Kagawad, Barangay Secretary, Barangay Treasurer, and Barangay Tanod, As

Concepcion v.
COMELEC (2009) – standing; aggrieved party (Poli A2015)
DOCTRINE: A decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional commission may be brought to this Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Article IX, to be read with Rule 65 of RoC) An aggrieved party is not to be
construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s disposition
via certiorari. Instead, an aggrieved party pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Jose Concepcion, Jr. is the Chair of NAMFREL and the Punong Baranggay at Bgy. Forbes Park, Makati City.
o He filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to set aside the En Banc Resolution dated 02 April 2007
and Order dated 8 May 2007” of respondent COMELEC.
• Jan. 5, 2007: the National Citizen’s Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a Petition for Accreditation to Conduct
the Operation Quick Count with the COMELEC.
o Concepcion was one of the signatories thereto.
• Same date: COMELEC issued COMELEC Resolution No. 7798:
o Based on EO 94 issued by Pres. Cory Aquino, Sec. 3 of which provides that “No barangay official shall be
appointed as member of the Board of Election Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly registered major
political party or any socio-civic, religious, professional or any similar organization of which they may be
members.”
o Rationale behind EO 94
§ Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs) are charged with the duty of maintaining the regularity and
orderliness of the election proceedings in each precinct to the end that elections will be honest, orderly,
peaceful and credible.
§ COMELEC usually receive numerous complaints against barangay officials entering polling places and
interfering in proceedings of the BEIs, causing delay and political tension.
§ Thus, COMELEC resolved to prohibit the following:
• The appointment of barangay officials which includes the Punong Barangay, Barangay
Kagawad,Barangay Secretary, Barangay Treasurer, and Barangay Tanod, as
Chairman/person and/or Member of the BEIs or as official watcher of any candidate, duly
registered major political party, or any similar organization, or any socio-civic, religious,
professional [sic], in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. The prohibition extends
to barangay officials, employees and tanods, who are members of accredited citizens’ arms.
• (Wrt the people mentioned above) Staying inside any polling place, except to cast their vote.
• April 2, 2007: COMELEC ruled on NAMFREL’s petition, granting the petition for accreditation subject to some conditions:
o Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., the National Chairman of NAMFREL, must first be removed both as a member and
overall Chairman of said organization.
o Reorganize according to its internal rules an independent organization and submit before election day a list of its
officers and members and likewise delete from its roster any previous officer or member similarly situated to
Concepcion.
o Accreditation shall be deemed automatically revoked in case of a violation of any of the provisions in the
Resolution.
• NAMFREL filed a manifestation and request for re-examination:
o contains information regarding NAMFREL’s reorganization and its new set of officers showing that the petitioner
had stepped down as National Chair and had been replaced by a new Chair
o NAMFREL’s acceptance of the conditional grant of its petition for accreditation
o NAMFREL’s request for a re-examination without further arguments of the April 2, 2007 Resolution as it
specifically affected the petitioner’s membership with NAMFREL
• This was denied by COMELEC and NAMFREL no longer questioned the ruling.
• Instead of a direct reaction from NAMFREL, Concepcion filed the present petition
o Ostensibly questioning the COMELEC’s April 2, 2007 Resolution
o but actually raising issues with respect to Resolution 7798.
• Concepcion’s objections:
o EO 94 could not be the statutory basis for Com. Reso. 7798 because it only applies to the Feb. 2, 1987 plebiscite.
o Nothing in EO No. 94 prohibits the petitioner’s membership with NAMFREL or the petitioner’s appointment as
Chair or member of a duly accredited COMELEC’s citizen arm.
o Petitioner was not a poll watcher, and the objective of EO 94 could have been achieved if COMELEC simply
prohibited the appointment of baranggay officials as poll watchers.
o COMELEC cannot go beyond the law for it has no law-making powers.
o Com. Reso. 7798 could not be given retroactive application.
§ Effectivity clause: Jan. 14, 2007
§ NAMFREL petition: Jan. 5, 2007
o It is an invalid implementing regulation
o On constitutional grounds:
§ Unreasonable; no connection to the purpose of the law
§ Violates right to association by his enforced removal and member and Chair
§ Denied due process when he was not afforded the right to a hearing
Jaigest – PoliRev - 1

• OSG’s answers:
o Com. Reso. 7798 is a valid exercise of COMELEC’s quasi-legislative powers.
§ Sec. 52(c) of the OEC empowers COMELEC to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing the
provisions of this Code (the OEC) or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer..."
§ Central Bank v. Cloribel: notice and hearing are not required when an administrative agency exercises
its quasi-legislative power, as opposed to quasi-judicial power which requires notice and hearing
o While EO No. 94 may have been issued primarily for the February 2, 1987 plebiscite, its spirit and intent find
applicability and relevance to future elections.
o While the petitioner is not appointed as member of the BEI or as watcher, he nonetheless labors under a conflict
of interest.
o That petitioner is a barangay chairman and at the same time the NAMFREL Chair clearly raises questions on his
neutrality and non-partisanship; COMELEC non-partisanship may at the same time be compromised, as it is the
COMELEC which accredits its citizens’ arm.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is Concepcion an aggrieved party who has standing to file the present case for certiorari? – NO *Note: Court did not really
discuss the merits; procedure lang.
• As a preliminary discussion, the SC holds that there is a “blatant misuse” of Rule 65.
o SC directed towards the focus of Concepcion’s petition:
o While the petition expressly provides that it “seeks to set aside the En Banc Resolution dated 02 April 2007
and the Order dated 8 May 2007 of the COMELEC,” who in GAD and in gross violation of [Concepcion’s] right to
due process of law, denied [him the] right to associate when COMELEC, as condition of NAMFREL’s accreditation
as citizen arm, directed removal of Concepcion as overall Chairman and member;
o Concepcion actually directs his attention at Resolution 7798, not the April 2, 2007 Resolution.
§ He likewise raises issues that call for the interpretation of Resolution 7798’s underlying basis, EO 94
o IMPT: As such, Concepcion seeks to assail, in his individual capacity, a COMELEC adjudicatory resolution
(i.e. the April 2, 2007 Reso) for its adverse effects on him when he was not a party to the case.
§ NAMFREL, which is the direct party to that case and who had accepted the COMELEC
accreditation ruling, is NOT A PARTY to THE PRESENT PETITION.
§ The present petition is clearly Concepcion’s own initiative, and NAMFREL, the direct party to the
COMELEC’s April 2, 2007 resolution, has absolutely no participation.
• The petition, while it assails the COMELEC Resolution of April 2 2007 (an exercise of COMELEC’s quasi-judicial function),
actually focuses on the alleged defects of Resolution 7798 (exercise of rule-making power of COMELEC)
• The SC discusses two defects of Concepcion’s petition:
•
st
1 defect: NO PERSONALITY TO FILE:
o IMPT! The requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned by Sec 7, Article IX of the Constitution: a
decision, order, or ruling of a constitutional commission may be brought to this Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
o This requirement is repeated in Rule 65, Sec. 1
o IMPT! An aggrieved party under Rule 65 is one who was a party to the original proceedings that gave rise to the
original action for certiorari under Rule 65.
o Under Tang v. CA: the term “person aggrieved” is not to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured
by the lower court’s order or decision can question the said court’s disposition via certiorari. To sanction a contrary
interpretation would open the floodgates to numerous and endless litigations which would undeniably lead to the
clogging of court dockets and, more importantly, the harassment of the party who prevailed in the lower court. …
xxx “person aggrieved” in a special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the
proceedings before the lower court.
•
nd
2 defect: conversion of an express challenge of an adjudicatory resolution into a challenge for nullity of a
regulation through an original Rule 65
o To be sure, a COMELEC adjudicatory action can be challenged on the basis of the invalidity of the law or
regulation that underlies the action.
o But to do this, a valid challenge to the adjudicatory action must exist; at the very least, the Concepcion must have
the requisite personality to mount the legal challenge to the COMELEC adjudicatory action.
• Other notes:
o Concepcion had other remedies:
§ declaratory relief with the appropriate Regional Trial Court under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court
§ petition for prohibition under Rule 65 to prevent the implementation of the regulation
§ validly contesting an adjudicatory order of the COMELEC
• Such challenge, however, cannot be made in an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65
dissociated from any COMELEC action made in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
• Medyo pinagalitan ng SC si Concepcion on his “backdoor approach to achieve what [he] could not directly do in his individual
capacity under Rule 65.”
o Lozano v. Nograles: “our liberal approach has its limits and should not be abused.”

Pascual v. Secretary (supra) (taxpayers)
(Edited A2015)
DOCTRINE: The validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in the consequence of its
enforcement.Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds,
upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
FACTS:
• Case involves Pasig Provincial Gov. Wenceslao Pascual, assailing the appropriation of P85,000 under RA 920 for
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals.
o He claims that the feeder road terminals do not connect any govt property/important premises to the main
highway;
o That the feeder roads were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the
Antonio Subdivision;
o That this Subdivision (and lands on which the feeder roads were to be constructed) belonged to a certain Jose
Zulueta, who, at the time of the passage of the Act in June 1953, was a Senator.
o That prior to the passage of the appropriations act, Zulueta offered to donate the feeder roads to Pasig, subject
to the condition that “[Zulueta] would submit a plan and agree to change the names of two of them..”
§ No deed of donation was executed.
§ But Zulueta called attention to the approval of Act and the P85K.
• Pascual further claims that:
o Act was illegal and void ab initio because the construction of the projected feeder roads with public funds would
greatly enhance the value of Zulueta’s subdivision, a private property.
o Appropriation of P85K was made by Congress because it was made to believe that the roads were public roads
and not private streets of a private subdivision
o That Zulueta executed an alleged deed of donation 5 months after passage of Act, or in December 1953 to make
it appear that it was signed by then Executive Secretary
§ That being subject to an onerous condition, the donation was actually a contract
§ The contract stipulates: "The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby donated for street purposes only
and for no other purposes whatsoever; it being expressly understood that should the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines violate the condition hereby imposed upon it, the title to the land
hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto revert to the DONOR, JOSE C. ZULUETA."
§ The donation violated the provision of the Consti which prohibits members of the Congress from being
directly/indirectly financially interested in any contract with the Govt.
o The project currently being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways must be stopped.
• Zulueta contends that RA 920, being a law passed by Congress and approved by the President, cannot be illegal because
Congress is the source of all laws.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can Pascual question the legality of the donation? – YES.
• The validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in the consequence of its enforcement.
o Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer.
o In the US, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers, have sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality
of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.
§ A different view is taken by the US Supreme Court when it comes to standing, i.e.: that insofar as
federal laws are concerned, the relationship of a taxpayer of the US to its Federal Govt is different from
that of a municipal corp.
• This (later view) is not applied to our jurisdiction because the relation between the people of the PH and its taxpayers is not
identical between the people and taxpayers of the US and its Federal Govt.
o Our relation is closer from a domestic viewpoint; more fully direct compared to that of the US; as our simple and
unitary type of government is not subject to limitations like to those imposed by the Federal Constitution upon US.
o The rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation appropriating local or state
public funds — which has been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court (Crampton vs.Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) —
has greater application in the Philippines than that adopted with respect to acts of Congress of the United States
appropriating federal funds.
• Additionally, Gov. Pascual is not just any other taxpayer contesting constitutionality of an act which can constitute
misapplication of public funds. He is the Provincial Governor, representing the state’s most populated political subdivision,
and the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the PH.

Galcito v. Aquino (2012) – No material interest in future increases in benefits
DOCTRINE: In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as
contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such
right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.
FACTS:
• Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order,
seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on
September 8, 2010.
• July 26, 2010 – PNoy made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and
other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System—a GOCC
which has been unable to meet its standing obligations.
o Subsequently, the Senate, through the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises,
conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of
GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs).
o Based on its findings that “officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting
themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other]
irregular and abusive practices,” the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 “urging the President to order the
immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other
perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs].”
• Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled “Directing the Rationalization of
the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes.”
o EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position
classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.
o A Task Force was also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers, while
GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force information regarding their compensation. Finally,
EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except
salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period
to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members
of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.
• Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the President
and for being in breach of existing laws.
o The petitioner is a Filipino citizen and an employee of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth).
He is currently holding the position of Court Attorney IV and is assigned at the PhilHealth Regional Office
CARAGA.
o The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[SC: We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and for having been mooted by
subsequent events.]
ISSUES/HELD:
Did the petitioner avail of the proper remedy? NO! He should have filed a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63.
• Certiorari is not the proper remedy.

• Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and
mandatory acts.
• The issuance of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect
remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court
1
(RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7.
MAIN DOCTRINE! Does the petitioner have locus standi? NO! Petitioner lacks locus standi.
• To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee
of PhilHealth, he “stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of
salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative
of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation.”

1
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.” (Emphases ours.)

o The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest
in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and
implemented.
• The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest since future increases in salaries
and other benefits are merely contingent events or expectancies.
o The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to seek judicial protection. Section
9 of EO 7 reads:
§ “Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances, Incentives and Other
Benefits.—Moratorium on increases in the rates of salaries, and the grant of new increases in the
rates of allowances, incentives and other benefits, except salary adjustments pursuant to
Executive Order No. 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and Executive Order No. 900 dated June 23,
2010, are hereby imposed until specifically authorized by the President.” [emphasis ours]
• SC: We are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the
outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy.
o DOCTRINE ALERT! In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot
but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary
increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail
EO 7.
o It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is not something that just anybody with some
grievance or pain may assert. It has to be direct and substantial to make it worth the court’s time, as well
as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another department of government.
§ If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then
the courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an
excursion into constitutional adjudication.
o Rationale for the rule? 3 words – SEPARATION OF POWERS! It must suffice to warrant the Judiciary’s
overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government, such as the
President, and the clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale goes to the very essence
of representative democracies.
• Petitioner’s lack of locus standi cannot be cured by the petitioner’s claim that he is instituting the present petition as a
member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government
are legally and validly issued.
o The Court ruled in IBP v. Zamora that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law
and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case. This
supposed interest has been branded “as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by]
the whole citizenry.”
o The Court made a similar ruling in Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo and held that the petitioners
therein, who are national officers of the IBP, have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or
potential injury which the IBP, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance
of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.
• We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power of the President
to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials and employees, the
same cannot “infuse” or give the petitioner locus standi under the transcendental importance or paramount public
interest doctrine.
o Velarde v. Social Justice Society: Even if the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus
standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved
any way, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case.
§ In other words, giving due course to the present petition which is saddled with formal and
procedural infirmities explained above in this Resolution, cannot but be an exercise in futility that
does not merit the Court’s liberality.
o Lozano v. Nograles: “while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus
standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of ‘personal injury’ to the broader ‘transcendental
importance’ doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused.”
• Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal interest in the issue in dispute, he
cannot also be considered to have filed the present case as a representative of PhilHealth.
o In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant failure of the petitioner to provide a Board Resolution
or a Secretary’s Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its representative.
Minor points:
• The petition has a defective jurat.
• The petition has been mooted by supervening events with the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the
President is now authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs

Legaspi v. CSC (1987) – access to records
Citizens and associations; transcendental importance
FACTS:
• The CSC earlier denied Valentin Legaspi’s request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
• These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil
service eligible who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
• Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of the two above-mentioned government employees is guaranteed
by the Constitution and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, Legaspi filed a
petition for mandamus, to compel the CSC to disclose said information.
• OSG contends that Legaspi does not have standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal
right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned.
o He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the CSC to furnish Legaspi with the information
he seeks.
• CSC claims that Legaspi does not have actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.
o At most, there is a vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made
inquiries on the subject.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is the right to information on matters of public concern invoked by mandamus? – YES
• The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution:
o Art. 4, Sec. 6: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be
afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
• This provision was retained and amplified in the 1987 Constitution under Art. 3, Sec. 7, with the addition of the phrase, “as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development.”
• These constitutional provisions are self-executing.
• They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating
the duty to afford access to sources of information.
• Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution
without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature.
• What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which
must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public
interest.
• However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and duty
under Art. 3, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable.
• Therefore, the right may be properly invoked by mandamus proceeding.
Does Legaspi have legal standing? – YES
• To be given due course, a Petition for Mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of
any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right.
• The petitioner in every case must therefore be an “aggrieved party” in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to
be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.
• What is clear upon the face of the Petition is that Legaspi has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right.
• In Tanada v. Tuvera:
o when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he
is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.
• When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied
by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general “public” which possesses the right.
• In Subido, it was held that even those who have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the
“public” to whom “all records relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds shall be open.”
• “Public” is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term; it embraces every person.

• To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular information sought
are given the right to inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction.
• Legaspi, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction f the exercise
of the public right.
• There is no reason to deny his standing to bring the suit.
• In recognizing the people’s right to be informed, the Constitution expressly mandates the duty of the State and its agents to
afford access to official records, documents, papers, and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy
development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
• In Tanada, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what the Court declared as an imperative duty of the government
officials concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature as well as all executive orders
and proclamations of general applicability.
• The absence of discretion on the part of the government agencies in allowing the examination of public records, specifically,
the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido.
o Based on these two cases, government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to,
information of public concern.
§ However, reasonable regulations may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the
manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public.
§ Example: prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage or loss of the
records may be avoided
Does the power to regulate the manner of examining records carry with it the power to prohibit? – NO
• The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit.
• The discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information is a limitation upon the availability of
access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose.
• On the other hand, the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded pertains to the government
agency charged with the custody of public records.
• Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided,
undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and that the exercise of the same constitutional right
by other persons shall be assured.
• The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
Is the right to information on matters of public concern absolute? – NO
• The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the
essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy.
• But it is not absolute.
• Since access to official records, papers, etc., are “subject to limitations as may be provided by law,” the law may therefore
exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.
• In every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information
sought, i.e.:
a. Being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and
b. Not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
• The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern.
• The first question is addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information.
o In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is
not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of
the guarantee.
o To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to
review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of mandamus.
o There is no rigid test which can be applied in determining whether or not a particular information is of public
concern.
o It is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance,
as it relates to or affects the public.
• It is not enough that the information sought is of public interest.
o For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.
• HERE: CSC has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit Legaspi’s right to know who are, and
who are not, civil service eligible.
• The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public.
• Hence, there is nothing secret about one’s civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.

• Legaspi’s request is, therefore, neither unusual or unreasonable.
• And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligible, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the CSC.

Joya v. PCGG (1993) – Private Funds
DOCTRINE: A taxpayer’s suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon
the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. In this case, what is being challenged
does not involve the expenditure of public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties.
FACTS:
• This is a Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for PI and/or Restraining Order. All 35 petitioners
seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale by Christie’s of NY of the (1) Old Masters Paintings, and
th th
the (2) 18 and 19 Century Silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila.
• Antecedent Facts:
o President Cory Aquino authorized PCGG chair Caparas authority to sign the Consignment Agreement between
the PH and Christi, Manson and Woods International, Inc.
§ This concerns the scheduled sale of:
• (1) 82 Old Masters Paintings,
• (2) antique silverware contained in 71 cartons seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila, and
• (3) such other property as may be subsequently identified by the PCGG.
§ These were all allegedly part of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
o Commission on Audit (through Chairman Domingo) submitted its findings and observations regarding the
agreement:
§ The authority of the former PCGG chair to enter into the agreement is of doubtful legality
§ The contract was highly disadvantageous to the government
§ PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the US, and
§ The assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance. Their disposal is
prohibited by law.
o Director of National Museum (Gabriel Casal) issued a certificiation that:
§ The items subject of the consignment agreement did not fall within the classification of protected cultural
properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage.
o The court denied the application for PI to restrain the sale on the ground that (1) petitioners had not presented a
clear legal right to a restraining order and (2) that proper parties had not been impleaded.
o Hence, on 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded and the amount of $13,302,604.86 were turned
over to the Bureau of Treasury.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the petition comply with the legal requisites for the court to exercise its power of judicial review? – NO
• For the court to exercise its review power, there must be compliance with its legal requisites:
o The question must be raised by the proper party
o There must be an actual case or controversy
o The question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, and
o The decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself
• On the FIRST REQUISITE:
o Discussion:
§ GENERAL RULE: “Legal Standing” means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. “Interest” must be a material and personal interest.
§ EXCEPTIONS: The court has allowed exceptions to the general rule such as:
• When a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure enforcement of a public duty for the
fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and
• When a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement
of public funds.
o Does the petitioners fall under the GR? Do they have legal standing? – NO
§ As to the paintings: Petitioners themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons
to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila, which is a nonprofit and nonstock corporation. (The chair was
Imelda Marcos and its president was Bienvenido Tantoco)
• Thus, the ownership of these paintings legally belong to the foundation or corporation or the
members thereof.
§ As to the antique silverware: These were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from their friends and
dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding anniversary, an occasion personal to them.
§ The confiscation of these properties upon the end of the Marcos administration should not be
understood to meant that the ownership passed on to the government. The constitutional and statutory
requirements of due process and just compensation must still be complied with.

§ Petitioners failed to show that they are the legal owners or that these pieces have become publicly
owned. Hence, they do not possess any clear legal right to question its unauthorized disposition.
o Can it be an exception under a mandamus case? – NO
§ Although the action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria
of a mandamus suit.
§ A writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the
attendant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
§ In this case, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials
under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is
constitutionally infirmed.
o Can the petition be allowed as a taxpayer’s suit? – NO
§ A taxpayer’s suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve
disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer
of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
§ In this case, what is being challenged does not involve the expenditure of public funds but the
disposition of what they allege to be public properties.
• On the SECOND REQUISITE:
o There is an actual case or controversy when it involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or
other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice
§ A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before the
court.
§ Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the
auction sale of the artworks on a particular date·11 January 1991· which is long past, the issues raised
in the petition have become moot and academic.
o The court has the discretion to recognize a case which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or
legal standing when paramount public interest is involved.
§ However, in this case no such justification exists.
§ Under RA 4846, the state is mandated to preserve and protect the important cultural properties and
treasures of the nation.
• The cultural properties are classified as:
o Important cultural properties – cultural properties which have been singled out from
among the innumerable cultural properties as having exceptional historical and
cultural significance to the Philippines but are not sufficiently outstanding to merit
the classification of national cultural treasures.
o National cultural properties - a unique object found locally, possessing outstanding
historical, cultural, artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and
important to this country and nation
§ The Director of the Museum himself stated that the paintings and silverware DO NOT constitute
protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the register of the museum.
• The court gave respect to the certification by the director, being one authorized to undertake
the inventory, registration, designation or classification, with the aid of competent experts, of
important cultural properties and national cultural treasures.
• Given their expertise, their findings are generally accorded not only respect but at times even
finality.
• SC: No compelling reason to grant the petition:
o NOT the proper parties
o The properties are NOT protected cultural properties.

Board of Optometry v. Colet (1996) – unregistered organizations
DOCTRINE: Since respondent-organizations failed to show that they are juridical entities (as certified by the Securities and Exchange
Commission), they cannot be deemed real parties in interest in whose name the action may be prosecuted. Neither can some
individuals be considered parties in representation of the optometrists, as their names do not appear in the registry list of the Board.
Thus, there is no actual case or controversy yet, because an actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.
FACTS:
• Judge Colet had granted a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Board of Optometry from implementing the Revised
Optometry Law (RA 8050) or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder.
• The grounds of the private respondents in filing for Declaratory Relief and injunction against the law were:
o Surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and addition of provisions in the Reconciled Bill which were made without
the knowledge and conformity of the Senate panel, thus vitiating legislative consent (note that the consolidation
of the HB and the SB were reconciled by a Bicameral Conference Committee, which was ratified by the House
and the Senate and approved into law by the President)
o Violation of every Filipino’s right to reasonable safeguards against deprivation of life, liberty and property because
it authorizes optometrists to use certain kinds of pharmaceutical agents (sobrang vague and bullshit ng ground
na ‘to)
o Undue delegation of legislative power when it provides for a penalty of imprisonment for 8 years max and a fine
not exceeding Php40k on any person who violates any rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to RA 8050
o Suppression of truthful advertising of optical goods; and employment of vague ambiguous terms in defining
prohibitions and restrictions in the law (void-for-vagueness)
• Among the petitioners of the civil case in RTC-Manila Br. 29 were:
o Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.;
o Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP);
o Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA)
o Association of Christian- Muslim Optometrist (ACMO)
o Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the Philippines (SMOAP)
§ each allegedly represented by its president.
• However, the body of the petition gave no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of these alleged assocs.,
save for Acebedo Optical. It merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home
addresses.
• Also, the individual-petitioners Miguel Acebedo (representing Acebedo Optical), Miriam Llave (for OPAP), and Republica
Panol do not appear in the registration books of the Board of Optometry to be authorized optometry practitioners in the PH.
o No evidence of PRC certifications
• The Board argues that there is no proper ground to warrant the issuance of the writ:
o Petitioners do not possess the requisite right to entitle them to the relief demanded
o They have not shown their legal existence or capacity to file the case, or even their authority to file it in a
representative capacity
• In granting the injunction, the RTC reasoned:
o Viewing the petition as a whole and the supporting exhibits, the court is inclined to find prima facie that petitioners
have legal rights affected by RA 8050 and that in its operation, said Law is likely to inflict serious and irreparable
injury to such legal rights.
o There is clear “Public Right” that laws should be the product of the untrammeled will of the people’s
representatives in Congress.
o There is also a “public right” that the laws should in truth and in fact promote the public good. Such public right
would be negated and violated if RA 8050 institutes a practice which exposes persons availing of optometric
2
services to serious risk impairment of vision through administration by optometrists of DPA’s.
o Law authorizes virtual suspension of the licenses of the present crop of optometrists, until after they shall have
re-trained and qualified to use DPA’s.
o (there were more but they’re irrelevant to our discussion)
ISSUES/HELD:
Do the private respondents have locus standi to question the constitutionality of RA 8050? – No.
• Private respondents claim they do under the “rule on Public Right” pursuant to Tanada v. Tuvera, citing Severino v. Gov.
General. That their rights as optometrists or optical companies would be adversely affected by the assailed law.
o They further contend that they also seek “as taxpayers and citizens, under the concept of Public Right, to bar the
enforcement of the law because it endangers the Public’s health,” a danger “clearly seen from the oppositions to
the law filed before both houses” of Congress.

2
"Diagnostic pharmaceutical agents"-Specific topical drugs used to aid optometrists in their examination of the human eye.

• SC: only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the names of the real party in interest.
o Civil Code, Art. 44 – an association is a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from
that of its members
• There is serious doubts as to the existence of OPAP, COA, ACMO and SMOAP.
o Body of the petition does not state these assocs not state their addresses. Nowhere is it claimed that they are
juridical entities – which runs counter to Rule 8, sec. 4 that requires facts showing the capacity to sue or the legal
existence of an organized assoc of persons that is made a party must be averred.
o Not even the sworn statements of alleged presidents were suchs assocs mentioned
o They did not even address the issue of juridical capacity in their comment to the present petition
• For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then
be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action.
• A real party in interest is a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
o since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons,
be deemed real parties in interest.
o since the names of Miguel Acebedo, Miriam F. Llave, and Republica A. Panol do not appear in the registration
books of the Board of Optometry as authorized optometry practitioners in the Philippines, they do not have the
requisite personal and substantial interest in the case.
• To maintain a class suit, it must be alleged that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest
to many persons and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. – they failed to
allege and prove the requisites of a class suit
The SCA for Declaratory Relief also fails because they failed to meet the requisites of (1) justiciable controversy, and (4) that the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.

Tondo Medical v. CA (2007) – Standing is determined by the merits of the case even in cases of transcendental importance
DOCTRINE: A citizen is allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual
of threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Constitutional questions which are of transcendental importance cannot
be invoked where a party’s substantive claim is without merit. A party’s standing is determined by the substantive merit of his case or
a preliminary estimate thereof.
FACTS:
*This is a repeated case so I lifted the facts and other issues from 2016 digests.
• In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA)
o Provided for 5 general areas of reform such as:
§ Fiscal autonomy of government hospitals
§ Securing the funding for priority public health programs
§ Promotion of the development of local health systems and ensure effective performance
§ Strengthening of the capacities of health regulatory agencies
§ Expansion of National Health Insurance Program (NHIP)
• DOH then issued draft guidelines for the implementation of the aforementioned programs.
• Tondo Medical employees alleged that the implementation of the reforms had resulted in making free medicine and free
medical services inaccessible to economically advantaged Filipinos.
• Tondo Medical employees alleged that the HSRA is void for violating constitutional provisions.
o Art. III, Section 1
o Art II, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18
o Art XIV, Sections 1 and 3
o Art XIII, Sections 11 and 14
• EO No. 102 was also issued which redirected the functions of the DOH from being the sole provider of health services to
being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance as a result of devolution of basic services to local
government units.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can the Tondo Medical Center employees anchor the suit on the violation of specific sections of Article II of the 1987
Constitution? – NO
• The HSRA cannot be nullified based on bare allegations that it violates the general principles in the Constitution.
• The principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.
o They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws
• These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions, as not
self-executing and therefore cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
o These provisions do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
Can the President validly issue EO No. 102? – YES
• Article VII, Section 17 provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
• The DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book VI of the Administrative Code, mainly tasked
with the functional distribution of the work of the President.
o It is an agency under the supervision and control of the President and is part of the Office of the President.
• EO No. 102 is well within the Constitutional power of the President to issue. It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional
power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by
other statutes and consistently affirmed by the Court.
RELEVANT ISSUE: Do the Tondo Medical Center employees have standing to file the case? – NO
• The Court upheld the standing of citizens who filed suits, wherein the transcendental importance of the constitutional
question justified the granting of relief.
• In Domingo v. Carague, the petition of was dismissed when the petitioners therein filed to show any present substantial
interest.
o Even in cases in which the Court declared that the matter of the case was of transcendental importance, the
petitioners must be able to assert substantial interest.

• Present substantial interest, which will enable a party to question the validity of the law, requires that a party sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of its importance.
o It should be distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent subordinate or inconsequential interest.
• Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils., Inc. v. Comelec:
o A citizen is allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that:
§ He has personally suffered some actual of threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the government
§ The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
§ The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
o Constitutional questions which are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked where a party’s substantive
claim is without merit.
• A party’s standing is determined by the substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof.
• In the case at bar, the Court found that the employees miserably failed to show any merit to their claims.

Anak Mindanao vs. Executive Secretary (2007) – abstract claims
FACTS:
• In Sep 2004, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 364

o Transformed Department of Agrarian Reform into Dept of Land Reform (DLR)
o Placed PCUP (Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor) under supervision of DLR
o Placed National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) under supervision of DLR.
• In Oct 2004, EO 379 amended EO 364 making the NCIP an attached agency of the DLR.
• In 2005, GMA issued EO 456 which reverted the DLR back to its original name “Dep of Agrarian Reform”.
• Anak Mindanao Party List (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants Organization Inc. (MDOI) question the constitutionality of EO
364 and EO 379.
o The petitioners question the legality of placing the NCIP under the DAR and making the NCIP an attached agency
to the DAR.
• They argue that the EOs violate the principle of separation of powers.
• A preliminary question was raised on the standing of both AMIN and MDOI.
• On the preliminary question of standing, OSG alleges that:
o AMIN – has standing as a member of Congress (an act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress)
o MDOI – no standing, no issue of transcendental importance to justify a relaxation of the rule
ISSUES/HELD:
Does AMIN have locus standi? YES.
• AMIN has locus standi, as conceded by the SolGen. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.
Does MDOI have locus standi? NO. MDOI raises no issue of transcendental importance to justify a relaxation of the rule on
legal standing.
• MDOI is a registered peoples organization of Teduray and Lambangian tribesfolk of North Upi and South Upi in the province
of Maguindanao.
o MDOI alleges that it has standing as it is concerned with the negative impact of NCIPs becoming an attached
agency of the DAR. It fears that transferring the NCIP to the DAR would affect the processing of ancestral domain
claims filed by its members.
• Any party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest.
1. It has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government
2. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action
3. The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
• Syllabus-related: MDOI’s nebulous claims of “negative impact” and “probable setbacks” are too abstract to be considered
judicially cognizable. MDOI’s line of causation between the challenged action and the alleged injury is too attenuated.
• Their vague propositions that the EOs will work injustice cannot clothe MDOI with the requisite standing. Neither
would its status as a “people’s organization” vest it with the legal standing to assail the validity of the EOs
• MDOI relied on the rulings of these cases but are inapplicable.
1. La Bugal v. Ramos--personal and substantial injury resulting from mining activities permitted by the assailed
statute and
2. Cruz v. Sec. of Environment and Nat. Resources—indigenous peoples’ leaders and organizations here were not
petitioner who had to satisfy the locus standi requirement. They were just intervenors who sought to defend the
constitutionality of a statute. They weren’t assailing the constitutionality.
• DOCTRINE ALERT!!! MDOI raises no issue of transcendental importance to justify a relaxation of the rule on legal standing.
Requisites you need to satisfy to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance (Senate v. Ermita):
1. Public character of the funds or assets involved
2. Presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of government
3. Lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
• MDOI failed to satisfy the above-mentioned requirements. The case of Francisco Jr. v. Fernando specifically declares the
transcendental importance of the issues raised must relate to the merits of the petition.
Are the EOs constitutional? YES.
• AMIN’s contention
o AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be transformed,
merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders.

o Thus, the EOs violate separation of powers since the legislature had seen fit to create these agencies at separate
times and with distinct mandates, the President should respect that legislative disposition.
• The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over executive departments, bureaus and
offices in the President alone. And it lays down a limitation on the legislative power.
o The line that delineates the Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
o The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.
§ Legislative power is “the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter & repeal them.”
§ Thus, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces
all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
o While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.
§ The executive power is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.
§ The President has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices.
• This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.
§ The President also has the duty of supervising and enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general
peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his
control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
• The Constitution’s express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out
reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
• In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive agencys position
in the scheme of administrative structure.
o Such determination is primary, but subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure.
o As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may
justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office.
o Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The
Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law.
• Thus, the Admin Code of 1987 provides that the President can reorganize the admin structure of the Office of the President
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
o The Office of the President consists of the Office of the President proper and the agencies under it.
o It is not disputed that PCUP and NCIP were formed as agencies under the Office of the President.
o Thus, as provided by the Code, the President may transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency.
• The characterization of the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President does not remove said body
from the President’s control and supervision with respect to its performance of administrative functions.
• In transferring the NCIP to the DAR as an attached agency, the President effectively tempered the exercise of presidential
authority and considerably recognized that degree of independence.
o It has been held that an attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it
is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision.
• Thus, the EOs are constitutional.

Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes (supra Art. VI) – standing; citizen’s and associations; transcendental importance
FACTS:
(The Tañon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu in the East and Negros in the West. It harbors a
rich biodiversity of marine life, including endangered species of dolphins and whales. For this reason, former President Fidel V. Ramos
declared the Tañon Strait as a protected seascape in 1998)
• The case involves 2 consolidated cases.

st
o 1 case: The petitioner, “Resident Marine Mammals,” are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other
cetacean species that inhabit Tañon Strait. Their Stewards: Gloria Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma Osorio are their
legal guardians and friends.
nd
o 2 case: The petitioner, Central Visayas Fisherfold Development Center, is the organization establish for the
welfare of fisherfolk in Region 7.
o Both cases are against Depart of Energy Secretary Angelo Reyes.
• 2002, the government of the PH, acting through DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract
(GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration (JAPEX).
o This contract involves geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
o It also included geophysical and satellite surveys as wells as gas sampling.
• 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 to SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of
petroleum resources covering 2,850 sqm offshore the Tañon Strait.
o JAPEX conducted drill one exploration well during the project in compliance with the Environmental Impact
Assessment found in PD 1586.
o JAPEX was issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
• Petitioners now went to the SC for redress seeking to enjoin SC-46 from implementation and to nullify the ECC in violation
of the Constitution.
o RMM and their Stewards contend that JAPEX’s oil exploration activities have an adverse ecological impact on
the Tañon Strait.
o RMM and the Stewards showed a study made that showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to
70 percent, the average harvest per day went from 15-20 kilos to 1-2 kilos a day. They attribute these decreases
to the destruction of the "payao" also known as the “artificial reef."
o They further contend that the ECC obtained by JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions
with the affected stakeholders were not held.
o FIDEC confirms the allegations made by RMM of reduced fish catch and lack of public consultations with the
fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior to the issuance of the ECC.
o Moreover, FIDEC alleges that during the seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from entering and fishing
within a 7km radius from the point where the oilrig was located greater than the 1.5km radius "exclusion zone"
stated in the contract.
• DOE, through the OSG, contend that:
o (1) RMM and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition,
o (2) SC-46 does not violate the Constitution and the various laws,
o (3) ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations;
o (4) DOE may not be compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC-46;
and
o (5) all the petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief.
o Moreover, the OSG contended that the case is moot and academic due to the termination of the contract prior to
the judgement of the case. (SC did not accept this for (1) a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest; (3) constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) The case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
ISSUES/HELD;
(MAIN ISSUE) Does the RMM have legal standing? No, but there’s no need for RMMs to have standing. Human beings have
the standing in envi cases as stewards of the environment.
• OSG argues that Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that “only natural and juridical” entities can file a suit and that
the Oposa case does not apply since they were all natural persons, even though some are unborn.
• SC discussed the issue on whether animals or inanimate objects have legal standing in the 1972 US case of Sierra v. Roges
C.B. Morton, where Justice Douglas dissented that inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation.
o He said that “a ship has a legal personality for maritime purposes. The corporation sole is an acceptable adversary
and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory
processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes. So valleys, alpine
meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the
destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life. The river is the living symbol of all the life it sustains
or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including
man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life.”

• In the PH, locus standi in environmental cases has a more liberalized approach.
o The current trend moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases.
• Recently, the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases was approved, it allows for a “citizen suit” and
permit and Filipino citizen to file to courts violations of the environmental laws basing on the reasoning that humans are
“stewards of nature”:
o The enactment of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases enabled litigants enforcing environmental
rights to file their cases as citizen suits.
o It liberalized standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal
and direct interest, based on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.
o The need to give animals legal standing in environmental cases has been eliminated by the Rules since
any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, is allowed to bring a suit to enforce environmental laws.
o So since we have these Rules, there’s no need to give animals standing. They don’t have standing, but
since humans are stewards of nature, humans can file for the proper envi case.
• In fact, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a
permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. (Oposa).
o The right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as
it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment.
o The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of
laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal
standing to file this petition.
Can they implead Pres. GMA as an unwilling co-petitioner?—NO.
Sec. 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides for the provision of unwilling co-plaintiff.
• The reason cited by the Stewards to include former PGMA in their petition, is insufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-
petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the
functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention."
Is Service Contract No. 46 valid?—NO, it is unconstitutional.
• According to Sec. 2, Art. 12 of the Constitution:

o The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use
of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into
in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
• SC discussed whether service contracts are still allowed in the 1987 Constitution.
o In the case of La Bugal, the SC held that the deletion of the words “service contracts” in the Constitution did not
amount to a ban on them per se. The same is evidenced in the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission.
• More importantly, the case of La Bugal enumerated the safeguards based on the Constitution and SC held that SC-46 is
null and void for non-compliance:
o Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The
grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform
terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible
insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is
presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure
that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch
of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
•
st
1 requisite: There is a subsisting general law:
o SC held that PD 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972 is the general law that governs the oil
exploration.
o Even though it was enacted by Marcos, the same is considered valid and effective absent a repealing law.
•
nd rd
2 and 3 requisites: President was not a signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress.
o SC held that even though there is a general law, the President was not a signatory and the Congress is not
notified of such contract, renders it null and void.
o OSG opined that DOE Sec. acted as an “alter ego” of the President. The same does not apply in this case.

o SC held that in the case of Joson v. Torres, the same principle is limited, to wit: Under this doctrine, which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally.
o Also, in the case of La Bugal, the SC held that “under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written
in every statute and contract.”
Did Service Contract 46 violate other laws?—YES. (not really related to Consti.)
• Petitioners claim that SC 46 violate RA 9147 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, RA 8550 or
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, and other laws.
§ Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area having been declared
as a protected area in 1998. Any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be
implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing to determine the effects of such activity on
its ecological system.
§ SC held that the said law may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum
exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in
the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a
NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the
Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.

People v. Vera (1937-38) (exception to the rule on earliest opportunity)
(Edited 4A Case Matrix)
DOCTRINE: General Rule: The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
Exception: In the exercise of sound discretion, the courts may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a
statute should be presented.
FACTS
• In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the HSBC.
• In 1936, he filed for probation.
o The matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu Unjieng’s petition
for probation.
• A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation.
• The Prosecution opposed the petition.
• Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that
courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused
like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only meant to be
applied in provinces with probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if construed as
a province, has no designated probation officer – hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.
• HSBC intervened in this case and alleged that the Probation Law is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause because it confers upon the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones
Law in the Philippine Legislature and by the Constitution in the National Assembly, and that it gives the provincial boards
the authority to enlarge the powers of the CFI of different provinces without uniformity, contrary to the Jones Law and the
Constitution.
• In a supplementary petition, the fiscal, in behalf of the People of the PH, concurs for the first time with the issues raised by
HSBC regarding the constitutionality of the Probation Law.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can the validity of the Act be attacked for the first time in this case (considering that it has already been elevated to the SC
on certiorari)? – YES.
• Preliminarily, it is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of  an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts
unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case,
i.e. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.  
o The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions.
Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary
course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate.  
• It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not
raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered on
appeal.  
o But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may
determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented.  
§ In criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may
be raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal.
§ Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question,
though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary
to a decision of the case.
§ And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time,
where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below.
• As to the power of this court to consider the constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these
proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad. That case provides:
o It has been held by that court that the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a
defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court.
o But in this case where a new act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was
likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's
validity promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice.
• On the hypotheses that HSBC represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional
question here — a point we do not now have to decide — we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines,
represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings.  
o The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.
o It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose
name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside.

§ Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
o Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Springer (1927), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action
instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines.  
• The act is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause.  

Narra Nickel Mining v. Redmont (2014) – Capable of repetition; need to formulate principles
DOCTRINE: The Court can decide that a case is not moot if the controversy raised requires formulation of principles or if it is capable
of repetition.
FACTS:
• Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont), a domestic corporation, took
interest in mining and exploring certain areas of the province of Palawan.
• After inquiring with the DENR, it learned that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and mining activities where
already covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
o Petitioner McArthur, through its predecessor-in-interest Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI), covering an area of over
1,782 hectares in Barangay Sumbiling, Municipality of Bataraza, Province of Palawan and which includes an area
of 3,720 hectares in Barangay Malatagao, Bataraza, Palawan.
o Petitioner Narra acquired its MPSA from Alpha Resources and Development Corporation and Patricia Louise
Mining & Development Corporation (PLMDC) covering an area of 3.277 hectares in barangays Calategas and
San Isidro, Municipality of Narra, Palawan. Subsequently, PLMDC conveyed, transferred and/or assigned its
rights and interests over the MPSA application in favor of Narra.
o Petitioner Tesoro acquired its MPSA over 3,402 hectares in BarangaysMalinao and Princesa Urduja, Municipality
of Narra, Province of Palawan.
• (Relevant facts hereunder) à Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR petitions for the denial of
petitioners’ applications for MPSA alleging that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are owned
and controlled by MBMI, a 100% Canadian corp.
o Redmont argued that since petitioners’ capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise disqualified
from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino citizens.
• When the case reached the CA, it found that there was doubt as to the nationality of petitioners since petitioners had a
common major investor, MBMI, a 100% Canadian corp.
o CA used the "grandfather rule" to determine the nationality of petitioners.
o Recall Corp. à Grandfather Rule- Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, but if the percentage of Filipino
ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such
percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality.
• Petitioners argued that CA erred when it did not dismiss the case for mootness despite the fact that the subject matter of
the controversy, the MPSA Applications, have already been converted into FTAA applications and that the same have
already been granted.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is the case moot and academic? NOPE!
• Petitioners’ claim that CA erred in not rendering the instant case as moot is without merit.
• A case is said to be moot and/or academic when it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value." Thus, the courts "generally decline jurisdiction
over the case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness."
• The "mootness" principle, however, does accept certain exceptions and the mere raising of an issue of "mootness" will not
deter the courts from trying a case when there is a valid reason to do so. In David v. Arroyo, the Court provided four instances
where courts can decide an otherwise moot case, thus:
1.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
2.) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved;
3.) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and
4.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
• All of the exceptions stated above are present in the instant case.
1. The Court notes that a grave violation of the Constitution, specifically Section 2 of Article XII, is being committed by a
foreign corporation right under our country’s nose through a myriad of corporate layering under different, allegedly,
Filipino corporations.
2. The intricate corporate layering utilized by the Canadian company, MBMI, is of exceptional character and involves
paramount public interest since it undeniably affects the exploitation of our Country’s natural resources.
3. The corresponding actions of petitioners during the lifetime and existence of the instant case raise questions as what
principle is to be applied to cases with similar issues. No definite ruling on such principle has been pronounced by the
Court; hence, the disposition of the issues or errors in the instant case will serve as a guide "to the bench, the bar and
the public."
4. Finally, the instant case is capable of repetition yet evading review, since the Canadian company, MBMI, can keep on
utilizing dummy Filipino corporations through various schemes of corporate layering and conversion of applications to
skirt the constitutional prohibition against foreign mining in Philippine soil.

Minor: Is the corporation Filipino or foreign? Foreigner, Canadian Corp!
• “Corporate layering” is admittedly allowed by the Foreign Investments Act (FIA); but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution
and pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. Further, the pronouncement of petitioners that the grandfather rule has already
3
been abandoned must be discredited for lack of basis.
• After a scrutiny of the evidence extant on record, the Court finds that this case calls for the application of the grandfather
rule since, as ruled by the POA and affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails and persists in the corporate ownership of petitioners.
o Also, as found by the CA, doubt is present in the 60-40 Filipino equity ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and
Tesoro, since their common investor, the 100% Canadian corporation––MBMI, funded them. The assertion of
petitioners that "doubt" only exists when the stockholdings are less than 60% fails to convince this Court.
o The "control test" is still the prevailing mode of determining whether or not a corporation is a Filipino corporation, within
the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, entitled to undertake the exploration, development and utilization
of the natural resources of the Philippines.
o When in the mind of the Court there is doubt, based on the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, in
the 60-40 Filipinoequity ownership in the corporation, then it may apply the "grandfather rule."
• Concluding from the above-stated facts, it is quite safe to say that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are not Filipino
since MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60% or more of their equity interests.
o Such conclusion is derived from grandfathering petitioners’ corporate owners, namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC.
o Going further and adding to the picture, MBMI’s Summary of Significant Accounting Policies statement — regarding
the “joint venture” agreements that it entered into with the “Olympic” and “Alpha” groups — involves SMMI, Tesoro,
PLMDC and Narra.
o Noticeably, the ownership of the “layered” corporations boils down to MBMI, Olympic or corporations under the “Alpha”
group wherein MBMI has joint venture agreements with, practically exercising majority control over the corporations
mentioned.
o In effect, whether looking at the capital structure or the underlying relationships between and among the corporations,
petitioners are NOT Filipino nationals and must be considered foreign since 60% or more of their capital stocks or
equity interests are owned by MBMI.
Leonen’s super-long dissent:
• The so-called “Grandfather Rule” has no statutory basis. It is the Control Test that governs in determining Filipino equity in
corporations.
• The Control Test promotes the policy of a “national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.” It is a matter of transitivity
that if Filipino stockholders control a corporation which, in turn, controls another corporation, then the Filipino stockholders
control the latter corporation, albeit indirectly or through the former corporation.
• As against each other, it is the Control Test, rather than the Grandfather Rule, which better serves to ensure that Philippine
Nationals control a corporation.
• The Grandfather Rule may be used as a supplement to the Control Test, that is, as a further check to ensure that control
and beneficial ownership of a corporation is in fact lodged in Filipinos.

3
Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the Constitution provides: Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law.

Torrecampo v. Metropolitan (2011) – executive policy
Political questions; requisites
FACTS:
• Capt. Beda Torrecampo of Brgy. Old Balara in Quezon City, in his capacity as taxpayer and on behalf of his constituents,
filed a petition against:
o MWSS and its Administrator, Allado
o DPWH and Sec. Ebdane.
• Torrecampo sought to enjoin respondents from implementing the C-5 Extension Project.
o The C-5 Road Extension Project (Project) will connect SLEX to NLEX.
• He alleged that if the Project would be allowed to continue, 3 aqueducts of the MWSS which supply water to 8 million Metro
Manila residents will be put at great risk.
o He insisted that the RIPADA area in Brgy. University of the Philippines (UP) is a better alternative to the lots
utilized by MWSS and DPWH.
• In their memorandum, MWSS, through the OGCC, explained the purpose of the MWSS and its participation in the Project.
o Under the MWSS Charter, MWSS owns and has jurisdiction, supervision and control over all waterworks and
sewerage systems within the development path of the expanding Metro Manila area.
o Presidential Proclamation No. 1395 (PP 1395), issued by PGMA, declared and reserved certain parcels of land
of the RIPADA area for 2 purposes:
1. As access highway for the new road alignment of the C-5 Project that will connect the NLEX and
SLEX
2. As housing facilities for deserving and bona fide occupants
o PP 1395 directed the MMDA, under direct supervision of the OP, to coordinate with DPWH for detailed
engineering plans and designs for the access highway as well as with the LRA and DENR.
o At the time of issuance of PP 1395, MWSS did not have any participation in the C-5 Extension Project.
o In 2007, MMDA Chair Bayani Fernando wrote to the MWSS and proposed the utilization of certain MWSS
properties for constructing Medium Rise Buildings (MRBs) for the affected families who will be displaced by the
Project.
o MWSS issued a resolution allowing DPWH to use the 60 Meter Right-of-Way for preliminary studies in the
implementation of the Project.
• In their memorandum, DPWH, through the OSG, stated that to execute the Magsaysay Ave.-Congressional Ave. segment
of the Project, the DPWH will follow the direction of the existing Katipunan Ave.-Tandang Sora Ave. road connection.
• Torrecampo argues that:
1. He has legal standing to file the present suit
2. Only the SC may issue a restraining order against government projects
3. The present suit is not premature
4. Implementation of the Project violates and defeats the purpose of RA 8975 unless it is enjoined.
• He claims that the right of Metro Manila residents to clean and potable water is greatly put at risk, in violation of Sec. 16,
Art. 2 (right to health) and Sec. 6, Art. 12.
ISSUES/HELD:
Should the petition prosper? – NO
• Torrecampo seeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy, and quotes the Constitution as a thin veil for his weak
arguments.
• He wants the Court to determine whether the Tandang Sora area is a better alternative to the RIPADA area for the C-5
Extension Project.
• Despite the definition of judicial power under Sec. 1, Art. 8 of the Constitution, an inquiry on issues raised by Torrecampo
would delve into matters that are exclusively within the wisdom of the executive branch.
• The possibility of judicial interference, as well as the speculative nature of the present petition, was shown during the oral
arguments:
o Justice Carpio: Did you go to the President and ask the President to tell the DPWH Secretary not to waste the
taxpayer’s money?
o Atty. Villamor (for Torrecampo): No, the point Your Honor, the petitioner here is a lowly Brgy. Capt.
o Justice Carpio: Yes, but you can also go to the President if you think that there is a waste of funds by the DPWH
Secretary?
o Atty. Villamor: We did not contemplate of [sic] that possibility, Your Honor.
o Justice Carpio: You should go to the superior first of the Department Secretary, ask the President. We are not
the overseer of the President in terms of Executive functions here.

• The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is obviously not within the
province of the Court.
• Such determination belongs to the Executive branch.
• Moreover, in this case, the DPWH still has to conduct the proper study to determine whether a road can be safely construed
on land beneath which runs the aqueducts.
• Without such study, the MWSS, which owns the land, cannot decide whether to allow the DPWH to construct the road.
• Absent such DPWH study and MWSS decision, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction can be alleged
against or attributed to respondents warranting the exercise of the Court’s extraordinary power.

De Agbayani v. PNB (1971) – Operative Fact
DOCTRINE: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination (of unconstitutionality), is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,·with respect to particular relations, individual and
corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
FACTS:
• De Agbayani was able to obtain a loan from PNB in the amount of P450. It was dated on July 19, 1939, maturing only on
July 19, 1944.
o It was secured by a real estate mortgage covering property in the province of Pangasinan.
• On July 13, 1959, PNB instituted an extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding with the office of the Provincial Sheriff of
Pangasinan to recover the balance of the loan.
• De Agbayani countered with a suit against PNB and the office of the Sheriff.
o Her main allegation was prescription. The mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed since fifteen
years have elapsed from the date of maturity (July 19, 1944).
• PNB moved for the dismissal of the case. They argue that:
o Prescription did not run during the period from March 10, 1945 to July 26, 1948. This period should be deducted
from the computation of the tiem during which the bank did not result to legal steps for the recovery of the loan.
§ On March 10, 1945, Executive Order No. 32 was issued. The EO provided for a debt moratorium:
• “Enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable within the
Philippines, except debts and other monetary obligations entered into in any area after
declaration by Presidential Proclamation that such area has been freed from enemy
occupation and control, is temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth
Government”
§ On July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act extending the period of the moratorium was
declared invalid.
§ Note of the timeline: (Note also that the SC based the end of the period, not from 1948 but from
1953)
• (1) March 10, 1945 – EO 32 was issued providing for a debt moratorium
• (2) In 1948 – RA No. 342 (moratorium law) was passed extending the period.
o “All debts and other monetary obligations…. Shall not be due and demandable for
a period of 8 years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor
by the US PH War Damage Commission”.
• (3) May 18, 1953 – Case of Rutter v. Esteban was decided by the SC.
o It held RA No. 342 as unconstitutional for extending the period of the debt
moratorium.
• Lower court granted the writ of preliminary injunction. It enjoined the PNB from proceeding with the foreclosure sale since
the prescriptive period has lapsed.
o It is the view of the trial court that an unconstitutional act is not a law. It creates no rights and imposes no duties.
It is thus inoperative as if it had never existed.
o Under the civil code: “When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern”
§ Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws of the Constitution.
ISSUES/HELD:
Has the period for foreclosure prescribed already? – NO
• Prior to the declaration that an act is null and void, it must have been in force and had to be complied with. Prior to it being
nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with.
• It is only until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, is it entitled to obedience and respect.
o This reflects the fact that the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid.
o The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionally], is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,
with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
• The court recognized that at the time of the issuance of the EO, there was a factual justification for the moratorium. At the
time the court used as basis the reasonableness and rational basis tests:
o The PH was liberated from the Japanese military forces in 1945. Business was at a standstill. Her economy lay
prostrate. Measures, radical measures, were then devised to tide her over until some semblance of normalcy
could be restored and an improvement in her economy noted.
• However, when the RA (implementing the EO) was then presented before the court in 1953 (Case of Rutter), the question
before the court was on satisfying the rational basis test, not at the time of its enactment, but on the current date.

o Court now held that the period provided for seems unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress
is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at
the mercy of the debtors.
§ Obligations pending since 1945 still remain unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to
prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means
that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could affect a
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941.
• The existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences
are attached.
• The court adds that the prescriptive period was tolled from March 10, 1945 (effectivity of EO 32) to May 18, 1953
(when the decision of Rutter was promulgated).

Philippine Coconut v. Republic, supra. – retroactive application to avoid injustice
DOCTRINE: Applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the Government, to
the coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore expect that
their Government would take utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for public purpose.
FACTS:
• Remember that this case is about the coconut levy fund.

o One of the projects for the fund was to purchase the UCPB so that farmers can loan free of interest; and so that
the UCPB shares were to be distributed to the farmers. – SC ruled that the coconut levy funds are in the nature
of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. They cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given
for free to private individuals. Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means,
it is still public in character.
o SC also ruled that the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) block of SMC Shares were government owned.
• For our discussion under Article 8, we will focus on the assailed Partial Summary Judgment (PSJ) of the Sandiganbayan
subject of the petition before the SC.
o The SB refused to proceed to trial on the merits and declared that the farmer’s UCPB shares (which were
sequestered in the Ill-Gotten Wealth Cases against Cojuangco) were conclusively owned by the Republic.
o Farmers wanted to prove that they owned those shares, and not Cojuangco (an alleged crony of Marcos).
• The petitioners argue that SB exceeded its jurisdiction when it effectively sanctioned the taking of COCOFED, et al’s property
without due process of law and through retroactive application of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the coconut
levy laws, an act that is not only illegal and violative of the settled Operative Fact Doctrine but, more importantly,
inequitable to the coconut farmers whose only possible mistake was to follow the law.
o That the SB gravely erred when it outrightly refused to recognize the operative facts that existed as well as the
rights that vested from the time the coconut levy laws were enacted until their declaration of unconstitutionality in
the assailed PSJs. As a result, the assailed PSJs constitute a proscribed retroactive application of the declaration
of unconstitutionality, a taking of private property, and an impairment of vested rights of ownership, all without due
process of law.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the Operative Fact Doctrine apply to the UCPB shares? – No.
• As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law.

o it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has
not been passed at all. (Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management)
• EXCEPTION: OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE
o only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. 
o It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. (Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation)
o The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law.  
• The Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to rule otherwise would be iniquitous and
would send a wrong signal that an act may be justified when based on an unconstitutional provision of law.  
• In Chavez v. NHA, the court applied the operative fact doctrine, wherein the law was declared unconstitutional 10 years
after being implemented. Rights were already vested.
• SC: (1) In this case, the claimants do not have any legal right to own the UCPB shares distributed to them.
4
o Payments under R.A. 6260 (pursuant to which the petitioners are claiming the shares) are not the same as those
5
under P.D. No. 276. The amounts of CIF contributions under R.A. 6260, which were collected starting 1971, are
different from the CCSF levy under P.D. No. 276, which were collected starting 1973. The two (2) groups of
claimants differ not only in identity but also in the levy paid, the amount of produce and the time the government
started the collection.
• (2) To grant all the UCPB shares to petitioners and its alleged members would be iniquitous and prejudicial to the remaining
4.6 million farmers who have not received any UCPB shares when in fact they also made payments to either the CIF or the
CCSF but did not receive any receipt or who was not able to register their receipts or misplaced them.
o Petitioners represent only 1.4million members.
• (3) SB made the finding that due to enormous operational problems and administrative complications, the intended
beneficiaries of the UCPB shares were not able to receive the shares due to them.

4
receipts issued under R.A. No. 6260 were to be registered in exchange for shares of stock in the Coconut Investment Company
(CIC), which obviously is a different corporate entity from UCPB.
5
payments under P.D. No. 276 constituted the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF)

o Due to numerous flaws in the distribution of the UCPB shares by PCA, it would be best for the interest of all
coconut farmers to revert the ownership of the UCBP shares to the government for the entire coconut industry,
which includes the farmers.
• (4) Also, a number, if not all, of the coconut farmers who sold copra did not get the receipts for the payment of the coconut
levy for the reason that the copra they produced were bought by traders or middlemen who in turn sold the same to the
coconut mills.
o The reality on the ground is that it was these traders who got the receipts and the corresponding UCPB shares.
o Also, some uninformed farmers who actually got the COCOFUND receipts, not appreciating the importance and
value of said receipts, have already sold said receipts to non-coconut farmers, thereby depriving them of the
benefits under the coconut levy laws.
o Thus, the nullification of the distribution of the UCPB shares and their transfer to the government for the coconut
industry will, therefore, ensure that the benefits to be deprived from the UCPB shares will actually accrue to the
intended beneficiaries –the genuine coconut farmers.
• Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were haphazardly distributed to private individuals based on
statutory provisions that are found to be constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a variety of grounds.
o Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB shares may not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit.
• Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would be iniquitous and would also serve injustice to the Government, to the
coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore
expect that their Government would take utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for public purpose.

CIR v. San Roque Power Corp. (2013) – Operative fact doctrine
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of operative fact is in fact incorporated in Section 246 of the Tax Code (Rulings of BIR shall not retroact if
prejudicial to the taxpayer, except if there is material misstatement, bad faith of the tax payer and if facts subsequently gathered by
the BIR differs materially from the facts in which the ruling is based). Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling
issued by the CIR from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the CIR or the Court. The reversal is not given
retroactive effect. There must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the CIR that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A mere
administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not be
uniformly and consistently applied. An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general
public and can be availed of only by those with informal contacts with the government agency.
(Doctrine of operative fact is extensively discussed in the MR)
FACTS:
*This is a consolidation of three cases (San Roque, Taganito and Philex). Reference was made in the Tax digests made for Taxation
2 under Atty. Montero. Recall the 120+30 days prescriptive period in claiming VAT refund.
CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque)

• San Roque is a domestic corporation whose function is to design, construct, erect, assemble, own, commission and operate
power enerating plants and related facilities pursuant to and under contract with the Government of the Philippines or any
of its subdivision, instrumentality or agency.
• San Roque entered into a Power Purchase Agreement ("PPA") with the National Power Corporation ("NPC") to develop
hydro-potential of the Lower Agno River and generate additional power and energy for the Luzon Power Grid, by building
the San Roque Multi-Purpose Project.
• On the construction and development of the San Roque Multi- Purpose Project which comprises of the dam, spillway and
power plant, San Roque allegedly incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of ₱559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001.
• On March 28, 2003 it then filed with BIR for a refund.
o CIR’s inaction though prompted San Roque to file a Petition for Review with CTA on April 10, 2003. (13 days
after)
Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR (Taganito)

• Taganito Mining Corporation, is a corporation whose business is to buy, sell, and/or produce ores or business related
thereto.
• Taganito filed all its Monthly VAT Declarations and Quarterly Vat Returns for the period January 1, 2005. Taganito reported
zero-rated sales amounting to P1,446,854,034.68; input VAT on its domestic purchases and importations of goods (other
than capital goods) and services amounting to P2,314,730.43; and input VAT on its domestic purchases and importations
of capital goods amounting to P6,050,933.95.
o November 14, 2006, Taganito filed for a tax credit/refund of its supposed input VAT amounting to ₱8,365,664.38
• As the statutory period within which to file a claim for refund for said input VAT is about to lapse without action on the part
of the CIR, Taganito filed the instant Petition for Review on February 17, 2007.(less than 3 months)
Philex Mining Corporation v. CIR (Philex)

• Philex is a corporation engaged in the mining business, which includes the exploration and operation of mine properties
and commercial production and marketing of mine products.
• Philex filed its Original VAT Return for the third quarter of taxable year 2005 and Amended VAT Return for the same quarter
on December 1, 2005.
• On March 20, 2006, Philex filed its claim for refund/tax credit of the amount of ₱23,956,732.44
• Due to CIR’s failure to act on such claim, on October 17, 2007, pursuant to Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC of 1997, as
amended, Philex filed a Petition for Review.
• CTA Division ruled:
o Philex’s claim prescribed. The two-year prescriptive period specified in Section 112(A) of RA 8424, as amended,
applies not only to the filing of the administrative claim with the BIR, but also to the filing of the judicial claim with
the CTA.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can the taxpayer file a judicial claim without waiting for the lapse of the 120 day period? – NO
• It is indisputable that compliance with the 120-day waiting period is mandatory and jurisdictional.
• Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates a mandatory provision of law. It violates the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies and renders the petition premature and thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the
CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the taxpayer’s petition.

San Roque
• San Roque did not wait for the 120-day period to lapse before filing its judicial claim. Its failure to comply with the 120-day
mandatory period renders its petition for review with the CTA void
• San Roque cannot also claim being misled, misguided or confused by the Atlas doctrine because San Roque filed its petition
for review with the CTA more than four years before Atlas was promulgated.
o Thus, San Roque cannot invoke the Atlas doctrine as an excuse for its failure to wait for the 120-day period to
lapse.
o In any event, the Atlas doctrine merely stated that the two-year prescriptive period should be counted from the
date of payment of the output VAT, not from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales involving the input
VAT were made.
o The Atlas doctrine does not interpret, expressly or impliedly, the 120+30 day periods.
Taganito
• Taganito also filed its petition for review with the CTA without waiting for the 120-day period to lapse. Taganito filed its
judicial claim before the promulgation of the Atlas doctrine.
• However, Taganito can invoke BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated 10 December 2003, which expressly ruled that the
"taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way
of Petition for Review."
o Taganito filed its judicial claim after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 but before the adoption of the Aichi
doctrine. Thus, Taganito is deemed to have filed its judicial claim with the CTA on time.
Philex
• The CIR had until 17 July 2006, the last day of the 120-day period, to decide Philex’s claim. Since the CIR did not act on
Philex’s claim on or before 17 July 2006, Philex had until 17 August 2006, the last day of the 30-day period, to file its judicial
claim.
• However, Philex filed its Petition for Review with the CTA only on 17 October 2007, or four hundred twenty-six (426) days
after the last day of filing. In short, Philex was late by one year and 61 days in filing its judicial claim.
Should the 30 day period fall within the 2 year prescriptive period? – NO
• Section 112(A) of the Tax Code clearly, plainly, and unequivocally provides that the taxpayer "may, within two (2) years
after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund
of the creditable input tax due or paid to such sales."
o This means that the taxpayer may apply with the CIR for a refund or credit at any time within two years. Thus, the
application for refund or credit may be filed by the taxpayer with the CIR on the last day of the two-year prescriptive
period and it will still strictly comply with the law.
• The two-year prescriptive period does not refer to the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA but to the filing of the
administrative claim with the CIR.
o As held in Aichi, the "phrase ‘within two years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit or refund’ refers to
applications for refund/credit with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA."
• If the 30-day period, or any part of it, is required to fall within the two-year prescriptive period (equivalent to 730 days60),
then the taxpayer must file his administrative claim for refund or credit within the first 610 days of the two-year prescriptive
period.
o The 30-day period to file an appeal before the CTA becomes utterly useless, even if the taxpayer complied with
the law by filing his administrative claim within the two-year prescriptive period.
Can there be a valid claim of estoppel due to the taxpayer’s reliance on BIR Ruling DA-489-03? – YES
• BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated December 10, 2003 expressly states that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the
lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review."
• Prior to this ruling, the BIR held, as shown by its position in the Court of Appeals, that the expiration of the 120-day period
is mandatory and jurisdictional before a judicial claim can be filed.
• Strict compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to prosper, except for the period from the
issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was adopted,
which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional.
• It is considered as a general interpretative rule issued by the Commissioner which may be relied upon by taxpayers from
the time the rule is issued up to its reversal by the CIR or the Court.

Motion for Reconsideration (MR) – CIR v. San Roque
FACTS:
• San Roque prays that the rule established in the 12 February 2013 Decision (see above) be given only a prospective effect,
arguing that “the manner by which the BIR and the CTA actually treated the 120 + 30 day periods constitutes an operative
fact, the effects and consequences of which cannot be erased or undone.
o The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general rule, such that a judicial declaration of invalidity may
not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to such declaration.
• The CIR, on the other hand, asserts that Taganito’s judicial claim for tax credit or refund was prematurely filed before the
CTA and should be disallowed because BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued by a Deputy Commissioner, not by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can the operative fact doctrine apply on the alleged actual practice of the CTA of not observing and requiring strict
compliance with the 120+30 day period? – NO
• The general rule is that a void law or administrative act cannot be the source of legal rights or duties.
o Article 7 of the Civil Code enunciates this general rule, as well as its exception: “Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to
the contrary.
o When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.”
• For the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a “legislative or executive measure,” meaning a law or executive
issuance that is invalidated by the court.
o In the present case, however, there is no such law or executive issuance that has been invalidated by the Court
except BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.
• To justify the application of the doctrine of operative fact as an exemption, San Roque asserts that “the BIR and the CTA in
actual practice did not observe and did not require refund seekers to comply with the 120+30 day periods.
o This is glaring error because an administrative practice is neither a law nor an executive issuance.
o There is even no such administrative practice by the BIR as claimed by San Roque.
• Before the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003, there was no administrative practice by the BIR
that supported simultaneous filing of claims.
o Prior to BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, the BIR considered the 120+30 day periods mandatory and jurisdictional.
o Prior to BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, the BIR’s actual administrative practice was to contest simultaneous filing of
claims at the administrative and judicial levels, until the CA declared in Hitachi that the BIR’s position was wrong.
• The CA’s Hitachi decision is the basis of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated 10 December 2003 allowing simultaneous filing.
o From then on taxpayers could rely in good faith on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 even though it was erroneous as
the Court subsequently decided in Aichi that the 120+30 day periods were mandatory and jurisdictional.
• The doctrine of operative fact is an argument for the application of equity and fair play.
• In the present case, the Court applied the doctrine of operative fact when it recognized simultaneous filing during the period
between 10 December 2003, when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued, and 6 October 2010, when the Court
promulgated Aichi declaring the 120+30 day periods mandatory and jurisdictional, thus reversing BIR Ruling No. DA-489-
03.
• (Doctrine Alert) The doctrine of operative fact is in fact incorporated in Section 246 of the Tax Code (Rulings of BIR shall
not retroact if prejudicial to the taxpayer, except if there is material misstatement, bad faith of the tax payer and if facts
subsequently gathered by the BIR differs materially from the facts in which the ruling is based).
o Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the CIR from the time the rule or ruling is
issued up to its reversal by the CIR or the Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect.
o There must, however, be a rule or ruling issued by the CIR that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith.
o A mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere
administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently applied.
o An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general public and can be
availed of only by those with informal contacts with the government agency.
• CTA or CA rulings are not the executive issuances covered by Section 246 of the Tax Code, which adopts the operative
fact doctrine.
o To hold that CTA or CA decisions, even if reversed by the Court, should still prevail is to turn upside down our
legal system and hierarchy of courts.

Is BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 valid even if such was issued by a Deputy Commissioner? – YES
• Section 7 of the Tax Code does not prohibit the delegation of such power.
o The CIR may delegate the powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of the Tax Code to any or such
subordinate officials with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, subject to such limitations and
restrictions as may be imposed under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the CIR.
*There are dissents and separate opinions to this case and the MR, I did not read and did not include them kasi ang haba na. I think,
and I hope I correctly assumed that the MR was able to sufficiently discuss the matters relevant to our topic.

Araullo v. Aquino (2014)
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. This may be quasi-legislative (e.g. rules
and regulations) and quasi-judicial (e.g. decisions). The DAP was an executive act. The doctrine of operative fact only applies when
it would result in inequity and injustice – this means that it applies to those projects that can’t be undone or whose beneficiaries relied
on good faith on the DAP.
FACTS:
• When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy.
o The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad
then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
• The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
o DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for
next year’s appropriation.
o So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.
o Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to
other priority projects.
o The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of
such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
• Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
o Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
• Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received
Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
o Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the
Senators.
• This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns
out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for
certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
• This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
o DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
• Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions
thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order
292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
• The SC held that DAP was unconstitutional.
ISSUE/ HELD:
Does the doctrine of operative fact apply?—YES.
• GR: A legislative or executive act that is declared void for being unconstitutional cannot give rise to any right or obligation.
o XPN: Doctrine of operative fact.
• The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its
unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded.
o In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general
rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
• The doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional EXECUTIVE ACT.
o The term executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are
quasi legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.
o The term ‘executive act’ also includes decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the executive
department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by the Court. In short, the
doctrine is not limited to statutes and rules and regulations.
• Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine only to executive issuances like orders and
rules and regulations, said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or the
agencies under the executive department.
o In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences
that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on
decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified.
o This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice,
equity and fairness.
• The adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were EXECUTIVE ACTS.
o The DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the Executive, through
the DBM, implemented it by issuing various memoranda and circulars.

o The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the different agencies and
departments was consistently applied throughout the entire Executive.
• To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an
operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be
impractical and unfair.
o Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the
recipients could be required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP.
o That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
• Moreover, the implementation of the DAP yielded positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country.
o To count the positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like public infrastructure, could easily include
roads, bridges, homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like.
o Not to apply the doctrine of operative fact to the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy
results by destruction, and would result in most undesirable wastefulness.
• WHEN TO APPLY. Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out, the doctrine of operative fact does NOT always apply,
and is not always the consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can be invoked only:
o In situations where the nullification of the effects of what used to be a valid law would result in inequity and
injustice;
o Thus, if no such result would ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional law is totally ineffective should apply.
• In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to (1) the PAPs that can no longer
be undone, and (2) whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but CANNOT apply to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper
tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.

Kalipunan v. Robredo (2014) – operative fact doctrine (NOT MENTIONED IN THE CASE L); implementation of infrastructure
project not subject to judicial review
FACTS:
• Members of Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus Homeowners’ Association + other individual
petitioners (Kalipunan et al) were/are occupying parcels owned by and located in San Juan, Navotas, and QC (LGUs)
• The LGUs sent Kalipunan et al notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Sec. 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, to give way
to the implementation and construction of infrastructure projects in the areas illegally occupied by Kalipunan et al.
• Sec. 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any court order when:
o persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; and
o persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented.
• Kalipunan et al files for prohibition and mandamus before SC against then DILG Secretary Jessie Robredo to first secure
an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their implementation of Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279.
Arguments:
o They justify their direct recourse to SC by generally averring that they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law
o LGUs committed GAD in implementing Section 28, which are patently unconstitutional.
§ Violative of due process because it allows for demolitions and evictions without any court order
§ Violative of non-impairment of liberty of abode unless there is a court order
6
§ Violative of Art. XII, Sec. 10.
o Violative of their right to adequate housing, as a universal right under Article 25 of Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and Section 2 (a) of RA 7279
o They stand to be directly injured by the threats of evictions and demolitions
o They also allege transcendental importance
• Arguments of the LGUs and DILG: (sorry table na kasi andami hahaha)
Mayor of Navotas Mayor of San Juan Mayor of QC SILG and NHA Gen.
Manager
o Dismiss petition for serious procedural • Availing of prohibition • Premature • Adopted Navotas’
effects such as: and mandamus is petition for position.
o violation of hierarchy of courts improper; Mayor invocation of • Liberty of abode is
o Erroneous use of mandamus to question performed neither judicial review not illimitable and
constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) judicial nor ministerial • Violation of does not include
o Failure to prove grave abuse of discretion functions in hierarchy of the right to
o No judicial controversy since Navotas had implementing RA 7279 courts encroach upon
already successfully evicted Kalipunan et • Petition moot and • Implementation other person’s
al on Nov 2011 academic due to of law through properties.
o Petition was filed out of time successful eviction of RA 7279 does • RA 7279 provides
o That Article XIII of the Consti allows some of the petitioners not amount to sufficient
evictions without court order as long as • RA 7279 lays down the GAD safeguards in
done in accordance with law and in a just procedure in evicting ensuring that
and humane manner informal settlers in a just evictions are
o That RA 7279 is such law. and humane manner carried out in a just
o The Consti doesn’t provide Kalipunan et al and humane
procedural due process prior evicitons manner.
and demolitions; that their invocation to
right to freely choose their abode is
misplaced since they have no vested right
to occupy properties that they do not own
ISSUES/HELD:
ISSUE1: Did the petition violate hierarchy of courts? – YES
• SC is a court of last resort, not a court of first instance.

• Concurrence of jurisdiction among SC, CA and RTCs to issue writs of certiorari etc does not give Kalipunan et al unrestricted
freedom of choice of forum.

6
SECTION 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and
in a just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the communities where
they are to be relocated.

• By directly filing Rule 65 with SC, Kalipunan et al have unduly taxed the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted
to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction.
ISSUE2: Did Kalipunan et al correctly avail of prohibition and mandamus? – NO
• Writ of prohibition only lies against tribunal corporation, board, officer or person’s exercise of judicial, quas-judicial or
ministerial functions
• On the other hand, a petition for mandamus is merely directed against the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
who unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station
or who unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
o Thus, a writ of mandamus will only issue to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty. It will not control a
public officer’s exercise of discretion as where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment.
• In this case, Kalipunan et al seek to prohibit the LGUs from implementing RA 7279.
•
7
A reading of the provision shows that the acts complained of are beyond the scope of prohibition and mandamus. The use
of the permissive word “may” implies that the public respondents have discretion when their duty to execute
evictions and/or demolitions shall be performed.
o Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation
8 9
o The time when LGUs shall carry out evictions and/or demolitions is merely discretionary, not ministerial , judicial
10
or quasi-judicial.
ISSUE3: Is the constitutionality of Section 28(a) and (b) subject to review? – NO
• No because the resolution of such is not the lis mota of the case.
• Courts will not determine constitutionality of a law unless the following requisites are present:
o (1) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination;
o (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question;
o (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and
o (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case
• Except for the petition pertaining to QC, this case no longer presents a justiciable controversy because Mayors of San Juan
and Navotas have already successfully evicted the concerned petitioners
• “Lis mota” literally means “the cause of the suit or action”
o petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be
resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable.
o If there is some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
question of constitutionality should be avoided.
o Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and
not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.
• In this case, SC held that Kalipunan et al failed to compellingly show the necessity of examining the constitutionality of
Section 28(a) and (b) of RA 7279 in light of Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution.
o Magkalas v. NHA: SC held validity of PD 1472 which authorizes the NHA to summarily eject all informal settlers’
colonies on gov’t resettlement projects as well as any illegal occupant in any homelot, apartment, or dwelling unit
owned/administered by the NHA;
o (same case above) that demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order in
several instances provided by law.
• Note that Art. XIII, Sec. 10 allows eviction/demolition as long as in accordance with law and in a just and n a humane
manner:
o RA 7279 ensures this “just and humane manner” through commanding LGUs to comply with a prescribed
11
procedure in executing eviction and/or demolition orders.

7
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition.—Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may
be allowed under the following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
8
The duty is discretionary if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide when the duty shall be
performed.
9
a ministerial duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
10
involve the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in
controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.[
11
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:
(1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or demolition;

Sameer v. Cabiles (re-enactment of a void law declared unconstitutional can’t be done)
DOCTRINE: When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
FACTS
• Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
• Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired and signed a 1-year employment contract and was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal
o The contract stated that Joy would be paid NT$15,360/month
• Cabiles alleges that in her employment contract, she agreed to work a quality control for one year.
o However, upon reaching Taiwan, she was put to work as a cutter
• Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was
terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.”
o She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.”
• Joy claims that she was told that she only earned NT$9,000.15 from June 26 to July 14
o According to her, Wacoal had deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plant ticket to Manila
• On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal.
• LA dismissed the complaint.
• NLRC reversed LA’s decision.
• CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Commission respondent illegally dismissed NLRC’s finding and awarding her
three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees.
• Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, states
that:
o Overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause “shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less."
• In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime, the SC ruled that the clause “or for 3 months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less” is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and substantive due process.
• However, the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" was reinstated in RA
8042 upon promulgation of RA 10022 in 2010. It is contained in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022.
o Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the clause in
Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent’s termination from work in 1997.
o Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can the reincorporation of a previously declared unconstitutional provision be upheld in the new law? – NO.
• In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in any
manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise.
o The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law
that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
• Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision.
o A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have
so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated representatives of the families to be resettled and
the affected communities in the areas where they are to be relocated;
(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays and during good weather, unless the
affected families consent otherwise;
(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of law enforcement and observe
proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to
a court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit
concerned and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from
service of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said order shall be executed: Provided, further, That should
relocation not be possible within the said period, financial assistance in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage
multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected families by the local government unit concerned.

• In this case, we are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so changed so as to
cause us to reverse binding precedent.
• The new law puts our overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as they were prior to Serrano. Failure to reiterate
the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the same untold economic hardships that our reading of the Constitution
intended to avoid.
o Obviously, we cannot countenance added expenses for further litigation that will reduce their hard-earned wages
as well as add to the indignity of having been deprived of the protection of our laws simply because the SC’s
precedents have not been followed
• SC found that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to
equal protection and due process.
o Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that
would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
• SC reiterated its ruling in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed
overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
• The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power. A law is void on this basis only if classifications are
made arbitrarily. There is no violation of the EPC if the law applies equally to persons within the same class and if there are
reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and those who do not fall within the class
o A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class."
o The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification.
• In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished between fixed-period overseas
workers and fixed period local workers. It also distinguished between overseas workers with employment contracts of less
than one year and overseas workers with employment contracts of at least one year.
o Within the class of overseas workers with at least one-year employment contracts, there was a distinction between
those with at least a year left in their contracts and those with less than a year left in their contracts when
they were illegally dismissed.
• We also noted in Serrano that before the passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally terminated
overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment were computed in the same manner. Their money claims were
computed based on the "unexpired portions of their contracts."
o The adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the money claims of illegally dismissed
overseas workers with an unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of three months worth of their salary.
o There was no such limitation on the money claims of illegally terminated local workers with fixed-term
employment.

Film Development Council v. Colon Heritage (2015)– Acted in good faith, so, operative fact applied
DOCTRINE: The Operative Fact doctrine nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law or an executive act by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot
always be ignored. It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law.
FACTS:
• Sometime in 1993, respondent City of Cebu, in its exercise of its power to impose amusement taxes under Section 140 of
the Local Government Code (LGC) anchored on the constitutional policy on local autonomy, passed City Ordinance No.
LXIX otherwise known as the "Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu (tax ordinance)."
o Central to the case at bar are Sections 42 and 43, Chapter XI thereof which require proprietors, lessees or
operators of theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement, to pay an
amusement tax equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts of admission fees to the Office of
the City Treasurer of Cebu City.
• Almost a decade later, or on June 7, 2002, Congress passed RA 9167,creating the Film Development Council of the
Philippines (FDCP) and abolishing the Film Development Foundation of the Philippines, Inc. and the Film Rating Board.
o Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 provided that producers shall be entitled to an incentive equivalent to the amusement
12
tax imposed and collected on the graded films, Grade "A"= 100%; "B"= 65%.
• Accordingly, petitioner, sent demand letters for unpaid amusement tax reward (with 5% surcharge for each month of
delinquency) due to the producers of the Grade "A" or "B" films.
o According to petitioner, from the time RA 9167 took effect up to the present, all the cities and municipalities in
Metro Manila, as well as urbanized and independent component cities, with the sole exception of Cebu City,
have complied with the mandate of said law.
• Meanwhile, on March 25, 2009, petitioner received a letter from Regal Entertainment, Inc., inquiring on the status of its
receivables for tax rebates in Cebu cinemas for all their A and B rate films along with those which it coproduced with GMA
films. This was followed by a letter from Star Cinema ABS-CBN Film Productions, Inc., requesting the immediate remittance
of its amusement tax rewards for its graded films for the years 2004-2008.
• Because of the persistent refusal of the proprietors and cinema operators to remit the said amounts as FDCP demanded,
the city finally filed a petition for declaratory relief with application for a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to declare Secs.
13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional.
• Having ruled that the questioned provisions are unconstitutional, RTC Cebu ordered the return of all amounts paid
by respondent Colon Heritage to FDCP by way of amusement tax.
ISSUES/HELD:
Preliminary: RA 9167 violates local fiscal autonomy. In the case at bar, through the application and enforcement of Sec. 14 of RA
9167, the income from the amusement taxes levied by the covered LGUs did not and will under no circumstance accrue to them, not
even partially, despite being the taxing authority therefor. Congress, therefore, clearly overstepped its plenary legislative power, the
amendment being violative of the fundamental law’s guarantee on local autonomy,

12
Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 provided for the tax treatment of certain graded films as follows:
Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. - Films which have obtained an "A" or "B" grading from the Council pursuant to Sections 11
and 12 of this Act shall be entitled to the following privileges:
a. Amusement tax reward. - A grade "A" or "B" film shall entitle its producer to an incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed
and collected on the graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized and independent component
cities in the Philippines pursuant to Sections 140 to 151 of Republic Act No. 7160 at the following rates:
1. For grade "A" films - 100% of the amusement tax collected on such film; and
2. For grade "B" films - 65% of the amusement tax collected on such films. The remaining thirty-five (35%) shall accrue to the funds
of the Council.
Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. - All revenue from the amusement tax on the graded film which may
otherwise accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and independent component cities in the
Philippines pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160 during the period the graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and
withheld by the proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within thirty (30) days from the termination of the
exhibition to the Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the producers of the graded film within fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof.
Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas who fail to remit the amusement tax proceeds within the prescribed period
shall be liable to a surcharge equivalent to five percent (5%) of the amount due for each month of delinquency which shall be paid to
the Council

Was the RTC correct in declaring the entire RA 9167 unconstitutional? NO, courts cannot go beyond the issues in a case,
which the RTC, Branch 5 did when it declared RA 9167 unconstitutional.
• Noticeably, the RTC, Branch 5, in its September 25, 2012 Decision in Colon Heritage v. FDCP, ruled against the
constitutionality of the entire law, not just the assailed Sec. 14. The fallo of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner, as follows:
(1) Declaring Republic Act No. 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional; <- WRONG
(2) The obligation to remit amusement taxes for the graded films to respondent is ordered extinguished;
(3) Directing respondent to refund all the amounts paid by petitioner, by way of amusement tax, plus the legal rate
of interest thereof, until the whole amount is paid in full. <- UPHELD, relevant to next issue.
• In this regard, it is well to emphasize that if it appears that the rest of the law is free from the taint of unconstitutionality, then
it should remain in force and effect if said law contains a separability clause.
o A separability clause is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one provision shall not invalidate the
other provisions of the act.
§ Such a clause is not, however, controlling and the courts, in spite of it, may invalidate the whole statute where what is left,
after the void part, is not complete and workable.
o In this case, not only does RA 9167 have a separability clause, contained in Section 23 thereof which reads:
Section 23. Separability Clause.—If, for any reason, any provision of this Act, or any part thereof, is declared
invalid or unconstitutional, all other sections or provisions not affected thereby shall remain in force and effect.
• It is also true that the constitutionality of the entire law was not put in question in any of the said cases.
o Moreover, a perusal of RA 9167 easily reveals that even with the removal of Secs. 13 and 14 of the law, the
remaining provisions can survive as they mandate other matters like a cinema evaluation system, an incentive
and reward system, and local and international film festivals and activities that “will promote the growth and
development of the local film industry and promote its participation in both domestic and foreign markets,” and to
41
“enhance the skills and expertise of Filipino talents.”
o Where a part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.
§ The exception to this is when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, in which
case, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest.
o Here, the constitutionality of the rest of the provisions of RA 9167 was never put in question. Too, nowhere in the
assailed judgment of the RTC was it explicated why the entire law was being declared as unconstitutional.
MAIN ISSUE: Do the amounts paid by Colon Heritage need to be returned? No.
• It is a well-settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
o Applying this principle, the logical conclusion would be to order the return of all the amounts remitted to FDCP
and given to the producers of graded films, by all of the covered cities, which actually amounts to hundreds of
millions, if not billions.
o In fact, just for Cebu City, the aggregate deficiency claimed by FDCP is P159,377,988.54.
o Again, this amount represents the unpaid amounts to FDCP by eight cinema operators or proprietors in only one
covered city.
• An exception to the above rule, however, is the doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a matter of equity and
fair play.
o This doctrine nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law or an executive act by recognizing that the existence
of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that
cannot always be ignored.
o It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law.
o In Hacienda Luisita v. PARC, the Court elucidated the meaning and scope of the operative fact doctrine, viz: “The
"operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or
executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with”
• Here, to order FDCP and the producers of graded films which may have already received the amusement tax incentive
reward pursuant to the questioned provisions of RA 9167, to return the amounts received to the respective taxing authorities
would certainly impose a heavy, and possibly crippling, financial burden upon them who merely, and presumably in good
faith, complied with the legislative fiat subject of this case.
o For these reasons, We are of the considered view that the application of the doctrine of operative facts in
the case at bar is proper so as not to penalize FDCP for having complied with the legislative command in
RA 9167, and the producers of graded films who have already received their tax cut prior to this Decision
for having produced top-quality films.
• With respect to the amounts retained by the cinema proprietors due to petitioner FDCP, said proprietors are required under
the law to remit the same to petitioner.
o The operative fact doctrine equally applies to the non-remittance by said proprietors since the law
produced legal effects prior to the declaration of the nullity of Secs. 13 and 14 in these instant petitions.

o It can be surmised, however, that the proprietors were at a loss whether or not to remit said amounts to FDCP
considering the position of the City of Cebu for them to remit the amusement taxes directly to the local government.
For this reason, the proprietors shall not be liable for surcharges.
• In view of the declaration of nullity of unconstitutionality of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167, all amusement taxes
remitted to petitioner FDCP prior to the date of the finality of this decision shall remain legal and valid under the
operative fact doctrine. Amusement taxes due to petitioner but unremitted up to the finality of this decision shall be remitted
to petitioner within thirty (30) days from date of finality. Thereafter, amusement taxes previously covered by RA 9167 shall
be remitted to the local governments.

People v. Mateo (2004)
Automatic review; par. 2(d)
FACTS:
• 10 informations, one for each count of rape of Imelda Mateo, allegedly committed on 10 different dates from 1995-1996,
were filed against Efren Mateo.
• The informations alleged that Efren was the partner of Imelda’s mother, Rosemarie, and that he had carnal knowledge of
Imelda against her consent on 10 different occasions in the house they lived in.
• Imelda never reported the incidents because Efren had threatened to kill her and her mother if she were to disclose the
matter to anyone.
• Each time the rape incidents occurred, Rosemarie was not at home.
• Imelda claimed that each time she was sexually assaulted:
o It was inside the house in Buenavista, Tarlac,
o During the night
o She would try to ward off his advances by kicking him but he proved to be too strong
o Her three sleeping siblings (Ryan, Marlon and Iris) failed to wake up despite the struggles she exerted to fend off
the advances
o Efren covered her mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting.
• The predictable pattern of the rape incidents prompted the defense to ask her whether she had, any any one time, taken
any protective measure in anticipation of the rape incidents.
o Once, she had requested her siblings to keep her company in the bedroom at night but Efren scolded them.
th
o During the 4 rape, she armed herself with a knife but, when Efren entered, she was not able to retrieve the
weapon from under her bed as Efren was sitting right on top of it.
• Dr. Fider, witness for the prosecution, stated that she had physically examined Imelda and found lacerations pointing to
possibly one or two, and at most 3, incidents of rape.
• Efren denied the charges, claiming that he was in Barangay Talaga, Capas, Tarlac, caring for ducklings.
o During that period, he was able to go home only once a week or three times a month.
o While he admitted to leaving occasionally the animals in order to go home, these visits, however, were said to be
brief and mainly for getting some food and fresh clothes.
• Efren dismissed the charges against him as being the malicious retribution of a vengeful stepdaughter.
o Allegedly, he took Imelda to task after his son, Marlon, who had reported seeing her engaged in sexual intercourse
with one Pikong Navarro insider the room of their house.
o He also learned that his neighbor, Sharon, had caught his stepdaughter and Navarro in a very comprising position.
o In anger, he hit Imelda twice with a piece of bamboo and forbade her from going out at night.
• Rosemarie, the mother of Imelda, rose to testify in defense of her common-law husband.
o She claimed that the charges may have been fabricated by her relatives who were jealous of Efren because he
had been receiving the remittances of her earnings from Jeddah.
• Sharon Flores, an usisera neighbor, testified that she repaired to the house of Imelda to investigate the rumors regarding a
man seen entering the Capulong residence.
o When he went in, saw Imelda and Pikong Navarro lying on the bed embracing each other under a blanket
(scandaaaaaalous).
• Anselmo Botio, a friend of Efren, and Marlon Mateo, Imelda’s brother, corroborated Efren’s alibi.
• During trial, Imelda’ testimonies were inconsistent, especially with regard to the sleeping arrangements of Efren and her
siblings.
• RTC found Efren Mateo guilty of all 10 counts of rape.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the evidence agree with Imelda’s cry of rape? – NO
• The prosecution’s claim that Imelda had the sole privilege of sleeping in the lone bedroom of their house while the rest of
the family, namely both her parents and her three siblings, had to squeeze themselves in the sala strained credulity and
that the testimony of Rosemarie to the effect that the couple were the occupants of the single bedroom while their children
stayed in the sala where the television was located, made more sense.
• Not only did the account of Imelda contradict that of Rosemarie but that Imelda herself would appear to have made
irreconcilable statements.
• The subsequent conduct of a victim could also either confirm or negate her claim of rate.
o The human nature, characterized by an instinct for self-preservation and an aversion to humiliation, would dictate
that a typical victim of rape could display changes in behavior, erratic mood swings and an alteration in her daily
routine.
o No such changes were observed in Imelda’s case.

o There was no apparent attempt on her part to run away from home despite every chance to escape from her
tormentor or to exercise every means available to ensure that the incidents would not be repeated.
o At 15 years old, she was already old enough to think of her safety and well-being.
• While it may be argued that Efren’s moral ascendancy over Imelda was enough to intimidate her to suffer in silence; still, it
could well be improbable for a victim who had been raped no less than 10 times not to make a simple outcry against her
unarmed rapist when she had every opportunity to do so.
Is the SC the proper court to try the case? – NOT ANYMORE, CA first
• Up until then, the SC had assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of
the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment is imposed.
o This practice finds justification in Sec. 5(2)(d), Art. 8 of the Constitution.
o The same constitutional article has been a thesis for Art. 47 of the RPC, as well as procedural rules contained in
Sec. 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Sec. 13 of Rule 124 and Sec. 3 of Rule 125 of the Rules of Court.
• However, the constitutional provision is not preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.
• In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence of unanimity on
the crucial point of guilt or innocence of Efren.
• Some are convinced that the evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of
acquittal from the SolGen on the ground of inadequate prof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• The occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily factual matters,
which the SC has had to face with in automatic review cases.
o Yet, it is the CA that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.
• While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the SC of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere has it proscribed an intermediate review.
• If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, RP or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court deems it
wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the CA before the case is elevated to the SC.
• Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused,
and no care in the evaluation of the fact can ever be overdone.
• A prior determination by the CA on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment.
• If the CA should affirm the penalty of death, RP or LI, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding
penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case
to the SC for its final disposition.
• Statistics would disclose that within the 11-year period since the re-imposition of the death penalty law in 1993 until June
2004, the trial courts have imposed capital punishment in approximately 1,493, out of which 907 cases have been passed
upon in review by the SC.
• In the SC, where these staggering numbers find their way on automatic review, the penalty has been affirmed in only 230
cases comprising but 25.36% of the total number.
o Significantly, in more than half or 64.61% of the cases, the judgment has been modified through an order of
remand for further proceedings, by the application of the ISL or by a reduction of the sentence.
o Reduction of the death penalty to RP has been made in no less than 483 cases or 53.25% of the total number.
o Acquittal was rendered in 65 cases.
o In sum, the cases where the judgment of death has either been modified or vacated consist of an astounding
71.77% of the total of death penalty cases directly elevated before the SC on automatic review.
§ That translates to a total of 651 out of 907 appellants saved from lethal injection huhu.
But can the SC do this? – YES
• Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the SC under Art. 8, Sec. 5
(Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts.)
• Procedural matters fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the SC than the law-making power of Congress.
• The rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate review by the CA, a subordinate appellate court, before the
case is elevated to the SC on automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
• Pertinent rules of the Revised Rules on CrimPro, more particularly, Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Sec. 13 of Rule 124,
Sec. 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to the SC in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, RP or LI, as well as the resolution of the SC en banc dated Sept. 19, 1995, in “Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court” in cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.
• Remanded and all records to be forwarded to the CA.

People v. Gutierrez – Transfer of Venue
DOCTRINE: The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by
law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an
effective administration of justice. One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from
one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing
a miscarriage of justice, so demands.
FACTS;
• A group of armed men went to barrio Ora Centro and barrio Ora Este in the municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur
and set fire to several inhabited houses therein resulting in the destruction of these houses and the death of an old woman
named Vicenta Balboa.
• After investigation, informations were filed charging the 17 private respondents, together with 82 other unidentified persons
with:
o Criminal Case 47-V for arson with homicide
o Criminal Case 48-V for arson
• The Secretary of Justice then issued two Administrative Orders
o AO No. 221 authorized Judge Lino Añover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, with official
station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970.
o AO No. 226 authorized Judge Mario Gutierrez (The judge holding over the criminal cases therein) to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to
Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice.
• It appears that the witnesses of the prosecution sought to transfer the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union,
or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety.
• Judge Gutierrez declined the transfer arguing that:
o AO No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required
it for the more expeditious disposal of the cases.
o AO No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in question
to the Circuit Criminal Court
o The accused had already pleaded
o The transfer of venue should have been made at the very inception of these cases
ISSUES/HELD:
Can the transfer of venue be allowed? – YES
• It is true that the Secretary of Justice is not given the power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Such power,
if allowed, would violate the separation of the executive and the judiciary.
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o The laws used as basis do not permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts.
o The transfer to circuit criminal courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of First Instance should be effected
by raffle.
o Hence, judge Gutierrez, in construing the AO as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his
discretion.
• However, the SC believes that Judge Gutierrez failed to consider the contention of the witnesses that the cases should be
transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in
view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives
would be endangered.
o The fear expressed had factual basis and necessity:
§ Of the 100 armed suspects, some 82 are still unidentified and at large
§ One of the private respondents (Vincent Crisologo) belongs to an influential family in the province,
being the son of the Congressman of the first district of Ilocos and of the Lady Governor.
§ The executive branch has not been shown to be able or willing to give the witnesses full security during
the trial
§ The confirmation of Judge Gutierrez was actively supported by the Crisologo’s.
o Regardless of the place where its evidence is to be heard, the prosecution is still required to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
• The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the SC and such inferior courts as may be established by law.
Such power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective
administration of justice.
o One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to
another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of
preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.

13
RA 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts, Administrative Orders No. 258 and 274.

o This power is considered inherent in both the courts of England and the US. That such inherent powers are
likewise possessed by the Philippine courts admits of no doubt, because they were organized on the American
pattern.
• The SC in the exercise of judicial power possessed by it under the Constitution and the statutes, should decree that the trial
of cases 47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either in
San Fernando, La Union, or in Baguio City, at the earlier available date.

Santero v. CFI-Cavite (1965) – rules of court vs. civil code
DOCTRINE: Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
FACTS:
• This is petition for certiorari which questions the CFI-Cavite order granting the Motion for Allowance filed by private
respondents who are Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel Santero (children of Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz)
[Anselma spawns].
o Certiorari was filed by Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico and Willy Santero, who are the children of Pablo with
Felixberta Pacursa [Felixberta spawns].
o While the case was pending before the SC, Anselma’s 3 other children filed for another Motion for Allowance, which
the CFI granted. Later, the CFI would order the administrator of the estate to get back the allowance of the three
additional recipients, based on the Felixberta spawns’ “Urgent Motion to Direct the Administrator to Withhold
Disbursement of Allowance to the Movants.”
• The Felixberta spawns argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they already attained majority
age, two are gainfully employed and one is married.
o Basis: Sec. 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court
o They also argue that there was misrepresentation on the part of Anselma in asking for tuition fees, books and other
school materials for SY1982-83 because these ward have already attained majority age so they are no longer under
guardianship.
• SC points out provisions of the New Civil Code:
o Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance,
according to the social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or
training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
o Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children
during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
ISSUES/HELD:
Which provision of law controls, Rule 83, sec. 3 of the RoC or Arts. 290 and 188 of the Civil Code? Civil Code.
• The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded
as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.
• While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil
Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction.
o Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero.
• Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive
support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules
of Court which is a procedural rule.
o Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law
spouses who are the mothers of the children here).

Damasco v. Laqui (1988) – Prescription of Crimes v. Rules of Court
DOCTRINE: Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the graver offense charged, he
cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction
a circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.
FACTS:
• Atty. Efigenio S. Damasco was charged with the crime of grave threats.
o On July 8, 1987, in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Damasco did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
threaten one Rafael K. Sumadohat by saying:
§ “Bakit mo ako ginaganito? Magbabayad ka. Papatayin kita. Mayroon akong baril, babarilin kita,
tagadiyan lang ako.”
• After the trial, Judge Hilario Laqui found that the evidence presented did not establish the crime of grave threats but only of
light threats.
o Damasco was convicted of the latter crime and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100.00 and the costs.
• Damasco filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the dispositive part of respondent Judge’s decision, and contended that:
o He cannot be convicted of light threats, necessarily included in grave threats charged in the information, as the
lighter offense had already prescribed when the information was filed.
§ The crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the information was filed only on 17 September 1987 or
after the lapse of 71 days.
§ Incidentally, the affidavit/ complaint was filed with the Fiscal’s Office only on 7 September 1987, or after
the lapse of 61 days from 8 July 1987
§ Upon the other hand, the crime of light threats, which is a light offense, prescribes in two (2) months 2
which means sixty (60) days.
• The Lower Court denied the motion and stated that since the Court acquired jurisdiction to try the case because the
information was filed within the prescriptive period for the crime charged, which is Grave Threats, the same cannot be lost
by prescription, if after trial what has been proven is merely light threats.
ISSUE/HELD:
Can Damasco be adjudged to be guilty of a lesser offense includible within a graver offense originally charged against him
if such lesser offense has already prescribed? – NO
• In Francsico v. CA, the Court held:

o Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the graver offense
charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed.
o To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of the law on prescription by the
simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.
• In the case of Felino Reyes v. IAC and People of the Philippines, a Memorandum entitled “An Examination of the Rule
Which Holds That One Cannot Be Convicted Of A Lesser Offense Includible Within a Greater Offense, Where Prosecution
For The Latter Was Commenced After Expiration Of Limitations Applicable To The Lesser Offense,” is an attempt to depart
from the rule laid down in Francisco vs. CA by:
o invoking the principle of presumption of regularity in the performance of official acts and duties, and;
o interpreting the phrase “prescription of a crime or offense” as merely “a bar to the commencement of a criminal
action
• Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute
an act prohibited and punished by law.
o While it is the rule that an accused who fails to move to quash before pleading, is deemed to waive all objections
which are grounds of a motion to quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under
Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes criminal liability.
o To apply the suggestion in the aforecited memorandum could contravene said Article 89, which is a part of
substantive law.
o This position is further strengthened by Sec. 8, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which added
extinction of offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a failure to assert a
ground of a motion to quash.
• A departure from the ruling in Francisco vs. CA, can be done only “through an overhaul of some existing rules on criminal
procedure to give prescription a limited meaning, i.e., a mere bar to the commencement of a criminal action and therefore,
waivable.
• This will have to contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged, such rules shall not
however diminish, increase or modify substantive rights
• In the case at bar, the questioned decision convicting Damasco of light threats was set aside.

Baguio Market Vendors v. Hon. Cortes (2010) – Congress cannot repeal SC rules
DOCTRINE: The exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure is “one of the safeguards of this Court’s
institutional independence.” The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by the SC concerning pleading,
practice and procedure; it cannot be validly annulled, changed, or modified by Congress.
FACTS:
• Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BMV) filed before Baguio RTC a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
under the Real Estate Mortgage Law (Act 3135). Under RULE 141, Section 7(c) – petitions for extrajudicial foreclosure are
subject to legal fees based on the value of mortgagee’s claim.
• BMV sought exemption from paying the legal fees based on Article 62(6) of the Cooperative Code.
o It exempts cooperatives “from the payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the Philippine Government
for and in connection with all actions brought under” the Cooperative Code.
• RTC rulings:
o RTC Judge Cortes denied the exemption. He cited Rule 141, Sec. 22 in which exemption from legal fees pertains
only to the “Republic, its agencies and instrumentalities.”
o BMV filed an MR which was again denied by Cortes.This time reasoning that fees collected under Rule 141 are
not “fees payable to the Philippine Government” but to a special fund. Hence, reliance on Article 62(6) is
misplaced.
• OSG – agreed with BMV.
o As the substantive rule, Article 62(6) prevails over Sec. 22 of Rule 141, a judicial rule of procedure.
o Also, the judiciary is part of the Government, so the amount payable to the special fund is technically payable to
the Government.
• SC Office of Chief Attorney (OCAT) – not a party but SC required this office to comment because the issue involved SC’s
power to promulgate rules.
o RULE 141, section 22 prevails over Article 62(2) because (1) power to impose fees is judicial and (2) the 1987
Constitution insulated Court’s rule-making power from Congress’ interference by omitting in the 1987 Constitution
the power of congress to alter judicial rules found in 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is BMV’s application for judicial foreclosure exempt from legal fees? NO.
• The Petition for extrajudicial foreclosure is outside ambit of Article 62(6) of RA 6838
o The exemption under Article 62(6) pertains to two types of action: (1) those brought under the Cooperative Code
and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative Development Authority.
• By simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption
from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding
o First, the fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under the Real Estate Mortgage Law (Act 3135).
o Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim exemption only in actions to
enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives.
• At this point, the SC said that the abovementioned reasons are enough to dispose the case. But, in order to clarify the power
of the Court to promulgate rules vis-à-vis power of Congress to make law, it reiterated its previous rulings in the GSIS Case
and Echegaray.
• (IMPT) The Power of the Legislature vis-à-vis the Power of the SC to enact judicial rules
• Until the 1987 Constitution, our two previous constitutions textualized a power-sharing scheme between the legislature and
the SC in the enactment of judicial rules.
o In 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the SC was vested the power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
and procedure in all courts and the admission to the bar.
o They also granted the legislature the concurrent power to repeal, alter of supplement the rules.
• In 1987, however, the subsidiary and corrective power of Congress has been omitted.
o Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice —The rule making power of SC was expanded. The SC was given power to
promulgate rules for the protection of Constitutional rights. The power to disapprove rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by the Court with Congress (more so with the Executive).
o RE: GSIS --- the court en banc denied GSIS’ request, on the basis of its charter, to be exempt from payment
legal fees.
• The exclusive power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice and procedure is “one of the safeguards of this Court’s
institutional independence.” The payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by the SC concerning
pleading, practice and procedure; it cannot be validly annulled, changed, or modified by Congress.

In re: In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption (legal fees)
(Edited A2015)
DOCTRINE: There is a total “non-exemption” of cooperatives from legal fees and sheriff’s fees by applying the principle of separation
of powers. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees.
Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of
the Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or
controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is
constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.
FACTS
• Perpetual Help Community Cooperative (PHCCI) requested the issuance of a court order to clarify and implement the
exemption of cooperatives from the payment of court and sheriff’s fees pursuant to RA 6938 as amended by RA 9520 (The
Philippine Cooperative Act of 2008).
• PHCCI argues that it enjoys exemption to such fees under Sec.6, Art. 61 of RA 9520
o Sec. 6, RA 9520: Cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the
Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this Code, or where such actions is
brought by the Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in favor of the
cooperative.
• PHCCI claims that this provision reiterates Section 62, Paragraph 5 of RA 6938 (Act to Ordain a Cooperative Code of the
Philippines).
• Also, it alleged that this was the basis for the resolution in A.M. No. 03-4-01—0
o That exempted the cooperatives from payment of all court and sheriff’s fees in connection with actions filed by its
duly elected officers which were brought to enforce payment of obligations contracted in favor of the cooperative.
• PHCCI field a motion to implement these exemptions to the MTCC of Dumaguete
o However, the court ruled that it is a national concern and should be up to the SC to come up with a policy and a
uniform system of collection.
• On September 21, 2011, Executive Judge Estoconing of the MTCC of Dumaguete issued an order treating the motion filed
as mere consulta having no main action filed in court.
o He expressed his reluctance in granting these exemptions since many of the cases filed by PHCCI are small
claims cases and such require the payment of docket fees and other fees as provided under Section 8 of the Rule
on Small Claims.
• PHCCI then went up to the SC to have this matter settled.
ISSUES/HELD:
Are cooperatives exempt from the payment of court and sherrif’s fees? – NO.
• The term “all court fees” does not include sheriff’s fees
o In a resolution dated September 1, 2009, the SC held that exemptions granted to clearly do not cover the amount
required to defray actual travel expenses of sheriffs and process servers and other processes relative to the trial
of the case.
o This resolution exempted cooperatives from legal fees, but not sheriff’s fees.
Can a law passed by Congress grant exemption from court fees? – NO.
• There is a total “non-exemption” of cooperatives from legal fees and sheriff’s fees by applying the principle of separation of
powers.
o The SC had previously denied the petition of GSIS for recognition of its exemption from fees under Sec 22 of
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Rule 141 of the RoC
o The SC cited Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
§ In that case, the court said that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter,
or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure and held that the power to promulgate
these Rules is no longer shared with the Congress, more so, with the Executive.
• Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by the SC concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress.
• One of the safeguards of the SC for institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now the Court’s exclusive domain.

14
Sec. 22. Government exempt. -- The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the
legal fees provided in the rule. Local governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without independent
charters are not exempt from paying such fees. However, all court actions, criminal or civil, instituted at the instance of the
provincial, city or municipal treasurer or assessor under Sec. 280 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall be exempt from the
payment of court and sheriff’s fees.

o The other branches will be running to trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issues that effectively
repeal, alter, or modify and court rules.
• Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees.
• Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components,
o the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and
o the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF).
o The laws that established the JDF and SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to guarantee
the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy.
• Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential
element of the Court’s fiscal independence.
o Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled
corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF.
o Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and
erodes its independence.
• The court reiterated their decision in GSIS in the cases of Baguio Market Vendors Cooperative and also re-clarified that
National Power Corporation is not exempt from legal fees as well.
• With the foregoing categorical pronouncements of the SC, it is evident that the exemption of cooperatives from payment of
court and sheriff’s fees no longer stands.
o Cooperatives can no longer invoke Republic Act No. 6938, as amended by Republic Act No. 9520, as basis for
exemption from the payment of legal fees.

In re: Cunanan (admission to the bar) (Read with In Re Argosino (next case) and baguio vendors)
(Edited A2015)
DOCTRINE: The ultimate power, however, to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court, and the
law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license.
FACTS
• This case concerns Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953."
• Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar,
o Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court(R126-S14): 
§ "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject."
o the court, however, has lowered the passing rate in the past. (exact term used: their grades were “raised to 75”)
§ 1946: 72; 1947: 69; 1948: 70; 1949: 74; 1950-1954: 75. 
• Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious
of having been discriminated against unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar lobbied in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.
• The President requested the views of the SC on the bill.
• Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto,
and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it.
• Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the
vetoed bill.
• Although the members of the SC reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become
15
a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. This became RA 972
• After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission.
o There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the
law in question
• To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether
or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
o Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades.
o If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should
be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is RA 972 Constitutional? – YES, partly.
• These bar flunkers have inadequate preparation – thus to admit them would be contrary to public interest.
o By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice – it would create a serious social danger.  
o The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problem evolved by the times become more difficult.  

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SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court,
any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred
and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-
half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or
grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

o An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly.  
• the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility
o Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable.  
o the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial
o The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that
§ it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action,
§ while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power  
o The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the
government  
• The act of admitting or denying people admission to the bar is done through a court judgment – only the court can revoke
such judgment
o In lowering the passing rate from 1946-1952, RA 972 is not a legislation but a judgment
o a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
o affecting the bar candidates concerned – only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department that
may do so.
• The ultimate power, however, to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed
by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license.
o Cited Sec 13, Art VIII of the 1935 Constitution:
§ The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
o Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court  
o The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take
the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter.  
o The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys
at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law.  
o Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment
the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its
responsibility to admit,  
o suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
• There is no valid Classification provided to justify the inclusion of the bar flunkers of 1946-1955 and to exclude those flunkers
prior to such years
o The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon
material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon
substantial distinctions.  
o A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made
to operate on that class only, and not generally on all.  
o As regards to RA 972 what’s the classification given for lowering the bar passing grade to 69?
§ If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.  
o The fact that there were no records of bar flunkers in 1944 and 1941 or the years before does not justify the
unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither
is the exclusion of those who failed before said years  
Does Art. 2 of RA 972 violate the one-subject-one-title rule? – YES.
• Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
• Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals.
o The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and
jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness.  
• Art 2 which establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time was not embraced in the title of RA 972 which only have
temporary effect from 1946 to 1955  
o because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.  
• However, lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955,
said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

In Re Argosino (Compare to previous case)
(Edited A2015)
FACTS
• On 4 February 1992, Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals were charged with the crime of homicide
in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991 due to hazing  
• They pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence.  
• They were granted probation
• On 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar  Examinations.
o In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to
take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.
o He passed the Bar Examination.
o He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office  
• On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit
him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation  
ISSUES/HELD:
Can Mr Argosino be admitted to the bar? – NOT YET.
• The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is
a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained
and certified  
• In re Farmar :
o upright character as condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive
o a license to practice law in North Carolina o It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
o acquired, through association with his fellows. o It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright
o character ordinarily would, or should, or does o . Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following
the line of
o least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong
• In Re Application of Kaufman, citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
o there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. – that is why there is a requirement [that applicant must
have] a high moral standard
o the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself
for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for,
after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a
far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license.
• Court cited other jurisprudence such as In Re Keenan; Re Rouss; Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:  
o the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning  
o The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public... [otherwise]
people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it [would be destroyed]  
• In Mr Argosino’s case
o Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of
good moral character.  
o The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately
led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect
the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking   admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust
and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless
stray dog.
• We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of
application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office 
o Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may
be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar.
o evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly
since the judgment of conviction was rendered
o He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the
family of the deceased student and to the community at large.

PNB v. Asuncion (1977) - Substantive law (Civil Code) > Procedural rule (Rules of Court)
(edited A2015 digest)
DOCTRINE: A substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural law
FACTS:
• Philippine National Bank (PNB), granted respondent Fabar Incorporated various credit accommodations and advances
(discounting line, overdraft line, temporary overdraft line and letters of credit) covering the importation of machinery and
equipment.
o PNB likewise made advances by way of insurance premiums covering the chattels securing these credit
accommodations.
o Said credit accommodations had an outstanding balance of P8,449,169.98 as of May 13, 1977.
• All of the above credit accommodations are secured by the joint and several signatures of private respondents Jose Ma.
Barredo, Carmen B. Borromeo and Tomas L. Borromeo and Manuel H. Barredo.
• Despite PNB’s several demands, respondents failed to pay.
• PNB instituted a case for collection against all private respondents and Manuel H. Barredo filed before the sala of respondent
judge Honorable Elias B. Asuncion, CFI of Manila, Br. 12.
• Before the case could be decided, Manuel H. Barredo died.
• CFI à issued an Order of dismissal stating:
o In view of the death of defendant Manuel Barredo, the Court hereby dismisses this case since the present suit is
for a money claim which does not survive the death of said defendant.
o Cited Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court --- Where the obligation of the decedent is solidary with
another debtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice to the
right of the estate to recover contribution from the other debtor.
o The claim of plaintiff may be filed with the estate proceedings of the decedent.
• PNB’s MR was denied.
• Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES/HELD:
Did the respondent Court err in dismissing the case against all the defendants, instead of dismissing the case only as against
the deceased defendant and thereafter proceeding with the hearing as against the other defendants, private respondents
herein? YES
1. Reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court was erroneous.

• A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing prevents a creditor from
proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors.
• Said provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to pursue his claim against
the estate of the deceased solidary debtor.
• The rule has been set forth that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has the option whether to file or not to file a claim against
the estate of the solidary debtor.
• Manila Surety v. Villarama --- Section 6 of Rule 87 (of the Old Rules of Court) provides the procedure should the creditor
desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there is certainly nothing in the said provision making compliance with such
procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving debtors, should the creditor choose to
demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court
jurisdiction to 'take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly
allows the creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.
• Article 1216 of the New Civil Code applies --- gives the creditor the right to proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors
or some or all of them simultaneously.
2. [MAIN] Substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule.
• In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, the creditor may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary
debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors.
• It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim against the estate
of the deceased solidary debtor.
• For to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a condition precedent for any collection action against
the surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code.
• If Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216 of the New Civil Code would, in effect,
be repealed since under the Rules of Court, PNB has no choice but to proceed against the estate of Manuel Barredo only.
o This provision diminishes the Bank's right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one, some or all of
the solidary debtors.
o Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a
substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule.
o Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil
Code, the former being merely procedural, while the latter, substantive.
• Old Const. Section 5, Article X --- provides that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.

People v. Lacson (2003) – time bar rule
Not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights
FACTS:
• This is an MR of the SC Resolution remanding the case to the RTC of QC for the determination of factual issues relative to
the application of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (RRCP) on the dismissal of the cases against
Panfilo Lacson and his co-accused.
• In said criminal cases, Lacson and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of 11 male
persons (including 2 minors, policemen and members of the AFP), bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
• The SC ruled in the Resolution that the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases were with the express consent of
Lacson as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and for examination of witnesses.
o The Court also held therein that although Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP could be given retroactive effect, there
is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant.
• The trial court was directed to resolve WHETHER:
1. The provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused
2. It was directed by the court after notice to the offended party
3. The 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed
4. There is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period
5. Notices to the offended parties were given before the cases of Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir
6. There after affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the 3 other victims
7. The multiple murder cases against Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar.
• The Court further held that the reckoning date of the 2-year bar had to be first determined whether it shall be from:
o the date of the order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases, OR
o the dates of receipt by the various offended parties; OR
o date of effectivity of the new rule.
• In support of their MR, the petitioners contend that:
o Sec. 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to Criminal Cases because the essential requirements for its applications were
not present when Judge Agnir issues his resolution.
§ They contend that Lacson did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir of the cases.
§ Lacson allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the CA and during the hearing that he did not file
any Motion to Dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.
§ Moreover, the heirs of the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said
cases.
§ Lacson et al’s express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and the notices to all the heirs
of the victims of the former’s motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to the
nd
application of the time-bar in the 2 paragraph of the new rule.
o The time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
• Lacson argues that he himself moved for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases, citing the resolution of Judge Agnir
stating that Lacson and the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases should
the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests against them.
o He also asserted that proper notice was given to the other parties.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is Sec. 8, Rule 117 applicable to Criminal Cases? – NO
• Sec. 8, Rule 117:

o (1) A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to
the offended party.
o (2) A provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years or a fine of any amount,
or both, shall become permanent 1 year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent 2 years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
• Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the CA, Lacson is burdened to establish
the essential requisites of the first paragraph:
1. The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuico) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of
the case
2. The offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case

3. The court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally
4. The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal
•
nd
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application the time-bar in the 2 paragraph of the new rule.
• The raison d’etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a case is to bar
him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same
offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.
•
nd
Although the 2 paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the
issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal
shall become permanent 1 year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of
the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived.
o The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order
of dismissal.
• Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing.
o It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no interference or implication to supply its meaning.
o Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case no objection or
with my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case
or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent.
• A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal.
• If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within
the periods provided in the new rule.
• On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his
objection, the new rule would not apply.
o The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to
oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of
limitations.
• The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new
Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein.
• There would be not need of a new preliminary investigation.
• However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or
some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for
the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new
Information is filed.
o A new PI is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal
complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal
liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal.
Was Lacson able to prove all the requisites? – NO
•
st nd st
Lacson has failed to prove that the 1 and 2 requisites of the 1 paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir
dismissed the cases.
• The prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases.
• For his part, Lacson merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses alleging that under Art. 3, Sec. 2 of the Constitution and the decision of the Court in Allado v.
Diokno, among others, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Lacson and to have the prosecution’s witnesses summoned before the court for its
examination.
• Lacson contended in his motion that until after the trial court shall have personally determined the presence of probable
cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against Lacson and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be
recalled by the trial court. He then prayed that:
o (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Art. 3, Sec. 2 of the Constitution be conducted by the
court, and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and
their witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and
o (2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until the
resolution of the incident.
• Lacson DID NOT PRAY FOR THE DISMISSAL, provisional or otherwise, of the criminal cases.
• Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.
• During the hearing in the Court of Appeals, Lacson, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared
that he did not file any motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.
• (Case then included transcript of the hearing between Justice Salonga and Atty. Fortun, wherein Att. Fortun categorically
stated that they didn’t ask for a provisional dismissal.)
• Furthermore, in his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the CA, Lacson declared in no uncertain terms that
he did not move for the dismissal of the Informations.

• The admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the CA are binding and conclusive on him.
• To apply the new rule in this case would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or
impliedly included therein.
• There was also no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing thereon served on the heirs of the
victims at least 3 days before said hearing.
o Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively
comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including:
§ Collusion between the prosecution and the accused, thereby depriving the State of its right to due
process
§ Attempts to make witnesses unavailable
§ Provisional dismissal with the consequent release of the accused would enable him to threaten and kill
the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses, or flee from PH jurisdiction.
• Even if Lacson’s motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the
nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal, all the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing
although the prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion.
• Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir issued his
nd
resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the 2 paragraph of Sec. 8, Rule 117.
Should the time-bar be applied retroactively? – NO
• The time-bar under Sec. 8, Rule 117 is not a statute of limitations but is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the
right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the
lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
• The time-bar does not reduce the periods under Art. 90 of the RPC, a substantive law.
• It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the information had been filed
but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused.
• Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived
its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused.
o The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent.
• He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily included therein.
• The State may revive a criminal case beyond the 1-year or 2-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for
the delay.
• By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within the
period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the RPC are not thereby diminished.
• But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the timeline under
the new rule, the effect is basically the same.
• Procedural laws may be applied retroactively.
• As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be
punished.
• But a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of
due process of impair the independence of the court.
• Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement the constitutional
rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such
as the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the
particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in
particular.
• IN THIS CASE, the time-bar of 2 years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
• The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Art. 90 of the RPC.
• However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and
speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused.
o The time-bar must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short of insufficient that the rule
becomes a denial of justice.
• Petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
• The time-bar was fixed by the SC to exercise the malaise that plagued the administration for the criminal justice system for
the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.
• To apply the time-bar retroactively so that the 2-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public
prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the
intendment of the new rule.
o Instead of giving the State 2 years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than
2 years to do so.
• Judge Agnir dismissed the cases on March 29, 1999.
• The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000.

o If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only 1 year and 3 months or until March
31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases.
o The period is short of the 2-year period fixed under the new rule.
• On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have 2 years from December 1, 2000 or until
December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases.
Should the period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 be included in the computation for the time-bar? – NO
• The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of the 2-year period
because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with
the time-bar.
o It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the cases against Lacson or that it was negligent
for not reviving them within the 2-year period under the new rule.
• To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed
with the express consent of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to
comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect.

Ampong v. CSC (2008) – Exclusive Supervision
DOCTRINE: The Civil Service Commission (CSC) has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service; However, the Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel regardless of
whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary.
FACTS:
• Petitioner Sarah Ampong used to be a public school teacher under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports.
o She late transferred to the RTC of Alabel, Sarangani Province, where she was appointed as Court Interpreter III.
• It was found that Ampong took and passed the examinations under the name of Evelyn Decir back when she was still a
teacher.
o Ampong, pretending as Decir, applied and took the Professional Board Examination for Teachers at Room 16,
Kapitan Tomas Monteverde Elementary School. She passed with a rating of 74.27%.
o The picture attached to the seat plan were not the same picture attached to the CSC form. There were also
marked differences in the signatures affixed therein.
• Because of this, a case was filed against Decir and Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service.
o While Decir denied the charges against her, Ampong voluntarily appeared at the Civil Service and admitted to
her wrongdoing. She voluntarily waived the right to avail of the services of counsel.
o She contends that the husband of Decir is her husband’s cousin. That they begged her to take the examination
in behalf of Decir and that she agreed because she pitied them.
o She adds that there was no monetary consideration involved in her acceptance.
• CSC found Ampong and Decir guilty of dishonesty and dismissed them from service.
• Ampong appealed, raising for the first time the issue of jurisdiction.
o She argues that the exclusive authority to discipline employees of the judiciary lies with the Supreme Court; that
the CSC acted with abuse of discretion when it continued to exercise jurisdiction despite her assumption of duty
as a judicial employee.
o That at the time the case was filed against her on August 23, 1994, she was already appointed as a court
interpreter (August 3, 1993).
• CSC denied the appeal. They held that:
o While it is true that the commission does not have administrative supervision over employees in the judiciary, it
still has concurrent jurisdiction over them.
o The fact that court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the SC does not totally isolate them from
the operations of the Civil Service Law.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the CSC have administrative jurisdiction over an employee of the Judiciary, for acts committed while said employee
was still with the executive department? – NO (but SC ruled against Ampong because of estoppel)
•
16
While the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service , the Constitution provides that the SC is given
EXCLUSIVE administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel.
o Hence, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations.
o No other branch of government may intrude into this power without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
• The fact that Ampong committed the offense before her appointment to the judicial branch does not remove her case out of
the administrative reach of the SC.
o Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the SC, regardless of whether the offense was
committed before or after employment in the judiciary.
o The standard operating procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
• HOWEVER, the SC upheld the ruling of the CSC based on the principle of estoppel.
o The previous actions of Ampong have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction of the CSC. She cannot be
permitted to adopt a different theory on appeal to impugn the court’s jurisdiction.
o Aside from the full participation of Ampong before the CSC, she also admitted to the offense charged. Such
admission of guilt stands.
§ The fact that she was not assisted by counsel when she waived such assistance is immaterial. While
a party’s right to the assistance of counsel is sacred in proceedings criminal in nature, there is no such
requirement in administrative proceedings.

16
Embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled
corporations.

Maceda v. Vasquez (1993) – falsification – Read with De Vera v. Pelayo, Caoibes v. OMB, and Fuentes v. OMB
Art. VIII, Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
DOCTRINE: Only the SC can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with laws and take proper administrative action
against them.
FACTS:
• Respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged in his affidavit-complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman:
o That petitioner (Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, presiding judge of RTC-Antiques, Branch 12) had falsified his
Certificate of Service dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before
January 31, 1998,"
o when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal
cases that have been submitted for decision.
o He further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May,
June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total
ofseventeen (17) months.
• On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide
the aforementioned cases.
o Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's ruling in Orap
vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is
under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
o Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can the Office of the Ombudsman entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge’s certification
submitted to the SC? – No.
• Where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman
must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee
had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
• However, there is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to
his official duties.
o A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious
misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State
under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
• In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
• Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
o By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
o The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for
such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers
to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the
judiciary.
De Vera v. Pelayo
P filed a criminal case against Judge X for knowingly Before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation
rendering unjust judgment and malicious delay in the of Art. 204 and 205 can be entertained, there must first be
administration of justice before the Ombudsman. The “a final and authoritative judicial declaration” that the
Ombudsman referred the case to the Supreme Court for decision or order in question is indeed “unjust.” The
appropriate action. P assails the referral of the case to the pronouncement may result from either: (a) an action of
Supreme Court arguing that the Ombudsman, not the certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the
Supreme Court, is the one vested with jurisdiction to resolve validity of the judgment; or (b) an administrative proceeding
whether the crime charged was committed by the judge. in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for
promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Likewise, the
Was the referral to the SC correct? –Yes. determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed

the disposition of the case is also an exclusive judicial
function.
Caoibes v. Ombudsman
2 members of the Judiciary were entangled in a fight within The Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself
court premises over a piece of office furniture. whether a complaint against a judge or court employee
involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty
Should an administrative case before the Ombudsman and bound to refer to the Supreme Court the determination as to
already pending with the court be referred to the Supreme whether an administrative aspect is involved in all cases
Court? –Yes. against judges and court personnel filed before it.
Fuentes v. Ombudsman
May the Ombudsman conduct an investigation of acts of a Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or
judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in administrative complaint before his office against petitioner
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers.
absence of an administrative charge for the same acts The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme
before the Supreme Court? –No. Court, for appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in

the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Chavez v. JBC (2012) – Interpretation of “a representative of Congress”
ARTICLE VIII. Judicial Department. SECTION 8.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of
law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
DOCTRINE: It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had
in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Only One (1) representative shall come from the
Congress, and not one each from the Senate and House of Representatives.
FACTS:
• The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29,
2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as his potential successor, triggered
the filing of this case.
• Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from political pressure and partisan activities,5
the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and independent body to
recommend nominees to the President.
• It conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC).
o Its composition, term and functions are provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution.
• Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the
ex officio members.
• Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and
the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC.
o In other words, Congress had only one (1) representative.
• In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th)
member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC— one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
• Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from
the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.
ISSUE/HELD:
Does the provision in Article VIII Section 8 require only 1 representative from the Congress to be ex officio member of the
JBC? – YES
• It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should
be understood in the sense they have in common use.
• The provision is clear and unambiguous. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

• The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction.
o It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC.
• Verba legis non est recedendum―from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
• The raison d’ être for the rule is essentially two-fold:
o It is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained
o The Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness
it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
• The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense.
• No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but
that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
• Even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable
from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
o The seven member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose: to provide a solution should there be a
stalemate in voting.
o This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between
two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
o This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process,
especially in the event a tie is reached.
• JBC theorizes that the Constitutional provision was so worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted,
the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted
a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.
• It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government—to legislate.
o In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process
o The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers such as the power of appropriation, the declaration of
an existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral returns for the President and Vice President and
impeachment.
• The aforementioned is not the same in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists
in the workings of the JBC.
o No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers.
• The term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
o A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic scheme which the Constitution laid with
firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single representative of Congress, as one of the co-equal branches
of government
• It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
o Any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate.
• Doctrine of Operative Fact applies in the case at bar.
o The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play.
o It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored.
o The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
o The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law.
§ It was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in
double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
• In this case:
o The Court stated that the current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared
unconstitutional.
o Notwithstanding the finding of unconstitutionality in the composition of the JBC in the case at bar, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid by virtue of application of the Doctrine of Operative Fact.
o The Court took the initiative to clarify that it is not in a position to determine as to who should remain as the sole
representative of Congress in the JBC
§ The Judicial and Bar Council was enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution.
On the issue of locus standi:
• JBC contends that Chavez lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice.
• The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a
judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
• Chavez, therefore, is clothed with legal capacity to sue in the case at bar.

Jardeleza vs. CJ Sereno (2014)
DOCTRINE: SC has jurisdiction over a case involving the proper application of the Rules of the JBC based on its expanded jurisdiction
under Article VIII, Sec. 1. For the unanimity rule to apply, it must relate to questions of integrity – that is, it bears a candid relation to
his moral character. Even if proceedings before the JBC are sui generis, due process still applies. Jardeleza’s right to due process
was impaired as he was neither formally informed of the questions on his integrity nor was he provided a reasonable opportunity to
prepare his defense. Thus, since JBC violated his rights to due process and their own rules, his name should be included in the list.
FACTS:
• This case arose from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Abad last May 22, 2014.
• Thus, the JBC announced the opening for application / recommendation for the vacated position
• Francis Jardeleza (Jardeleza), then incumbent SolGen was nominated by the UP Law Dean, Danilo Concepcion to the
position.
• On June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received calls from Justice Lagman (a member of the JBC) informing him that Sereno
(as ex-officio Chairperson) would be invoking the “unanimity provision” against him
o This provision requires voting in the JBC to be unanimous when the integrity of an applicant is raised or challenged
o He was also directed to make make himself available before the JBC on June 30.
• This was due to Sereno questioning Jardeleza's ability to discharge the duties of his office and his integrity as shown in a
confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration case for the government.
• On June 30, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court's ante-rooms where DOJ Sec Leila M. De Lima informed him that
Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and disclosed information on a confidential legal memorandum
• At 2PM, he was summoned by the JBC. Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Sereno if he wanted to defend himself
against the integrity issues raised against him.
o However, he refused as he would not be lulled into waiving his rights.
o He requested that she execute a sworn statement specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to
cross-examine her in a public hearing.
• Note as well, that it was on June 30 that the additional allegations of a supposed extra-marital affair in the past and alleged
acts of insider trading were first raised.
• The JBC continued to deliberate and later released a shortlist of 4 nominees, without Jardeleza’s name on the list.
• An article appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer online, stating that the Court's Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te, revealed
that there were actually 5 nominees who made it to the shortlist, but one was not included because of the unanimity provision
(Rule 10, Sec. 2, JBC Rules)
• Thus, Jardeleza filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and mandamus under R65 with a prayer for issuance of a TRO
seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees
o On the grounds that the JBC and Sereno acted in GADALEJ in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient
number of votes to qualify for the position (he got 4 out of 6 votes)
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the SC have jurisdiction over the case? YES.
• FIRST, Sec. 8, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The same section gives the SC
supervisory authority over it.
o The power of supervision includes the power to ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a
government entity are observed and complied with.
o Based on this, the supervisory authority of the SC over the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with its
rules. In this case, Jardeleza's principal allegations in his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority.
• SECOND, on the availability of mandamus.
o There is no question that the JBC's duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something.
• THIRD, on the availability of certiorari.
o JBC alleges that certiorari is improper as it is not exercising quasi-judicial functions.
o However, the Court said that it could exercise the expanded judicial power of review (Art. VIII, Sec.1) vested upon
it by the 1987 Constitution.
o Thus the SC can decide a case involving GADALEJ on any branch/ instrumentality of the government, EVEN IF
it does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Do the allegations against Jardeleza relate to "questions of integrity" calling for the application of the unanimity provision?
NO and YES
• In total there were 3 allegations against Jardeleza: (1) his handling of a case, (2) extra-marital affair (3) insider trading.
• On his handling of a case – NO
o Sereno claims that the invocation of the provision was not borne out of a mere variance of legal opinion but by an
"act of disloyalty" committed by Jardeleza in the handling of an international arbitration case for the government.
o SC: The fact remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the "disagreement" in legal strategy as
expressed by a group of international lawyers.

o Disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of, interaction among members of the legal
community.
o Stripped of a clear showing of gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a
legal tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing on his moral choices.
• On the extra-marital affairs and insider trading – YES
o A lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency which every member of the Judiciary is expected to observe.
o On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital securities market. When
someone trades in the market with unfair advantage in the form of highly valuable secret inside information, all
other participants are defrauded
o These two bear a candid relation to his moral character and can be properly categorized as "questions on integrity"
under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.
o Hence, the "unanimity rule" may come into operation.
Is Due Process available in proceedings before the JBC and demandable as a matter of right? YES.
• Jardeleza claims that:

o he should have been informed of the accusations against him in writing;
o he was not furnished the basis of the accusations
o the JBC considered his refusal to explain as a waiver of his right to answer
• JBC claims that:
o The proceedings being sui generis, it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the right to a hearing in the fulfillment of
its duty to recommend. The JBC, as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the
nominees.
o Even so, Justice Lagman on behalf of the JBC informed him that Sereno would be invoking the unanimity rule,
and that Secretary De Lima likewise informed him about the content of the objection to his nomination. However,
it was Jardeleza himself who refused to shed light on the allegations.
• SC: The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
• The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the argument that an applicant's access to the rights afforded
under the due process clause is discretionary on the part of the JBC.
o The fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is impressed with discretion, however, does not automatically
denigrate an applicant's entitlement to due process.
o Notwithstanding being "a class of its own," the right to be heard and to explain one's self is availing.
• In cases where an objection to an applicant's qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor
renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend.
o Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion.
o When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC
is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an
unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it.
• The subsequent issuance of JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBC's deference to the grave import of the right of the
applicant to be informed and the right to be heard.
o The provisions of JBC-010, provide that within 10 days from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates:
any complaint or opposition against a candidate … shall be in writing.
o The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under the rules of statutory construction,
bears great weight in that: 1] it covers "any" complaint or opposition; 2] it employs the mandatory term, "shall";
and 3] most importantly, it speaks of the very essence of due process.
o While JBC-010 does not articulate a procedure that entails a trial-type hearing, it affords an applicant, who faces
"any complaint or opposition," the right to answer the accusations against him. This constitutes the minimum
requirements of due process.
Was Jardeleza’s right to due process violated? YES.
• Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding.
• Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
himself.
• The JBC did not follow the procedure laid out in JBC-010
a. The complaint was not filed in writing w/in 10 days from the publication of the notice
§ There was only verbal notice to Jardeleza via the telephone call
b. When Sereno first raised the allegations against his integrity in an earlier June 5 (before the calls) meeting, there
were already procedural issues involved. (i.e, she should have filed in writing).
c. Even assuming that the confidential nature of the legal memorandum impelled the JBC to resort to oral notice
instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written opposition, the JBC only summoned him at June 30, when they could
have done so earlier.
§ In fact, it would not be amiss to state, at this point, that the confidential legal memorandum used in the
invocation of the "unanimity rule" was actually addressed to Jardeleza, in his capacity as Solicitor
General. Safe to assume is his knowledge of the privileged nature thereof and the consequences of its
indiscriminate release to the public.

§ Had he been privately informed of the allegations against him based on the document and had he been
ordered to respond thereto in the same manner, Jardeleza's right to be informed and to explain himself
would have been satisfied.
• What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the
Council and to instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense.
o Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of his physical presence during the
meeting.
o Was he given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a
meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry.
§ It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts of insider
trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting.
§ While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not
given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior.
• These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by
surprise, but to provide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response.
Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise.
Should Jardeleza’s name be included in the shortlist for nominees? YES
• There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to Jardeleza's legal strategy in
handling a case for the government.
• While Jardeleza's alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall within the contemplation of a "question on
integrity" and would have warranted the application of the "unanimity rule," he was not afforded due process in its
application.
• The sui generis character of JBC proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority to disregard the due process under JBC-
010.
• Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of
the questions on his integrity nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.
• With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the
President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic
tenets of due process.
• Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction.
• Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to propound is that a majority of the members
of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful
spot in the shortlist submitted to the President.

Villanueva v. JBC (2015)
DOCTRINE: The JBC is empowered to set the standards/criteria in choosing a nominee for the judiciary but cannot go lower than the
minimum requirement set forth in the Constitution or under law. As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for,
screening, and selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine how
best to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to
be observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to
respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is
shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those judges with five years of
experience was an exercise of
discretion by the JBC.
FACTS
• Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus,
and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-
level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.  
• The petitioner was the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion,
Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court.
• On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs):
Branch 31, Tagum City;  Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur
• JBC decided not to include his name in the list of applicants due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance
for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at
least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list.
• Petitioner argued that:
o the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more;
o the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and
o the JBC's five-year requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal
Opportunity of Employment.
• The petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10[4] of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8557 should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the
qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since he has already complied with the
requirement of 10 years of practice of law
ISSUES/HELD:
Was the JBC’s policy of requiring 5 years of services as judges of first-level courts before qualifying as applicant to second-
level courts constitutional? – YES.
• The JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and women who
will sit on the judicial bench.
• While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from
having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
o The adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and
incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
• The JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary.
• The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal function of choosing
and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President.
o However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining
applicants' qualifications.
o In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees
for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law
for every position.
o The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is
most fit among the applicants.
o Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
• JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective
and efficient administration of justice.
o Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an
applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and his
office.
• The JBC has the power to determine who shall be recommended to the judicial post.

o To be included in the list of applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria imposed by
the JBC itself. As such, prospective applicants, including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to
take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria.
o Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ is not justified.
• As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and selecting applicants relative to
recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional
mandate.
o Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the
evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to
respond to existing circumstances.
o Its discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is shielded from
any outside pressure and improper influence.
o Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those judges with five years of experience was an exercise of discretion
by the JBC.
• The JBC did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely
exercised its discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must
be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.
• Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication
requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government.
Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of
the Administrative Code
o The JBC policy needs to be published though. The assailed policy involves a qualification standard by which the
JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would
regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to
lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these
vacant positions.

Aguinaldo v. JBC (2017)
DOCTRINE: The President is not bound by any clustering of nominees done by the JBC. Incidental to this doctrine, clustering of
nominees by the JBC is unconstitutional for the following reasons:
1. It impairs the President’s power to appoint members of the judiciary and determine their seniority
2. Clustering can be used as a device to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee.
3. There are no objective criteria, standards, or guidelines for the clustering of nominees by the JBC
4. There is technically no clustering of nominees for first and second level trial courts
5. The designation by the JBC of numbers to the vacant SB Associate Justice posts encroached upon the President’s power
to determine the seniority of justices appointed to the said courts
FACTS
• This Motion for Reconsideration is to challenge President Aquino's appointment of Econg and Musngi as Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, which disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies in said
collegiate court into six separate short lists.
• The Court ultimately decreed in its previous Decision dated November 29, 2016 that:
o President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he
disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th,
20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
o President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential
constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified
nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list.
o This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the President to appoint from
a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy.
o To meet the minimum requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there
should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the
minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted for the President's consideration a
total of 37 qualified nominees.
o All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of nomination by the JBC
under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution.
o Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity
• In the above decision, The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the simultaneous
vacancies that occurred by the creation of six new positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional
was only incidental to its ruling that President Aquino is not bound by such clustering in making his appointments to the
vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts.
o Other than said declaration, the Court did not require the JBC to do or to refrain from doing something insofar as
the issue of clustering of the nominees to the then six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was
concerned.
• The JBC then successively filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente) on December
27, 2016 and a Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29 November 2016) on February 6, 2017.
o At the outset, the Supreme Court noted the revelation of the JBC in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention
that it is not taking any position in this particular case on President Aquino's appointments to the six newly-created
17
positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
• In several motions the JBC argued that (argument in detail under individual headings):
o That in submitting six short lists for six vacancies, it was only acting in accordance with the clear and unambiguous
mandate of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution for the JBC to submit a list for every vacancy.
o The JBC also moves for the inhibition of the ponente (Chief Justice Sereno) of the assailed Decision based on
Canon 3, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary
§ The JBC alleges that the ponente, as consultant of the JBC from 2014 to 2016, had personal knowledge
of the voting procedures and format of the short lists, which are the subject matters of this case.
§ The ponente was even present as consultant during the meeting on October 26, 2015 when the JBC
voted upon the candidates for the six new positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan created
under Republic Act No. 10660
o The JBC proffers several reasons for not immediately seeking to intervene in the instant case despite admitting
that it received copies of the appointments of the six Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the Office of the
President (OP) on January 25, 2016, to wit:

17
The immediate concern of the JBC is this Court's pronouncement that the former's act of submitting six lists for six vacancies was
unconstitutional. Whether the President can cross-reach into the lists is not the primary concern of the JBC in this particular case. At
another time, perhaps, it may take a position. But not in this particular situation involving the newly created positions in the
Sandiganbayan in view of the lack of agreement by the JBC Members on that issue.
What the President did with the lists, for the purpose of this particular dispute alone as far as the JBC is concerned, was
the President's exclusive domain

§ Even as its individual Members harbored doubts as to the validity of the appointments of respondents
Musngi and Econg as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, the JBC agreed as a body in an executive
session that it would stay neutral and not take any legal position on the constitutionality of said
appointments since it "did not have any legal interest in the offices of Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan"
§ None of the parties prayed that the act of clustering by the JBC be declared unconstitutional; and
§ The JBC believed that the Court would apply the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the discharge
by the JBC of its official functions and if the Court would have been inclined to delve into the validity of
the act of clustering by the JBC, it would order the JBC to comment on the matter.
o The JBC posits that clustering is a matter of legal and operational necessity for the JBC and the only safe standard
operating procedure for making short lists.
§ It presents different scenarios which demonstrate the need for clustering:
• There are two different sets of applicants for the vacancies;
• There is a change in the JBC composition during the interval in the deliberations on the
vacancies as the House of Representatives and the Senate alternately occupy the ex
officio seat for the Legislature;
• The applicant informs the JBC of his/her preference for assignment in the Cebu Station or
Cagayan de Oro Station of the Court of Appeals because of the location or the desire to avoid
mingling with certain personalities;
• The multiple vacancies in newly-opened first and second level trial courts; and
• The dockets to be inherited in the appellate court are overwhelming so the JBC chooses
nominees for those particular posts with more years of service as against those near
retirement.
o The JBC further contends that since each vacancy creates discrete and possibly unique situations, there can be
no general rule against clustering.
o Submitting separate, independent short lists for each vacancy is the only way for the JBC to observe the
constitutional standards of:
§ one list for every vacancy, and
§ choosing candidates of competence, independence, probity, and integrity for every such vacancy.
o It is also the asseveration of the JBC that it did not encroach on the President's power to appoint members of the
Judiciary.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is there reason to reverse the Nov. 29, 2016 decision of the SC? – NO.
• There is no cogent reason to reverse the Decision dated November 29, 2016, particularly, in view of the admission of the
JBC of the lack of unanimity among the JBC members on the issue involving the clustering of nominees for the six
simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and their disinterest to question the "cross-reaching" or non-
observance by President Aquino of such clustering.
o Only 4 JBC members signed the Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention
• To determine the legal personality of the signatories to file the JBC Motions, the Supreme Court had to put particular
significance to who among the JBC Members signed the Motions and to Chief Justice Sereno's act of administering the
oath of office to three of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, including respondent Econg, in resolving
the pending Motions of the JBC.
o However, in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, the JBC now reveals that not all of its Members agree
on the official position to take in the case of President Aquino's appointment of the six new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices.
o Thus, the position of the JBC on the clustering of the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice rests on shaky legal ground.
• However, even if the Supreme Court allows the intervention of the JBC (which it did) the arguments of the JBC on the merits
of the case fail to persuade the Court to reconsider its Decision dated November 29, 2016.
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES
Did the clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by the JBC impaired the President's power to
appoint members of the Judiciary and to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices?
– YES.
• The SC noted that they unanimously voted that the JBC acted beyond its constitutional mandate in clustering the nominees
into six separate short lists and that President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the said
clustering
• Even if the JBC invokes its constitutionally-granted independence and discretion, this independence and discretion is not
without limits.
o It cannot impair the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and his statutory power to determine
the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.

o The Court cannot sustain the strained interpretation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution espoused
by the JBC, which ultimately curtailed the President's appointing power.
• In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court ruled that the clustering impinged upon the President's appointing power
in the following ways:
o The President's option for every vacancy was limited to the five to seven nominees in each cluster.
§ Once the President had appointed a nominee from one cluster, then he was proscribed from
considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies.
§ All the nominees applied for and were found to be qualified for appointment to any of the vacant
Associate Justice positions in the Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain why one nominee
should be considered for appointment to the position assigned to one specific cluster only.
§ Correspondingly, the nominees' chance for appointment was restricted to the consideration of the one
cluster in which they were included, even though they applied and were found to be qualified for all the
vacancies.
o Moreover, by designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC established the seniority or order of
preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, a power which the law (Section 1, paragraph 3 of
1
Presidential Decree No. 1606 ), rules (Rule II, Section 1 (b) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan),
and jurisprudence (Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices
of the Court of Appeals), vest exclusively upon the President.
Can clustering be used as a device to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee? – YES.
• The JBC avers that it has no duty to increase the chances of appointment of every candidate it has adjudged to have met
the minimum qualifications for a judicial post.
• However, the SC noted that it did not impose such duty upon the JBC and that it only requires that the JBC gives all qualified
nominees fair and equal opportunity to be appointed.
• The clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts can actually
be a device to favor or prejudice a particular nominee.
o A favored nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her appointment; or
conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her chances of
appointment.
• The six nominees actually appointed by President Aquino as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices were the following:
VACANCY IN THE PERSON SHORT FORMER POSITION HELD

SANDIGANBAYAN APPOINTED LISTED FOR
16th Associate Justice Michael Frederick L. 21st Undersecretary for Special Concerns/ Chief of Staff of the
Musngi Associate Executive Secretary, OP, for 5 years
Justice
17th Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz 19th Undersecretary, Office of the Executive Secretary, OP, for
Associate 4-1/2 years
Justice
18th Associate Justice Geraldine Faith A. 21st Former Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, for 6
Econg Associate years Chief of Office, Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)
Justice Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA)
19th Associate Justice Maria Theresa V. 17th Judge, RTC, Malolos Bulacan, for 10 years
Mendoza-Arcega Associate
Justice
20th Associate Justice Karl B. Miranda 20th Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the Solicitor General
Associate (OSG), for 15 years
Justice
21st Associate Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses 18th Judicial Staff Head, Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ),
Associate Supreme Court, for 2 years
Justice
• It would be safe to say that all the aforementioned six nominees were strong contenders.
o If all six nominees were placed in the same cluster, then only one of them would have been actually appointed
as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice and the other five could no longer be considered for the still unfilled
vacancies.
Where there any objective criteria, standards, or guidelines for the clustering of nominees by the JBC? – NO.

• The problem is that the JBC failed to present a legal, objective, and rational basis for determining which nominee shall be
included in a cluster.
o Simply saying that it is the result of the deliberation and voting by the JBC for every vacancy is unsatisfactory.
• A review of the voting patterns by the JBC Members for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice only raises more questions and doubts than answers.
o It would seem, to the casual observer, that the Chief Justice and the four regular JBC Members exercised block
voting most of the time.
o Out of the 89 candidates for the six vacancies, there were a total of 37 qualified nominees spread across six
separate short lists.
o Out of the 37 qualified nominees, the Chief Justice and the four regular JBC Members coincidentally voted for
the same 28 nominees in precisely the same clusters, only varying by just one vote for the other nine nominees.
• It is also interesting to note that all the nominees were listed only once in just one cluster, and all the nominees subsequently
appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justice were distributed among the different clusters, except only for respondents
Econg and Musngi.
• The SC emphasized that the requirements and qualifications, as well as the powers, duties, and responsibilities are the
same for all vacant posts in a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan; and if an individual is found to be qualified for
one vacancy, then he/she is found to be qualified for all the other vacancies - there are no distinctions among the vacant
posts.
• Furthermore, it is improbable that the nominees expressed their desire to be appointed to only a specific vacant position
and not the other vacant positions in the same collegiate court, when neither the Constitution nor the law provides a specific
designation or distinctive description for each vacant position in the collegiate court.
Is there any clustering of nominees for first and second level trial courts? – NO.
• The SC further pointed out that its Decision only discussed vacancies in collegiate courts.
o The constant referral by the JBC to separate short lists of nominees for vacant judgeship posts in first and second
level trial courts as proof of previous clustering is inapt.
• The separate short lists in such situations are technically not clustering as the vacancies happened and were announced
at different times and candidates applied for specific vacancies, based on the inherent differences in the location and
jurisdiction of the trial courts, as well as the qualifications of nominees to the same, hence, justifying a separate short list for
each vacant post.
What about the clustering of nominees for vacancies in the CA in 2015? – While clustering of nominees was observed in the
nominations for vacancies in the Court of Appeals in 2015, it escaped scrutiny as the appointments to said vacancies were
not challenged before the Court.
• The SC took the occasion to clarify that the application of its ruling in the Decision to the situation involving closely
successive vacancies in a collegiate court may be properly addressed in an actual case which squarely raises the issue.
• (Nice to know Dean might ask) The SC also stressed that the current vacancies in the Supreme Court as a result of the
compulsory retirements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion are not in issue in this case, but has been brought to the
fore by the JBC itself in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention.
o Therefore, the Court will refrain from making any pronouncements on the separate short lists of nominees
submitted by the JBC to President Duterte on December 2, 2016 and December 9, 2016 so as not to preempt
the President's decision on how to treat the separate short lists of nominees for the two current vacancies in the
Supreme Court.
o The Court will only address the statements made by the JBC in relation to said short lists by reciting some relevant
historical facts relating to the filling-up of previous vacancies in the Supreme Court.
• The JBC avers that it had no choice but to submit separate short lists of nominees to President Duterte for the vacancies
for Supreme Court Associate Justice vice Associate Justices Perez and Brion, who retired on December 14, 2016 and
December 29, 2016, respectively, because there were different sets of applicants for each, with 14 applicants for the seat
vacated by Associate Justice Perez and 17 applicants for the seat vacated by Associate Justice Brion.
• The SC held that the situation is the own doing of the JBC, as the JBC announced the expected vacancies left by the
compulsory retirements of Associate Justices Perez and Brion, which were merely two weeks apart, through two separately
paid publications on August 4, 2016 and August 18, 2016, respectively, in newspapers of general circulation; invited the
filing of separate applications for the vacancies with different deadlines; and separately processed the applications of
candidates to the said vacancies.
o The JBC would inevitably end up with two different sets of nominees, one set for the position vacated by Justice
Perez and another set for that vacated by Justice Brion, notwithstanding that the JBC undeniably found all
nominees in both sets to be qualified to be appointed as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, as they all
garnered at least four votes.
o There had been no similar problems in the past because the JBC jointly announced simultaneous or closely
successive vacancies in the Supreme Court in a single publication, invited the filing by a candidate of a single
application for all the vacancies on the same deadline, jointly processed all applications, and submitted a single
list of qualified nominees to the President, thus, resulting in a simple, inexpensive, and efficient process of
nomination.

§ Such was the case when the JBC announced the two vacancies for Supreme Court Associate Justice
following the retirements of Associate Justices Quisumbing and Chico-Nazario in 2009.
• The JBC, then headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, submitted to
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) a single short list dated November
29, 2009 with a total of six nominees for the two vacancies for Supreme Court Associate
Justice, from which, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Associate Justices Perez and
Mendoza.
§ The JBC again announced the two vacancies for Supreme Court Associate Justice due to the
retirements of Associate Justices Nachura and Carpio Morales
• The single short list dated June 21, 2011, submitted by the JBC, under the Chairmanship of
Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, presented, for President Aquino's
consideration, six nominees for the two vacant posts of Supreme Court Associate Justice,
with President Aquino subsequently appointing Associate Justices Reyes and Perlas-
Bernabe.
• How the new procedure adopted by the JBC of submitting two separate lists of nominees will also affect the seniority of the
two Supreme Court Associate Justices to be appointed to the current vacancies is another issue that may arise because of
the new JBC procedure.
o Unlike the present two separate lists of nominees specifying the vacant post to which they are short-listed for
appointment, the short list of nominees submitted by the JBC before did not identify to which of the vacant
positions, when there are more than one existing vacancies, a qualified candidate is nominated to as there was
only one list of nominees for all vacancies submitted to the President.
o Correspondingly, the appointment papers issued by the President, as in the cases of Supreme Court Associate
Justices Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, did not specify the particular vacant post to which each
of them was appointed. The appointment papers of the afore-named Supreme Court Associate Justices were all
similarly worded.
• As earlier stated, the Court makes no ruling on the above-mentioned divergence between the procedures in the nomination
for existing vacancies in the Supreme Court followed by the JBC before and by the present JBC as it may be premature to
do so and may prejudge whatever action President Duterte may take on the two separate short lists of nominees for the
current Supreme Court vacancies which were submitted by the JBC.
Does the designation by the JBC of numbers to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts encroach on the
President's power to determine the seniority of the justices appointed to the said court? – YES.
• The JBC contends in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention that its individual members have different reasons for
designating numbers to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts.
• In its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court already adjudged that:
o Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of the Sandiganbayan Associate Justices
cannot be determined until their actual appointment by the President.
o It also bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such as the
Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members
by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission papers.
§ By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the
seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before their
appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the President's
power of appointment.
• It is also not clear to the Court how, as the JBC avowed in its Motion for Reconsideration, the clustering of nominees for
simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts into separate short lists can rid the appointment process to the Judiciary of
political pressure; or conversely, how the previous practice of submitting a single list of nominees to the President for
simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, requiring the same qualifications, made the appointment process more
susceptible to political pressure.
o The 1987 Constitution itself, by creating the JBC and requiring that the President can only appoint judges and
Justices from the nominees submitted by the JBC, already sets in place the mechanism to protect the appointment
process from political pressure.
o By arbitrarily clustering the nominees for appointment to the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice into separate short lists, the JBC influenced the appointment process and encroached on the
President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and determine seniority in the said court, beyond its
mandate under the 1987 Constitution.
• Finally, the JBC maintains that it is not bound by the Decision dated November 29, 2016 of the Court in this case on the
ground that it is not a party herein.
o The JBC prays in its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, among other
reliefs and remedies, for the Court to reverse its ruling in the Decision dated November 29, 2016 denying the
Motion for Intervention of the JBC in the present case.
o However, the Court has now practically allowed the intervention of the JBC in this case, by taking into
consideration the issues raised and arguments adduced in its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention, but which the Court found to be unmeritorious
• As for the other new rules and practices adopted by the JBC which the Court has taken cognizance of and docketed as a
separate administrative matter (viz., Item No. 2: the deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of

the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred to in pages 45 to 51 of the Decision
dated November 29, 2016), the JBC is actually being given the opportunity to submit its comment and be heard on the
same.
o The administrative matter was already raffled to another ponente, thus, any incident concerning the same should
be consolidated in the said administrative matter.
Must Chief Justice Sereno inhibit herself from the case? – NO.
• The present Motion for Inhibition has failed to comply with Rule 8, Section 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,
which requires that
o A motion for inhibition must be in writing and under oath and shall state the grounds therefor
• Yet, even if technical rules are relaxed herein, there is still no valid ground for the inhibition of the ponente.
o The ponente is not a counsel, partner, or member of a law firm that is or was the counsel in the case;
o the ponente or her spouse, parent, or child has no pecuniary interest in the case; and
o the ponente is not related to any of the parties in the case within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or
to an attorney or any member of a law firm who is counsel of record in the case within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity.
• The ponente is also not privy to any proceeding in which the JBC discussed and decided to adopt the unprecedented
method of clustering the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six separate
short lists, one for every vacancy.
o The ponente does not know when, how, and why the JBC adopted the clustering method of nomination for
appellate courts and even the Supreme Court.
• This ponente was not consulted before the JBC decision to cluster nominees was arrived at and, therefore, she did not have
the opportunity to study and submit her recommendation to the JBC on the clustering of nominees.
• It is the practice of the JBC to hold executive sessions when taking up sensitive matters.
o The ponente and Associate Justice Velasco, incumbent Justices of the Supreme Court and then JBC consultants,
as well as other JBC consultants, were excluded from such executive sessions.
• Consequently, the ponente and Associate Justice Velasco were unable to participate in and were kept in the dark on JBC
proceedings/decisions, particularly, on matters involving the nomination of candidates for vacancies in the appellate courts
and the Supreme Court.
• Hence, even though the ponente and the other JBC consultants were admittedly present during the meeting on October 26,
2015, the clustering of the nominees· for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was
already fait accompli.
o Questions as to why and how the JBC came to agree on the clustering of nominees were no longer on the table
for discussion during the said meeting.
• Neither is there any basis for the ponente 's voluntary inhibition from the case at bar. Other than the bare allegations of the
JBC, there is no clear and convincing evidence of the ponente 's purported bias and prejudice, sufficient to overcome the
presumption that she had rendered her assailed ponencia in the regular performance of her official and sacred duty of
dispensing justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor.
o SC quoted Gochan v. Gochan: In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to
be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and
convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially
if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly
and equitably - both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected.

Nitafan v. CIR (1987) - No tax exemption
DOCTRINE: Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During the continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
FACTS:
• Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC,
National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries.
• They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or
diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that
"(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
• Petitioners argue that the deletion in the 1973 Constitution of the phrase “No salary or any form of emolument of any public
officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.“ Petitioners claim that
the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the deductions of withholding tax from salaries constitutes diminution of salaries? NO.
• Vs 1935 and 1973 Constitution

o 1935 Constitution provided: “The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive
such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”
o 1973 Constitution: “The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their continuance in office.”
§ And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically stipulated: "No salary
or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment
of income tax. "
• The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate such contention. The
debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved
by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make
the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.
o The Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges
but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be
applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the
provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.
o With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the
salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in
Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded.
o The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable
terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.
o Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of
their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the
government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
• The intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income
tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" in the words
of Commissioner Rigos. In the course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard to
Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of
members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.

Vargas v. Rilloraza (1948) – temporary replacement; uninterrupted security of tenure;
*read with Estrada v. Desierto
Sec. 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the
age of 70 years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
FACTS:
•
st
[Not in case: the People’s Court was set up by the 1 Congress of the Commonwealth of the PH in 1945 to decide on
charges of collaboration with the occupying Japanese forces during WW2.]
• The respondents in this case are Rilloraza, Bernabe and Escudero, all judges of the People’s Court.
• Jorge Vargas assails the constitutionality of Sec. 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 (CA 682) or the People’s Court Act on
the following grounds:
1. It provides for the qualification of members of the SC, other than those provided in Sec. 6, Art. 8 of the 1935
Constitution
a. Sec. 6, Art. 8: No person may be appointed member of the SC unless he has been 5 years a
citizen of the PH, is at least 40 years of age, and has for 10 years or more been a judge of a court
of record or engaged in the practice of law in the PH.
2. It authorizes the appointment of members of the SC who do not possess the qualifications set forth in said
provision of the constitution.
3. It removes from office members of the SC by means of a procedure other than impeachment
4. It deprives the Commission on Appointments of Congress of its constitutional prerogative to confirm or reject
appointments to the SC
5. It creates 2 Supreme Courts
6. It impairs the rule-making power of the SC
7. It is a bill of attainer and an ex post facto law.
8. It amends the Constitution
9. It destroys the independence of the Judiciary, and it permits the “packing” of the SC in certain cases, either
by the Congress or by the President.
• Respondents, through the OSG, disputed these contentions.
ISSUES/HELD:
Preliminary stuvvs on the powers of the judiciary
• Before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, the law on disqualification of judges was contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure.
• Art. 8, Sec. 13 of the 1935 Constitution repealed them along with the others dealing with pleading, practice and procedure,
as statutes, and declared them rules of court, subject to the power of the SC to alter and modify the same, without prejudice
to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement them.
• In such case, when the Constitution so provided, it sanctioned as rules of court, among other provisions, those in said
sections of the former Code of Civil Procedure concerning the disqualification of judges.
• If said sections should be deemed as pertaining to then existing substantive legislation, then thy were continued as laws or
statutes by the aforecited provision of Art. 16, Sec. 2.
• By virtue of the provisions in the Constitution, the grounds for disqualifying judges, which had been held to include justices
of the SC, were those established in the former Code of Civil Procedure.
• The SC later promulgated the Rules of Court wherein Rule 123 treats of the matter of disqualification of judicial officers.
• By reason of the fact that the provisions of the former Code were continued by the constitution itself, either as rules of court
or as laws or statutes, there can be no question of unconstitutionality or repugnancy of said provisions to the constitution
as regards the disqualification of judicial officers.
• The framers deemed it fit, right and proper that said provisions shall continue to govern the disqualification of judicial officers.
• Such question of unconstitutionality or repugnancy to the constitution, however, arises in relation to the disqualification of
certain members of the SC provided for in Sec. 14 of the People’s Court Act, which says:
o Any Justice of the SC who held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the
government called Philippine Republic may not sit and vote in any case brought to that Court under Sec. 13
hereof in which the accused is a person who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine
Executive Commission and the PH Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof.
o If, on account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds or disqualification of judges, in Rule 126,
Sec. 1 of the ROC, or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability the requisite number of Justices
necessary to constitute a quorum or to render judgment in any case is not present, the President may designate
such number of Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-Large of First Instance, or Cadastral Judges, having none of

the disqualifications set forth in said section one hereof, as may be necessary to sit temporarily Justice of said
Court, in order to form a quorum or until a judgment in said case is reached.
Can Congress add to the pre-existing grounds for disqualification of an SC Justice? – NO
• No act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution can become law.

• To find out whether Section 14 of the PCA is repugnant to the Constitution, one of the best tests would be to compare the
operation with the same section if the latter were to be allowed to produce its effects.
• Even before the enactment of the PCA, it was not only the power but the bounden duty of all members of the SC to sit in
judgment in all treason cases duly brought or appealed to the Court.
• That power and that duty arise from Art. 8 of the Constitution providing how the court shall be composed and how it may
sit, ordaining that they shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years or become incapacitated
to discharge the duties of their office, and the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions bearing on the jurisdiction,
powers and responsibilities of the SC.
• If Sec. 14 of the PCA had not been inserted therein, there can be no question that each and every member of the SC would
have to sit in judgment in said case.
• But if Sec. 14 were to be effective, such members of the Court “who held any office/position under the PH Exec. Comm. Or
under the Philippine Republic” would be disqualified from sitting and voting in the instant case, because the accused herein
is a person who likewise held an office or position at least under the PH Exec. Comm.
• What the constitution ordained as a power and a duty to be exercised and fulfilled by said members of the PCA would
prohibit them from exercising and fulfilling.
• What the constitution directs, the section prohibits.
• For repugnancy to result it is not necessary that there should be an actual removal of the disqualified Justice from his office
for were it not for the challenged Sec. 14, there would have been an uninterrupted continuity in the tenure of the displaced
Justice and in his exercise of the powers and fulfillment of the duties appertaining to his office, saving only proper cases or
disqualification under Rule 126.
• What matters here is not only that the Justice affected continue to be a member of the Court and to enjoy the emoluments
as well as to exercise the other powers and fulfill the other duties of his office, but that he be left unhampered to exercise
ALL the powers and fulfill ALL the responsibilities of said office in ALL cases properly coming before his Court under the
Constitution.
• Any statute enacted by the legislature which would impede him in this regard simply can not become law.
• To disqualify any of the constitutional component members of the Court is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court
itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
• Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power.
• And if that judge is the one designated by the constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of this court, as is the case with the
Justices of the SC, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the
court itself.
• If Congress could disqualify members of the SC to take part in the hearing and determination of certain collaboration cases
it could extend the disqualification to other cases.
o The question is not one of degree or reasonableness.
o It affects the very heart of judicial independence.
• Art. 8 of the Constitution does not admit any composition of the SC other than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices
therein mentioned appointed as there provided.
• the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members or the SC are replaced by judges of first
instance.
o It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this.
Can a person act as an SC Justice who has not been appointed by the President nor confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, even only as a “designee?” – NO
• Members of the SC should be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
o Hence, designees may not act as Justices of the SC.
• The “designation” authorized in Sec. 14 of the PCA cannot be a compliance with the provision requiring appointment.
• An additional disqualifying circumstance of the “designee” is the lack of confirmation by or consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
• Taking into consideration the fact that only 4 of the present Justices of the SC are not adversely affected by the
disqualification established in Sec. 14 of the PCA, the “designees” constitute a majority wen sitting with said 4 Justices,
giving rise to the result that if the composed by them all should be considered as the Supreme Court, it would be composed
by 4 members appointed and confirmed pursuant to the Constitution and 6 who have not been so appointed and confirmed.
o The situation would not be helped any be saying that such composition of the Court is only temporary, for no
temporary composition of the SC is authorized by the constitution.

• The clause “unless otherwise provided by law” in Section 4 cannot be construed to authorize any legislation which would
alter the composition of the SC, as determined by the Constitution, for however brief a time as may be imagine.
• In principle, what really matters is not the length or shortness of the constitutional composition of the Court, but the very
permanence an unalterability of that composition so long as the constitution which ordains it remains permanent and
unaltered.
Can judges designated by the President by the method of “designation” created by CA 682 constitutionally “sit temporarily
as Justice” of the Supreme Court? – NO, Section 14 of the PCA is unconstitutional.
• Art. 8 of the Constitution, in requiring members of the SC to be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointment, makes it plainly indubitable that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices who are to compose
the Court and sit therein under Section 4, have to be thus appointed and confirmed.
• A mere designation under Section 14 of the PCA does not satisfy the Constitutional requirement of appointment, with the
additional circumstance that as to such designation, the Commission on Appointments is entirely dispensed with.
• There is nothing which authorizes, merely by legislation, any change in the constitutional composition of the SC, or the
performance of its functions by any but its constitutional members.
• Usually provisions of a constitution are mandatory rather than directory, and mandatory provisions are binding on all
department of the government.
• It is clear that the framers intended the SC to function through the members who are therein defined.
o This naturally excludes the intervention of any person or official who is not a member of the Court in the
performance of its functions.
• It is self-evident that the “designees” cannot be such members in view of the fact that they have not been appointed and
confirmed as such pursuant to Art. 8 of the Constitution.

People v. Gacott – en banc decision to discipline
DOCTRINE: It is not intended that all administrative disciplinary cases be heard and decided by the whole court.
• SC en banc - cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts. This is in cognizance of the need for a thorough and
judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary.
• SC in division – when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or
both.
FACTS:
• This is a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration by Judge Eustaquio Gacott Jr.
o This is from a decision of the lower court annulling his order dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529, complemented
with a reprimand and a fine of P10k for gross ignorance of the law.
§ A complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor
Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes.
§ The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to
prosecut is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same.
§ The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished
by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge
granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter of Implementation relied upon by the City
Fiscal is not the “law” contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law
such as R.A. 1130.
§ Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no
power or authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case be quashed.
• Judge Gacott gave copies of his motion to: The Chief Justice, The Judicial and Bar Council, Solicitor General, Bar Confidant,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Court Administrator and his deputies, Secretary of Justice, and Ombudsman.
o Copies of the supplemental motion were also furnished to the individual members of the SC.
• The main contention of Judge Gacott is that:
o He was not informed of the transfer of his case from the third division to the second division of the SC.
o That it is the SC en banc and not the division that should hear and decide on his case.
ISSUES/HELD:
Did Judge Gacott gravely abuse his discretion in granting the motion to quash in the criminal case? – YES
• FIRST. The judge was irresponsible in the performance of his duties. Such error is not only an error in judgment but one
amounting to gross ignorance of the law.
o There was failure on his part to check the citations used by the prosecution and to take judicial notice of all laws
of the land. Such duty does not devolve solely upon the prosecution or whoever may be the advocate before the
court.
• SECOND. The case was validly raffled to Justice Bidin who was then with the Third Division of the Court. When he was
transferred to the Second Division, the case remained with him as the original ponente hence it was transferred also to the
Second Division.
o There is no rule in the Court that the parties be informed that a case has been transferred to another division. To
do so would reveal the identity of the ponente which is precisely what some litigants use to, and still, watch for
and speculate upon.
• THIRD. The court discussed Section 11, Article VIII of the present Constitution:
o “The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by
a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.”
o Judge Gacott based his argument on the second sentence of the section in contending that it is only the full court
and not a division thereof, that can administratively punish him.
o SC held that:
§ A reference to the Court itself necessarily means the court en banc. Where the reference is to the court
acting through its divisions, it would necessarily be so specified.
§ Section 11 clearly shows two situations:
• The first clause which states that “the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to,
and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc.
o It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be
heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will
hereafter be explained.
• The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court
en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein”.

o Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and
decided by the full Court itself.
§ Hence, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be
decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation
of serious charges against members of the judiciary.
• It is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one
year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be decided in
division.

Air France v. Carrascoso – appellate conclusions: ultimate facts
Article VIII Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor.
DOCTRINE: A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of
the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any
specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense."
FACTS:
• Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March
30, 1958.  
• On March 28, 1958, Air France, through its agent, Philippine Air Lines (PAL) issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
o From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso was able to travel in first class.  
o However, at Bangkok, the manager of Air France forced Carrascoso to vacate his seat because a  “white man”
had a better right to it (the term was used by witness Ernesto Cuento).  
o Carrascoso refused and told the manager that the seat “would be taken over his dead body”.  
o Acommotionensuedandmanyoftheotherpassengersgotnervous.  
o The other Filipino passengers pacified Carrascoso and told him to just give up his seat. He reluctantly  gave his
seat.  
• CFI of Manila ordered that the ff. be given to Carrascoso:
o 25K - Moral damages  
o 10K - Exemplary damages  
o P393.20 - Difference in fare between the first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip from  Bangkok to
Rome.  
o 3K - Attorney’s fees  
• CA affirmed but modified slightly the refund from P393.20 to P382.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in
all other respects.”
• DEFENSE is now claiming that that:
o The findings of the CA failed to make a complete finding of the case since it did not state therein the contentions
of Air France as well as the reasons why it was not sufficient.  
ISSUES/HELD:
Did CA fail to make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it? – No.
• The provision in sec. 14 is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state
18
"clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall
contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it."
• A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack.
• The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is
drawn
o A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence presented by one party
and the other upon the issues raised.
o Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts" which a party "considered as
proved." 
• A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the
Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom
"any specific - finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense” because "There is no law that so requires."
o the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe
them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the Constitution".
o People v. Maniqgue: The mere fact that the findings “were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution
without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant’s side in the controversy as shown by his
testimony” would not vitiate the judgment.
• If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the
defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence.
o At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters
within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it.

18
Judiciary Act of 1948.

• Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of the ultimate
facts as found by the court 'x 'x 'x and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon.”
o They consist of the court’s “conclusions” with respect to the determinative facts in issue.”
o A question of law, on the other hand, has been declared as “one which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.”
• On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to
affirm the same.

Francisco v. Permskul (1989) – Memorandum Decision
DOCTRINE: The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower
court only by remote reference (this means that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading
the memorandum decision). For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law
being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. It is an additional condition for its validity that
this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties or easily determinable
by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved.
FACTS:
• On May 21, 1984, Victorino Francisco leased his apartment in Makati to Winai Permskul for one year with P3,000 monthly
rental and a security deposit of P9,000 to answer for any unpaid rentals and any damages to the leased premises.
• On May 31, 1985, Permskul vacated the property.
o He requested a refund of his deposit minus P1000 representing rental for the additional 10 days of his occupancy
after the expiration of the lease.
• Francisco denied Permskul’s claim and said that Permskul still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and
water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original condition.
• Permskul sued in Makati MeTC and Francisco was ordered to pay P7,750.00, representing the balance of the deposit after
deducting the water and electricity charges and the sum of P1,250.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs.
• There was an appeal in Makati RTC and the MTC decision was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987
through a memorandum decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION:
After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts
by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
• Francisco went to the CA but his petition for review was denied.
• Judge dela Rama justifies the memorandum decision as authorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes the ruling of this Court in
Romero v. Court of Appeals sustaining BP 129.
o Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:
o Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. Every decision or final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall
clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is based which may be
contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision,
order or resolution appealed from.
ISSUE/HELD:
Did the Memorandum decision issued by the RTC of Makati violate Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution? – YES
• Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution states:

o No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.
o No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
• The first paragraph of Art. VIII Sec. 14 has been in force since the 1935 Constitution. The purpose has always been the
same, viz., to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after
consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws.
• The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure them that the court rendering the decision actually
studied the case before pronouncing its judgment.
• Other reasons for the requirement are as follows:
o The losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what
he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal.
o The decision, if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to accept
the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal.
o Decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law on which they are based, especially those coming from
the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful references and even as
precedents in the resolution of future controversies.

• The purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum decision is to expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit
of the parties as well as the courts themselves.
• Viewed in the light of practical considerations, the memorandum decision can be welcomed indeed as an acceptable method
of dealing expeditiously with the case load of the courts of justice.
• However, expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the Constitution.
• In the case at bar, a judgment was made by the MeTC in compliance with the rule on summary procedure. The decision
consisted of three typewritten pages, single space, and stated clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was
based.
• The problem is that in affirming this judgment, RTC of Makati rendered a mere memorandum decision that simply adopted
by reference the findings of fact and law made by Judge Balita of Makati MeTC and then concluded, without saying more,
that “there (was no cogent reason to disturb the same.”
• Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines provides that:
o The judgment or final resolution of a court in appealed cases may adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decision or final order appealed from.
• Where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court
below, it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the above provision.
• The distinctive features of the memorandum decision are:
o It is rendered by an appellate court
o It incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order or ruling
under review.
• The reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower
court. This is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since
they are being approved or adopted anyway.
• Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 per se is not invalid or unconstitutional. The Court in this case made an examination of the
actual compliance of Judge dela Rama’s memorandum decision with the provision of Article VIII, Section 14 and Section
40 of B.P. Blg. 129.
o The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the
lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately
available to the person reading the memorandum decision.
o For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being
adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision.
o The memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of
fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the
decision.
• In the case at bar, there was substantial compliance with Section 40 because of the direct availability and actual review of
the decision of Judge Balita incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of Judge de la Rama.
• The Court further stated that the interpretation it made in the case at bar will not apply retroactively to the memorandum
decision rendered by the RTC in the case at bar, or to the decision of the CA affirming RTC’s decision on the strength of
Romero v. CA.
• The Court, as final words, reiterated that all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements set forth in the case
at bar, both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered.
o Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down
the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.

Deutsche Bank v. CIR (2013) SUPRA – applies only to decisions not minute resolutions
DOCTRINE: The requirement that that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly
applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions.
FACTS:
• Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch (DB Manila) remitted to the BIR P67M, representing 15% of the branch-profit
remittance tax (BPRT) on its remittances to its head office in Germany.
• Believing that they overpaid the BPRT, since the RP-Germany Treaty provides for a lower rate of 10% on branch
remittances, the petitioner filed a refund with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and subsequently with the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA).
• Both the BIR and the CTA denied the refund stating that the branch office should have filed a tax treaty relief application
prior to availing of the preferential treaty rate.
• The CTA relied on the earlier case of Mirant Corporation vs. CIR (CTA En Banc Case No. 40, June 7, 2005) wherein the
CTA held that a ruling from the ITAD (International Tax Affairs Division) must be secured prior to the availment of a
preferential tax rate under a tax treaty.
• Unsatisfied with the CTA decision, DB Manila Branch filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is the en-banc decision of the CTA in Mirant vs. CIR binding? NO.
• The SC’s minute resolution on Mirant is not a binding precedent.
• The Court cited Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
o When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formal and substantive
requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed
sustained.
o However, with respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes
res judicata.
o However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute
resolution is NOT binding precedent.
• Thus, in CIR v. Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier-Nickel involving the same parties and the
same issues, was previously disposed of by the Court thru a minute resolution dated February 17, 2003 sustaining the ruling
of the CA.
o Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the previous case "ha(d) no bearing" on the latter case because the two cases
involved different subject matters as they were concerned with the taxable income of different taxable years.
• Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision.
o Doctrine: The constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only
to decisions, not to minute resolutions.
o A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not
require the certification of the Chief Justice.
o Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports.
o Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision.
o Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a
decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice.
• Even if we had affirmed the CTA in Mirant, the doctrine laid down in that Decision cannot bind this Court in cases of a similar
nature. There are differences in parties, taxes, taxable periods, and treaties involved; more importantly, the disposition of
that case was made only through a minute resolution.
NOTE: On the substantive issue, the Court said that the principle of pacta sunt servanda requires the performance in good faith of
treaty obligations. Thus, to require that taxpayers must first comply with an administrative requirement (under RMO 1-2000) is not in
consonance with the performance in good faith. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objectives
of the said RMO. In addition, it was pointed out that the prior application becomes illogical if the premise of the claim was an erroneous
payment since the taxpayer could not have known it would be entitled to the refund since precisely it was using a different basis when
it paid the taxes due.

Salazar v. Marigomen
(Edited A2015)
DOCTRINE: Time and again, the Court had instructed judges to exert effort to ensure the decisions would present a comprehensive
analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would substantially address the issues raised by the parties.
FACTS
• Doroteo M. Salazar charged Judge Antonio D. Marigomen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 61, Regional Trial
Court, Bogo, Cebu, with gross ignorance of the law, bias, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service and rendering a
decision violative of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure and the Constitution in connection with
Election SPC Case No. BOGO-00789.
• Zenaida F. Salazar, wife of complainant, and a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Madridejos, Cebu in the May 2001
elections, filed on July 4, 2001 an election protest against the proclaimed winner Lety Mancio (Mancio) before the RTC
• Initially, the case was handled by another judge (dela Peña), who ordered that the ballots be revised;
o he was, however, replaced by Marigomen (no mention why).
• Marigomen in turn dismissed the protest and declared Mancio the mayor.
• On appeal, the COMELEC First Division, by Resolution of March 25, 2004, reversed and set aside the August 8, 2003
Decision of respondent and declared complainant’s wife Zenaida Salazar as the duly elected mayor.
• Salazar claims that Marigonem admitted in evidence uncertified photocopies of the contested ballots, the original copies of
which were in the custody of the HRET, contrary to Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provide that it should
be certified copies and that Marigonem considered the uncertified photocopies-exhibits for Mancio in deciding the case.
o Hence, the charge of gross ignorance of the law.
• Salazar also claims that Marigonem was partial. For instance, he
o Ignored the objections to the evidence.
o Was acting as if he were the counsel for the protestee,
§ demonstrated during the testimony of the Clerk of Court when protestee’s counsel had difficulty
explaining the nature of the clerk’s testimony and Marigonem laid the basis thereof.
o despite the parties’ agreement to follow the Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated March 12, 2002 executed
between the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) allowing the
submission of affidavits of witnesses in lieu of their testifying in court, subject to cross examination, Marigonem
allowed protestee to present witnesses to give oral testimonies.
• Finally, complainant claims that respondent (4) violated the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as well as the Constitution for
not clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the law on which his decision was based.
ISSUES/HELD:
(Main issue) Was the decision of Judge Marigonem based on factual and legal bases that were shown in the decision? – NO.
• SC found that there is also merit in the complaint that respondent judge failed to abide by the express mandate of the
COMELEC Rules and Procedure and the Constitution to state clearly and distinctly in every decision the facts and the law
on which it is based. 
• The questioned decision dismissed for lack of merit the election protest filed by Salazar against Mancio, and declaring the
latter to be the duly elected municipal mayor of Madridejos, Cebu, with a total votes of 5,214 as against the 5,144 votes
garnered by Salazar, or a difference of 70 votes.
o The final tabulation of votes came about after the respondent judge declared on the penultimate page of the 22-
page decision, thus:
§ After reviewing or re-appreciating the ballots of the contested precincts, the Court invalidated ninety
(90) votes of the protestant and has not validated stray votes in her favor as she has not formally offered
the claimed stray votes or ballots. The court shall only consider ballots which are presented and formally
offered.
• After a thorough examination of the questioned decision, it became obvious that the invalidation of the 90 votes against
Salazar was made without indicating in the decision the factual and legal bases therefor.
o Expectedly, the COMELEC First Division, in its Resolution promulgated on March 25, 2004, reversed and set
aside the August 8, 2003 Decision of respondent judge, and declared Salazar as the duly elected mayor of
Madridejos, Cebu.
• Time and again, the Court had instructed judges to exert effort to ensure the decisions would present a comprehensive
analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would substantially address the issues raised by the parties.
o Respondent failed in this respect.
Was Judge Marigonem ignorant of the law and manifestly biased? – YES.
• SC cited the decision of the Office of the Court Administrator

• Administrative matter involves the exercise of the Court’s power to discipline judges.
o It is undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, that is, to maintain the faith and confidence of the
people in the government.

o Thus, unlike in ordinary cases, there is no private offended party in administrative proceedings who may be
entitled to judicial relief.
o The complainant need not be a real party in interest, as anyone may file an administrative complaint against a
judge, the only requirement being that the complaint be verified and it “be in writing and shall state clearly and
concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the
Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.  
• The admission of the uncertified or plain photocopies of the contested ballots by respondent Judge in favor of Mancio
betrays his ignorance of Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
o The Rule, otherwise known as the Best Evidence Rule, simply provides that as long as the original evidence can
be had, the court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in
the absence of any clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in
court.
o In this case, the original copies of the contested ballots have neither been lost nor destroyed. They are in the
custody of the HRET, and had respondent judge wanted to examine them, he could have easily ordered the
transfer of their custody to the court.  
• His invocation of Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to justify his admission of the plain copies of the contested ballots
is misplaced.
o The Rule allows the admission of secondary evidence when the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be found.
§ However, the offeror is burdened to prove the predicates thereof:
• (a) the loss or destruction of the original was without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of
destruction of documents;
• (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable
inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and
• (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made
for the document in the proper place or places.  
• Verily, as the original copies of the contested ballots are in the custody of the HRET, which fact was known to respondent
judge, there was no occasion to apply Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. When the law is so elementary, not to
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.  
• Respondent judge took special interest in the presentation of Atty. Caayon as a witness for Mancio. The purpose of Atty.
Caayon’s testimony was to show that the photocopies of the ballots were the same as the original ballots in the custody of
the HRET.
o When the counsel for Salazar, Atty. Manuel S. Paradela, refused to stipulate on the faithful reproduction of the
original ballots, the counsel for Mancio declared that they could request HRET to bring the original ballots to the
court for comparison.
o Respondent judge, however, ignored the manifestation, and proceeded to ask Atty. Paradela if the latter was
represented during the photocopying of the original ballots. Nonetheless, the counsel for Mancio, Atty. Nathaniel
Clarus   requested for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to bring the original ballots
to the court.
o Despite that manifestation, respondent judge allowed Atty. Caayon to affirm the veracity of the photocopies in his
possession
• Respondent judge’s bias for Mancio was further shown by respondent judge when he allowed one of the counsels for
Mancio, Atty. Reinerio Roiles, to testify despite the vigorous objection of Salazar through his counsel, as the testimony was
in violation of Rule 12.08, Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility.
The Rule prohibits a lawyer from testifying in behalf of his client, except on formal matters such as the mailing, authentication or
custody of an instrument, or on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends

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Concepcion v.

COMELEC (2009) – standing; aggrieved party (Poli A2015)

Can Pascual question the legality of the donation? – YES.

• Certiorari is not the proper remedy.

Citizens and associations; transcendental importance

Is the right to information on matters of public concern invoked by mandamus? – YES

Does Legaspi have legal standing? – YES

Is the right to information on matters of public concern absolute? – NO

Can the President validly issue EO No. 102? – YES

• In Sep 2004, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO 364

Does AMIN have locus standi? YES.

Are the EOs constitutional? YES.

• The case involves 2 consolidated cases.

Can they implead Pres. GMA as an unwilling co-petitioner?—NO.

Is Service Contract No. 46 valid?—NO, it is unconstitutional.

• According to Sec. 2, Art. 12 of the Constitution:

Is the case moot and academic? NOPE!

Leonen’s super-long dissent:

Political questions; requisites

Should the petition prosper? – NO

Has the period for foreclosure prescribed already? – NO

• Remember that this case is about the coconut levy fund.

• As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law.

CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque)

Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR (Taganito)

Philex Mining Corporation v. CIR (Philex)

Does the doctrine of operative fact apply?—YES.

ISSUE1: Did the petition violate hierarchy of courts? – YES

• SC is a court of last resort, not a court of first instance.

ISSUE2: Did Kalipunan et al correctly avail of prohibition and mandamus? – NO

ISSUE3: Is the constitutionality of Section 28(a) and (b) subject to review? – NO

Automatic review; par. 2(d)

Does the evidence agree with Imelda’s cry of rape? – NO

But can the SC do this? – YES

Can the transfer of venue be allowed? – YES

• In Francsico v. CA, the Court held:

Is RA 972 Constitutional? – YES, partly.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Does Art. 2 of RA 972 violate the one-subject-one-title rule? – YES.

Can Mr Argosino be admitted to the bar? – NOT YET.

DOCTRINE: A substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural law

1. Reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court was erroneous.

Not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights

Is Sec. 8, Rule 117 applicable to Criminal Cases? – NO

• Sec. 8, Rule 117:

Was Lacson able to prove all the requisites? – NO

Should the time-bar be applied retroactively? – NO

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in

ARTICLE VIII. Judicial Department. SECTION 8.

On the issue of locus standi:

Does the SC have jurisdiction over the case? YES.

• Jardeleza claims that:

Was Jardeleza’s right to due process violated? YES.

Should Jardeleza’s name be included in the shortlist for nominees? YES

Can clustering be used as a device to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee? – YES.

VACANCY IN THE PERSON SHORT FORMER POSITION HELD

• Vs 1935 and 1973 Constitution

Preliminary stuvvs on the powers of the judiciary

Can Congress add to the pre-existing grounds for disqualification of an SC Justice? – NO

• No act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution can become law.

WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.

• Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution states:

• SC cited the decision of the Office of the Court Administrator