REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SANDIGANBAYAN
Quezon City

Seventh Division

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Case No. SB-16-A/R-0004

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

- versus - Gomez-Estoesta, J., Chairperson

Trespeses, J. and
Jacinto, J.

ALELIABELLA-SERRANO,
Accused-Appellant. Promulgated:

X- -X

DECISION

GOMEZ-ESTOESTA,J.:

This is an appeal from the Judgment dated August 25, 2015^ of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226 ["trial court"], finding
Barangay Treasurer Aleli Abella-Serrano ["accused-appellant"] guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Malversation through
Falsification ofCommercial Document, which dispositive portion states, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having
proved the GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, finds the
accused Aleli Abella-Serrano GUILTY and is hereby CONVICTED ofthe
complex crime of Attempted Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification ofCommercial Document defined and penalized under Article
217 in relation to Articles 171, 48 and 51 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ofEleven (11)years. Four(4) months and One

1 Records, Volume 1, pp. 171-178

I
 People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano |
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SB-16-A/R-0004
DECISION ON APPEAL

(1) Day as MINIMUM to Twelve (12) years as MAXIMUM of Prision

Mayor in its maximum period and to pay the costs ofsuit.

SO ORDERED.2

Accused-appellant challenged her judgment of conviction by filing a

Notice of AppeaP on September 7, 2015. The trial court, however,
erroneously elevated the records to the Court of Appeals instead of the
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated September 15,2015.

Necessarily, accused-appellant filed a Motion to Endorse Case to the

Sandiganbayan (with Motionfor Suspension ofPeriod to File Brieffor the
Accused-Appellant) before the Court of Appeals to correct the procedural
error. In the Resolution dated March 3, 2016"^ of the Fifth Division^ of the
Court of Appeals, the motion was granted and the Judicial Records Division
was directed to forward the case to this Court, citing Cariaga v. People.^

Hence,the present appeal.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The facts are imdisputed, save for the defense raised by the accused-
appellant.

Accused-appellant,a resident of16 T. Alonzo Street,Project 4, Quezon

City, was appointed Barangay Treasurer of Barangay Marilag, Quezon City
on August 15, 2002. She took her Oath of Office on the same date before
Barangay Chairperson Andrew S. Abundo ["Abundo"].'' On the premise that
she would be an administrative support personnel of the newly elected
Barangay Chairperson who enjoyed his trust and confidence, accused-
appellant's appointment was approved by the Sangguniang Barangay of
Barangay Marilag per Resolution No. 002 Series of 2002.® Abundo was the
Punong Barangay of Barangay Marilag from August 15, 2002 to November
30,2007.9

Four(4) years later, a different scenario befell the accused-appellant.

An investigation was promptly initiated against her for neglect of duty
resulting from her failure to submit financial reports, leaving the barangay in
the dark as to its financial status for purposes of fund allocation and budget
appropriation. Considering the duties of the accused-appellant as Barangay
Treasurer who has custody of funds, many unauthorized check encashments
2 Penned by Presiding Judge Manuel B.Sta. Cruz
^ Records, Volume i, p.243; Records, Volume 2, p. 13 which bears receipt by the Sandiganbayn Records Division
^ Records, Volume 2, pp. 38-44
5 Composed of Justice Jose C. Reyes,Jr. as Chairperson with Justice Stephen C. Cruz and Justice Ramon Paul L
Hernando as Members
6 G.R. No. 180010,July 30,2010
' Records, Volume 1, p. 146; Exhibit "A-1"
8 ibid.. Exhibit"A"
® TSN dated July 30,2008, p.4
 People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano |
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SB-16-A/R-0004
DECISION ON APPEAL

were discovered and these encashments were not even the subject ofbarangay
appropriation.^®

Resolution No. 012-S-06 dated August 10, 2006^^ was thus issued by
the Sangguniang Barangay imposing indefinite suspension upon accused-
appellant "for breach of trust and loss of confidence effective August 11,
2006." The Resolution authorized Abimdo to implement the indefinite
suspension and make the necessary legal action against the accused-appellant.

On August 11,2006, Abundo wrote the manager of Landbank-Cubao

Branch, Quezon City, not to honor any barangay transaction presented by the
accused. His letter^^ read, thus:

August 11,2006

ATTY.ROSEMARIE J. RONILLO
MANAGER
LANDBANK
Cubao Branch
Aurora Blvd., Quezon City

Dear Atty. Ronillo:

This is to request your office to refrain from dealing bank transactions with the Barangay
Treasurer of Barangay Marilag, Ms. Aleli A. Serrano with regards [sic] to the account of
Barangay Marilag effective upon the receipt ofthis letter. The undersigned wishes to inform
you that the above named person is under investigation due to her involvement in some
irregularities related to her work.

Thank you very much.

Very truly yours,

HON. ADREW S. ABUNDO

Punong Barangay

It was under such circumstances that at around 10:00 in the morning of

August 28, 2006, the office of Barangay Marilag received a telephone call
firom the bank manager, Atty. Ronillo, informing them that accused-appellant
was about to encash a check worth P35,000.00 at the Landbank. Abundo
immediately called up Kagawad Yvette V. Luna, the Chairperson of the
Committee on Appropriation,to verify ifan appropriation for P35,000.00 was
made. When Kagawad Luna replied in the negative, Abundo rushed to
Landbank.

Abundo lost no time in approaching the accused-appellant to ask her

what she was encashing. Accused-appellant could not utter a reply. Abundo
took his chance to seize the check fi*om her and demanded why she was doing

^TSN dated July 30,2008, pp.20-24

"Records, Volume 1, p. 140; Exhibit"B;" TSN dated July 30,2008, p.5
V.
^ ^
ff
"Records., p. 144; Exhibit "D;"TSN dated July 30,2008, pp. 24-26
13 TSN dated July 30,2008, pp.26-28; TSN dated February 20,2014, p.4; Exhibit"E"
 People V. Alell Abella-Serrano |
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SB-16-A/R-0004
DECISION ON APPEAL

it. It was then that the accused-appellant answered, "Kap, pangbaon tsaka
pang-gastos ng mga bata^^^

The check seized from the accused-appellant was marked as Exhibit

"F," as follows:

'fCCpUNTtM. ' «c6uicn«^;/ £ \ 9C

fqgi$g2^i03r^7 BARANOAYMAmLAQ \n ^ ^60d64(«7i80#] 7^. «wm
,

1^..
ORDER ■ .1 ^ ""***—* //

PESOS
TAyV^ F/Vc Thmsand n
m
LANDBANK
'ISttBAO BRANCH
AURORA BLVD..

D>0Q00lii 7fiO?tPO 103S»0l&^ifOOi

upon closer examination of Landbank Check No. 0000467807 dated

August 28, 2006^^ which was made payable to the order of the accused-
appellant, Abundo discovered that his signature appearing on said check was
not his, gauged from the downward curve ofthe "A" when his regular stroke
was upward. Abundo had known that accused-appellant had encashed checks
in the past by forging his signature. When he reported the matter to the City
Mayor,he was instructed to solve the problem on his own. While appropriate
action was being taken in the past, the barangay officials could not recover
the checks for evidence since accused-appellant burned them to escape
punishment.

This time around, after accused-appellant was caught red-handed,

Abundo called his staff to ask for police assistance. It was Barangay
Secretary Silverio Purificacion who personally alerted the desk officer ofthe
Quezon City Police District(QCPD)ofthe commission ofthe crime ofestafa
and falsification ofa commercial document then being committed. SP03 Joel
Sioson ["SP03 Sioson"] responded to the call. After having been briefed of
the complaint, SP03 Sioson proceeded to Landbank-Cubao Branch.

At Landbank-Cubao Branch, Abundo pointed to the accused-appellant

as the person who just committed the crime. After reading her Miranda rights,
accused-appellant was apprehended and brought to PS-7 for investigation and
disposition.^^

"ibid., p. 28
« Exhibit"F"
y.(y
16 TSN dated July 30,2008, pp. 28-30 ' ^
"ibid., p. 32; The testimony of prosecution witness Andrew S. Abundo was terminated with no cross examination
made per Order dated November 16,2009; Records, Voiume 1, p.72
16 TSN dated December 2, 2010, pp. 3-4,6
16 ibid., pp. 4-5; See also Affidavit executed by P03 Joei Sioson marked as Exhibit "H"
People V. Aieli Abella-Serrano |
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SB-16-A/R-0004
DECISION ON APPEAL

In her defense, accused-appellant submitted her Judicial Affidavit,

which when conjoined with her testimony in court, has been summarized by
the trial court, as follows:

The defense presented only one witness, the accused herself Aleli
Abella-Serrano who testified on her direct examination based on her
Judicial Affidavit dated May 7,2015,that: she denied forging the signature
of Barangay Captain Andrew S. Abundo in Land Bank Check no.
0000467807; she admitted, however,that she attempted to encash the said
check; the signature appearing on the subject check is similar to other
documents bearing the signature of the said Barangay Captain; she is
familiar with the signature ofBrgy. Captain Abundo;she tried to encash the
subject upon the instruction of Brgy. Captain Abundo purportedly to pay
for some obligations of the latter and that of the barangay council; on a
yearly basis she had been audited by the COA and there were no instances
that there were missing fimds; while waiting for the verification ofthe check
she was surprised when the police arrested her at the bank; the police
officers told her nothing on the way to the police station; she was not aware
that she has been suspended by the barangay council and the said suspension
was only effected after she had been charged; she had been the one signing
the check, payrolls, vouchers and liquidation from August 11, 2006 until
the time she was arrested on August 28,2006; when she tried to encash the
subject check it was not supported by any Resolution, Request for
Allocation(ROA), and Voucher because it [was] the usual practice in the
barangay that in cases of emergency expenses, the requirements are
dispensed with and the said documents are only prepared thereafter; she is
being charged because she knows a lot ofirregularities in the barangay and
she already opted to resign in 2004 but was prevailed upon to stay; Brgy.
Captain Abimdo wanted to run again in 2007 and in his efforts to appear
"clean" to the electorate she was implicated in the instant case.

In her cross examination, the accused admitted that: she started

working as Barangay Treasurer of Barangay Marilag on August 16, 2002;
in the disbursement offunds in the barangay, she first makes a request for
appropriation or allotment, which is done by the Punong Barangay; the
same request is approved by the Chairman ofthe Commission of Accounts
as to the availability of funds; thereafter the Chairman of Appropriations
certifies to the existence of the appropriations; she in turn certifies the
availability offunds for the obligations; when she attempted to encash Land
Bank check no. 0000467807 there was no request for appropriation;
likewise there is no approval by the Chairman of Commission on Accounts
regarding the availability of allotment; also there is no Certification firom
the Chairman of Appropriations that there was an existence of
appropriations; finally as a Barangay Treasurer, she has no Certification of
any availability offunds amoimting to P35,000.00.

On redirect-examination by Atty. Jonathan Magallanes ofthe Public

Attomeys' Office, the same accused averred that: the procedure in the
withdrawal of the use of funds of the barangay was not followed in their
barangay; it was the practice in their barangay that encashment ofthe check
is done first before making the request for allocation(ROA);the same was
pursuant to the directive ofthe barangay captain.

//■
People V. Aleli Abeila-Serrano |
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SB-16-A/R-C004
DECISION ON APPEAL

On recross-examination, accused Serrano admitted that: despite the

alleged irregularities in the disbursement offunds in the barangay she did
not take any action to file a complaint pertaining thereto; she never
submitted any resignation letter despite her intentions to resign in 2004.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

The lone assignment of error presented by accused-appellant was

phrased, thus:

[THE TRIAL COURT] ERRED AND COMMITTED

PALPABLE MISTAKE WHEN IT CONVICTED THE
ACCUSED[-APPELLANT] OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED[-APPELLANT] BEYOND
RESONABLE DOUBT

Accused-appellant harps on her judgment of conviction on the

following grounds:

1. No testimony of a handwriting expert was presented to arrive at a

conclusion that the signature ofBarangay Chairperson Andrew S. Abundo on
subject check was indeed forged;

2. Evidence needed to be re-calibrated or re-evaluated to show the

inconsistencies and incredulity in the testimony given by Barangay
Chairperson Andrew S. Abundo,following the personal observations made in
open court by then Presiding Judge Leah S. Domingo Regala;

3. The testimony ofBarangay Chairperson Andrew S. Abundo was not

corroborated on substantial points by prosecution witnesses SP03 Joel Sioson
and Yvette V.Luna who only offered hearsay evidence on the fact in issue, as
the person who could have given a firsthand account ofthe incident was the
bank manager ofLandbank but who was not presented as a witness.

4. No proof was given whether accused-appellant was made aware or

notified ofher preventive suspension firom office.

THE PROSECUTION'S REFUTATION

The Prosecution debunks the lone assignment oferror, thus:

1. A handwriting expert is not indispensable to prove that the

signature of Barangay Chairperson Andrew S. Abundo in subject check was
forged as thejudge can conduct an independent examination ofthe questioned
signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity;
People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano |
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SB-16-A/R-0004
DECISION ON APPEAL

2. Accused-appellant failed to point out the inconsistencies and

conflicting declarations purportedly made by Barangay Chairperson Andrew
S. Abundo. On the other hand,prosecution witness SP03 Joel Sioson testified
on the basis of his own personal knowledge insofar as it covered the
apprehension of the accused-appellant or the fact that he was shown the
documents in connection with die complaint charged against the accused-
appellant; in the same way, prosecution witness Yvette Luna testified on the
basis of her own personal knowledge when she confirmed that there was no
allocation made by the Committee on Appropriations of the Sangguniang
Barangay on the amount ofP35,000.00 covered by the check. The testimony
of LBP Manager, Atty. Rosemarie J. Romillo, was not necessary as it would
have been merely corroborative.

3. There was no need to show whether accused-appellant received

the order or resolution of the Sangguniang Barangay on her preventive
suspension since this was immaterial to her criminal act of attempting to
encash a check bearing the forged signature ofBarangay Chairperson Andrew
S. Abundo.

4. This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as judgment

ofconviction has already become final. The appeal was erroneously elevated
to the Court of Appeals by the trial court but it took the accused-appellant
more than the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days to move for the
endorsement of her case to the proper forum; hence, she has lost her right to
appeal.

OVERTURE ON THIS COURTIS JURISDICTION

The appellate jurisdiction of this Court has been challenged at the

outset, brought about by the Prosecution's observation that the accused-
appellant took time to file a motion before the Court ofAppeals to necessarily
transmit the records of this case to this jurisdiction. It cited Section 2, Rule
50 of the Revised Rules of Court in asseverating that "[a]n appeal
erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not he transferred to the
appropriate court hut shall he dismissed outright."

We cannot subscribe to such proposition, as it fails to sensibly

understand the concept when an appeal is perfected in a criminal case.

The period for perfecting an appeal in a criminal case is found under

Section 6, Rule 122 ofthe Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure, viz:

Sec.6. When appeal to be taken.-An appeal must be taken within

fifteen (15)days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of
the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall
be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed
until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the

1 i
People V. Aieli Abella-Serrano |
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SB-16-A/R-0004
DECISION ON APPEAL

accused or his counsel at which time the balance ofthe period begins to run.
[Emphasis supplied]

As afore-quoted,the period for perfecting an appeal from the judgment

rendered by the Regional Trial Court is fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from. It is true that the
perfection ofan appeal in the manner and within the reglementary period laid
down by law is not only mandatory butjurisdictional, and failure to perfect an
appeal as legally required has the effect of rendering final and executory the
judgment ofthe court below and deprives the appellate court ofjurisdiction to
entertain the appeal.^®

In this case, promulgation of judgment was made on September 7,

2015, with the accused-appellant and her counsel de officio present.^^ On the
same day,records reveal that accused-appellant filed her Notice ofAppeal and
served a copy of the same, by personal service, to Asst. City Prosecutor
Raymund Oliver S. Almonte,in compliance with Section 3(a)ofRule 122.^^
There can be no doubt, at this instance, that the appeal was filed within the
reglementary period and that accused-appellant has substantially complied
with the requirements of the law for perfecting an appeal. Even Judge
Manuel B. Sta. Cruz, Jr. ofthe Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
226, ruled that the appeal was "seasonably filed" in his Order dated
September 15, 2015.^^ The elevation of the records of an appealed case,
therefore,became a plain and ministerial duty on the part ofthe aforesaid court
over which the accused-appellant has no intervention whatsoever.^"^

The trial court, however,erroneously elevated the records ofthe appeal

to the Court ofAppeals. Later,the Court of Appeals corrected the procedural
error and, citing Cariaga v. Peoplef^ endorsed the records of the appeal to
this Court. It reiterated that the trial court was duty bound to forward the
records ofthe case to the proper forum since the judge was expected to know
and should have known the law and the rules ofprocedure, especially in cases
such as this where a person's liberty was at stake. Such disposition is an
exercise ofjudicial discretion on the part ofthe Court ofAppeals and, whether
done judiciously or not, is not a remedial matter that is within the jurisdiction
ofthis Court to take cognizance of.

Inevitably, the elevation of the appeal to the wrong forum, or the

initiatives made by the accused-appellant on whether to endorse her appeal to
the proper court, are variables that are not considered in the computation of
the perfection of the appeal. For certain, however, it is the Sandiganbayan

2° Retoni V. Court ofAppeals, et al., G.R. No.96776, February 5,1993

Vide: Order dated September 7,2015; Records, Volume 1, p. 180
22 Sec. 3. How appeal taken.-(a)The appeal to the Regional Trial Court,or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the Judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
22 Attached to Records, Volume 1
2^/V/turov. Co/oyco, eto/., G.R. No. L-S3465, November 2,1982
25 G.R. No.180010,July 30,2010 I^ * /
/ 7
People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 9I Pa ge
SB-16-A/R-0004
DECISION ON APPEAL

which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions

or orders ofregional trial courts, whether in the exercise oftheir own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction, pursuant to P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. 8249. To echo Cariaga v. People:

XXX XXX XXX XXX.

Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a

person being deprived of liberty due to a procedural lapse militates against
the Court's dispensation ofjustice, the Court grants petitioner's plea for a
relaxation ofthe Rules.

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the

attainment ofjustice,such that any rigid and strict application thereof which
results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always
be avoided.

It is in this essence that the process ofthe appeal should be allowed to

run its full course.

We cannot,however,overlook the procedural lapse patent in the appeal

for its non-compliance with Section 7, Rule 124^^ of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure in conjunction with Section 13, Rule 44^^ of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Appellant's Briefdid not contain the requisite
subject index and table of cited cases; worst, the Statement of Facts and
Antecedent Proceedings had no page references to the record. Unlike the
appeal procedure in the Court of Appeals which could have dismissed such
appeal outright under Rule 50 ofthe 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure,this Court
is not accorded the same provision under its Revised Internal Rules. The
criminal nature ofthe case is of primordial concern as what is at stake here is
the liberty of the accused. These procedural lapses are not fatal and hence,
can be disregarded for the nonce.^^

THE COURTIS RULING

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Accused-appellant does not even deny that on August 28, 2006, at the
time alleged in the Information, she was about to encash LBP Check No.

2® Section 7. Contents ofbrief. — The briefs In criminal cases shall have the same contents as provided in sections 13
and 14 of Rule 44. A certified true copy of the decision or final order appealed from shall be appended to the brief of
appellant.(7a)

^Section 13. Contents ofappellant's brief. — The appellant's brief shall contain, in the order herein indicated,the
following:

(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and a table of cases
alphabetically arranged,textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they are cited; x x x.
✓

28 People V. Dela Concha,6.R. No.140205,September 3,2002

People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 10
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0000467807 in the amount of P35,000.00 at Landbank-Aurora Branch,

Cubao, Quezon City. Only, she averred that she was only doing so upon the
instruction ofBarangay Chairperson Abundo and that the signature appearing
therein was that of Abundo, having signed it in her presence. She maintains
that there was no truth to the allegation that she forged the signature on the
check.^^

At the heart ofthe appeal, therefore, is the trial court's finding that the
check was a forged instrument to make the accused-appellant liable for the
crime charged.

The trial court's own independent

assessment that the signature
appearing on subject check was
forged,, without resorting to expert
evidence,is sufficient in itself.

Accused's insistence that she did not forge subject check was debunked
by the trial court in this wise:

XXX this Court is morally convinced that accused is guilty of

committing falsification of commercial document by counterfeiting or
imitating the handwriting/signature of Barangay Captain Andrew S.
Abundo of Barangay Marilag, Project 4, Quezon City. A close perusal of
the subject chebk Land Bank of the Philippines Check No. 0000467807
(Exhibit("F")and the defense's own evidence. Certification dated February
15, 2005 (Exhibit "2") would certainly show marked differences on their
respective strokes and style of writing. Apparently,there is clear evidence
of an effort to counterfeit or imitate the signature of Barangay Captain
Abundo. x x x.

No reversible error can be ascribed at this instance.

The observations made by the trial court on the disparity in the

handwriting strokes and style of the signature were validly assumed. The
expert opinion ofa handwriting expert need not be resorted to. As pronounced
in G& MPhilippines v. CuamhoV?^

X X X the opinions of handwriting experts, although

helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical
procedure involved in the analysis, are not binding upon the courts. As
such, resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the
examination or the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery
does not depend entirely on the testimonies ofhandwriting experts, because
the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned
signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity. No less than Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the

Vide: Judicial Affidavit of Alell Serrano y Abella, Q3 & A3 to 09 & A9

3® 6.R. No.162308, November 22,2006 Y
•$
People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 111 P a g e
SB-16-A/R-0004
DECISION ON APPEAL

disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the

party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge." Indeed, the authenticity of signatures is not a
• highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g.,
quantum physics or topology, or molecular biology, would constitute
matters ofa highly technical nature. The opinion ofa handwriting expert on
the genuineness ofa questioned signature is certainly much less compelling
upon ajudge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical
issue.[Emphasis supplied]

Accused-appellant cannot, therefore, insist that the opinion of a

handwriting expert should have been consulted first to show proofofforgery.
Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting.^^ To reiterate, the authenticity of a
signature though often the subject of proffered expert testimony, is a matter
that is not so highly technical as to preclude a judge firom examining the
signature himself and ruling upon the question of whether the signature on a
document is forged or not. A finding offorgery does not depend exclusively
on the testimonies of expert witnesses as judges can and must use their own
judgment, through an independent examination of the questioned signature,
in determining the authenticity of the handwriting. This was what the trial
court did, and this will not be disturbed on appeal.^^

Besides, the trial court was not hard-pressed to find any other basis on
record to establish forgery.^^ Prosecution witness Andrew S. Abundo himself
disputed the authenticity of his signature on subject check, as follows:

COURT:

Q: Could you show us your regular signature and one that is

authentic?

A: Here, Your Honor, my letter to Atty. Ronillo.^"^

FISCAL ALMONTE

Q: In this letter dated August 11, 2006, there is a signature of

Andrew S. Abundo,can you tell us the difference in your genuine signature
as to the signature appearing in the Landbank check which [you] deny
signing the same?

A: The second letter"A"is slightly curved downward while my

regular stroke is upward, sir.^^

China Banking Corp. v. Lagan,6.R. No. 160843,11 July 2006 ^ «

32 Belgica v. Belgica, G.R. NO.149738, August 28,2007 «
33Spouses Alfaro v. Court ofAppeals,et al., G.R. No. 162864, March 28,2007 w ^*
34 See Exhibit"D" / ^
35TSNdatedJulv30,2008,p.29 J
People V. Aleli Abeiia-Serrano 12
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The trial court may not have specifically elucidated why there were
''^marked differences on[the]respective strokes and style ofwriting" but this
is only because there was no further need to state the obvious. The trial
court's comparison ofExhibit"F"(subject check)and Exhibit"2"(Barangay
Certificate No. 203-05) was enough to arrive at its conclusion that the
signature of Abundo on subject check was forged. The upward almost
diagonal slant ofthe signature as well as the compressed style with which the
letters were written, highlighted by the upward line by which the letter "A"
was crossed, was what gave way. But while Abundo limited the comparison
of his signature with his letter to Atty. Ronillo (Exhibit "D"), his signature
appearing in Exhibits "A" (Resolution No. 002 Series of 2002), "B"
(Resolution No. 012-S-06), and "C"(Request for Obligation of Allotment)
and "D"(letter dated August 11, 2006) are more telling with the finding of
disparity.

We reassert nonetheless that forgery is not presumed; it must be proved

by clear and convincing evidence and whoever alleges it has the burden of
proving the same. To determine forgery, it was held in Cesar vs.
Sandiganbayan^^ that:

[']The process of identification, therefore, must include the

determination ofthe extent, kind, and significance of this resemblance as
well as of the variation. It then becomes necessary to determine whether
the variation is due to the operation ofa different personality, or is only the
expected and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing ofthe same
writer. It is also necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the result
of a more or less skillful imitation, or is the habitual and characteristic
resemblance which naturally appears in a genuine writing. When these two
questions are correctly answered the whole problem of identification is
solved.["']

Where a comparison of prosecution witness Andrew S. Abundo's

signature was thus made and where he likewise took the witness stand to
testify on the same, a handwriting expert need not be called in to make a
deduction that the signature on subject check was forged.

More importantly, it cannot be overlooked that subject check was found

in accused-appellant's possession who then had every intention to encash the
forged check. Under these circumstances, there arose the legal presumption
that the possessor and user of a falsified document is the forger thereof.^^
When it is proved that a person has in one's possession a falsified document
and makes use ofthe same,the presumption or inference is justified that such
person is the forger. The rule is &at ifa person had in his possession a falsified
document and made use of it(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting
thereby, the presumption is that one is the material author ofthe falsification.

G.R. Nos. 54719-50,January 17,1985, quoting Osborn,The Problem of Proof, lifted from Viaje, etal. v. Pamlntel, et
ai, G.R. No.147792, January 23,2006
^ Caubang v. People, G.R. No.62634, June 26,1992
People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 13
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This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so
closely-connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be
proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close
cormection with the forgers, and, therefore, had complicity in the forgery. In
the absence ofa satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession ofa
forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.^^

The finding offorgery ofthe trial court,therefore, will not be disturbed.

There lies no need to re-calibrate or

re-evaluate the testimony of
principal witness Andrew S.
Abundo as no inconsistencies
marred his judicial declarations.

In this case, the records bear out that three (3) trial judges heard the
testimony of witnesses in the following sequence:

(i) the testimony of prosecution witness Andrew S. Abundo was heard

by former Presiding Judge Leah S. Domingo-Regala on July 30,2008;

(ii) the testimony of prosecution witness SP03 Joel Sioson was heard
by Acting Presiding Judge Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla on December 2,
2010;

(iii) the respective testimonies of prosecution witness Yvette V. Luna

and accused-appellant were heard by incumbent Presiding Judge Manuel B.
Sta. Cruz, Jr. on Februaiy 20,2014 and May 11,2015.

While the accused-appellant has not raised an issue in this regard, let it
be said nonetheless that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous
solely because the judge who heard the case was not the same judge who
rendered the decision. In fact,it is not necessary for the validity ofajudgment
that the judge who penned the decision should actually hear the case in its
entirety, for he can merely rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken
during the trial as the basis for his decision.^^

The purported inconsistencies pointed by the accused-appellant in the

testimony of Barangay Chairperson Andrew S. Abundo, however, were
culled more from the prying questions and cutting remarks made by former
Presiding Judge Leah S. Domingo-Regala, quoted in the Appellant's Briefs as
follows:

38 Serrano v. Court ofAppeals and People, G.R. No. 123896, June 25,2003 i *
33 Kummer v. People,G.R. No.174461, September 11,2013 '^
People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 14
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In page 17 of the TSN on the testimony of Kap. Abundo dated July 30,
2008:

Court: So how do you check whether you should sign the check
already? What do you do?
XXX XXX XXX XXX

XXX

Witness: It will be checked, Your honor.

Court: You did not mention that. You must be complete in your
answer, you're on the witness stand.
In page 18 to 19 of the TSN of the.same witness, the Court was able to
observe as follows:

Court: You mean to say it is the Treasurer who certifies whether

thefimds is available? Earlier you have a different answer.
Witness: Adequate, your honor.
Court: You really do not know what you are saying and what you
are talking about. How can the Court believe you, you're not
credible that way.
The same presiding judge has also noted that the evidences being
presented were mere generalizations and not proofs of the case. With the
questioning of the presiding judge, witness Abundo also admitted that he would
based [sic] in his memory whether he signed a check or not.In page 23 ofthe same
TSN,we find:

Q: So you based that in your memory, you mean, whether you

signed a check or not?
A:Somehow,I based it in my memory that Iwas not able to sigp
as such and I also asked the Committee Chairman of the
Appropriations Committee'ifthere is an allotment but he told me
that there was none your Honor.
Further reading of the TSN would also show that witness-complainant
Abundo also admitted that while he knew ofthe accused alleged forgeries in the
past, he did not lose confidence in her. In fact he also admitted that there were
instances when he found out of some alleged forgeries but that he did not do
anything and that even after knowing these, accused continued to act as the
Barangay's treasurer.
Court: You see. Earlier, Iwas asking you about when in the past
she also madeforgeries ofchecks and you said you wrote to the
bank manager. But that is not referring to the present case
already. So during thefirst time that she did that in the past, you
did not do anything, correct?
Witness: Yes your honor.
(page 26, TSN ofKap. Abundo, dated July 30, 2008)
Court: That is now but in the past, you did not. You said you did
not do anything, you did not take action because you did not
check So ifthat is unchecked, that is not true, you have no basis
for stating that. It was a loose statement without basis. You did
not check It is not true that in the past you did it. It is not true.
You did not take action, you did not do anything.
XXX XXX XXX XXX

1
People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 15
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A perusal of*the entire transcript of stenographic notes taken on the

testimony of prosecution witness Andrew S. Abundo showed that former
Presiding Judge Leah S. Domingo-Regala snagged more queries from the
witness than the public prosecutor could muster, ranging from questions that
often berate the witness on barangay procedure"^® to arguments she herself
raised on why no action was done when accused-appellant was found to
encash forged checks in the past/^ These are not inconsistencies that would
erode the truth or destroy the credibility of the prosecution witness. These
are mere perceptions ofthe trial judge whose overwrought intervention in the
trial has done more to upstage the prosecutor or the defense counsel in
examining the witness. The reference that the witness has not mentioned or
completed an answer, or did not know what he was talking about, or did not
do anj^hing in the past to report the malfeasance of the accused-appellant,
were remarks generated from Judge Regala's own questioning on how
barangay disbursement was made, which did not even proceed as follow up
points from the questions propounded by the public prosecutor. It is obvious
that Judge Regala wanted to know more about the budget cycle in barangay
appropriations but could not stop herselffrom voicing opinionated statements
that appeared overbearing, if not scathing. It was only fortunate that main
witness Andrew S. Abundo did not lose his equanimity, despite the rigors of
the courtroom, and stood his ground.

Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot isolate such tongue-lashing

comments from the trialjudge in her favor when an overall review ofthe same
showed no inconsistency. The material testimony of prosecution witness
Andrew S. Abundo that accused-appellant was caught red-handed in
encashing a forged check with no barangay appropriation to account for
remained unblemished. In this regard, no inconsistency was belabored by the
accused-appellant, when this was tlie main crux ofthe criniinal charge.

At the time of the commission of the crime, accused-appellant was

indisputably the appointed Barangay Treasurer ofBarangay Marilag, Quezon
City."^^ As such, under Section 395 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise
known as The Local Government Code, accused-appellant was mandated to
perform the following functions and duties:

(e)The barangay treasurer shall:

COURT: Thafs why I was wondering why the Secretary did not certify [the barangay resolution]. You were the
witness then, you are the one who certified those documents? That is self-serving. You ask your Barangay Secretary
to certify that(TSN dated July 30, 2008, p. 5)

COURT: The question is why did you not take action against her no matter what she did?

Witness Abundo: We suspended her right after we discovered. Your Honor.

COURT: That is not true, she continued to be your Treasurer until after August 28,2006. You cannot even
remember[when]in the past you claim that her forge[ry] happened and you did not even do anything about that.
You did not even suspend her then because she continued to be your Treasurer.
(TSN dated July 30,2008, p. 31)

^2 Exhibits "A" and "A-r

 People V. Aieii Abella-Serrano 16
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(1)Keep custody of barangay funds and properties;

(2) Collect and issue official receipts for taxes, fees, contributions,
monies, materials, and all other resources accruing to the barangay treasury
and deposit the same in the account ofthe barangay as provided imder Title
Five,Book II ofthis Code;

(3) Disburse funds in accordance with the financial procedures

provided in this Code;

(4) Submit to the punong barangay a statement covering the actual

and estimates of income and expenditures for the preceding and ensuing
calendar years, respectively, subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book II
ofthis Code;

(5) Render a written accounting report of all barangay funds and

property imder his custody at the end ofeach calendar year, and ensure that
such report shall be made available to the members of the barangay
assembly and other government agencies concemed;

(6)Certify as to the availability offunds whenever necessary;

(7)Plan and attend to the rural postal circuit within his jurisdiction;
and

(8) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.

In this contemplation, the accounts and financial records of the

barangay were kept in the custody of the accused-appellant as Barangay
Treasurer, which included checks drawn against the depository account ofthe
barangay. Accused-appellant was one ofthe authorized signatories in checks
for purposes of disbursing barangay funds, the other being the barangay
chairperson."^^ Hence,it did not come surprising that she had in her possession
at the time of her apprehension subject check. Only, the disbursement being
made was unauthorized. As significantly pointed out by Barangay
Chairperson Abundo, the check disbursement had no allocation fi*om the
Committee on Appropriation ofthe baranagay, as certified to by prosecution
witness Kagawad Yvette V. Luna in her capacity as Chairperson of said
committee."^"^ Her warrantless arrest by SP03 Joel Sioson only followed as a
matter of course."^^

No inconsistency here prevailed; on the contrary, the respective

testimonies of Kagawad Yvette V. Luna and SP03 Joel Sioson strongly
bolstered the accusation made by Barangay Chairperson Abundo. Besides, it
is not for accused-appellant to speculate that it was Landbank branch manager

vide: Barangay Fund Management viewed from http://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/BB-6.pdf

on October 18,2017
^TSN dated February 20,2014, pp.4-7; Exhibit"E"
^TSN dated December 2,2010, pp.4-5; Exhibit"H"
///
People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 17 1 P a g e
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DECISION ON APPEAL

Atty. Rosemarie J. Ronillo who was the vital witness who could have given a
firsthand account ofthe check encashment at the bank. Only the prosecutor
has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for
the prosecution."^^ The non-presentation of Atty. Ronillo as a witness by the
prosecution is thus not tantamount to suppression ofevidence. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly ruled that the prosecution may decide on who should be
presented as witnesses. Moreover,the adverse presumption from suppression
of evidence is not applicable when (1)the suppression is not wilful;(2)the
evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative;(3)
the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an
exercise of a privilege."^^ If accused-appellant was truly convinced that Atty.
Ronillo could shed more light in her favor, she could have called her as a
witness, but she did not.

We thus remain penchant to the time-honored rule that in the matter of

credibility of witnesses, the fmdings of the trial court, in ordinary criminal
proceedings, are given weight and respect by appellate courts and, generally,
will not be disturbed on appeal. Deviation from this rule will only be allowed
if there is any showing diat the trial judge overlooked some material or
substantial facts which, if given consideration, will alter the assailed
decision."^^

We,therefore, find no reason to deviate from the factual findings and

conclusions ofthe trial court.

The preventive suspension of the

accused-appellant will have a
substantial bearing on her
conviction for the crime of
malversation

There is no question that accused-appellant is an accountable officer

pursuant to Section 101 (1) of P.D. No. 1445 which defines an accountable
officer to be "every officer ofany government agency whose duties permit or
require the possession or custody ofgovernmentfunds or property shall be
accountable therefor andfor the safekeeping thereofin conformity with law,"
As already adverted to,among the duties ofthe accused-appellant as Barangay
Treasurer under Section 395 of Republic Act No. 7160 is "fkjeep custody of
barangayfunds andproperties.

Angeles v. People, G.R. No.172744, September 29,2008

47 People V. De Jesus, G.R. No.93852, January 24,1992
4
' ,

^Ambagan,Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos.204481-82, October 14,2015

-♦s People V. Pantaleon, Jr., etal., G.R. Nos. 158694-96, March 13,2009
People V. Aleii Abella-Serrano 18
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DECISION ON APPEAL

Per Resolution No.012-S-06 dated August 10,2006,^® it would appear,

however, that accused-appellant was imposed an indefinite suspension for
breach of trust and loss of confidence by the Sangguniang Barangay of
Barangay Marilag effective August11,2006. This fact cannot be overlooked,
especially when accused-appellant points out in her Appellant's Brief that
there was no proofthat she has received the order or resolution ofsuspension;
hence, there may be truth to her claim that she did not know about her
indefinite suspension in the first place.^^ The Prosecution, however,
disregarded proofofsuch notice,rationalizing that her suspension fi'om office
is "neither an indispensablefact nor an essential element that needed to he
established under the given circumstances.

Contraiy to prosecution's stance, the imposition of indefinite

suspension^^ is material in determining whether the crime of Attempted
Malversation was committed. . For how can an accused under indefinite
suspension be liable for malversation if she is temporarily incapacitated from
performing the duties of her office, particularly in the custody of barangay
fimds, as in this case?

Necessarily, the concept of preventive suspension, like indefinite

suspension, has to be taken into consideration.

In the case of Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,^^ the Supreme Court En

Banc ruled that as an effect of preventive suspension, the suspended official
is barredfrom performing thefunctions of his office and does not receive
salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office.
Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-
controlled conditions and gives a premium to the protection ofthe service
rather than to the interests of the individual office holder. Even then,
protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition on
the exercise of the functions of the official's office; the official is reinstated
to the exercise ofhis position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted.

In this context, is it even crucial to determine, as accused-appellant

harps, that she was actually served with a copy of the barangay resolution
imposing upon her indefinite suspension? Apparently,this is not so.

Significantly, in the case of Legaspi v. City of Cebu, et al.,^^ the

Supreme Court belabored a discussion on the constitutional guaranty of due

50 Exhibit "B"
51 at paragraph 25
52 Brieffor the Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 15
53 Per DILG Legal Opinion No.41,s. 2009 citing DILG Legal Opinion No.38 s. 2003,the determination of the conditions
upon which preventive suspension may be imposed is vested exclusively with the sanggunian concerned. Preventive
suspension is said to be an incident to jurisdiction and/or tool for the disciplining authority; that is, the sanggunian
concerned, to make use In the course of its administrative investigation. See also Section 389 (b)(5) of the Local
Government Code
^ G.R. No. 184836, December 23,2009 - ^
55 G.R. No.159110, December 10,2013

f/' ^
People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 19 1 P a g e
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DECISION ON APPEAL

process of law as against any arbitrariness on the part of the Government,

whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary.
Among other salient points, it emphasized that:

Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due

process. Yet, there are many instances under our laws in which the
absence of one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial
or deprivation of due process. Among the instances are the cancellation of
the passport of a person being sought for the commission of a crime, the
preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges,
the distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies, the padlocking of
restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies,
and the abatement of nuisance per se. Add to them the arrest of a person in
flagrante delicto.[Emphasis supplied]

XXX XXX XXX XXX.

The ratio has been fully explained in the vintage case of Comejo v.
Gabriel, et which truth still echoes to this time, viz:

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an
administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge
Cooley,the leading American writer on Constitutional Law,has well said,
due process oflaw is not necessarilyjudicial process; much ofthe process
by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order ofsociety
maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due
process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of
right in judicial proceedings,in administrative proceedings it is otherwise
since they rest upon different principles.(Weimer vs. Bunbury [1874],30
Mich., 201; Den. vs. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. [1856], 18
How., 272, followed in Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco [1910], 16 Phil., 534;
Tan Te vs. Bell [1914], 27 Phil., 354; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus [1915], 31
Phil.,218 and other Philippine cases.)In certain proceedings,therefore,
of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of
contradictions that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential
to due process oflaw. Examples ofspecifically or summary proceedings
affecting the life, liberty or property ofthe individual without any hearing
can easily be recalled. Among these are the arrest of an offender pending
the filing ofcharges; the restraint of property in tax cases; the granting of
preliminary injunctions ex parte; and the suspension of officers or
employees by the Governor General or a Chief of a Bureau pending
an investigation. (See Weimer vs. Bunbury, supra; 12 C. J., 1224;
Administrative Code,sec. 694).[Emphasis supplied]

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law
prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office as "property." It
is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office is not
property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due
process oflaw, but is a public trust or agency.In the case ofTaylor vs.
Beckham ([1899], 178 U. S., 548), Mr. Chief Justice Fuller sjaid that:
."Decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere agencies

56G.R. No. 16887, November 17,1920,041 Phil 188

//• f
People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 20
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DECISION ON APPEAL

or trusts, and not property as such." The basic idea of government in the
Philippine Islands, as in the United States, is that of a popular
representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers
of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or
contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office
pursuant to the provisions ofthe law and holds the office as a trust for the
people whom he represents.

Coming now to the more specific consideration ofthe issue in this

case, we turn to the article by Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, generally
considered the leading authority in the United States on the subject of
Administration LaWj in Vol. 29, Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, and
find the rule as to suspension of public officers laid down very concisely
as follows: "Power to suspend may be exercised without notice to the
person suspended." (P. 1405.) The citation by Professor Goodnow to
support his conclusion is State of Florida, ex rel. Attorney-General vs.
Johnson ([1892], 30 Fla., 433; 18 L. R. A.,410). It was here held by the
Supreme Court ofFlorida that the governor could,imder section 15 ofthe
executive article of the Constitutions suspend an officer for neglect of
duty in office without giving previous notice to the officer of the charge
made against him.

A later compilation ofthe pertinent authorities is to be found in 22

Ruling Case Law, pp. 564, 565. On the subject of suspension of public
officers it is here said:

"The suspension of an officer pending his trial for misconduct,so

as to tie his h^ds for the time being,seems to be universally accepted as
fair, and often necessary.... Notice and hearing are not prerequisites to
suspension unless required by statute and therefore suspension without
such notice does not deprive the officer of property without due process
of law. Nor is a suspension wanting in due process oflaw or a denial of
the equal protection ofthe laws because the evidence against the officer
is not produced and he is not given an opportunity to confront his accusers
and cross-examine the witnesses."

XXX XXX XXX XXX.

Regardless of whether accused-appellant was notified of Resolution

No.012-S-06 imposing upon her indefinite suspension,therefore, she was,for
all intents and purposes, suspended from office effective August 11, 2006.
Indeed, the office she serves is not property she can hold on to, for public
office is public trust. This is only concomitant to Section 389 of the Local
Government Code where she can be appointed, and removed, from office
upon approval ofthe majority ofthe members ofthe Sangguniang Barangay.
To wit:

Section 389. ChiefExecutive: Powers, Duties, and Functions. -

(a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay

government, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties and
functions, as provided by this Code and other laws.
People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 211 P a g e
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DECISION ON APPEAL

(b)For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose

of which is the general welfare ofthe barangay and its inhabitants pursuant
to Section 16 ofthis Code,the punong barangay shall:

XXX XXX XXX xxx;

(5) Upon approval by a majority of all the members of the

sangguniang barangay,appoint or replace the barangay treasurer,the
barangay secretary, and other appointive barangay officials; [Emphasis
supplied].

Atthe time ofher apprehension on August28, 2006,it is thus odd why

accused-appellant still held in her possession a check charged to the account
of Barangay Marilag which she attempted to encash. Under these
circumstances,can she still be held liable for the complex crime ofAttempted
Malversation thru Falsification of Commercial Document?

For a prosecution ofthe crime of malversation to prosper, concurrence

ofthe following elements must be satisfactorily proved:

(a)the offender is a public officer;

(b)the offender has custody or control of the funds or property by

reason ofthe duties of his office;

(c)the funds or property are public funds or property for which he

is accoimtable, and, most importantly; and

(d) the offender has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or

consented, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take them.^^

Since accused-appellant was under indefinite suspension at the time of

the commission of ihe crime on August 28, 2006, the second element is
inescapably missing. Her temporary prohibition from holding office barred
her firom exercising the functions of her office which is the custody of
barangayfunds and properties under Article 395^® ofthe Local Government
Code. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot be held liable for malversation
which was alleged and proven to be in the attempted stage. In this regard,she
must be acquitted ofthe crime of Attempted Malversation.

Accused-appellant, however, should answer for the remaining offense

of Falsification of a Commercial Document, which elements have been
sufficiently established in this case, viz:

57 Panganiban v. People,6.R. No. 211543, December 9,2015

5® Section 395. Barangay Treasurer: Appointment, Qualification, Powers and Duties,-xxx
xxx xxx xxx.

(e)The barangay treasurer shall: ^ ^

(1)Keep custody of barangay funds and properties; y
People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 22
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DECISION ON APPEAL

(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public

officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position;

(2) that the offender committed any of the acts of

falsification enumerated in Article 171 ofthe RPC; and

(3) that the falsification was committed in a public,

official or commercial document.^^

The ruling made in Monteverde v. People, is apropos:

X X X. Still, acquittal firom a component offense will not

necessarily lead to an acquittal fi'om the other(or others). When a complex
crime under Article 48 ofthe Revised Penal Code is charged,it is axiomatic
that the prosecution must allege in the information and prove during the trial
all the elements ofall the offenses constituting the complex crime. We stress
that the failure ofthe prosecution to prove one ofthe component crimes and
the acquittal arising fiierefi-om will not necessarily lead to a declaration of
innocence for the other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex
crime is charged and the evidence fails to establish one of the component
offenses, the defendant can be convicted ofthe others, so long as they are
proved.

The first element has been established, as accused-appellant herself

does not deny that she was appointed as Barangay Treasurer of Barangay
Marilag of Quezon City per Resolution No.002-S-2002.^^

The existence ofthe second element is tied to the forged signature of

Barangay Chairperson Abundo found on subject check.^^ The forged nature
of such signature has already been affirmed despite the absence of an expert
handwriting analysis on the matter.

The third element has been concretized with the presentation of

Landbank Check No. 0000467807 dated August 28, 2006 in the amount of
R35,000.00 which was found in the possession ofthe accused-appellant at the
time she attempted to encash the same. There is no question that subject
check is an instrument which has the peculiar qualities as a commercial
document as it places certain funds under the special control of its lawful
holder so long as it is retained in one's possession, giving the holder not only
the right to the funds against which it is dravm, but a claim against the drawer
and previous endorsers in the event of a failure ofthese funds in whole or in
part.^^
)

In this sense, accused-appellant had every intention to utter subject

check by presenting the same with the forged signature of Barangay

David V. Agbay,G.R. No. 199113, March 18,2015

G.R. No. 139610, August 12,2002
61 Exhibit "A"I
62 Exhibit "F"
/•
66 United States v.Sham, G.R. No.6781, November 6,1911
People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 23
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Chairperson Abundo, the other authorized signatory thereto. Such instance

consummated the offense^ in contemplation ofthe following ruling, viz:

"[W]henever someone has in his possession falsified documents

[which he used to] his advantage and benefit, the presumption that he
authored it arises."

.. . This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged

documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user
or possessor may be proven to have the capacity ofcommitting the forgery,
or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity
in the forgery.

In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in

possession ofa forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed
to be the forger.

Certainly, the channeling of the subject payments via false

remittances to his savings account, his subsequent withdrawals of said
amount as well as his unexplained flight at the height ofthe bank's inquiry
into the matter more than sufficiently establish .. . involvement in the
falsification.^"^

Accused-appellant's denial that subject check for payment was signed

by Andy," without satisfactorily explaining why this diverged from
barangay appropriation procedure, should only wane. As a matter of fact,
during trial, accused-appellant was candid enough to admit that:

In her cross examination, the accused admitted that: she started

working as Barangay Treasurer of Barangay Marilag on August 16, 2002;
in the disbursement offunds in the barangay, she first makes a request for
appropriation or allotment, which is done by the Punong Barangay; the
same request is approved by the Chairman ofthe Commission of Accounts
as to the availability of funds; thereafter the Chairman of Appropriations
certifies to the existence of the appropriations; she in turn certifies the
availability of funds for the obligations; when she attempted to encash
Land Bank check no. 0000467807 there was no request for
appropriation; likewise there is no approval by the Chairman of
Commission on Accounts regarding the availability of allotment; also
there is no Certification from the Chairman of Appropriations that
there was an existence of appropriations; finally as a Barangay
Treasurer, she has no Certification of any availability of funds
amounting to P35,000.00.^^ [Emphasis supplied]

Accused-appellant's hand in the falsification of the commercial

document cannot be denied since she was not even authorized to possess
subject check in the first place in view of her indefinite suspension.
Considering it was her who took advantage ofand intended to profittherefirom
through the use of the forged check, the presumption was that she was the

^People V. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6,2014 f'

® Vide: Judgment dated August 25,2015, p.3; Records, Volume 1, p. 173
/■f
People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 24
|P a g e
SB-16-A/R-0004
DECISION ON APPEAL

material author ofthe falsification.^^ Accused-appellant's denial of her guilt

is thus not sufficient to destroy the probative value of the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution.

For her penalty for Falsification, Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code^^ provides:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or

ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary who,taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any ofthe following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

XXX XXX XXX XXX.

The value ofthe defraudation is regardless as the same is not taken into
account in the imposition of the prescribed penalty, unlike malversation,
estafa or thefl. Following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term ofthe penalty should be within the range ofthe penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed for
Falsification is prision mayor, the penalty next lower would then be prision
correccional which has a duration ofsix(6)months and one(1)day to six(6)
years. We fix the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty at four (4)
years and two(2) months. Then again, in fixing the maximum term, note is
taken that no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commission
of the crime; hence, the medium period ofprision mayor shall be imposed
which has a duration ofeight(8)years and one(1)day to ten(10)years. We
fix the maximum term at eight(S^years and one(1)day.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED.

The assailed Judgment dated August 25,2015 ofthe Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 226, is hereby MODIFIED,finding accused-appellant
Aleli Abella-Serrano GUILTY ofthe crime of Falsification ofCommercial,
Document defined and penalized under Article 171 ofthe Revised Penal Code
and is hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty offour(4)years and two(2)
months ofprision correccional as minimum to eight(8)years and one(1)day
of prision mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant is likewise imposed the
penalty of FINE ofFive Thousand Pesos(P5,000.00). /

Vide: Pacasum v. People, G.R. No. 180314, April 16,2009

"Amended by Republic Act 10951 but which cannot be given retroactive effect at this instance since the prescribed
penalty is higher and hence, not favorable to the accused-appellant
People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 25 I P a g e
SB-16-A/R-0004
DECISION ON APPEAL

SO ORDERED.

MA.THERESA DOEDRES C.GOMEZ-ESTOESTA

Associafe Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

V.TRESPESES BAYAMHIJJACINTO
mssociateJustice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

got.
»^ORES
MA.THERESA DOttORES C.GOMEZ-ESTOESTA
Associate Justice, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer ofthe opinion ofthe Court's Division.

[FARO M.CABOT^JE-TA]
Presiding Justice