
of Iraq's safeguarded nuclear seems, previously identified
by Iraq as components of Its declared 'pearefid unclear
programme'
However, the Iraqi lstmg faded to include any of
the sues, such as Al-Jesuz, Al-Tamuya, ALSharqat or AI-
Atheer, which had been designed and constructed
specifically to support Iraq's clandestine nuclear
programme In addition, Iraq sought to bide Its nuclear
weapons programme by unilaterally destroying some
of the evtdence after the Gulf War As Iraq later
acknowledged, It further demolished one of the bomb-
damaged uranium processmg facilities at Al-hol., Wed
to decontaminate laboratory facilities at Al-Tuarawl. to
hide evidence of undeclared reprocessing experearrows,
and unilaterally destroyed a large amount of special
imported steel for its centrrfuge programme.
The first IAEA inspection, that began an 15 May 1991,
was centred on the IAEC AI-Tuwadha Nuclear Research
Centre, from which a technical baseline far future
inspections was to be established . The inspechon
revealed that, although much of the technical facilittes
'Iraq sought to hide «s nuclear weapons programme by unilaterally destroying some
of the evidence after the GuliWar As Iraq later acknowledged, it furtherdemolished one of the bomb-
damaged uranium processing facilities atAl-Jesira, tried to decontaminate laboratory facilities at AI-
Tuwartha to hide evidence of undedared reprocessing experiments, andunilaterally destroyed a large
amount ofspecial imported steelfor its centrifuge programme'
0
had been destroyed during the Gulf War, the HEU fuel
for the three research reactors appeared to be intact and,
although relocated before the coalition aur stakes, had
not been diverted to nuclear weapons usage
As early as the second mspechon campaign m June,
dtfficulhes started t0 arm when Iraq obstructed the
IABfs's access to an undeclared site at which Iraq was
ahehrptmg to conceal major EMIS equipment that had
been motored been AI-Tanoya The inspection sue, the
Abu Ghrmb army banacks, had been designated for
inspection on the basis of information provided by
member states based an analysts of overhead imagery
The senousness of this obstruction prompted the visit of
a high-level mission, including the IAEA director
general, and resulted in Iraq undertaking to provide full
and free access to IAEA umspertors
This visit also resulted m a further 'declaranon by
Iraq, which it issued on 7 July 1991, cmaddeat with the
comvmencement of the third urapechon campaign . This
thud dedarahon provided information on prevtously
undeclared components of Iraq's claimed 'peaceful
nuclear programme' - essentially projects for the
converston of uremum compounds and uramum
a_anchune_nt through Eh4S, gaseous diffusion, centrifuge,
and chemical methods-but continued to exclude Iraq's
end objective, namely the development and production
of nuclear weapons
The thud, fourth and fifth mepechons focused on the
verification of this latest declaration. These Omspechons
were nnconfrontahnnel despite the emergence of
evidence to modern Iraq's undeclared expedmentehnn in
the production and separahonof plutonium in but cells at
the Al-Tuwatrha Nuclear Research Came Overall, Iraq
acknowledged the production of several graamies of
plummum, which the fAEA secured and removed from
the country
In its sulh inspection, been Za-7o September 1991, the
IAEA, achng on mformauon received from supporting
member states, camad out ururuiounced mspechons
at a number of buildings fn downtown Baghdad, of
which two-the AI-Nrqabat budding (called the Nuclear
Desi gn Comm) and the Al-Khatrat complex (the PM
Headquarters) - were notable m theu resdts. At AI-
Mqabat, the IAEA main discovered a number of metal
hunks conqmmg technical reports and other documents
related to Ireq's clandestine nuclear programme. Irdhal
examination of these documents at the srte revealed
incontrovertible evidence that Iraq had embarked upon a
nuclear weapons programme However, before the IAEA
Iraq's nuclear programme under inspections (1991-98)
team eould pursue its assessment, Iraqi Official, forcibly
removed the documentation cache The cache wes
returned to the IAEA team during the early hours of the
next morning but only after the Iraqns had removed
key docutnents.
Despite this apparent setback, individual members of
the mapedron team had managed to conceal aoma
documents, which escaped setzure by the Iraqi minders
one such document, which was appended m the rcpnrt
of the sixth Inspection campaign, was a progress report
for the AI-Atheer far,bty for the first half of 1990-
This report Identified AI-Atheer as Iraq's nuclear
weapons development and pmdumon facility and -I-
introduced f'C3 (petmchemlcal 3), the code name,
of Iraq'
. clandestine, nudesr prqgratnme. Subseqtrent
enslysts of the doam,eotation cache showed that it
conteuu.d ebout t,7oo pC3 teduuml reports out of what
was aventually determined to be a total Of 1,574 reports
produced by PC3/fAEC prior to 1991-
The second confrontation occurred the next day
during the mspecuon at AI-Rhalrat This budding was
found In cantain an unmense amount of documentahon,
which, although not of the same technical value HS that
dlscnvered at AI-Nlqabat, was to Imme important no
eheddmg light on the covert procurement system lraq
had put in place in support 1rC3 Although of lesser
tectudcal impact the inspection et the Al-IOvmrat
building had a much greater pnlthcal profile as the
Mspechon feam,ilavingrefussd to surrender Bte recheaf
records, wea effeehvelyheld captive m the buddutge car
park for e period of 96 hours, before leaving with the
,sands rt demanded to retain .
Notvntbstanding the mountain of evidence to the
contmry, Iraq continued to tne)st that it was not
pursuing s mrdear weapons programme and that Al-
Atheer wea merely conducting research into the
necessary technical cequ3reutents should the Political
decision everbe taken ta develop nuclear weapons 'nus
situation continued urtnt August 1995 when the
defedion of Lt Cm HuaeinKamel to Jordan forced Iraq
to rstand and to wake further declamations, and prnvtde
additional documents to the lAEA - urcludutg further,
details on Iraq's weaponlsaHon experiments, gas
centrifuge efforts, and the'aash programme' Analysis
of the IAEA'a extensive collection of documentation
from £raq's clandestine nuclear programme showed dial
pC3/IAEC had produced 1,374 technical ralromia, Pro"
re-tssues and updates, desembmg III wudt and pr-geese
£n Ws clandestine nuclear programme. Of this total,
overall the JAEA supervised the destruction of more than 50,000 square mehriss of nuclear-related
Ffactory space. some 600 metric tonnes of speclabsed alloys and some 2,500 items of nuclear-related
' eqWpment.. In addition, the IAEA removed from Iraq all weapan-usable nuclear material (NEU in
` research reactartuelandasmallamountofsepamtedplutonurm) .'
r,57a reports, along with the bulk of the misted re-issues
and updates, are m the IAEA archives, which has
enabled a comprehensive reconehucnon of the
progmamre's history
From the seventh L4EA inspection m October 1991
through to the t5tfr mspcchotr m November 1991, the
IAEA also began to systematically destroy equipment
and matenal and key factlsnes associated with
Iraq'. nude- weapons programme Iraq eurrcndered
additional hem. associated with the centrifuge and
weapomsation efforts after the defecuon of Hussnn
£CameL Ovemll the IAEA supervised the destruction nf
more than 5o,0oo square metres of nuclear-related factory
space, some 60o metric tannea of epectaltced alloys, and
some a,500 Items of nuclear-related equipment .
Key buildings were destroyed at AI-Tarnruya, Al-Sharqat,
and Al-Atheer Key items destroyed mcluded large
numbers of EMIS c®rponents, centrifuge comPrevints
and machine trial, for manufacturing such components,
reproc<ssing equipment, and equipment for tesnng and
fabricating weapons components In addrlion, the IAEA
removed from Iraq all weapon-usable nuclear material
(HErI m research reactor fuel and a small amount of
separated plum .)
After the metal incidents with the LAEA m 1991,
Iraq,, relationship with the IAEA tended to be less
confrontational than Its relationstup with UN9COM,
perhaps because there was less of Iraq's nuclear
programme left to hide, compared in it. CW, 8W, and
missile programmes Iraq set out to cultivate a goad
relationship with the IAPA, once important elements
of the nudear programme were discoveted, to drive a
wedge between the IAEA and 11NSCOM and in have
'the nuclear file closed' Had they achieved this they
could have claimed progress m the disarmament
process, eased the inspection pressure and added to
the dwistonseamo,yy the UN Securdy council
Iaq's cooperation was tested on many =as . with
the fAHA's mtroduchun of 'capable affe' mspecYions,
wtach involved stilts of multi-di-alilinarY Inspection
teems to locations with no known association with Iraq .
clandestine nucJcar Programme but which were judged
by the IAEA to have capabtbhes that could support
prulub£ted nuclear acHvthes Apart from a few
politically monvated grumbles, Iraq provided the
necessary cooperation to iacdrtale these inspections,
winch Involved same, 7. sates up to December 190
In arriving at a coherent picture of Itaxis clandestine
nude" programme, the fAPA also invesagated a
Iraq's nuclear programme under inspections (1991-98)
number of leads that proved incorrect, and, as reports of
an undergrour,d rea.7or m 7raq and of an opemnonal
later enrichment facility Much effort was expended in
investigating such cases, particularly the underground
reactor Even though neither of these facdttes proved to
be at the alleged locatlons, the information contamed a
gram of truth For Instance, if was determined that Iraq
had indeed carried out a feasibility study for thebuildmg
ufan underground reactor as part of its overall feasibility
studtes on a proposed civil uuclear energy programme
Similarly, although no indications of an operational laser
ermchment plant were dtscuvered, Iraq acknowledged
that it had m fact investigated laser enrichment
technologies, but had decided not to pursue the
technologymbeuofmmeaccessible approarhes,such as
VMS and centnL,ge enrichment
9y ikceo,bar x9,8, its, rAHA was confidera that
lraq's indigenous nuclear weapons programme had not
produced more than a few grammes of weapons-usable
nuclearmaterial (HEUandseparatedplutomum)prior
to r99r, and that the major elements of Ireqs pre-war
capabhty to produce weapon-osable nuclear material
had either been destroyed m the rg9r Guff War, or
subsequently dismantled under IAEA supervrsion
Moreover, the ongoing monltanng and verification
(OFty) regime established by the IAEA (and buttressed
by information from member states) provided strong
i At fhe same nme, Iroq's nuclear potenual was not compfetdy el£minafed
r
ssnentificandtechnicalexpertlseo(Iraq'snuclearprogrammesurvwed,andBaghdadhastnedtokeep
i
rrs cnre nuclear teams m place warkrng art various civilian projects. /n
the Security Council, the OMV regime could not provide strong
concealablertemsandachvates'
loois for detecting Iraqi efforts to braid faemhnes to
produce weapons-usable nuclear materrds m significant
(I e kilogramme) amounts No such efforts were
detecYed m the period from 199, to 1998
At the eame tune, dam's nuclear potential
was not
completely elmmtated . Most rmportsndy, the
sdenufic
and technical expertise of Iraq's nuelear programme
survived, and Baghdad has tied to keep As core nuclear
teams m plae working on various civilian pro)"
According to one defector, an engineer who worked in
the enrrrhment pmgremme, nuclear personnel
were
ordered to report for duty m resume work on nuclear
protects m Augrut 190 In addition, as the LAEA
reported to the Security Counal, the OMV regime could
not-provtde strong assurances regarding readily
-^° -- o mono,
centnfuge components, expIosive~lenses'and ihetr
raiding moulds and even torme amounts of ru,tural
uramum Simdarly, readily concealabie activities mdude
computer slmulahonsofimplosion dynamtes,lhelesMg
of explosive lenses and die tabacabon and exiting of
small numbers of centrifuge machines There is no hard
evidence that research
activities of thus sort taok place
between 19111 and eggB, but the probahdtty that such
activities would have been detected by the IAEA
m by
national intelligence means is relatlvely low
Mosr importantly, the
addition, as the IAEA reported to
assurances regarding readily
Iraq's nuclear programme since 1998
m<e r998, without the pressure of 1ALsA mspectam,
Iraq has had more opportunities to reconstitute
S elements of [is nuclear weapous prog[nmme and to
keep these activities sevet In the absence of inspections
tamarind information, there is little base for asuartaining
haul's current nuclear capabdrhes,but a pmgmahc'woust
case' can be derived from knowledge of Iraq's nuclear
programme as of tgga and Informed speculation about
what Iraq could have achieved since the end of
mepections in 1998 Assuming that Iraq remains, an
interest m acquiring nuclear weapons, which seems
likely, it is logical that Iraq would continue work,
especially in ereaa that are technically acceavible and
present a relatively low risk of detection-
Certainly, m the area of unclear weapons design and
fabrication Iraq could have completed the necessary
theoretical modelling and pmcncsi testing of enthal
nuclear weapon components - in particular the
eleckonics system, the tugh explosive package, the
neutron hudator and the ponfication, casting and
machining of natural or depleted uranium metal
compormnb. Hecbom[s work could have been Imitated
in e number of mvlben engineering or technical anstindesi
in Iraq with little nsk of rea[ote external detection
Further development of the explosive package would
also be largely immune to detection Iraq has a large
indigenous industry for ft production, and Naiting of
both military and civil[an explosives, and hating of
shaped charges for an unploaton device could be carried
out at a number of locations, under rover of pemnitted
military or civilian explosive activities Completion
of the 'non-nuclear components of this design could
also have been accomplished For example, work on
the purification, casting and machining of natural or
depleted machine could be readily undertaken,
with only minor modifications, at any aniamering
establishment For testing the high explosives package,
components made of natural or depleted mammon metal
(widely avadable in Iraq) would provide an accurate
substitute for HEU components.
in short, given the state of Iraq's nuclear weapons
design m r99r, it is reasonable to assume that Iraq
could have completed the necessary theoretical and
experimental work for a practical Implosion design over
the past decade r Taking the hypothesis one stage
further, Iraq could have fabricated the non-nuclear
components and explosive package for a limrted number
of nuclear weapons " All of those achvrtres word have
been carried out with a relatively low risk of detection
main, during the period r99r-g8 when IAEA inspectors
were present in Iraq. Indeed, the IA6A OW plan was
predicated on the assumption that Iraq had acquired the
necessary skills to new Hh'U and, possibly separated
plutonium, for nuclear wenpone purposes Had Iraq
chosen to pursue such activities; after December a9g8,
the risk of detection would be much lower.
vt Lnn4wnnnnn.nfMxwneatnani,va A11a
The key question, then, as the availability of nuclear
wepone-usable nuclear matenel in quaretries sufficient
for a nuclear device In theory, Iraq could acquire
such material either through indigenous production
or through rovert procurement efforts . In te. of
mdtgermouv produchon, most expens believe that gas
centrlfuge presents the most attractive technlcal ophon for
Baghdad Unlike pMIS and gaseous diffusion, gas
mntrifuge Is much mom efficient and mom criannalable
Unlike leer enrichment, Iraq had already acquired the
baste technology for singleyinder gas centrifuge
machines prior to join The plutoNum route, which
requires construction of a nuclear reactor and
reprocessing plant, la generally considered Unlikely,
being both beyond current Iraqi capabilities and very
difficult to conceal.
Schematicdiagram of gas centrifuge machine
IMRnatle
7op nnduP nuPansion
Mn[MR
eama~n
Topknop
Rata[u6o Molwdv
x[onn pump
Rolund4R r.anp
-man
soetom
rmop
Sumr
Centrifuge Gas
rotor centrifuge
soereunsc
If these assumptions; are correct, how far could Iraq
have advanced with a gas centrifuge programme over
the past character During the period of UN inspections, it
is plausible that Iraq could have command research and
expena[entauon on am centrifuges and pursued efforts
to fabricated centrifuge components indigenously Such
' itwouldbemoredlfficulttaacqwreforeignmaterials,equipment,andcomponentswnhoutdetecuon
sumaB-seale cenmfuge testmg and fabncahon would
present few cancealmemt problems It is worth among
that Imq's centrifuge R&D work at Rashdtya took
place In a room afmBar In siu to a double garage
"
The 5o-machme casczde that was planned at 1Bashdrya
for use m the 'crash programme' was to be housed m a
hall no larger than a squash court If such research
achvides did take place during r9g1-98, Iraq could have
resolved the tecluucal difficulties and obstades that
hampered its centrifuge programme clrra aggt
Moving from a research or even pdot-scale programme
to a facility capable of producing significant arnments of
IiEU, however, would present n number of turbnual
challengie; and greatly maeese the nsk of detechon
A caseade of r,ooo madunea (capable of producing
about aokg of FiBU annually) would require considerable
floor space (about r,ooo sq maims) and the import of
large amounts of foreign materials, components
and eqwpment which would be difficult for Iraq to
acquire under the current sanctions regime and
which would be subject W detection and interception.
In addition, the operation of a large cenmfnge plant
would require mmatmchon of large and highly visible
fac¢bties to proccee natural um[uum and produce feed
material for the cantnfuge facility Thus, it seems unlikely
that Iraq waWd have been able to embark on the
construction of a large-de facility for couching unamorn
between aggry8 and yet manage to evade detection
After the end of inspections, Iraq will have had more
freedom to pursue such a project, although it would still
have needed in take precautions to escape detection by
serial and satellite surveillance Iraq could take a
number of chase. to hide a ., ..dia centrifuge
plant from surveillance, but [t would be more ddhcult to
acquire foreign materials, equipment, =it components
without detection. Assuming that 19ga is the shooting
point, most expects do not belleve that Iraq could have
completed a facility for the production of nuclear
weapans-usable nuclear material in only a few years
This judgement [s based an an assessment of fiaaj's
technical capabilities, and an the difficulties Iraq would
face m acquiring the necessary foreign materials,
equipment, and components, especially m the face of the
existing Samoans regure
Whether Imq has acmally embarked on an effort since
rg98 to build seaet faolrees to produce enough matenel
for a nuclear weapon is [mknown The coast recent
public assessment from the CIA says only that
'We believe that Iraq has probably crounned at least
luw-levei theoretical R&D sted with its nuclear
programme'! The same report adds that, 'the
Intelligence Community remains concerned that
Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials, that
'Iraq could take a numberafmeasures to hide a 1,000-machine centrifuge plant from surveillance,but
Assumingthat1998isthestartmgpoin6mostexpertsdonotbelievethatlraqcouldhavecompleteda
facility for theproduction ofnuclear weapons-usable nudearmaterialln only a fewyears'
u Iraqh Weapods of Mass Destruction An 1155 StratenicDOSSier 26
Iraq's nuclear programme since 1998
,,,old aid m reconstituting its nuclear weapons
programme', but no details are provided In terms o1
how long it would take Iraq to build production scals
facilrtes, the most recent US Department of Defense,
report on proliferation issues judges that : 7rsq would
need five or more years and key foreign assistance to
rebuild the mfcastmcture to erul[f, enough material for a
nuclear weapo[f'° Iraq could have been manufacturing
and testing key components, such as the electrical firms
circuits and explosive lenaes, while UNSCOM and the
IABA were m the country They have had even more
freedom to get on with this kind of work smre the
inspetom left .
If there eaeessments are correct Iraq ts probably
years away from produung a nudes, weapon from
utdgernoualy produced material However, the tunehne
for a bomb would be much shorter if Iraq were able
to acqmm sufficient nuclear weapona-nsable nuclear
maternal from a foreign source In that case, assuming
that Iraq has already completed design and fabrication
work for an Implosion device, n could produce a nuclear
weapon m a short period . perhaps a matter of months,
depending on the amount, form and composition of the
acquired material As far as is known, nenher Iraq nor
an/ other country or group have been able to obtain
sufficient black market' fissile matcrcial for s nuclear
weapon, but the possibility cannot be ruled out
Iraq would find it easier to acquire radloarhve
materials for a radiological weapon or so celled 'daty
bomb' Since Iraq no longer possesses any nuclear
reactum, rt cannot produce new radioactive material, but
there am a number of ezuemg radiological sources in
imqthatarebemgusedformvnhanpurposes iraqrould
divert this material or seek to obtain radiological
materials from a foreign source Compared to HEU
and separated plutonium, materials for a radiological
weapon, such es caestmn-137, mbaltfi0, and amennum,
are relatively widespread and less secure At least one
recent Iraqi defector damns that he parhapated in
an Iraqi procurement operation to purchase what he
beheves was radloacove material in Taricama in 1994,
but lus story cannot be continued Notleng at all is
known about Iraq, work on designs for radiological
weapons since the 1987 project. Iraq [s certamly capable
of budding a crude radiological weapon, but the 1987
design used ineffective dispersal technology and was far
too, large and heavy to be dellvered by missiles m Iraq's
inventory, and Iraq's current capability to dehvu
radiological wespom by aircraft am limited
Iraq's nuclear programme since 1998
Delivery by truck or boat as an option 'Me potential
consequences of a radiological device, In terms of
casualness and area contaminated, would vary widely
depending on the amount and type of radioactive
material used and on the effectiveress, of explosive
dL+semuratron .
In conclusion, Baghdad remuss a strong untereaft in
developing nuclear weapons, but it seems unlikely that
traq has produced, or m close to producing, nuclear
weepons from Indigenously produced nuclear material
This essesement assumes that the known stairs of Iraq s
nuclear capabilities in r998 was basically accurate and
Iraq's nuclear programme since 1998 O
that the IApA OMV system would have detected an
Iraqi effort W build clandestine facilities for producing r
nuclear material If Iraq were somehow able to acquits,
nuclear weapons-usable nudear material from a foreign
source, however, It could probably produce nuclear
weapons In a relatively short time, aasumumg that lraq s
nuclear weapons design team has completed thear work

'Baghdad retains a strong Interest In developing nuclear weapons, butit seems unlikely that Iraq has
produced or is close to producing, nuclear weapons from indigenously produced nuclearmaterial This
assessment assumes that the knownstatus oflraq's nuclear capabilities In 1998 was basicallyaccumte
and that Iraq was notable to build clandestine facilities forproducing nuclearmatenal.'

Iraq'sWeapons ofMass Destruction " An1155Strategic DUSsler 28

 Iraq's biological weapons programme
Overvisw ~ ~ - ~ - - ° ^-
rail's biological weapons (BW) programme, like its
Ichemical weapmm (CM prograamme, started m the
mad-rg7os, in the aftermath of the 191 Amb-Israeli
War and the 1974 od prim mereases. Unlike the CIA?
programme, however, witch moved quickly from
research to production . and weapumsehon by the early
x98oe for page m war with Iran, h'aq's BW programme got
Key 4raq1 hiolagica! weapons sites (t9911-2oe2)
(scc tqble opposite)
" DevvrMaNUM(19FI-96)
~ AuMIn dNnm orempmvlbed mloo~yaMtsu
(UN maritime, ume D.vnbv 19ee1
inanaPmmrd.pkt~uad.mmaw+wrlcu.rvr...~qan
roiqWVImpNm.uMaW15C0aY.M1VWnyplabydre.pam.
rhea/WMkrrwb6eruadm,eraiidortadamnbof4a918W
rdoerdwnwPYmpmal.mr.rrBW/oaeeu,
= -I :wna
off to a slow start beset by managerial problems.
Jtevitalised in 1985, the BW programme made steady
progress over the next few years, including the
a
construction of dedicated production facility and early
weapons tests By 1989, perhaps in anticipation of its
move ageutat KuwaiC lraqbegan to produm BW agentm
volume After Iraq invaded Kuwait m r9go, Baghdad
stepped up Inrgescale BW agent production and
'Iraqi BW munihons can spread terrorand provokeastrong polltlcal respoase butare unlikely to cause
mass casualties, unless Iraq has made substantial advances in delivery technology Delivery by
unconventional means (commandos or terrorists), however, is more difficult to preventandpredrcC
- assembled tudunentarv BW mwrrhum Accordme to
subsequent Iraqi accounts, the biological weapons were
distributed to military units, who were delegated to use
them if coalttton forces advanced on Baghdad or used
nurlear weapons Most of Ireq's key BW facahBes, wIuch
had been successfully hidden from western intelligence
agencies, escaped attack during the Gulf War,
Sterling m 1991, UN iwpectots began tuuavelbng
Iraq's nuclear and chemical secrets after the first
mepectaons, but Baghdad continued to eonceal the BW
progreumse unfit 1995. Whm it finally iscluncreludged
its earlier efforts, however, Iraq claimed it had
aernetly'obhlereti' ib BW programme to or -991,
including all agent and munmorle From 1995 to
the end of inspections m r998, UNSCOM destroyed
some facilities and materials associated with the BW
programme and made various uneuccesstul efforts
to verify lmqi claims of pest BW production it
weapoussaDOn In the end, UNSCOM was only able to
accoant for a pmttnn of Iraq's BW mumhons, bulk agents
and growth mail .,
In the absence of inspectors smce r998, there in even
more unrerfsusty Iraq room the expartase, materials,
and facdlNes to reaume mass production of soute BW
agents an an emergency battle, as it did m rggo It is not
known whether Baghdad bas averased that BW option,
but It eeeme plausible, especially in the few of US threats
to overthrow the regime by force If Iraq has retemed
a large stock of prrrgga agent or has produced fresh
agent, delivery capabilities are a key factor in evaluating
the magnitude of Iraq's potential BW threat.
Presurnably, Iraq he . strong incentives to improve rls
BW delivery capability, but very little is known about
Iraq's current BW delivery capabilities On balance,
Iraq's ability to deliver BW efficiently with conventional
munitions (missiles, planes, rockets, etc) agasnst
appalling forces on the battlefield or against chriLlson
targets beyond Iraq's borders appears to be Imvted,
unless Iraq has made substantul advances in delivery
technology. Iraqi BW mwuhons can spread harbor and
provoke a strong polfbcal response but are =likely to
cause mass cnsuslBes, provided that adequate civil
defence and vecdrsehon pwgrammes are instituted
Delivery by unconventaonal meau .a (commandos or
terro~ts), however, is respor, difficult to prevent and
predict Depending on fine agent and method of
dissemination, even a Embed blo-terrorist attack =old
have spreass; consequences
u
I-"
Keylraqihiologicalshes
Daurafoot and stands
Disapse Vaccine Fadgty,
7baAgdculturalandWeter
Basarsreeaflaaearchfeetre
at fudallyals
Ai Single Call
Pmtaln plant
AI-Muthanna(aluMuthanna
saurra aciudcFederatbnarAmerrcan5denbstcMaJor5lres/asociafedWIrhIrn9YPdnWMDPmgramme-UNSCOM Derember 1997
UIrPorIiamentrwalgnandCommanweulthAfluln,wihtenanswersto9uestlans,7May7Wi
UNSCaAt,ReportonsratusWJISammamentandmonnodnqY19997)<,79701/1999
Iraq's biological weapons programme
Original home of BW research programme In 19741979 andIn 1987-1990 conducted
laboratnry scaleresearch on aflatoelns,anthres, botulinum toxin, Collision Parini
(gas gangrene), mycotmlns and dun The she was bombed In 1991 andla now inactive
Designed andconstructed In 1988-1989 as Iraq's main known facility forblalnglcal agent
producnon nor, facility 7mduced thousands of Ilrrts of arohmx and hundreds of Ores of
ClostrldrumperRlngens spores andconcentrated botulinum mxln before the Gulf War
7hesite wasdestroyedInMay-1une19gebyUNSCOM Inactkeasofl998
Also known as AHAanal In 1990,taken over in, 'he BW Programme for research on vlal
warfare agents such to camelpoq human mtavims and Infcalous haemonhaga
ron/uncrivais and production of botullnum toxin and possible work on Bnnllusanrh,ads
In March 1001,1raq reportedly wrate to Me UN secrera,yfienerel re9uesdng asslsmnce
to maamate the Bdlityfor the production of foot and mmuh vacclne work appears m beve
staned lhe fanbly has about 25% of 8s 1991 wpadty
At,. known as AI Safa'ah Prlorm Gulf Waeconvened from agncultural research itannn for
production ofafiamaln and geneuc englneenng Cunent status Is not known but as of
1998 all rnpacny had been mmoved
Convened for the production of hundreds of Ilain of bolulinum toxin In the late 198ns
The facility was derelict and contained! no equlpmant In 1998
Orlginallocatlonforlraq'sBWprogmmmeIn1985-87Conductedresearchoninlualtoalc
evaluadon of numerous BW agents and studied their growth chamcredsua and survwablllry
Agents included afiataeln,anthras.boeulmum toxin and don Also conducted small-scale
production of bonrllnum toxin MY equipment and staff were moved to M-Salman In 1987
lbe fadllry provided weapoNsadon eapenise to fire SW programme am was me locallon for
fillmg OW munitions mainly based on CW munition technology and telling Heavlly bombed
InGuMWar
lbe pdmarytesting site for unconventional weapons mntralled by AIMUthenm Weapons
man with horullnum todn,Boollussubtllb la simulant for annhrex), a8ataxln,and Tillean
spores ware urainm aker, In Me late 1960, it was all. a beat site for mdiatiuo,dremiral and
whltephasphomuswaapona
Plant for arlracnng andpracesslng castor beans in produce all for asks fluids (and the
msldue, rlon milnl Commercial In the 1980;operanonal In theI990s and rebmbIn 1999 to
Improve capacity Brake fluld plantdeamyed in December 1999 during Operation DesertFOr
Cunelnsbtusunknown
 Iraq's biological weapons programme before the Iraq's biological weapons programme before the Gulf War
Gulf War

A
s -4though' fCt'e'ht§tory "bR+'7fdq'B- biological- -the prnduchon it weapordsenon of CW, which ..
weapons programme Is shrouded m uncutaulty, beginning to make en impact on ffie battlefield against
a general picture con be constructed from Iran, and BW work was net an Immediate priority
venous Iraqi declarations to UNSCOM after sg9T and In February 1985, the new BW research programme at aacramanthmds Bacteda Pulmonarylinhaladan) tough, Monaliry(funneated) &445lines productlandedared
from IINSCOM's anslysu, bsspechosle, it mtemews Al-Mutharems wait reinvigorated with the appointment tanMrui diigcUltybseathlnp,exhaustion Fubnomrya0-95%, brIraqUNSCOMunable tovedfy
with Iraqi officials and scientists associated with the of Dr Rehab Rusted Taha, a recent postdoctoral toxemla,ayanosisterminal sh0ok eutanmm5-2g% Equipment and unacrounual-for
programme.' According to Iraq, its biological weapons rrtt¢obiologwt from the University of Baghdad Under Gooses. ., (skin),Itching,small Intertina125-60% grawlhinstills dommsupportdata
programme was established in 1974 by decree her direction, work started on three biological agents lost.whIChdevelupsintoulrer Incuba0onpedad UNSCOMeslimatsdamaunn
of President Saddam Irussem UNSCOM acquired botuLnum heart, it. (Recall. inefleacm) p .., and wnhblack cmtreLymphglands Sympmmsusuallyoccur petiouced by hail could be at least
evidence that some plassnsng and Initial arthoues Clnslrvdwm perfsrngma Anthrax is an some bactersad may swell can cause bload wIth(n7days threetimes greatarthanstated
took pleceearLec, perhaps in a9ya with the ustablushormank disease that can be incurred by ingesmors or Inhalation of poisoning .lntestinal nausea Notcantagloui
of the State Orgamustation for Technical Industries the bartered sports or through skin lessons It produces wmhinga( blaoqfevecaiarrhaea
(SOTi), which was responsible for Iraq's CW and an infection that can resultm death wsthm days to weeks Clostridium To ., . Nause;weaknera,vomidng Monaliry(duntreated) 19,79011oesproduction deaared
Ow progmmmes after exposure- Botulinum toxin produces an acute botulmum resplrarorypatalyYs. 60-9o°.nlncubationpedad
Under the distraction of Major Groomes location, the muscular paralysis that can result m death within a few bylras4UNSCOMunable tosedfy
(botulinum 12-36must aherinhalation
A1-Ftszen Ibis Al-Hesthern lommuts wait established in day. of exposure Closhrdsam pefim'gms produces a Equipment andunaccauntedtor
toMa:botulism) Grain in2472hourelllness gmwrhmediadonotsuppandata
1974 for Israel BW research, as we8 as early work condition known as gas gangrene, caomrsg gaaenus
Mrmonths IfnotlethaL UNSCOMestlmaredamounn
on Iraq's chemical weapons programme By mid-r974, rating of fieah it requmng acropmation of Loch. From Notconta9laus, praducadbylrzqcould beatleast
a miaobrolog,cal containment fanltty, located on the 1985 to 1987, 1the 'Biology Group' at AI-Mutharlne
double the stated amaum.
Al-Salmon peninsula, was completed for the specific produced laboratory quantities of agent for basic Torin Weaknes;teve¢cou9h, Morlality(Ifunheated) . lolmespruducdnnderlaredhy
purpose of BW research This facility was known as the research, acquired authentic BW bacterial strains from
pulmonaryoedema.severe presumed high Incubation Imq.Oacumenrs ..it InteMews
Lbn Siru Centre or the 'Second Centre'-the But: centre 7ntetssaHotlal aomces (both creammons and individuate) respi2mrydisuesz perindsymptamsacwr donatsupportdat>accoNlng
being the CW research facility at Al-Rashad in and scmsted Lbranes and dapbsaes for relevant
wlMln 16-24 hours to UNSCOM
Baghdad Pundamental BW research was mlNSted m offenaive BW Information According lo Iraq, them were
Oea7, ft..hypruixemla In
a variety of pathogens =it Imarts, looking at their no plans at thls ome for large-scale BW Product ion and
36-72 hours.
besie r)taracteslaB® and productlart, dlsve.osbtsflon end wcaponisahon, but General Nszar Arthur told UNSCOM
Notcontagmus
storage dtamcterlanca. Botullnmn train, shmilamis of m r995 that a plan was established an r9B6 to adueve
anthrax, entedc pathogens and vsruses were prionNee assumes. Bad., . Confiulan,ssveating.vomiNng, Morvllry(ifunneated)high
wrapoicusuation within five years. 34ahtreapmduc9ancritical by
pfrrln9ens dlarrhcea,bumlngsklnWin, hecubabonWool a-24hours Iraq.UNSCOMunabletovenfy
Ireq claims that the whole pm)ect was mssucces .iful a May 1987, Dr Taha's Biology Group was
tyasgangrmel rashorbllsten,bleedhrg,acute Nationalities.
and the initiative ended with the impnsonment of the transferred from AI-Muthanna to Al-Salmar, the original EquIpmert and unaccounted for
lung distress
mshtute's chairman and other senior staff in Jarearry home of Iraq's BW programme, to occupy laboratories in gmsvlh mall . do act .,pan dista.
rp9for'sdentificfraud' In UNSCOW. view, however, the Fr Eavsvon of due Technical Research Centre UNSCOMassessedmount could
the AI-Hazen hsshtute was liquidated room for firemaxi (TRC)' In UNBCOM's view, this move wait Intended W be at least 15 times the quantity
irregularities than a lacls of edenBBc progress, maintain the secrecy and security of the BW programme, stated
Be,tween 1979 and 1984, Iraq claims that no work star- AI-Muthanna was under International scrutiny for Aapeq711asflawa Tom Neadarhq)aunddcbvommnq, Inng-termeapasure(nduces 2.200 lines pmducnm declared by
relevant to biological warfare was undertaken its known CW acBvitLs.In its new location, the Biology andAspergiNru gasnolnlesdnalbleedirg,llver cancer hot contagious Los, Facilities, Nuipmeoped,
UN5COM concluded, however, that some level of BW Group continued research ors pilot-scale production of pamsrdces dlseaeaMpossible llveron<m penwmel do nnt iuppandaia. '
research committed doting ttus period Construction of anthrax it botuhnum toxin, and msisated new research lagetouln) IntemahunalerprtsusessBaq
faaLhes, started at the behest of the Al-Hazen Instshste, projects m s988 on Closlrrdmm perfnngen spores and could not have prnduced quamity
continued at A13alusan, and some staff from the former aBatunn . ABatmdn is a to. mmmordy ismocialad with dalmed,glvenequipment fadlides
Al-Hazen hleNtute remained at the stie, working an fungal<untemmated food graircs and is known for its and permnnelsratedbylraq.
undisclosed projects, In 1983, Pmfeasor Near Ifindavn Induction of liver cancers Despite the transfer of the SkinirtltadorhblisterywmMng
Tom Notcontaglous Iraq dedamd comounted! resezrdl
of Musdnsmyah Umversity, who served as e ..or Biology Group to A6SaLnan, Al-Muthameas continued its diarthcea,dlatpshyhaemmhage on mxin
consultant to the BW programme, submitted research work on BW in cuNabosehnts with the TRC In August and cnmvlslons,posslble death
proposals for BW m the ruling Ba'ath Party In addition, r987, for example, At-Muihenne acquired a single cell ngeaaspp Fungus Plantdlsease Inteaedplants produce tmics last causes total remalnlngquaniHles
according to General Nvar Attar, Dtrector of Al- protein plant at AI-Ta)s, wldcL was renovated and used
Iwhutsmut) for human. weIs destmyedinluty7991
Mutharusa, Iraq's main chemical warfare facility, in r988 for pllot-scale production of bobdanusn train for
responsibility for research and development on gmaNrv> Woo Olarrhea,acvta9asooentedds. MorblltylRuntreated) laqdeclared conductedresesrch
use m weapons Want
biological weapons was added to his facility,; mandate Prom s988 untd the Gulf War, Ireq'a BW programme VatyluwinaduNsunlm an virm
us a987- The for-vs of Al-Mutbasula, however, was on expanded across the bonrd. In 1988, construction began death ft . dehydration
Iqcvhaam padad I-2 days
Inne,55-edaya.cantaglaua
Noteaaq may haveconducred nxearch on additional agent
;Includes, Ebolaandsmallpox
'General Nlzar Attar told UNSCOM In 1995 that a plan was established In 1986 to achieve SaunYr MdodeCOrtm/oraluoreCr.nhdarMertvendm,hmplMrow.rGCgov;ihelntemmmnallnrdNterar5trmegkSNdeSStrahy¢Suruey
weaponisanon within fita years:
1997i9$poDOrHmIthta6amtny5rvsvce,hnpJhvww.phlscouk/,UNSCOMReportonstatmofdlsarmamortmdmanimdny5/199&%4,
29A1/1939;USAmryMedIralHesearrhlnstlMeorlnretUaus0lseaser,US4h1q1IOSMNicalManagemeerof9falogIraICasaaMesHandbroY,
rab3tb1,WoddNenIshOrgaNraaaqhtrpl/arsivwhnlnNm/

a, 1. . . .4 w. .. . .. ... .s te... n.<s. ...sl,., . . e .. nca n..s. .

Iraq's biological weapons programme before the Gulf War
on a new facility, known as the AI-Hakam factory,
or Project 324, This was specifically designed for the
mduatrml-scale production of BW agents To equip the
new facility, Iraq attempted to procure industrial
fermenters and spray drsess appropriate for nere with
pathogens, from companies overseas, Based can Iraqi
documents, the original plan called for purchasing
three five cubic metre fermertters, two for the production
of botulinum tabor and one for anthrax production
As far as ss known. procurement efforts for these
ferntmtem were uruuccessfuL Insteed, Iraq installed a
fermentnhon line removed from the Al-Raddi Veterinary
Company at Abu Ghralb, which provided a total Of 12
cubic metres fermentabon capacity. Al-Hakarn became
operational In January ayBy and produced arttitrax
spaces, botullnum toxisa, and Cioseridmm perJnnBene
spores corm the nesrt two years' The total amount
actually manufactured remains uncertain . According
to UNSCOM estimates, AI-Hakam was theoretically
capable of producing as much as 8o,o0o hires of agent
morosely, but Iraq daims that nmsumuns production was
never achieved.
In March 1988, Iraq also started evaluating existing
CW munitions to determine their instability for BW
purposes. This wes a constraints programme between
Al-Muthanna, the Naval and Aerial Bombs Department
of the Military Industrial Combination MC) and the
Technical Research Centre (PRC). Research Included
work with the x5okg aerial bomb, Ri4a sexist bomb
(developed in xqgo), xxxmm rockeb and 155mm artillery
shells. The majority of field trials declared by Iraq to
TJNSCOM Involved teshng short range iaxmm carloads
for the delivery of bolssBnuas tnson, Indirect spores,
inflationist, and When ., but Iraq claims this effort was
abandoned by August i9gobecausenwas considered an
inef6aett means of delivery. In 1988 the 1RC also
evaluated heltcopterdisveminntion to disperse BW
agents using spray devices. In tlus project the TRC
modified a commercial helicopter mounted with a
chemical Inaeclsade spray system and in August r988
successfully sprayed aqueous Bemlltrs subtitle paresi (.
simulant for anihru eposes) in field heads. Iraq claim°
It built az of these sprayers (so called Zubmdy
devira), but tlreu dsspnafnnn Is unkourson. Biological
weapons tests were undertaken in least five locations
- Af-Mohammedryap Jurf AI-Sarkar, AI-Hakam,
At-Nahrawan end Abou Obmda Airfield
7raq acknowledged research on rotavirus, camelpox vims, and infectious haemorrhaglc conjunctrvlns
vlms, but denies anywork on smallpox or Ebola or anyproducuon of vitalOW agents foroffensive BW
purposes After hisdefection, HusseinArmlet claimed that production work on haemorrhagec viruses,
forthe BW progmmme wasundertaken at the Foot andMouth Disease VaccinePlantat fhura, butthis
was never substantiated by sampling or additional interviews'
In late r988, hr possibly early sg8g . Iraq alsu started an
initiative to develop ncln, a hold denved from castor
beanplants that ts lughlylethal when mhaled, pmducmg
a severe breakdown of lung Name and rearrhang in
haemorrhagsc pneumonsa and death This was an
uutsahve outrnde the TRC/AI-Muthamsa ores by ffir
Muustry of the lrstenor, but the protect was eventually
incorporated into Al-Muthanna Experts from the
Science Research Council and the University of Baghdad
collaborated on the project . According to Iraq, it
produced just ten litres of rim, which was used in field
trials with a55mm shells in November 19go Iraq claimed
the tests were tmsuccessful and the project was halted
Research on BW agents also expanded m 1988 Moving
beyond bacteriological agents, Iraq began research
protects on trtcothacenes, enatoxtu, sort TRIdt.
Work had sbrted earher on Idleha app (wheat smut,
a fungal plant pathogen) . This was considered
an economic weapon, was also used by Iraq as
a simulant m weapons lests and was researched as a
delivery vehicle for chemical and themor agents while Iraq
totally derues work wish Yinwma post,., which
real plague, they also had an Inventory of other
bacterial agents, such as Frauclsella tularensrs, Br7rrella spp.
and Corynebactenum drptherrne. T7NSCOM uncovered no
evidence that these organisms were developed, but
the vmedsa to produce these agents was available lo Iraq
Iraq ated trades production of Cfastndmm batuhnrun type
B, Although forensic traces of thus agent were found on an
industrial fermenter probe for pH at Al-Hakam .
By July x99o, Iraq had added arm. sort garratio
engmeenrlg to 11s offensive research activities bal
mamtams that the genetic study at the :xruar and
Vacnne Inststute at Abu Ghraib was not actually
started However, Dc Mahmoud Bdal, the head of
CW research who directed the Institute, appointed
Dr Ali Za'ag, lraq's leading gainers, engineer, In the
Institute m late-xggo . Iraq acknowledged research
on rotav)nss, carnations virus, and infectious
haemorrhagse cosqunchvtbs vusss, but desues any work
on smallpox or Bbola or any prostitution of viral BW
agents for offensive BW purposes . After his defectsort,
Heat hens Kernel claimed that production work on
'haemorrhagic viruses' far the BW programme was
undertaken at the Foot and Mauth Disease Vaccine Plant
at Dam, but flits was never substantiated by sampling
or additional finerterds
Iraq's biological weapons programme in the Gulf War
m'/''h e Iraqi BW programme nitrated m the said-r98as
' was not intruded to reach fell maturity and the
and-tggrss However, in the period from Iraq's
mvaalon of Kuwatt m August a9go m the coahNOn
su-strdres of January tggr, Baghdad might tar rrrsrloflrsa
its available BW capabilities. According to Iraqi
declarattosis In 1995, Hussem Kernel gave orders m
August r99o to maxinnae prodnchon of btologu.al
agents and produce biological weapons in addition
to oantsnued industrial production of binat ional, toxin
at AI-Hakam, which began in 1989, Iraq says that the
AI-Hakam facility began industrial scale production
in September rggo of more than grind btres of anthrax
spores and yqo htres of Clasfndlum perfringens spores .
To enhance prudssctsnrs from A4Hakam, the bleary
Tndostnel Commssslon also requisitioned the Poot and
Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant at Daura (.do named AI-
Marled) and modified it for The production of bacteria and
bacterial bodies, haqacknowledgeddthat wine 5.ooollhes
of botultnum to . type A was produced these between
October 1990 And January aggr Based on forensic
II
'Inthepenodfromlraq'sinvasionofKuwaamAugust1990tothecoalihonalr-stnkesofJanuary1991,
I Baghdodsoughttomobiliseitsavailable BWcapabebrles'
aldtusuinsnlseilewadlaads Is
M-400 let handle 5n 1¢0
Modinad .wra9e rw drop-r.nm
SourceeBNSCAM,Repprtanasmesofdltarmomentondmonrtodng,S719Y9/94,19/07/1999
USaepormlentafSWSeImqWeaponsofMassO*anPrugmrmNSGOVammentWhnePaper.73/OL7996
evldenre or ferments
. at the sde, UNSCOM smap" that
enthmn was also produced at the Daum facdity to
addsbon, Iraq claims it produced wine x,do httes of
aflatoxm from May 1990 to January sggt at the
Agriculture and Water Resources Centre It Fudahyah,
Baghdad (code named AI-Safa'ah) allhough the
methodology and scale of ti, production process ere
uncertain Ovrsall,Iraq declared that itproduced atleast
x9,eao btrea of concentrated botubntmr to. (rtezrly
xo,uan btres were filled into murubons), 8,5oo this
of concentrated auBuax (some 6,50o
lines were filled
into mumhonv) and x,xm Inner of concentrated af7atosin
(1,58o hires were filled cum musv4ons)
In December rgqo, according to Iraq, anthrax spores,
botullnum toxin end affaroxm were loaded into three
types of weapons - 25 of-Hnssem missile Warheads, asy
RA00 aersel bombs, and four drop-tank mounted,
ventun-based spray devices - although lINSCOM was
never able to verify these overall numbers Agent for
these weapons, produced at A!-TTakam and elsewhere,
was Iransported in AI-Muthasma, where filling occurred
UNSCOM was unable to comfort that only 25 were
producedandthat allwereunilaterallydestmyxd.
as Iraq claim, UNSCOM found remnanoindudlng
sufficient stainless-steel agent considersto acrount fm
declaredwarheadqbutInterim ofremnantswere
Inconsisrent wrin Iraq's aaoom aNSCOM belleved the
rumbas offired warheads forspedficagents wasdedved
by lost by coterie,
Iraq claimed 3e0 bombs were madaced for SW purposes
hnd 43 empry bombs) aNSCOM was unable Iverify this
production documents show more bambs were avadable
forBW Iraq claimed unrlateral destruction of 157filsed
bombe.UNSCOM unable to venfybid at o7unted far up to
60 bombs between 7997-se Iraq acknowledged that
numbers of bomhs filled with parncuiar Me towns were
only estimates
No ewdenceto verity only iwere producMlntervlews
Indicated! 12 onks were to be Mattered An Iraqi official
stated tanks were to deliver broudium toxin

Iraq's biological weapons programme in the Gulf War
The'-allucartori of'tliA'dr°fferent agents among thsA-'Z'oplesof5paNshBRIRbnmbs,eqmppedwlthpararhntes
weapons is also unclear, and Iraq has changed its
accqunhng several times in vanous declarations to
tINSCOM. Iraq derdes any other agent fill or any other
weapons system. Some former DNSCOM h,spectora
belleve that additional al-Husaan warheads might have
been filled with a fourth agent, possibly Clastraleme
pefrtngerrta spom, but Iraq dismiss this and an confirming
evrderex was uncovered by UNSCOM.
The BIN warhead for the al-Hussefn mmads was a
crude affair. Originally designed for CW delivery, a
stainless steel contamer with. it. warheed was filed
with rqg Inner of aqumve BIN agent (anthrex spores,
batullnuor main or aflatoxin), and the warhead was
set to deionate on impact. Iraq admowled$es that
it conducted static and dynmic tests of CW-tilled
missile warheads of this design in a9go, but denres my
testing with BW agent or suntrlant Given this design,
moat of the agent (perhaps around go%) would
probably have been destroyed upon impact, and
dissemination would have been meffiaent 11. area that
would be contaminated following the impact off e BW-
filled al-Huasmt warhead is urilaiown, but it would
probably be an area a few hundred metres in diameter.
with additional coverage as the BW 'cloud' gradually
disperses and drifts in the wind. Depending on
prevailing weather condihonv, botuBnum toxin would
due within an he= and airborne anthrax spores within
a few he=, although anthax spores that settled
on the ground could renmem for years as a long-term
hazard.
The R-CBO aerial bombs were Iraqi manufactured
Iraq's biological weapons programme in the Gulf War
in slow descent and fused to deboamite on Impact Each
bomb mntamed about 95 lines; of aqueous agent Iraq
admmvledged to UNSCOM (but later retracted) that it
conducted a senea of field tests beginning in August r9go
with six R-400 bombs (two each charged with bohilmum
tuxm, BaNlas subhlts spume, and aflatoxm) at the Al-
Mohnmmedtyat test site In these field tests, Iraq
claim ed it achieved an mile] dtspetsal area of about
aoo Madrid in diameter upon impact, after which the
BW 'doud' would drift depending cat prevaflmgi amid
conditions Iraq also acknowledged conducting tests m
August 199o to determine the optimal burster charge to
diepmse agent Iraq failed to mnvmce tINSCOM that
all such tests had been fully accounted for When
deployed with BW agent, the RiBO bombe were lined
with an epoxy resin point (which served to minimue
agent degradation) and were creaked with a distinct
lateral black stnpe
in addition to missile warheads and aeriai bombs,
Iraq launched two emergency projects after the Invason
of Kuwait to use modified aircraft drop-tanks to
dtssendrmta BW agenta In one prnlect, which Iraq
datuu began in November i9go and continued
through March ag9r, four drop-terdes for a Mvage P-I
were modtfied in spray wet BW agent with ventun
sprays (erther botuhnum taxm or anthrax spores) NMO bombs shnwlng Me lateral blad strlpa Indleativcatan innar mean, af epoaypaint "Id, aervait to mlnbNm aga
Each mnk held about apoo liters of HIM agent In the degmdaaoaandaaymbulwitbinawhitartandlladdrclelndlotingahatthanllwarbotulmumtarlntypa0.
other project, which also began in late a9go, a remotely
pdoted MiG21 fighter, ahcraR was being developed to Iraq acknowledged deploying the biological weaporu programme, such as A] Muthanna and the Technical
deliver BW egents using stmilar auxiliary fuel drop, produced to few locations (Airfield 37, Al-Azztaiya Research Centre at AISahrmn Norathalm, the main
terdm modified for dtssemiruhon of BW agent Firing Range, Al-Mansounya 7lmnels, and the Tlgns BW production fanhty, Al-Hakam, and nolLan faahnes
Canal) in January rggr It is known that weapons with that were mobdwed for BW production, such m the
Iraqi acknowledged markmgs for biological weapons Pont and Mouth Drsease Vaccine Plant at Daure and
were located at additional Ones In addition, weapons the A¢ncWture and Water Resources Research Centre at
(saner bombs) matked for biological weapone were F.deby.ti, .partunscathed
found empty at Al-Muthenna during the first CW At the bme of the Gulf War, coalition governments
inspection on June rggr although thetr stgmficance was were unaware that Iraq had Had and deployed
not recognlsed unta October 1995 It as unlikely that BW emotions, only leering of it m 1995 when Iraq
unfilled weapons would be so marked and it as probable adamowledged for the first tune that it had done so.
that these were once fdled and the agent wttton u; Detads about the deployment and command and control
-counted for In September 1995, Iraq claimed that it arrangements for the use of BW mumnons aral nuclear
seaetly devtroyed all of these filled munitions; (as wall m Iraqi officials claim that flue weapons were dispersed 0
unfilled instil
. warheads, act ual bombs, and modified four sum, and military command. were authorued to
druip-moloj) an July r99. use the wespmla to mullets against nuclear weapons or
Although Iraq was suspected of weapotusmg BW if communications were cut with Baghdad and it
prior to the Gulf War, the complete extent of its nppeared that coalition forces were advencmg on
programme was unknown . CW aftes were extenslvely Baghdad Iraqi ofhnals also told llNSCOM that they
boatbed during the coalition attacks in isomer, 199r, beheved Iraq s BW (and CW) arsenal helped to deter the
mcludtngCW sttes thatwere also associated with the BW coalition from extending the war beyond Kuwait
At the time of the Gulf War, coalition governments were unaware that Iraq had filled anddeployed
f_BWmn=mbons-nlylearnmg-frttn1995whenIraqacknowledgedforthefirsthmethatRhaddonesa.'
Iraq's biological weapons programme under
inspection (1991-98)
mong the years of UNSCOM inspections, Iraq's
BW programme was the last of its WMD
Dprograniuies m be revealed From rggr to 1995,
Iraq categorically denied that it had an offensive BW
pmgramme, and d took a number of steps to conceal the
programme fmm IINSCOM, including false statements,
forged docvmenls and selective deatruction of evidence .
Four to the BretUNSCOM BW inspection in August iggs,
for example, an short was made to cleanse all equipment
used In the BW programme, and the Al-Hakam facility
was presented to UNSCOM inspectors cas is than
factory for single all protons, an additive used in solved
foods Under the cover . ltaq lard piene to expand the
facility and sought to purchases additional industrial scale
feraoessters and torks to, increase production capacity
By 1995, however, UNSCOM had uncovered
paoauvement details for equipment, notably bacterial
growth nledrn, m quanBUes that had no plausible utrlity
for Iraq's loruted civilian biotechnology industry. Faced
with this evidence, Iraq acknowledged m July 1995 that
it had produced botulintun toxin and anthrax on an
Industrial scale at AI-Hakam from rg8g b rggr, but
conbnued to deny that any BW weapons were produced .
Iraq did not acknowledge that it had filled weapons with
BW agent until the defection of Lt Gen Htusem Kemel
in August 1995 I^ September 1995, Iraq acknowledged
weaponinabun, but claimed that it had 'oblttetsted' its
BW programme In the summer of rgga, including the
unilateral destruction of at-Htrssein warhead contamers,
R480 bombs, aircraft droptanks and residual bulk
agents, as well as documents and equipment associated
with the BW programme. Overall, Iraq claims that It
destroyed bulk agent totaling about 6,cox, brings of
concentrated batullnum toxin, over x,ooo litres of
concentrated essthrax, 34 . litres of concentrated
perfringens and an unspecified quentity of altercation.
In reality, this destruction was undertaken as a part
of Iraq's concealment and deception effort . Iraq retained
documents, bacterial growth media, facslthes and
expertise, and created false documents m disguise
information on its BW programme After Iraq's
revelations; £n 1993, UNSCOM conducted u momtoring
Inspections, and ;5 biological inapectiona, including
Interviews with Iraqi personnel and sdentssts
associated with the programme and extensive forensic
analysis of facilities and destruction after, During these
Investigations, UNSCOM identified traces of BW
agents on the containers of destroyed a!-Hassem missile
warheads and R-40B aenal bombs, but could not
verify the total number of such weapons or the allocation s
During these investigations, UNSCOM identified traces of BW agents on the containers of destroyed
al-Hussem missile warheads and B-40o aerial bombs but could not verify the total number of such
weapons or the aflocauonofdifferentBW agents among the weapons
Iraq's biological weapons programme under inspection (1991-98)
of different BW agents among the weapons Iraq's ,primeonal m the rggas and was expanded m rgge to the Seatnty Council in laundry rggg' fir the BW area,
improve capaaty However, the plant was deatruyed particular emphasis was placed on the continued
accounting frequently changed as UNSCOM discovered
m December 1998 during Operation Deserl Fox, and its requirement for a complete and verifiable disclosure
new evtdence In sis September 1995 dedaratton, for
current status or unknown, of all its activities Unrertamhes remamed about the
example, Iraq claimed it had filled five al-lifiessio n
warheads with anthrax sponscas and 16 with translation In conclusion,llNSCOM made considerable effort to numbers of weapons manufactured in iggo, the
toxm, but when UNSCOM found bams of enthmx on ttnmvel Iraq s BW programme but was tmable to gain a quannnes of agents produced, acqmssean o£ matenele
mmnnfs of at least aeven warhesds at the destruction proper understanding of the programme because of the and equipment, as well as planning, research end
sste, Iraq declared that It had got the mandures confused primary of substantiated minuteman provided by trial development Iraq has not provided evidence of
On reflechon, the Ireqls said, 16 warheads were filled and the reluRence of Iraq to address planning and temunatmn of its offensive pragmernme and the evidence
with anthrex spores and early five with botubnum mx,n. military aspects of the programme The many Issues of collected by the Commission raises serious doubt
After the defection of Hussein Kantel, Iraq submitted concern are catalogued in the report provided by about Iraq's assertion that the programme was truly
a total of do . 'Full, Final and Complete Died. .' UNSCOM's Executive Cltmrmsn, Richard Butler, to 'obhterated' m rggr
(FFCDs) an sts BW programing, to MSCOM in August
rgg5. June r996, end September r997- A panel of experts 'Iraqhasnotprowdedevldenceaftermrnanonofltsoffensrveprogrammeandtheevidencecallected
convened by UNSCOM in September 1997 concluded by the Commission raises serious doubt about Iraq's assertion that the programme was truly
that Iraq's FFCD was inadequate and incomplete, find I bbliterated'In 1991'
faction, technical meenngs between UNSCOM and Iraq
in Victims (m March 1998) =it Baghdad (in July r998)
could not resolve outstanding issues In parucular,
UNSCOM concluded that it was unable to vastly
Iraq's accounting for the 'material balance' of BW
murdtlons, bulk BW agent, and bactenal growth medsa
(see Table 'BW Delivery Systems') According to one
recent account, asseesments by US intelligence analysts
surd UN Inspection, have concluded that Iraq might have
reHirsPd ro,ooo lltres of liquid sonfloar.' sufficient fix the pmducnon of I,1o011tres ofmnmntreted botulmum mxln
Based on Iraq s deductions, UNSCOM destroyed At-
(dissuading on fvillab,lity of other components, Including yeast enratt) 1hls would
11.1c., m rgg6, along with eome pardiacticut facilities at represent s% more than that declared by Iraq
Dau® and zs tonnes of growth Muslim By 1996, AI-
Hakam was a more extensive facdtty than it had been in lbloglycollap broth 9o Arelativelynrmlldiscrepancybutiheestlmatedependsontherellabd,tyoflraq
rggr . Iraq had partly built a third produdton capability esnmates ofquantlty consumed or lost during me production of broahmar, toxin
at the facility, which was a disease dual-uae facility
ostensibly for large mdustsal-stale production of smgle years Extract 520 Thts minimum ertlmate,s uncertainandUNSCOM belleved It likely to be much
cell ptoteln, but over specaffied for such a purpose higher It Is based an a Iiberal assessment of theextends of mory .wed and
Construction design of both buildings and plant had Irregularly marked contalners Nowevepthis minimum figure Is sufficient to produce
oaarrred from r99z to 1995 and would have progressed 26.000 lines of 9onllusonth,uch apores,orover 311mes the amount sedans by Iraq
on a far larger scale had the facility not been destroyed
Eacher, Iraq attempted to proctor, a single cell proresn Pass... 1,100 Iraq mass that about >00 kg of peptone wae order, VNSCOM didnot brafiew this to
plant from Russia in 191 'Me delegation, that visited he Was and theestimate number includes the entire amount not adequately
Moscow Wetted staff acknowledged to be an mtegral accounted for Sufficient amount to produce 5,SUoIttres of concentrated pednngens
part of the Iraqi BW production programme before rggr agent, of about 16 team the amount declared by Iray
Iraq claims that this was a legitimate civilian project. In
any event, the equipment was not supplied. source UNSCOM,Reponon'tetuserdl5ommmenrundmannMng .s/1999/9a,79/01/1999
At Felltrfah, Iraq developed a plant for extracting and
proceamg castor bases to produce o8 far brake fluids
The residue from iris process would contain debt trean,
and the disposal of and accounting for thts matenal was
always e concern for UNSCOM immune, since it onald
readily 6e diverted to a weapons pmJect The plant,
which was originally <onalructed in the rgBOe, was
 Iraq's biological weapons programme since 1998 Iraq's biological weapons programme since 1998

mot's current BW capabilities are unknown Compared
'to Iraq's nuclear and chemicel weapons programme,
Iraq's BW programme wm the least understood and
verified by UN mspectors by December r99g, although
it as believed that Iraq probably retained souree unknown
quantity of BW agent (most likely anthm .) and growth
media fee. before r9qr . Aside from these uncermorti.
about Imq's past BW programme, Iraq poesessas an
industrial capability and knowledge base to produce
agents quickly and m volume d destred . Moreover, hnq
has had a decade of experience countering Intelligence
and developing effective concealment methods, and BW
is probably the eassest of the WMD types to hide-
Recent defectors from Iraq claim that the BW
programme is contmumg. According lo a former
official of Iraq's security and intelligence service, Iraq
maintains a fleet of disguised refrigerator Renault
trucks, which have been converted to mobile buclogical
production labomtmres . (Interestingly, a samor Iraqi
official told UNSCOM that haq had once considered use
of mobile BW production faalrhes). Another defector,
Adrian al-Hafderl, who apparently worked as a civil
enguaw,says hewasinvolved inmnsiructmganumber
of underground fecdthes that could be used for BW
wmk" Name of these Persuade can be confirmed but
Western governments apparently take them seriously
Iraq's possible role m the autumn zoox anthxax scare
in the United States has also been a topic of speculation,
based on the physical properties of the spores, found .
Bentw,ite, which was reportedly used in the production
of the andnax-laced letters, is en addthve that Iraq has
us,ed for the microbial uvvecBdde Bacillus thumilaorans.
The anthrex type used In the letters was apparently the
Amee strain, which Iraq attempted to obtain from the
UK m 1988 However, Iraq hes Pat acknowledged that it
possesaed the Ames strah and it used the Volhass serum
for ns weapons production, On balance, US authorities
seem to regard as unlikely my Inup connection to the
anthrax letters, and they are apparently focusing their
investigations on US atfaens who ought have screw
to anthn»c through parNnpatw, in the US BW defence
prqgramme
Another ares of apeculseon is whether Iraq might
have been able tn obtain smallpox virus, which could be
used to start an epidemic Smallpox was endemic In Iraq
mill the r96os . The last acknowledged outbreak was m
r9yr end ended in June r9yz . The World Health
Organization cerhfied Iraq free of smallpox in April
1979. Despite the eradlcattun, Iraq retamed an mtexest m
smallpox m the 198m, producing and testing vacvnes,
immunising troops, and acquiring research papers
concemmg military use. Smallpox was mduded on a lot
of variance archived m r99r at Count Military Medical
Lxbomtory, Al-Rasheed Military Hospital, m Baghdad
Iraq also bad a research inherent m camelpox vuus, a
vans that is genetically very similar to smallpox, butnot
a human pathogen
. Iraq has not however, pmnded
my details about its offenslve work with r.,Ip.a
. Iraq has a legitimate requirement for vateemay,
virus
purposes to develop and produce annual pox vaceines
but these projects currently am Put mentored . Unless
Iraq were able to preserve live smallpox virus from the
early Mrs, the only known cmxent stncks are m the
United States and Russia, and there a no confirmed
information that these mod. have been cornpromised
Smce 1998, Iraq has continued to develop sites that
were assoaated with its BW programme, notably at the
Hoot and Mouth Diseases Vaccine Plant at Daum which
produced batubnuas toxin and probably anthrax m late
. At Iraq's request, the Food and Agriculture
199o
Organization (BAO) inspected the facility in May ioeo
and n.commended that renovations occur In aanr Iraq
srmoucnced that it intended to renovate the faabty and
warned the US and UK against obstmCtmg it in the
absentee of inspecBoru, the renovation work at this
facility goes unobserved, as does the use of retained
utdusuial feramentatron capacity capable of produong
bacteria, bacterial lnxirrs and viruses
. Whalever missiles Iraq still possesses me unlikely to be
With its known avBfen facilities, which were
monitored by UNSCOM until 1998, Iraq unions a OW
agent production capability equivalent to the deign
production capability of the r99o AI-Hakam facility,
which was on the order of a few thousand hires of agent
weekly Iraq else has the indigenous capability to design
and manufacture theequipment required to produce and
proreas biological warfare agents and their delivery
means, and so does not need he import such equipment
from oversees, much se it might dmrre superior
equipment Iraq produced fermenters and spray diners at
the Same establishment for Heavy Engineering; and at the
Mechanical Engmeenng Design Department Centm for
Engmeernng Design, Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission,
TYtwattha, in the a99os and no doubt still mntmues to
do so Without muturnational inspection, the opportunity
exists to develop capability unconstrained. Iraq also
retame its shift associated with the BW programme, with
their experuse, experienc e and knowledge of aB aspecta
of a biological weapons programme [he mumHons
evaluated by Iraq for B W purposes am available (aenal
bombs, rockets, missile warheads) although some may
question the effectiveness of those, delivery systems
Iraq law chosen not to divulge its BW-specific
weapons reseanh, and so additional systems may now
be available In the absence of inspectors, Nahonal
Teduvcal Means are unlikely to provide much (if any)
Information on field trsmtg of BW mumtms
lo summanse, Iraq moons a significant capability to
produce BW agent It may have substantial stocks
of previously produced agent which it successfully
concealed from UNSCOM Any botolinum toxin
produced um t9&r9o would no longer be useful, but wet
anthrex from that period - d stored properly - would
.fill be udechous In any event, Iraq can produce new
stocks of bulk BW agent, including bouilinnum term
and anthrax, m an emergency with existing facillhas,
equipment and materials judging from Iraq's behavlour
during the Guff War, when it nmnbehsed agentproduchun
and prepared BW murddmw, it seems plaueuble met Iraq
would take sundar measures if faced with the threat of
invasion today. Beyond this generality, however, it is ~ dissemination would be extremely meffiaent if Iraq has
extremely difficult to assess the magnitude of Iraqs' not advanced beyond as r99o-era design . Most agent
potenhal BW threat Amounts and types of agent can' would be destroyed an
only be guessed at, but ate presumably m the range of
thousands of lines
Assuming agent is available in sufficient quasffitxs, " of factors, including tune of day, weather conditions,
the key came is delivery capability If haq's r99 . BW
delivery capability is taken as a base Ime, 10 threat to, dead ... Id cause ..In. m the hundreds or even
weB-eqvmpped and defended embuny to. is ],noted
accurate enough for battlefield use Aircraft or UAV.
uaed to deliver agent (whether through Penal bombs or
spray devices) against opposing troops am vulnerable to
opposing an for ., as are aerosol generators mounted
on vetdrles BW agentr could be de6vered byshort range
munitions, including artillery shells and rackets, but
bmdefence measures, including vaccination, provide
another, layer of protection for forces Nonetbeless, the
threatofBW attackposesstgmficsrrtpsychologicalmsues
for even the besttramed troups, and defensive measures
against such aRadrs would complicate military
operations and loirkdIns
Given how ]title is known of Iraq s BW capability,
unpleasant surprises cannot be ruled ouc
What - it any - work Iraq has conducted an come
sophisticated technology for delivering BW since r99r ta
unknown For example, R Is not known if Iraq has made
stgtufimnt progress in developing drying techniques,
which would allow for longer storage and more effective
dusemmahon of agent ftaqs experiments with spray
devices in the late a9Bae involved wet agent, but &aq did
acknowledge an mtereat m drying technology, and there
are probably sufhaent dry. m Iraq to handle available
agent Even with dry agent, however, explosive
dosemmahon would be inefficient, with most of the
owterralbemgdestmyedinthcuuhalexploston Itsnot
known whether Iraq has attempted to develop
technology for noncxploswe dresemmatton of agent
Even if it has, any =home delivery vehicle would
be vuhrerable on the battlefield to mr defences and
opposing au forces
The potential Iraqi BW threat agaimet civilians
outside Iraq Is much harder to assess In theory, Iraq's
presumed quanttlres of BW toxins could cause enormous
sualhes against an unprotected populatfon, but
delivery cepalubty, remams unclear As discussed in the
missile chapter, Iraq may possess a small forte of 6501m-
range .1-Hussem nusadex and arokm-mnge a/-Samoud
missiles, which could be equipped with BW warheads
Each al-Husaein warhead was designed to carry rq511tres
of aqueous BIN agent (a significant amount), but
pact and ffic immediate
area of dispersal would be fairly small (a few hundred
metres in diameter) However, depending on a number
population density and so forfh, the raulBng BW
thousands in theory, Imil's Penal delivery capability
through R400-type bombs or varmus spray devices
would be more efficient (isqieclaDy the team), but it
is nuclear whether Iraqi hebcuptera or a,rcraff could
venture much beyond Iraq's borders in the face of
opposing artforces endatrdefences Nonetheless, strong
civil defence measures and vaccu,ations will be needed
to reduce the risk of civilian casmathes and maintain
public confidence and order
Aside from conventional ruilitary mourners,
delivery of BW by individuals or small groups achng as
commandos or terminate remains a plausible threat that
is very difficult to defend agautst. The magnitude of this
threat, however, vanes tremendously with the type of
agent involved and the method of dissemination.
Overall, Infectious agents are potentially the greatest
threat and almost nothing ts really known about Iraq's
work with mfechous agents before or after iggi From
Baghdad's viewpoint the threat of such an attack
presumably serves as a deterrent against military
efforts to overthrow the regime Whether Baghdad has
the will or ability to carry out such an attack as a last
..it hi unknown

'Iraqpossesses an Industrial capability andknowfedge base to produceagents quickly and in volume I Aslde from conventional military munitions, delivery ofBW by individuals or small groups ac: ti
if desired' as
I_ commandosorterronstsremarnsaplausfblethreatthatrsverydlfFculttodefendagamst

"
0
 Iraq's chemical weapons programme
overview
mpared to its efforts M acquire nuclear and
biological weapons, Iraq'$ chemical weapons (Cw)
C programme ways the that to reach full maturity,
and btrluded not conhol, bllster end nerve agents m a
variety of munrborl .a, includi ng mlssde warlleads, aenal
bombs, recluses, and arllllery, shells. Given the relatively
low technological requirements for producing and
wespomaing chemical weapons, and driven, by the
necessities, of us war against ban, haqwas able to achieve
largesmle production of mustard (a blfs~ agent) by
1983 and then went on to acMeve production land
weaporusatlon of the nerve agents tallma by 1984 and
some and cycloearin by r9gy Defying UN proluvd, 7raq
used chemical weapons extensively against barrel
troops from Iq8z onwards In Baghdad's view, chemical
weapons played a uitlml rule In helping fn neutrahee
Irtut's manpower advantage and m pressuring Tehran to
accept a oesse~Hre m 1989. haq ente.rged from the war
With the largest and most advanced chemical weapons
capability m the Middle East at that time
In the hiatus between the end of the war with Irnn
in 1988 and the Gulf War m assn, Iraq made ftartber
progres§ in developing binary chemical munuh ms,
producing and weeponlaing an advanced nerve agent,
V)(, and developing an indigenous production base for
key CW prenusors The Gulf War, however, devastated
Iraq's primary CW production faolibes and a large
portion of its stockpile of CW mumhons. prom rgqa to
1998, UNSCOM accounted for, ared disposed of, large
aptaraHdes of CW contribute, bulk agent, precursor, and
production equipment Nonetheless, Itial was almost
certainly able to conceal and salvage key aspede of as
CW programme, including an unknown quanttty, of CW
munitlons, agent and precursors, Mme Importattuy, Iraq
retained the experienced personnel, know-how and
Ahhoughlraq'scurrentfWmpabibtlesarereducedfromtheirhlghomtln19906eforetheGuffWar,
It lsprobablyable tomobilise a limrtedcapabihtyforuse on the batt Beldandagainstcvfan targets'
cheancel industrial capabrbty, to recunstimte elements of
its CW programme an . emergency basis
Although hxq's curreatt CW capabilities are redurrcl
from Its high point m rqqo before the Gulf War, it is
probably able to mobdase a burned capability for use on
the battlefield and against civilian "is
p
~ \~
I
raq 5 ch emlca l weapons programme
1Key Iraqi <hemical sites
AI-MUaiannafMuthanna Also known as Same., this laige hnlitywas Inq's Primary <hemlcal weaponsresearch,
5tataFStabllrhmen4 devebpmenrandprodurtbn facility pdorto me GulfWarlbe slteopratedeontmuauelyfrom
1983 M 1991,produdng thousands of tons ufprecursonmusprdgas,and nerveagena ban,
pa per and V7) At in helght,Me fadllty Included ten Cw aceraymosen, production plantwith
a combined production capability of Mousands af mnnes peryear, as well as munitions Elb,
lines and largeslorage bookers for agentand CV manners Tinefarlllty was heavAydamaged
., the GuIfWar andextensively mspetted by UNSCOM,whlch dnpsed of remalnlng
dud
precunar metenalx,agenas,and producdon equlpment at thesite fmm 1992 ta1997
Fallujah I Thls fanlitywas in the Initial phases ofmnnmalon atthe time of theGuIfWar It consisted
mainly of warehousing and Infrastructure Items Iraq never revealed its ultimate goals br
Fallolah I It might have been Intended as an additional precursor production fatally forAl-
Muthanna or suppanfar a planned nearby HM% explosive pIanCAs of 799a, It was Inaetive
Fallulah II We tecllity produced chemical weapons precursars, such as cldorine,Mlonyl chlande and
(probably) two direct nerveagent precunon,for Me AI-Muthanna faulay llfie Fallujah II site
was bnmbd during theGulf Wap and remaining precursors and equlpment were transfeved
to Me AI-Muthannasite fordestruction under Me supervision of UN5COM between 1997-97
As of 1998,me racibtywas macdve
Paltu)ah III lhnsdaalso Intended to provlde precunon to Me AI-Muthanna CW producdonfadllty was
MMe middle stages of combustion at Me time of Me GuffWar thefacility was heavily
bombed in 1991 Some wrysmall-srale nonLW-fonnulanoNdISHllatlan acUvmes were
canied outm Me warehousesMroughout UNSCOM's time in nor, Site of planthr proasslng
rasror beans,denroyed In Oecember i99e dunrg OpemHOn oesertrac
A4Nashad Faahty In Me roMem ouu4lm of 9aghdad at which chemlcal research started In Meeary
1970s.5malFsale producvon of tabun Early produalonof mustard In Arrifted quantity
Equipment and permnnel relocated to AI-Muthartna in 1983
SourcealrrdudePMerodpnafAnIerIran5rlentlsn,MaJarSherAssaclatedWlthlrag'sPanWMa
Prngramme-UNSCOAf Derember 199r
UNSCOM,NaparfanrlaNSOfdnormpmenrandmomtwing,91999/91,29Ni/1999
Iraq's chemical weapons programme in the
Iran-Iraq war
q's cheredcalweepurnsprogramerne begarour theearly
ig7m ; as a research =it development effort located
I the Al-Rashad facility in the northern Outskirts of
Baghdad . Part of the Al-Har.en Ibn AI-Hattham project,
which was sleds responded. for lreq's early BW sueesrch
progmumse, the work at Al-Rashad included resseerch
into offensive chemical wespons agents and chemical
weapons defences, training cadres of scientifically
instead personnel and the acquisition of laboratories
and pilot-scale production equipment After Saddam
Humane tnnk over as president of Iraq in July s979, work
on the chemical weapons programme accelerated .
Initial objectives at this stage were limited In production
of a few bounce of CS (a rlot mntrul agent) and mustard
(H) (a persistent blister agent). Investigators hear other
agenb, including nerve agents, commued
Production
The main Impetus for en expansion of Iraq . CW
progranime was the Iran-Iraq War, (igiks-88)
Iraq Lsveded Iran in September t9Bo and was Wtially
Successful. As the war progressed, however, It berzrne
clear that fran's superior manpower resources, the
faBureofhxnfmisofArabetfuuatytorebel artdjoinleaq,
and the inability of Iraq to coordinate Its military
traavrces (amongst other factors), threatened to up the
balance In Irnn's favour Breaching for a battlefield
eqtsalfeer, Baghdad decided on a huge expansion of
lot CW programme under the name Project 922
Prom r98a untB 1988, Iraq commuted industnal-arale
CW production facilities, procured raw materials and
production equipment and, finally, stockpiled and
weaponised CW agents in large quantities.
The site chosen for the heart of the Iraqi CW
progremme lay go kilomelres northwest of Baghdad,
a desolate trade near Samsrra used only by shepherds
Knowit collectively as the Muthamta State Establishment,
the programme initially comprised the Al-Mutlszsma
organisation, the research and production Site near
Samatts (normally referred in as Mutlsarma), offices in
Baghdad and the old pro)ect ]mom at Al-Rashad
Eventually Muffumna would grew to recompose tan
separate production units or factonea, a research
laboratory area, a storage area, a booker complex,
headquarters and administration buildings and a
drensical weepm~s filling plant The final layout of the
plant would cover ao square kilometers, tinged by antf-
aireraft defences Many ad= esmbushmenb and military
bases throughout Iraq would eventually become
Involved m the complete chain of procurement, research,
produchon, wespomsafion, storage and use.
'From f981 until 198$ Iraq constructed industHahscale CW production facilities, procured raw
materials and production equipment and, finally, stockpiled and weapomsed CW agents in large
quantities'
Iraq's chemical weapons programme in the Iran-Iraq war
Procurement for the programme was conducted
under a vanety of cover names Project 922 and the
State Organisation for Tedttucal Industries (SOTI) (the
funding Organisation in the early years) were used in
the early ag8os, and later, the State Establishment
for Pesticide Production (SEPP) was also a cover Musterd H 811ster V., high Sides blinedng,mn)unnimny UsedMmughaut 2,85aronnev
Procurement targets, nourdy from western companies, damagetoairways,daath Irao-IragWar lout couldhaveupm
included production equipment for CW, precursor four, August emlhundred tannes
chemicals and saddled munitions t983 onwards. dendhi agent
By 2983 meet of the A1-Hazeu personnel at Al-ltashad
had relocated to their new Module. at Motivators it Taben GA Nerve Moderate Salwadonrunnynose,sweatlng Usedagelnst Veterans.
others had been reatilled. Plannmg for an offensive CW summers, of breath, muscle Iran6am
capsibildy had been earned Out for at least eight years, and spsm,unconsrlousnessdeath March 1984a7
over the provirms; three years, for extensive literature
survey end pivcus®mrt of key equipment bad occirced- Sarin Gg Nerve LOW Sairramem, mini ...a. Usedagainst lran 795tonnesUncIudIngGn
'(ise first agent to be produred in quantity was mustard sweaUng .shortnaysofbreath, On letter Stages at Iraq could have undeclared
suede spasm, Iran-Iraq War pmcursars fur a few
This formed relatively easy to produce, and in the secnnd
half of 1983, 150 tormes wete produced at use PB incemicenemo, death hundred tonnesofGFIGe
production plant at Mutlianne By 1987, the annual
capacity of the plant lud risen to 9. minister of mustmet, Cyinsarin GF Nerve Moderate salivation, ninny nose, sweaolng. Used againstiran 795 namesuncluding GO)
which Iraq wait able to produce in high quality and purity shormessGfbreath,musde In LAW ill. 0
Although dies, is evtdenre dust Iraq mireamented with naumumons,kereme,death ImnAraq4Ya,
the use of Stabilities to increase the shelf life of Its
mustard, most of the material produced does not appear V% mcn, Van, high s.~".adnn,rennymove sweannq Possibly used ln 39mnnestendered
to have been mbilissed . she. of Weir, muscle limited quantllles by ne,which sees,
A blister agent used extensively in the First World spamunmnsdousness,deeth against Iran hsvesufhaentprecursors
War, astound ls prtmanly used to cauee mrapaatahng In 1988 foraddldonalleatonnes
in)uries rather than fatahlies Exposure reseses damage
fn the eyes, lungs, and skin The effects aw, relatively CB cs Biotcanrrol l.ow-high Burning sensation in nose and Used throughout Unhnawn
delayed after exposure, and eepmed individuals may dimes, tlghtrress MniechesC traniaq War
suffer from long term, debilitating Injuries Mustard ls a coughlng,sneenn%chofJnS
persistent agent, which can contaminate an area for
several days, depending incurred coundmons " Measures me duration Our which an agent is efkttNaVades, however,acrording to the method of dissemination and environmental
As a weapon, mustard can be effective in restricting the mndltlom.such as aveathmrand hands
eneray's use of territory and hampering logistical
operations However, large amounts of mustard Sourtesindude:UNSCOA4IlepwtenltntusofdiwrmamentandmondnnnqL1999/94,79N1/1999
are necessary for effective military operations Us6ovemmnmt70eWOlagiml&ChemIrsIWerIere7hreapUSArmyMedkoIReseanhlnsrltuteofehemlmladens¢ChamImICnsaoIryCare
Roughly, one tonne of agent se needed to effectively 13MSlon,hrrp!/cccepgeaarmy mlUdekultasp
contaminate 26 square kilondeftes of territory, if
properly disseminated Iraq bad mveehgoted the production of tabun (GA), a nerve agent, As a mutt iraq turned to the non-pecarstent
In addition to mustard, Iraq also pursued production premiered, nerve agent, on a small scale at Al-Rarhad nerve agent man (GB) Sam production. at Mudeems,
of Gaedea nerve agarfs G-eeruro ors,e, gents, which During 1983, billion precursor production, began at the started at the end of sigh but bemuse of corrosion and
include fibrin (GA), sarin (GB), motion (GD) and pilot plants at Muthamiz, followed by tabin, production production difficulties, largescale production did not
cydosams (GF), were developed in the 193m by Germans at the P7 production plant at Muthanna Although tabmt begin until the second half of 19B7 By 1988, Iraq was able
scientists working on pesticide development In cmntrest production was successful in small-scale experiments, to produce more than Boo tonnes per yesr of senn and Its
to mustard, these agents are mom lethal and qmcker Iraq had difficulty ecaling up to mdustnal-scale related, mare pecusfent nerve agent, cydosarm (GR
amng. Absumbed through the don or respiratory had, production and the mtosmt of mien produced at Sann was, however, not a complete replacement
they wn cnuse death within . few reforms by disrupting Muthanna was never more than too forms per year ~ for return As a non-perststent agent, sann could be
the nervous system and paralysing respiratory muscles. The material produced was of poor quality and heavily used directly on the bettlefield when Iraqi troops
G-senes agents vary m then persistency end therefore contaminated with various solids Iraq later declared in were expected to occupy the contaminated area
differ in than ophmal military . tJFISCOM that production of taburs had reased by Use relabvely shortly after a nerve agent attack . [adsitlg
end of i986 taburfs persistency, satin was less effective for
Iraqa use of tabtm demmishufad the effechvarmeas of contaaunatmg c. It . . a", logratic stocks or
a persistent nerve agent on the battlefield affermat transport centres As a partial solution, Iraq used
poorly prepared irasuzn troops However, because Of Its cyclosamt, a more persistent nerve agent, or a mtxture
dsfHculBes producing fablm, Iraq needed a replacement of sarut and cycloszrsn for general battlefield use
Iraq's chemical weapons programme in the Iran-Iraq war
Evetrcyclosarin, however, was not able to fulfil the MuHlatma tnokplace from April 1987 to September 19g8,
needed requirement W remain in sufficiently high but Iraq says thetthey weretstlsuccesafulbeczuee of poor
croneetitmhons m the am foe more than a few mlnubes In agent quality and malignity
the Iraqi sutmner. In addstton, Iraq commoned to Muthasasa waa not the only location of the CW
mtpenence difficulties producing barin and ryclosann manufacturing programme- Some qo lilometres away,
due fn the corrosion of production equipment not far from the town of Pallu(eh, three separate plants
1lteembassy forIraq laytntheproduction ofaVagent, (known, as pallulah 1, II and III) were planned in the
VX. Vbenes nerve agettb, developed in the rq5os by desert to produce precvreors for the Muthanna CW
British eaenhsts, are highly persistent and much more
production facility Given the increasing dtifficulty and
koxic than G-senes sterve agenda Although more cost of obtaming CW precwsom, Iraq aimed lo be
complex to manufacture than Gagents such as dealer in completely self-suffiaenttn the production of CW agents
bbtay VX and its Immediate pmvrenm rue also much and their precutaots With ample supplies of sulphur
lees mrmaive and present reduced corrosion problems and phosphorous does and an established petrochemical
In menttfaetutn It was logged, therefore, that Iraq would
sectnr. Iraq rnrght have bees able to achieve this aim by
gook to produce VX, and d had no less than sut separate
the late aggos.
research teems working car the problem as early as 19815, In addihon to agents that were produced m volume
The Rest production ruua et the Metric and Did. plants en (mustard, tabun, string, cyclosartrt end possibly Vx),
230yaugeaaAal 1,243 1,233 eccaunted far byUNSCOM am desuayed
being . (musnrdl 1992-93
250gaugeaMal 125
earth remnents cormadbi .with declared
belnha (a) qoentilywere seen by IINSCOM
2lOyaugandal 8,122 2,OW 7.627 accounted for by UNsCCAA am destroyed In
bortlbs (unfilladl
1991 am 1993 Iraq law 500were dellvered
damagedby fnrelgn supplier standards N 1,400
dasoeyed bombs were accounted farIraq pmvided
agent whkh It seld wage bnm 600 meted hombs.
U1qs0Oa4 could notverify this.
50eyauga eeri.l 1.426
900acmulrtedfarbyUNSCOManddestroyed in
bomps (tnqstardl 1992-93 UNSCOMsawrennantsafmanyhundreds
o(desuoyxd bomM bwn atapl of430 hombs Iraq
gild had been centered In a fire sediment In 1980,
500
.gaugeeeriel Ilb Me remnants have been foundlraq presented documenu
handles (a) in loss said, that 116 bamhs filed war Cs gas had
been small atafacility destroyedduring MeGulf War
SDDyeugeaadal 422
331 accounted! hxbyUNSCOMaMdestroyedlraq
besides, (unfilled) saW 1 W were dellverad damaged by supplqr.
P-Wnartalbembs 337 160 527 337accounted forbyllNSCOManddesnypdf
mowed ENdeamnfafnwbombs prndurxdbyIraq
for BW were round amongthese.BOmb 2mnann
consistent with thosedaWmddestroyed lnGugWar
ar anllatenlly were seen by UNSCOM Iraq Provided
(20,OOOmofabombsblledwINC3whkhweredesboyeddunrgfheGUl/WararaneaRhesrorage/ardrdesoswellasrompaneneolspedal
supporting documents an 527dedabod destroyed
munMOnc6uiMMgboasreraerenatlndudedMrhemblU
unilaterelly
Soissce .UNSCOM,Pepprtonrmnuo(dBdrrnomentandmonrfarlng,L1999N0,29N1/1999
"
Iraq's chemical weapons programme in the Iran-Iraq war
57 UNSCOMammsntedformmoantsafupto60from
In 1992-98 Iraq proNdedsuppordng documents.
3011 58accountedforbyUNSCOManddesnoyed
No evldence proWded of 308 bombs Iraq declared
had been melted
12 ONSCOM saw remnants Wup to 50 bombs In 1991
Dommentary evidence In 1996 Mat Dill broker had
dso been filled with mustard. Iraq said In 1997 thast only
afewwere filled with mustard fortrials
D62ealelbambs 1,203 - 1,203accaunted for by UNSCDM anddestroyed in
(umulad) 1992-93
82mmroeteb6eNn) 6,610 4,660 6,4s4 of those declared after Gulf War were accounted
for by UNSCOM end deqrnyed m 1992-93 Of thox
dedared mlned dunng the GuIFWar.UNSCOM In 1991
saw eNdence of me, destruyed rocJkers at the two
sees where the recken had been Remnants of about
4,DO0 accaunted for by UNSCOM In 1991-98
6,Beo 36500 26500 Iraq dedared 6,880after theGuIf Wer,but 7,305 were
destmyed by UNSCOM Of thosededar1 destroyed!
mining itsGUIf War,evldenm was foundof many
destroyed ranked,andbargain In which they had light
go red were completely clamored,Documentary enridence
. givenbyIraq Inlass Nat36,5Wstoredatafaoliry
were destroyed during war Of mass dedged
unilaterally destroyed UNSCON! saw remnants of
11,500 rackets Not veN6ahle due to leyel of desimctinrn
logars preeented by Irtq witch light were
fmm 15,000 mehed rnckeu UNSCOM could
notverifythls
155rnm ertlltery 13,030 550 12,792 were ascaanted Por by UNSCOM and
'Wit . hindsight) destroyed In 1992-94 No evidence of 550 shells Iraq
said It had lost shordyahar GuHWar
I55mrrTertIllep 16,950 1,700 accounted! forby UNSCOM and destroyed Iraq
Aides menthol) In 1998 Pinwheel documents an mnverAOn of 75,616
to conventional weapons. of which UNSCOM has
a¢oanted for 1,779
special missllaanrhaads 30 All were accountedfarby UNSCOM and destroyed/
(sadnNlnary ylrnponanb of wan
.) remoyed 1n 1992-93
spatial mhsilawarkeads 45 43i5 accounted! for by UNSCOM in 1992-98
ibinarycanponentsofsadn/ Remnants of 3 more declared as Special Mining
warheads were found In 1997-90 In 199b
biological agents . %gahl
degradation products of agentV% found an some
,special warheads remnenhlnq praviderl suppornrg
documenrson a(coimnng for special warheads
'
0
 Iraq's chemical weapons programme In the Iran-Iraq war
Iraq conducted research on, and limited production of,
many other agents. The research division of At-
Muthanna earned out extensive tests on a wide range of
agenb, including BZ analogues (an vmcapaatant), CK
(cyanogen chlonde), DM (adamvte), OFF (a type of
nerve agent), L (Lewisite), I'S (cldoropsmt), Tammehn
ounce, GD (Brown), GE (ethylaarm) and thioserm Some
of these were manufactured m batches as Iarge as 5mkg.
UNSCOM did not find any evidence that any of those
' appears to have devolved from the president to
agents had been wesporrisad.
WuponbsHon
During the course of the Irau-Iraq War, Iraq delivered
chemical weapons m a vanety of aerial bombs, andlery
shells and rockets. Tract's wesponistlonof CW was often
primitive but nevertheless effective enough-
The mostcomtnon CW mumumns used by Iraq against
Iran were 155-to artillery shells and 1zznim Grad
nxkefs tittle needed m be dnne to the standard 155mm
she8 easlrtg, which was designed to be filled wsih white
or red phosphoroos smoke composition, to adapt it for
CW we . Iraq's self-propelled and towed scullery have
ranges from r8,oao to ppoo metres. According 0 Iraqi
dedacations, r55mas artillery shells were used tra deliver
mustard . The rxvnm rockets were specifically designed
for CW use, and a wide variety of rocket casings and eub-
mumhms aslosed withm the rocket warhead were used
to hold different agents and overcome leakage problems
The raamm rockets fn Iraq's inventory have ranges up
to 30,000 metres (Soviet-supplied Sakr go vanaane)
According to Iraqi dedaratons, rvm. rockets were
used to deliver mm agent The rockets were designed to
explode on Impact not the meet effioent meaos of
delivery because a portion of the chemical fill was
destroyed in the process However, the rockets were still
effective in coming significant casualties against
unprotected troops d delivered in large numbers
In the wer against Iran, the Iraqi au' force relied on a
combination of Imported and locally manufactured
aerial bombs, including the 25c- and 500-gauge and
DB-2 aerial bombs According to Iraqt declarations,
which were largely confirmed by UNSCOM the z5o-
and Sorgange bombs were produced at several
locations, while the Stete Establedament for Mechanical
Industries manufactured ft, DS-2 sernes, which was
based on a mixture of existing drop-trunk and Ruestain
bomb designs The z5o-and 5oo-gauge and DB-2 bombs
were simple free-fall bombs with impact fusung, which
limited the efficiency of agent dispersal for individual
'Offensive CW doctrine remains one of the least well-investigated andmostpoorly understood aspects
of IraqS WMD capabilities b/ the UNSCOM mvesngaaon One of the weaknesses of the UNSCOM
investigation of frogs chemical WMD was Its inability to engage Iraq in anyproper discussion on its
offensive CW doctrme or the employment oftts offensiveCW military units'
Iraq's chemical weapons programme in the Iran-Iraq war
weapons, but was an acceptable ovemll delivery means fm<(s chemical WMD was its Inability to engage Iraq m wem deemed hosble The attack onHalabla itself appears
any loop . dtscussron on its uffenstve CW doctrme or to have been an exemplary pumshment for the whole
if large numbers of bombs were used . All special
mumnons were filled at Muthamu According to Iraqi the employment of its offensve CW military nmfs. town, reinforced by lialabla's sirategc importance m the
declarations, aenal bombs were used for delivery of CS, Although Iraqi doctrine is poorly documented, d Is regtods geography CW casualty figures are difficult to
probable that the doctrnre was based on classical sacertam, with evidence also emerging of long-term
mustard and nerve agent.'
offensive CW dodru,e - that CW ts of great uMtty effects, which are poorly understood. Halabja itself
Iraq's use of chemlul ur®apons against untrained, dl-prepared troops or ctvdmns and suffered between S,ooo and Spoo CW deaths, while other
The esrhest reports of Iraqi CW use against Iran occurred particularly effective for defence against human-wave campaigns against the Kurds probably account for a
further Bo,-a,ooo CW deaths
in raid-1982 The most likely agent was mustard, attacks Delegation of authority for the use of CW
By the end of the Iran-Iraq War m 1988, Iraq
produced m funded quantdies at Al-Rashad. As the PS
mustard production plant at Muthsm,a crow, on steam, individual Iraqi army corps commanders only at the had developed the largest and most advanced CW
the quanh4es available became greater, and Iraq used latter stages of the IrarrIL'aq War programme m the lvhddle Bast At full capacity, the
Muthamw facility could produce up to goo tmmes of
mustard extensively against Innian 4nops m autmnn Iraq's most disturbing use of chemical weapons was
against us owrn population m Klmdtstan. Although CW mustard per year and 8oo tormes of samt/cyclosann per
1983 (at Panlwm in the north) and spring 1984
had been used intemnttamtly in the northern secmrs of year Though still dependent on outside suppliers for
(at Melnoon Island in the south) . In March 1984, a UN
investigative team conctuded thatimq Fhad used chemical Iraq from 1983 onwards, Kludieh civilian populahons key precursors and production equipment, Iraq had
acquired the ability to produce a number of precursors
weapons gamed h. were nM targeted until the arrival of AB Haeean al-Mapd,
who was given responstbshty for ending Kurdksh and had embarked on arn ambitious programme to
By early 194 tabun had become available in landed
resrsfannce in Marcb r98y On 15 April, he ordered develop an independent precursor production base at
quantities and of low purity In March r98q, d was used
CW attarks against Kinefth forces in the Islam and the FaBujah factbttes Through coal and error, Iraq had
in figntmg near Bases, and m greater quantities;
the follownng March in the Howersh Marsh . As billion Shalubazar valleys, and nearby Kurdish villages developed effecnve (if pnmihve) CW munitlons m the
were subjected to a CW au attack the next day The form of canal bombs, artillery sheBs and rockets- Most
production rams to an end, sarur production came on
stresum, followed by cyclosann, arM eventually Muthamia chemical attack on Halabla took place m March 1986, and , important, Imq's use of CW against Iren and agams
confirmed for Baghdad tlix value of
provided large amo unts of nerve agent for battlefield we caused the highest single casualty Rgure for a CW attack ' Kurdish populanon
on the Kurds CW attacks against Kurdish targets cbeuarsl weapons for national eecutrty and domestic
After the AI-Pao battles of February 1986, the UN issued a
contained mall z5 August r988 As a whole, Baghdad stalahty For Iraq's leadership, thepasstsattet and useof
catdearnatson of Iraq In March r986 for using chemical
used aHacks against dadtaus to support its overall policy chemical weapons was even as legitimate and even
weapons- From then on, however, Iraq's use of mustard
and nerve agents (manrly man and cydoearin) ustatmged of depopulating Kurdish areas, where all the population essentul to the survival of the regmte
and began to assist Iraq fn achieving significant results,
including therecapmreoftheFaopenuisulamApril 1988, 7hrough trialand error, Iraq had developed effective (ifprimitive) CW munitions m the for-of aerial J
the recapture of Shalamche in May 1988, and the capture bombs, artillery shells and rockets'
of Mehmn in )une-wdones that helped lead to the ceese-
fne with Iran m August 1988. Iraq probably used limited
quantities, of VX against lraman troops m 1988 . By August
r9s8, another UN uwnttgahon concluded that Iraq had
used CW extensively m operetrons in 1988 Again, hide
happened to Iraq as a result of the UN mveshgatwn.
By the end of the 1=-Iraq War, Iraq had successfully
ignored a total of seven special UN misoonq . The number
of CW casuelhes in the Inin-Tract War is difficult to
assess. especially given the need to drfferenhate
between mtntedtaterssualhes,andthose whosuffer long-
term effects. Conservative estimates place the overall
number of short-term and long-term fruits. CW
casualhes between qo,ooo and eo,oeo
Offensive CW daMne remams one of the least wall-
Investigated and most poorly understood aspects of
Iraq's WINED capabilities by the LINSCOM mvesngaHon.
One of the weaknesses of the UNSCOM investigation of
 Iraq's chemical weapons programme in the Gulf War
end of the Iran-Iraq War roduced amarked
I changein the operations] prequirements; and
onentahon of the Iraqi CW programme 71tece was
no longer a requirement to produce large quentmes of
busiest and nerve agent, particularly since the nerve agent
produced by Iraq was wther pornfied nor abducted and
bad a very limited ehef life- 'flimughout this period, Iraq
cancentreled on several inihahves to make Its CW
establishment responsive to, pear military requirements
and to eam as much money as possible by applying the
chemical production expertise built up over the preceding
eight years to the production of civilian products, such as
shampoo, rat poison and brake fluid.
In addition to diversifying lot products, Iraq
contained efforts to develop an indipsom e; capability to
pruduce key pnecureoss at Pallu)eh I, II, and III, Iraq
successfully developed a new pmducuon-scsle process
to manufacture key organophosphomus precutsars for
G- and. V-sgermts (an accompbshment Iraq did not
disclose until after the defechon of Hussein Kamel in
i995) paid made (utworessful) efforts to Ford. .
pestiade plant However, the Pallu)ah project was only m
its fmttal stages by t9qt Of the three Pallulah ades, only
Pallujah II had any substantial production units by rq9a,
with a chlorine and tlumtyl chlorine plant (precureors for
muetatd, GB, GP, NIX) in operation. A phosphorous
trschlmrde/phosphmous oxyclilonde unit had been
delivered but not commisstoned and a trunethyl
phosphite plant had only join started construction.
In the lull between the Ian-Iraq War and the Gulf
War, Iraq mnr~trated on perfecting VX produclsan
The full extent of Inq's VX programme remans undear.
Prior to the defection of Husseln Kemel m r995, Iraq
acknowledged to UNSCOM that It had conducted
research nn VX but demed any pswluchon . AfferKamel's
defection, and under pressure from UNSCOM, Iraq
eventual admitted that d produced 9 9 tonnes of VX
between 1988 and i9go and clamped that it had
unilaterally discarded all tememmg agent and VX
processors, including 65 tosmes of rtuhne, . claimed
used exrlussvely for production of VX However, a I1N
Pvixpetts Meebng on VX (as experts from rd. coupon.)
held In February 1998 concluded that Iraq was capable of
producing significant quanbtas of VX before January
1991 The UN exports; also concluded that 7raq may
posseas pre.cursors enabbng It to produce up to aoo
tone. of VX
Iraq also undertook effarts to design and develop
binary CW munitions and improve delivery capability
In binary munitions, the required precursor chemicals,
which are much less toxic end more stable than the nerve
'In thelull between theIran-Iraq Warand theGulfWar, Iraq concentrated on perfecting VXproductton .
Iraq also undertook efforts to design ond develop binary CW munitions and improve delivery
capability'
49 Ira's Weaon "
Iraq's chemical weapons programme in the Gulf War
agent, are stmed separately Inside the weapon and mixed yet baqhas always denied that these CW tcvls took place Follnwmg the mvasron of KuwaR, and faced with the
either shortly before or at ttMe moment of Bring The Thts denial a all the more surprising since delivery by prospect of a coalition counterattack, Iraq apparently
advantage ofbinary munitions us that the weapons pose a aerial spray is one of the most efficient means of mobilised us cbemtral forces, filling nl Hussnn missiles
reduced handling and storage hazard and have a Innger delivering chemical weapons and was tested and warheads, R-408 aerial bombs, and other memories,
shelf life . After Hussem Kamel's defeddon, Iraq disclosed weepoNsed as part of imq's gW programme UNSCOM and deploying chemical mumnotcs from production and
thattthad successfully developed and tested binary sarin found no evidence fhet Iraq was preparing to deliver CW storage facilities to the army and art force In 1991
and ssnn/cycloasnn fills for the R-0oll aerial bomb,
with spray devices at the pipe of the Gulf War. UNSCOM was able to verify most of lraq's declarations
IM. shells and for'speaal' missile warheads by ,9W As r9qo progressed, Iraq became more belligerent and on deployment to regional depots and anbeses through
The R-4f10 aerial bomb, based on a Spanish bomb Saddanm Hussem threatened m April t9qo to burn' half of documents provided by Iraq and by UNSCOM
design, were developed in rg9o and nmanufactured by farael and boosted that Iraq had developed 'binary tnspectrons, but quesuons remain, especially concerrung
Nasser State Establishment More advanced it. Iraq's
weapons' The UNSCOM investigation team were deployment ti field units and command and control
free-faR bombs, the R-400 was a parachute-aetarded told by Iraqi offiaals that production of CW agent, armngemenm According to Iraq, no special puts were
limb with en impact fusa and capacity forholdmg about weaponisation and msssde flight tests then began in order trained to use chemical munitions, and Iraq refused to
go lstres of binary fill, which would produce about 35 bnice theditechveofSaddemHussem .Them arestrong discuss with UNSCOM its chain of command for
hires of sarln according to Iraq's binary method . The indications, however, that offensive CW work had ordering combat use of CW. Iraq's decision not to use
parachute design allowed for more accurate and safer recummenced at MuHtanna and its anteNte plants as chomral weapons during the Gulf War against coalition
delivery by low-flying aircraft, although use of Impact early as add-1989 Mustard, sann end cycles . were all forces or ageusst Iaraeis dties is widely ascribed to
losing would have limited efficiency of agent dispersal produced, as was a disputed amount of VX Baghdad's Baghdad's fear of retabahon Many years later, Iraqi
According to Iraq, It produced slightly mine than a,ooo decismn to restock as CW sexual m 1989 mayhave beat officials dauned to UNSCOM that us CW (and BM
R41p trumbs filled with the alcohol component of the m antlcipauon of ta eventual muve against Koomt in weapons were being held in reserve, for use only if
binary fill prior to the Gulf War, and UNSCOM was able August r99) coabhon forces advanced toward Baghdad
to account for most of these complains, which were
destroyededherbyUNSCOM,bymalibonforcesdusing
the Gulf War or undstecally by Imq
fly late 1989, according to Irarp declarations, Iraq also
began manufacturing a limited number of 'special
werltes,ds' for CW delivery by its 65okm-range al-Hussnn
baWstte nusailes . After the defechon of Hussem Kamal,
Iraq admitted that it conducted three flight tests of long-
range missiles with chemical warheads, including me
with serum m April [9go The warheads were fitted with a
smtple bafflad alloy tank, which was filled with agent by
standing the warheads on thetr noses in a rudimentary
fruit frame and leading a hosepipe down to the warluad
couturier from a tank of CW agent devated by , forklift
truck Although slow and haz,rdnus, mas technique
worked well forfilling asmall number ofwarheads Each
special warhead was designed to carry approximately
145 htres of CW agent or binary components. The
warheads wQe fitted with tmpact fuses, whulr would
have seriously limited the effectiveness of agent
dispersal. Iraq dsmts that us CW musdo warheads were
filled only with sam, or alcohol binary crunparrands for
sann, but m 1998 UNSCOM detected degradation
products of VX no remnants of some special warheads
that Iraq unilaterally destroyed in Iwo, suggesting theist
least some mmile warheads were filled with VX at the
ihne of the Gulf War
Research between 1988 and r9go was not confined to
shells, rockets, bombs and missiles Some evidence of
research on agent delivery by aerial spraywas,morrivexid,
'Following the invasion of Kuwait and faced with the prospect of a coalition counterattack, Iraq
apparently mobilized its chemfcal forces, filling al-Nussem missiles warheads, R-400 aerial bombs, and
othermunitlon; anddeploymg chemical munitions from producbonandstorage facilities to the army
andarrforceln 1991 .'
 Iraq's chemical weapons programme under
inspection (1991-98)
n contmst to riaq's nuclear and biological weapons
' programme, its primary CW faahUes and capabdtaes
were relatively well-knomvn prim to the Gulf War
industnsl scale imadiretion of agent and ..him and
extend" battlefield use of CW wuid not be hidden from
notable powers Coalition attacks during the Gulf War
damaged and destroyed most of Iraq's dedicated
preammr and CW production capability at Muthanna
and the satelbte PaIIulah n facility, as wen as a large
number (Iraq claimed more than 40,0ea) of filled and
unfilled CW commerce.
With Its primary CW facilities out of operation and
its civilun chemical industry under inspection and
mmutoring, it Is unlikely that Iraq produced substa ntial
new quantities of CW agents or munitions between :ggr
and 1998 Nor could Iraq deny the existence of its
offensive CW programme In the early isigns, it declared
to UNSCOM, for destruction, more dum 4oooo filled =it
unfilled CW mumHons and more than 4m tomes of
bulk agent (mustard, tabun and sann/cydosadn) .
Front Baghdad's standpoint, these admissions served to
demons trate compliance with the relevant Security
Council resolutions; and-more practically-to dispose of
unstable aid harardous mumtums and agent stocks .
lmcfs naive agent had a buuted shelf file m my event,
and some of the munitions remaining mustard were
beginning m pose problems due to decomposition. In
addition to disclosing munitions and bulk agent, Iraq
eventually declared to UNSCOM for destruction ower
s,6oo tdmws of key precomer, and ==it 4w pieces of
chemical production equipment.
Despite these admissions, however, Iraq sought to
conceal aspects of Its CW programme from UNSCOM
and obstruct IINSCOM's efforts to estebbsh a 'material
balance' of Iraq's holdings of CW munitions, bulk CW
agent, ptecutturs and production equipment Even after
the defection of Hussein ICamal, when Iraq provided
doamiartatarn to UNSCOM mdicabng mass production
of binary sann-filled muruhons and VX and VX
precursors, Baghdad continued in resst full disclosure of
its CW progmmme IINSCOM's efforts to account im
munitions and agent were based at Imqi declarahmts of
amounts wed during the Iran-lraq War, amounts
destroyed during the Gulf War and summits that Iraq
claimed to have destroyed without UNSCOM
supervision In July %991. AR of these numbers were
sub/ecttoumampulaGonbyIraqand proved Impossible for
UNSCOM lo verify
As the aesessment of iraq's CW capabililres unfolded,
Irsq's aanunt of its CW activmes would change in order
to accommodate the late"- of mfarmeeon umnvered
h Is unlikely that Iraq produced substantial new quantities of CW agents or munitions between
1991 and 1998 :
by UNSCOM research ocaperNons ur defector repornng .
If the UNSCOM findings over the course of seven
years of Inspection are examined, it is clear that than, is
not one area of Iraq's Offensive CW capabtbty that can be
regarded as completely understood and accounted for.
Whether oneexammesmumhons,prnductmnofagents
end precursors, production equipment and plant
operating Instructions or Iraqi observe CW dociririe, it w
clear that UNSCOMwasunable tocomplete thedieemdrig
of Iraq's CW programme in it final report to the UN
SenintyCounal m]anuary r9gg,UNSCOMUNSCOM,derudied five
priority Issues in the chemical weapons are .
" Expenditure of chemical munitions in the agsm Out
of a total of more then 2oo,oao CW munitions; that Iraq
claim to have produced during the course f as entire
CW peogramme, Ireq declared to UNSCOM that n
'cons.Fmed' or otherwise disposed of about rao,aoa
mumtons during the han-Iraq War During an
Inspection m July 1998, however, UNSCOM
discovered an Iraqi Air Pome document that
contradicted Iraqi dauns of CW'consumphon' during
the 7ran-Iraq War and showed that Iraq had, m fact,
uaec 6,37s less amid bombs than theyhad staled This
eLw: means that more than yoo tomms of agent are
unaccounted for Iraq took the document from the
inspectors by force and refused to provide any
explanahon of the figures or return the document to
UNSCOM. (As a practical matter, any nerve agent
from this period would have deteriorated by now, but
mustard-filled mumtlonv might suit be usable )
" 55o artillery shells filled with mostard Iraq declared
to UNSCOM that55o 155mm artillery shells filled with
.laid were 'lost' after the Gulf War, but
it presented no evidence to support this claim
Iraq claiumed that any mustard from it. period
would have degraded, but UNSCOM testing sender
numbers; from this vintage found at a CW storage
facility In rggy-98 and determined In April 1998 that
the mustard remained effective Although the quantity
is small, IIIVSCOM judged that any remaining
mustard-filled agents from the pre-rggo period onuld
still be usable
" RAN aerial bombs- Of the r,55a R-900 bombs
produced, Iraq claimed that it destroyed mare than
r,ooo unilaterally without UNSCOM supervision in
July 1991- In attempting to verify destruction for about
half of these bombe, UNSCOM sought dop:umwdahon
from Iraq on the disposition of d,e panchute tad
Iraq's chemical weapons programme under Inspection (1991-98)
a mamberof Ne UNSCOM Inm Insper.b a SOOkg mastard-
Ulfed bomb wltb " soeanerananw fyatem.
sou,re UNSCaM
sections of these munf¢mis . Alihcmgh Iraq presented
the requested information, UNSCOM was unable to
carry out field utspechons W verify the information
bar= inspectfomu ended in December 1998
" VK production and weaponisation Despite ember
demale, hail adamwledged, aft
. the defection of
Hnssein Kamel In 1995, that it had produced 39
tonnea of VX m t988 In Februery r998, a pxnel of UN
experts concluded that Iraq could have produced
additional VX prior to r991 and may retain suffiamt
precursor, to produce xoo tonnes of VX Iraq she
denied any weapomsahon of VX, but UNSCOM
sampling of special missile warheads in rg98
found the presence of VX degradshon products,
suggeshng that some missile warheads were filled
with VX by Iraq (Any VX produced by Iraq before
r99a 1s likely to have decompoeed over the past
decade, but undeclared stocks of precursors for VX
would give frail the ability to produce fresh supphes
of VX, a more toxic end persistent nerve agent then
Gsenes agents )
According to plans discovered during UNSCOM Inspections, Iraq intended to disperse dual-capabdlty
facilities for producing precursors throughout Its civilian chemical industry providing the ability to
mobilise production of binary components for munitions when needed'
CW production equipment Iraq removed nearly zoo
" .
pi of unused glass CW pimiction equipment
from Muthemu pnor on UNSCOM mspecuuns in
r99r and concealed this equipment from UNSCOM
unW 1996. Although the equipment was eventoelly
declared to UN9COM and destroyed m October 1997,
. UNSCOM requested addrtonel information on the
movement of the equipment Iraq presented this
mformahon 1n july r998, but UNSCOMwas unable to
carry out field invedigationt ; to verify the information
before Inspectors were halted m Or<ember r9g8
While these issues idenu5ed by UNSCOM in January
rggg are essential to resolving questions about Iraq's CW
programme prior to ag9a, they fall to address the whole
capability of Iraq's CW programme Even before the
Gulf War, Baghdad had ressigow,xi the vulnerability of
the huge Muthvma complex, which was bombed by
Iran in 1996, and had begun to develop plans to
decentraltse the CW produchon base Coalition stbacka
on Mutharria during the Gulf War and subsequent
UNSCOM inspections reinforced and indeed accelerated
this averdll sirelegy.
According to plans discovered during UNSCOM
mspectfons, Iraq intended to disperse dud-capability
facilities for producing preaursors throughout us civilian
diemual mdm&y, providing the ability to mobilise
production of binary components for mumhnns when
needed
Despite UNSCOM's destruction of chemical
productlon equipment directly involved in CW
producnon, Iraq retauud hundreds of doid-use, process
plant anmponents suitable for CW agent or precursor
production Although Iraq's pre-199i CW procurement
network was compromised, u has mntmued efforts
to acquire precuraer chemicals, equipment, knowledge
and training to maintam and improve its CW apabtbty
In addition to sustaining Its polenbal CW production
udraatmchue, d is Iughly likely that Imq cnntmoed
compartmentalised and demable CW research, such as
efforts to develop more effective nerve agent stabilisers
 Iraq's chemical weapons programme since 1998
' raq currently has the capacity m achieve a limited CW
' capability based on existing cherrocal industry
infrastructure, existing technical and production
et.perltse, hidden CW agents and precursor stocks and
aoshng munitions, fabnmtton plants In the absence of
precise infamiation, Imq's current CW capabilities am
composed of tspablltues d managed to ram during the
period of UNSCOM Inspections from a9gr to Iqgg and its
ability to genemle new capabilities smca tha end of
Irtipections in December r998
In terms of the former, Imq's potential capabilities are
fairly well bounded. Iraq probably managed to rebels
stocks of key prrecttnors for nerve agents and perhaps up
to a few hundred tonne of good quality bulk mustard
Any Gagent or V-agent stocks that hxq concealed from
UN^'COM mspectlons are likely to have deteriorated by
now, but Iraq mWit have teteined stable preconsions for .
few hundred movies of earns, and cyclosarm and a similar
Mount of VX WeapomsaBOn of any retained material
would not pose a significant obstede Aside ficin any
filled or unfilled continuous that Iraq managed to
coMeel frnm UNSCOM, Iraq is able to manufacfum
new CW muniban .s, including artillery shells,
rockets, serial bombs, and missile warheads. Although
Iraq's wapomsahon technology was often crude
and dangerous, it could be quickly reconstituted in an
emergency It ts not known whether Iraq lus beenable to
develop more efficient and sophisticated weaponisahm
teclpuques over the past decade, but It has probably
connnued In conduct research in this area
An assessment of Iraq's ability to produce fresh CW
agent and pretutsnra from its existing civilian chemical
Industry and chemical stocks is more difficult to pin
down. Although UN9COM wee able to develop a good
m^-^t of lmq's civilian cliemral btdustry as part
of Its ongoing monitoring and verificaturn regime, the
extent to which Iraq has been able to acquire powsmor
cirenucals and production equipment covertly is
unknowns. As of 1998, the dual-use chemical equipment
and components monitored by UNSCOM were not
configured for production of CW agents or key
precutaors, but Iraq could have taken advantage of the
absertce of importance sons, 1998 W reconfigure =is to
support CW production.
According to a US White Paper from February iW8,
'7n the absence of IINSCOM inspection, Iraq could
quickly rodent flouted mustard agent production within
a few weeks, full-scate production of sann within a few
months, and pre-Gulf War production -including VX _
within two to three yesrs'.' According m the most
recent CIA public aasessment. Iraq bas ' neututed a
monsh+ichon effort' at'former dual-use CW production
Iraq's currentCW capability probably comprises hundreds of tonnes of agent(presumablya
~ mtxture ofmustard and nerve agent probablysarin/GF and perhaps V)7'
___---___
Iraq's chemical weapons programme since 1998
faahttes' and'appears to be melalbng or repairing dual- with such missile warheads is questionable Most of the spam parts, and low Bight training tore has likely
use equipment at CW-mlated finuhtne" Further details CW agent is likely to be destroyed upon impact, and the degraded operational performance In thericy, an Iraqi
on Iraq's potential CW poschich. capabilities, including remember would be dispersed over a limited area. In au-sinke mit of the blue mtghtbe able to reach some long
assessments of annual production capabilities; by duel- addition, Iraqi missile forces would be subject to pre, distance targets, but Iraq's ability to mount long-range
use faabhes, have not beet made public empbon, and missile defence systems might intercept offenvve au operattons would be stgmfirantly reduced il
If these assessments are mrrect, a critical factor for son, mcommg missiles If some CW- .d warheads opposing forces, strike fital or if defences are on high alert
determining Iraq s carretit CW capabilthes is when, m did strike populated areas, casualty rates would be In conclusion, Iraq's current CW capabilrty does not
whether, Baghdad has made the political decision to affected by a number of facmrs, mrludmg populehon appear to pose a decisive threat against opposing
mobdtse Its avdtan chemical industry to produce CW density, tune of day, weather conditions, and amount of mllttary forces who would be protected against CW
agent and key prentmoo This cannot be determined warning mine Effechve avtl defence measures could attack and armed with au superiority Althmtgh small in
Arguably, a full-stale mobdtsahon Is not warranted by significantly reduce the vulnerabBity of ctvdtan number, inaccurate and vuhtereble to deimces, Iraqi
moshng regional threats, and Baghdad ought be populations ancmfl and missBes armed with clremtcal mun,hons
restrained by the possible risk of discovery if d te devdes Given the limits on its missile delivery capabilities, could disrupt logistical operations m rear areas and
to aduut UN la,epeclore As the threat of a posaible US Iraq nught sea to deliver CW agent by air Iraq ttueaten unprotected crvilian populehortv rvithm range,
uulttary attack to overthrow the regtuie has become clear has sufficient agent, a known ability lo weapowe CW butamunhkelytouusemassczsualBea Nonethelesa,an
sma early :ooz, however, It is increasingly plausible that in aenal bombs, and operabonal experience from the' Iraqt CW attack on dvilisa might be sufficient W trigger
Baghdad would have mobdieed whatever CW rvsourrra Iran-Iraq Weir However, Iraq's remaining air force a relaltatory, response from the country under attack
it could muster, both pre-aggr storks and fresh agent capabilities are very weak On paper, its, Iratp Ar Force
pcoduchon and weepomsation, has about SolvtiG238N and Mirage pIEQ modem attack
Overall, however, it is unlikely that lmq inently aircraft with a normal combat radius of about 75dtm -
possesecs an offensive CW capability comparable to us capable of reaching Tel Aviv. Poor malnteoance, lack of
pre-19q. levels of thousands of tonnes of agent and tens
of thousands of effective munfhutrs. Iraq's current CW
capability probably mmpnses hundreds of Mnnes of
agent (presuarably a nuxhtre of mustard and nerve 'In cancluston,lraq's current CW mpability does net appear to pose a decisive threat agaarstopposmg
agent, probably serm/Gp and perhaps VX) Ilse military military forces who would be protected against CW attack and armed with air superiority. Although
and political effectiveness of this agent stockpile small in number, inaccurate and vulnerable to defences, Iraqi aircraft and missiles armed with
depends on Iraqe current delivery capability against chemical munitionscould disrupt logistical operations m fear areasandthreaten unprotectedcivilian
tactical or strategic targets Iraq's tactical CW arsenal populationswithin range, but areunlikely to causemass casualties.'
could include perhaps several thousand mutations,
including artillery shells, short-range rockets and serial
bombs Though much reduced from its r9go inventory
and vulnerable to opposing aa forces, Irecj s mr force
remiss; ==it 35 Su-22, Su-29 and Su-25 ground attack
aircraft that ..]it be used for taatical delivery of CW
munitions On balance, an arsenal of this stze is
insufficient for sustained offensive militery operations
and is unlikely M udbct mthtanly significant caeundric.
on well-tcamed and we8<qmpped troops Nonetheless,
Iraq's known ability to many chemical warheads to its
rocket and scullery ptecea (with mnges up m 3opoo
mehes) could complicate operishons for opposing forces,
who would be requtmi m wear protective gear
Iraq's capability tu delivery CW moustions with
missiles or aircraft over longer dtstances against rear
logistical areas and civilian targets is relatively limited
Assuming Iraq has a small number ofal-Hussnn missiles,
it he . a demonstrated capability W fabricate, it All
'special warheads'wrth CW agent orbtnary mmponents
Unless Iraq has advanced beyond the tmpact fusing and
warhead design of its a99o-em special warheads,
however, Its ability m effectively dlssemmete CW agent
---~~~---
Iraq's ballistic missile programme Iraq's ballistic missile programme

Key Irqqf hallistic missi(e sites

fthoal radated in des constext of the Aimb-Ismalf
Main site for pre6ulf WarScud modification and production of of-HUSSeIn musllesirnduding
conflict after syn, Imal's missile progrommon, back
aldrameswarheads,engmes Most buildings damaged or destroyed during sheGulfwar
Aoff drassaing the Iran-Imq War (198o-88) when
UNSCOM teams destroyed prohihited mlssllas, support systemt development and
Iraq successfully modified its imported Scud rrileMles construction equlpmentand specialized tools and dlesMlssde fabnebon facility afteclual
in develop an ettmded-rertga variant known as, the during DerenFOx In 199&Repartedly rebulit
al-Husse'us m)esBe. Stimulated by the social of the
al-HVSSeIn against Iran, Baghdad embarked ass an
kafah Pdmaryfaulty fw preGulf War sladc testing of Iliad angina Most buildings damaged m
ambiflous programme to acquire an Indigenous missile destroyed during the Gulf War Convened to a facility for moo-proscribed anMeesTargeted
production capability and develop even lovger-mange during DesenFOxin 199B
mieslleayetemsbasedonihed~nngendmulffeGgmg
of Scud technology. In the late rqBos, Iraq's trusalle
uara Produced launchersfor theal-HmsCn missile programme.Most buildings were desrroyed
programme was closely linked to the development dudngtheGu7War converted to a faciliryfw non prosrribed military acelvides.
of chemical, biological end ntsclmr warheads as Iraqi
President Saddam Husselnsought to eetabhsh lreq as the
AI-Q . Qaa Producllon ofwalifieadsfor the al-Husseln Warhead processmg facilities at the site were
doltiment Arab power in the regain. destroyed under UNSCDM supervision Converted to a facility for non prpscnbct acnvmes
The r9ga Gulf War, and subsequent UNSCOM efforts
from tgqa to rgq8, drastically cut short Inial's ambitious
Warertya Prewar workonpruduRlonofIndigeno
Indigeno us guidance and commal systems for at house,
missile programme Nonetheless, Iraq sought to selvage missiles Cornmeal to a facility forrons,rosalbed missile activities Location am ...
comments of its pre-wer missile force end eetablish a
paiecirTargeted during Coast Pas In 1998
'break out' capablhty under the guise of short-range
tmsslle progreaimes permitted under UN restrictions,
Yawmal-Ar1m Part of the Balat al-Shuhada graup of facilities respannble for pre-war development of the
'Jespite the ending of CINSCOM htepechons m Tggg, eadr-20oo mlsslle,lntended site for final assembly and terms All long-ranye nowle test and
Iraq's current missile eapabdstes an probably quite development equipment, Including ram bulldlnge,were destroyed unde(UN5COM
bodied, especially in the absence of significant foreign
supervelon Converted to a facility far ner"arandial missile

Ta)al-Marlk Panafthe galas al-Shuhada group of fanlltles responsible forprewar development of me

Badr2natmissile intended forproduction ufwild pmpellanu Allnine buildings and
equipment Imoved in Me badiprogramme were destroyer! under UNSCOM supeMsmn
Converted lo wark on min,manaftred missile activists.

Me aFfiqar Part of me Balat .1 Started. g.up of facilltles responslblefordevelopment fare Butdr-2000

eesmlance Iraq mayretam a very small force of al-Huasein misslle,intended to manufacture of motor asesBombed during the GulfWar UNSCOM

udsetlee capable of reaching Tel Aviv, Rryadh, and seems completed destruction of remaining productlan equlpmentConverted to a fadlRyfor
noripirmic,abol in ...14 activities
Tehran and e handful of short-range al-Saminual
msssdes capable of turning Kuwait from antithesis
Iraq Armed with CBW warheads, which Iraq can Mail Locaaon of Ibis al-HayMam Mlulle Research and D.ug . Come, set up In April 1992 for
must probably produce, these missiles pose e research and development an 51hort-arage assume missiles not prohibited] "a UN
Targeted during 1998 raids of DesertFOa Reportedly ad uat
potential direct to avdars populations However, given
constraints an iraq's bxlstdcal and operahnrml capability
Also Inown as Saad-15 doing consouctlon Research and develupmentfaclllty fiar missiles
end the effectiveness of possible munter-meastues, Iraq's A41Unal
and anileryTargeted during those, 5tarm 1990 state of Deserrrav Repostually mount
ability to inflict mass casualties with CBW-armed
msssdes against avshsn targets as probably quite hunted,
provided that adequate civil defence menstsrss are taken .
Without such meaetlaee, a few Iraqi m,avdes with CBW NOTE Some sltes Involved in non-prosulbed missile activities as of December 1998 have not been publicly Identified

bsamoud warheads might be able to strike uvshast targets, rzoamg

panic and d)sroptsmt ar~it possibly infBcNng arough Sourcesmdude:FederotlanarAmeoransaeno'srs'Malor5ltesASSOOaredK,th Iraqk Part WMD
miwlis and
Is uneher raetialhestoaeatestrongpolibtalpacssureformtahabon Programme-UNSCOMDecember 1997
PaltagontwebrlteroroaeuaannDetertFOKhttp1/wwwdelens¢IlnkmlUspedalzrdesert I
UNSCoMReyoaonstatus ofGraannmentandmandating y1999/9t29,'o1/1999

The 1991 Gulf War and subsequent UNSCOM efforts from 1991 to 1998 drastically cut short ImqY
ambitious mlsille programme. Nonetheless, Iraq sought to salvage remnants of its pre-War missile
force and establish a 'break out' capability under the guise at short-range m/ssde programmes
permitted underUN restrictions'

0
 Iraq's missiles in the Iran-Iraq war
raq's ba0[slic'Srfid6de progmumme,begau in the "mid"
l19708, in the conteict of the Aab-Isteeh conflict
In rgyy when Israel was pmdudng the 5ookm-range
Jerrrlm I missile based on French terlmology, Egypt
requested and received a small battery of Scud-B missdes
from the Soviet Union in agyz . After the October sgl ;
Arab-Iaredi War, in which Iraq played a larger
role thsn in previous conBlcle, Baghdad also tmned
to Moscow for mtssrles and began to take delivery
of Scud-B missiles; in igyq. Based on German V-2
terkmology, the Scud-B missile is a slnglestage hqwd-
fuelled ballistic missile with a range of 3ookm and a
IAookg payload, including a non-separating. urdtery
conventional warhead of about Sookg of high explosive
The Scud airframe contains separate tanks of fuel
(kerosene) and ondiaer (nitric acid) that are bumed m the
vusaileengine toprovide propulston.With arelatively
uneophistuaterl gold. system, the Scud-B has an
accuracy of about rkm circular error probable (CEP)',
which is the radius of a circle vnfhm which half of the
missile projectiles are expeered m half. In total, Iraq
imported BrgScud rnfemlesandrumobiklaunchetsasfrom
theSoviet Uruon .
The Iram-h"aq War, which began when Iraqi forces
Invaded Iran m September rgBo, provided a major
Impetus for the further development of Iraq's missile
programme. Iraq first fired Scud missiles against Ireruan
targets in rgBz in response, Tehran rushed to procures
Scud missiles from Lbya and North Korea and began to
strike Baghdad with aaiesdes in rgel . With Tehran
beyond the range of Iraq's Scud musiles, the pressvre on
Baghdad to develop a longer-rm,ge system to retehate
was iramerise
In mid-i986, [he Iraqi miirtery industrial complex
under the superwsmn of Saddam Hussewn's son-in-law,
Hussem Kamel, pushed forward several competing
missile projects. One of these projects -code-iiarned Badr
2f100-hadactually beguninlate t98q,when Iraq signed
a contract: with Consen, a Swtsa-based consortium of 16
European mmpames,tosupply rocket moor production
technology and 115 Badr-2000 mlesdes based on the
Amenpn Perahing 2 The Badr-2f100 specifications called
for two versions of the twoslage solid-fuelled ballistic
missile, one with a 62okm range and one with a yzokm
range, and a payload of 5ookg As a result of emerging
'inthesecondquarterof 1988, at the height ofthe'Warofthe Gties;some 189al-Hussern missiles were
launched at Tehran.Overall,Iraq claims that It fired 516 Scud andal-Hussem missiles againstIranian
targets during the conflict'
Iraq's missiles fn the Iran-Iraq war r1o
i
mtemationsl esport contro~f measures and bilateral
diplomatic pressures, however, Consen continually
failed to meet deadlines, To accelerate the project, Iraq
signed a new contract in agBy for the supply of only ry
missiles By ygBg, Consai came under scrutiny for the
violation of airport control Is. It was dissolved and us
leadership prosecuted As a result, Iraq received only
some training and a few detiverles of eqmpment. For all
mteNs and purposes, the Badr-200H project never got off
the ground
Another project however, achieved dramatic succesa.
It was based an indigenous Iraqi efforts to modify the
Scud Wssdes already In Imq's arsenal In order tu double
their cange.ln less than rg months, foul was able tu Bight
test the new missile (code named al-Hussnn) in Auguat
a9871 and began in modify Sntd mlsstles on a serlal basts
byearly vgBgforuseagainst Iran Toachieveanes4ndcd
range, Iraqi ectw,bats cut apart Sired missiles, extended
the airframe, and installed larger fuel and modisOr tanks
to tnaease (hen propellant capability Sioultramemily,
Iraq reduced the wetght of Ihe ongmsl Scudwad,eads by
about 5wkg, mainly by sacrificing pad of the explosives
paylorl Mmor modifications wcare alao made ln the
Scvd engrne b achieve slightly longer bum home With a
reduced payload and greater propellant ®paaty, the at-
Hussnn had a range of about 65okm. However, the
missde, which used the Original Scud guidance and
control system, became even less accurate, with a CEP of
sppmlmately 15 to 3km . Moreover, Iraq's modtfiraBons
to the Scud onsted flight stability problems With changes,
in wetght distributor, an extended airframe, and higher
reentry speed., the al-Hussem missile and warhead
tended to break up when it re-entered the atmosphere,
thus senouslyreduangaccuary
7bese deficiencies, however, did not prevent the af-
Hussnn from serving as an effective instrument of terror
against Iranian nhes In the second quarter of 1988, at the
height of the 'War of the Gttes', some tBg al-Hussean
missiles were launched at Tehran Overall. Iraq clauns
that it fired gab Scud and al-Hussm, missiles against
Iranian targets during the conflict By April, Iran had
ended its missile attacks against Iraq and subsequently
agreed to begin cease-fire negonatons In August rgBg,
the two belligerents signed a cease-fire, and Traq, military
engtneem ware haded as heroes
 Iraq's missile programme between wars (1988-90)
i(- smaCce,fid me of mand. againstIran resoulearial
Baghdad's appreciation for the strategic utility of a
eat missile polarity. After the cease-fin, with Ire,
Baghdad sought to tumpmve the al-Hussem, accelerated
effects to develop an indigenous production capability
and ordered production of aao ut-Hussem missiles,
including mine with chemical end biological warlresds.
(Ultimately, Iraq planned W produce about v,ooo al-
Hussem missiles) In addition, Baghdad ordered the
development of a new missile system able to deliver a
payload of almost a torme (meant to accommodate a
nuclear payload) over a range of some a,aookm, putnng
moet of the Mrddie Eastunder snlraq, ballisdc umbrella
Iraqi requirements fm a nuclear delivery system else
called for a balhstic missile with a larger airframe
(from 88nmm to t,a5omm diameter), which was seen as
necessary to acoommodate a nuclear device
Topumre these objectives, the Iraqi realitery-fixelustual
compleca underwent a reorganisahon under [he newly
.led .Milflery Industnalrsauon Committee (NIIC),
aimed atlooking ltsreliance onimported parts This was
to be achieved via reverse engmeenng of imported
meterials and manufacturing m local workshops,
somehmes with the assistance of foreign compares,. The
reverae-engtneeririg efforts included the acquisition of
soplustiated production machinery and leelhnology, as
well as coutPmrents and matenaLa from various Western
suppliers Some reverse-engmeenng work on Scud
gurdance, navigation and contact (GNC) equipment was
provided by British and Austrian companies, and
assembly late for GNC sets were dehvued to Iraq-
German compare' provided missile propulsion
sulrtouoonents and semi-firushed materials for autrame
and warhead production.
To Improve the performance of the of-Hussnn mutsde,
lraqi scientists and engineers studied various techniques
for obraming a more sable aerodynamic ronfiguraUon
By reconfiguring some internal components, Iraq was
able to slightly reduce the length of the original al-
Husenn . The result was the so-called 'short al-Huvsnn' .
With a shghtly Incmesed range of yzokm and wsth a non-
separahng warhead with a payload of some q3okg, the
new version did not break up on re-entry Into the
atmospirere, By the end of the rq8os, the 'short al-
Hussnn' became the standard version of the .1-Hosseas
mesas that Iraq world produce (end eventually uee m
the Gulf War, along with the original al-Hueecm)
Iraq also made progress in developing and building
non-conventional warheads for the al-Hussear missile
'Befween lore 1989 andearly 1990, after several relatfve successes m theresearch
I non-conventional warfare agents, Iraq began to produce al-Hussein warheads
for chemical and biological delivery Overall, the weaponisatton of
agents in missiles by Iraq was primitive andsub-op tlmal, with contact fuses designed g
I impact with the ground.'
In late 1985, on a emgle occasmn Iraq apparently tested
the possibility of filling a Scud missile with a chemical
warhead Between late 1989 and early r99o, after savenq
relative successes in the research and developmen
of non<onventloual warfare agents, Iraq beg. tu
produce al-Huseem warheads specifically designed for
chemical and biologlcel delivery Thesis so-caBed'special
warheads' were equipped with contact fuses and
contained a mnieter filled with r;5 force of liquid
chemical or biological agents instead of high exp)osvve.r .
Biological warfare agents were contained in stairileas"
steal casuatem, chemical warfare agents um alommtmn
ones Overall, the weaparroatton of chemical and
biological warfare agents m missiles by Iraq was
pnautwe and sub-optunal, with contact fuses designed
to detmtate on impact with the ground En addition to
C6W warheads, Iraq developed and deployed a =all
number of a3okg cimaete-filled musde warheads lead,
named d{-He)arah or al-Sifed missiles) designed to
peneba,e,hardened structures
Along with improving the al-Huasnn, fmq began an
work on an even more stretched version, die al-Abbu (the
code-mars, could radicals it was designed to strike the
ImmanntyofBanduAbbamtheStra,tofHomtuz) The
new missile was destgred to have a range of 9aakm with
inoeased propeBant repaciues and a payload farther
reduced to Jaokg Part tested in April 1988, the resulb
were disappointing Even more so than the original al-
Hussnn, the new missile was aerodynamically unstable
and tended to break up on re¢ntry fare the atmnsphere,
dmsncally reduong acetuecy In the end, the a4Abbaswas
never fielded- To deal with the instability problems
informal in extended-range Scuds with nouseparanng
warhcads, Iraqi engmcers started to explore the
technology for separating warheads A successful flight
test with such a warhead on an al-Hussnn missile, using
the American separating solution of explovve bolts, was
advevedoniheeveoftheGulfWar flefmetheGuIfWar,
Iraq also obtained a parachute device for retarding al-
Hussein warheads, possibly intended to assist
dwsemmatron of CUW agents Iraq did not acknowledge
se work with sad, par:hrdes m UNSCOM until 1995
Nonetheless, Iraqi efforts to extend the Scud mosede's
range withm the original diameter of the Scud ablutions
were reaching their hunts, and the arhteved payloads
were well below the goal of a tome warhead, which
eaghdedaoughtforanuclearwarhead Inearlyr9g9,the
Iraqi authontiee decided to explore dtfEerent technical
routes to arlueve longer ranges with a greater payload
anddevelopmentof
speaficallydesigned
chemical and btolo fcol
Ire
to detonare on
Iraq's missile programme between wars (7988-90)
The first route was a more ""we redeargn of the Scud
technology, which gave buth in the %ut al-Abbas' ot S73
mtcsde project Iraqi engineers undertook design studies
and experiments to widen the Scud airframe to r,z5omum,
coding, the propellant tanks, use propaganda that would
produce morethrust,andmodify theoriginal Scud single
,mgme to make it work longer and more efficiently
Although the al-Abbas was never budt or tested, missile , systems were designed, one for a r,ooamm bore gun, and
experts assessed that it could have theoretically reached
r,aookur with a payload of one music, In ecsernce, this
pm))ect would have led m a missile very close to the
North Korean Nodang syetem, whose development
started approximately at the issue period
A further option explored by Iraq was an even
more ignificent departure hear the prior practice of
mammental improvements to the basic amgle-amgme
Scud design and mvolved clustering engines and mule-
stagmgihebalbsacmtssde Oneresuliwasthestartofthe
Tammua project, which Baghdad officially announced in , liquid propulsion based Scud technology Iraq also made
December 1989 At the hme, Iraqi officials claimed the
Taammuzwauldhavearangeofx,aoukm,basedonatwo-
stage design consisting of a Scwl as a first stage and a
modified SA-2 Volga sustamer se a second stage . The
Tammuz project apparently went no further than design
efforts and consbuctmn of a mock-up missile before (he
Call War Iraqi soenhsls later told UNSCOM that the
pm)ect wes not pursued, probably due to the limrtaaons
m diameter and mass of the aduevable payload
Another approech, insisted m early 1988, involved
clustering and stacking subcomponents and produced
different variations of tire a1-Afud Space Izuoch Vehicle
(SLV) fix design cuns,eted of five Scud engutes clustered
together to boost a second stage consisting of mother Scud
engine, with a solid recket motor thud stage
The al-A)nd SLV wav launched m Decertmher 1989
The dustered first stage flew for 130 seconds. but the
second mid third stages were mock-ups and did not
separate m ~gmte Another SLV design under amity wes a
two-stageve)udemde-nantedal-Klmreef The vehtde'sfirst
stage consisted of a modifled futal-Abtms' S33 and a second
stage probably based on the Scud or al-Hussem mssile, or
even a secand fat al-A6Ews' S13 Used as a ballistic missile,
the ol-Xharcef rmght have reachd an estimated range of
;oookmrvuh a payload estimated at a,oookg-mmparable
in design and performance to the North Korean Taepo-
Dong 1 tested in August 1998 In Iraq, however, the al-
Kharerf dOl nut advance beyond paper studies
In addition to Iong-range crusades, Iraq also pursed
development of a mamuaoth artillery piece know as the' Abtd space launch vehicle test
'On the eve of- the Gulf War- . Iraq succeeded m-modtfying its existmg Scud force to ob tam, by
incrementalimprovements,themaztmumrange(wrthsigmficantlyreducedpayload)outofthesmgle-
I
engme liquid propulsion-based Scud technology"
Supergun or Project Babylon After successfully testing a
smallu pmtotype eystem m August 1989, Iraq pmceeded
with development of two larger bore systems of 35ot"u'
and tannin bore respectively Both guns were designed
to be elevated and mounted on an mdmed but fixed
emplacement The 35amm system was actually limit,
, and test slugs were fired at Jabal Haamryn Even larger
some hardware was delivered to Iraq list. the Gulf
War Although innovative, the charge designs and
propellants used in the Supergun limtted the range
and payload capabilities of the system, which was
-dismantled by I)NSCOM after the Gulf War
On the eve of the Gulf War, Iraq's adtlevenments m the
uussile field were impressive In particular, Iraq
succeeded m moddymg its existing Scud force to obinm,
by incremental improvements, the mevrnum range (with
etgmficantly reduced payload) out of the smgleengme
considerable progress in acquiring the technology,
infrastructure and eqwpment needed to produce
al-Hussetn crusades mdrgenously, although it was still
unable to produce all cnhcal missile components
indigenously, especially the turbopump bt the bqwd
engine and the guidance, navigation and =hot sets of
the mi.vaBes Iraq fall had to rely on the import of
adtml components, machine tools, spare parts and raw
matenals, aswell as an Eorergn teduucel essutanre Gwvi
its success in purchasing foreign assistance, however, d
seems clear that Iraq was making substanhal progress
towards acluevmg a purely Indigenous capabilfty to
produce al-flussan missiles
Although the 65okm-range al-Huesein and Its variants,
including the warhead-separation version, could be
considered success sued., the vanmu technical efforts of
Iraqi engineers to stretch the capabilities of the basic Scud
vussile were reaching their physical learn, In the and, the
range of Iraq's modified Scud mead . was well Order
Irar~s s,zookm goa4 and the payload was limited m a few
hundred kilograms This led to loop efforts to pursue an
even more extensive mdestgn of Soul technology, sudi as
expanding the diameter of the Scud mif,-, dostering
engines and multt-staging By the end of r99o, however,
Base efEortrm werc sWl at an early stage of development .
None of these attempts had reached the status of
prototype development and succeasfW testingand almust
no hardware was known to have been actually produced
beyond paper smaee son, exF for the at-
 Iraq's missiles in the Gulf War
allowing the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait in August
199c, and the subsequent build-up of US-led forces,
F Baghdad mobilised its missile forces By lam rggo,
Iraq took precaun(narysteps to prepare CBW warheads
for its missiles. According to subsequent Iraqi
declarations, a total of 75 special warheads were filled
with dir-vircal or biological agents : So warheads were
filled with nerve agents (sarm and probably V%), r5
with anthnx spores, five with botullnuum mwn and five
with affatozin). In early rggr these warheads were
deployed In the field, As part of its crash nuclear
programme, a Scud warhead was lent to the Iraqi
nuclear organisaBon m study how m modify it for the
delivery of a nuclear device
in January rggr, the Gulf War started with the
intensive, US-led air tampaign, followed by ground
force operations in Pebruary During the short confhet,
Iraq fired wine 93 ai-Huasran missiles at Saudi Arabia
and Israel. TIfie missiles aimed against Saudi Ambut
seemed prunetrly intruded m disrupt coalition military
operahmu,whde the missiles Cued against Israel (needy
40) were presumably intended m provoke an Israeli
response that would create severe political
cvqtpBcations for the Arab members of the enh-Ireq
troal4hon- At least five aFHrlarak missiles upped with
concretewarhesds were fired at Ismel's Donnas nuclear
complex, while the reminder, with high explosive
warheads, were aimed at cedes
Tftere has been much speculation about Iraq's
dedsmn not to use my of its COW warheads. Most
W;slem ocperb attribute this restraint m de6errence,
remforeed by Seaetary of StamJames Baker's wamingto
Though Iraqi missile forces were oflittle consequence forthe overall course of the war, an al-Hussein
strike againsta US mllltaryfa<tllty In SaudfArabla caused the greatest number of US casualties fn any
single incident, and the mobility of the launchers allowed them to evade allied planes, which were
unable to destroyanyoperational missiles during the war'
Deputy Prime Minister Tanq Aria m Geneva before the
war not m use of COW or face unspecified
m due view, Baghdad feared that crossing the CBW
ttueshold, especially against civilian targets, would
invite a among coalition (or Israeli) response and provide
a basis for estendmg war goals beyond the evtcnon of
Iraqi forces from Kuwait Prom Baghdad's prospective,
however, It was believed that deployment of CBW
warheads helped to deter coalition forces se wait Tanq
Ails told UNSCOM fixecuBve Chromium Rolf Ekeus m
rgg5 that special COW warheads were dispersed m four
sites, and that Saddam Husseln had delegated authority
m the commanders of his missile force 1o launch CBW-
tipped missiles d Iraq was attacked with nuclear
weapons or they believed thet Baghdad was about m be
conquered by the allied looses
In any event, the Gulf War (though a military duester
fm Baghdad) probably helped m confirm for Iraq's
leadership the utility of a ballistic missile force Though
Iraq'n missile forces were of little consequence for the
overall course of the war, an al-Hussefn stoke against a
US military facility lo, Saudi Arebla mused the greatest
number of US orsualBee m any single incident, end the
mobility of the launchers allowed them m evade allied
planes, wluch were unable to destroy any operational
messiest during tha war Iraq's missile attacks against
Israel also faded to achieve its presumed am of
widening the win, but demonstrated Iraq's capability to
hit once beyond its immediate vicinity Iraqi offi cials
also saytheybelieve that haq's C8W-armed nuesile form
helped keep thewarRauted and dammed coalition forces
firm pushing beyond Kuwait towards Baghdad .
Iraq's missile programme under inspection
(1991-98)
n the wake of the Gulf War, much of Iraq's missile
ludrastructrim lay m rmns. Major facilities at Tali,
Rafah, IJora, Thu al-Fiqar, and Al-Kutdt were bombed
and heavily damaged Many of the major industrial
faahBes that supported Iratfs programme m develop an
indigenous made capacity were severely bombed.
Nonetheless, Iraq trai n ed a considerable al-Hussem force
of some r ;o massdes, along with 14 operational combat
mobile launchen, came than aoo warheads (Including 75
special warheads), some 6ao tomes of propellant (m&
and oxtdtser), and asserted components. Some of Iraq's
mtasde-related famhhes had esmped devastabon in the
Gulf War attacks, and key equipment such 0 precious
machine tools, could be salvaged from others
In addition, UN Security Council Resolution 687 allowed
Iraq to pmeeee relevant talns cal expertise and industrial
capabilities m develop and produce miasde9 wdh a range
of less than r5okm, which enabled Iraq to maintain ft
W. working on missBe-related projects and establish .
basis for pursuing long-range missiles if and when UN
sanctions and ress(nchons wers, lifted
During the next eight years, under UNSCOM
importune, Iraq's missile progmmme would focus on
selvagtngwhat it could of rbremavang al-Huseem forces,
conducting small-scale covert research and development
efforts on proscribed missiles, and imbenbog several
new programmes to develop missiles within the
permitted r5okm limit Overt and covert vuasile-related
procurement efforts also continued.
In its Inltfal "mile declaration to IINSCOM m July
tggr, Iraq sought to conceal the bulk of as exieNng
missile capabilities It declared 48 missiles, live
operational combat launchers, 5o warheads (inducing; so
special warheads), and around 7o jounce of propellant,
.Inch were ell destroyed under UNSCOM suPa.,..
Iraq also denied that it had any programme to reverse
engmeer and indigenously produce the al-Hussnn
missile In early summer of rgqr, however, What
UNSCOM inspections, pointed out major discrepancies
between the on-site observatrons made by the
international Inspectors and the dedaahons made by
Iraq Perhaps reassessing their situation, the Iraqi
authonhes dam, they ordered the unilateral and secret
destruchon - in violation of UNSCR 687 - of an
additional 85 imported missiles, seven 'mdtgenous
produced' missiles, aro warheads (Including 45 special
warheads), g operational combat launchers, and about
550 tonnes of propellant, along with production tools
and key engine components, such as Imported
turbopumps ad indigenously produced cocub.soon
chamber and nozzle assembhes According to the Iraqi
'By the end of zgg8, UNSCOM had made considerable progress in verifying Iraqi declarations of its
unilateral destruction campaign, but questions still remained about a small amount of Imported and
Indigenouslyproduced missiles, warhead; missile propellant ; and engine components.'
authonfles, the destruction was; carried out over me
sunsmcr and autuom of rgg7, but they did not inform,
fJNSCOM of this destruction until March agga
Much of UNSCOM's subsequent work would be
devoted m efforts to verify end account for the numbers
claimed by Iraq In Its unilateral destruction campaign. In
the course of these efforts, UNSCOM dlecoveted and
disposed of additional equipment, components and
materials that were part of lraq's programme m reverse
engmem and produce al-Huaesn missdes . In July 1995,
for example, UNSCOM destroyed some flow forming
mectune9, vemam fumers, and a belawng machine,
thatImqhad ecquued for theproduchon of l4qmd-fuelled
missile enenes . Other pieces of equipment were placed
under mosdmnng or released for we in non-proscribed
acnmtla . IlN3COM a7so supernsed the destucnon of a
large amount of equipment associated with the Bad,2000
solid missile project. By the and of 1998, UNSCOM
had made considerable progress in verifying Iraqi
declarations of its unilateral chatrietion campaign, but
questrons still remained about a small amount of
imported and indigenously produced rmesdes, warheads,
ausvle propellant, and cogme components
For UNSCOM, accounting for Iraq's imported Scud
missiles was essential in venfybtg whether Iraq had been
drsarmed because UNSCOM expects did not believe
that Iraq was capable of producing mdigenously aB the
cumponenm for an enme inside After years at
unsuccessful attempts to validate Jmq's ordered
..mg of enhre tmported Scud miss,les, IINSCOM
shifted to efforts to acrount far moor aub-systems such es
rocket engines, propellants, warherids and guidance
systems In this effort, UNSCOM excavated all known
'bunal sttaa; and me eammed missile components were
exammed to detemune the. so. in eddition, ad
rtussde-related'fude sues' were re-veded b deHramme
where the material stored there had come it= and
where it was sent. Phtally, UNSCOM interviewed all the
people known m have been involved m the removal,
transportation, docconcermation, storage, retention and
hidmg nf mtssde eyatenis
The result of this acmunung effort was only partially
successful, Per instance, UNSCOM was able to account
for all but a few Sonet-supphed Scud rocket engines, but
the overall 'matenal balance' for engmes was ambiguous
because Iraq had been able to reverse engineer and
produce many engine components, Itself and it had
Imported a number of engine cnmponents and sub-
systems hom European companies Propellants mold
not be accounted for because, accordmg to Iraq,
It bad dumped all us pvopellent onto the ground
 Iraq's missile programme under inspection (1991-98)
In the guidance and musical area, the story was much
more confused because there were an excess of systems
that could not be explained even with the inclusion of
known imported spares The material balance for
warftesds was also Incomplete- Any hope of aemunbng
for Indigenously produced morrow systems or sub-
systems was thwarted by Iraq's programme of unilateral
destruction and a Lad of data concerning the dispositions
of all of the resulting matenal. As a result, UNSCOM
could red discount the possibility that Iraq had been able
to squirrel away ermugh components and spare
propellant fm a handful of raliesubs;
As UNSCOM laboured ro account for Iraq s unilateral
destruction campaign and root out Iraqi efforts to
salvage remnants of me uf-Hussetn programme, Iraq also
initiated a number of permitted and proscribed ballistic
missile related activities In early sgy, Iraq began work
to reveesecalgineer the Volga loquid-firelled missile
engine of the Soviet supplied anti-aircraft suarfece-tri
SA-2 system, which would serve as the basis for Iraq's
declared a5okm-range missile programme. At the same
time, Iraq condnued with prescribed armones, whorls It
successfully enameled frwt UNSCOM mepecton. These
activism included attempts on modify the C-601 cruise
ml-11e to a esufaco-to-surface mode, simulation of a
Scud-based spar.e launch vehicle and the actual
modification of the SA-2 missile to a surface-toaurface
capability. This last protect, named Gl (orJt),was sundnr
to the al-pahd protect that Issq had pursued prior to the
Gulf War Initiated around August tgga, the GI missde
consisted of . indned launch SA-2 missile, modified m
AI-Samwrd Isn .ORnown
Srud-6 300 1,000 10
,ru-xuneom sso soo IS-3a
AI- " bbu 900 300 unknown
" Cin.ular Errorvrobable IMP) Is the radius of a code within which hall of the mlssnes pmfealb am expecred tohlk
Sources krdirdeFedemfmnofArrIerImnSdent6qUNSCOMandIraqi Missiles
http/AwwJU.org/nuke/9uMeA~aq/mlsslIMMahbM
USOeparbnentofUefensolnfamaNanFopeclraqYSrudBUlfIsBcMISd1a75hly1lmd
Iraq's missile programme under inspection (1991-98)
fly in a surfacne-tosurfare mode, with a range of reveal
hundred kilometres According to subsequent Iraqi
declarations in late r995, am flight wits of the GI mosside,
capable of prohibited ranges, were undertaken between
January and April i9g3 wsthoutnoufiratsms to UNSCOM
and werenot detectedby the vssilsng teams ln Mey 7gg9,
according to Iraqi declaraNons, fluseem Kernel, who was
then responsible for all Iraqi missile programmes,
decided to stop the GI project, partly due to test fadutes
After 1993, Iraq continued to work on vanous
declared r5okm-range projects under the generic
designation Abalnl-1011, which included both Isqusd-and
solid-fuelled versions In the Uquld area, there were two
compenng projects, both based on the Volga engine
used In the SA-2 ndssde, but headed by nvals m the
Iraqs mrssde prognmme The first project, based on e
stelsd~as eteel airframe of 7,omm or diameter, was
temmtated when the head of the pro)ect was arrested
and fel'.ed by the Iraqi authorities; m late 1995, e few
months after Hussein larrial's defection The computing
project. which has cnme en be known as the al-Sumoud,
was based on a Samoan diameter aluminium
airframe and could be launched from a mobile
Trarvcposter/Erector/Launcher (TEL). In m, ,t can
be corl .vsdered a mmi-Scud- Su flight more of the al-
Samoud took place between 1997 and 1998 Under
UNSCOM supervlston. Not all were successful . By the
end of ag98, Iraqi graces w¢e unit facing problems
with the liquid propulsion of the missile Another
Abubd-100 design - with a composite solid-fuel
rocket motor - was reacnveted m 1997 Under a new
Non-pmuribed missile systern based on liquid fuel Volga
engine of SAQ missile Tested several times since 1997 Iraq programuse manager after a long standby period a twostage bathetic nilealle based on SA-2 technology
maytuve produced a smallforce slnce 199a Nonetheless, the threat ss suffiaently sertous that strong These proscribed acNvsbes were discovered by UNSCOM
civil defence measures are ssecessary to ensure public mapectors or declared by Iraq after Huseem Kamel
Single state liquid fuel mnslle purchased waso USSR safety and meridian public confidence 'Me AbabII-100 defected to Jordan m August s995.
starting In 197< Modlhed to produce qPNusseln and al- Solid fuel mtssde as an unguided uldined-launch Stoking out on a new path in late 3995 . Uday Hussem
Abbus artllery rocket with a range of smne iaolmt Its design (Saddauls son), who had taken over parts of Hussem
Started prior to the Gulf War, end work underteken Kernel's portfolm, ordered the development of the al-
Extended nnge venlon of5cud-B, fist rancor In April 19a7 from sggr In 3997 was Located to technical development Be'. project, which involvind consorting L,29 training
Several vadants produced ofsanllarmn9NpaYload of a sub-scale mom, lets mm radio-controlled Unmanned arroad vehicles
capadty Iraq may have retained a small force of are4ulf Beyond these IINSCOM-momtored actlvsttes,lraqalso (f1AVs), allegedly for the tramang of anti-aircraft artillery
Mr misslks minded several redwood, shortduranon, undeclared, mew Cannlbahsmg parts from less than a it .?. ageing
prescnbed activities, including reverse engineerlng of aucraft available in its air form hmsung academy, Iraq
Send gyroscopes, pmcusament attanpts of gyroxopes for
Morlifiodonof Srod-B Tert Red! in Apnl 1988, never was able to modify a few L29 jets m UAVS with a radio
fielded intercontinental ballistic missiles, work on a Space controlled range of about golms Several successful ]light
launch Vehicle based nn the clustering of several Volga tests were undertaken worms, a epace of 30 monttxc. For
englnes and the design of a turbopump m duster Volga Umted Naumlsh,spectosa, the mamcmscem saseedby the
engines The last two studies were considered by al-Bar'aa project was its potential capability to operate as a
UNSCOM as prreetitmg a potential breakout atntegy for kmg-mnge UAV, If Iraq was able M develop msproved
"
Iraq's missile programme under inspection (1991-98)
guidance and control capabilities At least urml the
departure of the Inspectors from Iraq in December 1998,
thts breaknut scamrin was not observed Although na
proscribed adivtty, was noticed by IINSCOM, some
experts considered the aFBaraa m a potential vehicle for
spraying chemical or biological agents, while others
thought rtwas Intended as a Conventional cause missile
During the course, of UNSCOM Inspections, Iraq
mnhnued misslle-related procurement efforba. Despite
intematiorul sanetfone, Iraq covertly negotiated
transactiona with am thvt 5oo companies from more
it= qo countries all aro und the globe, from the Western
world to pasteum Europe and Asia . Competitive deals
were often negotiated with the support of unport-export
front companies eslsbEshed m the LvUddle Fast and
willon Iraq. Iraqi negotiators were Interested In a wide
variety of goods and technologies, Including
: hqWd
propellant engine parts and related chemical.,
solid propulsron technology and related chemicals,
guidance and Control equipment, electronic Components,
computers and software, plants for manufacturing
mi~ale related part, barorzmebrc devices, machine tools,
production lines for key chemicals, and technical support
and training. Some of these commercial relationships;
even envt .voned a complete research and development
programme for a i5olon-rionge ballistic .it, to
be designed, developed and tested outside Iraq.
'During the course of UNSCOM Inspections, Iraq continued misstle-related procurement efforts Despite
international sanctions, Iraq covertly negotiated transactions with more than 500 companies from
more than 40 countries all around the globe, from the Western world to Eastern Europe andAsia.'
The arrangements Iraq made were worth several million
dollars Some of the contracts were in be paid with
foreign currency, some through barter arrangements
involving Iraqi oil products .
So. of these himeact. were terminated in their
early stages, while others were signed, but only to be
Implemented after the idling of sancnoris on Iraq
Nonetheless, some contracts were actually implemented
and did result m the delivery of mine spare parts
for machine tool ., vacuum furnace ., raw materials,
potenhonmetera and mechanical components for
gyroaropes to Iraq. In me case, Complete gyroscopes
recovered from Rusaten long-range buEishc wassiles were
even smuggled iMO the country and latex recovered by
IINSCOM m December rgg5 All of these tmnsachoru
were undertaken m vtolahon of UN sanchous, through a
highly centrabsed prncurement network with a
Constantly evolvingpattem, involving vanous munsmes
With it. withdrawal of United Nations inspectors in
December rggB, the Darrf Fox bombing camprogn
focused on miselle-related facilities. In the attack, a
LrmMd number of workshops in half a dossm declared
missile faalitles were bombed and damaged, including
the final assembly and production lines of the
al-Samaud 17te bombing campaign also appeared to
target all the airbases that were involved with the at-
Ha'aa UAV project
Iraq's missile programme since 1998
the abserme of inspectors since Dec ember 1998 or
direct access to Iraqi Classified Informahon, u is
Indifficult to assess Iraq's current mossale Capabilities
A balanced assessment hinges on two related questions
Eustly, to what extent (if any) was Iraq able to conceal
it= UNSCOM and salvage some elements of its pro,
rggr Scud-based missile force? Secondly, to what eatent
Could Iraq reconstitute a missile capability based on its
permitted missile progremmes during fggr to rgg87
To complicate matters, aiawers lo these queshons
depend on the eMent to winch Iraq has been able to
acquire materials, equipment, and technical assistance
covertly from foreign sounce since agga - another
unknown Prior to rggr, hours efforts to produce or
assemble ballistic missiles were heavily dependent on
access to fmeign sources According to UNSCOM, Iraq
made considerable progress in developing anindigenows
Capability to produce key missile components, such as
aufremce, pmpellant tanks, nozzles, warheads and since
engme components, but still depended on several
unported Critical components and matanals, such as
turbopumps and guidance and control sets. IEJSCOM
assessed that by the end of [99o, Iraq had failed to
acquire an indigenous capability to produce locally an
more at-Hussem missde system through us mverse"
engineering efforts, although it could assemble entue
missiles using a mixture of reported and locally
produced components
The Gulf War and subsequent LWqCOM activities
badly damaged lraq's infrastructure for indigenous
missile production, but Baghdad has tried to rebuild we
cepzbbhes through Its permitted i5okm-range m~,csde
programmes and covert procurement efforts Compared
to its pre-war missile u,Irestmdtue, however, Iraq's
capabilities as of Deceumber sgge were vastly reduced
Although some Bo mtes were momtnzed by IINSCOM m
its OMV plan for nuseiles, only four IraqI estabhshments
.Wit be described es dedicated to work on nussles,
UAVs and unguided rockets They were supported by
less than a dozen industrial facdrhes with specific
expertise usable In the . .pace industry After rggr, the
embargo hindered both prosenbed and non proscribed
procurement efforts by Iraq A number of procurement
efforts were mtercepted, but obviously it is unposstble to
ensum that an procurement efforts faded.
With respect to pre-rggr missiles, UNSCOM
concluded mr9gythatrtwasable toaaountforBryofthe
Big Scud missiles that Iraq purchased from the Sonet
flown, based on Iraqi declarahons and independent
'While not a militarily significant force, a small force of al-Hussem missiles could be politically
significant, especially ifarmedwith chemical or biological warheads,which couldreach cities In Israel,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran Iraqis most probably able to fabncate'speaal
Hussern missiles and has the raw materials and capability to produce enough CBW agentto fill such
warheads.'
venficaoon . Hnwevec, sume mtssdes m iraq's declaranon
could not be completely validated by independent
means, including UNSCOM's efforts to account fm key
mtssde components that Iraq claims it destroyed in i9gri
This unrertunty Includes the eight mi ssiles that Iraq says
it tested m the rgBae, a small portion of the 56 console,
that Iraq says It used during the Iran-Iran War, and even
a few missiles fired during the rgga Gulf War. To add to
the uncertainty, UNSCOM was not able to acemmt fully
forseven'mdigenouslyprod ueed'al-Huscnntacticssthat
Iraq claims 11 unilaterally destroyed in iggr (Iraq cisimv
liters, were nonoperable'hammg mi .wles' )
As a result, n ® possible that Iraq son has a smell
number of mvisdes (or components for such inbefles),
although no hard evidence has been put forward to
support this susptaon According fin the latest CIA
saurian, 'Iraq probably reWms a small, covvt force of
Scud-type mlsrJlea'? In thewmst rase scenano, Hus could
ronshtuteaforceofseveraldoren65okmrangeal-HUSSem
mtssdes, if one in . that all the worecomted-ful
mtssdes surnved More realistically, suue some of the
missiles wereprobabty used for their stated purposes, the
numbers of survmmg al-Hvssenn mu'siles are more likely
lower, perhaps e dozen a so If and, nod. do t,
thetr operabonal effectiveness and reliability may well
have degraded overtheyears with wear and man and lack
of morning. This accounting assumes that Iraq was not
able to produce missiles indigenously prior to rggr and
has not been able to purchase missiles covertly since
then. Based on tis success before the Gulf War, Iraq r,^
also probably produce mobile launchers, for al-Hussean
m,sudes, primarily by mnveuthng imported trucks
While not a mihtarnly significant force, a result force of
al-Hussem missiles could be politically significant,
especially if armed vnth chemical or biological heads,
which caold cearh ones m Israel, Kuzat Saudi Arabia,
Turkey and Tom. Iraq vs most pmbably able to fabvcate
'speaalwarheads'foral-Hussemmissiles andhastherew
matenale and Capability to produce enough CBW agent
to fill such warheads in theory, tlus volume of CBW
agent, (such as V% or anttuax epores) could rause mass
casualties mthehundreds ofthousands manunprotected
populabon, but in practice the danger to Civilians would
be much less, given the small number of Irarp missiles,
theu questlonable reliability and accuracy, and traq's (at
leastinrgga)meffimentwarheaddesgn Cwdundefence
measures could also significantly reduce casualties,
particularly with adequate warning done
Inaddll4on,some Iraqi missiles might bedestroyed on
warheads'foral-
 ,.-9
Iraq's missile programme since 1998 Iraq's missile programme since 1998

delivering CBW against oppnsirsgforces The af-Sannrud's such mssede flight tests due to theu infrared signature,
IlNSfOM accounting of Irads imported Scud/al-NUSSein missiles
range na also roo short co engage, even with a CBW end fide has not been reported
payload, lugh-value targeta located beyond Iraq's in conclusion, Irar[a current ballishe missile
borders, except for Kuwatt To strike Kuwasit however, cepabdshes are probably bound, compared to in robust
the al-$amoud would have to be deployed in South . form and Infrastructure prior to the Gulf War Most
tYa-79e0 vpenAIMn, Detabsedondocumentationhomlraq Nolnd¢pendenlcormboadon Iraq within the tw-Ny, znne, and the survival of such likely, Iraq possesses a very small missile fume of
Including entries systems and tlre.u uewe an close in the Iraqi border is lsnuted-renge and accuracy, based on its pcergga assets
likely in be dow-hived and extervssmvs of in UN-peraatted missile programmes
Iran-inqwrltWa-9al 516 Data bascd an ducummtaNOn from laq.f2rdal cartoboratlon by To achieve a longer-cange mtssde based an af-Summfd In uus view, Iraq probably can put together a small
Independent vmwaL trrlrnolugy, Iraq could attempt to cluster four el-Samaud number of 65okm range al-Hussefn misssles (perhaps a
budding blocks together to achieve a Send missile doxen or so), and it may have been able in produce a
. Iraq could allies, attempt to tip such a dostu
equivalent small number of al-Smaaud with a range up to ~nokus
TaaUmysurllaaUratllnked 69 Dan basedon dacumentadon trainIraq A number of the test Bring,
to madiNotinna of missiln corraberaredbylndepwMenrsoanes with an el-Samnud secmsd stage, reaeat-asg the Taaunuz While not a significant threat to military forces, these
179es-9o1 two-atagc mrssde, although the resulting payload would mrssde-espeaally tf armed with chemical orbiological
be limited In tnass Accounting in a defector, who says he agents - could pose a potential threat to civilian
Dan based on documentadon from Iraq Inlormadon on most finsgs left fraq in the summer of non, wooklon, remand on 010
Guff WarUen-A1anh t9971 93 Populations, "WY on more of dteruptton and terror,
conaboaredlryInde,endentsources .Disaepancyonamiss numberexlns shelved Tansmua project, but that is not conftrased . To be butarcunlikely tocauseumnas asoathes
between Imq's debt and data ban other smaces technically vahdated, msyafthese more ambtttous efforts
based on duetevng or mulh-stagmg monfle building
contraction fallaxhMg5C17697 48 Desaactbn vMlled by UNSCDAe blocks would undoubtedly require stahe and right Istan
ylulyt997)
handy US national tecMs®1 means would most likely detect

Unilateral dismantles by Insa 85 Data based on ducameruadan from Iraq UNSCOM carred! out laboratory
analysh of remnants exravarea in 199&97 and Identified! englne remnants 'Iraqprobably canputtogether a small numberof650km range al-Hussein missiles (perhaps a dozen
IMbhIyenA0ctt9971
from83dtheasdeda.ed. orso), andItmayhave been able to produce a small numberofal-Samoudwith a range up to 200km'

Total 819 UNSCOMhNIeveditcauldacmunHoreVOfei9mhslles Inqalsodalmsk

unilatrrally desnoyed 71r,digenously pmduced'trainlng mlsslles'p .nnon
operable)Inlulyl99t UNSCOMhesnotbeenabktoyadfythls

Saurtr.UASCOMHepwtonsmmsardaarmamenrandmanfrodnyL1999iDa, :9Por/r9ss

the ground, and musile defence systems, (e g the launch
Armru) might intercept a small number of aurvsvmg
missiles . IDased on performence m the Gulf War,
however, pre-emptive attacks against mobile Iraqi
missile forces and theatre =mile defences ere unlikely to
be totally effective In the worst case somedo, Iraqi
mrsades armed wsth CBW warheads could cause
rasdaltles in the hundreds or pessfbly thousands, cause
panic and disruption, end create strong poInbcal
pr¢amis for retaliation
in beene of missile forces based on lrasq's permitted
programmes, It is doubtful that Iraq has made
substantial progress m developing a solid-propelled
SRBM since 1998, although work has presumably
commuted on the solid fuelAbabd-10o-speculatwe break
out incisions based on the ai-Samoud liquid-fuelled
missile terlsnology, are more plausible At a mlnzmum,
lrsqs engineers could rn¢ease the propellent tanks
capacities of the aFSamoad to reach ranges of some
aookm with a few hundred kdogrammes payload,
suitable for CgW delivery. Given in exposdrmce in the
dessgn end fabrication. of special warheads for the at-
Hussnn missile, Iraq is presumably capable of
trtormilacturirig scaled-down CBW warheads far the id-
gerund In theory, the would put Kuwatt within reach d
launched from sousithanot Iraq.
As of Decernbec rg98, however, Iraq had suit ironed
out all the bugs m the al-Samoud development, and it is
not known whether Iraq hss been able to overcome
these difficulties over the past three end a hall years
and, if so, how many al-Samond nuseiles it would have
been able to produce As of early znn, according to the
CIA, 'We believe that development of the liqu id-
propellant a1-Samoud SRBM probably is maturing and
that a low level operational capability could be achieved
in the near future - which, is futtber snggested by the
appearance of four al-Samoad tranaporter-erecror-
launrhers (TEla) with ainfoures at the 31 December
assist Al Aqsa parade" It is not known if the displayed
imitates were operational. From the same report, the
CIA ended that Iraq has rebuilt msssRe-related facslsbes
bombed during Desert Fox, but it ts not known what
activities are taking place et these aites.
As a practical matter, an Iraqi force of al-Samoud
missiles would be of boosted military utility, given In
small numbers and probable moseemarry, Far groused
battle engagements, shorter-range multiple launch
rocket syslems and artillery would be more effective for

" -
9 IrasWeaons ofMassDestruction " Aier 6
 Conclusion : towards a net assessment
-,"llventy-9va yans of prolifmtlon
the wake of the lq/) Arab.iaaelt War and the 1974
'nmcrease in oil prices, Iraq launched stmultaneous
programmes to &aquiremidearlitological, and chemical
weapmte and ballistic miaslre. Iraq was cadhtly not the
first Middle Eastern country to pursoe these capabilities,
and the Iraqi mitten, has often justified Its efforts an a
defensive responsetoexternal threats andprolUnahonby
other countrles Nonetlreless, Baghdad's quest for
weapons of must destruction (WMD) and mramles has
been closely coupled with Baghdad's rumbium to establish
Iraq an a domumant regimml power, its propenuty to use
military fares in pursidt of foreign policy objectives, and
president Saddam Hussem's personal saphation to
become a great leader of the Arab world.
9lnm Iraq's WMD pmgsammes began m the mtd-
tg7m, evertm have retoferced the regtme's .bead
to possessing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons,
as well an long-range missiles In the gruelling eight-year
struggle against Iran, Baghdad came to, behave
that chemical weapons neutralleed Iran's manpower
advantage an the battlefield and that missde strokes
against Tehran broke Iran's will to continue the war,
prom Baghdad's perspective, the use of chemical
weapons against Kurdish civilians served to suppress
Kurdish resutance and count internal subility . In the
Gulf War, Iraq launched balloon miaadee agaue :t fvraeh
cities and US forces in Saudi Arabia. Iraqi offienalB
say they believe that Iraq's possesslon of CRW-armed
missiles deterred Israel from repenting its rggr rard on
Iraqi nuclear facilities and prev®ited Washington from
advancing an Baghdad whatever the accuracy of these
claims, the Iraqi regime shown a profound and Warning
belie f no the strategic value of WINED and mend. as
essential to national security and regime saivrivad.
The atmnglli of that oremartment in demonstrated by
Baghdad's refusal to coopaete fully with UN Inspeoloot
from rggr-0, even at the price of continuing economic
serrctions and pellucid isolation, and by Raghdados
refusal to allow therensmphon of inspections smre tggg
Given Baghdad's behaviour over the last 25 years,
there is every reason tobelfeve thatit remarns commsHed
to retaining and developing its WMD and missile
capabilities as a core oblechve. Nunetheless. Iraq'e
overall current ability to produce and deliver WMD are
severely dunmished from its zeruth an the eve of the
Gulf War. Operators Desert Storm and Desert par, UN
inspections; and dimisntlement and economic sartzhims,
have a8 taken their fall To different degrees, the
mmdtormg systems established by UNSCOM and the
fABA hampered Iraq'a ability to canat or reconstitute
'War, sanctions, and inspections have reversed and retarded, but not eliminated Iraq's nuclear,
biological, andchemlcalweaponsandlong-range mrssde<apadtles, norremoved Baghdad's enduring
interest in developing thesecapabilities.' - itsdelivery capability, which appearslimited'
Conclusion : towards a net assessment
resources m pursuit Of . .clear We'spoon From its biological weapons programme fm . UN u,spectdrs; '
capabthhes from rgga ro-ag9g, and the contmumg -
somehow regime has obstructed Iraqi efforts 0 acquire Baghdad's pempective, gm centrtfuge ennchment is ' only revealing in 1995 that it had produced biological
vital foreign assanu arece probably the meet attractive technical option for moody weapons after Iraq's Invention of Kuwait In relative
revtving its nuclear potential Worm, Iraq's BW programme was the least understand
War, emotions, and inspecaons have reversed and
in esthercave, taking 1998 as a baseline, there Is Priced and accnunted for by 1998 plausibly, Iraq could have
retarded, but not eliminated Iraq's nuclear, biological,
agreement that Iraq is very unlikely In have achieved the retained substanual quantities, of pro- growth media
and chemical weapons and bng-mnge nussde capadlles,
ability to produce sufficient grade material for nudear and BW agent (prrhaps thousands of Iftres of anthrax),
nor removed Baghdad's endurang Interest In developing
weapons since the end of Inspecoons in 1998 Even worst and connnued research,on other agents and more
these capabilities. The ectett to wlucb Iraq was able m
,me assessments judge that Iraq will require several more element delivery systems during the penod of UN
retatn elements; of IN preGulf War WMD and missile
years before it can develop that capability, assuming it inspections. In my event, Iraq's BW rapabrhhes would be
capabilities and the extent to which d in capable of
reconstituting these capabdiues mace the end of can obtain acresv to subnormal foreign mstenals and relatively may to cremations ainre iggg, and relatively
inspections in tgge varies with different weapons types eqmpmmt Againat tlue erenado, however, there m a easy tobids Asof19gg,Imqpossessed suffidentcivilian
nudear, wlldcard if, sumehow, Iraq were able to acquire facilities, equipment, and materials b produce bulk BIN
sufficient nuclear commit from foreign sources, It could agent within weeks following a pohtical decision to
Nuclear and radiological
probably produce nuclear weapons on short order, resume produchon. It an not known for contain whether
Of the~duee WMD types, nuclrar weapons seen the
Initials, m a matter of months Thin is based an the Iraq has resumed production of fresh BW agents, but it
furthest from Iraq's grasp. Unlike chemical or biological
plausible assumption that Iraqi designers, working seems a safe bet List it has, or will, m the face of an
agents and weapons, Iraq did not produce nuclear
from the Mg, baselme, have beeri able to complete =pending attack Amounts and typea of BW agent that
material (In sigruficartt quantity) or nudear weapons
prepmatons for bmldmg e -do- we-pose, Muse fissde iLSq my have at its disposal can only be guessed at, but
before rggr Moreover, compared to biological or
umtenal becomes available While Iraqr acqumadion presumably includes botulinum toxin, ariffican, and
chemical weapons faalihee, nuclear lnsbllahons are
of gentle material on the black market as not a high perhaps other agents m the range of thousands of Bras
relatively more specialised and complex, mine
probabrhty, it has to be seen an a real risk that could In theory, Iraq could have preserved or produced
technically demanding, =it harder to lude As a result,
dramatically and qmckly shill the balance of power atough BW capacity to muse mass casualhes, which,
the IABA nuclear inspeehons were relatively more
b, contrast to nuclear weapons, it ts much mom fram Baghdad's perspective, presents Iraq's closent,
successful in disarming Iraq s nuclear Foremost, and the
approximenon to noclesr weapons an an tratnunent of
rAHA monitoring system provided] relatively high difficult to aeseas Iraq's capability and interest m
ao3usnng radiological weapons In r9g7, Iraq briefly deterrence or tenor- In practice, however, the magnitude
confidence that Iraq could n ot reconstaut, its pre-Gulf
considered the development of a mdsologtcel weapon of lraq's BW threat depends an m delivery capability,
War nuclear mfras'hucture without detection Thus, we
based on zircommn (a poor chorce of matenal) ureehated which appears tactual An of rg9t, Iraq's BW dehvery
have greater confidence that Iraq's pre-war nuclear
in an Iraqi research reactnp but the project was capability was rudrmentscy and inefficient, relying
infraslruchtre and material session were effectively
abandoned and no reliable Information, an further effods pnmanly on explosive dissemination of liquid agent in
accounted fm and dLvarmed by r99g, compared to its pre-
emce then have cume to light Since Iraq e research m,amle warheads, aerial bombs, and tacfkal mumhona
war CBW capability . Nonetheless, Iraq salvaged us must
reactors were destroyed at the Gulf War, it can no longer Unless Iraq has substantially improved its delivery
vital nuclear sssets~ knowledge and pessomel Mmt
produce its own radioactive material . However, Iraq capabBtnes, its current BW finest against weBy.quipped
likely, some, level of nuclear weapons-related research
could dwert radiological =Wrist used for civilian and will-defended forces would natbe decusive, more so
and development crammed during the llnl mspecbon
Purposea m Iraq or rtnughtbe able to obtarn smtable and if biological defence meuums were "an -espaoavy a
regune, plausibly resulhcng in the design, malog, and
fabnrahon of key camponents for e small number of mum readily available redioacuve material-, such as comprehensive vacdneon programme To the extent
Caesltmt-137 or Cobalt-60, from foreign sources B so, that Iraq bas developed more effective delivery
nuclear weapons, mlnus the essenual Brstle normal.
delivery by truck or boat seems muse plausible than by merlurtisms, such as airborne spray devices for wet
on Ow assumption, nuclear weapons-usable nurl°a,
missile or summit. In any event, a radiological device is agent or mechanisms for abb. . . disseminator, of dry
material (LIEU or separated plutomum) is the vrtal
more likely to cause dentuptlon than cons. caaualGas agent, the aircraft or hebcopters used to delrver BW
moving ingredient for an Iraqi bomb . It is not known
agent against opposing troops would be vulnerable to aft
whether Iraq has taken advantage of the end of
Biological defences and opposing air forces
trrspections . 998 to begin rebuilding facilities In
If nuclear is our, most confident essessutent, biological 0 The Iraqi BW threat against avdtans ouWde Iraq u
order to produce such material. Some experts believe
our least Elm more them as nuclear and chemical much harder to assess, and potentially much greater
that Baglrdad might be reatraisadby the risk of detaximin
progmmmes, Baghdad went m great lengths to conceal Assuming Iraq has retained a =all force of 65okm-range
and the inevitable air strikes that would follow, focvsusg
instead an remnsntutingits BW and CW arsenals, which
can be accomplished mom reandily and with Iran risk of 'There is a nuclear wrldcard if somehow, Iraq were able to acquire sufficient nuclear material from
detection, wing existing civilum facilities and little foreign sources, It could probably produce nuclear weapons on short order, probably in a matter of
external eerstance Odter experts believe that Baghdad months'
vows nuclearwe .,pats es the ultimate WMD trump card
and Is prepared to risk deterHon and re-invest umassrve
casualties, which,
'In theory,Iraq couldhave preservedorproduced enough BW capaclty to cause mass
from Baghdad's perspective, presents IraqS closest approximation to nuclear weapons a; an
threat depends on
instrument of deterrence or tenor In practice however, the magnitude oflraq's BW
"
LJ IreqRweapons ofMass DestruUfon " AniI55Strategic Dossier 70
Conclusion : towards a net assessment
al-Hussrm missiles, It ,,roold deliver BW warheads ,to
cities in Israel, Kuwait, Seudt Arabia, Turkey, end Iren
from relatively protected launch points within Iraq
If Iraq has rtot advanced beyond IN Gulf War warhead
design, however, dissemination would be mefffuent,
with most agent destroyed on impact and ths, remainder
disposed over a small area of a few hundred maims
diameter. Even se, depending on the agent used and a
number of ambient factma, casouslocis in an unprotected
population word run in the hundreds or even
thousands Delivery by airborne spray devices; would
likely be more deadly, d lour .it could scomour .
opposing sir force, and au defences Most difficult to
anticipate is the possibility of delivery of BW by
mdividuals or small groups acting as cummanclos or
termrists or even unvnthng mrrieta. Infectious, agents
present the greatest potetrtml threat, but almost modurg
u known about briefs work with arfections agents,
Including the key questton ofwhether Ireqhae somehow
preserved Or obtained smallpox vuus
chemical
Compared to Iraq's potential biological weapons
capability, its chemical weapons arsenal is better known
end less thteatening Of do pre-Gulf War mventory, heq
probably retamed a few hundred tonnes of vmustard and
enough stable pre,-irraors to produce a few hundred
mares; of sann/ryclosann and perhaps a similar amount
of VX In the absence of Inspection smre 1993, Iraq could
also have reconfigured dual-use chemical equipment
and componatts from Its civilian chemical industry
within a short period of weeks or months (depending on
the agent) to produce itesh CW agent and precursors;
As with IBM, it is preaunu.d (but not proven) that
Baghdad has taken the precaution of ordering a
mobiltvation of its civilian facilities to produce fresh CW
agents If so, Iraq-s corrent CW tapabilrty probably
computers; hundreds of movies of agent (presumably a
uifxtrrre of around and name agent, most likely issom
and cyclosarhi and perhaps VX) and perhaps a few
thousand morticians It rs unlikely that Iraq currently
possesses; an offensive CW capability compaable to its
pre-199a levels of thousands of tnames of agent and tens
of thousands of effective rearatems
'Me auditory and political effectiveness of Iraq's CW
agent stockpile depends primarily on Iraq's delivery
capability against tactical m strategic targets . judging
from its capability m r9gr, Iraq's tecucal CW anenal s
likely to include artillery shells, short-range rockets and
aeeiat bombs, all will, contact fuses Assuming Iraq has
beea able to produce a few thousand muNtuus from
7f so, lraq's current CW capability probably comprises hundreds of rarities of agent (presumably a
mixture of mustardandnerve agent most likely sann andtyclosann andperhaps VX) andperhaps a
fewthousand munluans' ----
avallable CW agent, an arsenal of this size islandikely to
mfhct mdttanly significant casualties on well-tramed
and welleqiiipped troop Nonetheless, Iraq's ability
to deliver cheoural washeads on tts rocket and arttBery
pieces, as well as most bombs, would pose operational
complications for opposing forces, who would be
requited to wear protective gear
Iraq'e capability to effedrvely delwer CW muNtions
with missile, or aneraft aver longer distances against
rear logistical areas and dues is questionable Unless Iraq
has advanced beyond the impact fusing and avartiead
design of IN tq9r-era special wat9teads, IN ability W
disseminate efficiently CW agent with missile warheads
is extremely limited and unlikely to cause large
eaninltdy-it is not known whether Iraq has been able to
develop more sophisticated and efficient warhead
designs to dusmdrute cfienueal agent Iraq could also
seek to deliver CW agent over long dtelences by au,
but IN rensumng air force capabtbties are very weak.
Nonelhelese, the potential threat of CW attack could
disrupt logistical operations in mar aress and cause panic
among civilian populations, and Increase political
presssun=-forcetaOaNon
Ballistic missiles
lraq's cut ballistic missile capabilities us very
modest, compared to Its robust missile force and
substantial missile development and production
infrastnrctiire m r9gr 71re Gulf Warand subsequent UN
efforts mat Iraq IN large mate force and destroyed
most of Ifs mfrashuchtre for indigenous development
and production of Scud-based missiles During the
period of UN mspechons, however, Baghdad was
probably able to retain some elements of Os pre-war
miasde capabilities, and it has pursued new capabdttfes
through permitted r5okm range missile Frograrnmes
eM covert procurement efforts 'Me Dusert Fox a n
strikes concentrated on facilities that supported Imq's
r5ohm range mtssile prograttmres, but Iraq has
reportedly rebuilt (at least externally) many of these
damaged facilrhes
Stnce the end of Inspecumis m 1998, it Is unhkely that
Iraq has been able to reconstitute IN prevtous uussde
production rapabibbes for long-range missiles, winch
would have required sigmficant foreign assistance
Therefme, the most Important corm for Iraq's current
mtssde mpabl0ty us whether it was able to salvage
remnants of its pre-Gulf War al-Hussnn missile firrou
with a 65otv+ range After e<tensive efforts, UNSCOM
concluded that It could sccuunt for all but two such
missiles, but some of this accountrng was based an Iraqi
"
dedamuons that could not be validated by independent
meaas As a result, Iraq probably has a small number of
adssdee (or components far such social .) Some worst-
case assessments put this number at several do,.
mmedes, a more likely figure is around a dozen By
carousing contain trucks, Iraq is capable of building
mobile leundien for these mtssBes
In terms of missile to., based un Iraq's permitted
missile programs,Iraq could probably increases the range
of the al-Samoud to around zaokm with a few hundred
kilograms payload, suitable for CBW delivery Whether
Iraq has been able to complete development of the al-
Samnud since 1998 aand begin limited production is
unknown, but plausible In this case, Iraq could have a
,mail force of al-Samaud mi ssi les, which could be
equipped with CBW warheads. As a practical matter,
however, tu strike Kuwait, the al-Samoud would have to
deploy in Southern Iraq wtttun the no-By zone, where
lraq's adsole crews would be highly vubterabie to attack
foraslong esthezone ispatrolled Anyal-Samaudattacks
against stgndlcant targets m Turkey wuuld need to be
launched from Kurdish areas, which Baghdad does
.at central
Iraq's slrMegic aptians
Assuming that Iraq possesses a limited C-BW arsonal,
will, various radical mumtou .q and a handful of long-
range missdes and arrcraR,whetsirategy czn tt pursue to
.,shot these resources to defend the regime and
munhy? The owl immediate danger Baghdad faces is a
US threat to use military force to overBtrow, the Iraqi
regime, on the grounds of traq's demonstreted and
suspected poison of WMD In theory, Baghdad has two
opium in meet this threat . Food, it could seek to remove
the American ratmnale by reamaing UN Inspections in
an effort to demonstrate that it has disarmed I.
comphance with UN Security Council requirements
Second, d muld seek,by dederahoa end demonetramn,
to create a credible throat of massive retaliation with
WMD in order to deter an American attack and
discourage other countries in the regain from lending
support to a US nultmry csmpamgn.
In principle, these two options am finsuourilable The
first approach requires Baghdad to give up IN WMD
preliminaries The second option requires Baghdad to
build up IN WMD programmes In September xaay
Baghdad appeared to be pursuing both options
sunultatteously, at least as long IN a US decision to we
force for'regmre chsnge' retnaned open. On me band,
Baghdad publicly demes that it retains any MAT)
opabdrhes and contmues to offer dtscua®ons on the
probably has a small number of missiles (or components for such missiles) . Some worst-case
I assessments put this number at several dozen missiles; a more likely figure Is around a dozen By
I convertmgcavdlantmcks,lraqiscapableofbuildmgmobilelaunchersforthesemlssfles
'converting
Ita4WeapansofMass Uestructlon " pn11555tretegicDossier 72
Conclusion- towards a net assessment
possible resumption of inspections by UNMOVIC On
the Other hand, Iraq has probably begun to mobdtse IN
CBW capabdihes m secret (Including production of agent
and preparation of mumnon .s) in order to prepare for a
possible confirmation with the United States
If Washington derides (or appears to decide) to
proceed with an attack, however, Baghdad will be
pressed to ahoose between these confusing options
Inspection or deterrence Faced with a credible US darat
to overthrow lus regime by force, president Hussam may
choosethelesserevdofaccepting UNunspectlons Based
on Iraq's past behavtuur, however, it is hard in believe
that Baghdad's cooperation will be genume or long
lasting The challenge for Baghdad will be to offer
enough cooperauon to keep Inspections alive (and a US
attack at bay), while shill protecting those WMD aunts
that the regune considers essenhal This is likely to be a
difficult balancing act to maintain Although UMM0`V[C
will probably neerl some have to build the institutional
knowledge, experienced personnel and tradecmft to deal
with Iraqi concealment and demal tactics, them is no
reason in believe that UNMOVIC or the IABA would
settle for false or incomplete assurances Indeed,
Wastungton is likely to pounce on any sign of Iraqi non-
coopetahon to declare that mspecuons have failed and
regime change is the only alternative
If d comes to war, [raq's conventional forces would be
no match against US to. and any allies with, them but,
depending on than determination to cont inue the fight,
they could mBtct considerable casualu. m street-t.-
street fighting and cause disruption through sabotage
and terrorist attacks Imq has presumably prepared
contmgenaes to deploy CBW munitions to selected field
units, as it did in the Gulf War. Vichally nothing is
known about command and control and delegsturn of
authority to such umts, beyond Ireq's post-Gulf War
rlatms that commanders were authorlsed to use CBW in
response to nuclear attack or if they believed that the
Castilian forces were advancing towards Baghdad
In a replay of the Gulf War - but with the US
determined to fmvsh the Iraqi regime this tons - some
Iraqi freld commanders may decide not to order the use
of CBW, m the hope of preserving their personal safety
in a poet-Saddam Iraq It seems unlikely, however, that
all use, of CBW can be avoided Some loyal now are
Likely to use tachcel CBW mutuhons (rodcNa and
artillery shells) against US forces in the field, even
though the effectiveness of these attacks will probably is,
limited Aubome or helicopter home, sprayers mold, in
theory, pose a greater threat to US forces but CBW
protective measures and defensive measures would
.'
Conclusion:towards a net assessment
probably ptevaiteeff`ou's'Easualltes. Attempts to lamse'is c-end a sma'llee"'chFmlcatvFa'porid'stockp>tej f6otigh
CBW attacks against US bases m Kuwalt or Turkey with
elsarFrange consoles, oe airaaft cannot be ruled ouh
As m the Gulf War, Baghdad has the option of
Iatuelung missile attacks against Israel (alus tune with
CBWarmedadssBes)Inthehopeofprovokingintermit
Intervention thatwouldrallyArab support toIraq'sside
From~Baghdad'e perspechve, a small force of bgolat
range misetles armed with CBW warheads is a precious
strategic aeset, and a Idgh value target for US forces.
Sume missiles might Set destroyed an flue ground, and
missile defenses may account for others, but mine could
get through. With nothing m lose, Baghdad may also
seek to mount CBW attacks with special forces and
sympathettc terrorist groups in the US and allied
countries . A difficult question to Answer is the
wBlmgneas of nsslstary officers and secursty ofruaals to
follow president Saddem Huasem down a suicide path
and the degree to width, conversely, an internal military
coup becomes more likely if the reglme appeal doomed
A net assessment
This strategic Dossier does not attempt to make a me,
either way, cut to whether Saddam Husseuis WMD
arsmal se a raaus belliperse Itunderltnee the factflort Iraq to minks Iraqi backsliding, Even the must robust and
half mentioned its ambitions in all am" of W?AD and
misesles and still has sorm boosted capabilities It
confirm that Iraq has sought to disgusse or conceal Its
continued WMD activities, in clear violation of its
teasefire obhgabnns since rggi. By aggg, UN mspectors
had aqueazed out a fairly cohment underetendlng of
Iraq's WMD and Consul. programmes, and narrowed
down the range of uncertainties, but several key
questions troularded.
Nearly four yeare without ioapechm~s have Increased
that level of uncertainty. A reasonable net asses®tent is
that Iraq does not have nuclear weapons, but could
construct one fairly quickly If it obtained svffioent fmsde chance of propsoung regioml =it international security
material. Iraq most likely has a solall force of proscribed
balluhc nsii+sles with a range of about bgokm, perhaps a
dozes, or so, which ere capable of delivering CBW
warhesds. It has extensive biological weapons capacities,
'this StrategicDossierdoes not attempt to make a case,either way, as to whether Saddam Hussetals
D arsenal Is a casusbefit perse.'
F;W211
F,w.
Wait arid the threat will grow. Strike and the threat maybe used This Strategic Dossier Invites policy
makers; and the pubficta make an early assessment oftheveladvar risks ofthese different options and
ita -an a course that has thebest chance ofpromonng regional and international secunty.'
choose
0
-
delivery uieans for both are homed and uncertam.
In the present mtuahort, Seddam Hussein can slowly
Continue to reload his WMD and weds capabilities,
though hampered by tedusscat prubleals, sanctions and
the threat of air strikes against covert facilities
If gccitons worse lifted, Iraq's abthty to reconsulule its
capabilities wouldaerelerate,asstrelevant access mvltal
foreign supplies of nmterial, components, equipment,
and expertise
. In either eese-whether sooner or later -
it as . likely that the mument Iraqi regime will
eventually add .. its objectives- Should Iraq acquire
nuclear wespone and coure effective delivery moral it
would greatly limit options for diecking potential bolls
threats to its nelghbouts and certainly ehmulate further
proliferation in the region
It hsepectone were resumed, Iraq's freedom of Action
to pursue WMD would be restricted, but not clummated
The extent to which con, posposchow, can be effective
vanes with each WMD terhrology, but depends first and
foremost con the extent of Iraq's wdlmgness b cooperate
As in the past, the threat or claw of force may compel
Baghdad to extend greater cooperation, but signs of
weakness and division in the facility Coursed are likely
comprehensive competing sysfmt will fad if Iraq expels
the inspectore or feels free to restrict Ill . as . A wer,
if it inetells a new goverslmattt in Baghdad willing to
comply with Iraq's mtenmBonal mmrsdtnsenls, would
ellminate Iraq s WMD threat, but at the it of sure
limited Caw use, (and civilian cwwdwa) during the
conflict to overthrow the present regime
Either course of action comes nsks Wait and the
threat will grow . stake and the threat my be wed This
strategic Douler Invites polscyn®kers and the public m
make an early assessment of the relative risks of these
different ophons and Iii, chores a Course, that has the beat
Conclusion:towards a net assessment
ones nutpossesshdllbes to produceBsslle material in suffldentamounts far nuclear
nudear/Badiolngioi
weaporte
Would yulreatleartsevemlyeanandextenuwrtorelguassisnncetabulldsuchflsslle
matenal produalon (splices.
Could probably assemble nudearweapons within months if issue material from foreign
snurrxs were otmined
Current interest In radiological weapons unknown Coulddiven domestkcIvIlFuse
radlolsomPes or seek to obtain foreign material for a miss denim
probably retained substential growth media and SW agent (perhaps thausandsaf Ilnes of
Biological
antlvax) firm pre-1991 narks
capable of resuming BW Agent pollinator, on shortnotice (weds) from existing civilian
fadliues,could have produced thousands of lines of anthrax botulinum twin and other
agents Men 1999 Actual stocksunknown
Pmduaion of viral agents,possession of smallpox unknown
Probably remined afew blind ran tonnes of mustard and precmson far a fewhundred tonnes
Classical
af sanNcyrlosarln and perhaps similar amounr ofVx from we1991 storhs .
Capable of resumlng CW produc9onon then nobce (mnnJul from adding dvilan fadlhies,
could have produced hundreds of mnnesof agent(mustard and nerve agenul since 1998
Actual stokaunknown
probably retained asmallforceof s50kmrange al-Husseld missiles, perhaps around a driven
BaiIIstieMlullea
mlsslles
noes not poeseasfacilities to produce long-range missiles, Wouldrecoils several Was and
extensive foreign assistance to mnsuun such fadlltles
May have produced sume aFSamoudmissllea With ranges up to ]Ilgkm
Capable of manufactunng nidimencary CBWwarheads, development of male advanced
designs unknown
Capable of mnverting civilian vehldes to mobile launchers .
Othar dallvary means Capable of dellvedng CBW In vinous Impact-luse tartiral munWons (emdlery shelly rockea,
aenal bonds)
Could have a few thousand CW tactical munitions
Capable of delivedng BW with simple airbome wet spny devices, develnpment & mom
advanced devkes for Wet spay mdlssemlnaMng dry agent unknown
Small Inyento,y of modem ndte aircraft (MICr77,Mlrage fl)With mind combat rathus,
somegromWanaQalrrrafol5u37,5u4,5u51 HehcapteqpmelbleUAVbasedanL-39
wore,
Speolal Forms and lesions.
Iran'sWeaponsofMass Destruction " An11SSStratenlcDossier 74
Footnotes
. hfstaryof UN Inspections In traq I799t-961
0 "Mane Calvm,'Saddam Builds New Atum Bomb', The
'For theeake of mnvemenre, WMDis Wades shorthand
fornuclear, brulogical, andcbemical weepans
tAentlaw of Iraq's Biological weaponsprogmmme
'For additional details, seeUNSCOM report to the UN
18cwntyCounni, S/1999/9'b?5January 1999
'CRC was subordinnte to both the Military Comarlsslon
and theSpedalSecurityOrge[tiszttas,headedatihattune
by Lt G®,.Lt Gen Hussein Kamel .
qn 1[a BW programme, lreq assigned code narnes to
diNemntagentr FnolectA=bobrlinumtaxfn,B=lladlus
anttuocu s,mce9, C = Aflatoxmaflatoxm, D = Tillebs,
F = Fuserlum/tTrirothecenee, and G = Qostndlum
pxrh,ngerw spores Iraq has refused to ducoss what, if
anything,'Pmject E' mrgla be
°Pettagon Shafts Anthrax Vaccine, to Civilian Uses', New
York Tune&29 June 20tf2
'Subrtatted to Ambassador Celtic, L N Amorlm,
President of the Security Council, on 25th January 1999
^Aa Iraqi Defector Tell. of Work an at ICeast 20 t£Idden
Weaporw Sites', New York Times, 20 December 2001
Overview of Iraq's nuclear Woapons programme
'The history of Imq's clandestine nuclear programme is
based on fAFA Inspections, interviews vnUr Iraql nuclear
pasoniiel, and documents obtained from Iraq, as
discussed m vanous reporb of the lAEADuedor Gmeral
to the Seeurity CourrcB- For e ssm,mary, see IAEA
Director General to the Security Counal, document
S/1997/T79, dated e Octnber 1997.
'Ihese drawings, vAuclt appeared to have been stolen
frum the German company MAN, provided somewhat
mromplete detail of a series of commeretally obsolete
smgle-rylirnder macldnes . However the drawing
coRectian included a small number of dra,.vlnga retailing
to tsvu-eybrrder and seven-cylmder cadr,fuge machmer
Although the EDC insisted that their principal focus was
on the development and production of single-cylinder
machines d had taken the step of muddymg the civil
engineedng of it. cmhifuge halts under construction at
Al-Furat and EDC Rashdfya to acmmmodete the much
'teller' seven-cylinder centrifuge machines
MW only sigmficeat faahty mlaamg from the'Bow-sl+eef
is a Uramum-hexafluoride (UF6) plant of suitable
capacity to feed a production-acele centrifuge enrichment
plant Imq'a explanattoa wae that althaugh the need for
such a plant was recognised, the cantrduge ProJect's
foreseeable development ruRds could be easily met from
,the then existing laboratory-acale UF6 pruducbon
facBlbes
"lhese esNmate9 a .uume ButnanuaJ urardum as the feed
material for both enrichment proc'eases However, had
Iraq been able to secure LEU feed stock. the I lEU Yield
could have aaIleasedtluee m Sour-fald
"yJiBiam Broad, 'DOCUment Reveals 1987 Bomb Tested by
,q', The New' York Times, 29 Apn12001
Sunday lYmes, 24 December 2r1IX1
'What such a device might look like is them speculation
Iraq . designs drca 1991 were ton large and heavy m be
denvered by missiles m Icaq's arsenal There is no way of
knowing whether Iraqi designers have been able to
achieve smaller and lighter weapons designs
-Due defector has claimed that Iraq produced enough
components for three to five nuclear weapons, but this
Informed. has not been conCunu.d and ratiocination
from 'this individual on other issues be, proved
unreBeble
'1JnclasssBed Report to Congress on the Arquiption of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Ihstrucuon
and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January
Through 30 June 2001, CIA January 2002
'°Prohfaahum Threat and Response, 05 Department of
Defame, January 2001,
Ovarvlew of Imq's blalagisal weapons pmgremme
'Foc additional details, sce UNSCOM report to the UN
Security Council, S/1999/94,25 January 1999
'TRC was subordinate to both the Mblitary Commission
and the Special Security Organisation, headed at that b+ne
by Lt Gen Hussom Kernel-
sin its BW programme, Iraq assigned code names to
different agents project A s bombnum toxFn, B =
Bacillus anthracis spores, C = aflamxin, D = TsBenn, F =
Fusaaum/tisothecenes, and G = Clostndmm
parfrmgens spores Iraq has refused to dlscues what, d
anything, 'Pru(ect E' might be
"Perrtagon Shltts Anibax Vaccine to Clvdlea Uses', New
York Tunes, 29 June 2002
'Submnted m Ambassador Ce1so L N Amonnr,
President of the Security Council, on 25 January I999
'An rraqi Defector Tells of Work on at Irast 20Iildden
Weapons Sure', New York Trans, 20 Lt,eember2001
Overvi" w of Irads chemical weapons programme
'Although classified as a not control agent, CS Was used
on the battlefield m rornbmahon with mueterd and nerve
agents to help incapacitate Lanian fnrces
'US Govemment White Paper, 'Me Iaqs Weapons of
Mass Destruction Programs, 13 February 1999
lTteport lo Congress on the Acqu'SShon of Technology
Relating to weapons Of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Canvmbonal Weapons, I Iartuary Through 301u^-2m1',
CIA,Ianoary 2tb2
'OVervLw of Iraq'a bsll4tic missile POollon arnis
Umdar error probable is the radina of a cud . withm
Yhirb half of . musde's pm)ecblea am expected to fa11
'RepuH to Congress an die Acqmsrhon of Technalugy
Relating in Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Weapons, I January Through 30 June 2001'.
CIA, "
'Hrid.
" The "Amonm Reporl", report afpanel come `9
disarmament and future ongoing monitoring and
verification issues, S/399913%,27 March 1999,
" Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, Iraq
Biological Warfare Threat, 11 October 1990,
http //www fas org/srp/gulf/mtel/961031/U408pg
f_90 bct
" Arma Commit Today, "Anhclpaeng Inspechons
UNMOVIC Readies Itself for Iraq", interview, with
UNMOVIC Execub,,a Chairman Hams Bit,
J"ly/August 2000.
" Bhada, Shyam and Daniel McGrory, Brighter than
the Baghdad Sun, Little, Brown and Company,
London 1999
" Bone, James, 'Trncp sites for bto-war revealed by
defector ", The Times (London), 12 July 2001
" Boyne . Sean, "Iraq's M70 " mudstry of missing
weapons", Jane'sJntelhgence Review, March 1998,
" Broad, William J., "bocvment Reveals 1987 Bomb
Test by IraR', The New York Times, 29 April 2001
" Butler, Richard, Former Executive Chairman of
UNSCOM, Diplomat in Residence, Council mi
Formar Battalions, hearing before the US Scram
Committee on Armed Services, 28 September 2000
" Butlen Richard, former Executive Chairman of
UNSCOM, Diplomat in Residence, Council on
Foreign Rciahune, hearing before it. US Senate
Foreign Relabono Committee, "Mebtary Involvement
m Imq", 31 July 20112
"
Butler, Richard, Saddam Defiant The Threat of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, and [be Crisbi of
Global Security, Wesdenfeld & Nlcolson, London
2000
" Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), UrvlasslRed
Report to Congress on the AcqWstbon of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, i January
Ifuuugh311une200I Jamary2002.
" Chipman, Jolur, 'America'. right to light Iraq',
Fmeneml Times, London, 13 August 2002
" Cinnelone, Joseph, Deadly Arsenals Tracking
Weapons of Mass; Destruction, Camegie Endowment
for Intematlowl Peace, Washington, DC, 2002
"
Cordeaman,Anthony H,Proliferation mthe"Axrsof
Evil" North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 30 January 2011P .
" Cardesotan, Anthony H, Senior Fellow, Center for
Strategic and Intemabonal Studies, bearulg Won,
the U S Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
"Military Involvement m Iraq", 31 July 2002
" lhteifer, Charles, Resident Visiting Scholar, Center
for Strategic and Intemahmul Studies, Former
Deputy Executive Charrman, 11NSCOM, hearing
before the US Smlate Foreign Relations Comaubee,
*Military Involvement in Iraq", 31 July 2002.
EIMom, Robert, Semm Advieer, Carter for SMteg,c
" and Intetuanowl Studies, he
ta "lore the US ,
b-.-,n,-m" nf M." . n" .r., ..r .. . an rnie
Sonete Covemmenlal ALffalrs Subcomauttee on
International Security, Proliferation and Federal
Services, l March 2W2.
" Evans, Michael, and Rofand Watson, "Irnq buBding
up deadly areenal, say defectors", The Tuner
(I,ondon),11 July 2f102
" Gagucd, Robert Deao, 9chool of Foreign Sernce,
Georgetown University, hearing before the US
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Mdttary
Involvement in Iraq", 31 Ju1y2002
" Gordon, Michael R and General Bernard B Tra4wr,
The General's War The Inside Storyof theConflict m
theGulf, Boston I.Lttle, Browo,1995.
" Hamr.e, Khldhrr, Former Iraqf Nuclear Engineer and
Director, Courall on M1dd1e Eastern Affsus, hearing
before the U S Senate Foreign Relations Comunttee,
'Military Involvement m Iraq", 31 July 2001
" Hanss.a, Klddir with Jeff Stem, Saddam's
Bombaraker, Sarbner, New York. 2W0
" Intennznonal Atomic Energy Ageny, Report of the
Director General of 1A7A m comu.Yhon with the
panel on disarmament and current and future
onguutg momtormg and venficahon Issues,
5119991127,9 February 1999
" International Atonuc Energy Agency, Report of die
Duector General of IAEA underparegraph 16 of SCR
]051, S/1997/779, 8 October 1997
" Katzman,Kenneth,Iraq Compliance, SaInhom, and
US Policy, Congressional Research Service Issue
Brief for Congress, updated 2 January 2002
" Kay, David A, Science Applications IntematJmul
Corporation, Former Chief Nuclear Weapons
Inspector m Iraq 1991-92, hearing before the US
Senate Governments] Affair. Subcommittee an
Intematlonal Security, Proliferation and Federal
Servtces, I March 2002
" Levenberg, Milton '`Deadly Unknowns about Iraq's
Biological Weapons Program", Institute for Science
and lnternebonal Security, 9 Febmary 20110
" Miller, Juditb, "Penbgan Shifts Anthrct Vacxine to
C,vDian Uses, New York Tunes, 29 June2002
" blhller,Judith,"Defectortells ofImqtarms sites",New
York Time,, PP December 2001.
" Md1er,Judsth,"SecretSNesbaytTeBsofRenovanoos
at Sdes Por Chenucsl and Nuclezr Amre" New York
Times. 20 DecembQ 2001
" MtRer,Juduh,Stephen EngelbergandWilliam Bmad,
Germs Biological Weapons and America's Secret
War, Simon & Schuster, New York, 200I
" Nations], Intelhgenca Com,d, Foreign Mssde
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat
Through 2015, December 2W1.
" Prados,Alfred B,Iraq PosbWarChallenges andUS
Responses, 1991-1997, Congressional ResezFch
Service Report for Congress, 14 April 199B .
" Fred ., Alfred B and Kinsman, Kenneth, lmq-US
Confrontation, Congressional Research Service issue
nn .ela. 14 0
Further reading
Brief for Congresa, updated 2n February 2B02
" Pullrnger, Stephen, Military Action Against Iraq lbe
Nuclear Option, The latenuffional Security
Worvuhon Service, Policy Paper No 83, April 2002
" Bitter, Scott, Endgame Solving the Iraq Problem -
Once and for AB, Sinion & Schroder, New York, 1999
" Bitter, Scott, "The Case for Iraq's Qualitative
Disarmament", Arms Control Today, June 2000
" Rose, David,'7raq's Arsenal of Tereer, Vanity Fair,
May 2001
" Spertzel, Richard O, Head of Biological Weapons
Inspections, UNSCOM, 199498, hearing before the
US . Senate Govemma"tal Affairs Subc.dre an
Intemahorul Security, Prohfershon and Federal
Service.s, l March 2082
" ~Trevan, Tim, Saddanis Secrets" The Hunt for Iraq's
~ Hidden Weapons, HarperCo111ns Publishers,
London, 1999
" United Nations Mnmtormg, Venficatton and
Inspection Commisnon (IJNMOViC), for van . key
docvmeNs, including quarterly reports and I1N
Security Council resolutions, please see-
. http " //www .un.org/depts/unmov¢/doaummts/d
nesbat hire
" United Nab. Special Co. .. (UNSCOM), for
various key documents, Including serial-annual
reports to the UN Security Council, please see
http-//vrnm",un org/depts/unscom/unsondoc htm
" United Nature Special Commlsswn (t7NSCOM),
Report an Status of Disarmament and Monitoring,
5/1999/94, 29 Jmuary 1999
" US Army Medical Research Institute of Infections,
Diseases, USAMRIIU's Medical Management of
Biological Casuelues, Handbook, February 2001 .
" US . Depadurmt of Defense, Proliferation Threat and
Response, January 2001 .
" US Departnment of Defense, Informehon Paper
Iraq's Scud Balhshc Meadee, 25 July 2000
" US. Deparnnent of State, Iraq Weapons of Mass
Destruction Programs, US Goverrmtmt White
Paper, 13 February 1998.
" US Germaal Accounting Office, Weapons of Mess
Destntetion UN Confronts Significant Challenges
m Impiementutp, Sanctions against Iraq, May 2802
" U S Goverrm"ent, The Biological & Chenucal
W.if.e, Threat
" Venter, A1 J . "t1NSCOM odyssey the search for
Saddam's biological arsenal", Jane's Intelligence
Review, March 1998
" Veneer, Al J., "Uphdl struggle Scott Bitter and the
.aid, for Seddzm'a weapons; Jane's Intelligence
.lcew, December 1998
WebsBims
" Arms Central Aasodation, Arms Control Today
,http ://www.armscontrot.org/act/
" Brrc1anp1nstitu6on-FeI;ourm on Iraq
Further reading
' - hitp //www brookings edu/dybdncmot/fp/ blip //www defenseluda md/speasIS/desert-fox/ United Nations Special Commission
prolecb/iraq hlese Peamanent Mission of Iraq to the United Natnev; http //www .un org/Depts/unscom
" BuRetm of the Atearec Scientists http //www.uaqt-msvon org/ US Array Medical Research Institute of Infechous
hltp //www thebulletin org/ 1'ubbc Health Laboratory Service Distaste (USAMRTID)
" Camegte Endowment for International Peace http~//www phls on uk/ http //www . .red army mil
Non-ProBferatlon Project
: Iraq Resources The Royal Initiate of International Affairs US DepartmentofDefense
http " //www eerp org/files/nonprohf/cauntnes/ Middle Best Research Programme http //www/defenselink vuI/pubs
cnuntry asp7ID.3&cuunery=lreq http " //www.nia .org/ma/scan/sr-sql/fi=pages/ U S Deparbnent of State
" Center for Strategic and International Studus (CSIS) sf=page_ID/se=91/va=ths5echon=research/ Bureau of Near Feature Affairs
Middle East Program va=th~sDetad=0/va=tlusPage=mep/ep=contmt/ http //wwwstategov/p/nea
blip //www cite org/trudeast/ind"Itten ml=1/fpxnntenthtml US Depart urcent of State
" Centers for DLsesse Central and Prevention (CDC) Stockholm International Peace Research Inshtute Intemationel information Programs, Leg Update
htep //www .de gov (SmRp http //ustnfo state gov/reglonal/nea/haq
" Chemmal suit Biological Arms Control Inahtute Educational Module on Cluenu .1 and Biological Washington Post
(CBACp Weapons (CBW)Non-Prolifer-ahon Case Study Iraq Resources related to Operation Desert Fox
http //www cbacLorg/ http //cbwstprise/mdex2htrnl http'//envw washingtonpost rom/
" Federation of A¢merlcan Scientists (PAS) UK Foretgn and Commonwealth Office wp-srv/mad/longterm/uaq/anelyeie .htm
Iraq Special Weapons Guide Relations with Iraq Wtsconsu: Protect on Nuclear Arms Control
http-//www fas org/nuke/gWde/uaq/mde<html hhp //www fro gw uk/servlet/Front7pagename= Iraq Watch
" Gu1fLA1K, Office of the Specml Assistant for Gulf OpenMarket/Xceletate/ShowPage&~-Page&ad= http //www aaqwatch org
War lllnesses 11107029394379 World Health Organrzanon (WHO)
Website posts declsssified dacuments from various United Non.. Monitoring, Verification and http //www who mt/en/
agencies, including; the Central Intelligence Agency inspection Comaussmn (ONMOVIC) World Nuclear Aa,ccmuon
(CIA), Deparm,ent of Deferves (DOD), joint Clefs of http-//www on org/Depts/unmovic http //www.world-nuclear org
Staff, US Air Force, Arrny, Central Command, Marine United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme O1-
Corps and Navy. for-Food
htip .//wmw gulflmk osdmil/cg>btn/texis/ http //www an org/Depts/olp/
search/browse
" The Henry L SBrnson Carter
http //www stunson org
" Institute for Science and lnternabonal Security (ISIS)
Country Asaessments Iraq
http //www tsts-onlme org/publtcaBons/vaq/
" The International Atomtc Ernergy Agency (lAEA)
rApA Iraq Action Team
http ://www tees, or at/worldatter/Prograrearnat,/
AchonTeam/mdezhtml
" Johns Hopkins University, Center for Civilian
Btodefenae Strategtes
hltp //www hopkins-blodefense .arg/
" Monterey Institute of Intemahnnal Studies, Center
for Nonprobferahon Stud,es (CNS)
Iraq Special Collecturn,
http //ais came; edu/researrli/iraq/mdex htm
New Mexieo Weapons of Mass Destruchon
" Preparedness Working Group
http"//www wind-nm-org/Index asp
" Nuclear Threat Initiative (N77)
Iraq Overview
hire //www all org/elesearch/el}raq_1 html
" "Orgatusation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OpCW)
blip //wwwopeworg/
" PBS, Proathne, Spying an Saddain, I999
http://www pbs org/wgbh/pagee/fronBme/
ahowe/tuiscom
" , Pentagon, Opera*sat Fox
 Security Council resolution 686 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 1 of 2

United
Appendix - Relevant UN Security Council Nations
Resolutions
S/RES/0686 (1991)
2 March 1991
Resolution 696 2 March 1991

Resuludon 687 3 April 1997

Resolution 70715 August 1991 RESOLUTION 686 (1991) '

Resolution 71511 Oetoher 1991
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2978th meeting on 2 March 1991
Resolution 105127 March 1996
The Security Council,
Resolutlon 12a417 nacember 7999

Recalling and reaffirnling its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665
(1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990), 677 (1990), and 678 (1990),

Recalling the obligations of Member States under Article 25 of the Charter,

Recalling paragraph 9 of resolution 661 (1990) regarding assistance to the Government of Kuwait
and paragraph 3 (e) of that resolution regarding supplies strictly for medical purposes and, m
humanitarian crzcanistances, foodstuffs,

Taking note of the letters of the Foreign Minister of Iraq confirming Iraq's agreement to comply fully
with all of the resolutions noted above (S/22275), and stating its intention to release prisoners of war
immediately (S/22273),

Taking note of the suspension of offensive combat operations by the forces of Kuwait andthe
Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990),

Bearing in mind the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions, and the objective m resolution
678 (1990) ofrestoring international peace and security in the region,

Underlining the importance of Iraq taking the necessary measures which wouldpermit a definitive
end to the hostilities,

Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Iraq and Kuwait, andnoting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating
under paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 678 (1990) to bring theirmilitary presence m Iraq
to an end as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives of the resolution,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1 . Affirms that all twelve resolutions noted above continue to have full force and effect;

2. Demands that Iraq implement its acceptance of all twelve resolutions noted above and in particular
that Iraq-
 Page 2 of 2 Security Council resolution 687 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page l of 8
Security Council resolution 686 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait 1

(a) Rescind immediately its actions purporting to annex Kuwait,

(b) Accept in principle its liability for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to United
Kuwait and third States, andtheir nationals and corporations, es a result of the invasion
Nations
and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq ;

(c) Under international lawnnmediately release under the auspices of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, Red Cross Societies, or Red Crescent Societies, all S/RHS/0687 (1991)
Kuwaiti and third country nationals detained by Iraq and return the remains of any 3 April 1991
deceased Kuwaiti and third country nationals so detained; and

(d) Immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, to be completed in
the shortest possible penod;
RESOLUtION 687 (1991)
3 . Further demands that Iraq:
Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting, on 3 April 1991
(a) Cease hostile or provocative actions by its forces against all Member States
The Security Council,
including missile attacks and flights of combat aircraft ;
Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9
(b) Designate military commanders to meet with counterparts from the forces of Kuwait
August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13
and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) to
September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990)
arrange for the nulrtary aspects of a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible time,
of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678
(1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991,
(c) Arrange for immediate access to and release of all pnsoners of war under the
auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and return the remains of any
Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and
deceased personnel of the forces of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with the return of its legitimate Government,
Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990), and
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
(d) Provide all information and assistance um identifying Iraqi mines, booby traps and
independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States
other explosives as well as any chemical and biological weapons and material in
cooperating with Kuwait under pamgmph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence
Kuwait, in areas of Iraq where forces of Member States cooperating with Kuwait m Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991),
pursuant to resolution 678 (1990) are present temporarily, and m adjacent waters ;
Reaffirming the need to be assured of Imq's peaceful intentions m the light of its unlawful invasion
4 Recognizes that during the period required for Iraq to comply with paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the and occupation of Kuwait,
provisions ofparagraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) remain valid,
Taking note of the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 27 February 1991 and
5. Welcomes the decision of Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to
those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991),
resolution 678 (1990) to provide access and to commence immediately the release of Iraqiprisoners
of war as required by the terms of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, underthe auspices of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as rndependent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963
"Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of
Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters", thereby recognizing formally the boundary
6 . Requests all Member States, as well as the United Nations, the specialized agencies and other
between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United
international organizations in the United Nations system, to take all appropriate action to cooperate Nations m accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and m which Iraq
with the Government and people of Kuwait in the reconstruction of their country;
recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders as
specified and accepted m the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted
7 . Decides that Iraq shall notify the Secretary-Geneml and the Security Council when it has taken the by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932,
actions set out above;
Conscious of the need for demarcahon of the said boundary,
8 . Decides that in order to secure the rapid establishment of a definitive end to the hostilities, the
Security Council remains actively seized of the matter.
Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations
under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of
its prior use of chemical and affirming that grave consequences would follow my further

wons
Security Council resolution 687 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 2 of 8
use by Iraq of such weapons,
Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating m the
Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held m Paris
from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and
biological weapons,
Recalling 21so that Imq has signed the Convention on the Prhrbihon of the~Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, of 10 April 1972,
Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention,
Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to fts Convention and encouraging its
forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the
convention,
Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a
Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,
Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles m unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take
specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,
Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials
for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-
Proltfemtion of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,
Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone m the region of the
Middle East,
Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security m the area
and of the need to work towards the establishment m the Middle East of a zone free of such
weapons,
Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in
the region,
Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available
means, including a dialogue among the States ofthe region,
Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661
(1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait,
Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991),
many Kuwaiti and third comity nationals are still not accounted for and property remains
utrretumed; , 6 Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the
Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New
York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of
international terrorism,
Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets
outside It"aq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,
Security Council resolution 687 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 3 of 8
Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-Geneml of 20 March 1991 and 28
March 1991, and conscious of the necessity tc meet urgently the humanitarian needs m Kuwait and
Iraq,
Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in
recent resolutions of the Security Council,
Conscious of the need to take the following measures arhng under Chapter V11 of the Charter,
O
1 . Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to
achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire ;
A
2 Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary
and the allocation of islands set out in the "Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait
and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition
and Related Matters", signed by them m the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on
4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United
Nations m document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964,
3 Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with
Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on
appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document
S/22412 andto report back to the Security Council within one month;
4 Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary
and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations;
B
5 Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit
within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate
deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a
demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and
five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to m the "Agreed Minutes
Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Imq Regarding the Restoration of
Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters" of 4 October 1963 ; to deter
violations of the boundary through its presence m and surveillance of the demilitarized
zone ; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the temtory of
one State to the other, and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Securdy
Council on the operations of the unit, and immediately dthere are serious violations of
the zone or potential threats to peace,
completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be
established forthe Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with
resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with
resolution 686 (1991); "
C
7 Invites Iraq to unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for
W
Security Council resolution 687 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 4 of 8
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April
1972;
8 . Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering
harmless, under international supervision, of
(a) All clhenucal and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all
related subsystems and components and all research, development, support
and maaufacturing facilities ;
(b) AR ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 Icilometres and
related major pads, and repair and production facilities;
9 Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following,
(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the
adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts
and types of all items specified m paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site
inspection as specified below;
(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate
Governments and, where appropriate, with the Duector-General of the
World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the
present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a
plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days
of such approval:
(i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out
immediate on-site inspection of Traces biological, chemical and
missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the
designation of my additional locations by the Special
Commission itself,
(ti) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special
Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless,
taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all
items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items at
the additional locations designated by the Special Commission
under paragmph 9 (b) (Q above and the destruction by Iraq,
under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all us
missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under
paragraph 8 (b) above; '
(iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance
and cooperation to the Director-General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13
below ;
10 . Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or
acquire any of the items specified m paragraphs 8 and 9 above and reque e prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is
Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to deveIV plan for
Security Council resolution 687 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 5 of 8
the future ongoing monitoring and venfication of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph,
to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty
days of the passage of this resolution ;
11 . Invites Iraq to reaffirm . unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons of I July 1968,
12, Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear
weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any
research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above, to
r
submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-Ceneral of the International Atomic
Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a
declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all
of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and
removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and
cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for m the plan of the Secretary-
General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above, to accept, in accordance with the
arrangements provided for m paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the
destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above;
and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing
monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings,
13 . Requests (lie Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through
the Secretary-Geneml, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as
provided for m the plan of the Secretary-General m paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out
immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations
andthe designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission ; to develop a
plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in
paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by
the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and
obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Pmlifemiton ofNuclear Weapons of 1
July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with
paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material m Iraq subject to the
Agency's verification and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all
relevant nuclear activities m Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval
within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution,
14 . Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13
of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing m the Middle
East azone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and
the objecuve of a global ban on chemical weapons;
D
15 . Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken
to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any
property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact,
E
16 . Reaffirms that Iraq, without Prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq ansing
liable under mtematt*w for any direct loss, damage, including environmental
Security Council resolution 687 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
Page 6 of 8
damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments,
nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait;
17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign
debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere acrupulously to all of its
obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt ;
18 . Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within
paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund;
19. Directs the Secretary-Geneml to develop and presen ; to the Security Council for
decision, no later than thirty days following the adophcu of the present resolution,
recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the payment of claims
established in accordance with paragraph 18 above and for a programme to implement
the decisions m paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including, administration of the fund ;
mechanisms for determining the lippropriate level of Iraq's contribution to the fund
based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products
from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General,
taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity as
assessed in conjunction with the tnte(nattonal financial institutions taking into
consideration external debt service, a3d the needs of the Iraqi economy ; arrangements
for ensuring that payments are made to the fund ; the process by wluch funds will be
allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims
and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims m respect of Iraq's liability as
specified in paragraph 16 above, and the composition of the Commission designated
above;
F licences or any other arrangements,
20 . Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to
Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies, and
prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained m resolution 661
(1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Seemly Council Committee
established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no-
objection!'procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified
m the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991, and m any further findings
of humanitarian need by the Committee ;
21 . Decides that the Security Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above
every sixty days in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq,
including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the
purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therem ;
22 . Decides that upon the approval by the Security Council of the programme called for
in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions
contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the
import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against
financial transactions related thereto contained in resolu:on 661 (1990) shall have no
further force or effect;
23 . Decides that, pending action by the Security Council under paragraph 22 above, the
Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) shall lpowered
Security Council resolution 687 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 7 of 8
to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to
carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against
the import of commodities and products onginanng in Iraq ;
24 Decides that, m accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related
resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall
continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or
supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or
aircraft, of
(a) Arms and related matericl of all types, specifically including the sale or
transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military I
equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and
components and their means of production, for such equipment ;
0
n
(b) Items specified and defined m paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise
covered above,
(c) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the
production, utilization or stoclcpilmg of items specified m subparagraphs (a)
and (b) above ;
(d) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating
to (he design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of
items specified m subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
25 Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance
with paragraph 24 above, notwrthstandmg the existence of any contracts, agreements,
26. Requests the Secretary-General, m consultation with appropriate Governments, to
develop within sixty days, for the approval of the Security Council, guidelines to
facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph
27 below, and to make them available to all States end to establish a procedure for
updating these guidelines periodically,
27 Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take
such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security
Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the
terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all
appropriate steps to assist m ensuring such full compliance;
28 Agmas to review its decisions m paragmphs 22, 23, 24 and 25 above, except for the
items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and m my
case one hundred and twenty days following passage of the present resolution, taking
into account Iraq's compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the
control of armaments in the region, '
29 Decides that all States, including Imq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure
that no claim shall lie at the instance ofthe Government of Iraq, or of any person or
body m Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or
was
body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance
measures taken by the Security Council m resolution 661
affected by reason of the
(1990) andrelated resolutions;

Security Council resolution 687 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
30 . Decides that, m furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all
Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the
Intemational Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating
the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever
located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red
Cross for th6'se'Kuwaiti and third country nationals still r1naccolrnteg fol; ' ' -
31 . Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General
apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the
repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third comity nationals or their remains present
in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990,
H
32 . Requires Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any
act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of
such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all
acts, methods and practices of tmorism;
33 . Declares that, upon official nofification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the
Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is
effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in
accordance with resolution 678 (1990);
34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be
required forthe implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and
security in the region.
Adopted ar the 2981s! meeting by 12 vofev to 1 (Cuba) with 2 abshndons (Eeuadop Yemen).
.
Page 8 of 8 Security Council resolution 707 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 1 of 3
United
Nations
-
SIRES/0707 (1991)
15 August 1991
RESOLUTION 707 (1991)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3004th meeting, on 15 August 1991
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution 687 (1991), and its otherresolutions on this matter,
Recalhng the letter of 11 April 1991 from the President of the Security Council to the Permanent
Representative of Iraq to the United Nations (5%'22485) noting that on the basis of Iraq's written
agreement (S/22456) to implement fully resolution 687 (1991) the preconditions established m
paragraph 33 of that resolution for a cease-fire had been met,
Noting with grave concern the letters dated 26 June 1991 (S/22739), 28 June 1991 (S/22743) and 4
July 1991 (S/22761) from the Secretary-Geneml, conveying information obtained from the
Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and the Dtrector-General of the IAEA which
establishes Iraq's failure to comply with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991),
Recalling further the statement issued by the President of the Security Council on 28 June 1991
(S/22746) requesting that a high-level mission consisting of the Chairman of the Special
Commission, the Director-General of the IAEA, and the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament
Affairs be dispatched to meet with officials at the highest levels of the Government of Iraq at the
earliest opportunity to obtain written assurance that Iraq will fully and immediately cooperate in the
inspection of the locations identified by the Special Commission and present for immediate
inspection any of those items that may have been transported from those locations,
Dismayed by the report of the high-level mission to the Secretary-General (S/22761) on the results
of its meetings with the highest levels of the Iraqi Government,
and the
Gravely concerned by the information provided to the Council by the Special Commission
IABA on 15 July 1991 (S/22788) and 25 July 1991 (S/22837) regarding the actions of the
Government of Iraq in flagrant violation of resolution 687 (1991),
Gravely eonccrned also by the evidence in the letter of 7 July 1991 from the Minister of Foreign
statements and findings that Iraq's
Anion of Iraq to the Secretary-General and tn .subsequent
notifications of 18 and 28 April were incomplete and that it had concealed activities, which both
(1991),
constituted material breaches of its obligations under resolution 687
Noting also from the letters dated 26 June 1991 (S/22739), 28 June 1991 (S/22743) and 4 July 1991
(S/22761) from the Secretary-General that Iraq bas not fully complied with an of its undertakings
the
relating to the privileges, in* ties and facilities to be accorded to the Special Commission and
Security Council resolution 707 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 2 of 3
IAEA inspection teams mandated under resolution 687 (1991),
Affirming that in order for the Special Commission to carry out its mandate under paragraph 9 (b)
(t), (ii) and (iii) ofresolution 687 (1991) to inspect Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and
ballistic missile capabilities and to take possession of them for destruction, removal or rendermg
harmless, full disclosure on the part of Iraq as required m paragraph 9 (a) of resolution 687 (1991) is
essential, , ~ .. , _.  , . ,, _ ,
Affirming that m order for the IAEA with the assistance and c -operation of the Special Connoussion,
to determine what nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any
research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to them need, m accordance with
paragraph 13 of resolution 687 (1991), to be destroyed, removed or rendered harmless, Iraq is
required to make a declaration of all its nuclear programmes including any which it claims are for
purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,
Affirming that the afotemen6oned failures of Iraq to act in strict conformity with its obligations
under resolution 687 (1991) constitutes a material breach of its acceptance of the relevant provisions
or resolution 687 (1991) which established a cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the
restoration of peace and security in the region,
AfFuming further that Iraq's failure to comply with its safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of 1 July 1968, as established by the resolution of the Board of Governors of the IAEA of
18 July 1991 (GOV/2531), constitutes a breach of its international obligations,
Determined to ensure full compliance with resolution 687 (1991) and in particular its section C,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
1 . Condemns Iraq's serious violation of a number of its obligations under section C of resolution 687
(1991) and of its undertaktngs to cooperate with the Special Commission and the IAEA, which
constitutes a material breach of the relevant provtsions of resolution 687 which established a cease-
fire and provided the conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in the region,
2 Further condemns non-compliance by the Govemment of Iraq with its obligations under its
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, as established by the resolution
of the Board of Governors of I S July, which constitutes a violation of its commitments as a party to
the Treaty on the Non-Proltfemtion of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,
3 Demands that Iraq
(i) provide full, final and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of
all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons,
their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear
programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-
weapons-usable material, without further delay,
(ii) allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams immediate,
unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records
and means of transportation which they wish to inspect,
(iii) cease immediately any attempt to conceal, or any movement or des4ftu of any
material or equipment relating to its nuclear, chemical or biological weaPM or ballistic
Security Council resolution 707 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 3 of 3
missile programmes, or material or equipment relating to its other nuclear activities
without notification to and prior consent of the Special Commission,
(tv) make available immediately to the Special Commission, the IAEA and their
Inspection Teams any items to which they were previously dented access,
(v) allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams to conduct both "
fixed wing and helicopter flights throughout Iraq for all relevant purposes including
inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and logistics without interference
of any kind and upon such terms and conditions as may be determined by the Special
Commission, and to make full use of their own atrcmit. and such airfields m Iraq as they '
may determine are most appropriate for the work of the Commission,
(vi) halt all nuclear activities of any kind, except for use of isotopes for medical, V
agricultural or industrial purposes until the Seemly Council determines that Iraq is in
full compliance with this resolution and paragtaphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991),
and the TAEA determines that Iraq is m full compliance with its safeguards agreement
with that Agency,
(vii) ensure the complete implementation of the privileges, immunities and facilities of
the representatives of the Special Commission and the IAEA in accordance with its
previous undertakings and their complete safety and freedom of movement,
(vin) immediately provide or facilitate the provision of any transportation, medical or
logistical support requested by the Special Commission, the MEA and their Inspection
Teams,
(ix) respond fully, completely and promptly to any questions or requests from the
Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams,
4 . Determines that Iraq retains no ownership interest in items to be destroyed, removed or rendered
harmless pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991),
5 Requires that the Government of Iraq forthwith comply fully and without delay with all its
international obligations, including those set out in the present resolution, m resolution 687 (1991),
m the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of I July 1968 and its safeguards
agreement with the LkEA .
fi Decides to remain seized of this matter
Security Council resolution 715 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Security Council resolution 715 (1991) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 2 of 2

logistical, informational and other operational support for the carrying out of the plan submitted by
him ;
United
(c) Perform such other functions, m cooperation in the nuclear field with the Director General of the
Nations International Atomic Energy Agency, as may be necessary to coordinate activities under the plans
approved by the present resolution, including making use of commonly available services and
informatjon to the fullest extent possible, in order to achieve maximum efficiency and optimum use
of resources ;
S/RES/0715 (1991)
11 October 1991 5 Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the plans approved by the present
resolution and cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency in canymg out the plans ;

RESOLUTION 715 (1991)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3012th meeting, on 11 October 1991
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, and its other
resolutions on this matter,
Recalling in particular that under resolution 687 (1991) the Secretary-General and the Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were requested to develop plans for
future ongoing monitoring and verification, and to submit them to the Security Council for approval,
Taking note of the report and note of the Secretary-General (S/22871/Rev 1 and S/22872/Rev 1),
transmrttmg the plans submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
6 Decides to encourage the maximum assistance, in cash and in land, from all Member States to
support the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency m carrying out their activities under the plans approved by the present resolution, without
prejudice to Iraq's liability for the full costs of such activities ;
7 . Requests the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990), the Special Commission and the
Director General of the International Atotntc Energy Agency to develop m cooperation a mechanlsm
for mondormg any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the
implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, including the
present resolution and the plans approved hereunder;
8 . Requests the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency to submit to the Security Council reports on the implementation of the plans approved by the
present resolution, when requested by the Security Council and m any event at least every six
months after the adoption of this resolution,
9 Decides to remain seized of the matter.

1 . Approves, in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and the present
resolution, the plans submitted by the Secretary-Geneml and the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (S/22871/Rev .l and S/22872/Rev .l),

2 . Decides that the Special Commission shall carry out the plan submitted by the Secretary-General
(S/22871/Rev . l), as well as continuing to discharge its other responsibilities under resolutions 687
(1991), 699 (1991) and 707 (1991) and performing such other functions as are conferred upon it
under the present resolution ;

3 Requests the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out, with the
assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission, the plan submitted by him (S/22872/Rev . 1)
and to continue to discharge his other responsibilities under resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991) and
707 (1991) ;

4. Decides that the Special Commission, in the exercise of its responsibilities as a subsidiary organ of
the Security Council, shall:

(a) Continue to have the responsibility for designating additional locations for inspection and
overflights;

(b) Continue to Tender assistance and cooperation to the Director General of th~ernatlonal Atomic
Energy Agency, by providing him by mutual agreement with the necessary spe~expernse and
.
 Security Council resolution 1051 (1996) on approval of the mechanism
for monitoring Page 1 of 3 Security Council resolution 1051 (1996) on approval of the mechanism for monitoring. .. Page 2 of 3

l Approves. putsuant to the relevant provisions of its rcsolutions the

687 (1991) and 715 (1991), the provisions for the monitoring mechanism contained m annex I of
United aforementioned letter of 7 December 1995 (S/199571017),
subject to the terms of this resolution ;
Nations
2 .Approve.s also the general principles to be followed in implementmg
the monttprtng mechanism contained in the letter of 17 July 1995 from the
S/RES/1051 (1996) Chatrman of the Special Commission to the Chairman of the Committee established
under resolution 661 (1990) which is contained m annex II of the aforementioned
27 March 1996 letter of 7 December 1995 (S/1995/1017),

3.Affirms that the mechanism approved by this resolution is without

prejudice to and shall not impair the operation of existing or future
non-proliferation agreements or regimes on the international or regional level
RESOLUTION 1051 (1996) including arrangements referred to m resolution 687 (1991), nor shall such
agreements or regimes impair the operation of the mechanism,
Adapted by the Security Council at its 3644th meeting,
4 .Confirnms, until the Council decides otherwise under its relevant
on 27March 1996 resolutions, that requests by other States for sales to Iraq or requests by Iraq
for import of any item or technology to which the mechanism applies shall
The Security Council, continue to be addressed to the Committee established under resolution
661 (1990) for decision by that Committee m accordance with paragraph 4 of the
Reaffirming its resolution 687 (1991) of 8 April 1991, and mechanism,
m particular
section C thereof, its resolution 707 (1991) of 15 August
1991 and its
resolution 715 (1991) of l l October 1991 and the plans for
ongoing monitoring 5 Decides, subject to paragraphs 4 and 7 of this resolution, that all
and verification approved thereunder,
States shall :

Recalling the request m paragraph 7 of its resolution 715 (1991) to the
Committee established under resolution 661 (1990), the Special Commission
and
the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to develop
in cooperation a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or
supplies by other
countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section
C of
resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, including resolution
715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder,
(a)Transmit to the 7omt wit constituted by the Special Commission and
the Director General of the IAEA under paragraph 16 of the mechanism the
notifications, with the data from potential exporters, and all other relevant
information when available to the States, as requested in the mechanism on the
intended sale or supply from their territories of any items or technologies
which arc subject to such notification in accordance wtth paragraphs 9, 11, 13,
24, 25,27 and 28 of the mechanism,

Having considered the letter of 7 December 1995 (S/1995/1017) to the (b)Report to the joint unit, in accordance with paragraphs 13, 24, 25, 27
President of the Council from the Chairman of the Committee established
under and 28 of the mechanism, my information they may have at their disposal or may
resolution 667 (1990), annex I of which contains the provisions for receive from suppliers m their territories of attempts to circumvent the
mechanism for export/import monitoring called for in paragraph 7 the
of resolution mechanism or to supply Iraq with items prohibited to Iraq under the plans for
715 (1991), ongoing monitoring and verification approved by resolution 715 (1991), or where
the procedures for special exceptions laid down m paragraphs 24 and 25 of the
Recognizing that the exportlimpott monitoring mechanism is an integral mechanism have not been followed by Iraq,
part
of ongoing monitoring and verification by the Special Commission
and the IAEA,
6-Decides that the not, ficattons required under paragraph 5 above shall
Recognizing that the export/import mechanism is not a regime for be provided to the joint unit by Iraq, in respect of all items and technologies
international licensing, but rather for the timely provision of information by referred to in paragraph 12 of the mechanism, as from the date agreed upon
States m which companies are located
which are contemplatmg sales or supplies between the Special Commission and the Director General of the lAEA and Iraq,
to Iraq of items covered by the plans for ongoing monitoring
and verrficanon and in any event not later than sixty days after the adoption of this
and will not impede Iraq's legitimate right to import or export resolution;
for
non-proscribed purposes, items and technology necessary
for the promotion of its
economic andsocial development, paragraph 5 above shall
7Decides that the notifications required under
date the
be provided to thejoint unit by all other States as from the
Acring under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, Secretary-General and the Director General of the IAEA, after their
"
consultations with the £the Council and other interested States,
me-*
 Security Council resolution 1051 (1996) on approval of the mechanism for monitoring. .. Page 3 of 3
report to the Council indicating that they are satisfied with the preparedness
of States for the effective implementation of the mechanism ;
B.Decides that the information provided through the mechanism shall be
treated as confidential and restricted to the Special Commission and the IAEA,
to the extent that this is consistent with their respective responsibilities
under resolution 715 (1991), other relevant resolutions and the plans for
ongoing monitoring and verification approved under resolution 715 (1991),
9 .Afflrme, if experience over time demonstrates the need or new
technologies so require, that the Council would be prepared to review the
mechanism in order to determine whether any changes are required and that the
annexes to the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved under
resolution 715 (1991), which identify the items and technologies to be notified
under the mechanism, may be amended in accordance with the plans, after
appropriate consultations with interested States and, as laid down m the plans,
after notification to the Council ;
lO .Decdes also that the Committee established under resolution
661 (1990) and the Special Comrnission shall carry out the functions assigned lo
them underthe mechanism, until the Council decides otherwise,
11 .Reguesrs the Director General of the IAEA to carry out, with the
assistance and cooperation of the Special Conunission, the functions assigned to
him under the mechanism,
12 .Ca(Is upon all States and international organizations to cooperate
fully with the Conunittee established under resolution 661 (1990), the Special
Commission and the Director General of the IAEA in the fulfilment of their tasks
m connection with the mechanism, including supplying such information as may be
sought by them m implementation of the mechanism,
13 .Ca!!s upon all States to adopt as soon as possible such measures as
may be necessary under their national procedures to implement the mechanism;
14-Decides that all States shall, not later than 45 days after the
adoption of this resolution, be provided by the Special Conamission and the
Director General of the IAEA with information necessary to make preparatory
arrangemeqts at the national level prior to the implementation of the provisions
of the mecliantsm,
15 .Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations underthe
mechanism approved by this resolution and cooperate fully with the Special
Commission and the Director General of the IAEA in the carrying out of their
tasks under this resolution and the mechanism by such means as they may
determine in accordance with theirmandates from the Council;
16-Decides to consolidate the periodic requirements for progress reports
under its resolutions 699 (1991), 715 (1991) and this resolution and to request
the Secretary-General and the Director General of the IAHA to submit such
consolidated progress reports every six months to the Council, commencing on
11 April 1996 ;
17Decfdes to remain seized ofthe matter.
"
Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) on the situation between Iraq mid Kuwait Page 1 of 7
United
Nations
S/RES/1284 (1999)
17 December 1999
RESOLUTION 1284 (1999)
Adopted by the Secunty Council at ns 08 4theeting,
on 1 7 December 1999
T he security Counil,
Recalling its previous relevant resolutrons, including its resolutions 661 (1990)
of 6 August 1990, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 699 (1991) of 17 June 1991 . 707
(1991) of 75 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 34 April
1995, 1051 (1996) of 27 March 1996, 1153 (1998) of 20 Febrnary 1998, 1175 (19981
of 19 June 1998, 1242 (1999) of 21 May 1999 and 1266 (1999) of 4 October 1999,
Recall eng the approval by the Council 1n it . resolution 715 (1991) of the plans
for future ongoing monitoring and verifrcaLlon submitted by the Secretary-General
and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
pursuance of paragraphs 10 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991),
Welcominrt the report, of the three panels on Iraq (S/1999/356), and havln-q held a
comprehensive consideration of them and the recommendations contained in them,
St-esolog the importance of a comprehensive approach to the full implementation
of a11 relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and the need for
Iraqi compliance with these resolutions,
Recalling the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of
mass destruction and a11 mrss~.les for their delivery and the objective of a
global ban on chemical weapons as referred to in paragraph 14 of resolution 687
(1991),
Concerned at the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and determi ned to improve that
situation, 
Recallrng with concern that the repatriation and return of all Kuwaiti and third
country nationals or their remains, present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990,
pursuant to paragraph 2 (c) of resolution 696 (1991) of 2 March 1991 and
paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991)~ have not yet been fully carried out by
Iraq,
ae-al lLna that m its resolutions 686 (1991) and 687 (1991) the Council demanded
that Iraq return m the shortest possible time all Kuwaiti property 1t had
seized, and noting with t that Iraq has still not complied fully with this
IF
 Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
demand,
Acknowledging the progress made by Iraq towards compliance with the provisions of
resolution 687 (1991), but noting that, as a result of its failure to implement
the relevant Council resolutions fully, the conditions do not exist which would
enable the Council to take a decision pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) to lift
the prohibitions referred to in that resolution,
Reiterating the..cpmmitment of a11 Member-states to, the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of Kuwait, Iraq and the neighbouring States,
Ac under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking into
account that Operative provisions of this resolution relate to previous
resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter,
A.
1 . Decides to establish, as a subsidiary body of the Council, the United Nations
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) which replaces the
Special Commissron established pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) of resolution G87
(1991) ;
2 . Decides also that UNMOVIC will undertake the responsibilities mandated to the
Special Commission by the Councrl with regard to the verification of compliance
by Iraq with its obligations under paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 687
(1991) and other related resolutions, that UNMOVIC will establish and operate, as
was recommended by the panel on disarmament and current and future ongoing
monitoring and verification issues, a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and
verification, which will implement the plan approved by the Council in resolution
715 (1991) and address unresolved disarmament issues, and that UNMOVIC will
identify, as necessary in accordance with its mandate, additional sites in Iraq
to be covered by the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification,
3 . Reaffirms the provisions of the relevant resolutions with regard to the role
of the IAEA in addressing compliance by Iraq with paragraphs 12 and 13 of
resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, and requests the Director
General of the IAEA to maintain this role with the assistance and cooperation of
UNMOVIC,
4 Reaffirms its resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1051
(1996), 1154 (1998) and all other relevant resolotions and statements of its
President, which establish the criteria for Iraqi compliance, affirms that the
obligations of Iraq referred to in those resolutions and statements with regard
to cooperation with the Special Commission, unrestricted access and provision of
information will apply m respect of UNMOVIC, and decides in particular that lraq
shall allow UNMOVIC reams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any
and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport which they
wish to inspect in accordance with the mandate of UNMOVIC, as well as to all
officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom
UNMOVIC wishes to interview so that UNMGVIC may fully discharge its mandate ;
5 . Requests the Secretary-General, within 30 days of the adoption of this
resolution, to appoint, after consultation with and subject to the approval of
the Council, an Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC who will take up his mandated tasks
as soon as possible, and, in consultation with the Executive Chairman and the
Council members, to appoint suitably qualified experts as a College of
Commiasnoners for UNMOVIC which will meet regularly to revnew the implementation
of this end other relevant resolutions and provide professional
advice and
Guidance to the Executive Chairman, including an significant policy decisions and
on written reports to be submitted to the council through the Secretary-General,
6 . Rec ests the Executive Chairman of (1NMOVIC, within 45 days
Q*
Page 2 of 7 Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 3 of 7
to submit to the Councrl, in consultation with and through the Secretary-General,
for its approval an organizational plan for UNMOVIC, >ncludrng its structure,
staffing requirements, management guidelines, recruitment and training
procedures, incorporating as appropriate the recommendations of the panel on
disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues,
and recognizing in particular the need for an effective, cooperative management
structure for the new organization, for staffinq with suitably qualified and
experienced personnel, who would be regarded as international civil servants
subject to Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations, drawn from the
broadest possible geographical base, including as he deems necessary from
international arms control organizations, and for the provision of high quality
technical and cultural training,
7 . Decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA, not later than 60 days after they have both
started work in Iraq, will each draw up, for approval by the Council, a work
programme for the discharge of their mandates, which will include both the
implementation of the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification,
and the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq pursuant to its
obligations to comply with the disarmament requirements of resolution 687 (1991)
and other related resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraq ;
compliance, and further decides that what is required of Iraq for the
implementation of each task shall be clearly defined and precise,
8 . Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMGVIC and the Director General of the
IAEA, drawing on the expertise of other international organizations as
appropriate, to establish a unit which will have the responsibilities of the
joint unit constituted by the Special Commission and the Director General of the
IAEA under paragraph 16 of the export/impart mechanism approved by resolution
1051 (1996), and also regu e-ts the Executive Chairman of uUmovic, in consultation
with the Director General of the IAEA, to resume the revision and updating of the
lists of items and technology to which the mechanism applies ;
9 . _Decides that the Government of Iraq shall be liable for the full costs of
UNMOVIC and the IAEA m relation to their work under this and other related
resolutions on Iraq,
10 . RAwllle-t- Member States to give full cooperation to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in
the discharge of their mandates ;
11 . _Decides that UNMOVIC shall take over a71 assets, liabilities and archives of
the Spemal Commission, and that it shall assume the Special Commission's part in
agreements existing between the Special Commission and Iraq and between the
United Nations and Iraq, and affirms that the Executive Chairman, the
Commissioners and the personnel serving with UNMOVIC shall have the rights,
privileges, facilities and immunities of the Special Commission ;
12 . Requests the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC to report, through the Secretary-
General, to the Council, following consultation with the Commissioners, every
three months on the work of UNMOVIC, pending submission of the first reports
referred to in paragraph 33 below, and to report immediately when the reinforced
system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational in Iraq ;
H
13 . Reiterates the obligation of Iraq, in furtherance of its commitment to
facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals referred
to an paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991), to extend all necessary cooperation
to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and cal ls voon the Government of
Iraq to resume cooperation with the Tripartite Commission and Technical
Subcommittee established to facrlrtate work on this rseuer
s appointment, 14 . Requests the Secret xy-General to report to the Council every four months an
Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait
compliance by Iraq with its obligations regarding the repatriation or return of
all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains, to report every six
months on the return of all Kuwaiti property, including archives, seized by Iraq,
and to appoint a high-level coordinator for these Issues ;
C.
15 . Authorizes States, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 3 (a), 3 (b)
and d of reaplution 661 (1990) apd 9ubsequent,relevant resolutions, to permit the
import of any volume of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq,
including financial and other essential transaction. directly relating thereto,
as required for the purposes and on the conditions set out in paragraph 1 (a) and
(b) and subsequent provisions of resolution 986 (1995( and related resolutions ;
16 . Underlines , in this context, its intention to take further action, including
permitting the use of additional export routes for petroleum and petroleum
Products, under appropriate conditions otherwise consistent with Lhe purpose and
provisions of resolution 986 (19951 and related resolutions ;
17 . Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (19901 to approve, on the
basis of proposals from the Secretary-General, lists of humanitarian items,
Including foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, ear well as basic or
standard medical and agricultural equipment and basic or standard educational
items, decides, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (19901 arid
paragraph 20 of resolution 697 (1991), that supplies of these items Will not be
submitted for approval of that Committee, except for items subject to the
provisions of resolution 1051 (1996), and will be notified to the Secretary-
General and financed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph B (a) and
8 (b) of resolution 986 (1995), and requests the Secretary-General to inform the
Committee in a timely manner of all such notifications received and actions
taken ;
18 . Requests the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to appoint, in
accordance with resolutions 1175 (1998) and 1210 (1998), a group of experts,
including independent inspection agents appointed by the Secretary-General an
accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 9B6 (1995), decides that this group
will be mandated to approve speedily contracts for the parts and the equipments
necessary to enable Iraq to increase its exports of petroleum and petroleum
products, according to lists of parts and equipments approved by that Committee
for each indnvidual project, and _Ktguests the Secretary-General to continue to
provide for the monitoring of these parts and equipments inside Iraq,
19 . Encourav e- Member states and international organizations to provide
sapplementary humanitarian assistance to Iraq and published material of an
educational character to Iraq ;
20 . Decides to suspend, for an initial period of six months from the date of the
adoption of this resolution and subject to review, the implementation of
paragraph 8 (g) of resolution 986 (1995) ;
21 . Requests the Secretary-General to take steps to maximize, drawing as
necessary on the advice of specialists, including representatives of
international humanitarian organizations, the effectiveness of the arrangements
set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions including the
humanitarian benefit to the Iraqi Population in a11 areas of the country, and
further requests the Secretary-General to continue to enhance as necessary the
Visited Nations observation process in Iraq, ensuring that all supplies under the
humanitarian programme are utrlrzed as authorized, to bring to the attention of
the Council any circumstances preventing or impeding effective and equitable
distribution and to keep the Council informed of the steps taken towards the
implementation of this paragraph ;
Page 4 of 7 Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) on the situation betwecn Iraq and Kuwait Page 5 of 7
22 . R_yuests also the Secretary-General to minimize the cost of the United
Nations activities associated with the implementation of resolution 986 (1995) as M
well as the cost of the independent inspection agents and the certified public
accountants appointed by him, in accordance with paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution (~
986 (1995)Y /,
23 . Requests the Secretary-General to provide Iraq and the Committee 0
establi .5thed by resolution 661 (1990( with a daily statement of the status of the
escrow "'eccount established by paragraph 7 of resolution 986 (1995( ;
24 Begues-s the SecreLary-General to make the necessary arrangements, subject to
Security Council approval, to allow funds deposited in the escrow account
established by resolution 986 (1995) to he used for the purchase of locally
produced goods and to meet the local coat for essential civilian needs which have `
been funded in accordance with the Provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and -,
related resolutions, including, whera appropriate, the cost of installation and
train .vng serv;.ces ; r-1
25 . Directs the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to take a decision
on all applications in respect of humanitarian and essential civilian needs
within a target of two working days of receipt of these applications from the
Secretary-General, and to ensure that all approval and notification letters
issued by the Committee stipulate delivery within a specified time, according to
the nature of the items to be eupplied, and requests the Secretary-General to
notify the Comvmrttee of all applications for humanitarian items which are
included .in the list to which the export/import mechanism approved by resolution
1051 (1996) applies ;
26 . Decides that Hap pilgrimage flights which do not transport cargo into or out
of Iraq are exempt from the provisions of paragraph 3 of resolution 661 (1990(
and resolution 670 (1990(, Provided timely notification Of each flight is made to
the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), and r-guests the Secretary-
General to make the necessary arrangements, for approval by the Security Council ,
to provide for reasonable expenses related to the Halj pilgrimage to be met by
funds m the escrow account established by resolution 986 (1995),
27 . Calls upo n the Government of Iraq :
(i) to take all steps to ensure L7n, timely and equitable distribution of all
humanitarian goods, in particular medical supplies, and to remove and avoid
delays at its warehouses,
(it) to address effectively the needs of vulnerable groups, including
children, pregnant women, the disabled, the elderly and the mentally ill
among others, and to allow freer cees, without any discrimination,
including on the basis at religionso or nationality, by United Nations
agencies and humanitarian organizations to a11 areas and sections of the
population for evaluation of their nutritional and humanitarian condition,
(iri) to prioritize applications for humanitarian goods under the
arrangements set out in resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions,
(iv) to ensure that those involuntarily displaced receive humanitarian
assistance without the need to demonstrate that they have resided for six
months in their places of temporary resrdence ;
(v) to extend full the United Nations Office for Project
cooperation to
Services mine-clearance programme in the three northern Governorates of Iraq
and to consider the initiation of the demmmg efforts m other
Governorates ;
Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait Page 6 of 7 Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) on the situationbetween Iraq and Kuwait Page 7 of 7

28 . Requests the secretary-General to report on the progress made in meeting the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and on the revenues necessary to meet
those needs, including recommendations on necessary additions to the current
allocation for oil spare parts and equipment, on the basis of a comprehensive
survey of the condition of the Iraqi oil production sector, not later than 60
days from the date of the adoption of this resolution and updated thereafter as
necessary ;
?9 . Expresses its readiness to authorize additions to the current allocation for
oil spare parts and equipment, on the basis of the report and recommendations
requested in paragraph 28 above, in order to meet the humanitarian purposes set
out m resolution 986 (1995) and related resolution. ;
30 . Requests the Secretary-General to establish a group of experts, including oil
industry experts, to report within 100 days of the date of adoption of this
resolution on Iraq's existing petroleum production and export capacity and to
make recommendation ., to be updated as necessary, on alternatives for increasing
Iraq's petroleum production and export capacity in a manner consistent with the
purposes of relevant resolutions, and on the options for involving foreign oil
companies in Iraq's oil sector, including investments, sub3ect to appropriate
monitoring and controls :
31 . Notes that ln the event of the Council acting as provided for in paragraph 33
of thls resolution to suspend the prohibitions referred to in that paragraph,
appropriate arrangements and procedures will need, sub3ect to paragraph 35 below,
to be agreed by the Council in good time beforehand, including suspension of
provisions of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolution. ;
36 . Expresses its inten tion to approve arrangements for effective financial and
other operational measures, including on the delivery of and payment for
authorized civilian commodities and products to be sold or supplied to Iraq, in
order to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items in the event of
suspension of the prohibitions referred to in paragraph 33 above, to begin the
elaboration of such measures not later than the date of the receipt of the
rnrtral reports referred to in paragraph 33 above, and to approve such
arrangements before the Council decision in accordance with that paragraph,
37 F-r ther ezmress es its rnte-tlon to take steps . based on the report and
recommendations requested in paragraph 30 above, and consistent with the purpose
of resolution 986 (1995) and related resolutions, to enable Iraq to increase its ,.~
petroleum production and export capacity, upon receipt of the reports relating to
the cooperation in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA referred to in `
paragraph 33 above ; `~1
38 . Reaffirms its intention to act in accordance with the relevant provisions of - JQ
resolution 687 (1991) on the termination of prohibitions referred to in that
resolutrm ;
39 . _Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and expresses its intention
to censider action in accordance With paragraph 33 above no later than 12 months
from the date of the adoption of this resolution provided the conditions set out
in paragraph 33 above have been satisfied by Iraq

32 Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation

of paragraphs 15 to 30 of this resolution within 30 days of the adoption of this
resolution ;

33 . E xpresses its in tention, upon receipt of reports from the Executive Chairman
of UNMOVIC and from the Urrector General of the IAEA that Iraq has cooperated in
all respects with 11NFfOVIC and the IAEA in particular in fulfilling the work
programmes in all the aspects referred to in paragraph 7 above, for a period of
120 days after the date on which the Council is in receipt of reports from both
ONMOVIC and the IAEA that the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and
verification is fully operational, to suspend with the fundamental objective of
improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq and securing the implesientaLion of
the Council's resolutions, for a period of 120 days renewable by the Council, and
subject to the elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures
to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items, prohibitions against tie
import of commodities and products originating in Iraq, and prohibitions against
the sale, supply and delivery to Iraq of civilian commodities and products other
than those referred to in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) or those to which
the mechanism established by resolution 1051 (1996) applies ;

34 . Decides that in reporting to the Council for the purposes of paragraph 33

above, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC will include as a basis for has
assessment the progress made in completing the tasks referred to m paragraph 7
above ;

35 . Decides that if at any time the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC or the Director
General of the IAEA reports that Iraq is not cooperating in all respects with
UNMOVIC or the IAEA or if Iraq is in the process of acquiring any prohibited
items, the suspension of the prohibitions referred to in paragraph 33 above shall
terminate on the fifth working day following the report, unless the Council
decides to the contrary ;