Beyond Pacification. Competition State-Making in Rio's Favelas

REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.
° 2 - Julio-diciembre
231
rev.relac.int.estrateg.segur.12(2):231-265,2017
BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING

IN RIO’S FAVELAS*
Esteban Arratia Sandoval**
Abstract
During the 2016 World Economic Forum, the strategy of

pacification in Rio’s favelas was recognized as the most
innovative public security policy in the last decade.
From this scenario, and using Competition State-Ma-
king, this paper analyzes, under a qualitative approach,
the design and implementation of that initiative. Then,
we seek to assess its results after implementation, and
Referencia: Arratia, E. (2017). Beyond pacification. Competition state-
making en Rio‘s favelas. Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y
finally outline main lessons to extract from the Brazilian

case. The main conclusion of this survey is that the Bra-
Seguridad, 12(2), 231-265. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18359/ries.2221
zilian pacification strategy was based on three pillars:

operational decriminalization; adoption of comprehen-
sive approach; and coordination between three gover-
nment levels (federal, state, and municipal).
Evaluado: 10 de noviembre de 2016
Recibido: 3 de septiembre de 2016
Keywords: Brazil, competition state-making, organi-

Aceptado: 24 de enero de 2017
zed crime, pacification.

Artículo de Investigación
* Artículo de investigación financiado por Centro de Estudios Estratégicos

de la Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE)
**
Analista en Políticas y Asuntos Internacionales mención en
Seguridad y Defensa. Universidad de Santiago. Magíster en Estudios
Internacionales. Universidad de Santiago. Investigador Asociado
Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, Santiago de
Chile. Correo electrónico: jarratia@anepe.cl
232 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD
MÁS ALLÁ DE LA PACIFICACIÓN. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING

EN FAVELAS DE RÍO
Resumen
Durante el Foro Económico Mundial 2016, la estrategia de pacificación aplica-

da en las favelas de Río fue reconocida como una de las políticas de seguridad
pública más innovadoras en la última década. A partir de este escenario, y
utilizando el concepto Competition in State-Making (Construcción Competitiva
de Estado), el presente artículo analiza, bajo un enfoque cualitativo, el diseño
e implementación de la iniciativa. Luego, buscamos realizar un balance de los
resultados obtenidos tras su ejecución, y finalmente, examina las principales lec-
ciones que pueden extraerse del caso brasileño. La principal conclusión de esta
investigación es que la estrategia brasileña de pacificación se fundamentó en tres
pilares: descriminalización operacional; adopción de enfoque integral; y coor-
dinación entre los tres niveles gubernamentales (federal, estadual y municipal).
Palabras clave: Brasil, competition state-making, crimen organizado, pacifi-

cación.
ALÉM DA PACIFICAÇÃO. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING NA FAVELAS

DO RIO
Resumo
Durante Fórum Econômico Mundial 2016, a estratégia de pacificação nas favelas

do Rio de Janeiro foi reconhecida como uma das mais inovadoras políticas de
segurança pública na última década. A partir desse cenário e usando o concei-
to, Competition in State-Making (Construção Competitiva do Estado), este artigo
analisa, sob uma abordagem qualitativa, o desígnio e implementação da iniciati-
va. Em seguida, faz um balanço dos resultados obtidos após sua execução e final-
mente, examina as principais lições que podem ser extraídas do caso brasileiro.
O trabalho conclui que sua aplicação foi baseada em três pilares: descriminali-
zação operacional; adoção de foco integrante; e coordenação entre os três níveis
de governo (federal, estadual e municipal).
Palabras-chave: Brasil, competition state-making, crime organizado, pacifi-

cação.
BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS

REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre
233
Introduction they meddle into the State monopoly

of violence or, more precisely, in the
According to a report prepared by state monopoly of war and justice. So,
the Centre for Democratic Control of to protect the borders of their doma-
Armed Forces, Qualified Armed Non- ins and kill armed enemies that enter
State Actors: Current Trends & Future their territory, they charge vaccines,
Challenges, organized crime is largely exercise judgments, provide political
an economic phenomenon in the sen- support, and carry out social work.
se that criminal organizations provide
goods and services that were origina- The main deficit of many Latin Ameri-
lly provided by the State. This process can countries is the inability to restore
gives to the abovementioned orga- their presence in its respective territo-
nizations, in some cases, more social ries, not only from the security pers-
legitimacy than the State has in those pective but also in a comprehensive
territories (DCAF, 2012, p. 17). range of goods and services (see Table
1). That way, integral presence of the
However, it should be noted that, State has two levels: firstly, there are
unlike the insurgents or terrorists, cri- social actions that will serve to restore
minal groups are motivated primarily the confidence between the coercive
by economic incentives, not for poli- power of the State and the citizens,
tical or social objectives. In that sense, and, in a second level, there are ac-
Ioan Grillo (2016) uses the neologism tions concerning specific responsibili-
gangster warlords, which is considered ties of the State in mentioned places.
as more appropriate to define a set of The first have operational immediate
hybrid criminal leaders characterized value to occupy the zone, motivated
by concurrent presence, controlling by the forces on their role as peace-
certain territories, and threatening the maker and modifying the attitude of
fundamental nature of the state, not their inhabitants towards the police.
trying to dominate it completely but to The second was proposed to transform
seize some of its parts and weaken it, the factors that reproduce violence
operating in it instead. In certain areas, and crime (Buxton, 2015).
Table 1. Configuration of State presence in Latin America
Dimension Limitation on regulatory capacity Limitation on force monopoly

All territory vs. All territory vs.
Territorial
zones of the national territory zones of the national territory
All policy areas vs. All policy areas vs.
Sectorial
specific policy areas specific policy areas
Total population vs. Total population vs.
Social
population segments population segments
Temporary Sporadic vs. permanent Sporadic vs. permanent
Source: Elaborated by author from Maihold, 2015.
Esteban Arratia Sandoval

Thus, the more absent the State is from whose ultimate goal is to win the loyal-
its territory or the poorer the services ty of the population.
provided by it, the more susceptible
will be the communities to depend That way, a political response adapted
on criminal organizations that promo- to this phenomenon can’t be based
te illegal economies to become their only and exclusively in the vigilance
supporters. In contrast, “if these ser- and the application of the law in the
vices are provided to the population classic sense or the enforcement of
and their well-being is improved, this police – military operatives. Though
will discourage citizens to collaborate the repressive element is a crucial
in illegal activities for income and as component of the strategy, often it’s
a result support for criminal organi- possible that it could be complemen-
zations will be reduced, further hin- ted with other socioeconomic poli-
dering penetration” (Felbab-Brown, cies, so that the dependence of the
2010, p. 12). It shouldn’t be forgotten populations breaks in relation to the
that the development of criminal eco- criminal enclaves created by ANSA’s
nomies is directly linked to the lack (Felbab-Brown, 2016).
of alternative livelihoods in neglected
areas. Generally, authorities perceive Under this logic, when it comes to
these zones as sanctuaries for crimi- urban areas permeated by illicit eco-
nals and show no interest in impro- nomic and violent crime and where
ving the socio-economic situation for state presence is weak, governments
their inhabitants. need to follow two interrelated ob-
jectives: First, they must establish
Following the above, Alda Mejias better their own physical presence.
(2014) argues that in strong states In some cases, for example in Rio’s
which respond effectively to the needs favelas (slums), that statement (or
of their societies criminal groups can’t even insertion) of state authority may
replace the authority. But in areas of require the physical retake of terri-
social and political marginalization and tory controlled by violent non-state
poverty in many Latin American cou- entities. In others, to establish such
ntries, non-state actors often displace presence involves demonstrating that
the state, gaining the loyalty of large the prevalence of physical power, if
segments of society. For this reason, not actual monopoly of violence, lies
Vanda Felbab-Brown (2011) suggests in the state apparatus and its enforce-
that governments stop thinking about ment. Second, the government needs
crime only as an aberrant social activi- to regain the population‘s loyalty in
ty that must be eliminated, but rather those areas and away from criminal
require conceptualizing institutional organizations, so its presence should
response to violence as Competition not only be strong, but multifaceted
in State-Making between public bodies and positive (Patterson & Blain, 2014,
and Non-state Armed Actors (ANSA’s) pp. 61-62).

235
Therefore, an appropriate policy option ting of two interrelated objectives: to

to deal with the aforementioned pheno- achieve a better establishment of insti-
menon must provide means of access to tutional presence and to regain the lo-
public goods and services so that people yalty of population in areas controlled
transfer their loyalty to the state, stren- by ANSA’s, highlighting its potential
gthening the ties between the latter and deterrent against criminal organiza-
citizens, and hence the links among the tions and demonstrating to society that
population and ANSA’s weaken. State is stronger than them. In that
vein, it’s useful to comment what re-
In other words, the strategic parti- cently happened in Rio’s favelas where
cipation of these ANSA’s affects the a fierce war between drug trafficking
fundamental purpose of the State and organizations and the state, which has
has political implications because they lasted for a quarter century, is in the
act as competitive state-makings, un- process of profound transformation.
dermining its functionality and legiti- This is due to the implementation of a
macy. Thus, the more order, security, pacification policy by the Carioca’s go-
and t providing of economic goods to vernment rescuing the Felbab-Brown
win the hearts and minds of local po- thesis, designing this strategy as Com-
pulation, the greater the possibility of petition in State-Making between go-
becoming de facto proto-state rulers vernment and facções criminosas for
with a high degree of political capital the population’s loyalty.
(Felbab-Brown, 2011, p. 6).
However, socio-economic programs to Research design

reduce violence aren’t a substitute for
security. For this reason, prior to the re- This survey is based on a qualitative
construction of state, a militarized ap- analysis which is grounded in a non-
proach to security should be applied experimental design. In this particular
to rescue that territory, breaking the case, we use a longitudinal approach,
intimidating power of criminal organi- combining the use of three key instru-
zations, restoring the state’s authority, ments: discourse analysis, to compre-
and arranging it to the proper imple- hend the substantial logic behind the
mentation of government programs pacification strategy; trends descrip-
because, “it can’t enter an area domi- tion, to understand the main results of
nated by [gangs] with assistance plans its implementation and; ex-ante – ex-
of the Madre Teresa type, nor is it likely post contrast, to assess the impact of
to encourage citizen participation in the UPP in the implementation of the
places where drug trafficking has terro- above-mentioned strategy. In second
rized society” (Villalobos, 2015). place, this investigation is based on a
synchronic-diachronic study and, at
In short, the success of Competition the same time, is an exceptional case
in State-Making depends on the mee- (Gerring, 2007). In this sense, the fight

against criminal organizations in Rio From this perspective, Robert Muggah

was executed by means of the im- (2016) views Rio as a fragile city be-
plementation of a security policy that cause municipal authorities and their
emphasized the military-police coo- institutions are unable or unwilling to
peration as a substantial component provide basic services for its residents.
of pacification including, at the same That is, the cities become brittle when
time, a relevant and consistent socioe- the legitimacy, authority, and capacity
conomic support to the civilians living of its institutions properly violate the
in critical zones. basic functions such as guaranteeing
the safety of citizens, property, infras-
tructure, access to water, electrici-
War in Favelas ty, and the preserving of basic rules,
causing a break in the social contract.
Closely related to the issues raised However, it’s clear that fragile cities not
in the previous section, it should be necessarily lack of State presence, nor
noted that the absence of State in fa- are ungoverned areas where therefore
velas generated power vacuums that citizens rely on their own resources
criminals covered opportunistically or other actors to meet their needs,
in order to control and develop their creating a hybrid government system,
operations when drug trafficking on order, and security. So, Rio was trans-
a large scale took off in the South formed into a Cidade Partida (split city)
American country, endangering the between asfalto (formal city) and fave-
residents of these communities and, las (informal city).
incidentally, questioning two state
functions under a Weberian basic ma- The political transition in the country
trix: territory control and maintain the that allowed it to return to democracy
monopoly of violence within its bor- in 1985 coincided with an explosive
ders. Following this logic, Rio’s Secre- increase in crime rates. This can be at-
tary of Public Security, José Mariano tributed largely to the proximity of Bra-
Beltrame argue: “favelas were islands zil with cocaine-producing countries
where the state simply decided to such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru
leave. Its residents were forgotten and (drug trafficking at that time experien-
ignored, were cooked in a toxic juice ced a boom) creating favorable condi-
of extreme poverty, domestic violence tions for distribution and transfer. Thus,
and, since the late 80’s, the omnipo- facções criminosas began to capitalize
tence of drug traffickers, who specia- this opportunity and took control of
lized in abusing entire communities” many communities1 that were discon-
(Glenny, 2012). nected, without access to city services
1
According to research conducted by Institute of Social and Political Studies (IESP) and State University of Rio
de Janeiro (UERJ), 370 favelas (37% of total) remain under the control of drug traffickers. See: Goulart, 2013.

237
and basic infrastructure such as elec- gangs Comando Vermelho and Amigos
tricity, sewage, and garbage collection. dos Amigos (Phillips, 2009). Regarding
Added to this, these have been tradi- their war borders and the effect that
tionally considered illegal settlements, episode generated on the local po-
so they remain socially and politically pulation, Beltrame said that “in some
remote from the decision-making are; Rio’s favelas, urban warfare is develo-
such conditions of favelas transformed ped for territorial, economic, and so-
them into ideal centers of operation cial control” (IISS, 2015, p.2). Often
for facções criminosas. when a band leader dies or is captured
by the police, rivals try to expand their
In order to consolidate their power territory and invade the Boca do Fumo
in these areas, criminal organizations (sale point) in communities dominated
replaced the state providing security, by the criminal group. This fierce rival-
economic support, and basic services ry has led to a deeply rooted animosity
to their people. Assuming the role of between drug trafficking organizations
Donos do Morro (owners of the hill), and the birth of schisms competing
they established not only a territorial to maximize the benefits of drug tra-
control, but also a social one, maintai- fficking in 763 Rio’s favelas, home to
ning this parallel authority or criminal about 1/4 of the Carioca’s population
governance based on extrajudicial vio- (Klaubert & Kruger,2014).
lence used by each criminal organi-
zation to punish those who break the There are four facções criminosas con-
rules or resolve conflicts within their trolling favelas. The oldest of them is Co-
domains (Grillo, 2014; Sampó & Tron- mando Vermelho (CV), which emerged
coso, 2015). In other words, subjecting in the late ‘70s with the aim of mono-
residents of communities to control polizing the Carioca’s drug trafficking.
and forcing them to avoid crossing Then, in the mid-80’s Terceiro Coman-
linhas vermelhas (red lines), drawn to do (TC) was born, violently disputing te-
prevent interference from other crimi- rritories with CV, thus initiating an arms
nal gangs in its territory. In fact, once race between the two commands for
it establishes territorial claims and in possession of more efficient and lethal
need of protection, one can only ac- weapons to make them able to ensure
cess the settlements by force or by ob- control of Bocas do Fumo and its expan-
taining the permission of the respective sion into other favelas (Sampaio, 2014).
criminal organization. In the mid-90’s, a dissidence emerged
that came into conflict with both cri-
In October 2009, a helicopter with minal gangs: Amigos dos Amigos (ADA)
four soldiers flying over Morro dos and Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP). The
Macacos community was shot down fierce struggle for territory between
by drug traffickers after police laun- the various criminal organizations, and
ched an operation in the area to con- between them and the police, led to
trol heavy fighting between criminal unprecedented violence levels that

resulted in a dramatic increase in the politically legitimated. Under this lo-

number of fatalities in Marvelous City. gic, International Amnesty has raised
Indeed, during the 90’s, the homici- awareness on the risk of the Carioca’s
de rate reached a peak of 85/100,000 authorities participating, either by
people (UCDP, 2016). However, it’s complicity or omission, in the establis-
clear that confrontation involved three hment of a non-government in areas
other actors: controlled by these groups noting that
“so far, the government of Rio de Ja-
First, there are the militias, defined by neiro has been far from fulfilling its
sociologist Ignacio Cano (2012a, p. 15) responsibility to combat these vigilante
as formed by former or active police groups, and this has reinforced their
officers and characterized by the fo- sense of legitimacy” (Nuñez, 2010).
llowing features of paramilitary groups:
Militias wield significantly extensive
• Rivaling facções criminosas in the clandestine support of authorities sin-
territorial domain of communities; ce their operations are based mainly
• Exert coercion among the popu- on political favors, maintaining direct
lation living in the favelas through links with representatives of the legis-
violence and extortion; lative and judiciary powers. Even they
• Main motivation is financial gain; use their policies to influence state
• Legitimated themselves as positi- elections connections, coercing favelas
ve alternatives to drug trafficking residents to vote for certain candidates
through the provision of services proposed by the militias. So those ille-
such as order and sale of gas, priva- gal security forces whose power of ex-
te transport system, and installation tortion and land area increased rapidly
of underground cable TV or Inter- ended up having an increasing influen-
net connection; ce on the local government act. In that
• Their chain of command acts under vein, a report prepared by the Institu-
high officials of State. te of Social and Political Studies notes
that between 2005 and 2010 militias
These illegal armed groups are another tripled the areas under their control in
source of criminal violence, which da- Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, according to
tes back to the ‘90s. At that time, the data provided by the Research Center
militiamen expelled drug traffickers in on Violence, in 2013 the militias do-
some communities, selling protection minated 41.5% of Rio’s favelas, while
to residents and merchants in Rio’s fa- drug trafficking controlled only 56% of
velas located mostly in the west of the them (Efe, 2013).
city. Members of the police apparatus
were always present in these groups, Accordingly, it is possible to observe
but from the 90’s on they stopped me- that in the case of militias, there would
diating between political interests and be a transversality between powers, a
the favelas people, controlling them as synergy between formal and informal

239
institutions, becoming difficult to be but rather of criminal networks involv-

distinguished, for example between ing community leaders, politicians, and
the police and the militia. This is be- the police” (Arias, 2006, p.293).
cause the police is perceived as a lesser
evil militia compared to facções crimi- Proof of this is that facções criminosas
nosas and this allow them to continue and militias charged at municipal and
operating given that many of its mem- state candidates between US$35,000
bers were former colleagues. Similarly, and US$45,000 for campaigning on
militias avoid clashes with the security their territory, and up to US$132,000
forces, unlike drug organizations, ge- to ensure the support of community
nerating mutual acceptance and con- leaders in elections. Criminal groups
tributing to strengthen the impression also create blacklists of applicants and
that militia controlled favelas are safer conducted informal surveys, charging
than those dominated by drug traffic- applicants according to the size of the
kers. However, although the militias electorate. And while in the past crimi-
prevent drug traffickers to install in nal organizations of political campaigns
area under their domain, there are si- were profitable, according to O Globo,
tuations in which, for a long and esta- the standards set by these organizations
blished practice of patronage, some of are now more stringent, and the pheno-
them, in case they don’t get the expec- menon has spread to areas that in the
ted revenues, sell control of its territory past weren’t affected (Gurney,2014).
to facções criminosas and they end up
serving as protectors of criminal orga- Michael Misse suggests that dynamics
nizations (Koonings & Koenders,2012). as described previously obey to politi-
cal goods “produced in an asymmetric
On the other hand, government and exchange, often compulsive, beyond
the police, although sometimes consid- the interest that both parties have to
ered actors, are two forces that exert do so. Its price depends simultaneously
different types of control within favelas. on a political calculation and on a
During the 80’s and 90’s, as economic correlation of forces to acquire eco-
power of facções criminosas grew into nomic characteristics” (2015, pp. 79-
communities, networks between AN- 80). Likewise, they can be produced
SA’s and state authorities were created by the privatization of state powers by
as well as with the police; even some a public official as is the case of co-
politicians funneled resources from rruption, or simply the possession of
favelas to end up at the hands of drug information, strength, power, or an-
traffickers in exchange for votes. Links ything enough to force somebody into
that remain in force, although less visi- exchange in a relationship of violence,
ble, until today. In that sense, Desmond such as extortion.
Arias argues that “the persistence of
high levels of violence [in favelas] is not Finally, the police also plays a role as
the result of the inability of institutions, a gravitating coercive apparatus that

is physically present in communi- tivated by complaints from neighbors

ties and which attempts to meet the or ongoing investigations, emphasizing
government’s agenda. Historically, the the element of surprise (Cano, 2016;
security forces acted independently of Stewart, 2012). In other words, the
the government in favelas, establishing previous strategy was the military op-
connections with criminal groups to ob- eration, but weapons and drugs seizes
tain individual benefits, that iss, there were soon replaced and the operation
was no effort to combat facções crimi- had side effects: police deaths, bandits
nosas as long as they paid off. Indeed, and neighbors victims of this confron-
it’s estimated that up to 50% of the tation. That, in the end, only increased
profits of drug trafficking organizations violence: “gangs began recruiting more
were to police officers (Glenny, 2012). and more children soldiers, who initial-
Thus, practices such as arrego (weekly ly only warned criminals when police
payment from local traffickers to co- approached; and soon they had guns
rrupt police to do not hinder the deve- and community residents saw certain
lopment of their activities) became the romanticism in them, as protectors, but
rule, while the attacks, shootings, and they were cruel” (Turati, 2012). Besides
extrajudicial executions the exception. being extremely ineffective, this strategy
stigmatized and victimized the people
Even the police didn’t usually enter of the communities, the vast majority of
favelas, but merely patrolled their pe- which didn’t belong to organized crime
rimeter, leaving the population under groups, but they lived under the con-
the rule of ANSA’s. This model of po- stant oppression. Consequently, favelas
licing, which is basically a strategy of became not only the reason for the war,
containment, reinforced the isolation but also the scene of conflict.
of communities in relation to asfalto.
Consequently, corruption practiced by In 2000, already subjected to reverse
police officers who were involved in fa- the counterproductive outcomes ge-
velas through the relationship of extor- nerated by this erroneous approach,
tion and protection of drug trafficking, a new policy option emerged that was
contributed to the inhabitants of these the direct antecedent of the current
communities to have a negative per- anti-crime strategy: Police Grouping in
ception regarding the police presence. Special Areas (Grupamento of Policia-
mento em Areas Especiais, GPAE) crea-
ted under the mandate of Governor
UPPs... Challenging the Anthony Garotinho (1999-2002). As
conventional response the name itself suggests, it was a poli-
ce strategy for special areas, territories
Historically, the strategy adopted by that were, at first, conquered by tra-
Rio‘s government in favelas could be ffickers and then controlled by Special
described as War on crime consisting Forces physically located in the area.
on launching sporadic offensives mo- Unlike the approach described above,

241
GPAE was carried out following these inception, to control a spatial area.
guidelines: intolerance to the presen- Even he not even got to have a tenth
ce of firearms circulating within com- of the territorial jurisdiction of their
munities; intolerance to the presence successors: Pacifying Police Units (Uni-
of youth in criminal activities of any dades de Polícia Pacificadora, UPPs)
nature; and intolerance to the presen-
ce of the police, military, or civilians The origins of pacification policy back
in random acts of violence, abuse of when Rio de Janeiro was selected to
power, or criminal practices (World host 2014 FIFA World Cup in October
Bank, 2012). These pillars, retaken la- 2007, and as host of 2016 Olympics
ter by the current approach, represent Games in October 2009. In this con-
one of the major doctrinal adjustments text, the decision to bring peace to the
applied in the Carioca police action. favelas desire coincided with the city
administrators to enforce the promises
Although the program began to made to Féderation Internationale de
function successfully, drug trafficking Football Association and International
was strong enough to continue ope- Olympic Committee in generating bet-
rating, preventing violence in a terri- ter security for all people of the city, state
tory tacitly controlled by the police. and country. Both sporting mega-events
Unfortunately, this innovative project placed the Marvelous City on map of
failed because it was carried out as an globalized and competitive cities. From
initiative by a minority segment of the this perspective, celebration is an im-
Military Police of Rio Janeiro without portant showcase to support the Rio‘s
political and institutional support, competitiveness, showing their material
which resulted in a degradation pro- and symbolic in order to attract foreign
cess (Mendonça & Moulin, 2013). The investment flows resources.
lack of uniformity in the coordination
between civil and military police, and In addition to these events, two structu-
between the state government and ral and cumulative factors contributed
the municipality thwarted the efforts to promote the favelas pacification’s.
to strengthen this initiative in public On the one hand, political-party har-
security. Additionally, “its abrupt end mony existing between state and
due to political charges, after the Ca- federal government allowed open
rioca press denounced the governor a window of opportunity for Eduar-
was tacitly accepting the continuation do Paes (2009-15) and Sérgio Cabral
of illicit economies, though without (2007-14), Carioca’s mayor and gover-
violence and without effective control nor respectively, unify criteria regar-
of territory” (Misse, 2015, pp.83-84). ding public security and create the UPP
Discredited without greater political program. On the other hand, political
support, GPAE continue to exist as a climate of the time is: Eduardo Paes
kind of mini-battalions local, but gra- and Sergio Cabral they belonged to the
dually lost the ability, promised at its Brazilian Democratic Movement Party

(PMDB), and former presidents, Lula From this perspective, what differen-
Da Silva (2003-10) and Dilma Rous- tiates the new approach to War on
seff (2011-16), were members of the crime is not the mere presence of the
Workers Party, the closest allies of the State in favelas but a change of prio-
PMDB (Ashcroft, 2014). This political rities, an example of what Benjamin
alignment was very important to coor- Lessing (2010) defined as operational
dinate financial, logistical and human decriminalization: reorientation of re-
resources that would require the new pressive drug policy by operational
strategy against organized crime. agents of the state forces, from the
eradication of this illicit economy de-
Thus, after trial and error, the veloped within communities towards
Carioca’s authorities applied the les- minimizing violence, insecurity, and
sons learned and chose to turn in a other negative externalities associated
public security policy within the fa- with drug trafficking. This shift in prio-
velas launching a new program: Pa- rities was explained by the State Se-
cifying Police Units. However, one cretary of Public Security José Mariano
wonders, how do UPPs differ from Beltrame during an interview with The
other responses made earlier? Guardian as follows: “We can’t guaran-
tee that we will put an end to drug tra-
With the arrival in 2007 of former fficking, nor do we claim it [because]
governor Sérgio Cabral and Security we would have a failed project. What
Secretary Jose Mariano Beltrame (first we want is to break the paradigm of
police career in the post), the new ad- territory controlled by traffickers with
ministration dismissed the idea that war’s weapons” (Phillips, 2010).
violence in the favelas was due to a
problem of drug trafficking, criminal In strategic terms, the operational de-
gangs, and availability of assault wea- criminalization gives the State a wide
pons, and chose to understand it as a margin of maneuver to influence the
matter of territorial control. If violence behavior of drug traffickers: “Today is
stemmed power that allowed criminal clear that anyone who intends to use
gangs control over communities, the drugs, the chemical dependent, will
solution was to recover those spaces get drugs”, said Beltrame. “But the
and restore them to state authority. guy who might be there selling them
The UPP slogan ‘veio para ficar’ (came doesn’t have that power, that influen-
to stay) resembles notions of a ‘break ce” (Lisaardy, 2011a). Politically spea-
with history’ in Rio’s response to ur- king, the strategy of pacification is an
ban informality and violence (Werling, alternative route found for untying
2014). Therefore, the area is configu- traffic and violence associated with it
red as a strategic pillar for a pacifica- without having to face the dilemmas
tion policy, allowing the playback of implicit in the option to legalize or
sovereignty in terms of security and openly negotiate with criminals. The
service provision. State and specifically its security for-

243
ces simply defined clear and rational effort to change the history of police
manner priorities and acted consis- abuse in Rio. As the official website of
tently with them. Consequently, UPPs the project states:
represents a pragmatic choice to the
failed War on crime, that from a con- Pacifying Police Units is a new mo-
ceptual point of view, can be equated del of public security and police
with harm reduction: it isn’t intended that promotes rapprochement bet-
to eliminate the alleged root cause of ween population and the police, to-
the ills, crime or drugs, but to mitigate gether with strengthening of social
their adverse effects, such as violence policy in the communities. When
and criminal control over communities recovering the zones occupied for
(Turati, 2012). decades by drug traffickers and re-
cently by militias, territories led by
Under this logic, operational decrimi- the UPPs are peace communities
nalization is most clearly perceived in (UPP, 2016).
the virtual absence of clashes during
occupations as they happened befo- In other words, it replaces War on cri-
re the UPPs. After the occupation and me logics with a new approach based
installation of the UPPs, clashes and on the permanent police presence and
deadly incidents are no longer the rule an interactive community. And while
and became exceptional situations. UPPs exist within traditional police ro-
For example, according to Beltrame, les, this project grants great importan-
regarding the invasion of Rocinha, the ce to the reconstruction of community
Amigos dos Amigos stronghold: “The relations. All officers perform commu-
result was fantastic. In less than two nity service as part of their routine,
hours, Rocinha was fully occupied mainly teaching youth from music to
without a single shot, and the inhabi- karate and computer sciences; it tries
tants moved around the community in to transform the troubled relationship
tranquility” (Koonings, 2014, p.140). between police and the community
That statement sends the following (Morse, 2011).
message: pacification is a success be-
cause occupations are well planned In this direction, it’s necessary to point
and organized; with a minimum of out that one key of the pacification poli-
violence, are warmly welcomed by cy lies in the recruitment and training of
neighbors who positively perceive the agents that make up the UPPs. Former
State as returning to the favelas. Commander of the UPPs José Carvalho
summarizes: “We needed fresh minds,
Another aspect that distinguishes the not a Rambo. The old generation of po-
new approach is the adoption of the lice was used to kicking doors and ope-
principles of community policing in ning fire on the street” (Isacson, 2011).
order to maintain and integrate agents In an effort to get rid of this institutional
in favelas, representing an ambitious culture, only recently graduated from

the police academy were selected to meaning political capital on their favor,
participate as members. Once accep- whose sustainability is highly depen-
ted into the program, recruits undergo dent on their ability, by the state, to
three weeks of training that includes continue earning the minds and hearts
human rights, sociology, and meetings of the population.
with UPPs commanders to exchange
experiences, aiming to provide general From an organizational angle, it is wor-
guidance on the status of the specific th to note that Sérgio Cabral launched
favela in which each officer will ope- the first decree on this new project,
rate. After this brief period of prepara- Decree 41.650 o Bola da PM n°012, in
tion, UPPs officers are deployed. Thus, January 2009. This document provides
the emphasis is placed on community in its section 3 that each operation de-
policing rather than on the repressive pends on the UPPs and the doctrinally
activity focused on combat. Indeed, Pacification Police Coordination (CPP),
UPPs agents are much less visibly ar- whose commander reports directly to
med; they don’t carry heavy weapons the general commander of the Military
like those used by Special Police Ope- Police of Rio de Janeiro, and shall esta-
rations Battalion (known as BOPE). blish the necessary links with the State
Committee appointed by the governor.
From that perspective, Joaquin Villalo- In other words, the UPPs are operati-
bos explain: vely disconnected from the rest of the
territorial structure of the Military Poli-
To win the support of citizens, it is ce of Rio de Janeiro. Subsequently, Ca-
essential the good behavior of [the bral unveiled Decree 42.787 in January
security forces]. All errors, abuse 2011, nearly two years after the pre-
of power, and corruption become vious document. This decree establis-
operational difficulties, loss of infor- hes operational definition, objectives,
mation, and risks for themselves [the criteria, and implementation of the pa-
police]. Increasing the hostility of ci- cification process (Monroy, 2014).
tizens, who in most cases can have
forced relationships with offenders, Regarding the first aspect, the decree
is a serious error (Villalobos, 2015). defines the Pacifying Police Units as a
small police force that works exclusi-
Therefore, the behavior is not only an vely on a community located in an ur-
ethical or human rights issue; it is an ban area delimited by law. Each has its
important component of operational own office and can have one or more
efficiency. A better conduct of the for- bases. It also has a commander, body of
ce corresponds more possibly with the officers, sergeants, and soldiers, as well
building up of intelligence networks, as its own equipment, such as cars and
greater intelligence, and more effi- motorcycles. The UPP program works
ciency (Escoto, 2016). Ultimately, the on the principle of policing and has a
strategy aims to build peace in favelas strategy based on partnership between

245
the population and public security ins- undermine the rule of law” (Monroy,
titutions. UPPs act based on respect for 2014, p. 119). To better understand
the culture and characteristics of each the selection criteria by the UPPs, oc-
community, promoting dialogue and cupied favelas must use city bounda-
encouraging the emergence of com- ries created by Institute de Segurança
munity leaders. The program includes Publica (Public Security Institute, ISP).
agreements and partnerships between Hence, Rio’s state is divided into four
UPPs, government departments, the sections, each designated as Regiõ
private and the third sector. Integrada de Segurança Pública (In-
tegrated Public Security Region, RISP)
About the second point, it states that (table 2).
UPPs were designed with the following
objectives: It can be seen in Figure 1 that, sin-
ce its launch in Santa Marta favela
• Recover state control over commu- in December 2008, the pacification
nities under the influence of facções policy has notoriously favored RISP
criminosas. 1. Between 2008 and 2010, 11 UPPs
• Maintaining peace and security in were installed in RISP 1. From 2010
favelas to ensure socio-economic to 2012, 15 more were established
development of their inhabitants. in the first quadrant, and between
• Breaking War on crime logics in Rio 2012 and 2014 12 additional UPPs
de Janeiro (Ashcroft, 2014). were located in the same section.
In the same period, RISP 2 accu-
Similarly, the decree ratifies the profi- mulated only 3 UPPs, two of which
le of the target areas where the UPPs (Cidade de Deus and Batam) were
are installed as follows: “Poor com- executed shortly after Santa Marta.
munities with low institutional fra- Then, the third unit of UPP in RISP
mework, high degree of informality, 2 was implemented in Vila Kennedy
and ostensible and opportunistic ins- during May 2014, more than three
tallation of armed criminal groups that years later. The last UPP was at RISP
Table 2. RISP’s Location

RISP Location
Rio´s touristic South Zone as well as Downtown and North Zone. The famous Copacabana,
RISP 1
Crist Redeemer, Sugar Loaf, as well as both airports of the city are located in this area.
This area encompasses the rest of Rio´s municipality, with upper class (Barra) as well as lower
RISP 2
class (Bangú, Campo Grande) neighborhoods.
RISP 3 To the north of Rio lie several municipalities of lower income commuters.
This area includes Rio´s neighbour cities of Niterói, São Gonçalo, and several other
RISP 4
municipalities further away from the city.
Source: Elaborated by author from Klaubert & Kruger, 2014.

3, only one in this sector. Finally, it’s the 38 UPPs installed to date only 4
worth mentioning that RISP 4 hasn’t were implanted outside RISP 1 (see
received any UPP. Consequently, of Table 3).
Figure 1. Number of UPPS installed per RISP, 2008-14

Source: Elaborated by author from Klaubert & Kruger, 2014
Table 3. UPPs installed, 2008-14

Favela Implemention Date RISP
Santa Marta 12/19/2008 1
Cidade de Deus 02/16/2009 2
Batam 02/18/2009 2
Chapéu Mangueira e Babilônia 06/10/2009 1
Pavão-Pavãozinho e Cantagalo 12/23/2009 1
Ladeira dos Tabajaras e Cabritos 01/14/2010 1

Morro da Providência, Pedra Lisa e Moreira Pinto 04/26/2010 1
Morro do Borel, Casa Branca, Chácara do Céu, Indiana, Morro do
06/07/2010 1
Cruz, Catrambi
Formiga 07/01/2010 1
Morro do Andaraí, Nova Divinéia, João Paulo II, Juscelino Kubitschek,
07/28/2010 1
Jamelão, Morro Santo Agostinho e Arrelia
Salgueiro 09/17/2010 1
Turano 10/30/2010 1
Macacos 11/30/2010 1
Quieto, São João e Matriz 01/31/2011 1
Fallet, Fogueteiro, Coroa 02/25(2011 1
Prazeres, Escondidinho 02/25/2011 1
Morro São Carlos, Mineira, Zinco e Querosone 05/17/2011 1

247
Favela Implemention Date RISP

Mangueira 11/03/2011 1
Vidigal e Chácara do Céu 01/18/2012 1
Fazendinha 04/18/2012 1
Nova Brasilia 04/18/2012 1
Morro do Adeus/Morro da Baiana 05/11/2012 1
Alemão 05/30/2012 1
Chatuba 06/27/2012 1
Fé/Sereno 06/27/2012 1
Vila Cruzeiro 09/05/2012 1
Vila Proletária da Penha 09/05/2012 1
Rocinha 09/20/2012 1
Manguinhos 01/18/2013 1
Jacarezinho 01/18/2013 1
Barreira/Tuiti 05/22/2013 1
Caju 05/22/2013 1
Arará/Mandela 05/22/2013 1
Cerro-corá 07/25/2013 1
Lins 01/16/.2014 1
Camarista Meier 01/16/2014 1
Mangueirinha 24/02/2014 3
Vila Kenedy 05/23/2014 2
Source: Elaborated by author from UPP Official Website, 2016.
However, it’s natural to wonder why of formal employment and generates

most UPPs focus on RISP 1. As indi- 33% of the Carioca’s Gross Domes-
cated, RISP 1 mainly encompasses the tic Product. Addressing RISP 1, UPPs
Southern area of Rio de Janeiro, which ignore the state’s most violent areas.
includes most of the tourist attractions Some experts recognize this bias in se-
as Maracana Stadium, Crist Redeemer lection criteria stating that UPPs imple-
and famous beaches as Copacabana mentation doesn’t cover the areas of
and Ipanema (see Figure 1). In that greatest lethality, as Baixada Fluminen-
sense, Ignacio Cano (2012b) argues se or the West, controlled by militias.
that the vast majority of the UPPs are However, most favelas located in RISP
located in the Southern zone since, 1 are controlled by facções criminosas
although the region is inhabited by 7% who want to be closer to its main cus-
of the population, it accounts for 50% tomers: foreign tourists.

Figure 2. Map of Rio de Janeiro

Source: International Amnesty, 2016.
Finally, legal framework provides a holistic view of the pacification process in the
following steps (see Figure 3):
Figure 3. Stages of pacification process

Source: Elaborated by author from Cabral 2011, Muggah, 2013 and Werling, 2014.

249
Tactics. This phase is to regain territo- in order to pave the way for the arrival
rial control over the areas submitted by of public and private services, seeking
criminal groups. To achieve it, the Sta- the possibility that the community is
te reports that public and early BOPE reintegrated into the city, even though
invade a given favela to expel the nar- the program doesn’t intend to im-
cos. BOPE entry represents the re-con- plement these services itself. In other
quest of territory that has been under words, it is designed to set the stage for
the enemy’s power. Significantly, the a subsequent phase called “shock of
occupation is previously announced order”, in which business and proper-
in order to avoid confrontation and ty relationships are formalized (Fisher,
bands voluntarily leave the area or su- 2014). However, actual implementa-
rrender their weapons (Muggah & Sou- tion is left in the air, without providing
za, 2014; Nicoll, 2015). Even Carioca details on how the UPPs must enter or
government itself refers to this strategy start their activities in the community.
as Announced War, recognizing the Typically, this implementation inclu-
development of an armed conflict in des the construction and occupation
those territories, as well as an attempt of UPPs bases in strategic locations of
to approach them more cautiously. occupied communities. The presence
of the headquarters is crucial for the
Stabilization. In the second step of the success of the strategy as without an
BOPE invasion, the territory is stabili- established base in the favela, UPPs are
zed, neutralizing the last resistance delegitimizing themselves as competi-
cells of criminal gangs and they remain tive state construction. Even, the UPPs
in the favela as long as necessary, crea- are usually installed in public buildings
ting the conditions necessary to install that were abandoned or used by other
the contingent of the UPPs. Howe- government agencies. There are cases,
ver, this phase isn’t well defined, and however, as in Batam where the head-
there’s no prescriptive description of quarters that houses the UPPs worked
what should be or include. This spa- as a hideout for Comando Vermelho
ce, open to interpretation, has allowed (Estévez, 2013).
military intervention with National Se-
curity Force troops, particularly in the Evaluation and monitoring. The final
most populous and conflicting fave- phase of the process sets out to track
las: Complexo do Alemao (composed course changes, aiming to continuously
by 15 communities totaling 400,000 improve the program. Although this
inhabitants) or Complexo do Maré step may be more influential to the
(composed by16 communities where success and development of interven-
130,000 Cariocas live). tions, the decree doesn’t establish a
mechanism of control over the paci-
Implantation. The decree states that the fication process; and it doesn’t deter-
third step is when the UPPs moves per- mine formal appropriate indicators for
manently to the assigned community monitoring and evaluation for effective

management (Rodrigues, 2014). With- manent presence of State, including

out doubt, this ruling has damaged the its law enforcement as well as linking
generation of a comprehensive view the people to State via provision of
of the process, not only by local com- public goods, services and legal eco-
manders, but also by the policymakers. nomy –the essence of what popula-
Consequently, with the lack of an eva- tion centric COIN is about (Bertetto,
luation system, the project can’t adapt 2012; Felbab-Brown, 2013).
to the demands, thus generating a
long-term change. Since it’s known, COIN implies adopt-
ing multiple measures, whether mili-
From what was discussed above, we tary, economic, political, and social,
can infer that the pacification process to delimit and turn the insurgency in-
provides a solution to the crossroads effective (Garcia, 2010, p. 112). Due
of thinking the state from the strong- to the fact that the gravity center of
weak dichotomy, as a differential pre- the gangs in favelas, as well as in the
sence and situational playback devices case of insurgencies, is the local pop-
are revealed, in many cases illegal and ulation, it makes them vulnerable to
informal. Through these devices, the the application of counter-insurgen-
state strategically focus on some of its cy methodologies. Traditional COIN
facets: repressive-militarist or provider- principles have been critical in the
institutionalism (Monroy, 2014). strategy of Rio‘s Government, dem-
onstrating that its value and efficiency
Under this logic, it should be noted is preserved, even when used against
that the pacification process has tac- criminal groups.
tical fundamentals underlying Coun-
terinsurgency (COIN), an aspect that Additionally, similarity of this strategy
is clearly evident in how it faces the with the clear, hold, build approach as
challenge represented by facções cri- described in the now famous Counte-
minosas while ANSAs (Karim, 2014; rinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, is ob-
Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, vious (Daniel, 2015, p. 100). Indeed,
2014). The philosophy behind the Michael Burgoyne (2012) assessed
pacification was articulated in docu- how effective are Counterinsurgency
ments from the US Consulate in Rio, Field Manual 3-24 principles in their
which, exposed by WikiLeaks, showed efforts against facções criminosas.
that UPP “shares some characteristics The research results indicate that 10
with US counter-insurgency doctrine out of 12 guidelines contained in this
and strategy in Afghanistan or Iraq” document proved to be useful in Rio,
(Arsenault, 2012). Indeed, UPP is but need some doctrinal adjustments
very counterinsurgency-like approach based on the identification of the gra-
without it being called a COIN, but its vity center of these criminal groups
logic and basic scheme are there: per- (see Table 4).

251
Table 4. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 principles
in the pacification policy
Government legitimacy + Rule of law +

Unity of effort + Long-term commitment +
Primacy of political factors / Use of force +
Knowledge the environment + Small units +
Intelligence driven operations + Learning and adaptation +
Isolation from popular support + Support to host nation /
Source: Elaborated by author from Burgoyne, 2012.
Therefore, the main difference be- favoring the welfare and progress of
tween the traditional COIN strategy local population.
and the pacification process lies in
their starting and final conditions. Between 2008 and 2014, 38 UPPs
Thus, the causes of criminal violence have been installed in Rio, benefiting
in Rio are socio-economic and cul- 1,500,000 people in 264 communi-
tural, more than political-ideological ties, which amounts to a land area of
9,446,047 square meters (see Graphic
as for insurrection. And, instead of
2). Judging from the figures, the paci-
having as goal to strengthen the gov-
fication policy applied in Marvelous
ernment‘s legitimacy, as in a tradi-
City seems to have achieved its main
tional COIN, the expected result of objective: to regain state control over
the pacification process is to inte- favelas under the influence of facções
grate the communities to the asfalto, criminosas.
Figure 4. Level coverage of the pacification policy, 2008-14
Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.

On the other hand, it is necessary to pacification process has had a signi-

highlight that the pacification policy ficant impact in reducing homicides.
first evaluated its success by the be- Between 2007 and 2014, the murder
havior of crime rates in the interven- rate fell more than 65% in intervened
tion communities. This parameter favelas. In fact, the homicide rate in
used as its main objective, as descri- areas with UPPs was 7.4 deaths per
bed by official documents, to reduce 100,000 inhabitants in 2014, repre-
the levels of violence directly associa- senting a third of the verified rate in
ted with criminal groups operating in 2008 (21.5), when the first occupation
these areas. As shown in Figure 5, the took place.
Figure 5. Intentional homicide rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14
Similarly, Figure 6 show that the strategy, i.e., the UPPs has sheltered
greatest impact was a substantial de- 60 lives annually per 100,000 inha-
cline in the rate of police lethality bitants (Efe, 2015). So, those statistics
and accounted for only 3.7 resistan- show that “UPP are in many ways a
ce deaths (autos do resistência)2 per police pacification program before
100,000 inhabitants (20 cases) in pa- the approach prevailed [between se-
cified areas during 2014, equivalent curity forces]: authorization to kill in
to a reduction of 85% compared to favelas” (Vigna, 2015).
that recorded in 2008, 25.2 (136 vic-
tims). Based on these improvements, In the same way, Figure 7 shows that
it is estimated that about 5,000 ki- between 2007 and 2014 there was a
llings have been prevented since the sharp increase in the number of cri-
introduction of the new anti-crime mes reported in the pacified commu-
2
Autos do resistência refers to homicides resulting from police intervention in the exclusion of unlawfulness
and is invoked on the grounds of self-defense. Meanwhile, the responsible agents often argue that these
deaths occur as a result of armed clashes. See: HRW, 2016, p. 48.

253
nities. Table 5 shows a breakdown in to intentional and unintentional in-

this behavior in areas with UPPs bet- juries (40% of reports), threats (12%)
ween 2007 and 2013, revealing that and drug trafficking (5% of cases) (ISP,
the three largest increases correspond 2015, p. 5).
Figure 6. Resistance deaths rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14

Figure 7. Crime report rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14

Table 5. Crime reported before and after UPPs, 2007-13
Monthly rate (average) per 100,000

Average monthly cases for community
Crime in each community
Pre UPP Post UPP Pre UPP Post UPP
Disappearances 0.32 0.71 3.60 6.92
Intentional injury 3.34 11.66 41.33 127.36
Domestic violence 2.17 8.47 27.12 84.66
Threats 2.30 7.97 29.45 99.24
Rape 0.14 0.37 1.35 4.84
Robbery 5.87 2.70 61.23 20.58
Pick pocketing 3.48 5.38 46.46 64.99
Drug related crime 1.91 5.83 24.13 63.93
Note: Bold italic numbers indicate increased incidence during period studied.
Source: Muggah & Szabó, 2016.

In relation to the above, a report pre- creating the so-called cockroach effect3.
pared by the Laboratório de Análise da As expected, the installation of UPPs
Violência examined to what extent the generated a millionaire prejudice to
installation of UPPs affects crime rates criminal gangs who exploit drug traffic-
recorded in communities, concluding king. In fact, a report by the Intelligence
that while the pacification policy seems Department in 2009 revealed that only
to have succeeded in reducing armed in the communities of the South, the
violence, its impact on a wider series drug traffickers stopped receiving up to
of crime rates becomes more irregular, R$1.8 million monthly (Efe, 2014). The-
showing an upward trend. However, refore, as argue by Vanda Felbab-Brown
it’s difficult to know why some crimes (2011), instead of achieving a spreading
go up while others go down, and there ink-spot of security (with a zone of effec-
are two plausible hypotheses: tive public security steadily expanding),
operating clearance as tactical interven-
a) Increased reporting of crimes as a tions in the first phase of pacification
result of the increased confidence process can become a game in which
by intervened favelas residents violent crime and their negative exter-
when going to the authorities or lo- nalities simply move to other areas with
cal police without fear of reprisal. weak state presence.
b) The Pacification process has un-
dermined the authoritarian social According to Rio’s authorities, with the
control and power structures of occupation of some of the largest fave-
criminal groups, preventing them las, including Complexo do Alemao, in
from applying their codes of con- 2010, Rocinha, in 2012; Lins, in 2013,
duct, resulting in a real increase of and more recently Maré, in 2014, CV
unarmed crimes and those derived and ADA fled to Chapadão and Pedrei-
from domestic conflicts; this means ra, turning them into their new centers
that common crime is replacing of operations. Particularly, Chapadão
bigger criminal operations (Muggah has been christened New Alemão, re-
& Szabó, 2016, p. 13). ferring to the Alemao slum complex,
marked by an unprecedented vio-
Similarly, it is worth to mention that after lence, which was occupied in 2012
their expulsion as a product of the appli- (Thompson, 2012; Belton, 2016). The
cation of the pacification policy, facções CV now maintains a stronghold in Cha-
criminosas were forced to move their padão while the ADA has established a
illicit activities towards peripheral area, significant presence in Pedreira.
3
According to Bruce Bagley, the cockroach effect occurs when criminal organizations, to avoid detection
by authorities, after the light has been turned on move from one municipality to another, from one city
to another, from one country to another; or from one region to another in search of a better context to
establish and carry out their criminal activities. See: Garzón (2013, p. 12).

255
UPP Social… Securitization to the same services and opportunities

of development? as the rest of the city.
The process of occupation is carried It’s pertinent to mention that the UPP
on by the entry of UPP Social for the Social was launched in August 2010
purpose of coordinating the provision under the leadership of the munici-
of goods and services in pacified areas pality of Rio de Janeiro through Insti-
and integrating it to the asfalto. This tuto Pereira Passos (IPP) and with the
phase was designed by Rio’s autho- help of the United Nations Human
rities to coordinate social and urban Settlements Programme (UN-HABI-
development interventions, with the TAT), two years after the first occu-
explicit aim of ‘multiplying’ the im- pation. As pacification process, the
pact of the pacification process. And socioeconomic counterpart is deve-
represents an additional effort for pu- loped in three stages:
blic security that is only part of the
equation to reverse the exclusion in Starting with pre-implantation, this
favelas; it is also necessary to crea- phase, a group of local engineers
te necessary conditions for socio- goes around for a particular month
economic development. It was also after the recovery of the territory
influenced by similar projects imple- in the UPPs communities talking to
mented as part of the counter-insur- associations, leaders, and residents
gency operations in the Colombian to begin to identify the most urgent
cities of Bogotá and Medellin, and demands. This step is followed by
bears many similarities to the Natio- conducting a rapid participatory
nal Solidarity Program in Afghanistan mapping, which provides a socio-
(Foley, 2014). economic evaluation of each favela.
Based on this initial diagnosis, it holds
As indicated by Robert Muggah: “So- a UPP Social Forum in each of the
mehow the notion of a UPP and UPP neighborhoods to discuss the main
Social emerged by default rather than demands identified and possible so-
by design” (Ramsey, 2014); without lutions, assisting representatives of
this being a counterpart to the security all relevant municipal departments
strategy, the UPPs alone will not contri- (health, education, housing, etc.),
bute to the inclusion of communities, local leaders, the commander of the
and despite the previous work of the local UPP, and the private sector. The
UPPs in the recovery of territory, the results of these forums, including
social component couldn’t exist. The- the list of applications, participants,
refore, UPP Social program aims to and achieved agreements are made
complete the pacification process, in- available to the municipal and state
tegrating the areas taken over by UPPs, government. Finally, a team of local
by promoting socio-economic develo- coordinators of the UPP Social (two
pment, and allowing residents’ access or three, depending on the size of

the community) is set permanently in Elimination of geological risk. In 22

the communities, making daily visits of 38 areas occupied, R$239 million
to mediate between the community, were invested in infrastructure. The
government, and other providers of areas that received interventions were
basic services. Andarai, Barreira do Vasco/Tuiuti, Ba-
tan, Borel, Cerro-Corá, Cidade de
Between 2010 and 2016, the Rio de Deus, Chapéu Mangueira/Babilônia,
Janeiro government has invested a Complexo da Penha, Complexo do
total of R$2.1 billion in this initiative, Alemao, Complexo do Lins, Escon-
obtaining remarkable results in the fol- didinho/Prazeres, Fallet/Fogueteiro/
lowing areas: Coroa, Formiga, Macacos, Mangueira,
Providência, Rocinha, Salgueiro, São
Education. 232 Development Areas Carlos, São João, Turano, and Vidigal/
opened, 49 are in areas occupied by Chacara do Ceu.
UPPs. They have generated 9,295 jobs
in pacified communities since 2010. Dwelling place. Since 2009 it has in-
Investment in the quality of education vested R$882 million, covering 53,000
has achieved that the Index Develop- households, urbanization programs as
ment of Basic Education in the ter- Morar Carioca in 18 pacified zones.
ritories with UPP undergone a great Only in Manguinhos, were 9,800
evolution. According to data from homes were built, and in Complexo
2009 and 2013, in the second seg- do Alemao other 15,500.
ment, growth in this evaluation notes
reached 24%. Public Services. For example, pub-
lic lighting company RioLuz has
Health. Coverage of Family Health earmarked R$20.5 million for the
Strategy in the city increased from installation or upgrade of 20,965 lu-
3% in 2010 to 47.9% in 2016 and minaires. In fact, in zones as Chapéu
is expected to reach 70% in 2017. Mangueira/Babilônia they had an in-
However, in pacified areas this index crease of 210% in the number of new
is now 73%. In 12 of the 38 favelas or upgraded points. Additionally, the
occupied, coverage reached 100% Municipal Urban Cleaning Company
(Borel, Chapéu Mangueira/Babilô- (Companhia Municipal de Limpeza
nia, Formiga, Jacarezinho, Macaques, Urbana, COMLURB) invested R$15.27
Manguinhos, Pavão-Pavãozinho/Can- million in the installation of 302 con-
tagalo, Providência, Rocinha, Santa tainers and the purchase of 282 vehi-
Marta, São João, Tabajaras/Kids); and cles for logistics in garbage collection
three already exceed 90% (Caju - in 20 communities intervened by UPPs
97%, Mangueira - 95% and São Car- (Rio+Social,2016).
los - 92%). The goal for the end of
2016 is that 80% of the territories have However, the UPP Social isn’t only a
achieved 90%. matter for public investment, as indi-

257
cated by Wikileaks; the US Consulate nificantly increased the cost of living

in Rio reported in 2009 that the Gross in favelas once pacified; all residents
Domestic Product of the city would must pay water bills, electricity, cable
approximately increase to US$21 bil- TV and Internet services previously
lion if the residents of pacified areas available for free or at minimal cost.
were incorporated into formal econo- It should be remembered that prior to
my (Halais, 2013). Under this logic, it the arrival of UPP Social, public ser-
has been suggested that the pacifica- vices were supplied illegally by facções
tion process intended to transform the criminosas thus representing a qualita-
inhabitants of favelas into consumers, tive leap in terms of availability, access,
being understood as the key that has and quality.
allowed the expansion of provision of
services to its residents (water, elec- Closely related to the above, Jailson da
tricity, cable TV and Internet) and an Sauza, director of the Observatory of
incipient regularization goal of integra- Favelas says: “When the UPPs arrived,
tion of these territories into the city. more taxes, tariffs, and prices rose, the
space has been re-evaluated, there is
Similarly, it’s seen an unprecedented real estate speculation and that makes
opportunity for the expansion of pri- life difficult for people because mar-
vate initiatives because, although resi- kets fall behind the police” (Selvanaya-
dents of the communities are poor, gam,2013). Even, a speculative boom
companies see favelas as places of in- has been noticed when the news that
creasing opportunity. There are several UPPs will be installed in any favela be-
advantages in arrival at the pacified ar- gin to circulate. The housing market
eas, particularly the media exposure of has been one of the biggest beneficia-
their brands, the ability to expand its ries of the pacification policy; the price
customer base and sales, and the possi- per square meter and rental housing
bility of creating programs of corporate tend to increase dramatically in inter-
social responsibility that can contrib- vened neighboring favelas and neigh-
ute to community development, while borhoods at a higher rate than the rest
strengthening their reputation as posi- of the city. For example, prices have
tive agents in the Carioca society. increased by 50% in the pacified com-
munities only 24 hours after the BOPE
On the other hand, the promotion of raid (Lissardy, 2011b).
socioeconomic development in favelas
has generated mixed reactions on their A report prepared by Getulio Vargas
residents for it does not only mean to Foundation in 2013 concluded that
guarantee that they enjoy their rights, after the arrival of UPPs, rents in pa-
but also the need to meet a series of cified favelas grew 6.8% compared to
rigged obligations to formalization of the rest of the city (Griffin, 2016). In
access to public services in pacified other words: “Rio is going through a
communities. This situation has sig- huge real estate valuation, but in fa-

velas is higher, giving rise to what we policies to provide equal opportuni-

have called the UPP effect” (Lissardy, ties and meet the basic needs of com-
2011b). However, it has been sugges- munities in order to restore the social
ted that the recovery of favelas as Roc- contract between State and favelas re-
inha where the houses are on average sidents, so that the nexus between the
smaller and are home to more people population and criminal enclaves crea-
than other communities, can bring ted by ANSAs break. In short, there are
negative consequences, such as the two key variables in complex scenarios
rampant growth of illegal settlements such as the ones analyzed in this work:
externalities. State’s effective authority, accompa-
nied by a provision of public goods
and services reduce the scale and da-
Conclusions mage capacity of the illicit economy.
The analysis of Rio’s experience allows Thus, Carioca’s authorities adopted

the deriving of the following lessons for new premises and set realistic goals:
the design of public security policies eradicate drug trafficking isn’t an attai-
and prevention of violence in Latin nable goal. It is feasible to minimize
America: the impacts of illicit drug markets and
control exercised by facções criminosas
Firstly, the pacification policy shows in communities. By replacing the pre-
how policymakers recognized that tense of stopping traffic to end armed
social, political, and economic exclu- criminal gangs control, policymakers
sion is an ideal context in which cri- moved the debate on public security,
me and violence are strengthened. taking it away from the War on crime
It’s necessary to adopt comprehensi- approach and focusing it on the terri-
ve approaches to ensure the success torialization of illicit economies. It’s
of any public security strategy. This is therefore necessary to assume that re-
particularly true in large urban areas ducing crime is only meaningful to the
that have been victim of anarchy, cri- extent that it improves public security.
me, and neglect by the State for deca-
des, as in the case of Rio’s favelas. For Similarly, it’s necessary to adapt the
this reason, policymakers have applied strategy to the nature of problem to be
Felbab-Brown’s postulates and re- solved: policymakers determined that
conceptualized their strategy against the violence was caused by the territo-
facções criminosas as Competition in rial control exercised by criminal gangs;
State-Making. therefore, the pacification policy focu-
sed on the recovery of these territories.
As previously noted, although repres- For example, the use of specific police
sion is a critical component in go- models, such as community policing
vernment response, often must be isn’t due to subjective assessments as
complemented by socio-economic it enables control of territory rescued

259
by improving the relationship between Finally, a successful implementation

the inhabitants of favelas and UPPs. of comprehensive strategies against
crime involves acquiring a lasting
In this regard, another difference of pa- commitment. For a mayor or gover-
cification policy when compared with nor, talk to reverse the exclusion can
previous policies should be highlight: generate substantial electoral political
the realization of the social agenda af- gains. However, its implementation
ter the police-military operations. The is extremely complex and requires
creation of UPP Social program to be long-term planning; ability to obtain
conducted after the phase of stabiliza- resources, persuade state institutions
tion and recovery of territory is a great of various levels involved and invol-
indicator of that change. Access to so- ve civil society organizations and the
cial programs and social inclusion ini- private sector, while maintaining its
tiatives that get multiplied in pacified support and commitment for a consi-
communities due to a deconstruction derable period.
of favelas as the site par excellence of
crime. Therefore, implementing an in-
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REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING

Esteban Arratia Sandoval**

During the 2016 World Economic Forum, the strategy of

finally outline main lessons to extract from the Brazilian

zilian pacification strategy was based on three pillars:

Keywords: Brazil, competition state-making, organi-

zed crime, pacification.

* Artículo de investigación financiado por Centro de Estudios Estratégicos

MÁS ALLÁ DE LA PACIFICACIÓN. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING

Durante el Foro Económico Mundial 2016, la estrategia de pacificación aplica-

Palabras clave: Brasil, competition state-making, crimen organizado, pacifi-

ALÉM DA PACIFICAÇÃO. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING NA FAVELAS

Durante Fórum Econômico Mundial 2016, a estratégia de pacificação nas favelas

Palabras-chave: Brasil, competition state-making, crime organizado, pacifi-

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS

Introduction they meddle into the State monopoly

Table 1. Configuration of State presence in Latin America

Dimension Limitation on regulatory capacity Limitation on force monopoly

Source: Elaborated by author from Maihold, 2015.

Esteban Arratia Sandoval

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS

Therefore, an appropriate policy option ting of two interrelated objectives: to

However, socio-economic programs to Research design

Esteban Arratia Sandoval

against criminal organizations in Rio From this perspective, Robert Muggah

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS

Esteban Arratia Sandoval

resulted in a dramatic increase in the politically legitimated. Under this lo-

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS

institutions, becoming difficult to be but rather of criminal networks involv-

Esteban Arratia Sandoval

is physically present in communi- tivated by complaints from neighbors

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS

Esteban Arratia Sandoval

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS

Esteban Arratia Sandoval

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS

Table 2. RISP’s Location

Source: Elaborated by author from Klaubert & Kruger, 2014.

Esteban Arratia Sandoval

Figure 1. Number of UPPS installed per RISP, 2008-14

Table 3. UPPs installed, 2008-14

Ladeira dos Tabajaras e Cabritos 01/14/2010 1

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS

Favela Implemention Date RISP

Source: Elaborated by author from UPP Official Website, 2016.

However, it’s natural to wonder why of formal employment and generates

Esteban Arratia Sandoval

Figure 2. Map of Rio de Janeiro

Figure 3. Stages of pacification process

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS

Esteban Arratia Sandoval

management (Rodrigues, 2014). With- manent presence of State, including

BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS

Government legitimacy + Rule of law +

Source: Elaborated by author from Burgoyne, 2012.

Figure 4. Level coverage of the pacification policy, 2008-14

Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.

Esteban Arratia Sandoval

On the other hand, it is necessary to pacification process has had a signi-

Figure 5. Intentional homicide rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14

Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.