Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting
on the petition for habeas corpusfiled by Anastacio Laurel and based on a
theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid
and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government
in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino
citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic:
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary,
but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation
of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this
absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the
qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he
remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in
the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite
States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the President
of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants
of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or
sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty
vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which governs
a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished
from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or
severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called
period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the
rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory
occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the
subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory
occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the
former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one
of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th
Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in
articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the
conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during
the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate
government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as
suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was
suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United
States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our
decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the
question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de
factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied
territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted subsequently
in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an enemy
territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first
case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the
legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government
thereof; and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine
refers to the suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete
after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not
be applied to the present case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance,"
repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations
borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the
military government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be
considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the
protection he receives as above described, and does not do away with the
absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign
country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or
subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted
of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of
a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason
against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the
allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing
more than obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it
would necessarily follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or
state would, on one hand, ipso factoacquire the citizenship thereof since he
has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in
return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his
original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws
of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a
foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights
of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the
enemy military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to
govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague
Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties
and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance
during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the
ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the
government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national
security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence
with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public
order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of
firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and
are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate
government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against the
occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against
public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable
as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted
by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter
was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied
territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to
treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still
bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or
continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those
laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of
the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and
may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when
the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is
necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the
protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by
the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws
of humanity and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs.Director
of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that,
consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are
bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have
not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are
in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as
suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of
fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign
does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or
forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort,
the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to
repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate
government, or compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him;
because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the exigencies of
the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and
the safety and protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to
practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular
government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the
occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through
force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may
lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without
becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance
would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states,
and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public
conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling
inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government
without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and
even compel those who are not aid them in their military operation against
the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the
whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or
sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing
the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task
of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and
repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to
commit a political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the
Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though
originally intended to be a crime against said government as then organized
by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through
their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the
United States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the Philippines
established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the
sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of
the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof,
which provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in
such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and
corresponding officials under this constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign
government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed
in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our
Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or
Congress of the United States in approving the Independence Law above
quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the
declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the
Executive Department of the United States; that the late President Roosevelt
in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on August
12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now
the status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the
attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record,
Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States in many cases, among them in the case of
Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the
question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and
subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
which provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe
allegiance to the United States", was one of the few limitations of the
sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United States, but these
limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the
same way that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own
sovereignty although limited by that of the United States conferred upon the
latter by the States; that just as to reason may be committed against the
Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason
may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the
 sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the
Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government
from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those
charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth,
because it is an offense against the same government and the same
sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The
government established by this constitution shall be known as the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be
known as the Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended
opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the
reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion,
without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices
Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto
concurs in a separate opinion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1434 February 23, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO DE LOS REYES, defendant-appellant.
Claudio Gabriel for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MCDONOUGH, J.:
The defendant is charged with the crime of treason, committed as follows:
That on November 21, 1902, in Manila, he did feloniously, treasonably, etc., levy
war against, adhere to and give aid and comfort to the enemies of, the United
States and of the Philippine Islands, in that on or about August 30, 1902, he
accepted a commission in the regular army of the "Filipinos Republic" and served
as a captain and carried arms in such army and continued in such office and
continued to carry arms as aforesaid between the said dates of August 30, 1902,
and November 21, 1902, the said "Filipinos Republic" being as attempted
government organized by various persons against the authority of the United
States Government and that of the Philippine Islands and having for its object the
overthrow by armed insurrection of the regularly constituted government in said
Islands.
The defendant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced
to imprisonment for a term of twenty years and to pay a fine of $5,000.
The evidence upon which the court below based this conviction is substantially as
follows:
A Constabulary detective testified that he met the defendant in Bacord, city of
Manila, November 21, 1902; that a companion of the witness told him that the
defendant was a captain in the Katipunan Society; that thereupon they detained
the defendant and took him aside into a clump of trees where they talked to him
and got him to admit that he was an officer of the Katipunan. The officers took the
defendant to his house, where they searched his trunk and found in it and took
away a revolver and a captain's commission under seals. The following is a copy of
its commission:
SUPREME PRESIDENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
By reason of the qualifications of Antonio de los Reyes and the good service
rendered by him to the fatherland, the supreme president has been fit to
appoint him captain in the regular army of these Islands.
It is therefore ordered that all persons render him the corresponding honors
and obey all orders which he may issue for the good of the service.
K. K., the 30th of August, 1902.
CENON NIGDAO,
S. K., Minister of War.
A. G. DEL ROSARIO,
 S. K., Supreme President.
TO DON ANTONIO DE LOS REYES,
Appointed Captain in the Regular Army of these Philippine Islands.
This Constabulary detective further testified that one Cenon Nigdao was a
lieutenant-colonel in command of the whole Katipunan forces, but at that time had
been captured and was a prisoner at Pasig.
The witness was asked what this Katipunan Society is, and in reply stated that it is
an organization for forming an independent government for the Philippines, not
letting their headquarters or whereabouts be known to the American Government,
and to gain forces and arms by any means they can; sometimes they use force in
securing members.
When asked if he knew any of the armed forces of the society, he said that they
made an attacked on May 30 upon a Government force of the United States Army.
He said he had not seen the defendant with the insurgent forces.
Another witness for the prosecution testified that he had been informed of this so-
called government known as the Tagalog Republic, or Katipunan, through captured
documents, and that he knew their seals and recognized the seals on Exhibit A, the
commission of the defendant, as those of the organization.
The next witness called by the prosecution was Cenon Nigdao, who stated that he
was a tailor, 28 years of age, and secretary of war of the Katipunan. He identified
the signatures on Exhibit A. He stated that the Katipunan is the national party. Its
purpose is to defend the rights of the country and to ask of the American
Government the freedom of this country.
He further stated that when he gave this commission to the defendant to told him
to keep it, and when the time came for them to ask for liberty the people could not
do him any harm.
The witness named the secretary of the National party, the minister of the interior,
the minister of state, minister of war, and minister of justice of the association.
On cross-examination this "secretary of war," who had held office only for one
week, testified that he commanded no forces; did not know that defendant made
any use of his commission; that they did not take up arms because they were here
in Manila; and that he was living in the same house with the defendant and gave
him the commission there.
Another witness sworn for the prosecution stated that he was not a member of the
Katipunan, but was a member of the National party ever since he left Bilibid Prison;
that the "secretary of war" appointed him a lieutenant-colonel and he held the
commission three months but had no soldiers to command; and that there was no
army when Cenon Nigdao was living at Bacord.
He said he was sent out to Baliuag by one Santiago and stayed there about three
months, and when he found out that there was nothing doing he surrendered
himself and one revolver to the president.
If we reject, as we must, the confession of the defendant made to the Constabulary
officer, because it was not made in open court as required by law (sec. 9, act of
Congress passed March 8, 1902), we have but very little in the case upon which to
base a charge of treason. Even what there is in contradictory. The charge is that the
defendant took arms against the Government in the regular army of the "Philippine
Republic," whereas one witness for the prosecution swears that the Katipunan is
the treasonable organization, another says that body is known as the "Tagalog
Republic," and another, the so-called secretary of war, who commanded no troops,
but to whom the Government presumably gave credit because he testified for the
prosecution, stated that the Katipunan was the "National party" and the object of
that party was to obtain from the United States, by peaceable means, the
independence of the Philippine Islands.
The confession of the accused being disposed of the only other question to be
considered is whether the testimony of one witness that he issued to the defendant
the captain's commission above-mentioned, and the testimony of another witness
that he found this commission in the defendant's trunk, is sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the statute that "no person in the Philippine Islands shall under
the authority of the United States be convicted of treason . . . unless on the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act . . . ."
There is no proof whatever that the accused did any other act in connection with
this charge than to receive this commission. On the contrary the "secretary of war"
testified that they did not take up arms because they remained here in Manila.
I am of the opinion that the mere acceptance of the commission by the defendant,
nothing else being done, was not an overt act of treason within the meaning of the
law. Blackstone says that "as treason is the highest civil crime which (considered as
a member of the community) any man can possibly commit, it ought, therefore, to
be the most freely ascertained."
The state of affairs disclosed by the evidence — the playing of the game of
government, like children, the secretaries and colonels and captains, the pictures
of flags and seals and commissions all on paper, for the purpose of duping and
misleading the ignorant and the vicious — should be not dignified by the name of
treason.
Those engaged in this plotting and scheming in the pretense of establishing an
independent government in these Islands, with nothing behind them, without arms
or soldiers or money, and without the possibility of success, are simply engaged in
deluding themselves and perhaps innocent followers and in filling the cell of Bilibid
Prison.
Even though not guilty of treason, they may be tried for other lesser crimes.
The case of the United States vs. Magtibay,1 recently decided by this court,
involved much the same question as this, and is followed.
The judgement below is therefore reversed and the defendant acquitted, but
without prejudice to the prosecuting authorities to proceed against the defendant
for such other crime or crimes as the evidence discloses. The costs are adjudge de
oficio.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-985 January 23, 1948
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIONISIO AGONCILLO, defendant-appellant.
Macario Nicolas for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for
appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the People's Court finding the appellant,
Dionisio Agoncillo, guilty of treason and sentencing him to suffer fifteen years
of reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of two thousand pesos and the costs.
According to the information, from February, 1944, to March, 1945, in Cebu City
and its environs, the appellant (1) "did consistently and continuously traffic in war
materials and sold them to the enemy," and (2) "did join and serve the enemy as
informer, agent, and spy." The People's Court held that the second count was not
proven, and the appealed judgment of conviction is predicated solely on the first
count.
Under the theory of the prosecution, appellant's adherence to the enemy is
inferable from the following alleged facts: (a) In the afternoon of September 20,
1944, while the appellant was taking a bath in the house of his neighbor Rufina
Cepeda, the latter's cousin (Olimpio Do), who knew how to read Chinese, examined
appellant's clothes and found therein appellant's identification card written in
Japanese and Chinese characters tending to show that the appellant was a
Japanese undercover. (b) In January 1945, after a trip to Bohol, Rufina Cepeda told
the appellant that there were guerrillas in Bohol and that Japanese notes were no
longer accepted in said place. In the evening of the next day, Rufina Cepeda was
arrested by the Japanese and their undercovers and asked about things she saw in
Bohol. Rufina was detained for three days. After her release, the appellant came to
her house and got some chickens for the consumption of the Japanese who
arrested her. A Japanese also used to sleep once in a while in appellant's house.
Upon the other hand, appellant's alleged overt acts of giving aid and comfort to the
enemy are summarized in the brief for Government as follows: In the middle of
April, 1944, the appellant sold about 300 kilos of alum crystals, at three pesos a
kilo, to the Keribo, a construction company operated by the Japanese Army. Two
or three weeks thereafter, he sold to the same entity some 100 pieces of water
pipes, the price of which was not known. About the third week of December, 1944,
the appellant was seen on Jones Avenue helping push a handcart full of truck and
auto tires, batteries and spare parts into the intermediate and high school premises
then used by the Japanese Army as a motor pool.
Regardless of the writer's view on suspension of political laws and change of
sovereignty as heretofore expressed, the Court is of the opinion that the overt acts
imputed to the appellant have not been duly proven. With respect to the sale of
300 kilos of alum crystals, the testimony of the prosecution witness Lorenzo Barria
to the effect that the price was P3 a kilo, is not corroborated by any other witness.
With respect to the alleged sale of 100 pieces of water pipes, counsel for the
appellee admits that the price thereof was not known. An essential part of the overt
act charged in the information was therefore lacking. No pretense was made that
the appellant donated the articles in question. The alleged delivery of truck and
auto tires, batteries and spare parts can be disregarded. The only detail that may
at most be considered established by the prosecution refers to the fact that the
appellant helped in pushing a handcart loaded with such articles, and the evidence
is even uncertain in one respect, namely that the cart was brought either to the
intermediate school premises or the high school building. Indeed it was
acknowledged by the lower court that the witnesses for the Government did not
know how the appellant disposed of the articles loaded in the cart.
Even supposing, however, that the appellant had really sold for a definite price
alum crystals and water pipes, the same did not per se constitute treason. As said
articles or materials were not exclusively for war purposes, their sale did not
necessarily carry an intention on the part of the vendor to adhere to the enemy.
The theory of the prosecution is that the sale was treasonable in view of the other
proven acts showing appellant's adherence to the enemy. It appears, however, that
the alleged acts of adherence performed by the appellant took place after the overt
act in question. It is not unlikely that at the time the appellant made the sale, his
motive was purely personal gain, uninfluenced by any benefit inuring to the enemy.
Where two probabilities arise from the evidence, the one compatible with the
presumption of innocence will be adopted. (People vs. Agpangan, G.R. No. L-778,
October 10, 1947.)
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with
costs de oficio. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-856 April 18, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant.
Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali
for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th
Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by
electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence
only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court, were
substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1 —
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos,
recruited, apprehended and commandeered numerous girls and women
against their will for the purpose of using them, as in fact they were used, to
satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among
such unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami
Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana
Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of
the accused; it sufficient to reproduce here succinctly the testimony of
Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused came to her
house to get her and told her that she was wanted in the house of her aunt,
but instead, she was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito
Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her hometown; that
the accused came again and told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his
Information Clerk; that she did not accept the job; that a week later the
accused came to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other
girls Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor Hontanosas told
her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife; that when she was brought
to Colonel Mini the latter had nothing on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel
Mini threatened her with a sword tied her to a bed and with force succeeded
in having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following night, again she
was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped; that finally she was
able to escape and stayed in hiding for three weeks and only came out from
the hiding when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2 —
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in
company with some Japanese and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her sister
Cleopatra Ramo from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a
dance organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, Agapito
Hontanosas in order that said Japanese Colonel might select those first who
would later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that by means of
threat, force and intimidation, the above mentioned two sister were brought
 to the headquarters of the Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in
Tagbilaran where Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a life of shame. All these
facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said witnesses Eriberta Ramo
her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not necessary here to recite once more
their testimony in support of the allegations in court No. 2; this Court is fully
convinced that the allegation in said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by
the evidence adduced.
"As regards count No. 4 —
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls named
Eduardo S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes in
Corella, Bohol, by the accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer,
and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal
appetite, but these two, the accused Susano Perez and his companion
Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese Officer, satisfied
first their lust; the accused Susano Perez raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his
companion, Vicente Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S.
Daohog, testifying, said: that while on the way to Tagbilaran, the accused
though force and intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that she
resisted with all her force against the desire of the accused, but of no avail;
that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer
named Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July
16, 1942, the accused and his companion, Bullecer, went to her house to take
her and her sister; that her sister was then out of the house; that the accused
threatened her with a revolved if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a
car where Eduarda Daohog was; that while they were in the car, the accused
carried Eduarda out of the car, and their companion Bullecer took the other
witness (Eutiquia Lamay); that when the accused and Eduarda returned to
the car, the latter; Eduarda, covered her face, crying; that later, she and
Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that on arriving and in the
presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the Governor exclaimed: "I
did not call for these girls": but the accused replied saying: "These girls talked
bad against the Japanese , and that is why we arrested them"; that the said
Governor Hontañosas then, said: "Take them to the Japanese "; that the
accused and Bullecer brought the two girls to the Japanese headquarters;
that Eduarda was taken to one room by the Japanese Captain called Dr.
Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to another room by another
 Japanese living in that house; that she was raped by that Jap while in the
room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog and
Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations in Court No. 4 were fully proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 5 —
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused
commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana Bonalos on the
pretext that they were to bee taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel
in the investigation of a case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and
uponarriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the aforesaid two
girls to the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed
Forces in Bohol and by means of violence threat and intimidation, said
Japanese Colonel abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos;
that the accused subsequently of Colonel Mini and through violence, threat
and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her against her
will; that two days, later, upon the pretext of conducting the unfortunate
girls to their home, said accused brought the other girls Feliciana Bonalos to
a secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat
and violence had carnal knowledge with her against her will.
Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused came to
get her on the pretext that she was to be used as witness in a case affecting
certain Chinaman before Colonel Mini; that she and her younger sister
Flaviana were brought in a car driven by the accused; they were brought to
the house of Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana was conducted into a room
and after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came out with her
hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told her immediately that she
was raped against her will by Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving
the residence of said Jap officer, was taken by Perez to an uninhabited house
and there by threat and intimidation, the accused succeeded in raping her;
that when she returned to her (the witness), Flaviana was crying; that the
following day while conducting the two girls back to their hometown, she
(Feliciana) was also raped by the accused in an uninhabited house, against
her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as
following: That on June 15, 1942, the accused came and told her that the
 Japanese needed her daughters to be witnesses; that accordingly, he
daughters, under that understanding, started for Tagbilaran; that later, she
went to Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found them in the office
of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both daughters wept and told
her that they were turned over to the Japanese and raped them; that her
daughter Flaviana told her (the witness) that after the Japanese had raped
her the accused also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house; that the
accused did not permit her two daughter to return home on the pretext that
the Puppet Governor was then absent and in the meanwhile they stayed in
the house of the accused Perez; that when her daughter returned to her
house ultimately, they related to her (mother) what happened; that both
daughters told her they would have preferred death rather than to have
gone to Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother) that the accused had
raped her.
The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as a
part of the res gestae regardless of the time that had elapsed between the
occurrence and the time of the information. In the manner these two
witnesses testified in court, there could be no doubt that they were telling
the absolute truth. It is hard to conceived that these girls would assume and
admit the ignominy they have gone through if they were not true. The Court
is fully convinced that all the allegations contained in Court No. 5 have been
proven by the testimonies of these two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6 —
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companion
apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas,
nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and
reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and
other Japanese high ranking officers, which was held in Tagbilaran market on
June 25, 1942; that upon being brought the Puppet Governor, they were
severely reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942, against said nurses
were forced to attend another banquet and dance in order that the Jap
officers Mini and Takibayas might make a selection which girls would suit
best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible invitations was
to lure them to the residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral
purposes.
 Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at length. She declared:
That on June 29, 1942, she and companion nurses, saw the accused coming
to the hospital with a revolver and took them on a car to the office of the
Puppet Governor where they were severely reprimanded by the latter for
not attending the dance held on June and receptions was to select from
among them the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel Mini for
immoral purposes that she and her companions were always afraid of the
accused Perez whenever he came to said hospital; that on one occasion, one
of the nurses on perceiving the approach of the accused, ran up into her
room, laid down on bed and simulated to be sick; that said accused, not
satisfied, went up into the room of that particular nurse and pulled out the
blanket which covered her and telling her that it was only her pretext that
she was sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of
Nicanora Ralameda. Said testimony need not be reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not questioned, but
it is contended that the deeds committed by the accused do not constitute treason.
The Solicitor General submits the opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and
preserve the morale of the soldiers has always been, and will always be, a
fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of rests not only on its
physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual
report of the Chief of Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because
women's company kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining
them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason.
For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the same general result. yet by
common agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy and attachment
are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business
and political intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country
and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the occupation of a country by the
enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts between the invaders and the
natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature
degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable and untreasonable
assistance is not always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy is
comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate as was said Cramer vs. United
States. 89 Law. ed., 1441.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the
enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile
designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a
friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities
is to assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to
lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging
war against the giver's country enhance his strength and by same count injures the
interest of the government of the giver. That is treason. (See United
States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C.J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is
correct. His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or
men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even
though the women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for
the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women
themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their
bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the
Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to
weaken the power of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by fair
implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple
the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the
defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the
war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital
ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be
gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog,
Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct participation. Without
his cooperation in the manner above stated, these rapes could not have been
committed.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in
section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:
Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to
support the offense (treason) charged, the People's Court may, nevertheless,
 convict and sentence the accused for any crime included in the acts alleged
in the information and established by the evidence.
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by
the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of section 1,
paragraph 17, Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an accused the
right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." The
contention is not well taken. The provision in requires that the private crimes of
which an accused of treason may be convicted must be averred in the information
and sustained by evidence. In the light of this enactment, the defendant was
warned of the hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he was innocent
of treason and thus afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is
no element of surprise or anomaly involved. In facts under the general law of
criminal procedure convicted for crime different from that designated in the
complaint or information is allowed and practiced, provided only that such crime
"is included or described in the body of the information, and afterwards justified
by the proof presented during the trial." (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but these
assaults are not charged against him and should be ruled out. The crime of coercion
alleged and founded on count No. 6. need not be noticed in view of the severity of
the penalty for the other crimes which he must suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for
each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from 10 year of prision mayor to 17
year and 4 months of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify
each of the offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being
understood that the total duration of these penalties shall not exceed forty years.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court
sentencing the accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation
of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva
Ecija and in the mountains in the Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who
is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States
and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did
then and there willfully, criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military
Forces of Japan in the Philippines, against which the Philippines and the
United States were then at war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the
manner as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and
designed to assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the
Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and operations against the United
States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined and
assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed
conflicts and engagements against the United States armed forces and the
Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San
Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of Luzon,
Philippines, sometime between January and April, 1945. Contrary to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts
alleged except that of defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What
the People's Court found is that the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in
certain raids and in confiscation of personal property. The court below, however,
said these acts had not been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so
regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did
find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and
other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva
Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed with
rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; . . . that
during the same period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle,
performed duties as sentry at the Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in
Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the
American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with
the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the
Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the
proof of two witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single
one of the various acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who
gave evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizure of personal property,
and performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly
committed on different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one
specified deed. There is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the
defendant was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms.
Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by
another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at
least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence
of both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced
upon one against his will, membership in the Makapili organization imports
treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the organization was
created, which, according to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of
the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire
of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate
Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly
with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the
common enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths
of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be gather from the testimony
of one witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances
surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not
necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant
actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or
countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed himself at the
enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even
though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature
gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the
knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at
war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces
augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count
on men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own
people. The principal effect of it was no difference from that of enlisting in the
invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the
deposition of two witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet this
statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one witness
who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one day, another witness
another day, and so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look
for guidance from American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial
interpretation has been placed on the two-witness principle by American courts,
and authoritative text writers have commented on it. We cull from American
materials the following excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses
to be to the same overt act, was held to mean that there might be one
witness to an overt act and another witness to another overt act of the same
species of treason; and, in one case it has been intimated that the same
construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly
observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity of the testimony, by
sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their variance in details, is
wholly destroyed by permitting them to speak to different acts." The rule as
adopted in this country by all the constitutional provisions, both state and
Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify to the same overt
act. This also is now the rule in England.
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section
2038, p. 271:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is
separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed., 685),
expressed the same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to
the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but,
if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in
Wigmore on Evidence,ante.) And in the recent case of Cramer vs. United States (65
Sup. Ct., 918), decide during the recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays
down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in
a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting,
to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the
enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of
the trial court. To the possible objection that the reasoning by which we have
reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we have only to say that the authors of
the constitutional provision of which our treason law is a copy purposely made
conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This provision is so
exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where
two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed
by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to
discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and
tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding
the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from other
testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing as a
substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another
eyewitness to the same overt act.
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the
prosecution by a literal interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the
founders of the American government fully realized the difficulties and went ahead
not merely in spite but because of the objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.)
More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the Constitutional Convention
"as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against
legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing
Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice
Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said:
"It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional
provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony
than modern researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such
a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a
crude device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant
so unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely
or not, is severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the
Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that "'Treason may
sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult —
as in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision was adopted not
merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of
them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most
venerated of that venerated group considered that "prosecutions for treason were
generally virulent.'"
Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American
Constitution. By extension, the lawmakers who introduced that provision into the
Philippine statute books must be understood to have intended that the law should
operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American forefathers meant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-743 October 11, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POLICARPIO DUMAPIT, defendant-appellant.
Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiola and Jose V. Lesaca for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Carmelino G. Alvendia and Solicitor Guillermo E. Torres
for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the People's Court finding the appellant,
Policarpio Dumapit, guilty of treason and imposing upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, a fine of ten thousand pesos, and the costs.
The information charged six counts, but the People's Court based appellant's
conviction only on counts IV and VI. Under count IV, the appellant alleged to have
caused, with the aid of a group of Constabulary soldiers, the arrest in barrio
Balingahili, municipality of Botolan, province of Zambales, in March, 1943, of eight
guerrillas who were thereafter investigated and tortured by the Constabulary and
the Japanese and finally confined in the provincial jail for about three months.
Under count VI, the appellant is accused of having issued on April 14, 1943, an order
to Andres Atanasio, then Chief of the Non-Christian Tribes of the East Zambales
Mountains in Macasan, Botolan, Zambales, enjoining Andres Atanasio and his men
to capture, dead or alive, all Americans roaming in the forests of Zambales, and to
report the result of his mission to Onofre Dienzo, Superintendent of the Non-
Christian Tribes of Zambales.
Upon a careful review of the evidence, we are convinced that a reversal of the
appealed judgment is in order. As to count IV, we note that only three of the alleged
victims testified for the prosecution. They were Federico Decag, Emilio Trapse and
Catalino Dumangas. These, however, especially the last two, admitted that they
were investigated for, and suspected of, having burned the house of Pedro Daco.
(Pages 115, 131, 132 and 133, t. s. n.) Aside from the fact that the appellant denied
having had any hand in the arrest in question, the circumstance remains that said
arrest was effected as a result of the common crime of arson. That the matter had
no treasonous significance is shown by the further fact that those arrested were
confined for almost the whole period of their detention in the provincial jail, and
not in the Japanese garrison. If the Japanese in some way intervened, it was
undoubtedly because they had their own eyes and ears even in civil offices and they
merely wanted to be sure that any disorder was not directed against their authority
and safety. But said intervention, without more, cannot be attributed to the
voluntary invitation or denunciation on the part of the appellant or the
Constabulary. Appellants alleged authorship of the arrest is inconsistent,
moreover, with the affidavit of Federico Decag (Exhibit 1) to the effect that the
appellant helped in having him and his companions released.
Neither is the charged in count VI tenable. The lone witness for the prosecution on
this score is Andres Atanasio who had conspicuously supplied what is sufficient to
exculpate the appellant; for it is noteworthy that this witness categorically testified
that, as the appellant was handing over the written order for the capture of all
Americans, the appellant told him to disregard the same. (P. 36, t.s.n.) The
appellant admits having written the order, but corroborates witness Andres
Atanasio in the latter's exculpatory testimony.
The immediate background of the appellant is further refutation of the likelihood
that he had any treasonable intent. The appellant was before the outbreak of the
last war a corporal of the Manila Harbor Police and, upon order of his chief Alejo
Valdes, was even the one who was entrusted with the task of taking the personal
properties of the family of President Quezon to the motorship Edil. If the appellant
had undergone police training and become a member of the Constabulary during
the Japanese occupation, it was at the behest of the then mayor of Botolan (Juan
M. Corom) and provincial governor (Dantes), and with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the guerilla unit to which the appellant belonged. Indeed, the
appellant was known to the underground men as "Ave Maria."
The appealed judgment is therefore reversed and the appellant acquitted, with
costs de oficio. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Torres, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-433 March 2, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GAUDENCIO ROBLE, defendant-appellant.
Gonzalo D. David for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles
for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to death by the First Division of the People's Court sitting in Tacloban,
Leyte. The correctness of the penalty is the sole question put in issue in this appeal.
The information alleges:
1. On or about March 20, 1944, in the municipality of Dalaguete, province of
Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid
and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said accused being a
member of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany 10 other
member of the pro-Japanese constabulary all armed like the accused and did
apprehend and arrest Paulino Osorio for having helped the guerrillas and of
being the Father of two guerrilla men; that the herein accused after
maltreating said Paulino Osorio did detain him in the municipal jail of
Dalaguete; that in the same date the accused and his companions did
 apprehend Melchor Campomanes and 7 other person who were also
tortured for being guerrillas supporters and sympathizers and the accused
herein with his firearm did shoot Melchor Campomanes killing him instantly;
2. Sometime during the month of March 1944 in the municipality of
Dalaguete Province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and with
the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces said
accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there
wilfully, feloniously and treasonably lead guide and accompany a patrol of
13 constabulary soldiers and did arrest and apprehend Fortunato Linares for
being guerrillas and or guerrilla supporters; that said accused did tie and
torture the aforesaid person and cut a portion of their ears, the tortures
being so severe especially with respect to Antolin Rodriguez who effectively
died as a result of said tortures administered by the accused.
3. On or about May 18, 1944, in Cebu City Philippines with the purpose of
giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her
military forces, said accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously and treasonable
accompany a group of Constabulary soldiers all armed, to Mambaling and
other parts of Cebu City and did apprehend Eleuterio Padilla, a former
USAFFE soldier for being a guerrilla, and there herein accused and his
companions did tie and torture said Eleuterio Padilla detain him at the
Constabulary Headquarters for several days after which he was taken out
and mercilessly killed on May 26, 1944 by said accused.
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of
treason with murders with the result that the penalty provided for the most serious
offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing the case from the
standpoint of modifying circumstances the court believed that the same result
obtained. It opined that the killing were murders qualified by treachery and
aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength
cruelty and an armed band.
We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth in the information are
merged in and formed part of treason. They were in this case the overt acts which
besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in the crime. Emotional or
intellectual attachment and sympathy with the foe unaccompanied by the giving of
aid and comfort is not treason. The defendant would not be guilty of treason if he
had not committed the atrocities in question.
On the question of the applicability of the aggravating circumstances which
impelled the court against its sentiment to give the defendant the extreme penalty
we only have to refer to People vs. Racaza (82 Phil., 623) in which this question was
discussed and decided. There we said:
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation superior strength treachery and employment of means for
adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of
treason and may not taken to aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the
giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is in many cases as in this a long
continued process requiring for the successful consummation of the traitor's
purpose, fixed, reflective and persistent determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason.
Treachery is merged in superior strength; and to overcome the opposition
and wipe out resistance movements which was Racaza's purpose in
collaboration with the enemy the use of a large force and equipment was
necessary. The enemy to whom the accused adhered was itself the
personification of brute superior force and it was this superior force which
enabled him to overrun the country and for a time subdue its inhabitants by
his brutal rule. The law does not expect the enemy and its adherents to meet
their foes only on even terms according to he romantic traditions of chivalry.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to commit acts
unnecessary to the commission of treason. There is no incompatibility
between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners, Rapes, wanton
robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and
the perpetration of these will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of
ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main
criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond
doubt guilty fall within the terms of the above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior
strength are absorbed inn treason characterized by killings, the killing
themselves and other accompanying crime should be taken into
consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility
irrespective of the manner in which they were committed. Were not this the
rule treason the highest crime known to law would confer on its perpetrator
 advantage that are denied simple murderer. To avoid such incongruity and
injustice the penalty in treason will be adapted within the range provided in
the Revised Penal Code to the danger and harm and to which the culprit has
exposed his country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that
resulted from his deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the Revised Penal
Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind that conceived and
carried the crime into execution. Where the system of graduating penalties
by the prescribed standards is inapplicable as in the case of homicides
connection with treason the method of analogies to fit the punishment with
the enormity of the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and
consistency and in the furtherance of the law's aims.
Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we believe that the
appellants spontaneous plea of guilty is sufficient to entitle him to a penalty below
the maximum. The appealed decision is therefore modified and the sentence
reduced to reclusion perpetua with the legal accessories and costs.