SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
[31] FERNANDEZ vs DIMAGIBA
Notes:
Facts:
Ismaela Dimagiba, , submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of the purported
will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, the will instituted Dimagiba as the sole heir
of the estate of the deceased. The all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs
intestate of the decedent, opposed the probate of the will. On the grounds of forgery,
vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent to ask for provate
of the will and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion
of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the Dimagiba but which conveyances
were finally set aside by this Supreme Court
CFI admitted the will, finding it genuine and properly executed; they however
deferred the resolution on estoppels until the intrinsic validity of the will was
adjudicated upon. The petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied by the
CFI
CFI ruled that the will is unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale executed
after the will. CA affirmed CFI
p.s SA MADALING SABI AFTER GINAWA NI BENIDICTA YUNG WILL NYA, BINENTA
NYA PA RIN KAY DIMAGIBA YUNG MALAKINF PART NG ESTATE NYA, PERO YUNG
PAGBEBETA NYA KAY DIMAGIBA EH PINA VOID NG SC. ANG CONTENTION NILA
OPPOSITORS EH NA REVOKED NA YUNG WILL KASI MAY SUBSEQUENT NA
BENTAHAN. SINCE REVOKED NA DAW ANG WILL AT VOIN YUNG SALE EDI INESTATE
NA SO DAPAT SILA NA ANG TAGAPAGMANA.
Issue:
1. Whether CFI in allowing the probate of the will had become final for lack of
appeal;
2. Whether CFI, overruling the estoppel had become final
3. Whether the will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her
execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent.
Ruling
1. YES. The oppositors contend that the order probate of the will is considered
interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation. It
is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions
concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of
his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
enforceable or otherwise. The probate order is final and appealable; and it is
recognized by ROC that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings
from an order or judgment ... where such order or judgment: (a) allows or
disallows a will." There being no timely appeal on the probate the same
had become final and conclusive
2. YES. The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy,
being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are
entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of
disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian
of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment
prescribed for its violation. It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be
evaded on the pretext of estoppel.
3. NO. Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect: xxx
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or
any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise
shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the
alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason
of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless
the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of
repurchase; xxx.
The basis of the provision is a presumed change of intention on the part of the
testator. There is a doubt whether Benedicta intended to revoke her will by her
subsequent alienation of her property, as the CA ruled "no consideration
whatever was paid by Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering
it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the
testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in
her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom. Revocation
being an exception, Article 957 does not apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances
would not necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind
that the findings made in the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent
deeds of sale were also that it was the moral influence, originating from their
confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution of the deeds
of sale.
If the annulment was due to undue influence, then the transferor was not
expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it
cannot be concluded, either, that such conveyances established a decision on her
part to abandon the original legacy.
[32] PASCUAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Notes:
Facts
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 and was survived by (1) his
widow, Doa Adela Pascual; and other heirs from his siblings including Olivia S. Pascual
(herein petitioner).Doa Adela filed with the (CFI) of Pasig, Rizal, a petition for letters
of administration over the estate of her husband. The CFI appointed her special
Page 1 of 32

administratrix. To assist her with said proceedings, Doa Adela hired, Atty. Jesus I.
Santos, herein private respondent, as her counsel for a fee equivalent to fifteen (15)
percent of the gross estate of the decedent.
When Batas PambansaBlg. 129 took effect, the petition was
reassigned to (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 162, presided by Judge Manuel Padolina. The
heirs of the decedent moved for the approval of their Compromise Agreement,
stipulating that three fourths (3/4) of the estate would go to Doa Adela and one fourth
(1/4) to the other heirs. The intestate court approved said Agreement. On August 18,
1987, while the settlement was still pending, Doa Adela died, leaving a will which
named the petitioner as the sole universal heir. The latter filed at the RTC of Malabon,
Branch 72, a petition for the probate of said will which was later dismissed for forum
shopping.Six years after Doa Adela’s death, Judge Padolina rendered a Decision which
disposed as follows:[6]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let the
manner of partition of the estate of Don Andres
Pascual be as follows:
One fourth (1/4) of the properties, personal and
real, to the heirs of Don Andres Pascual in
accordance with the provisions of the
Compromise Agreement of October 16, 1985;
Three-fourths (3/4) of the properties personal
and real, to the estate of Doa Adela Soldevilla
Pascual, in accordance with the Compromise
Agreement of October 16, 1985.
This Court awards the attorneys fees of Atty.
Jesus Santos equivalent to 15% of the share of
the estate of Doa Adela S. Pascual.
After said Decision had become final and executory, the private respondent Atty.
Santos filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution insofar as the payment
of his attorneys fees was concerned. Despite opposition, the motion was granted,
Branch Clerk of Court issued a Writ of Execution; and Sheriff, a Notice of Garnishment
to the San Francisco Del Monte Rural Bank garnishing deposits and shares of stocks
belonging to the estate of Doa Adela sufficient to cover the amount of P2 million.
Petitioner filed with the (CA) a petition for annulment of the award of attorneys fees
in the January 19, 1994 Decision of the trial court. The appellate court dismissed the
petition, ruling that the intestate court had jurisdiction to make the questioned award
and that petitioner had been accorded due process.
Heirs of Doa Adela appealed to the SC and filed an Omnibus Motion, which in sum,
alleged that Judge Padolina conspired with petitioner and private respondent to place
the entire Pascual estate under their control. They claim that, without any hearing or
notice to them, the judge approved and awarded the attorneys
fees of private respondent, who was purportedly his classmate
and compadre.Consequently, petitioners-in-intervention pray for (1) the inhibition
and/or disqualification of Judge Padolina from hearing Sp. Proc. No. 7554.
Issues
Whether or not the awarding of attorneys fees is void from the beginning because it
was made after xxx [the] trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the attorneys client
by reason of her death.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
Ruling:
The Petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner insistently argues that RTC Decision, insofar
as it awarded attorneys fees, was void from the beginning because the intestate court
had lost jurisdiction over the person of the administratixDoa Adela (the attorneys
client) due to her death.
The argument is untenable. The basic flaw in the argument is the misapplication of
the rules on the extinction of a civil action in special proceedings. The death of Doa
Adela did not ipso facto extinguish the monetary claim of private respondent or
require him to refile his claim with the court hearing the settlement of her testate
estate. Had he filed the claim against Doa Adela personally, the rule would have
applied. However, he did so against the estate of Don Andres.Thus, where an
appointed administrator dies, the applicable rule is Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court, which requires the appointment of a new administrator.
The rule does not have the effect of divesting the intestate court of jurisdiction. Its
jurisdiction subsists because the proper party in this case is the estate of Don Andres,
which is distinct and separate from that of Doa Adela who merely served as the
formers administratrix. Doa Adela was merely a representative party, and the claim
was an item of the administrative expense of Don Andres estate. It is well-settled
that a monetary claim against the person administering an estate, in relation to his
or her acts of administration, in its ordinary course, can be filed at the court where a
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is pending.
The legal and factual bases of the award were stated in the body of the January 19,
1994 RTC Decision. The trial court revealed the importance of the services of private
respondent, who represented the estate, argued for the intestate courts approval of
the Compromise Agreement, and rendered legal advice on the final distribution of the
properties of the estate.The reasonableness of the stipulated attorneys fees finds
support in Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit v. Court of Appeals,[37] which upheld the
payment of twenty percent of all recoveries as attorneys fees in a foreclosure case.
Cornejo and his co-movants claim that their inheritance is being dissipated; thus,
they seek permission to intervene in this case. Obviously, however, they filed the
motion beyond the prescribed Rule which allows intervention at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court.
Any misconduct or violation of judicial responsibility allegedly committed by Judge
Padolina is not a proper subject of intervention. The reason is simple: he is merely a
nominal party in an action for annulment of a final judgment. Respondent filing to
collect his attorneys fees does not affect the validity or finality of the January 19,
1994 Decision or the award of attorneys fees in the settlement of the estate of the
husband of Doa Adela. In fact, it was dismissed for violation of the rule against forum
shopping. It is very clear that the motion for intervention has absolutely no merit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition and the Omnibus Motion are hereby DENIED, and the
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.
Page 2 of 32

[33] IN RE JOHNSON
Notes:
FACTS:
Emil H. Johnson, native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the US, died in the
city of Manila, leaving a holographic will, being written in his own handwriting and
signed by him. However, the will had 2 witnesses only. Clearly, it was not executed
in conformity with the Code of Civil Procedure which requires 3 witnesses.
A petition was presented in the CFI Manila for the probate of the will on the ground
that Johnson is a citizen of the State of Illinois, US at the time of his death. That the
will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State. Hence, could
properly be probated. (A will, made within the Phils. by a citizen of another state,
which is executed in accordance with the law of that state, may be proved in the
Phils.)
After a hearing was set and due publication was made, the will was admitted to
probate. About 3 months after the will had been probated, Ebba Johnson (daughter
of Emil) moved to annul the decree and put the estate into intestate administration
arguing that:
Theorder admitting the will to probate was beyond the jurisdiction of
the CFI and void because made without notice to her. (At the time the
CFI made the order of publication, Ebba is in the US)That the testator
was not a resident of the State of Illinois and the will was not in conformity
with the laws of that State.
ISSUE (related to Probate Proceedings in Rem only):
Whether or not the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain
the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
RULING:
As held in In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the proceeding as to the probate of a
will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a
wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given
to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would
be an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a
party of his property without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem,
and the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice prescribed
by the statute was unreasonably short."
Therefore, in this case, the order admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate
cannot be declared null and void merely because Ebba was unavoidably prevented
from appearing at the original hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will in
question
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
[34] TIBURCIA MANAHAN vs. ENGRACIA MANAHAN
Notes:
FACTS:
Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings No. 4162, for the probate of the will
of the deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on
August 3, 1930. The petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was named the executrix
in said will. On the day of the hearing of the petition, no opposition thereto was filed
and, after the evidence was presented, the court entered the decree admitting the
will to probate as prayed for. The will was probated on September 22, 1930.
One year and seven months later, On May 11, 1932, the appellant, Engracia Manahan,
herein filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order
admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will declared null and
void ab initio. The appellee herein, naturally filed her opposition to the petition and,
after the corresponding hearing thereof, the trial court erred its over of denial on July
1, 1932.
Her claim narrows down to the following: (1) That she was an interested party in the
testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have been notified
of the probate of the will; (2) that the court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did
not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication; and (3)
that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external formalities
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the
execution thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the following petition can still be maintained by the appellant.
HELD:
No. The Court dismissed her appeal and held that all of the issues and contention
that she presented had no merit. Moreover, there is another reason which prevents
the appellant herein from successfully maintaining the present action and it is that
inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the
trial court's decree admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive
against her, in accordance with the provisions of section 306 of the said Code of
Civil Procedure which reads as follows:
SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or
relation of a particular person the judgment or order is conclusive upon
the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or
relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting
Page 3 of 32

of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the
death of the testator or intestate
As the SC have already said, this question can no more be raised in this case on
appeal. After due hearing, the court found that the will in question was valid and
effective and the order admitting it to probate, thus promulgated, should be accepted
and respected by all. The probate of the will in question now constitutes res judicata.
-----
SC on the issues presented by Engracia Manahan
The appellant's first contention is obviously unfounded and untenable. She was not
entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect
it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the
petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir,
being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on the ground
that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted
heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.
The second contention is puerile. The court really decreed the authentication and
probate of the will in question, which is the only pronouncement required of the trial
court by the law in order that the will may be considered valid and duly executed in
accordance with the law. In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no
essential difference between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The
words authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires
is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the will the essential
external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document,
as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.
The last contention of the appellant may be refuted merely by stating that, once a
will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity
thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with
respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds
authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
proceedings
[35] CYNTHIA C. ALABAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO H.
PROVIDO
Notes:
FACTS:
Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and
Testament of the late Soledad ProvidoElevencionado
a. ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent and the executor
of her will
b. RTC’s RULING: allowed the probate of the will and directed the issuance
of letters testamentary to respondent
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings
a. CLAIMS:
1)they are the intestate heirs of the decedent.
2)RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the
correctdocket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.
3)will could not have been probated because:
a)the signature of the decedent was forged;
b)the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses
failed tosign below the attestation clause;
c)the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will;
d)the will was executed by force and under duress and improper pressure;
e)the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her
signature; and
f)she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the
willproperties which no longer belonged to her.
b. RTC’s Ruling: denied motion
1)petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the
deficiencyin the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal
of the petition.
2)RTC’sDecisionwas already final and executory even before petitioners’ filing of
themotion to reopen
3) Petitioners filed a petition to annul RTC’s decision
a.CLAIM: there was a compromise agreement between petitioners and
respondents and theylearnt the probate proceeding only in July 2001
b.CA’s RULING: petition dismissed
1)no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the
ordinary remedies of newtrial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment,
or other appropriate remedies through nofault of their own
ISSUE:
W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled for failure to mention the
petitioners as parties
HELD: No
1.Probate of a will is considered action in rem
a.Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will,
or any other personinterested in the estate may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the
will allowed.
Notice of the time and place for proving the will must bepublished for three
(3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of thetestator
b.Petitioners became parties due to the publication of the notice of hearing
Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in
rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the
Page 4 of 32

court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the
settlement of the estate of the decedent.
2.The filing of motion to reopen is similar to a motion for new trial.The ruling became
final and executor because the motion was filed out of time
a. Given that they knew of the decision 4 months after they could have filed a petition
for relief from judgment after the denial of their motion to reopen.
3.petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to comply with the
substantive requisites,
a. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the
case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered
b.
c. PURPOSE: to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there
will be a renewal of litigation.
[36] SANTOS V CASTILLO
Notes:
Facts:
On January 7, 1937, Emerita Santos, as legal guardian of the aforementioned natural
children of the deceased , filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna a petition
for the probate of a document as the last will and testament of Nicolas Azores. She
also prayed for the appointment of a special administrator.
On January 9, 1937, herein petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of Tomas
Dizon as special administrator, the appointment of a committee on claims and
appraisals, and for the determination of the monthly pension to which her children
were entitled, which motion was set for hearing on January 13, 1937.
On January 12, 1937, the petitioner filed the corresponding affidavit in support of her
motion for the appointment of a special administrator alleging inter alia that the
property of the deceased produced a monthly income were in the possession of the
legitimate children, and were in imminent danger of being lost or abstracted in view
of the manifest hostility of said legitimate children to the acknowledged children of
the herein petitioner.
At the hearing of the foregoing motion on January 13, 1937, the legitimate children
of the deceased entered their special appearance and objected to the jurisdiction of
the court on the ground that the petitioner failed to allege that she was the custodian
of the will of the deceased. They further contended that the petitioner had no
personality to petition for the probate of the will of the deceased because she was not
the custodian of said will; that the will presented by her probate was not the original
but only a carbon copy of the same; and that said will did not express the last will
and testament of the deceased because a codicil had been executed subsequently by
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
the testator, and hence said will cannot be probated without the codicil. Counsel
further manifested to the court their intention to file the original of the will and the
codicil for probate as soon as the novenaire for deceased shall have been terminated.
The court dismissed the petition of Emerita Santos for the probate of the will. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the case of the probate of the will
Ruling:
In order that the court may acquire jurisiction over the case for the probate of a will
and for the administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application
must allege, in addition to the residence of the deceased and other indispensable
facts or circumstances, that the applicant is the executor in the will or is the person
who had custody of the will to be probated. The original of said document must be
presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the nonrepresnetation of said original
and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof. Inasmuch as these requisites
had not been complied within the application filed by the peittioner, the respondent
judge did not exceeded his jurisdiciotn in dismissing the application in question.
[37] PEREZ V PEREZ, 195 PHIL 1132 (1959)
Notes:
FACTS:
This involves a case for summary settlement of a testate estate worth P6,000.00
according to the petitioner, or P10,000.00 according to the oppositors, wherein the
latter insist that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction to receive evidence for
the allowance of the alleged will because two heirs (Melanio Perez, Jr. and Milagros
Perez) had not been notifies in advance of the hearing for the allowance of such will.
Petitioner says the persons mentioned were not entitle to notice, since they were not
forced heirs – grandnephew and niece – and had not been mentioned as legatees or
devisees in the will of the deceased. And as to Milagros, petitioner asserts that notice
had been addressed to her last known residence in this country.
Issue: Whether the court has jurisdiction in allowing the will
Ruling: YES. The omission did not affect the jurisdiction of the court; it constituted a
mere procedural error that may or may not be the basis of reversal. In this case, the
SC ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested in the estate
through publication of the petition in the newspaper.
Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of procedural
convenience, not jurisdiction requisite and that even if the names of some legatees
or heirs had been omitted from the petition for allowance of the will and therefore
Page 5 of 32

were not adviced, the decree allowing the will does not ipso facto become void for
want of jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional question directly appealable to this Court refers to jurisdiction over
the subject matter, not mere jurisdiction over the person.
[38] DE ARANZ vs. GALING
Notes:
Facts:
Private respondent filed with the RTC of Pasiga petition for the probate and allowance
of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition
specified the names and addresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees.
The probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and that order was
published in the "Nueva Era" a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor
appeared and private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte and placed Arturo
Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness stand. During the
proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.
Two days after the appointment, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of
ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will. The
probate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the RTC, it ruled that personal notice of
probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional
requirement in the probate of a will.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in ruling that personal notice of probate proceedings to the known
legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will
Ruling: YES.
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.
— The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence,
and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20)
days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice
must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the
petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places
of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days
before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for
the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such
places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein
petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for
the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and
devisees of the testator. But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause
copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the
allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for
three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
[39] JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL. vs. ATILANO G. MERCADO
Notes:
Facts:
CFI allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, and approved the
account of the administrator (MERCADO) of the estate, declaring him the only heir of
the deceased under the will and closed the administration proceedings.
Appellants filed a motion to reopen the procedings and alleged that the court lacked
jurisdiction to act in the matter because there was a failure to comply with
requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in sec 630 of
the Code of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. — When a will is delivered to a court
having jurisdiction of the same, the court shall appoint a time and place when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance of the will, and shall cause public
notice thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or newspapers as
the court directs of general circulation in the province, three weeks successively,
previous to the time appointed, and no will shall be allowed until such notice has
been given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced to
writing and signed by the witnesses.
The appellants claim that the section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been
complied with although the trial judge, ordered the publication of the required notice
for "three weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the
will, the first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the
hearing took place on the 27th of that month, only 21 days after the date of the first
publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing.
Issue.
Whether there is a failure for the notice and hearing requirement
Ruling:
Page 6 of 32

NO. A US SC case provides that public notice requirement was complied with, if the
notice was published 3 times for each week, and he hearing on the will was only 15
days after the first publication.
Sec 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice should be
published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other
words the first publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before
the day appointed for the hearing.
The appellants also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the weekly
newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the notice of hearing was published, was a
newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.
[40] MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Notes:
Facts
Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at age 81. She left a holographic will, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
xxx xxxxxx
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon
City, Albay and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shagllbe inherited
upon my death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived
continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her
husband Pamping have been kind to me. ... I have found peace and
happiness with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive
and especially now when I am now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo
and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like me to
appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not
consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my
will.
xxx xxxxxx
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will.
Respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of
decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with CFI Pasig, Rizal
(Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the Intestate Case" for brevity). The Testate
and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before Branch XI, presided by
respondent JudgePronove.
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground
that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir,
was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.
On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case
and appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased
Clemencia Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said deceased while
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
oppositor Soledad Maninang is not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta
has not been shown to be unfit to perform the duties of the trust. "
Issue
Whether or not the court committed an error in dismissing the testae case due to the
preterition of Bernardo?
Ruling
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court of
Appeals. Respondent Court denied certiorari and ruled that the trial Judge's Order of
dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate Case.
We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed
the Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.
No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. 4
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms
of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if
the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two
diverse concepts.By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of
that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the
assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has
been preterited We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that
conclusion is not indubitable.
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso 12
... it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will
is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its
foundation, ...
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding
that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate
Case, certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its
jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of the Court of First
Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980 and December 19, 1980, are
nullified. Special Proceeding No. Q-23304 is hereby remanded to said Court of First
Instance-Branch XI. Rizal, therein to be reinstated and consolidated with Special
Proceeding No. 8569 for further proceedings.
Page 7 of 32

[41] ACAIN V. IAC
Notes:
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed a petition for the probate of the will of late Nemesio Acain
whereby the siblings of the testator were universally instituted. After the petition was
set for hearing, the latter’s legally adopted child (Virginia Fernandez) and his widow
(Rosa Vda. De Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: Constantino
has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings, he is merely a universal heir and
they have been preterited. Said motion was denied by the trial judge but was granted
by the IAC and ordered the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the will.
Thereafter, Constantino elevated the case to the Supreme Court arguing that:
The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon
the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate.
ISSUE (related to Scope of Inquiry of Probate Proceeding only):
Whether or not a probate court can only pass upon issues relating to the extrinsic
validity a will; If so, whether or not this rule is absolute
RULING:
The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity
and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon
to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. Unless, where
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed
upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should
meet the issue. (Example: as on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
oppositors)
Therefore, in this case, for private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the
will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be
intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal
heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been
preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of
time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate
outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved.
(Preterition Issue: Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code
may not apply as she belong to the direct line, although she is a compulsory heir. An
adopted child, however, by virtue of Child and Youth Welfare Code, has the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes her a legal
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
heir of the adopter. Thus, having totally omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator, pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance.)
[42] FAUSTO E. GAN vs. ILDEFONSO YAP
Notes:
FACTS:
Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a
petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased,
Felicidad Esguerra.Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap
asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during
her lifetime. After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon
R. San Jose, Judge refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for
reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due
execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes,
Socorro Olarte and RosarioGan Jimenez.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several reasons, the
most important of which were these: (a) if according to his evidence, the decedent
wanted to keep her will a secret, so that her husband would not know it, it is strange
she executed it in the presence of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did that witnesses
were unnecessary; (b) in the absence of a showing that Felina was a confidant of the
decedent it is hard to believe that the latter would have allowed the former to see
and read the will several times; (c) it is improbable that the decedent would have
permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro Olarte to read her will,
when she precisely wanted its contents to remain a secret during her lifetime; (d) it
is also improbable that her purpose being to conceal the will from her husband she
would carry it around, even to the hospital, in her purse which could for one reason
or another be opened by her husband; (e) if it is true that the husband demanded
the purse from Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will was there, it is hard to
believe that he returned it without destroying the will, the theory of the petitioner
being precisely that the will was executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.In
the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor's evidence
that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to probate the said holographic will of
Felicidad Esguerra.
HELD:
No, the TC was correct in refusing to probate the holographic will. The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the CA, which affirmed the TC ruling. The SC reached the
conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will
Page 8 of 32

may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will for the following reasons:
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with
the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their
whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called
by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or
trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent
scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they cannot receive anything on
account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only one
man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of
the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest
and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest,
could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness
and authenticity. The will having been lost — the forger may have purposely
destroyed it in an "accident" — the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and
the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the
holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only one of them need be
signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the most important
ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable
feature — feasibility of forgery — would be added to the several objections to this
kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known
Spanish Commentators and teachers of Civil Law.
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing
witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator
of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses
would testify as to their opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an
opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors,
because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
Moreover, the SC opined that even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and
probate a lost holographic will, they thought that the evidence submitted by herein
petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure
up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, the SC found themselves
sharing the trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the dubious circumstances described
in the appealed decision, the Court found it hard to believe that the deceased should
show her will precisely to relatives who had received nothing from it: Socorro Olarte
and Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her into amending her will to give them a
share, or threaten to reveal its execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads
to another point: if she wanted so much to conceal the will from her husband, why
did she not entrust it to her beneficiaries? Opportunity to do so was not lacking: for
instance, her husband's trip to Davao, a few days after the alleged execution of the
will.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
[43] RODELAS V. ARANZA
Notes:
Facts:
1. The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo
Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground that the
deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.
2. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original
will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.
Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy
RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by
the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.
[44] LEON V GHEZZIE MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Notes:
Facts:
Basil Gordon Butler, formerly a resident of the Philippines, died in Brooklyn, New York
City, in 1945, leaving a will which was duly probated in the Surrogate's Court of New
York County on August 3 of the same year, and of which James Ross, Sr., James
Madison Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were named executors. The estate having been
settled, the proceedings were closed on July 17, 1947.
The will contained this residuary clause:
After payment of these legacies and my just debts, including funeral expenses, I
devise, give and bequeath all of my remaining estate and personal effects of which I
may die possessed to Mercedes de Leon, of Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, to wit: the
personal effects to be delivered to her for her use and profit; the moneys, securities
and other valuable property, not personal effects, to be held in trust for her benefit
by my executors, at their absolute discretion, to be administered for her permanent
benefit in whatever way they may consider most advantageous in the circumstances
existing. Since the said Mercedes de Leon is not of sound judgment, and discretion in
the handling of money, it is not my wish that she be given any sums of money other
than for her current needs, except as my executors in their judgment deem
advantageous to her. In case the amount available for this bequest be sufficient to
Page 9 of 32

purchase an adequate annuity, the executors in their discretion may do so. And I
attest and direct that I do not wish to intend that the action of my executors upon
their discretion in this matter be questioned by anyone whatsoever.
For the purpose of carrying out that testamentary provision, James Madison Ross was
appointed trustee by the New York County Surrogate's Court on February 4, 1948.
Once appointed, and with the beneficiary signing the application with him, Ross
bought an annuity from the Manufacturer's life Insurance Co. at its head office in
Toronto, Canada, paying in advance $17,091.03 as the combined premiums. The
contract stipulates for a monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz during her
lifetime, with the proviso that in the event of her death, the residue, if any, of the
capital sum shall be paid in one sum to James Madison Ross or his successor as
trustee. And beginning May 27, 1948, Mercedes de Leon has been receiving the
stipulated monthly allowance through the Insurance Company's Manila Office.
With the object, so it would seem, of getting hold at once of the entire amount
invested in the annuity, Mercedes de Leon on September 4, 1948, presented Butler's
will for probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and secured the appointment
of Ada Loggey Ghezzi as administratrix with the will annexed early in 1949. After
having qualified, the administratrix filed the motion which Judge Amparo has denied;
and as the party most if not solely interested in that motion, Mercedes de Leon has
joined Ghezzi in this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the Court in the Philippines (Manila) has authority with respect to the assets
herein involved.
Ruling:
The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only to the
assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that
an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in
another state or country.This principle is specifically embodied in section 4 of Rule 78
of the Rules of Court:
Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may
operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another
state or country.
It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the
jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in
Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money.
The party whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the
company which holds the funds in its possession, the agency's intervention being
limited to delivering to the annuitant the checks made out and issued from the home
office. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred or
removed to the Manila Branch.
Hence, outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
[45] SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY, 95 PHIL 500 (1954)
Notes:
On May 14 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines,
died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Relublic of China, leaving real and personal
properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and
children by the first marriage had with the late Manuel T. Cruz namely (Apolonio,
Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr.) and a child
named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who
survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacanand after hearing, letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay.
After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.
Later on, the surviving widow filed a petition for the probate of a last will and
testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines by the late
Jose Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing
of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence
to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken and this Court held the
evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and and
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further
proceedings. In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued
for the taking of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, the probate
court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China
by the surviving widow and dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War
supervened. After liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and
documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and
signed by the deceased and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the
Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay, petitioner herein, filed
a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in
the Philippines or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China.
Issue: Whether the will probated and allowed in the district court of Amoy, China
may be allowed, filed and recorded here in the Philippines.
Ruling: NO.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be
proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also
be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931
should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.
The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to
the Consul General of the Republic of China, objected to by counsel for the appellee,
are inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does
not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on
procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would be
deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are
appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings
had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the
testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal
Page 10 of 32

district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof
that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of
procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter
of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as those
provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity
of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties
must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested
parties residing in the Philippines. The proceedings had in the municipal district court
of Amoy, China, may be likened to or come up to the standard of such proceedings
in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were
held at the back of such interested parties.
Furthermore, the order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport
to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof,
the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in
accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed
in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed
and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and,
therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a
competent court of this country.
[46] SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, vs.HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE
Notes:
Facts:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan became American
citizens. They lived in New York with their 3 daughters.
The spouses Cunanan each executed a will in New York, which provides each other
as the sole testamentary heirs of one another. In cases when one spouse predeceased
the other, their descendant are the substitute heirs. In addition it also contains a
proviso on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one
of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his
wife). Both spouses appointed Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor.
Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who
was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.
Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two
wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of
the County of Onondaga, New York. These two wills were admitted to probate and
letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
Subsequently, Salud Teodroro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn filed with the RTC a
petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of
the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan. Letters
of administration were issued in her favor.
Perez filed several motions praying for certain life insurance companies(Philippine Life
Insurance Company and Philippine American Life Insurance Company) be directed to
deliver the proceeds of the life insurance policy taken by the Cunanan spouses to her
and asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust
Company passbook savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit
certificates of the Cunanan spouses.
Atty. Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan,
known as the Cunanan heirs. He also manifested that before receiving petitioner’s
motion his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore,
“in the interest of simple fair play,” they should be notified of the proceedings.
Perez then filed a counter manifestation basically alleging that the Cunanan collaterals
had not legal or proprietary interests to protect and no right to intervene. Probate
court granted Perez’s motion.
Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the
appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates.
They alleged that that being the “brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving
heirs” of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been “deliberately excluded” in the petition
for the probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the
Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such
“misrepresentation” deprived them of their right to “due process in violation of Section
4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In her opposition, Perez asserted:
a. that she was the “sole and only heir” of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-
Cunanan to the exclusion of the “Cunanan collaterals;” hence they were
complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice;
b. that she could not have “concealed” the name and address of Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the
two wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court;
c. that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it
involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that
nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to
the executor who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary
ancillary proceedings in this country;
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had
entered into an agreement in the United States “to settle and divide equally the
estates,” and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the “court shall fix a time and place for
the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented
for allowance”. They further asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the
Rules of Court, the provision of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of
notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with.
A lot of motions and exchanges happened between the parties and along the line the
original Perez petitioner was substituted by her daughter because she was ailing.
Issue:
Page 11 of 32

Whether the Cunanan heirs should have been notified of the RTC proceeding filed by
Perez.
Ruling:
YES.
Petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan
and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she
noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall “cause
notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance” means
that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were
an “original will” or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication
and notice by mail or personally to the “known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator resident in the Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner,
are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner’s claim, are
entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule
76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the “court shall also cause copies of the notice of
the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator”.
[47] ANCHETA VS GUERSAY-DALAYGON
Notes:
Facts
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted
daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she
bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of Audrey’s conjugal share in real
estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance and shares
of stock in A/G Interiors. Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria
Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter, Richard died and left a will wherein he
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his shares in A/G, which he
left to his adopted daughter.
Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to
probate, filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project
of partition of Audrey’s estate. The motion and project of partition were granted.
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards to Richard’s will also filed a project
of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the Forbes property was
allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three
children. Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
Maryland, where Richard was a native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire
interest of the testator in the property subject to the legacy.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the
circumstances.
The Ruling
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land
of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely
appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set
aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled
that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake
or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according
to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic
fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and
April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
[48] NGO V. CHUNG KIAT HUA
Notes:
FACTS:
(1)Ngo The Hua, claiming to be surviving spouse of the deceased Chung Liu, filed a
petition to be appointed administratrix of the estate of aforementioned deceased. Her
petition was opposed
(2)Chung Kiat Hua, et. al., all claiming to be children of the deceased Chung Liu by
his first wife, Tan Hua.They claim that Ngo The Hua is morally and physically unfit to
execute the duties of the trust as administratrix, and that she and the deceased have
secured an absolute divorce in Taiwan.
(3)Chung Kiat Kang, claiming be a nephew of the deceased, filed his opposition to
the appointment of either Ngo The Hua or Chung Kiat Hu on the ground that to be
appointed they must first prove their respective relationship to the deceased Chung
Li and prayed that he be appointed administrator.
The lower court found that Ngo The Hua and the deceased were validly divorced by
the aforementioned Taipei District Court, and that Chung Kiat Hua, et al. are children
of the deceased. So it issued the order appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator
of the estate of Chung Liu.
(4)Chung Kiat Kang now contends that the lower court erred in passing upon the
validity of the divorce obtained by the petitioner and the deceased and upon the
Page 12 of 32

filiation of the oppositors-appellees, such being a prejudgment "since it is well-settled
that the declaration of heirs shall only take place after all debts, expenses
and taxes have been paid" in accordance with See. 1, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the relationship of the parties prior
to the satisfaction of the estate’s obligations
RULING:
It is to be noted that the court in making the appointment of the
administrator purport to determine the relationship of the parties and not to
make a declaration of heirs.
Section 5, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that letters of administration shall
be granted to the surviving spouse the next of kin, or to any principal creditor, in this
order.
In this case, oppositors-appellees denied petitioner Ngo The Hua's claim that she is
the surviving spouses of Chung Liu, and petitioner likewise denied the oppositors-
appellees' claim that they are children of the deceased. Since these applicants were
asking for the letter of administration on the theory that they are preferred according
to Section 5 Rule 79 because of their relationship to the deceased Chu Liu, the lower
court necessarily had to pass first on the truth of their respective claims of relationship
to be able to appoint an administrator in accordance with the aforementioned order
of preference.
Clearly, what the lower court actually decided is the relationships between the
deceased and the parties of claiming the right to be appointed his administrator, to
determine who among them is entitled to the administration, not who are his heirs
who are entitled to share in his estate. Hence, lower court did not err in declaring the
relationship of the parties without first satisfying the obligations of the estate.
[49] MEDINA et al vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Notes:
FACTS:
In this review by certiorari of the appellate court's resolution dismissing the petition
filed by petitioners challenging the lower court's orders appointing private respondent
Beda Gonzales as special administrator of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin
Medina, the Court excludes the said special administrator from interfering in the
possession and enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as "BitukangManok"
by petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen to whom the said property had been sold, and
full payment therefor received, by the estate through Gonzales' predecessor with the
approval of the lower court, which overruled Gonzales' opposition thereto as an
assignee of some heirs of the estate, and as one personally interested in the purchase
of the property for himself.
Respondent Gonzales appealed respondent court's order of approval and confirmation
of the sale of the "BitukangManok" property,as an interested party-assignee, on his
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
assertion that he had bought the rights of the other heirs of the estate — those of a
majority of the heirs, according to his answer at bar. The appeal is now pending in
the Court of Appeals.
Almost a year later, in an order dated February 11, 1971, acting on the motion dated
October 5, 1970 of respondent Gonzales for appointment as regular administrator of
the estate, respondent lower court appointed him "not as a regular administrator but
only as special administrator for the intestate estate of the deceased Agustin Medina"
and he qualified as such upon posting of the bond fixed in the amount of P5,000.00
and replaced "judicial administrator Pastor de Castro, Jr."
An urgent motion dated March 22, 1971 to revoke Gonzales' appointment as special
administrator on the ground that "by said order, Beda Gonzales is now assuming
the inconsistent positions of administering the estate especially the BitukangManok
property and at the same time appealing from the order approving the sale of that
property only for the purpose of enabling himself to buy and acquire that property to
the loss and prejudice of the estate contrary to law" was denied by respondent lower
court in its order dated July 21, 1971.
Having been denied by respondent lower court under its order of September 28, 1971,
petitioners instituted in the Court of Appeals an action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction under date of September 20, 1971, citing respondent Gonzales' conflicting
interests as special administrator and as "interested buyer ... persisting in objecting
to the sale, in his desire to be the buyer (of the BitukangManok property) despite
Court approval, thereby causing the estate unnecessary delay and expense to the
prejudice of the other heirs" and his interference with and collection of the harvests
of the said property duly sold to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, as well as pressing
for the appointment instead of petitioner Serafin Medina, as disinterested heir and
next of kin, as administrator of the estate. However, The CA found the "petition
insufficient in substance to merit due course" and ordered the dismissal thereof
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gonzales, the special administrator, is disqualified.
HELD:
Yes the special administrator is disqualified due to a clear conflict of interest. The SC
granted the petition. The sale to Rosalia of the BitukangManok property having been
approved and confirmed by respondent lower court over the personal opposition of
said respondent on March 6, 1970 which approval to the Court of Appeals, his
subsequent appointment as special administrator of the estate a year later under
respondent lower court's order of February 11, 1971 created a clear conflict of interest
that could cause grave damage and prejudice to the estate and subject it to
unnecessary suits.It is readily seen thereby that Gonzales has been placed in an
unduly favored position where he may use his position as special administrator to
favor his personal interests as one interested in the purchase of the property for
himself, although he denies obliquely in his brief such personal interest with the
statement that "there is no evidence or pleading of record that (he) is interested in
the acquisition for himself of the BitukangManok property ... and it is a matter of
record that having acquired the rights and interests of the majority of the heirs, he
had stepped into the shoes of such heirs, hence, his concern and interest to protect
the estate, as special administrator" — which is to say, to protect his claimed
majority interest in the estate, hence his insistence on opposing the sale.
Hence, the established doctrine that an administrator is deemed unsuitable and
should be removed where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by
Page 13 of 32

virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a quasi
trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate, and who should be
indifferent between the estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it for
due administration, and who should be removed when his interest conflicts with such
right and duly.As restated by the Court in Lim vs. Dias-Millares, "(I)n this jurisdiction,
one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has
adverse interest of some kind of hostility to those immediately interested in the
estate."
As in the cited jurisprudence, therefore, respondent lower court is directed to name
a suitable person or entity, who is competent and qualified and doesnot suffer from
any proscribed conflict of interest, (and preferably upon the common agreement of
the heirs, to avoid any further bickerings) as regular administrator charged with the
task of accomplishing and terminating the administration of the estate with the
utmost reasonable dispatch, with a view to an early distribution of the net estate
among the heirs and persons entitled thereto.
[50] OCTAVIO MALOLES II VS PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS
Notes:
FACTS:
In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He declared
that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is naming as sole devisee and legatee
the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named executrix is Pacita De Los
Reyes Phillips. The petition was filed in RTC Makati Branch 61. Judge Fernando
Gorospe of said court determined that Arturo is of sound mind and was not acting in
duress when he signed his last will and testament and so Branch 61 allowed the last
will and testament on February 16, 1996.
Ten days from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as executrix, filed a
motion for the issuance of letters of testamentary with Branch 61. She however
withdrew the motion but later on refilled it with RTC Makati Branch 65.
Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for intervention with Branch 61
claiming that as a next of kin (him being the full blooded nephew of Arturo) he should
be appointed as the administrator of the estate and that he is an heir.
Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring the motion filed by
Pacita to Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that since the probate proceeding
started in Branch 61, then it should be the same court which should hear Pacita’s
motion. Branch 61 however refused to consolidate and referred the case back to
Branch 65. Branch 65 subsequently consolidated the case per refusal of Branch 61.
Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion for intervention filed by Octavio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Octavio Maloles II has the right to intervene in the probate proceeding.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
HELD: No.
The Supreme Court first clarified that the probate of will filed in Branch 61 has already
terminated upon the allowance of the will. Hence when Pacita filed a motion with
Branch 65, the same is already a separate proceeding and not a continuance of the
now concluded probate in Branch 61. There is therefore no reason for Branch 65 to
refer back the case to Branch 61 as it initially did. Further even if the probate was
terminated, under Rule 73 of the Rules of Court concerning the venue of settlement
of estates, it is provided that when a case is filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the
case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other
branches.
Anent the issue of Octavio being an heir, such contention has no merit. He is not an
heir. Arturo died testate. Next of kins may only inherit if a person dies intestate. In
this case, Arturo left a valid will which expressly provided that ASF is the sole legatee
and devisee of his estate.
[51] REPUBLIC V MARCOS
Notes:
Facts:
On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City Branch 156, acting
as a probate court, in Special Proceeding No. 10279, issued an Order granting letters
testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad
Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand
E. Marcos.
On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC Order granted letters
testamentary to respondents. In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition to
the grant of letters testamentary to respondents, specifically on the following
grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense involving moral
turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a number of
cases and, hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least,
with questionable integrity.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are incompetent to serve as executors of the will of
Ferdinand Marcos.
Ruling:
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is
natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can
be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of the estate. The curtailment of this
right may be considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights
granted by will take effect from the time of death (Article 777, Civil Code of the
Philippines), the management of his estate by the administrator of his choice should
Page 14 of 32

be made as soon as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his assumption of
the trust can be interposed any longer. It has been held that when a will has been
admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the
person named as executor upon his application (23 C.J. 1023).
However, except for petitioner Republic's allegation of want of integrity on the part of
Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named
executors in the last will and testament, so as to render them "incompetent" to serve
as executors, the Court sees at this time, no evidence on record, oral or documentary,
to substantiate and support the said allegation.
A. "Convictions" against respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her
disqualification to serve as an executor was already reversed.
B. On the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II involve four
charges for violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four charges
for violation of Section 50 (non-payment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC). The court ruled that "failure to file an income tax
return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
[52] TORRES VS. JAVIER, 34 PHIL 382 (1916)
Notes:
FACTS:
It appears that two women are claiming to be the legal wife of Tan Po Pic, deceased,
Marta Torres and a Chinese woman named Yu Teng New. Marta Torres objected to
the appointment of any one except herself, while Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of
the Chinese woman, opposed the appointment of Marta Torres. The probate court
being unable to determine who, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased,
appointed a disinterested third person to act as administrator.
Issue: Whether the probate court is erred in appointing a disinterested third person
to act as an administrator of the estate of the deceased
Ruling: NO. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that letters of
administration should be granted, first, to the surviving husband or wife; second, to
other relatives in the order named; third, in case the surviving wife or next of kin or
person selected by them be unsuitable, the administration may be granted to some
other person, such as one of the principal creditors; and fourth, if there is no such
creditor competent and willing to serve, the administration may go to such person as
the court may appoint.
The first error assigned is that the court erred in allowing Tan Y. Soc to appear in the
proceeding. It appears that Tan Y. Soc was appointed administrator of the said Tan
Po Pic, deceased, the Court of First Instance of Manila under the misapprehension
that Tan Po Pic was a resident of the city of Manila at the time of his death. After it
had been ascertained that the deceased was a resident of the Province of Rizal, the
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
Court of First Instance of Manila transferred the case to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. In that court, the appointment by the Court of First Instance of Manila was
disregarded, the proceedings were begun for the appointment of an administrator by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Tan Y. Soc and Juan Cailles Tan Poo appeared in
those proceedings, apparently representing the interests of the alleged Chinese wife
of the deceased. Messrs. Crossfield & O'Brien, attorneys for the appellee in this case,
appeared for the alleged Chinese wife and acted in conjunction with Tan Y. Soc and
Juan Cailles Tan Poo in protecting her interests.
The second error assigned is that the court erred in taking into consideration the claim
that the deceased had a Chinese wife in China. It must be remembered that the
probate court did not find as a fact that there was a wife in China; nor does his
appointment of a third person determine the fact of the existence of another wife in
China. The court believed that it is for the best interest of all concerned to appoint as
administrator a disinterested third person, particularly in view of the fact that there
was likely to be litigation between Marta Torres and the Chinese wife as to which is
in fact his legal wife and entitled to an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po
Pic.
We do not find the errors assigned sufficient to warrant any action on the part of this
court.
[53] DE GUZMAN vs. LIMCOLIOC
Notes:
Facts:
Proceso de Guzman died without leaving a will. The deceased was first married to
Agatona Santos, with whom he had four children, named Nicolasa, Apolinario, Ana
and Tomasa. After Agatona's death, the deceased contracted a second marriage with
Angela Limcolioc, with whom he did not have any child.
The CFI of Rizal appointed Nicolasa de Guzman as judicial administratrix of the
properties of the deceased Proceso de Guzman. Respondent Angela, widow of the
deceased, asked that this appointment be set aside and that she be named
administratrix instead, on that ground of her preference as the widow. The court
denied this petition and sustained the appointment of Nicolasa. From these
resolutions, Angela appealed.
Issue:
WON that the trial court erred in not appointing respondent Angela asadministratrix
of the estate of the deceased Proceso de Guzman and in appointing Nicolasa de
Guzman as such administratrix without first setting the case for hearing
Ruling: NO.
The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment of the administrator of
the estate of a deceased person is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed
Page 15 of 32

as such administrator. This is the same consideration which the law takes into account
in establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband,
upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a
partner in the conjugal partnership. But this preference established by law is not
absolute, if there are other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator
other than surviving spouse. If the interest in the estate is what principally determines
the preference in the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, and if, under the circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another
who has more interest therein than the surviving spouse, the preference established
in the latter's favor becomes untenable.
The application filed by Nicolasa de Guzman for her appointment alleges that during
the marital life of the deceased with his first wife Agatona Santos, both, through their
mutual labor, acquired all the properties left by the deceased, not having acquired
any property during his second marriage with Angela Limcolioc. The court bore these
allegations in mind. It is true that the case was not heard for the purpose of
establishing these allegations, but when Angela asked for the reconsideration of the
appointment of Nicolasa, she did not deny these allegations and merely stated that
they do not justify her appointment as administratrix. For failure of Angela to deny
these allegations, thus taking them for granted, the court was justified in considering
them when it denied the reconsideration of its resolution and when it sustained the
appointment of Nicolasa.
If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were acquired during his
marriage with Agatona Santos, his children, among them Nicolasa, have more interest
therein than his now widow, Angela Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of
usufruct, to a portion equal to that corresponding to one of the children who has
received no betterment.
NOTE: May isa pang case na same title langpero related din d’yan, dun naman eh ino-
oppose ni Angela yungpag-aappointng court kayApolinario (brother niNicolasa) bilang
co-administrator of the estate. Same langrinnang ruling. 
[54] JOSE TORRES, PEDRO DE JESUS, vs. HERMENEGILDA SICAT VDA. DE
MORALES
Notes:
Facts:
Luis Morales, married to Hermenegilda Sicat, died, Jose Torres alleging to be a
creditor of the conjugal partnership commenced a special proceeding petitioning the
court for the issuance of letter of administration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus,
for the purpose of settling the estate of the deceased. The widow voiced her
opposition, and claimed preference to be appointed as administratrix. She said the
only close relatives and forced heirs were her six legitimate minor children, besides
herself.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
Torres presented evidence. The oppositor submitted none. Then the trial judge,
disregarding the preference established by law for the surviving widow, issued an
order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus as administrator.
Issue:
Whether the appointment should be upheld, ignoring the surviving widows
preferential right.
Ruling:
NO. Under section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court, when a person dies intestate,
administration should be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or nect of kin, or both,
...;
(b) if such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, . . . it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select.
The order of preference provided in this section is founded on the assumption that
the persons preferred are suitable. If they are not, the court may entirely disregard
the preference provided.
A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the surviving
spouse to the administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if the person
enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable the court may appoint another person.
Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of
some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate of such an extent
as to render the appointment inadvisable
The trial judge disregarded the statutory preference because, the widow has shown
hostility to the creditors by openly disputing their credits, she is therefore unsuitable,
for having adverse interests
It is a sound juridical principle that the administrator should not adopt attitudes nor
take steps inimical to the interests of the creditors. The administration of the intestate
is undertaken for the benefit of both the heirs and the creditors. Creditors means
those declared to be so in appropriate proceedings. Before their credits are fully
established they are not "creditors" within the purview of the above principle, it is
proper for the administrator to require proof of such debt.
At the hearing for the appointment of administrator, this widow practically did nothing
more than to inform the alleged creditors, "prove your credit before I honor it." That
is not necessarily dishonest nor contrary to real creditors. And then, not having
opposed all creditors, because she did not deny the estate's liability to the People's
Bank, she could not strictly be considered hostile to the creditors. Had she
acknowledged indebtedness to every one coming forward with a claim, regardless of
its merit, she would be useless, even harmful, both to the heirs and the actual
creditors.
Under the rules (Rule 87) creditors; claims may be filed, and considered,
only after the regular administrator has been appointed. Hence, in selecting the
administrator, the court could not yet normally accord priority treatment to the
interests of those whose credits were in dispute.
Page 16 of 32

[55] SUNTAY III vs. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
Notes:
Facts:
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
(respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing
the issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III
(Emilio III) and respondent.
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990.
Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five
grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel;
and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s
and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic
relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio
I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging
her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of no
effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil
that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic)
had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened
with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist
(sic) treatment. There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was
effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would
justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed
a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in
the same special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City
(JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was
subsequently reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of
respondent Isabel’s testimony in court that her grandparents’ visits caused her and
her siblings stress and anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico
adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s
estate, Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the surviving spouse
of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the
ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being
an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being
declared null and void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically
declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as
opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were
legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their
legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the
decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to
Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the
allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead,
Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate
of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died. Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November
2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of
decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio
III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate.
Issue
Who should be the administrator or has the better right over the estate of the late
Cristina Suntay?
Ruling
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III
and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate. The
general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid
down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Textually, the rule lists a sequence
to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This
order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of
kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence.8
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment
of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co-administrators
has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court which specifically states that letters of administration may be
issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we
can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that "x xx when an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or
administrator may administer the trust alone, x xx
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and
American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators. The
collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled
does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither
does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of
the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned
with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.Given
Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate
grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as
Page 17 of 32

co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left
entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and depends on the facts and the
attendant circumstances of the case.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference
mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be
made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on
the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their
paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as adverse
interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is
immediately interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III
working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the
decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s
estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage
and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s demonstrable
interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence
reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate.
Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of
the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate
and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof
While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed delay in
the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed
to complete, in the course of the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we do not find
any clarification on Isabel’s accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted
properties in the inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew existed and which
he claims to be knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator
rooted in his failure to "make and return x xx a true and complete inventory" which
became proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court
and by his inaction on two occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other
compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.The foregoing
circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and inaction become even more significant and
speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his interest
adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted
litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep
aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay,
improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from
making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the
parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who
will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing
admonition:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x xx. If there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond,
in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs.45
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our
Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely
issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No.
117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed
to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch.
[56] GUTIERREZ vs. VILLEGAS
Notes:
Facts:
Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only heirs her surviving spouse Jose D.
Villegas and two nieces — Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez.
Villegas was appointed administrator of the estate. In the petition, he named as
intestate heirs, besides himself, Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez.
Respondents presented in the probate court an unverified manifestation signed by
Adela Gutierrez, accompanied by a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan
at Salinan. The said kasulatan states that that all her rights, interests and
participation in the estate subject of this proceeding now belong to her sister, Rizalina
Santos Rivera, and that she will not take part in the proceedings and is not entitled
to the service of any pleadings, motion, order or decision filed or promulgated.
In a verified manifestation presented before the probate Court, Adela averred that
the deed of assignment of her rights, participation and interest in the estate of Irene
Santos and the first manifestation were obtained thru fraud practiced by the
administrator upon her and were vitiated by mistake or undue influence. She narrated
that Villegas force her to receive a money in favor of the deed of assignment because
she was told that the estate is worthless and the money be probably more than what
she would get in the estate. When she was made to sign the deed of assignment,
Adela did not know the true value of the estate, which she now estimates to be no
less than P1,000.000.00. She was placing the above facts within the knowledge of
the Court so that no action be taken giving value to the alleged deed of assignment
and in order that she (Adela) might be notified of each and all pleadings or orders
connected with the proceedings. The respondent denied the allegations
Page 18 of 32

Adela sought for the nullity of the deed of assignment and asked the court to furnish
her all copies of pleadings filed or to be filed in the intestate proceedings, it appearing
that the administrator presented pleadings in Court without serving her copies
thereof.
An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who alleged that the movant,
although originally a party to the probate proceeding, has voluntarily and expressly
desisted from being so, and that having assigned by sale, all her rights, interests and
participations in the estate, she has no longer any legal standing in the case.
At first the court granted the petition of Adela, however through several pleadings
and MR, the court ruled that the interest of Adela Santos Gutierrez to be considered
as heir is dependent upon the contingency that she would succeed in her case for
annulment of the Deed of Assignment in the CFI, her contingent interest is not
sufficient to make her an interested party in this proceeding.
Issue:
Whether Adela Santos Gutierrez is still entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed by
the administrator in the probate proceedings and orders therein issue by the lower
court?
Ruling: YES.
Adela Santos Gutierrez is an indispensable party to the proceedings in question. Her
interest in the estate is not inchoate, it was established at the time of death of Irene
Santos. While it is true that she executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that
she asked the same to be annulled, which action is now pending before the CFI.
Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings and
presenting the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, nevertheless fails to show
that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court. Every act intended to put
an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any
other transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). No serious argument can be offered to deny the
co-heirship of appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing (if We assume the
due execution of the Deed of Assignment), that the transaction is in the nature of
extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest
the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of
assignment and desistance.
All Adela wanted to convey was that she should participate or continue taking part in
the case for being an original party therein. It was her belief that in filing the
manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings (but which she later informed
the court to have been secured thru fraud), her standing might have been affected.
We see no prejudice to be suffered by the administrator and Rizalina, if they are
required to furnish copies of their pleadings to appellee. On the contrary, doing so,
will give appellee her day in court and provide protection to the administrator himself.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
[57] DURAN V DURAN
Notes:
FACTS:
Pio Duran died without testament on February 28, 1961 in Guinobatan Albay. Among
his alleged heirs are Josefina Duran, as surviving spouse; several brothers and
sisters; nephews and nieces.
Cipriano Duran, one of the surviving brothers, executed a public instrument assigning
and renouncing his hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of Josefina
Duran, for the consideration of P2,500.00. A year later, Cipriano Duran filed in the
Court of First Instance of Albay a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio
Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator. An ex
parte motion to be appointed special administrator was also filed by him.
Against said petition, Josefina Duran filed on August 9, 1963 an opposition, praying
for its dismissal upon the ground that the petitioner is not an "interested person" in
the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation the estate.Replying to
this, Cipriano alleged, on September 11, 1963, alleged in his opposition to the motion
to dismiss, that Josefina Duran was not the decedent's wife. Anent the deed of
assignment, he contended that the same was procured thru fraud, with gross
inadequacy of price and vitiated by lesion.
Still later, another brother of the decedent, Miguel Duran, filed on September 14,
1963, a petition to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina Duran moved to
strike out said petition as an improper attempt to intervene in the case. She also filed
a reply to Cipriano's opposition to her motion to dismiss. In turn, Miguel filed an
opposition to Josefina's motion to strike out.
Acting on said motions, the Court of First Instance issued an order dismissing the
petition of Cipriano for his lack of interest in the estate. Said lack of interest was
premised on the deed of transfer executed by Cipriano, and with the petition's
dismissal, Miguel's petition to be joined as co-petitioner was deemed without leg to
stand on.
The Issue
Whether or not Cipriano and Miguel Duran are considered to be an “interested party”
in the estate of Pio Duran?
The Ruling
The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and settlement of an
estate must be filed by an "interested person" (See. 2, Rule 79). Appellants contend
that the deed of assignment executed by Cipriano did not operate to render him a
person without interest in the estate.
Page 19 of 32

In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no settlement
proceedings was pending. The properties subject matter of the assignment were not
under the jurisdiction of a settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be
deemed a partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same does not need
court approval to be effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial partition is valid
as between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial
partition are not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors
and non-participating heirs only (Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196). Should it be
contended that said partition was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price,
the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that purpose. And in
the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the
deed of assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against
him, so that he is left without that "interest" in the estate required to petite for
settlement proceedings.
Anent appellant Miguel Duran, he sought in his petition below to "join petitioner
Cipriano Duran as co-petitioner in the latter's petition . . . and incorporates herein by
adoption all the allegations made in said petition." The same, therefore, amounted to
a petition to intervene in the settlement proceedings. As aptly ruled by the court a
quo, since there was really no settlement proceedings in the first place, the petition
to intervene must be denied.
Wherefore, the dismissal order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
[58] TAYAG V. TAYAG-GALLOR
Notes:
FACTS:
Felicidad Tayag-Gallor, one of the illegitimate child of the deceased, filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration over the estate ofIsmael Tayag. She
alleged that the decedent was married to Victoria Tayag who is in possession of
Ismael’s properties (2 real estates and a motor vehicle) These properties were sold
by Victoria preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. She claimed that
Victoria promised to give her and her brothers 100,000 each as their share in the
proceeds of the sale. However, the latter only gave half of the amount. Also, she
averred that Victoria caused the annotation of an affidavit executed by Ismael
declaring the properties to be the paraphernal properties of Victoria and intends to
dispose these properties to their prejudice.
On the other hand, Victoria argued that the properties belonged to her exclusively.
She prayed for the dismissal of the petition because Felicidad failed to state a cause
of action because it was necessary to allege that the latter was acknowledged and
recognized by Ismael as his illegitimate child. (An action to compel recognition cannot
be brought after the death of the putative father.)
ISSUE:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
Whether or not a petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently
states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she
is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been
acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter.
RULING:
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag, the
Court defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. This interest,
furthermore, must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent.
In this case, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to
maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to successional rights as
an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established through
voluntary or compulsory recognition.Necessarily, her interest in the decedent’s estate
which the Rules require to be material anddirect, may no longer be established.
Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that respondent’s successional rights may be
established not just by a judicial action to compel recognition but also by proof that
she had been voluntarily acknowledged and recognized as an illegitimate child.In
contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present
evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by
her deceased father because of petitioner’s opposition to her petition and motion for
hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition
is actually one to compel recognition which had already been foreclosed by the death
of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain
the suit by reason of the decedents voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her
illegitimate filiation.
Therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the decedent
suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or
acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. Assuming
the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that respondent is the decedent’s illegitimate child,
her interest in the estate as such would definitely be material and direct.
(The appellate court was, therefore, correct in allowing the proceedings to continue,
ruling that, respondent still has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent), just as the petitioner has the right to disprove it,
in the course of the settlement proceedings.)
[59] VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Notes:
FACTS: On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters
Page 20 of 32

of administration. At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as
special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar
granted the motion.A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on
May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters
of administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has
been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular
administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in
the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the
estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular
administratrix after due hearing.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina
G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to
dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled in favor of Virginia Fule.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the
proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction. Denied of their motion for
reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to
Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of
Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters
of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, over
the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B.
Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate.
Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as
special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and
assumed the office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be appointed as special administrator of the
estate of the deceased.
HELD:
No, the SC in this case denied the petition and upheld the decision of CFI of Quezon
appointingPreciosa B. Garcia as the specialadministratrix of the estate of the
deceased.
Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section
1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance
of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge
of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed. Formerly, the appointment of a special
administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under
appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not
lies in the probate court. That, however, is no authority for the judge to become
partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule,
his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and
legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in
the appointment of a special administrator. Nothing is wrong for the judge to
consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in
appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others
in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the
decedent. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion
of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of
a property.
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of
the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia
G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere
illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. On this point, We
rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment,
which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is
appointed, the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the
estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship
is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on
the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a
Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973
in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B.
Garcia. In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote
therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. Faced with these documents
and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.
[60] DE GUZMAN VS. GUADIZ JR., ET. AL.,
Notes:
Feliciano (petitioner) filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecijafor
the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting
the herein petitioner as sole and universal heir and naming him as executor; that
Catalina Bajacan died on February 3, 1977; that on May 10, the private respondents
filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition contending that all the real properties of
Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Intervivos
executed on June 19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their
favor;that on September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to defer resolution
on the said motion to dismiss until the parties shall have presented their evidence;that
a motion for the appointment of a special administratorwas filed by the petitioner on
Page 21 of 32

September 23, 1977 alleging that the unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily
delay the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor; that the decedent's
estate consists of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural rice land yielding fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of rice harvested twice a year; that somebody
representing the estate should collect and receive the palay harvests pending the
probate of the will; that on December 23, 1977, the respondent judge issued an order
denying the motion for appointment of a special administrator and therein, it was
stated that: “The appointment of a special administrator is predicated on the necessity
of enabling somebody to take care of the properties where there is a considerable
delay in the appointment of a regular administrator. In the present case, since the
properties covered by the will are undoubtedly in the possession of the oppositors
who claim to be the owners thereof, the Court sees no necessity of appointing a
special administrator.”
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, it was denied by the respondent
judge.
Issue: Whether the respondent judge acted with GADALEJ in denying petitioner’s
motion for appointment of a special administrator.
Ruling: YES.
Under Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised ROC, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special
administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. This discretion, however, must be
sound, that is, not whimsical, or Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to
include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in
another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the
removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree
among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be
immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and
preserve the property of the deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents which transpired
in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and
that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating
the immediate appointment of a special administrator.
The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are:
(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the win.
(2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of Catalina Bajacan
and opposition to the probate of the will is a deed of donation dated June 19,
1972 allegedly executed by the deceased Catalina Bajacan and her late sister
Arcadia Bajacan in their favor.
It appears that the estate in the name of the deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of
eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural land. It is claimed that these 80 hectares
produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is an
immediate need for a special administrator to protect the interests of the estate as
regards the products.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in accordance
with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar.
The respondent judge opined that there is no need for the appointment of a special
administrator in this case because the respondents are already in possession of the
properties covered by the will. The respondent judge has failed to distinguish between
the partisan possession of litigants from that of the neutral possession of the special
administrator under the Rules of Court. When appointed, a special administrator is
regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the
appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and in fact, as an officer
of the court. The accountability which the court. which attaches to the office of a
special administrator to be appointed by the court is absent from the personal
possession of private respondents.
The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests
in the fact that estates of decedents frequently become involved in
protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and losses
if there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the
assets in the interim. The occasion for such an appointment usually
arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning
the proof of the will, regular administration is .delayed. No temporary
administration can be granted where there is an executor in being
capable of acting, however.
Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to
preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized
to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs.
[61] RELUCIO V SAN JOSE
Notes:
Facts:
 Herein petitioner, Julita Relucio, was appointed administratrix of the
testate estate of Felipe Relucio, Sr.
 Upon petition filed on June 27, 1950 by Lorenzo, Rolando and Leticia
Relucio, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order on January
15, 1951, appointing Rolando Relucio as administrator in substitution of
the petitioner.
 Petitioner after failing to obtain a reconsideration, filed a notice of appeal.
Before the appeal could be perfected, Rolando Relucio moved for the
immediate execution of the order appointing him as administrator.
 In the order of March 20, 1951, however, the court merely made reference
to the letters of administration issued in favor of Rolando Relucio and did
not pass on the motion for immediate execution. On April 3, 1951,
Rolando Relucio filed a motion praying that the petitioner be declared in
contempt of court for failing to deliver to him, after demand, all papers,
documents, titles and properties of the estate under her administration.
Page 22 of 32

 In the order dated April 10, 1951, the Court of First Instance of Manila
denied this motion for contempt and appointed the Equitable Banking
Corporation as special administrator pending the appeal of the petitioner
from the order of January 15, 1951. The court ruled that the appeal
suspended the appointment of Rolando Relucio as administrator; but in
the same breath it justified the appointment of the special administrator
by arguing that, if the petitioner has to remain as administratrix during
the pendency of her appeal, "a removed administrator may easily nullify
such removal by interposing an appeal."
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of Equitable Banking Corp. as a special
administrator is justified.
Ruling:
The cases in which a special administrator may be appointed are specified in
section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: "When
there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned
by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other
cause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge
of the estate of the deceased and executors or administrators thereupon
appointed." A special administrator may also be appointed in a case covered
by section 8 of Rule 87 which provides as follows: "If the executor or
administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice
thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special
administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power
and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor
in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor or
administrator to pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend
such claim."
There is no pretense that the case at bar is one falling under either section 1
of Rule 81 or section 8 of Rule 87. In any view of the case, there is a regular
administrator. Pending her appeal from the order of January 15, 1951, the
petitioner had the right to act as administratrix. If the respondent Judge had
decreed the immediate execution of the order of January 15, 1951, Rolando
Relucio would then be the administrator pending petitioner's appeal.
Consequently, the respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in appointing
the respondent Equitable Banking Corporation as special administrator.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted and the order of the respondent
Judge of April 10, 1951, appointing the Equitable Banking Corporation as
special Administrator is set aside, without costs.
[62] DE GUZMAN V. ANGELES
Notes:
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
FACTS:
This is a dispute between the surviving spouse (appointed special adminsitratrix) and
the father in law as to the properties allegedly belonging to the estate of the deceased
but was being claimed by, and was in the possession of, the father in law. Father in
law now assails the appointment of daughter in law as special administratrix, as well
as the order for writ of possession, even before notice was given to him. Court held
that NOTICE is needed, even for the appointment of a special administrator, as it is a
position of trust and confidence which needs notice (to inform interested parties) and
hearing where the petitioner who seeks to be appointed proves his qualifications, and
the oppositors contests it.
-Manolito de Guzman died intestate.
-Elaine de Guzman (surviving spouse) filed petition for settlement of intestate estate
of the decedent before RTC Makati, alleging the following:
Manolito died in Makati, as a resident of Makati, left properties which were
acquiredafter the marriage of Manolito and Elaine (thus Conjugal property)
Compulsory heirs: Elaine (SS), 2 minor Children
-Elaine most qualified to be the administrator, filed motion for writ of possession over
5 of Manolito's vehicles (who were in the possession of Manolito's father - Pedro de
Guzman - the petitioner): granted!
-Petitioner made appearance, sought for extension to file opposition to the Motion for
writ of possession
-Elaine filed EX-Parte Motion to be Appointed as the Special Administatrix.Motion set
for hearing, all parties directed to be notified (BUT NO NOTICE GIVEN TO THE
PETITIONER!!!)
- RTC granted:
* made Elaine the special administratrix
* Granted motion for assistance of some military men and/or policemen to assist
Elaine in preserving the estate of Manolito
-Elaine tried to enforce order. Pedro de Guzman (petitioner) resisted, resulting in a
"near shoot-out between members of the Makati Police and CAPCOM soldiers which
was diffused by the arrival of Mayor Binay and the agreement that the bulldozer
sought to be taken be placed in Mayor Binay's custody while the parties sought for
clarification
-CLARIFICATION: the order only covers properties of the estate, not those claimed
-Pedro then filed motion, giving list of properties, he claimed he owns; also filed this
petition to annul the orders given
ISSUE 1:WON a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ
of possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in
a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased person even
before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties
pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court?
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT OVER THE
PROCEEDINGS vs. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS WHO ARE INTERESTED IN
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE
Page 23 of 32

The probate court, in accordance w/ R79.3, must first cause notice through
publication of petition!
-purpose: bring all interested persons w/n the court's jurisdiction so that the
judgment therein becomes binding on all the world
-if no notice:
proceeding for settlement of estate is void and should be annulled. OR else, may
deprive a person of his property w/o due process of law
The court orders affecting other persons subsequent to the petition filed are void and
subject to annulment
-here: no notice before the court:
acted on the motion of Elaine to be the Special Administratrix
Issued a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person
Granted the motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito
-if notice was given, then the creditors and other interested persons could have
participated in the proceedings, especially because Elaine immediately filed a motion
to have herself appointed as administratrix; Pedro appears to be the biggest creditor
of the estate who has the largest interest in it
Special administrator: representative of decedent appointed by the probate court to
care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is
appointed.
ISSUE 2:WON the orders could have been issued w/o notice: ONLY if there's urgency
-Here: no necessity/urgency for the issuance of the said orders w/o first giving notice
to interested persons; no avoidable delay
-emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an estate justify a
court's immediately taking some kind of temporary action even without the required
notice
So GR: give notice
exception: emergency situations
Why give notice even for appointment of special administrator:
"The position of special administrator, by the very nature of the powers granted
thereby, is one of trust and confidence. It is a fiduciary position and, therefore,
requires a comprehensive determination of the suitability of the applicant to such
position. Hence, under Philippine jurisprudence, it has been settled that the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator
should be taken in choosing the special administrator (Francisco, Vol. VB, page 46
citing the cases of Ozaeta v. Pecson, Ibid. and Roxas v. Pecson, Ibid.)
"In order to fully and correctly ascertain the suitability of the applicant to the trust, a
hearing is obviously necessary wherein the applicant can prove his qualifications and
at the same time affording oppositors, given notice of such hearing and application,
the opportunity to oppose or contest such application.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
[63] HEIRS OF CASTILLO vs. GABRIEL
(Note: Mag-drawing kayong family tree, madaming characters ‘tong case.)
Notes:
Facts:
 CrisantaYanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie, died in Malabon City,
Metro Manila, leaving behind a sizable inheritance consisting mostly of real
estate and shares of stock.
 Crisanta’smother, Crisanta Santiago Vda. deYanga, commenced an intestate
proceeding before the RTC of Malabon City. She prayed that letters of
administration be issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, Jr., also the brother of
the deceased because her daughter’s husband, Lorenzo, is incompetent.
However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator.
 Meantime, the marriage between CrisantaYanga-Gabriel and Lorenzo
Almoradie was declared void for being bigamous. The RTC then removed
Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr. in his stead.
 Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo, claiming to be the only legitimate child
of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for intervention.
 Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed before
the RTC of Malabon City a petition for probate of an alleged will and for the
issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. He alleged that he discovered
his mother’s will on October 25, 1989 in which he was instituted as the sole
heir of the testatrix.
 Belinda Castillo died.
 RTC issued an Order dismissing the intestate proceedings Mariano Yanga, Jr.
questioned the dismissal of the intestate proceedings before the appellate
court via a petition for certiorari.
 The probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special administrator of
his mother’s estate.
 The heirs of Belinda, filed a Motion praying that they be substituted as party-
litigants in lieu of their late mother Belinda.
 Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel, filed a "Manifestation
and Motion"where she informed the probate court of her husband’s death
and prayed that she be admitted as substitute in place of her late husband,
and be appointed as administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well.
She alleged that she had a bachelor’s degree in law and had worked for
several years in a law office.
Page 24 of 32

 The heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores’ manifestation and motion. They
averred that Dolores was not Crisanta Gabriel’s next of kin, let alone the
lawful wife of the late Roberto.
 Dolores L. Gabriel was appointed as Special Administrator of the estate of
decedent Crisanta Y. Gabriel, and upon posting of a bond in the amount of
₱200,000.00 pursuant to the mandate of Section 4, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court, may assume the functions and duties of such Special Administrator.
Issue:
WON the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it appointed Dolores as the Special administrator of the estate of
Cristina Gabriel rather than appointing Bena Jean Castillo (heir of Benilda) as the
regular administrator
Ruling: NO.
The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the discretion of the court.
The order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator under Section
6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator. In the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and
subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the court determines who is
entitled to the administration of the estate of the decedent. On this point, CA was
right that the preference of private respondent Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient
reason.
A special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the probate
court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is
appointed.When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a
representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the
administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court. As such
officer, he is subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and is
expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth
administration and earliest settlement.The principal object of appointment of
temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of
person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs. In many
instances, the appointment of administrators for the estates of decedents frequently
become involved in protracted litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great
waste and losses unless an authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the
assets in the interim is appointed. The occasion for such an appointment, likewise,
arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of
the will, regular administration is delayed.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to
include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in
another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the
removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree
among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be
immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and
preserve the property of the deceased.
The probate court has ample jurisdiction to appoint respondent as special
administratrix. The deceased CrisantaYanga-Gabriel left a document purporting to be
her will where her adopted son, Roberto, was named as the sole heir of all her
properties. However, pending probate of the will, Roberto died leaving his widow, the
respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the respondent has much stake in Crisanta’s
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
estate in case the latter’s will is allowed probate. It needs to be emphasized that in
the appointment of a special administrator (which is but temporary and subsists only
until a regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not determine the
shares in the decedent’s estate, but merely appoints who is entitled to administer the
estate. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and
the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to
be the basis of distribution.Thus, the preference of respondent is sound, that is, not
whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
[64] ROWENA F. CORONA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
Notes:
Facts:
Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a
holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which excluded her husband, Romarico Vitug,
as one of her heirs, and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or
about three weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for
reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a
ground for legal separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal
shares to her 3 sisters, and 2 nieces and appointed her niece Rowena F. Corona, as
her Executrix.
Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills (Spec.Procs. No. 9398), and for
the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because she (Rowena) is
presently employedin New York City. The Probate Court appointed Nenita P. Alonte
as Special Administratrix.
The surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and prayed
that the Petition for Probate be denied and that the two Wills be disallowed on the
ground that they were procured through undue and improper pressure and influence,
having been executed at a time when the decedent was seriously ill and under the
medical care of Dr. Antonio P. Corona,, Rowena's husband, and that the holographic
Will impaired his legitime. Romarico further prayed for his appointment as Special
Administrator because the Special Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs
and has no interest to be protected, besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to
administer.
Other relatives also opposed the petition.
The Probate Court set aside its Order in appointing Nenita as Special Administratrix,
and appointed instead Romarico as Special Administrator, for the reasons that under
Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of
preference for appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that
the disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of disqualification
for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is appointed only where the
surviving spouse is not competent or is unwilling to serve besides the fact that the
Page 25 of 32

Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin but merely a niece, and that the decedent's
estate is nothing more than half of the unliquidated conjugal partnership property.
Issue:
Whether Nenita or Romarico is qualified as an administrator
Ruling: YES
Rowena stresses that the order of preference laid down in the Rules should not be
followed where the surviving spouse is expressly disinherited, opposes probate, and
clearly possesses an adverse interest to the estate which would disqualify him from
the trust.
Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix's
choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide
latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will is entitled to the highest
consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality and
lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that the
side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in
the management of the decedent's estate.
Romarico is not disqualified the same reason as probate court has ruled.
P.S SA MADALING SABI CO-ADMINISTRATOR NA LANG SILA PARA WALA NANG AWAY
[65] MATIAS VS GONZALEZ, ETC., ET AL.,
Notes:
Facts:
Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a petition for the probate of a
document purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel,
who died single. The heir to the entire estate of the deceased — except the properties
bequeathed to her other niece and nephews, namely, Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud,
PolicarpioSalud, Santos Matias and Rafael Matias — is, pursuant to said instrument,
Aurea Matias, likewise, appointed therein as executrix thereof, without bond.
BasiliaSalud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate of her alleged will,
and, after appropriate proceedings, the court, presided over by respondent Judge
Gonzales, issued an order, sustaining said opposition and denying the petition for
probate.
BasiliaSalud moved for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator
of the estate of the deceased, and the appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata.
BasiliaSalud introduced evidence in support of said charges, whereupon respondent
Judge by an orderfound Rodriguez guilty of abuse of authority and gross negligence,
and, accordingly, relieved him as special administrator of the estate of the deceased
and appointed BasiliaSalud as special administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and
advised by her niece, Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as aide, interpreter
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
and adviser of BasiliaSalud." Said order, likewise, provided that "BasiliaSalud shall be
helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is hereby appointed as co-administrator."
Aurea Matins asked that said order, be set aside and that she be appointed special
co-administratrix, jointly with Horacio Rodriguez, upon the ground that BasiliaSalud
is over eighty (80) years of age, totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform
the duties of said office, and that said movant is the universal heiress of the deceased
and the person appointed by the latter as executrix of her alleged will. This motion
was denied in an orderwhich maintained "the appointment of the three above named
personslpending final decision on the probate of the alleged will of said
decedent."However, on March 17, 1956, BasiliaSalud tendered her resignation as
special administratrix by reason of physical disability, due to old age, and
recommended the appointment, in her place, of Victorina Salud. Respondents Ramon
Plata and Victorina Salud requested authority to collect the rents due, or which may
be due, to the estate of the deceased and to collect all the produce of her lands, which
was granted. Said respondents filed another motion praying for permission to sell the
palay of the deceased then deposited in different rice mills in the province of Cavite,
which respondent judge granted.
Petitioner instituted the present action against Judge Gonzales, and Victorina Salud
and Ramon Plata, for the purpose of annulling the above mentioned orders of
respondent Judge, upon the ground that the same had been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue
Who among them are qualified as special administrator to the estate?
Ruling
In support of this pretense, it is argued that petitioner should have preference in the
choice of special administratrix of the estate of the decedent, she (petitioner) being
the universal heiress to said estate and, the executrix appointed in the alleged will of
the deceased, until its final disallowance — that the management was given to
persons partial to her main opponent, namely, BasiliaSalud, inasmuch as Victorina
Salud is allied to her and Ramon Plata is a very close friend of one of her
(BasiliaSalud's) attorneys; that BasiliaSalud was made special administratrix despite
her obvious unfitness for said office, she being over eighty (80) years of age and
blind; that said disability is borne out by the fact that on March 17, 1956, BasiliaSalud
resigned as special administratrix upon such ground; that the Rules of Court do not
permit the appointment of more than one special administrator.
Upon a review of the record, we find ourselves unable to sanction fully the acts of
respondent Judge, for the following reasons:
Petitioner had no opportunity to object to the appointment of BasiliaSalud as special
administratrix, and of Victorina Salud, as her assistant and adviser, and the order of
February 27, 1956, to this effect, denied due process to said petitioner.Said order
was issued with evident knowledge of the physical disability of BasiliaSalud. Otherwise
respondent Judge would not have directed that she "be assisted and advised by her
niece Victorina Salud," and that the latter "shall always act as aide, interpreter and
adviser of BasiliaSalud."
By an order dated August 11, 1952, the Court, then presided over by Hon. Jose
Bernabe, Judge, decided the matter in favor of Horacio Rodriguez and against
Victorina Salud, upon the ground that, unlike the latter, who, as a pharmacist and
employee in the Santa Isabel Hospital, resides In the City of Manila, the former, a
Page 26 of 32

practicing lawyer and a former public prosecutor, and later, mayor of the City of
Cavite, is a resident thereof. In other words, the order of resident thereof.Tthe order
of respondent Judge of February 27, 1956, removing Rodriguez and appointing
Victorina Salud to the management of the estate, amounted to a reversal of the
aforementioned order of Judge Bernabe of August 11, 1952.
Although the probate of the alleged will and testament of Gabina Raquel was denied
by respondent Judge, the order to this effect is not, as yet, final and executory. It is
pending review on appeal taken by Aurea Matias. The probate of said alleged will
being still within realm of legal possibility, Aurea Matias has — as the universal heir
and executrix designated in said instrument — a special interest to protect during the
pendency of said appeal.
Inasmuch as the lower court had deemed it best to appoint more than one special
administrator, justice and equity demands that both factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased.
The rule, to the effect that "only one special administrator may be appointed to
administrator temporarily" the estate of the deceased, must be considered in the light
of the facts obtaining in said case. In the case at bar there is only one (1)
special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly by two
special co-administrators. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of
courts to appoint several special co-administrators.
Wherefore, the orders complained of are hereby annulled and set aside. The lower
court should re-hear the matter of removal of Horacio Rodriguez and appointment of
special administrators, after due notice to all parties concerned, for action in
conformity with the views expressed herein, with costs against respondents Victorina
Salud and Ramon Plata. It is so ordered.
[66] ROXAS V. PECSON
Notes:
FACTS:
A petition for the administration of Pablo Roxas’ estate was filed before the CFI of
Bulacan by Maria and Pedro Roxas (sister and brother of the decedent). The court
then appointed Maria as special administratix upon an ex parte petition. However,
Natividad Vda. De Roxas (widow of Pablo) filed a petition for the probate of an alleged
will and for her appointment before the same court. The court disapproved the will
and now pending on appeal.
CFI of Bulacan appointed Natividad as special administratix. Maria and Pedro then
filed a motion for reconsideration with an alternative prayer that Maria be appointed
as special co-administratix.Respondent Judge Pecson rendered a decision appointing
Natividad as special administratix only of all conjugal properties of the deceased while
Maria as special administratix of all properties belonging exclusively to Pablo.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
A petition for certiorari has been filed against the last order or resolution of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan based on the ground that the respondent judge acted in
excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing two special co-administratices of the
estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas, one of the capital or properties belonging
exclusively to the deceased, and another of his conjugal properties with his widow.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
appointing two special co-administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas.
RULING:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of
certain persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well
as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator
under section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection
or removal of special administrator. (21 Am. Jur., 833; De Gala vs. Gonzales and
Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 106.) As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special
administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be
sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.
But, under the law, only one general administrator may be appointed to administer,
liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only
one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate,
because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to
act in lieu of the general administrator.
Hence, Respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing two
separate special administratices of the estate of the decedent.
(another reason: especially if the estate to be settled is that of a deceased husband
as in the present case, for according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only
after the dowry and parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations
of the conjugal partnership have been paid, the capital or exclusive property of the
husband may be liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried estate may reach;
and if the estate inventoried should not be sufficient to pay the dowry and the
parapherna of the wife and the debtscharges and obligations of the partnershipthe
provision of Title XVII of the Civil Code relating to concurrence and preference of
credits shall be observed.If two separate administrators are appointed as done in the
present case, in every action which one of them may institute to recover properties
or credit of the deceased, the defendant may raise the question or set up the defense
that the plaintiff has no cause of action, because the property or credit in issue
belongs to the class which is being administered by the other administrator, which
cannot be done if the administrator of the entire estate is only one.)
[67] SERAPIA DE GALA vs. APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA
Notes:
Page 27 of 32

FACTS:
On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala,
a niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in November, 1926,
leaving no heirs by force of law, and on December 2, 1926, Serapia, through her
counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the
deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been executed
in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On
April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate of
the deceased. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and made
several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the
delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was in possession.
On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver
to Serapia de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the
property as ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de
Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in
her stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de
Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed, and
Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in her place, principally on the ground
that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment would
simplify the proceedings.
In the meantime and after various continuances and delays, the court below in an
order dated January 20, 1928, declared the will valid and admitted it to probate. All
of the parties appealed, Serapia de Gala from the order removing her from the office
of special administratrix, and Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from the order
probating the will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the TC erred in removing Serpia De Gala as a Special Administrator.
HELD:
No the TC did not err. The burden of the argument of her counsel is that a special
administrator cannot be removed except for one or more of the causes stated in
section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But that section can only apply to executors
and regular administrators, and the office of a special administrator is quite different
from that of regular administrator. The appointment of a special administrator lies
entirely in the sound discretion of the court; the function of such an administrator
is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased and to return an
inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the
deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a special
administrator indicates that both his appointment and his removal are purely
discretionary, and we cannot find that the court below abused its discretion in the
present case. In removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor of
the property pending the final determination of the validity of the will, the court
probably prevented useless litigation.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS | CASE DIGEST
Judge Marlo Malagar
[68] GLICERIA C. LIWANAG, v. HON. LUIS B. REYES
Notes:
FACTS:
On July 14, 1960, the late Pio D. Liwanag executed in favor of the Rotegaan Financing,
Inc., a real estate mortgage on a parcel of residential land with the building and
improvements thereon, at M. H. del Pilar Street, Manila, to secure the payment of a
loan in the amount of one hundred and eighty thousand pesos (P180,000.00),
Philippine Currency, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on said loan. It was
stipulated in the mortgage contract that the total amount of mortgage debt be fully
paid a year thereafter, or on or before July 14, 1961. Before the one year period
expired, the mortgagor Pio D. Liwanag died intestate.
As the total mortgage obligation of the deceased was not fully paid within the
stipulated period, the mortgagee Rotegaan Financing, Inc., instituted, in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, a complaint for foreclosure against the Estate of Pio D.
Liwanag and GliceriaLiwanag as administratrix of the estate. The action also prayed
for the appointment of a receiver.
The defendant GliceriaLiwanag filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for foreclosure,
on the theory that she may not be used as special administratrix.
ISSUES:
The correctness of the action for foreclosure against the special administratrix the
propriety of the appointment of a receiver.
RULING:
Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim
against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue
any of these remedies:
(1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim in the testate or intestate proceeding
and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate;
(2) foreclosure of his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court,
making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency
after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may prove the same in the testate or
intestate proceedings; and
(3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it at any time within the ordinary
period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not be
admitted as creditor of the estate and shall not share in the distribution of the assets.
Herein, respondent has chosen the second remedy, having filed his action for
foreclosure against the administratrix of the property.
Page 28 of 32

Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as special
administratrix. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special
administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would
find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases
where the appointment of a regular administratrix is delayed. So that if We are now
to deny the present action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a
regular administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was
constituted will be defeated.
It was, therefore, the will of the deceased himself that, in case of foreclosure, the
property be put into the hands of a receiver, and this provision should be respected
by the administratrix of the estate. The cases cited by petitioner in favor of the theory
that property in custodialegiscannot be given to a receiver is not applicable,
considering that this is an action of enforce a superior lien on certain property of the
estate and the appointment of a receiver, which is a very convenient and feasible
means of preserving and administering the property, has been agreed upon by the
contracting parties.
[69] ANDERSON V PERKINS
Notes:
Facts:
The Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceedings No. 29636 authorized the
special administrator of the testate estate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell at
public auction certain personal properties such as clones, books, gadgets, electrical
appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in
order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value might be
obtained in their disposition.
On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale.
Reasons for the opposition were that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold
were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that
unauthorized removals of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been
made.
The opposition notwithstanding, the lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved the
proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Oppositor
Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1) that said
order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal estate
of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, sec. 2, Rules of Court; (2) that said order was
issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold were
perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the personalty
sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor; (4)
that there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the
properties of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent
identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) that there is also evidence
showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of the personal estate.
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Judge Marlo Malagar
Issue: Whether or not the sale made by the special administrator is valid
Ruling:
No.
Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not being
perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to sell them. This
argument is untenable, because section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically
provides that the special administrator "may sell such perishable and other property
as the court orders sold" which shows that the special administrator's power to sell is
not limited to "perishable" property only.
It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve
the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed. But it is not
alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as
well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of
perishable property (Gao vs. Cascade Silver Mines & Mills, et al., 213 P. 1092, 66
Mont. 488).
It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not only
the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers
such administrator to sell "other property as the court ordered sold".
Records show that up to the time the proposed sale was asked for and judicially
approved, no proceedings had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the
alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of the estate
supposedly left by the deceased, or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property of
the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore, the issue of the ownership
of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership
liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with appellant as to which properties
of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve their value,
the proposed sale is clearly premature.
After all, most of the items sought to be sold—pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner
ware, electrical appliances, various gadgets, and Books—can easily be protected and
preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of the two
residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio City) left by the deceased, so that no
reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong
opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of
a substantial portion of the personal estate in question.
The special administrator claims in his brief that the oppositor-appellant should have
indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want sold and that her refusal
to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious claim. But it does not appear that
appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which items in the inventory
she did not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and later her motion
for reconsideration to the order approving the same were overruled by the court
without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her opposition were not well-
founded; the records do not even, show that an inquiry was made as to the validity
of the grounds of her opposition.
Wherefore, the lower courts order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the special
administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate is set aside, with costs
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against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and petitioner-appellee Dora
Perkins Anderson.
[70] CO VS. ROSARIO ET. AL., G.R. NO. 160671, APRIL 30, 2008
Notes:
The RTC of Makati Cityappointed petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special
administrators of the estate of the petitioners father, Co Bun Chun. However, on
motion of the other heirs, the trial court set aside petitioners appointment as special
co-administrator. Petitioner consequently, nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co (Alvin)
for appointment as co-administrator of the estate and the RTC appointed Alvin as
special co-administrator.
Almost four years thereafter, the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of the heirs,
revoked and set aside the appointment of Alvin for the reason that Alvin had become
unsuitable to discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator because his
capacity, ability or competence to perform the functions of co-administrator had been
beclouded by the filing of several criminal cases against him, which, even if there was
no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle
the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and confidence.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
trial court’s revocation of the appointment.
Issue: Whether the lower courts are correct in revoking Alvin’s appointment as
special co-administrator.
Ruling: YES. Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators
is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal
of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators
based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As
long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not
interfere with it. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity,
justice and legal principles.
Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds
the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the
appointment and giving no valid effect thereto. The special administrator is an officer
of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected to work
for the best interest of the entire estate.
The CA observed that the lower court took into consideration the fiduciary nature of
the office of a special administrator which demands a high degree of trust and
confidence in the person to be appointed. And Alvin, being burdened with the criminal
charges of falsification of commercial documents, his ability and qualification to act
as a special co-administrator of the estate of the decedent are beclouded, and the
recall of his appointment is only proper under the attendant circumstances. Without
condemning the accused man as guilty before he is found such by the appropriate
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Judge Marlo Malagar
tribunal, the court merely declared that it is more consistent with the demands of
justice and orderly processes that the petitioner’s son to avoid conflicts and possible
abuse.
As a final note, the Court observes that this prolonged litigation on the simple issue
of the removal of a special co-administrator could have been avoided if the trial court
promptly appointed a regular administrator. We, therefore, direct the trial court to
proceed with the appointment of a regular administrator as soon as practicable.
[71] ALCASID vs. SAMSON
Notes:
Facts:
In 1954, respondents filed an application in the CFI of Albay for the issuance of letters
of administration in favor in one of them, Jesus V. Samson, for the estate of the late
Jose V. Samson. On the same date, Jesus V. Samson was appointed special
administrator of the estate.
The application was opposed by petitioners Josefina N. Samson, the widow of Jose V.
Samson and her three minor children and they asked for the granting of letters of
administration in favor of Josefina, in the place of Jesus. After the hearing that
dragged for almost two years, Judge Alcasid, issued an order appointing Antonio
Conda, Municipal Treasurer of Libon, Albay, as the regular administrator. The court
issued an order requiring the special administrator to deliver the properties and funds
of the estate now in his possession to the regular administrator within three (3) days
from receipt of this order.
Respondents filed an appeal from the order of the court granting letters of
administration in favor of Condabut it was denied.
The Court of Appealsheld that, on the authority of the decision in Cotia vs. Pecson, the
order appointing Antonio Conda as regular administrator was stayed by the appeal
taken against it, and thereafter, Conda should not have been allowed to qualify in the
meantime, unless execution pending appeal should be ordered for special reasons
pursuant to Rule 39, section 2 of the Rules of Court; and that "should the special
administrator be found, after due process of law, unfit to continue", he "could be
dismissed and another appointed to look after the interests of the estate until the
appeal filed against Conda's appointment is finally disposed of.”
Issue:
WON the CFI acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the appointment
of Conda as the regular administrator the estate of Jose Samson that resulted to the
removal of respondent as special administrator
Ruling: NO.
The appointment and removal of a special administrator are interlocutory proceedings
incidental to the main case, and lie in the sound discretion of the court. It is well
settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain
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persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well as the
statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under
section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or
removal of special administrator. As the law does not say who shall be appointed as
special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or
court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which
must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.
It is well to mark that, in the present case, the special administrator was not actually
removed by the court, but that he was superseded by the regular administrator by
operation of law. Rule 81, section 3, of the Rules of Court specifically provides that—
When letters testamentary or of administration are granted on the estate of
the deceased, the power of the special administrator shall cease, and shall
forthwith deliver to the executor or administrator the goods, chattels, money
and estate of the deceased in his hands.
No question of abuse of discretion can therefore arise on account of the order of the
lower court requiring Jesus V. Samson to turn over the administration to the regular
administrator, such result being ordained by law. Upon the other hand, the conditions
of the estate justified the appointment and qualification of a regular administrator,
because the special administration had lasted nearly two years, and the prompt
settlement of the estate had been unduly delayed.
The case of Cotia vs. Pecsonactually dealt with the removal of a regular administrator
and not of a special administrator.
[72] JUNQUERA v BORROMEO
Notes:
Facts:
Vito Borromeo executed a will naming Jose H. Junquera as executor. When Vito died,
Junquera filed with CFI a petition for the probate of the will praying that, during the
pendency of its probate, he be appointed a special administrator of the estate. The
court appointed Junquera as special administrator upon the filing of required bond.
Crispin Borromeo and Teofilo Borromeo opposed to the probate of the will and filed a
motion for the removal of Junquera as special administrator on the ground that he
failed to submit an inventory of the estate as required by law as well as to deposit
either in the bank or with the clerk of court all the income of the estate and by his
conduct he may be considered as having neglected his duties as such administrator.
Junquera filed his opposition to the motion explaining that the reason why he failed
to file the inventory and report as required by law is that all the papers or documents
relative to the estate are in the possession of one Tomas L. Borromeo, who was
residing in Manila, and who owns with other relatives has the possession of the
decease properties. And he was not able to submit a report of the income of the
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Judge Marlo Malagar
estate, because he was opposed by some Borromeo to collect rental income. On the
same date, Junquera finally submitted an inventory of the estate and a report of the
income as required by law.
The lower court granted the motion removing Junquera as special administrator.
Issue:
Has Junquera complied with his duty to make inventory and was improperly removed
as a special administrator.
Ruling: NO
Section 4, Rule 82, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. A special administrator before entering upon
the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned
that he will make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits,
and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge, and that he
will truly account for such as are received by him when required by the court, and will
deliver the same to the person appointed executor or administrator; or to such other
person as may be authorized to receive them."
A special administrator before entering upon his duties shall give a bond conditioned
"that he will make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits,
and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge, and that he
will truly account for such as are received by him when, required by the court."
It appears that he was appointed as special administrator on June 14, 1952 after filing
a bond. He assumed office since then and yet until the motion for his removal which
was filed on January 2, 1953, or a period of approximately seven months, he appears
not to have taken any step to determine the property, real or personal, belonging to
the estate and much less has filed an inventory thereof with the court as required by
law.
While the rule does not fix any period within which he is required to submit an
inventory of the estate, it cannot be denied that such duty has to be performed within
a reasonable period, if not as soon as practicable, in order to preserve the estate and
protect the heirs of the deceased.
The law provides that an administrator, may be remove in case he fails to perform "a
duty expressly provided by these rules" or "becomes insane, or otherwise incapable
or unsuitable to discharge the trust
And as found by the trial judge, Junquera "have not even attempted, much less done
any substantial performance of any of (his) commitments", it is evident that he has
proved to be unworthy of his trust.
His claim for failing to do his duty is too flimsy to justify the long delay he has incurred
in the submission of the requisite inventory..
It is true that Junquera is the one named by the testator as the executor of his will
but such designation cannot give him any preference or advantage until after the will
is admitted to probate. This claim can only be asserted after the will has been
admitted to probate for such is "a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary
concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes"
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Judge Marlo Malagar

The rule is that "The appointment and removal of a special administrator lies entirely
in the sound discretion of the court, * * *. The sufficiency of any ground for removal
should thus be determined by the court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place,
affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to
or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court"

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