KYLLO VS.

US
(ELECTRONIC AND OTHER SEARCHES)

Facts:

 Marijuana was allegedly grown in petitioner’s home in triplex. The agents decided to use a thermal imaging device to scan the triplex to
determine if the amount of heat emanating from it was consistent with the high-intensity lamps typically used for door marijuana growth.
 The scan took only a few minutes. The scan showed that Kyllo’s garage roof and a side wall were relatively hot compared to the rest of the
house and the neighboring found.
 After Kyllo was indicated a federal drug charge of manufacturing marijuana he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect relative amounts of heat emanating from a private home constitute an unconstitutional
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

Ruling:

 Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that "[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in
general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”
 The surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."
 The Fourth Amendment States that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated.”
RICCIO “RICKY” A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID

(ELECTRONIC AND OTHER SEARCHES)

Government employee’s constitutional protection to privacy as to the computers they used in the work place may vary on a case-to-case basis. In
cases that there is reduced privacy expectation, search incidental to work-related investigations must comply with the reasonableness and scope test.

Facts:

 Pollo is a government employee whose computer was searched pursuant to the anonymous letter complaint to the Office of Chairperson
David. The government employer used Pollo’s personal files stored in the computer as evidence of misconduct. Thereafter, Pollo was charged
administratively and dismissed from service. Pollo now assails the validity of the search and resulting evidence thereby being the fruit of the
poisonous tree.

Issue:

 Whether the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent was
reasonable.

Ruling:

 YES. In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employee’s legitimate expectations of
privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. To the Court’s view, therefore, a
probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in
correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible
and often irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest
 Public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for no investigatory, work-related
purposes, as well as forinvestigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
 Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a two-fold inquiry: first, one must consider whether the action was justified at its
inception, x x x; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place. Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct,
or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file x x x. The search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light
of the nature of the misconduct.
POSADAS VS. OMBUDSMAN

(WARRANTLESS ARREST)

Facts:

 Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between his fraternity and another
fraternity on December 8, 1994. Petitioner Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman, asked the Director of the NBI for assistance in
determining the persons responsible for the crime. With that, respondent Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his
men went to U.P. and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, they attempted to arrest Francis Carlo
Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the
two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.

 Petitioners Posadas, Lambino, and Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that
the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them. As a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on
that day. However, criminal charges were filed later against the two student suspects.

 Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo
Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829, which makes it unlawful for anyone
to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.

 On motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the case. But such was disapproved. The Office of the
Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan.
  Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.

Issue:
 Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a warrant.

Ruling: No,
 In view of Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed the crime. The exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, Sec. 5 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure which reads:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

 There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime
being committed. Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The question is whether
paragraph (b) applies because it is the contention of the respondents that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in
the course of their investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime. But the Court ruled in
negative.
 "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which
means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts.
 At the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon and his men
attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion
that they were doing anything illegal.
SILVERTHRONE LUMBER CO. UNITED STATES
(EXCLUSIONARY RULE-barred the admission of such tainted evidence and whatever other fruits they may bear or lead to, without prejudice to
still imposing just deserts upon the errant officers. A fruit of an illegal or unconstitutional act could not and should not be given any form of
legitimacy by its admission in evidence; a means of deterrence, the erring officers may also be subjected to criminal and civil liabilities for violating
the constitutional proscription against unreasonable search and seizures.)

Facts:
 An indictment upon a single specific charge was brought against Frederick W. Silverthrone and his father.
 Both were arrested at their homes early morning of February and were detained in custody a number of hours.
 While being detained the representatives of the Department of Justice and the U.S. marshal WITHOUT A SHADOW OF AUTHORITY went
to their company office, Silverthrone Lumber Co., Inc. and made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found there.
 The district court ordered return of the originals but impounded the photographs and copies. The subpoenas to produce the originals were
served. Although the district court found that all the papers were seized in violation of the owners' constitutional rights, it ordered the owners
to comply with the subpoenas.
 Silverthrone refused to comply on the ground that the order infringed the rights of the parties under the Fourth Amendment.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Govertment can use the knowledge it gained from reading illegally seized documents as evidence against the petitioners at
trial?
Ruling:
 No, the essence of the provision (The Fourth Amendment) in forbidding the acquisition of evidence in certain way is that not merely evidence
so acquired shall not be used before the court, but it shall not be used at all.
 If the knowledge from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong
cannot be used by it in the way proposed. (pp. 618-619)