EN BANC

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and
CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO
WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS,
NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL
UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING,
DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-
MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU
MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL
S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-
VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H.
MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON,
VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE
M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY
SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T.
BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M.
MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA
BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which
they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated
Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants
ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr.
Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.

On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as
Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples.
For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the
Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the
petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda
in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground
that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands,
bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right
to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein
for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral
lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground
that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which
vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and
upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of
Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first
with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous
peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998,
which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a
lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule
infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist
from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2,
series of 1998;

"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from
disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply
with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be
read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to
dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated
upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION
VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS,
DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all
those similarly situated, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED
NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their
occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1of
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is
reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-
shaped island’s three barangays.5

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation
Survey of Boracay

Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular
3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on
their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12,
1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. 10

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond
the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have
the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced.
Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not
been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were
presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees
and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted
more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax
purposes.12

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed
any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to
submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13

The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-
5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These
lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on

August 7, 1933.16

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no
legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with
the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent
Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the
subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and
5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested
areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this
case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time
immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-
way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay
filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They
allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in
continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos
in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land.
Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the
required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied
portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public
forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the same
issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for
respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE
AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS
DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a,
PD 705?

II.

HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED
PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR
PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-
claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions
pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not
involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely:
(a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No.
141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439issued by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973
Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great
leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was
an unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.47Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be
disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the
persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may
be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be
ordinary acts of ownership.49

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership
of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first
introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law
provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It
established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain
conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or
possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only
after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the
date of its inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of
the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions which took
various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el
estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory
information title.59>

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the
Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3)
grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also
provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands"
under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64

x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The
act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This
is known as the Torrens system.66

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act.
The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect
titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning
the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was
sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act.
This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens
of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and
occupation en concepto dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69

After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No.
141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act
(RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land
applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74

The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration
proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under
Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of
all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It
was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands under the
Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In
fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited
and classified."82

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or
a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.86

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied
by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants
were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They
call for proof.87

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands.Private
claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting the
whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public
domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each
case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of
the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of
the evidence.91 This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the Executive before
it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of
the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October
7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the
power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption
on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public
domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination
did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically
made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable
lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act
No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It
certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian
doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent
on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a
mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular
land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it
or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There
must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just
said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a
question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more
valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is
not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as
forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified
as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are
agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration
case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other
is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove
swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance
belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No.
1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private
interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry,
or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said
Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or
mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95(Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those
that have already became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141,
gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands
into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or
implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.97

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable
case for determination by the land registration court of the property’s land classification. Simply put, there was no
opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands.
When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the
property’s land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.

We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which was
decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was
already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.103

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue
in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so,
whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified
lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply
here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or
mineral.

Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is
alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite
period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may
apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate
opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:

"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law
governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling
and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect
titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land
Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that
the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the
National Mapping and Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public
domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section
3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not."
Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD
No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with
the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for
commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island;111 that the island
has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the
island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land
or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry114 is particularly instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with
grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out
of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of
lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is
a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legalstatus of
Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to
alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation
No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot,
the island is susceptible of private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is
nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to
"private lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are
declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified
by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the
then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it
provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he
would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island,
together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of
the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas’
alienability.119

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and
peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao
and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in
Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it
alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared
wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to
private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of
the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands.121

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to
classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do
so.122 Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural
land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails,
which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the
classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to
make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that
Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring
conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705,
President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657,
thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order
No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into
account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the
public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it
into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified
lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact
that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land,
the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never been
previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We
agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where
there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which
has not been the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest
purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised
Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural
lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously
determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry
Code.127

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do
they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.128

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay
Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian
doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied
for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself.129Where the land is not alienable
and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with
respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants complied with
the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note
that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the
tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on
June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time.
They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested
right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied
portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word
in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people
have called the island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply
the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the
residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of
their substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to
possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to
preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of
title, such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to
exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill133 now pending in the House
of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to private
ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island
partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the
vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological
conservation is as important as economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection are not just fancy
rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets
prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz:134

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to
forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest
preservation, conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute
a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary
green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas
become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is
washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to
property – crops, livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing
observations should be written down in a lumberman’s decalogue.135

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of
the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they
had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, more
particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant
Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration
covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby
entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial
a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr.
Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and
described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map
No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration,
disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141,
Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D,
Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as
supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in
the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang,
Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration
of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-
DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982,
Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of
possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February 23,
2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of
the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of
the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere
obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio
for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument that the property
had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According
to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at
the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient
evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-
in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that
consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on
February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time
when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the
rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in relation
to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership.11Land is
considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for
public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to
the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of
the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State.15This means
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them
to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public lands
made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three,
namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added
national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive
act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the
public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to
enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the
Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the
land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national
parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does
not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of
Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of the
property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public
domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is
alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a
public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land
should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full
legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement
that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As
such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion
of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as
the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period
of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application of
Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire
duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land
at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run
against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title
that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land
of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the
Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by
the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in
favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years
prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly
recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33in order to
liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants,
particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the
State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now
run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore,
may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back
to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private
property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into
patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary,
proof that the land has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period
is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier
- the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible
for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for
land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President
issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 December 12, 2005

SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA.
MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V.
MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK,
SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON,
PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE
MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorney-in-fact,
Rosa R. Manotok, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision1 of the Third
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No.
210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision2 of the Special Division of Five of the Former
Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-
22481, and the LRA to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution3 denying the
motion for reconsideration.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals4 are as follows:

Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for
administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer L. Barque, which was
destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
sometime in 1988. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real
estate tax receipts, tax declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.

Upon being notified of the petition for administrative reconstitution, private respondents (petitioners herein) filed their
opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their
reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners’ predecessors-in-
interest is spurious.

On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 2101775on
grounds that:

1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered
by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT
No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213
dated February 01, 1991;

2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief,
Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated February 19, 1997.6

Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied in an order7 dated February 10, 1998 hence they appealed to the
LRA.
The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and should have confined himself with the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title.8 The LRA further declared:

Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing evidence that TCT NO. 210177
was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the
original of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists
TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence
and authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles
destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....

It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely
conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-
R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the Bureau of Lands ....

It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established
indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due
course and the same is mandatory.9

….

It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr.
Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful repository of survey plans for lots
situated within the National Capital Region including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the
custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise
duly supported by Republic of the Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr. Erive in his letter
dated 28 November 1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos … confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the
Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997 addressed to Atty.
Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. …

.…

The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or information about Plan FLS
3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein
that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession
Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said
computer print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt ….

The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal repository and duly signed by the
custodian thereof. The documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be
defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. … 10

Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners’ title was fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted that it
is only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed fraudulently reconstituted. It thus
opined that respondents’ title may only be reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners’ title was void and
should therefore be cancelled.11

The dispositive portion of the LRA’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer
L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon
order of a court of competent jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners’ filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by respondents with a prayer that reconstitution be
ordered immediately.

On June 14, 2001, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and respondents’ prayer for immediate reconstitution were
denied.13

From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review14 with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
66700 and praying that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No. 210177 without being subjected to the
condition that petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] should first be cancelled by a court of competent
jurisdiction.15 Petitioners likewise filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision16 on September 13, 2002, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed Resolution of the LRA dated June 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED
in toto and the petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.17

Respondents moved for reconsideration.18 On November 7, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the Former Second
Division rendered an Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to
reconstitute forthwith petitioners’ valid, genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 was denied,20 hence, this
petition docketed as G.R. No. 162605.

Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision21 on October 29,
2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.22

In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to
the petition for reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents’ title.23

Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals on February 24,
2004, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October 2003 is
RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No.
RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith respondents’ TCT No. T-210177.

SO ORDERED.24

From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, petitioners filed
separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively.

In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:

I
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS’ EXISTING
TITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:

a. THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS NOT PART OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.

b. THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and

c. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DOES
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN
ORDER THE ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY ALLOWING A "SHORT CUT", THE MAJORITY JUSTICES
DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.

II

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN ORTIGAS V.
VELASCO, CONSIDERING THAT:

a. IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING OVER THE SAME PARCEL OF LAND, AS A RESULT OF THE
RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF MOLINA. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS HOLD TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION, AS RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR NAMES.

b. IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS’ PROPERTY. HENCE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINA’S TITLE OUTRIGHT.
IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE ARE NO SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE
CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY HEARING.25

In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF
PETITIONERS MANOTOK NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID COURT WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER AND THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS EQUALLY
DEVOID OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE UNDER THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980
SPECIFICALLY SECTION 19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS CHALLENGED AMENDED DECISION
DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2004 DIRECTING LRA TO CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOK’S TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT,
AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OVER CIVIL
ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24,
1998 OF RESPONDENT LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q-547 [97] VIEWED FROM THE FACT
THAT SAID RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH LAW AND CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE THAT PROHIBITS
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS
EXISTING COVERING THE LAND SUBJECT THEREOF.

IV. THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THE
TITLE OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK SHOULD FIRST BE ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN
THE FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF FABRICATION AND
FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO OTHER LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A
FAKE AND SPURIOUS TITLE.

V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED
OUT OF TIME.26

On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated with the petition in G.R. No. 162335.27

In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul their title; (b) the reconstitution of respondents’
Torrens title would be a collateral attack on petitioners’ existing title; (c) they were not given the opportunity to be
heard, specifically the chance to defend the validity of their Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the
appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners’ title; and (e) the ruling in Ortigas was
misapplied.

The petitions must be denied.

The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate certificate
of title prior to the reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 2628 clearly provides:

Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available, in the following order:

(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

....

When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more than sufficed as
sources for the reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26 which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall
be made following the hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law. In addition, Section 12 of the same law requires that
the petition shall be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property only if the source of the
reconstitution is Section 3(f) of RA No. 26. Thus:

Section 12. … Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section
2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property
duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from
a prior certificate of title covering the same property.29

Since respondents’ source of reconstitution is the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the
reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that the
submitted plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is
the intent of the law to give more weight and preference to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title over the other
enumerated sources.

The factual finding of the LRA that respondents’ title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners’ title is
sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should
remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even finality by this Court and, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons. Basic is the rule that factual findings
of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions … are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the
consideration that this Court is essentially not a trier of facts.30
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble
or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a
proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party,
weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and
convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face
of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a
party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact. Questions like these
are not reviewable by this court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to
questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.31 A petition for review should only cover questions
of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable.32

In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite,33 this Court categorically declared:

Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that petitioner’s title to the land is of
doubtful authenticity.

Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the factual findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals....

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of which title,
petitioners' or respondents', is valid or spurious. This has been ruled upon by the LRA and duly affirmed by the two
divisions of the Court of Appeals.

The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the authority to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is adjudicatory in nature – it
can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham
or spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration, then there would be no basis for its
decision to grant or deny the reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA, when supported by substantial evidence, as
in this case, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.34

In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence submitted which between or among
the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition. Without such authority,
the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed only with mechanical powers.

The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA. Under Sections 1
and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or final orders of the
LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is
sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two
divisions of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners’ title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of
Appeals,35 we ruled that:

Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of sale and the title issued in virtue thereof in de los
Santos’ favor should be had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the instance of the Government. However,
since all the facts are now before this Court, and it is not within de los Santos’ power in any case to alter those facts at
any other proceeding, or the verdict made inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time that
cancellation proceedings be yet filed to nullify the sale to de los Santos and his title, would be needlessly circuitous
and would unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy at bar, .... This Court will therefore make the
adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other cases in similar
premises.

No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only to
have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of the case or of an
issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the
dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand
thereof.36

The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to act on the petition for administrative
reconstitution. The doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc., et al.37 does not apply in the
instant case. In Alabang, the Court stressed that:

… [L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles … cannot be the subject of petitions
for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment
the cancellation of such existing titles. … The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third
parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting
titlesin the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under
the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to
two different holders thereof. …38

The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens title was duly issued and that there is only one
title subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant case, it cannot be said that petitioners’
title was duly issued much less could it be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals
that the same is sham and spurious.

The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas in refusing to remand the case to the trial court.
As expressly declared in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco:39

Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution case (LRC No. Q-5405) to
the Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas’ and the Solicitor General’s appeals from the judgment rendered
therein, which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the records forthwith transmitted to the appellate
tribunal. This, in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities
afflicting Molina’s theory or cause of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent
appeal proceedings would be pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molina’s cause to
prosper. To defer adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.

The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed, the validity of respondents’ and petitioners’
title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual
findings are no longer reviewable by this Court.

A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al.,40 where this Court, as claimed by petitioners,
have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein is whether or not a
tenancy relationship exists between the parties.41 There was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be
discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject of the instant controversy.

There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of "their property" without due process of law when
the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC. As
already discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of
respondents and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court.
By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners
acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and
recognized their authority to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these
tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners’ claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present
evidence, which is the essence of due process.

As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:42

Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of certificates of title, the parties
acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said petition, and they were given the full
opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence
presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of
ownership was valid and binding.

The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners’ title which was irregularly and illegally issued
in the first place.43 As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite:44

The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a
piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.

In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible
because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the
evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report … that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis …

….

Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system
does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and vested. Thus, while it may be true, as
petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of
title, it is equally true that this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the
certificate.

Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted certificates of title secured through fraud
and misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.45

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the Third
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No.
210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former
Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-
22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.