Tiu, et al. v. Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No. 151932, 19 August 2009.

FACTS:

In a collection suit filed by PBCOM against petitioners Tiu, et al., the former demanded from the latter
the full payment of its secured loan obligation. PBCOM’s claim is supported by a Suretyship Agreement
signed by all members of the Board of Directors of Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), including
petitioners. This was controverted in petitioners’ Answer saying that the Surety Agreement was falsified
to insert the wordings “IN THEIR OWN CAPACITY” without their consent, attaching a certified copy of
the same document from the Records Management and Archives Office in Davao City. PBCOM then filed
a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with Motion for Leave of Court to Substitute Annex “A” of the
Complaint, wherein it attached the duplicate original copy retrieved from the file of the notary public.
PBCOM also admitted its mistake in making the insertion and explained that it was made without the
knowledge and consent of the notary public. PBCOM maintained that the insertion was not a
falsification, but was made only to speak the truth of the parties’ intentions. The trial court allowed the
substitution of the altered document. Petitioners move for reconsideration but was denied. The case
was elevated to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but only to affirm in toto
the trial court’s assailed order.

ISSUE: Is the Court of Appeals correct in affirming the trial court’s order allowing the substitution of the
“falsified” actionable document, notwithstanding it appears to have substantially altered the cause of
action?

HELD: YES.

[W]ith respect to PBCOM’s right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed thereto,
after petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows
amendment by leave of court.

This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus:

“Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such
manner that the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered” was stricken-off
and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that
under the new rules, “the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.”
This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action
or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice,
and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a “just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.”

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments
should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not
made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment
substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is
sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
Palileo v. Planter’s Development Bank, G.R. No. 196650, 08 October 2014.

FACTS:

In an action for specific performance/sum of money with damages and prayer for the issuance of writs
of preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff-
petitioner Palileo dated July 15, 2006 and received by Palileo on July 17, 2006. Defendant-respondent
PDB filed by private courier service – specifically LBC – an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for
New Trial, arguing therein that the trial court’s Decision was based on speculation and inadmissible and
selfserving pieces of evidence; that it was declared in default after its counsel failed to attend the pre-
trial conference on account of the distance involved and difficulty in booking a flight to General Santos
City. Petitioners’ copy of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was likewise sent
courier service through LBC, but in their address of record – Tupi, South Cotabato – there was no LBC
service at the time. On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial via registered mail; another copy thereof was simultaneously sent to
petitioners by registered mail as well. Meanwhile, petitioners moved for the execution of the Decision
pending appeal. In a petition for certiorari, the CA affirms the trial court decision but reversed itself
upon MR, relaxing the Rules in favor of PDB.

ISSUE: Was the CA correct in relaxing the Rules notwithstanding that PBD’s late filing and improper
service of its omnibus motion for reconsideration?

HELD: NO.

The proceedings in the instant case would have been greatly abbreviated if the court a quo and the CA
did not overlook the fact that PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed
one day too late. The bank received a copy of the trial court’s June 15, 2006 Decision on July 17, 2006;
thus, it had 15 days – or up to August 1, 2006 – within which to file a notice of appeal, motion for
reconsideration, or a motion for new trial, pursuant to the Rules of Court. Yet, it filed the omnibus
motion for reconsideration and new trial only on August 2, 2006.

Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be trivialized.
Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules. This is not to
mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address or area which was not covered by
LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed and re-sent the omnibus motion by
registered mail, which is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-
day period had expired.

Heirs of Miranda v. Pablo Miranda G.R. No. 179638, 08 July 2013.

FACTS:

Petitioners’ Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance was decided by the RTC against
their favor on August 30, 1999. Without any appeal, the Decision became final and executory. On
December 11, 2001, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution but was not implemented. On July 8, 2005,
respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion praying that the RTC issue a “Break-Open and Demolition Order” in
order to compel the petitioners to vacate his property. But since more than five years have elapsed from
the time the Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion in its Order dated
August 16, 2005. This prompted respondent to file with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment,
which was granted.

On July 13, 2006, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal via LBC, which was opposed by respondent on the
ground that the Decision dated August 30, 1999 has long become final and executory. Petitioners, in
turn, moved for the transmittal of the original records of the case to the CA, insisting that respondent’s
opposition is without merit. Finding the appeal barred by prescription, the RTC denied the Notice of
Appeal in its Order dated October 10, 2006. Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus
with the CA praying that their Notice of Appeal be given due course, but was denied on June 14, 2007
for being filed out of time. Petitioners assert that an action to revive judgment is appealable, and that
their appeal was perfected on time. They insist that the Notice of Appeal, which they filed on the 15th
day via LBC, was seasonably filed since the law does not require a specific mode of service for filing a
notice of appeal. Besides, even if their appeal was belatedly filed, it should still be given due course in
the interest of justice, considering that their counsel had to brave the storm and the floods caused by
typhoon “Florita” just to file their Notice of Appeal on time.

ISSUE:

Was the Notice of Appeal filed on the 15th day via private courier like LBC considered to be belatedly
filed?

HELD: YES.

It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed “within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from.Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may
be filed in court either personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of
receipt. In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt. In this case, however, the counsel
for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules.
Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via
LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that “the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-
forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;” instead, “the date of
actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.” Records show that the
Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day
beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of
time.

Neither can petitioners use typhoon “Florita” as an excuse for the belated filing of the Notice of Appeal
because work in government offices in Metro Manila was not suspended on July 13, 2006, the day
petitioners’ Notice of Appeal was mailed via LBC. And even if we, in the interest of justice, give due
course to the appeal despite its late filing, the result would still be the same. The appeal would still be
denied for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 30, 1999 is already final and executory