G.R. No.
78590 June 20, 1988
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC BRANCH 58,
MAKATI, METRO, MANILA; DEPUTY SHERIFFS JOSE B. FLORA and
HONORIO SANTOS and ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
FACTS:
On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Manolito de Guzman, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila.
On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession
over five (5) — vehicles registered under the name of Manolito de Guzman,
alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which are at
present in the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law, herein
petitioner Pedro de Guzman. The motion stated that as co-owner and heir,
the private respondent must have the possession of said vehicles in order to
preserve the assets of her late husband. On the same day, the lower court
issued an order setting for hearing the motion on May 27, 1987 directing the
deputy sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de Guzman at the expense of the
private respondent.
On May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to
Appoint Petitioner as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de
Guzman” which was granted by the lower court. Also in another order, the
lower court acted on the motion for assistance which authorized Deputy
Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B. Flora together with some military men
and/or policemen to assist private respondent in preserving the subject
estate.
Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce the later order. The
petitioner resisted when Deputy Sheriffs Jose B. Flora and Honorio Santos
tried to take the subject vehicles on the ground that they were his personal
properties.
The petitioner contends that such order is a patent nullity, the respondent
court not having acquired jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix
because the petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito de Guzman
was not yet set for hearing and published for three consecutive weeks, as
mandated by the Rules of Court. The petitioner also stresses that the
appointment of a special administratrix constitutes an abuse of discretion for
having been made without giving petitioner and other parties an opportunity
to oppose said appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and
issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the
preservation of the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the said deceased person even before the probate court causes
notice to be served upon all interested parties?
RULING: NO
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired
jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the
settlement of an intestate estate by the private respondent since the
petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the
deceased person, the possible heirs and creditors and the probable
value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Court to set time for hearing. — Notice thereof. — When a petition
for letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction,
such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall
cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of
the decedent, and to any other persons believed to have an interest
in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice
through publication of the petition after it receives the same. The purpose of
this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction
so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world. (Manalo v.
Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court Volume
3,1980 Edition) Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the
Rules of Court has been given to persons believed to have an interest in the
estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is
essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived
of his right to property without due process of law.
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes
court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and
subject to annulment. (See Eusebio v. Valmores, supra)
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court was caused to be given by the probate court before it
acted on the motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special
administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the
deceased person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance
to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.

The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the

preservation of the estate as the private respondent who happens to be the
widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as
mandated by the Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what
emergency would have ensued if the appointment of an administrator was
deferred at least until the most interested parties were given notice of the
proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular
administrator is apparent from the records.

If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an estate

justify a court's immediately taking some kind of temporary action even
without the required notice, no such emergency is shown in this case.
The need for the proper notice even for the appointment of a special
administrator is apparent from the circumstances of this case.

The respondent Judge himself explains that the order for the
preservation of the estate was limited to properties not claimed by third
parties. If certain properties are already in the possession of the
applicant for special administratrix and are not claimed by other
persons, we see no need to hurry up and take special action to
preserve those properties. As it is, the sheriffs took advantage of the
questioned order to seize by force, properties found in the residence of
the petitioner which he vehemently claims are owned by him and not by
the estate of the deceased person.

SPOUSES AJERO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
(Rule 76 - Allowance or Disallowance of Will)
FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982, was
submitted for probate in theRTC of Quezon City. In the will, the following
were named as devisees: petitioners Roberto and ThelmaAjero, private
respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar
Sand, Fe Sand,Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
Petitioners filed for allowance of decedent'sholographic will, alleging that at
the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not
actingunder duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect
capacitated to dispose of her estate bywill. Private respondent opposed the
petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor thesignature
therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were notduly signed by decedent; and, the will was
procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undueinfluence. The
petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the
disposition in the will of ahouse and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del
Norte. He claimed that said property could not beconveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The trial court admitted thedecedent's
holographic will to probate, finding that the question of identity of the will, its
due executionand the testamentary capacity of the testatrix to be resolved in
favor of the allowance of probate of thesubmitted will. On appeal, said
Decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals which found that,
"theholographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." Thus, this
appeal which is impressed withmerit.
ISSUE:
Whether the admission for probate of the holographic will in question is valid
since probate proceedingsare limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity
of the will sought to be probated.
HELD:
Yes, the admission of the said holographic will is valid. As a general rule,
courts in probate proceedingsare limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.
However, inexceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the
situation constrains them to do, and passupon certain provisions of the will.
In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in herholographic
will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H.
Sand (which ledoppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the
same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held byrespondent court, she cannot
validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father'sother
heirs.Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that a will shall be
disallowed in any of the followingcases:(a) If not executed and attested as
required by law;(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable to make a will, at the time of itsexecution;(c) If it was executed
under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;(d) If it was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary,or
of some other person for his benefit;(e) If the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that theinstrument should be
his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.These lists are exclusive; no
other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
Thus, in a petition to admit aholographic will to probate, the only issues to be
resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is,indeed, the decedent's
last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with
theformalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary
testamentary capacity at thetime the will was executed; and, (4) whether the
execution of the will and its signing were the voluntaryacts of the decedent
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity
is the requirement that theybe totally autographic or handwritten by the
testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalitieswill not result in
the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by
the testator.
DECISION:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CVNo. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of
thedisposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte.
The Decision of the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probatethe
holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the
above qualification asregards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Kalaw v. Relova because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing
132 SCRA 237 her full signature,

FACTS: The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such

insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which
On September 1, 1971,Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence
deceased sister, Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the
her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968. erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real
intention cannot be determined with certitude.
The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the
testatrix as her sole heir. She opposed probate alleging that
the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without
the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by
Article 814 of the Civil Code reading: Art. 814. In case of any insertion,
cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature.

ROSA’s position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be
given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.

Trial Court denied petition to probate the holographic will. Reconsideration

denied.

ISSUE:

W/N the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions
were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature
of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with Rosa as sole heir.

HELD:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made

by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature,
… the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects
the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with
another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of
full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that
the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing
remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will
as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of
mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect
Kalaw v. Relova because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing
132 SCRA 237 her full signature,

FACTS: The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such

insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which
On September 1, 1971,Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence
deceased sister, Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the
her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968. erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real
intention cannot be determined with certitude.
The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the
testatrix as her sole heir. She opposed probate alleging that
the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without
the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by
Article 814 of the Civil Code reading: Art. 814. In case of any insertion,
cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature.

ROSA’s position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be
given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.

Trial Court denied petition to probate the holographic will. Reconsideration

denied.

ISSUE:

W/N the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions
were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature
of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with Rosa as sole heir.

HELD:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made

by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature,
… the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects
the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with
another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of
full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that
the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing
remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the Will
as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of
mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect