G.R. No.
93475 June 5, 1991 We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner is actually
ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along
Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type jeep, then
driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then
driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and
injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal.
Two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2 of
Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's
victim. The information reads as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the
Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
above-named accused, being the driver of an owner-
type jeep with Plate No. NCC-313 UV Pil. '85 which hit
and bumped a motorized tricycle with Plate No. NA-
6575-MC '85 driven by Ernesto Reyes and as a
consequence of which Paulino Gonzal and Ernesto
Reyes sustained physical injuries and lost
consciousness, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously abandoned (sic) them and failed (sic)
to help or render assistance to them, without justifiable
reason.
On 29 June 1987 the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig rendered
its decision in Criminal Case No. 2793 finding the petitioner
guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined
and penalized under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner appealed.
Subsequently, petitioner filed this instant petition and he raises
this sole issue: could there be a valid charge for alleged
abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides as basis for prosecution. "2. Anyone who
shall fail to help another whom he has accidentallywounded or
injured" when, he was previously charged with "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple
physical injuries" under Article 265 (sic) of the Revised Penal
Code?
He maintains the negative view and supports it with the
argument that "[f]or the same act, that is, the vehicular collision,
one could not be indicted in two separate informations at the
same time based on "accident" and "recklessness', for there is
a world of difference between "reckless imprudence" and
"accidentally'."
Issue: whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for
abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code.
The Supreme Court holds in the negative because said
Articles penalize different and distinct offenses. The rule on
double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does
not, therefore, apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence.
invoking his right against double jeopardy.1âwphi1 He,
however, failed to directly and categorically state it in his petition
or deliberately obscured it behind a suggestion of possible
resultant absurdity of the two informations. The reason seems
obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the three courts
below. In any case, to do so would have been a futile exercise.
When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. 2793, he was not yet
arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before the Regional Trial
Court. As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the former
was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in the
latter took place only on 27 April 1989.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b)
before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
He is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised
Penal Code.
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy
may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses.
A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under
one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased
elsewhere, where two different laws (or articles of the same
code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses
arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important
act which is not an essential element of the
other.
The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for
separate offenses.1âwphi1 The first, Criminal Case No.
64294, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the
sole chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi
Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The
second, Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one's
victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes
Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal
Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.
Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or procedural
obstacle barred the filing of the two informations against
petitioner.

PEOPLE VS REYES (G.R. NO. L-21528- L-21529)
FACTS:
The petitioner, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee
of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City. He led a
group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in
front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at
Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such
as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;", "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin" and
others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col.
Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at
Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations
between personnel of the naval station and the civilian
population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col.
Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the
demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the place and talked to
Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that
the demonstration was not directed against the naval station but
against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their
having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from
the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them to
demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that
they would like the people in the station to know how they felt
about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they
did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted to blow off
steam."
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval
station. When he learned about the demonstration he became
apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's
protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother,
and another person in going out of the station, using his
(Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon
purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of Reyes.
He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at
the placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw
Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded
their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the
car while the other to led behind. After Hallare and his
companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos
St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of
Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes
got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right
hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he
shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin,
mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter,
he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises.
Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and
the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.
On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was
charged with grave threats and grave oral defamation
On the day of the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the
information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by
deleting therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel
objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had
already been arraigned on the original information and that the
amendment "would affect materially the interest of the accused."
Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial
proceeded.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amendment of information for grave
threats is substantial
2. Whether or not petitioner should be charged with grave
threats only.
HELD:
1. NO.
After a careful consideration of the original information, we find
that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in
Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its
paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender
threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of
a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that
the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner could
have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the
aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the
threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such
that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and
essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it change
the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened
to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo
any material change or modification in his defense. Petitioner
was not exposed after the amendment to the danger of
conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for
a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended
information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In
our view the deletion of the word "orally" was effected in order
to make the information conformable to the evidence to be
presented during the trial. It was merely a formal amendment
which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.
2. YES
The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of
the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with
threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their
persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence;
and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in
repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to
only one conclusion: that the threats were made "with the
deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person
threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect.
It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and
not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were
by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of
the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough
expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to
slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom,
if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a
reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should
be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against
Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed
and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as
Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation)
is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No.
2594, for grave threats, with costs against petitioner.
CALUAG vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 171511 March 4, 2009
FACTS:
Around 4:00 in the afternoon, Nestor, one of the witnesses
presented, learned that two of his guests from an earlier drinking
spree were mauled. At that time, Caluag and Sentillas were
drinking. When Nestor inquired from several people including
his own son Raymond what happened, Caluag butted in and
replied, Bakit kasama ka ba roon?, and immediately boxed him
without warning. Nestor retaliated but he was overpowered by
Caluag and Sentillas. Julia saw Caluag and Sentillas box her
husband. Although she tried to pacify them, they did not listen
to her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia
followed him. At around 6:00 p.m., Nestor told his wife to report
the boxing incident to the barangay authorities.
At around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen
were on their way to their barangay hall, she encountered
Caluag, who blocked her way at the alley near her
house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun, poked it at her
forehead, and said Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito? Despite this
fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to the barangay
hall where she reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay
authorities.
For the defense, Caluag stated that Nestor was drunk and unruly
and blocked his way. He also stated that it was Nestor who
boxed on the face which caused him to fall down. Nestor
pursued him and punched him again. Thereafter, an unidentified
man from the crowd armed with a knife went towards Nestor but
Sentillas timely interceded and pacified the man. Sentillas never
boxed Nestor. Caluag also denied poking a gun at Julia.
which amounts to a crime, and the threat to kill was not
subject to a condition.
The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia
Denido left her house to go to the barangay hall to report the
mauling of her husband which she witnessed earlier at around
4:00 o’clock in the afternoon. On her way there, petitioner
confronted her and pointed a gun to her forehead, while at the
same time saying “Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?” Considering
what transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia’s husband,
petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead clearly
enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her
person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the context
of the surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not go
against the threat to kill or to inflict serious injury evinced by
petitioner’s accompanying act. Given the surrounding
circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 282,
par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone
amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to
a condition.
The threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not
constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between
grave threats on one hand, and light and other light threats
on the other.
Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it
specifically states, “shall threaten another with a weapon or
draw such weapon in a quarrel,” since it presupposes that the
threat to commit a wrong will not constitute a crime.

MeTC: found Caluag and Sentillas guilty of slight physical

injuries, and Caluag guilty of grave threats.

RTC & CA: Affirmed in toto the joint decision of the MeTC.

Contention the petitioner: Petitioner argues that assuming

that he did poke a gun at Julia, the crime committed was other
light threats as defined under Article 285, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of grace threats?

HELD:
Yes, the Court sustained the conviction of the petitioner.

In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime

which may or may not be accompanied by a condition. In light
threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but
is always accompanied by a condition. In other light threats,
the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is
no condition.

The acts committed by the accused constituted grave

threats where there was a threat to kill or shoot someone,
Jose Timoner vs People

FACTS:

Jose Timoner, the petitioner, was convicted by the Municipal

Court of Daet with the crime of Grave Coercion, as penalized
under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, because of the
complaint by Pascual Dayaon, Lourdes Rabustillos and others.
Timoner, then Mayor of Daet, together with two uniformed
policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six
laborers, was acting on the recommendation of Dra. Allegre, the
Municipal Health Officer, to close among other structures that
were along the sidewalk, the barbershop of Dayaon and store of
Rabustillos. Timoner filed a complaint in the CFI of Camarines
Norte against Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of
their stalls, alleged that the stalls constituted public nuisances
as well as per se. The petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which was the Intermediate Appellate Court then,
however, the CA affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court.
Petitioner claimed that their actions was done in abatement of a
public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Timoner committed Grave Coercion

HELD:

The petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged. He did not

commit Grave Coercon as the elements of Grave Coercion 1)
that a person is prevented by another from doing something not
prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will,
be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or compulsion is
effected by violence, threats or intimidation; and 3) that the
person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right
to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under
authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. required
that he acted not under the authority of the law. As the then
Mayor of the City, Timoner had the authority to act on behalf of
the recommendation and his constituents’ right to public order
and safety, and that such stalls along the sidewalk affected the
community and general public, as it is in a public place, and was
annoying to all who come within its sphere. The Supreme Court
did contend that the barbershop did constitute a public nuisance,
as defined under Article 694 and 695 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Furthermore, it had been recommended for closure
by the Municipal Health Officer.
G.R. No. 90423 September 6, 1991
FRANCIS LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
PELAGIA PANLINO DE CHIN, respondents.
ART. 286. Grave coercions. — The penalty of arresto m
ayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upo
n any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of v
iolence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited b
y law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether i
t be right or wrong.
If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling anot
her to perform any religious act or to prevent him from so doing
, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.
Facts:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 20, 1984, the co
mplainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin, 23 years old, was fet
ched from her house upon the instruction of the petitioner Bran
ch Manager Francis Lee of Pacific Banking Corporation (herein
after referred to as bank). The petitioner confronted the compla
inant about a forged Midland National Bank Cashier Check No.
3526794, which the latter allegedly deposited in the account of
Honorio Carpio. During the said confrontation, the petitioner Fr
ancis Lee was shouting at her with piercing looks and threaten
ed to file charges against her unless and until she returned all t
he money equivalent of the subject cashier check. Accordingly,
the complainant was caused to sign a prepared withdrawal slip
, and later, an affidavit prepared by the bank's lawyer, where sh
e was made to admit that she had swindled the bank and had r
eturn the money equivalent of the spurious check. It was about
six o'clock in the afternoon of the same day when the complain
ant was able to leave the bank premises.
We find that complainant's lengthy stay at the bank was not du
e to the petitioner's threat. It was rather due to her desire to pro
ve her innocence
Further, We find that contrary to complainant's allegations in he
r affidavit, it was not the petitioner who suggested the encashm
ent of the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate but her sister; and th
at again, it was not the petitioner who agreed to the sister's sug
gestion but Cruz, the PRO Manager, Foreign Department of th
e bank
Moreover, while complainant claimed that her freedom of move
ment was restrained, she, however, was able to move about fre
ely unguarded from the office of the petitioner situated at the gr
ound floor to the office of Cruz at the mezzanine floor where he
r sister found her.
The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the fa
ct that the complainant refused to sign the promissory note in s
pite of the alleged threats of the petitioner. American authoritie
s have declared that "(t)he force which is claimed to have comp
elled criminal conduct against the will of the actor must be imm
ediate and continuous and threaten grave danger to his person
during all of the time the act is being committed. That is, it must
be a dangerous force threatened 'in praesenti.' It must be a for
ce threatening great bodily harm that remains constant in contr
olling the will of the unwilling participant while the act is being p
erformed and from which he cannot then withdraw in safety.
Against this backdrop, We hold that coercion did not exist in thi
s case. Consequently, the petitioner should be acquitted.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVER
SED and a new one hereby entered ACQUITTING the accused
of the crime of grave coercion.
SO ORDERED.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of petitioner in simply "shouting at the c

omplainant with piercing looks" and "threats to file charges aga
inst her" are sufficient to convict him of the crime of grave coer
cion.

Held:

Petitioner's demand that the private respondent return the proc

eeds of the check accompanied by a threat to file criminal char
ges was not improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat t
o sue. In the case of Berg v. National City Bank of New York (1
02 Phil. 309, 316), We ruled that:

... It is a practice followed not only by banks but even by individ

uals to demand payment of their accounts with the threat that u
pon failure to do so an action would be instituted in court. Such
a threat is proper within the realm of the law as a means to enf
orce collection. Such a threat cannot constitute duress even if t
he claim proves to be unfounded so long as the creditor believe
s that it was his right to do so.

The circumstances of this case reveal that the complainant, de

spite her protestations, indeed voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, co
nsented to do all the aforesaid acts.

Bearing in mind her involvement in the deposit and encashmen

t of the check, the complainant admitted to being nervous upon
being informed that the check was spurious.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- Appellants are therefore acquitted of a violation of article 133
appellee, of the Revised Penal Code but found guilty of a violation of
vs. article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
PROCOPIO REYES, POLICARPIO NACANA, FLORENTINO
CLEMENTE, HERMOGENES MALLARI, MARCELINO
MALLARI, CASTOR ALIPIO, and RUFINO MATIAS,
defendants-appellants.

(60 Phil 369, G.R. No. L-40577 August 23, 1934)

FACTS:

While the pabasa was going on the evening of April 10, 1933,
between 11 and 12 o'clock, the defendants arrived at the
place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to construct a
barbed wire fence in front of the chapel. Alfonso Castillo, who
was chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa, tried
to persuade them to refrain from carrying out their plan, by
reminding them of the fact that it was Holy Week and that it
was highly improper to construct a fence at that time of the
evening. A verbal altercation ensued.

When the people attending the pabasa in the chapel and

those who were eating in the yard thereof noticed what was
happening, they became excited and left the place hurriedly
and in such confusion that dishes and saucers were broken
and benches toppled over. The pabasa was discontinued and
it was not resumed until after an investigation conducted by
the chief of police on the following morning, which
investigation led to the filing of the complaint.

Many years ago the Clemente family by informal donation

gave the land on which the old chapel was erected. When it
was destroyed, the present chapel was erected, and there is
now a dispute as to whether the new chapel is not now
impinging on the land that belongs to the Clemente family.
The appellants are partisans of he Clemente family.

The appellants were then convicted in the Court of First

Instance of Tarlac of a violation of article 133 of the Revised
Penal Code or Offending the religious feelings.

ISSUE: Whether the defendants are guilty of Article 133 or

unjust vexation.

HELD:

The defendants are not guilty of Article 133 but of unjust

vexation. It is to be noted that article 133 of the punishes acts
"notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful." The
construction of a fence, even though irritating and vexatious
under the circumstances to those present, is not such an act
as can be designated as "notoriously offensive to the faithful",
as normally such an act would be a matter of complete
indifference to those not present, no matter how religious a
turn of mind they might be.

The Court ruled that the act of building a fence was innocent
and was simply to protect private property rights. The fact that
this argument is a pretense only is clearly shown by the
circumstances under which the fence was constructed,
namely, late at night and in such a way as to vex and annoy
the parties who had gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is
further shown by the fact that many of the appellants saw fit
to introduce as their defense a false alibi.