Marcos v. Manglapus (September 1989) - Residual Power

Marcos v.
Manglapus (September 1989) – residual power
Art. 7, Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
FACTS:
• The SC starts with: This case is unique. It should not create a precedent.
• On his deathbed, Ferdinand Marcos wished to return to the Philippines.
• But Pres. Cory denied his request, on the ground that such would be a threat to the stability of the government.
• Petition for mandamus and prohibition, asking the SC to order respondents (Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, National
Defense, the Executive Secretary, Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of Staff of DND), to issue travel documents to
Ferdinand Marcos and his immediate family members and to enjoin Pres. Cory’s decision to bar their return to the PH.
• The Marcoses claim that under the Bill of Rights, UDHR and ICCPR, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
o Sec. 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
o Sec. 6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
• They contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may
do so “within the limits prescribed by law.”
• Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
• OSG: the issue involves a political question which is non-justiciable.
o The main issue is: Is there a danger to national security and public safety if Ferdinand Marcos and his family shall
return to the PH and establish their residence here?
o Resolution of this allegedly falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President.
o There is a primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is the right to travel the individual right involved in this case? – NO
• Right to travel would normally connote travel from the PH to other countries or within the PH.
• The right involved is the right to return to one’s country, which is a different right under international law.
• The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of
the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but the right to return may be considered as a generally accepted principle of
international law and under the Constitution, is part of the law of the land.
Does the President have the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the PH? – YES
Did the framers of the Constitution, by enumerating certain powers of the President, intend that the President shall exercise
those specific powers and no other? – NO
• The Constitution provides that “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
• However, it does not define what it meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on the exercise of
certain powers by the President, i.e.:
o the power to control over all executive depts., bureaus, and offices
o power to execute laws
o appointing power
o powers under the commander-in-chief clause
o power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons
o power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress
o power to contract or guarantee foreign loans
o power to enter into treaties or international agreements
o submit the budget to Congress
o address Congress
• It would not be accurate to state that “executive power” is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state,
as well as head of government.
• Whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
• ALSO, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President.
• It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g. his power over the
country’s foreign relations.
• Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
• In the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of govt, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or
from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider:
o Service and protection of the people
o Maintenance of peace and order
Jaigest – PoliRev - 1

o Protection of life, liberty and property
o The promotion of the general welfare.
• The President must consider these principles in arriving at a decision when faced with the problem of whether or not the
time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the PH.
• The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed
dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-
gotten wealth are sought to be recovered.
• The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible.
• To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights
of certain individuals.
• (Syllabus topic) The power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people.
o It is a power borne by the President’s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution.
o May also be viewed as a power implicit in the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.
• The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence.
• Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by
the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.
• For in making the President Commander-in-Chief, the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
• That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning has been recognized by
members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by
103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return.
• The Resolution does not question the President’s power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the PH, rather, it appeals to
the President’s sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
Did the President act arbitrarily or with GADALEJ when she denied the Marcoses’ return? – NO
• It is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the
camel’s back.
• With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining
that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
• The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence,
if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.
• The country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to
the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to
destabilize the country.
• The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse.
*N.B. Court voted 8 to 7. Petition dismissed.
Motion for Reconsideration (October 1989)
Is there basis for Pres. Cory’s bar to the return of the Marcos family to the PH? – YES
• [By this time, Ferdinand Marcos had already died. But his family filed an MR so they can return.]
• (IMPT) It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers
which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties
under the Constitution.
• The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department
an in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
• This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers
of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific
power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general
grant of executive power.
• That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new.
• Myers v. US: Unlike the Congress, the federal executive could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as
not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms
where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed.
Is a recognition of the President’s implied or residual powers tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship? –
NOPE
• The residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President under
the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6:

o “Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is
unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in
order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of
the law of the land.
• There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the
President under the 19873 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6.
• FIRST, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power.
• SECOND, it refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation.
• MR denied.

Webb v. de Leon (1995) – prosecution of crimes; not quasi-judicial function
FACTS:
• On June 19, 1994, the NBI filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a letter-complaint charging petitioners (Hubert Webb,
Michael Gatchalian, Antonio Lejano and 6 others) with the crime of Rape with Homicide.
o The victims were Carmela Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer.
o The crime happened in the home of the Vizconde family at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque,
Metro Manila.
• Pursuant to this, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors to conduct a preliminary investigation.
o During the investigation, the NBI presented the ff:
§ Sworn statements of several witnesses (former housemaids, security guards, etc).
• Important here is the sworn statements made by the principal witness, Maria Jessica Alfaro,
who allegedly saw the commission of the crime.
• Note: Alfaro was the girlfriend of one of the accused (Estrada). She was allegedly used to
get access to the house since Carmela was only allowed to entertain female visitors. (Not in
case).
§ Autopsy reports of the victims showing that Carmela had 9 stab wounds, Estrellita had 12 and Jennifer
had 19.
§ The genital examination of Carmela also confirmed the presence of spermatozoa.
o The defense of Webb was denial and alibi:
§ That he did not commit the crime since he was in the US from March 1, 1991 to October 27, 1992.
(Crime happened on June 30, 1991).
§ That during his stay in the US, he purchased a motorcycle and a 1986 Toyota car and was even issued
a California Driver’s License.
• DOJ panel issued a 26-page resolution finding probable cause to hold Webb et.al for trial and recommended that an
information for rape with homicide be filed against them.
o On the same day, an information was filed against Webb et.al with the RTC of Paranaque.
• Webb et.al filed a petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. They argue
that:
o The RTC judges abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest
o DOJ panel also abused their discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of
rape with homicide.
o The DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and
o The DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
Information as an accused – The panel shoud have considered her participation in the crime of rape with
homicide.
• The relevant issue to us pertains to the last argument on the non-inclusion of Alfaro in the information:
o Under RA 6981: “An act providing for a witness protection, security and benefit program and for other purposes”,
Alfaro qualified as a state witness.
o Webb et.al questions Section 12 of the law which mandates her non-inclusion:
§ Section 12: Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program: The certification of admission
into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the provincial or city prosecutor
who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE WITNESS IN THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION and if included therein, to petition the court for his discharge in order that he can be
utilized as a State Witness. The court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused from
the information. Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal
prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used and all the rights
and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof.
o They argue that the section is an intrusion into judicial prerogative:
§ That it is only the court which has the power under the rules on crimpro to discharge an accused as a
state witness.
§ This is allegedly pursuant to “Section 9, Rule 119: Discharge of accused to be state witness.· When
two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the
prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when after requiring
the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that…..”
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the DOJ have the power to determine who may qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity
from prosecution? – YES
• Section 9, Rule 119 does not mean that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial
prerogative.

o Under the rule, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired
jurisdiction over both the crime and the accused.
o Hence, the discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of the court having JD, but it is not a recognition
of an inherent judicial function.
• The court also recognized that the Rules of Court can be changed by the legislature to improve the administration of ourt
justice system.
o RA 6981 (Witness Protection) is one such law. It will help the government in its uphill fight against crime, one
certain cause of which is the reticence of the witnesses to testify.
o The rational of the law is “Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear and
testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/
cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of
criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and
benefits to ensure their appearance in investigative bodies/courts”
Is there basis for finding probable cause by the DOJ panel? – YES
• A preliminary investigation determines whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime
cognizabe by the RTC has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
o The alleged inconsistencies in the affidavit of Alfaro did not erode her credibility.
§ Examples of inconsistencies: (1) Whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident, (2) Whether she
saw the dead bodies, (3) Whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house. Etc.
o The panel held that the inconsistencies have been sufficiently explained and was not made to deliberately distort
the truth.
§ Alfaro reasoned that during her first statement, she held back vital information due to her natural
reaction of mistrust.
• The panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners.
o A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects.
o Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
Is there basis for the warrants of arrest issued? – YES
• Petitioners argue that the RTC judges should have conducted “searching examinations of witnesses” before they issued
warrants of arrest against them.
• SC held that: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
o As long as the judge:
§ (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
§ (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
• In this case, the 26 page report of the DOJ, the two sworn statements of Alfaro and others satisfied both judges that there
is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners.
o The court stressed that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not
the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause.

DJUMANTAN v. DOMINGO (1995) - deportation
FACTS:
• This case talks about the deportation power of the Executive – that it is absolute and unqualified. But the case provides a
limitation to this power: prescription of the crime of unlawful entry.
• Djumantan is an Indonesian woman, who married Bernard Bañez (a Filipino who worked in Indonesia and converted to
Islam) in 1974 in Indonesia.
• She brought this case against Commissioner Andrea Domingo and other commissioners of Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, who ordered her deportation in 1991.
• Background:
o Djumantan and her 2 children with Bañez (Marina, 2y.o. and Nikulas, 9 months old) arrived in NAIA in Januray
1979.
§ Bañez and his [first and real] wife Marina Cabael met them. Djumatan and kids were made to appear
as “guests” of Bañez (gago lang).
§ Djumantan and kids were admitted to the PH as temporary visitors under Sec.9(a) of the Immigration
Act of 1940.
§ Bañez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support” that he is willing to guaranty his “guests” out of
gratitude to their family for their hospitality during his stay in Indonesia for work.
o In 1981, Marina discovered the true relationship of her husband and Djumantan and filed a complaint for
Concubinage with MTC, Urdaneta. Case was dismissed for lack of merit.
o In 1982, the immigration status of Djumantan was changed to permanent resident under Sec.13(a) of the
Immigration Act and was issued an alien certificate of registration.
o Lenardo, Bañez’ eldest son, filed a letter-complaint to the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter-
complaint to the CID.
§ Djumantan was detained by the CID, but was later released pending deportation proceedings after
posting a cash bond.
§ She first manifested to be allowed to voluntarily depart and asked for time to purchase an airline ticket,
but she later changed her mind and moved for dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she
was validly married to a Filipino citizen.
§ CID decision: Revoked the sec.13(a) visa previously granted to Djumantan because her marriage to
Bañez was irregular and not in accordance with PH laws.
§ Her MR was also denied.
o Djumantan brings this petition for certiorari for the ff reasons:
§ Her marriage to Bañez was balid under Art. 27 of the Muslim Code, which recognizes the practice of
polyandry by Muslim males
§ Under PH marriage laws (Civil Code), husband and wife are obliged to live together and husband is
given right to fix conjugal residence.
§ Thus, public respondent has no right to order them to live separately.
o In its comment, OSG took the position that CID cannot order her deportation because its power to do so had
prescribed under Sec.37(b) of the Immigration Act.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can the CID validly deport Djumantan as an “undesirable alien” regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen? – To answer
this, the following questions must first be resolved:
Was Djumantan legally admitted into the country and was the change of her status to permanent resident legal? – No and
No.
• There was blatant abuse of our immigration laws because her entry and change of immigration status were obtained through
misrepresentation.
• Her marriage to Bañez was never disclosed to immigration authorities.
• The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as temporary visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise of
discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. They would have been less inclined to allow her entry had they known
she was entered into marriage with a married Filipino.
• Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public
interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country
o Basis: since aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and
simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay
o The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the country, is protected
only so far as Congress may choose to protect it
o There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given
permanent residency, in the Philippines.
o The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws.
Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not
excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay as an alien.

Has the right of the CID to deport Djumantan prescribed? – Yes.
• The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and “shall not be effected x x x
unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within 5 years after the cause of deportation arises.”
• Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country.
• January 13, 1979 – petitioner was admitted and allowed entry on the basis of false and misleading statements in her
application and other supporting docs
• November 19, 1980 – Leonardo first complained with CID about the manner petitioner was admitted into the country and
asked for her deportation
• After EDSA Revolution – he sent a follow-up letter to the CID, requesting action
• Sept. 27, 1990 – only when CID ordered deportation
• In their Comment, CID urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien and claimed that what
they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely the revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa
previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).
o SC: The “arrest” contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for the purpose of carrying out an order for
deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country.
o When CID revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and
deportation as an overstaying alien.
• WHEREFORE, petition granted, TRO against the CID Order is made permanent, and CID Decision revoking the
Djumantan’s permanent resident visa is reversed.

Pontejos v. Ombudsman (2006) – power to grant immunity to state witness
FACTS:
• 1998, Restituto Aquino filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against HLURB officials and Robert Ngo.
o HLURB officials were Emmanuel Pontejos (as the Arbiter), Wilfredo Imperial (as the Regional Director), and
Carmencita Atos (as the Legal Staff).
• Aquino alleges that (1) Pontejos and Atos were guilty of committing conspiracy to exact money from him in exchange for a
favorable decision in a case pending in the HLURB against Ngo; (2) Pontejos acted as his counsel while the latter was the
hearing officer; (3) Atos received Php 10K check as consideration for a favorable decision; (4) Imperial was implicated as
an accomplice.
•
1
To prove his allegations, Pontejos produced several documents during the preliminary investigation.
• Defenses of Pontejos et al.
o Pontejos and other denied the charges. They contend that:
§ The meetings mentioned by  Aquino did not take place; and
§ They did not receive any money from Aquino.  
o Pontejos alleged that there were 3 cases involving Aquino in the HLURB.
§ REM-8652 (1995): Case filed against Aquino by subdivision lot buyers where Aquino allegedly failed
to develop.  
§ REM-9526: Case filed by Aquino against Hammercon Inc. (owned by Roderick Ngo) for revocation of
registration and license  
§ REM-9817: Case filed by Aquino against Hammercon for specific performance/rescission.
st rd nd
§ Pontejos decided the 1 and 3 cases and Imperial on the 2 case. All against Aquino.
o Imperial denied the extortion charges.
nd
§ He claims that he decided on the 2 case on September 1997. The alleged bribe was given on January
1998. Hence, he could not have accepted money for a case that has been decided on.
o Atos contend that the receipt of the Php 10k from Aquino was the payment for hams and cold cuts ordered by
Ruth Adel.
§ However, she subsequently issued two Affidavits where she retracted her original defense.
§ She encashed the check allegedly to accommodate Pontejos. She also recounted attending at least 4
meetings with Pontejos, Aquino and Adel during which Pontejos offered legal services to Aquino and
discussed Aquino’s pending cases.
• The Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause against Pontejos for:
o Estafa—made false pretenses to Aquino in order to receive P25k;
o Direct bribery—for demanding and receiving P100k from Aquino in exchange for a favorable decision; and
o Illegal practice of profession (RA 6713)— (1) for providing legal services to Aquino and receiving litigation
expenses, and (2) Prepared pleadings that Aquino submitted.
o More importantly, Deputy OMB held that Carmencita Atos should be extended immunity from criminal
prosecution and discharged as state witness. (IMPT!)
§ It held that Atos was merely a subordinate, a mere clerk of Pontejos.
§ Her testimony was necessary to build a case against Pontejos.
§ Also, in this case, she did not appear to be the most guilty.
• OMB Desierto approved the extended immunity to Atos.
o This extended immunity was on the condition that Atos would appear & testify against Pontejos.
• OMB then filed a criminal case with the RTC for estafa and direct bribery against Pontejos.
• Pontejos filed a Motion for Reinvestigation to be conducted by the City Prosecutor. Hence, the hearing of the case was
suspended pending the outcome of the reinvestigation.  (NOTE: RTC has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the case yet)
o Assistant City Prosecutor De Guzman conducted the reinvestigation.
o De Guzman recommended to amend the Information for estafa to include Atos as co-accused and not grant her
immunity. 
o De Guzman recommended that the power to grant immunity pertains solely to the courts, not to the
prosecution which can only recommend.  
• Deputy OMB disapproved the recommendation of Prosecutor de Guzman.

1
a. Affidavit-complaint of Aquino, dated 14 August 1998 (narration of the charges against respondents)
b. Affidavit of Ruth Adel in corroboration of Mr. Aquino’s affidavit;
c. Another affidavit of Aquino (contained meetings with Atty. Pontejos and Carmen Atos at Alps Restaurant, Racks Restaurant,
Little Quiapo (Q.C.) and Chowking Restaurant)
d. Another affidavit of Ruth Adel (which reveals that Atos received Php 10k in check and had it encashed)
e. Affidavit of Rowena Alcovindas corroborating Adel’s affidavit.
f. A copy of the encashed check showing Atos signature at the back of the check;
g. Copies of several drafts of decision and petitions either prepared in handwriting/typewritten of Atty. Pontejos.
h. NBI Examination Report revealing that the samples and questioned documents were authored by Pontejos.
i. Another affidavit dated 15 February 1999, of [C]omplainant Aquino, wherein he mentioned the places and dates of supposed
meetings with Pontejos and Atos as well as the amounts received by them in exchange of legal services and/or favor promised.

• Hence, Pontejos filed this petition for certiorari questioning the disapproval of the recommendation.
ISSUE/HELD:
Can the Ombudsman grant immunity to Atos to become a state witness?—YES, the OMB can grant immunity from
prosecution. Granting immunity is an executive function and the OMB is vested with such power.
• SC held that the OMB is vested with the power to grant immunity from prosecution.
o The question on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in character.  
o This prosecutorial power necessarily includes the discretion of granting immunity to an accused  in exchange for
his testimony against another.  
• In the case of Mapa v. Sandiganbayan, the SC held that:
o “The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the  prosecution process. It is
essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It
is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed
a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals
who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be
exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the
sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be
prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.”
• SC held that it does not go against the Constitution for Congress to vest the prosecutors, in general, with the power to
determine who can qualify as a witness and be granted immunity from prosecution.  
o There are many laws that allow government investigators and prosecutors to grant immunity.
o Notably, SC has upheld the discretion of the DOJ, COMELEC, and PCGG to grant immunity from prosecution on
the basis of laws that vested them with such power.  
o In the case of the OMB, it was vested with the power to grant immunity from prosecution given by the Ombudsman
2
Act.
• However, Pontejos contended that the authority of the OMB to grant immunity is still subject to the provisions of the Rules
3
of Court.
o He claims that the prosecution could only recommend, but not grant immunity. SC disagrees.
•  SC held that RoC provision is applicable only to cases already filed in court.
o Courts are given the power to discharge an accused as a state witness only because it has already acquired
jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.
o The power to choose who to discharge as state witness is an executive function, not judiciary.
• SC also held that Sec. 17 of the Ombudsman Act also requires conformity with the Rules of Court.
o There must be a standard to follow in the exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion. The decision to grant immunity
cannot be made capriciously
o (a) Testimony of the person is absolutely necessary, (b) no direct evidence against him, (c) can be substantially
corroborated, (d) accused not the most guilty, and (e) was not convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude.
SC held that Atos complied with the requirements.
• SC held that OMB did not show GADALEJ granting immunity to Atos.
Other issues not really related to syllabus topic.
Who has the mandate to find probable cause?—OMB! But there are some exceptions
• Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
• The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function left to the government
prosecutor, which in this case is the OMB.

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SEC. 17. Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,
the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession and production
of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by
the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives.
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Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. –When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any
offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with
their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused
can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused
has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall
automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement
shall be inadmissible in evidence.

o Courts do not interfere with this exercise of the OMB of discretion in determining probable cause unless there are
compelling reasons.  
• HOWEVER, in the case of Brocka v. Enrile, there are exceptions: (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without
or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy
is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is
clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.  
Was Pontejos denied due process?—NO, there was no violation of his right to due process.
• Pontejos also claims that he was not furnished a copy of Affidavit of Atos that connected him to the crimes.  
• SC held that the alleged denial of due process is controverted by the facts.
o It appears from the records that Pontejos eventually received a copy of the Affidavit.  
• More importantly, Pontejos challenged the Affidavit in his Motion for Reinvestigation.
o This shows that Pontejos was given an opportunity to  be heard.  

Banda v. Ermita (2010) – Power to reorganize
FACTS:
• National Printing Office (NPO) was formed on July 25, 1987 during President Cory Aquino’s term.
o It was created under Executive Order No. 285.
o Provided for NPO’s creation from the merger of Government Printing Office and the printing units of the Philippine
Information Agency (PIA)
• Section 6 of EO No. 285 provides for NPO’s creation and printing jurisdiction of NPO.
o NPO has exclusive printing jurisdiction on:
§ Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national, provincial, city and
municipal governments, including government corporations;
§ Printing of officials ballots;
§ Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act, Philippine
Reports, and development information materials of the Philippine Information Agency.
o NPO may also accept other government printing jobs, including government publications, aside from those
enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis.
o NPO shall be attached to the PIA.
• On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued EO No. 378 which amended Section 6 of EO No. 285 by:
o Removing exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities.
§ NPO shall continue to provide printing services to government agencies and instrumentalities.
However, it shall no longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the printing services requirements of the
government over standard and accountable forms. It shall have to compete with the private sector,
except in the printing of election paraphernalia which could be shared with the BSP, upon the discretion
of the Comelec consistent with the provisions of the Election Code of 1987.
§ Government agencies/instrumentalities may source printing services outside NPO provided that: (1)
the printing services to be provided by the private sector is superior in quality and at a lower cost than
what is offered by the NPO; and (2) The private printing provider is flexible in terms of meeting the
target completion time of the government agency.
o Limiting the amount appropriated to NPO in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) to its income without additional
financial support.
• Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, Atty. Sylvia Banda et
al. challenge its constitutionality, contending that:
o It is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal EO No. 285 issued by former President
Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and
o EO No. 378 violates Banda et al’s security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the
NPO.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is it within Pres. Arroyo’s executive power to amend or repeal EO No. 285 issued by Pres. Cory Aquino when the latter still
exercised legislative powers? – YES
• It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in
the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive
offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing
statutes.(Main takeaway)
• In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora:
o The Court pointed out that EO No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing
authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III,
Book III of the said Code: (A portion of the Banda case has stated that the issuance of EO No. 378 by President
Arroyo was also considered as an exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by this provision of the Admin
Code)
§ The President, in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take
any of the following actions:
• (1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
• (2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency
as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and
Agencies; and

• (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency
as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or
agencies.
o Also, under the general appropriations act, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other
entities in the Executive Branch are directed to adopt measures that will result in the streamlined organization
and improved overall performance of their respective agencies.
• It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has
been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information
Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
o Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the President to restructure the internal organization of
the Office of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another, and to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency in the Executive Branch and vice versa.
o Concomitant to such power, the President implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less substantive
changes to the functional and internal structure of the Office of the President, including the modification of
functions of such executive agencies as the exigencies of the service may require.
• In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred to another
agency.
o Under the assailed EO No. 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of
government forms and publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and
profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception
of election paraphernalia.
o At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing
responsibility to election forms.
• Also, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the President’s power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently
supported by specific provisions in general appropriations laws.
• In Larin v. Executive Secretary, the Court adverted to certain provisions of RA No. 7645, the general appropriations law for
1993, as among the statutory bases for the President’s power to reorganize executive agencies:
o Mentions the acts of scaling down, phasing out and abolition of offices.
o President is authorized to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure
(includes the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned)
• To reiterate, in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, it was ruled that the appropriations law recognize the power of the
President to reorganize even executive offices already funded by the said appropriations act, including the power to
implement structural, functional, and operational adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or
realign appropriations of funds as may be necessary under such reorganization.
• The case cited a number of other jurisprudence to emphasize that the President has the power to restructure and streamline
operations of the executive department. (Bagaoisan v. National Tobacco Administration, Tondo Medical Center Employees
Assoc v. CA, Domingo v. Zamora, Anak Mindanao v. Executive Sec).
• There is also reference made to Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which clearly states: [T]he president shall
have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
Did EO No. 378 violate Banda et al’s security of tenure since it paves the way for the gradual abolition of NPOs? – NO
• Banda et al. insinuates that the reorganization of the NPO under EO No. 378 is tainted with bad faith. Note that: The basic
evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it.
• A careful review of the records will show that Banda et al. failed to substantiate their claim.
o They failed to allege, much less prove, sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the NPO’s budget to its own
income would indeed lead to the abolition of the position, or removal from office, of any employee.
o Neither did petitioners present any shred of proof of their assertion that the changes in the functions of the NPO
were for political considerations that had nothing to do with improving the efficiency of, or encouraging operational
economy in, the said agency.
• In sum, the Court found that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo’s issuance of Executive Order No. 378.
• Procedural issue: failed to allege or state the number of employees to be affected by the assailed EO such that it failed to
prove whether it can be validly pursued as a ‘class suit’
• Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Carpio:
o I concur in the result that EO No. 378 is a valid Presidential issuance, but not because it implements Section 31,
Chapter 10, Book II of the Administrative Code of 19871 (Section 31) or that it is sanctioned by case law anchored
on PD 1416 (Granting continuing authority to the President of the Phils. to reorganize the administrative structure
of the National Government), but because EO 378 merely implements Republic Act No. 9184 (RA 9184)
o Indeed, EO 378 is not so much a “reorganization” move involving realignment of offices and personnel movement
as an issuance to “ensure that the government benefits from the best services available from the market at the
best price.”41 EO 378’s capping of NPO’s budget to its income is a logical byproduct of opening NPO’s operations
to the private sector— with the entry of market forces, there will expectedly be a decrease in its workload, lowering
its funding needs, regulating government procurement activities.

Laurel v. Garcia 187 SCRA 797 (1990) - alienation of government property
FACTS:
• Roppongi case
• Two petitions for prohibitions seeking to enjoin respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3, 179
square meters of land at Roppongi
• The PH acquired four parcels of land in Japan under the Reparations Agreement:
o Napeidai Property
o Kobe Commercial Property
o Kobe Residential Property
o Roppongi Property (subject of this case)
• Above properties were procured from the Japanese government for national development projects as part of the
indemnification to Filipinos for their losses of life and property during WWII
• R.A. No. 1789 (Reparations Law) prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and
development loans.
o Procurements are divided into those used by the following as determined by the National Economic Council
§ Government sector
§ Private parties – shall be made available by sale to PH or 100% PH-owned entities in national
development projects
• Roponggi Property
o Acquired under the heading “government sector”
o Became site for PH embassy until the embassy was transferred to the Napeidai property
o Due to government failure to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since.
• A proposal was presented to President Aquino to lease the property to a Japanese Firm
• Instead, President Aquino issued E.O. No. 296 entitling non-PH citizens or entites to avail of reparations’ capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease, or disposition.
o 4 properties were specifically mentioned in the “whereas” clause
• Executive pushed through with decision to sell Roppongi lot
• Petitioner Laurel argues:
o As part of the reparations from Japan, the property is classified as one of public dominion under Art. 420 of the
Civil Code
o Being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State because it is outside
the commerce of man
• Respondents argue:
o Property is subject to the laws of Japan (lex situs)
o Even assuming that the property is subject to the Civil Code, Roppongi property has ceased to become property
of public dominion
§ Has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service for over 13 years
o Intent of the Executive and Congress to convert it to private use has been manifest through a number of overt
acts which include the issuance of E.O. No. 296
• Petitioner Odeja argues:
o EO No. 296 is unconstitutional in that it contravenes
§ the constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national patrimony in the Preamble of the
Constitution
§ The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution)
§ Among others  
o warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional executive order is a misapplication of
public funds.
• TLDR: Petitioners argue:
o PH government cannot alienate the Roppongi property
o President cannot sell the Roppongi Property
o E.O. No. 296 is unconstitutional for making the Roppongi property available to non-PH citizens and entities
ISSUES/HELD:
Is the Roppongi property public property? – YES.
• Its nature is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the contract of procurement between PH and Japan
Can the Roppongi property be alienated? – NO.
• Being public property, it is outside the commerce of man

• The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare
and cannot be the object of appropriation.

Did the government intend to transform the property into patrimonial property through non-use? – NO.
• The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert
it to patrimonial property.
o Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles: Conversion can only happen if the property is withdrawn from public use
o Ignacio v. Director of Lands: Conversion needs a formal declaration on the part of the Government
• This declaration to the effect that a public property is to be made patrimonial must be definite
o Abandonment cannot be inferred from the nonuse alone specially if the nonuse was attributable not to the
government’s own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the
property
o Abandonment must be certain and positive
Can the President order the alienation of the Roppongi Property? – NO.
• EO No. 296 does not expressly authorize the sale of the four properties
o It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease
or other disposition.
o It merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789 that reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino
citizens and one hundred (100%) percent Filipinoowned entities
o Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the three other
properties were earlier converted into alienable real properties.
• RA 6657 did not authorize the Executive department to sell the Roppongi property
o Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources of funds for its
implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign countries, did not
withdraw the Roppongi property from being classified as one of public dominion
• TLDR: there is no law authorizing the conveyance of the Roppongi property
• President’s approval of the recommendation to sell the land was premature since it is conditioned on a valid change of the
public character of the property (at the very least)
o Moreover, the approval does not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative
powers.
• It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence.
• Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property does
not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its sale.
o It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of the Roppongi property.
Does Japanese law govern the Roppongi property? – NO (Conflicts issue.)
• Government merely alleged that Japanese law should be applied

o Japanese law was never presented
• This is not a conflicts of law situation as there is no dispute regarding the ownership of the property (no doubt that the
property belongs to the Philippines)
o The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State.

Review Center v. Ermita (2009) – power of President over administrative agencies
FACTS:
• June 2006: the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) conducted the Nursing Board Examinations nationwide.
• In the same month, licensure applicants wrote the PRC to report that copies of 2 sets of exams were circulation during the
examination period (so omg may leakage) among the examinees reviewing at the RA Gapuz Review Center and Inress
Review Center
o There was a list of 500 questions and answers in 2/5 exam subjects
• PRC admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members.
• June 19: PRC released the results and on August 18: CA restrained PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the
successful examinees.
• Consequently, President GMA replaced all members of the PRC’s Board of Nursing and ordered examinees to re-take the
exams
• PGMA issued assailed EO 566
o It authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar
entities in the PH
• CHED, through its Chairman Carlito Puno, also approved Memorandum Order No. 49, s. of 2006 (IRR).
o For this, Review Center, an org of independent review centers, asked CHED to “amend, if not withdraw” the IRR
arguing, that giving Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) permit to operate a review center will effectively abolish
independent review centers.
• May 7, 2007: CHED approved a Revised IRR (RIRR)
o The RIRR provides that only CHED-recognized, accredited and reputable HEIs may be authorized to establish
and operate review center/course upon full compliance with the conditions and requirements
o Existing review centers are given a 1-year grace period to tie-up/be integrated with existing HEIs, consortium of
HEIs and PRC recognized Professional Associations with recognized programs set under the conditions in the
RIRR
o Only after full compliance with the requirements shall a permit be given by the CHED
• But Review Center filed a Petition before the CHED seeking to clarify/amend the same to:
o Amend RIRR by excluding independent review centers from CHED coverage;
o Clarify meaning of the requirement for existing review centers “to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs, consortium or
HEIs and PRC-recognized professional associations with associations with recognized programs, or to convert
into schools;
o Revise the rules to make it conform to RA 7722, which limits CHED’s coverage to public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in post-secondary educational
institutions.
• CHED Chairman Romulo Neri denied Review Center’s petition in a resolution
o He conceded that the regulation of review centers is not one of the mandates of CHED under RA 7722;
BUT
o He referred to PGMA’s EO 566 to justify the denial.
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o EO 566 mandates CHED to regulate the establishment and operation of ALL review centers
o The resolution further provided that “to exclude the operation of independent review centers from CHED coverage
would clearly contradict the intention of EO 566.”
• As such, Review Center filed for Petition and Mandamus before the SC for annulment of the RIRR and declaration of EO
566 as invalid and unconstitutional.
ISSUES/HELD:
(ISSUE) Is EO 566 constitutional? – NO
• It is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands CHED’s jurisdiction

• The OSG argues that EO 566 is in line with RA 7722 since RA 7722 says that CHED has coverage over “programs… of
higher learning.” (Section 8 of RA 7722)
o Review centers are claimed to be among those “programs of higher learning.”
• IMPT! However, Section 3 of RA 7722 provides that:
o [CHED’s] coverage shall be both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-
granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private.
o While “higher education” is not defined in RA 7722/its IRR, “higher education” plainly/ordinarily means “education
beyond the secondary level” or “education provided by a college or university.”
o SC used the “plain meaning” or verba legis rule in statutory construction – that if the statute is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning without interpretation.

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Section 4 of EO 566:
"No review center or similar entities shall be established and/or operate review classes without the favorable expressed indorsement
of the CHED and without the issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to conduct review classes..."

o As such, “higher learning” or “higher education” must be taken in its ordinary sense, and if at all, must be read
with the phrase “degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private.”
o This means that such must pertain to tertiary education or that which grants a degree after its completion.
• On the other hand, a “review center” is an authorized entity intending to “offer to the public and/or specialized groups whether
for a fee or for a few a program/course that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge and competences and skills
of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure exams given by the PRC” (RIRR)
• As such, a “review center” is not an institution of “higher learning” contemplated by RA 7722
o It does not offer a degree-granting program
o Intended only to “refresh and enhance knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewes.”
o Neither can “similar entities that provided review/tutorial services in areas not covered by PRC licensure exams”
qualify as “programs of higher learning.”
• It is argued by the OSG that the PGMA only exercised her residual powers, or “such other powers and functions vested in
the President provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated in
accordance with law…” (1987 Admin Code)
• HOWEVER, exercise of this residual powers under the said provision requires legislation.
• There is NO LAW granting the President the power to amend functions of CHED.
o As such, the President cannot amend RA 7722 through an EO without a prior law granting her such power.
• President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend functions of CHED under RA 7722.
o Remember that legislative power is vested in Congress (Art. VI)
o Even if the President can issue “Administrative Orders,” or acts which relate to particular aspects of govt operation
in pursuance of his duties as admin head,” these must be in harmony with law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law.
• Since EO 566 expands coverage of CHED under law, it is an invalid exercise of power by the President.
• Since EO 566 is invalid, the RIRR implementing the EO is also an invalid exercise of CHED’s quasi-legislative power.

Biraogo v. Truth Commission 637 SCRA 78 (2010) - power of president to investigate
FACTS:
• Two consolidated cases which assail the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 (Creating the Philippine Truth Commission)
o Biraogo assails the EO for being violative of legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate
funds therefor
• The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator
Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his condemnation of graft and corruption
o “Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap.” (Aquino slogan)
• Upon win, Aquino then established the Truth Commission through EO No. 1
o ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
§ investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by thirdlevel public officers and employees, their
coprincipals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and after, submit its
finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman
o Though it has been described as an “independent collegial body,” it is essentially an entity within the Office of the
President Proper and subject to his control.
§ Constitutes a public office
o To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
§ It is not, however, a quasijudicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties.
§ All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations.
§ It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest.
o Although it is a factfinding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law.
§ It cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
• SC goes into a discussion of what Truth commissions are in general:
o Have the following characteristics:
§ they examine only past events;
§ they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event;
§ they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions
and recommendations; and
§ they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State.
o Commission’s members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes.
o Examples:
§ Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals (retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those
responsible for crimes against humanity.)
§ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent
future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims)
• Back to PTC
o PTC is not like the South African Truth Commission in that PTC was more about the identification and punishment
of perpetrators
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the President have the power to create the PTC? – YES.
• Biraogo argues:
o Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President
o Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute
or an authorization vested in him by law.
§ This power cannot be presumed since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that
authorizes the President to create a truth commission
o Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his
office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely
uses verbs such as “reorganize,” “transfer,” “consolidate,” “merge,” and “abolish.”
• Petitioner-legislators argue:
o the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of
government.
• OSG argues:
o there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact finding body such as a truth
commission

o Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create factfinding
committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its
administrative functions
§ Adjunct of the plenary powers under Sec. 1 and Sec 17, Art. VII
§ The power of the President to investigate extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as
his power to discipline subordinates, his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes
and in order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know.
§ TLDR: power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices.
• To answer this question, the SC had to answer the question: Does the creation of PTC fall within the ambit power to
reorganize under Sec 31 of the Revised Admin Code? (It does not)
o What is “reorganization” under the Admin Code?
§ Restructuring internal organization of the OP by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units
§ Transferring any function under the OP to any other Department/Agency or vice versa
§ Transferring any agency under the OP to any other Department/Agency or vice versa
o To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term “restructure”—an “alteration of an existing
structure.”
§ PTC was not a part of the OP prior to the enactment of EO No. 1
• Also had to answer the question: Does the creation of the PTC fall under the President’s power of Control? (It does
not)
o Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter
o Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices.
§ Power of control – inherent in the Executive,
§ Power to create public offices – based on either a valid delegation from Congress, or the President’s
inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
o So is there a valid delegation of power from Congress empowering the President to create the PTC? –
NO.
§ SC did not accept PD 1416 as the justification for the President to create a public office because the
decree is already “stale, anachronistic, and inoperable”
§ it was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure
of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant
to one of the purposes of the decree
• HOWEVER, creation of PTC is justified by Sec. 17, Art. VII (duty of President to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed)
o One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionallymandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees.
§ The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which
the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
(MAIN ISSUE) Does the PTC supplant the DOJ and Ombudsman? – NO.
• The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized.
o Flows from Sec 17, Art VII
• Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action.
o As previously stated, no quasijudicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of
persons who come before it.
• Difference between Power to Investigate and Power to Adjudicate:
Power to Investigate Power to Adjudicates

• To follow up step by step by patient inquiry or • To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.
observation • To determine finally.
• To trace or track; to search into; to examine and • Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense
inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;
Investigation is an administrative function, the exercise Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
of which does not ordinarily require hearing judgment.
Includes the function of receiving evidence and ascertaining Act of receiving evidence and arriving to factual conclusion
therefrom the facts of a controversy + authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved
authoritatively
• PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers

o If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices
o Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies.
o DOJ’s power to investigate is also not exclusive
• Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness.
Does EO No. 1 violate the equal protection clause? – YES. EO No. 1 struck down as unconstitutional on this point.
• The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases
of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only.
o The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
• the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
• Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction.
• Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.
Do petitioners have standing to question EO No. 1? – YES.
• Re: Petitioners from House of Representatives

o legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate.
o Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.
• Re: Biraogo (taxpayer)
o While no standing, this case is of transcendental importance

US v. Nixon (1974) – general claim of executive privilege
FACTS:
• Motion, on behalf of then President Nixon, to quash a 3rd party subpoena duces tecum issued by the US DC in US v.
Mitchell. The subpoena directed Nixon to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with
aides and advisers. District Court rejected Nixon’s claims of absolute executive privilege.
• 1974 - a grand jury of the US District Court for the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging 7 named individuals
with various offenses, including conspiracy to defraud the US and to obstruct justice.
• Although he was not designated as such in the indictment, the grand jury named Nixon, among others, as an unindicted co-
conspirator.
• Upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to the President of the US.
o This subpoena required the production, in advance of trial, of certain dates, memoranda, papers,
transcripts, or other writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings between the President and
others.
• Nixon publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations, portions of 20 conversations subject to subpoena in the case
were included.
• The President’s counsel filed a “special appearance” and a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule 17(c).
o This motion was accompanied by a formal claim of privilege.
• At a subsequent hearing further motions to expunge the grand jury’s action naming Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator
and for protective orders against the disclosure of that information were filed or raised orally by counsel for the President.
• The 7 individuals charged each occupied either a position of responsibility on the White House staff or a position with the
Committee for the Re-election of the President.
• The District Court denied the motion to quash and the motions to expunge and for protective orders.
o The court ordered the President or any person employee with custody/control of the documents or objects
subpoenaed to deliver to the court such.
o It also rejected the contention that the judiciary was without authority to review an assertion of executive privilege
by the President.
• Since the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, it is
contended that a President’s decision is final in determining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal case.
o Although his counsel concedes that the President has delegated certain specific powers to the Special
Prosecutor, he has not “waived nor delegated to the Special Prosecutor the President’s duty to claim privilege as
to all materials...which fall within the President’s inherent authority to refuse to disclose to any executive officer.
• The subpoena duces tecum is challenged on the ground that the Special Prosecutor failed to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 17(c).
• 2 grounds the President’s counsel raise to support its claims:
o The valid need for protection of communications between high Govt officials and those who advise and assist
them in the performance of their manifold duties
o The independence of the Executive Branch within its own sphere insulates a President from a judicial subpoena
in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential communications.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the Special Prosecutor have the power to contest the invocation of executive privilege in the process of seeking
evidence? – YES
• Under authority of Art. 2, Sec. 2, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation
of the US Govt.
• It has also vested in him the power to appoint subordinate officers to assist him in the discharge of his duties.
• The Atty. Gen. has thus delegated the authority to represent the US in these particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with
unique authority and tenure.
o The regulation gives the Special Prosecutor explicit power to contest the invocation of executive privilege in the
process of seeking evidence deemed relevant to the performance of these specially delegated duties.
Were the requirements of Rule 17(c) for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum met?
• Rule 17(c): A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or
other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance
would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the
subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and
may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portion thereof to be inspected by the parties
and their attorneys.
• A subpoena for documents may be quashed if their production would be “unreasonable or oppressive,” but not otherwise.
o Bowman Dairy v. US: certain fundamental characteristics of the subpoena duces tecum in criminal cases:
1. It was not intended to provide a means of discovery for criminal cases

2. Its chief innovation was to expedite the trial by providing a time and place before trial for the inspection
of subpoenaed materials.
o US v. Iozia: to require production to trial, moving party must show:
1. That the documents are evidentiary and relevant
2. They are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence
3. That the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production/inspection in advance of trial and
that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial
4. That the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general “fishing expedition.”
# Thus, the Special Prosecutor, to carry his burden, must clear 3 hurdles: relevancy, admissibility and specificity.
# The contents of the subpoenaed tapes could not at that stage be described fully by the Special Prosecutor, but there was
a sufficient likelihood that each of the tapes contains conversations relevant to the offenses charged in the indictment.
# With respect to many of the tapes, the Special Prosecutor offered the sword testimony or statements of one or more of the
participants in the conversations as to what was said at the time.
○ As for the remainder of the tapes, the identity of the participants and the time and place of the conversations,
taken in their total context, permit a rational inference that at least part of the conversations relate to the offenses
charged in the indictment.
# The subpoenaed materials are not available from any other sources, and their examination and processing should not await
trial.
Do the subpoenaed tapes contain admissible evidence? – YES
• There was a sufficient preliminary showing that each of the subpoenaed tapes contains evidence admissible with respect
to the offenses charged in the indictment.
• The most cogent objection to the admissibility of the taped conversations here at issue is that they are a collection of out of
court statements by declarants who will not be subject to cross-examination and that the statements are therefore
inadmissible evidence.
• BUT: most of the tapes apparently contain conversations to which one or more of the defendants named in the indictment
were party.
• The hearsay rule does not automatically bar all out of court statements by a defendant in a criminal case.
• Declarations by one defendant may also be admissible against other defendants upon a sufficient showing, by independent
evidence, of a conspiracy among one or more other defendants and the declarant and if the declarations at issue were in
furtherance of that conspiracy.
o The same is true of declarations of co-conspirators who are not defendants in the case.
• Recorded conversations may also be admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of any defendant who
testifies or any other co-conspirator who testifies.
• Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance of trial.
• HERE: there are other valid potential evidentiary uses for the same material, and the analysis and possible transcription of
the tapes may take a significant period of time.
• Enforcement of a pretrial subpoena duces tecum must necessarily be committed to the sound discretion of the trial court
since the necessity for the subpoena most often turns upon a determination of factual issues.
• Where a subpoena is directed to a President of the US, appellate review, in deference to a coordinate branch of govt, should
be particularly meticulous to ensure that the standards of Rule 17(c) have been correctly applied.
(RELEVANT) Do the two grounds relied on by the President’s counsel justify the privilege raised? – NO
• Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more,
can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.
o When the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of
such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises.
• Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, it is difficult to accept
the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly
diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be obliged
to provide.
• (IMPT) To read the powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to
enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of
non-military and non-diplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance of a “workable govt” and
gravely impair the roles of the courts.
• The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality
of judicial deliberations, for example has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens, and,
added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh
opinions in Presidential decision-making.
• A president and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.
o These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.
• The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Govt and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution.

o “The public...has a right to every man’s evidence, except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-
law, or statutory privilege.”
• The privileges referred to by the Court are designed to protect weighty and legitimate competing interests.
• Whatever their origins, the exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.
• IN THIS CASE: Nixon does not place his claim of privilege on the ground that they are military or diplomatic secrets.
• US v. Reynolds: It may be possible to satisfy the court, from the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged.
o When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court shall not jeopardize the security
which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone,
in chambers.
• No case has extended this high degree of deference to a President’s generalized interest in confidentiality.
• Nowhere in the Constitution is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest
relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers, it is constitutionally based.
• The importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the President’s
responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice.
• The allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the
guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic functions of the courts.
o The President’s broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited
number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases
• (IMPT) When the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is
based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.
o The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a
pending criminal trial.
Did the District Court err in authorizing the issuance of the subpoena? – NO
• If a President concludes that compliance with a subpoena would be injurious to the public interest, he may properly, as was
done here, invoke a claim of privilege on the return of the subpoena.
• Upon receiving a claim of privilege from the Chief Executive, it became the duty of the District Court to treat the subpoenaed
material as presumptively privileged and to require the Special Prosecutor to demonstrate that the Presidential material
was “essential to the justice of the case”
o HERE: that was what the US District Court did exactly.

Almonte v. Vasquez (1995) – EIIB information not subject of privilege
FACTS:
• Jose Almonte was the former Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) while Villamor
Perez is the Chief of the EIIB’s Budget and Fiscal Management Division.
• The Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter from an
employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen.
• The letter alleged that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed:
o The EIIB allegedly has a syndicate headed by Perez who is manipulating funds on the so called “ghost agents”
or the “Emergency Intelligence Agents”.
o The amounts were being used to pay for 30 mini UZI’s (machine guns), a Maxima ’87 for the personal use of the
Commissioner etc.
• Almonte and Perez deny the allegations:
o The only funds released to the EIIB by the DBM were those corresponding to 947 plantilla positions which were
filled.
o Denied that there were “ghost agents” in the EIIB.
• Saño, the Graft Investigation Officer of the OMB found the defense unsatisfactory and asked for authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation.
o Pursuant to this, he issued a:
§ Subpoena to Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of
their witnesses
§ Subpoena duces tecum to the Chief of the EIIB’s Accounting Division ordering him to bring „all
documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers
(salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988”.
• Petitioners moved to quash both subpoenas:
• OMB granted the motion to quash the subpoena since there were no affidavits filed yet against the petitioners. However,
he denied their motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being forced to produce
evidence against themselves, since the subpoena duces tecum was directed to the Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio
Rogado.
• At issue here is the power of the OMB to obtain evidence in connection with an investigation conducted by it vis-à-vis the
claim of privilege of an agency of the Government.
o Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the ground that “knowledge of
EIIB’s documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to]
knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being”
and this could “destroy the EIIB”.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can the petitioners be ordered to produce the documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB
employees on the ground that such documents are classified? – NO
• Discussion on executive privilege:

o A governmental privilege against disclosure is recognizes with respect to state secrets covering military,
diplomatic and similar matters.
§ This is based on public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the
individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot
enforce his legal rights.
o Examples provided by the SC:
§ Claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations:
• In US v. Nixon, the court recognized the right of the President to the confidentiality of his
conversations which it likened to judicial deliberations.
o Considerations in justifying a presumptive privilege for presidential
communications: A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so
in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.
• Confidentiality of judicial deliberations are premised on the fact that working papers and
judicial notes of judges are traditionally treated as private property.
§ Government’s privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of laws.
§ Privilege based on state secret.
• To avail of the privilege, the court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national
security, should not be divulged.
• However, if the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military,
diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the
confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution

an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the
enforcement of criminal laws.
• In this case, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.
o The main function of the bureau is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding
“illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting.
• Furthermore, there is no law or regulation which consider the personal records of the EIIB as classified information.
o The COA circular and statutes and regulations invoked by the petitioners claim that the records are confidential
in nature.
o In fact, by denying that there were savings made from certain items in the agency and alleging that the DBM had
released to the EIIB only the allocations needed for the 947 personnel retained after its reorganization, petitioners
in effect invited inquiry into the veracity of their claim.
• The need for the documents of the OMB clearly outweigh the claim of confidentiality of the petitioners:
o OMB is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the
allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are
relevant to his investigation.
o Furthermore the compelling reason for the claim of privilege was asserted in 1988. Seven years have passed
since such assertion, and such reasons may have weakened or ceased.
§ The agents whose identities could not then be revealed may have ceased from the service of the EIIB,
while the covert missions to which they might have been deployed might either have been
accomplished or abandoned.
o On the other hand, the duty of the OMB to investigate the matter remains.
• Court adds that even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this decision would
only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction.
o However, the court provided for guidelines to impart a fair investigation:
§ The examination of records in this case should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman himself.
§ Reference may be made to the documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman may render
or issue but only to the extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency.
§ Above all, there must be a scrupulous protection of the documents delivered.

Senate v. Ermita (SUPRA)
Neri v. Senate (SUPRA)
AKBAYAN v. AQUINO (2008) - JPEPA
FACTS:
•
5
JPEPA case. Diplomatic negotiations are privileged. Secrecy of on-going negotiations not violative of Constitutional right
to information (the President is the sole organ of foreign relations).
• Petitioners (non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers) filed a petition for mandamus and
prohibition to obtain from respondents Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al. the
6
full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.  
• Background:
o On  January 2005, Cong. Tañada and Aguja filed House Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA,
then being negotiated by the PH government.
§ In the course of its inquiry, the House Special Committee on Globalization requested herein respondent
Usec. Aquino to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA.
§ However, Usec. Aquino did not heed the request.
o The same request was again made by Congressman Aguja, but Usec. Aquino replied  that a copy will be provided
only after negotiations have been completed.  
o In a separate move, the House Committee requested Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita to furnish it with “all
documents on the subject including the latest  draft of the proposed agreement, the requests and offers etc.  
o Secretary Ermita replied that it has been a work in progress for three years and a  copy will be goven once the
negotiations are complete.  
o Congressman Aguja also requested NEDA Director-General Neri and Tariff  Commission Chairman Abon for
copies of the JPEPA.  
o Chairman Abon replied, however, that the Tariff Commission does not have a copy of  the documents being
requested.  
o In its third hearing, the House Committee was supposed to issue a subpoena for the  most recent draft of the
JPEPA, but the same was not pursued because by Committee Chairman Congressman Teves’ information, then
House Speaker Jose de Venecia had requested him to hold in abeyance the issuance of the subpoena until the
President gives her consent to the disclosure of the documents.  
o Then the present petition was filed on December 9, 2005.  
• JPEPA was signed on September 9, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo  and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi in Helsinki, Finland, following which the President endorsed it to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Article
VII, Section 21 of the Constitution.  
• The final text of JPEPA was made accessible to the public on September 11, 2006.  
• To date (July 16, 2008), the JPEPA is still being deliberated upon by the Senate.  
• This Petition is brought with the following contentions:
o The refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on matters of
public concern and of public interest. 
o The non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all
levels of social, political and economic decision-making. 
o Divulging the contents of the JPEPA only after the agreement has been concluded will effectively make the Senate
into a mere rubber stamp of the Executive, in violation of the principle of separation of powers. 
ISSUES/HELD:
Is the petition moot and academic? Not entirely.
• SC ruled that the principal relief is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between two State
parties. Although it has been largely moot because the JPEPA has already been made accessible to the public, it is still not
moot as to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
Do petitioners have standing? Yes, because it is based on the right of the people on matters of public concern.

5
Interesting fact: Atty. Tanya Lat is one of the counsels for petitioners.
6
The JPEPA will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the
Senate grants its consent to it. It covers a broad range of topics such as: trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless
trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons,
cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment,
and general and final provisions.

• It is sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right
• Legaspi vs Civil Service Comission - it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
• From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern.
• Respondents only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to
the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA covered by the doctrine of executive privilege?
-YES  [this is long, but trust me, it’s worth reading]
• The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction:
o Chavez v. PCGG: “information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.”
o PMPF v. Manglapus – petitioners therein were  President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going
negotiations of the RP- US Military Bases Agreement.  
§ The Court denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not
violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of
access to information.” The Resolution went on to state, thus:  
• The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which
are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its
confidential nature.
• Delegates from other countries come and tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and
of their differences with other countries and with other delegates; they tell you of what they
would do under certain circumstances and would not do under other circumstances … If
these reports … should become public … who would ever trust American Delegations in
another conference? (United States Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp.
282-284.)
§ Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. that the President is the sole organ
of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries, viz:
• The President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.
• He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates.
• Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it.
• As Marshall said, “The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign nations.”
• Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the
offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published.  
o It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
“historic confidentiality” would govern the same.  
§ Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with
other foreign governments in future negotiations.
o A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny would discourage future
Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations.  
o While it appears wise to deter PH representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty
negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes
negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of  lesser importance in order to obtain more
favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.
• Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we may be jeopardizing higher national goals for
the sake of securing less critical ones. 
o Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
constituting no exception. 
o It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing
a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. 
o Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public
interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.
• Communications can be privileged even if they don’t involve national security
o Examples: “Informer’s privilege” – privilege of the Gov not to disclose identity of a person or persons who furnish
info of law violations to law enforcers. The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national
security for privilege to apply.
o “presidential communications” which are presumed privileged without distinguishing between those which
involve matters of national security and those which do not. Privileged because “frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect
the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.”

• Closely related to pres. comms privilege is the “deliberative process privilege,” which covers documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated.
o The privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the obvious
realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of
discovery and front page news, the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.
o The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential
communications privilege.
§ The privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the privileged
character of the deliberative process.
§ Fullbright case: “Exposure of the pre-agreement positions of the French negotiators might well offend
foreign governments and would lead to less candor by the U.S. in recording the events of the
negotiations process.
§ xxx Finally, releasing these snapshot views of the negotiations would be comparable to
releasing drafts of the treaty, particularly when the notes state the tentative provisions and language
agreed on. As drafts of regulations typically are protected by the deliberative process privilege, drafts
of treaties should be accorded the same protection.”
o Since, in this jurisdiction, there is no counterpart of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, nor is there any statutory
7
requirement similar to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 5 in particular , Philippine courts, when
assessing a claim of privilege for diplomatic negotiations, are more free to focus directly on the issue of whether
the privilege being claimed is indeed supported by public policy, without having to consider if these negotiations
fulfill a formal requirement of being “inter-agency.”
• The privileged character accorded to diplomatic negotiations does not ipso facto lose all force and effect simply because
the same privilege is now being claimed under different circumstances –
o The privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens’ demands for information,
but also in the context of legislative investigations;
o It is the President alone who negotiates treaties, and not even the Senate or the House of Representatives, unless
asked, may intrude upon that process.
Does the privilege apply only at certain stages of the negotiation process? – No.
• The duty to disclose “definite propositions of the government” does not apply to diplomatic negotiations such as JPEPA.
• In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the SC held that: the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract.
• The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and
public order.
• It follows from this ruling that even definite propositions of the government may not be disclosed if they fall under “recognized
exceptions.” The privilege for diplomatic negotiations is clearly among the recognized exceptions.
Is there sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege? –No.
• The standard to be employed in determining whether there is a sufficient public interest in favor of disclosure is the strong
and “sufficient showing of need.”
• Arguments of the petitioners fail to establish their entitlement to the subject documents.

7
In order to qualify for protection under Exemption 5, a document must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be either inter-agency or
intra-agency in nature, and (2) it must be both pre-decisional and part of the agency’s deliberative or decision-making
process. (from US cases of Fulbright and CIEL)

Soliven v. Makasiar (1988) – who has the right to invoke immunity from suit
FACTS:
• NOTE: this case does not have facts in the originals. This is a resolution.
• Found in the other sources: Luis Beltran was a columnist of the Philippine Star. In 1987, a lot of coup attempts occurred
against the President Cory Aquino. Beltran wrote an article saying that former President Aquino hid under her bed in
Malacanang during one of the coup attempts. Aquino sued Luis Beltran for Libel. These are petitions for certiorari and
prohibition.
ISSUE/HELD:
Can the President, under the Constitution, initiate criminal proceedings through the filing of a complaint-affidavit?—YES,
the President can file a suit!
• Beltran argues that since the president is immune from being sued, it correlatively means that she cannot file a suit as well.
o He contends that in lieu of the criminal proceedings, the President have to be a witness for the prosecution,
bringing her under the jurisdiction of the courts.
o This would indirectly defeat her privilege of immunity from suit by testifying on the witness stand, she would be
exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
• SC held that the rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction.
o Being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that requires all of the person’s time and undivided attention.
• SC held that this privilege of immunity from suit pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office and not by any other person in the President's behalf.
o An accused in a criminal case, where the President is complainant thereof, cannot raise the presidential privilege
as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding.
• SC held that there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
o If the President decides to waive such protection under the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction, it can
be done.
o The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative.
o It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
Next issues not really related to the syllabus topic…
Were Beltran et al. denied due process when information for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice?—NO, this issue is moot and academic.
• Beltran was able to avail all the administrative remedies. 

o The City Fiscal of Manila found a prima facie case against him. 
o The Secretary of Justice denied the Beltran’s MR and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice which
nd
sustained the City Fiscal.  His 2 MR was likewise denied. 
o On appeal, the President, thru the Executive Secretary, affirmed the Resolution.
• Beltran waived his right to file a counter-affidavit.
o Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, he filed a Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed, thereby waiving his right to
file a counter-affidavit. 
o All that is required for due process is the opportunity to be heard which in this case is the opportunity to file a
counter-affidavit.
Was the Constitutional rights of Beltran violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause?—NO.
• SC held that the judge is not require dto personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in determining probably
cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest.
• The judge shall only personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal.  
• If on that basis, he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses.  
• If the judges are required to examine the witnesses personally, then he would be conducting preliminary investigations
rather than focusing on hearing and deciding cases.  
• Such procedure was unanimously adopted by the Supreme Court in Circular No. 12 on June 30, 1987.  
Other discussions:
• Beltran further contended he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character or the publication.
o SC held that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court.
• SC found no basis for “chilling effect” on the freedom of press freedom.

Separate Opinion!
Gutierrez, Jr. J., concurring 
• The first issue on prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure now embodied in the recently amended
Rules of Court on how a Judge should proceed before he issues a warrant of arrest.
• Anent the third issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent President should not be sued. At
the same time, the President cannot stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if somebody vilifies or maligns
him or her. 
• The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day. To this, I take exception. I know that most of our
fiscals and judges are courageous individuals who would not allow any considerations of possible consequences to their
careers to stand in the way of public duty. But why should we subject them to this problem? And why should we allow the
possibility of the trial court treating and deciding the case as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully explore the more
important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving government power and freedom of expression. However,
since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day, I limit myself to reiterating the dissenting words of
Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v. Illinois (343 U. S. 250) when he said:
o If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel laws are consistent
with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom
of expression.
• In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in the name of freedom of expression should be faithfully
applied.

Clinton v. Jones (1997) – unofficial conduct
FACTS:
• Jones sued Clinton to recover damages from Clinton, the current President of the United States, alleging, that while he was
Governor of Arkansas, Clinton made “abhorrent” sexual advances to her, and that her rejection of those advances led to
her punishment by her supervisors in the state job she held at the time.
o On May 8, 1991 during an official conference held at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Arkansas, Clinton delivered
a speech at the conference.
o Jones was at the reception desk. Then, Jones was allegedly persuaded by Ferguson (Arkansas police officer) to
go up the presidential suite in the hotel.
o Inside the suite, Clinton allegedly made “abhorrent” sexual advances that she vehemently rejected.
o Jones seeks for actual damages $75,000, punitive damages $100,000.
• Clinton promptly advised the court that he would file a motion to dismiss on Presidential immunity grounds, and requested
that all other pleadings and motions be deferred until the immunity issue was resolved.
• After the court granted that request to defer the proceedings, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice and to
toll any prescriptive period during his Presidency.
• The Judge denied dismissal on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery could go forward, but ordered any trial stayed
until petitioner’s Presidency ended.
• The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial, but reversed the trial postponement as the “functional equivalent” of a grant
of temporary immunity to which petitioner was not constitutionally entitled.
• The court explained that the President, like other officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to all citizens, that no case
had been found in which an official was granted immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, and that the rationale for official
immunity is not applicable where only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue.
• The court also rejected the argument that, unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference with the Executive
Branch would violate separation of powers.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can presidential immunity from suit be applied in this case? - NO
• The acts of Clinton when he was Governor are unofficial acts which are not covered by presidential immunity from suit.
• The Principal rationale for affording Presidents immunity from damages actions based on their official acts – i.e. to enable
them to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability
– provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct.
• Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within official capacity are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the act or who performed it.
• In other words, Presidential immunity is given to the Office, not to the person.
Also relating to immunity: Can the separation-of-powers doctrine be invoked to stay the proceedings? – NO
• The separation-of-powers doctrine does not require courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves
office.
• Even accepting the unique importance of the Presidency in the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that that doctrine
would be violated by allowing this action to proceed.
• The doctrine provides a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment of one of the 3 co-equal branches of
Government at the expense of anther.
o But in this case, there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in
some way be described as “executive.”
o Jones is merely asking the courts to exercise their core jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies, and, whatever
the outcome, there is no possibility that the decision will curtail the scope of the Executive Branch’s official powers.
• The Court rejects Clinton’s contention that this case – as well as the potential additional litigation may place unacceptable
burdens on the President that will hamper the performance of his official duties. in this particular case.
• It is settled that the Judiciary may burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President’s official conduct,
and may direct appropriate process to the President himself.
• It must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of the President’ unofficial conduct.
• The reasons for rejecting a categorical rule requiring federal courts to stay private actions during the President’s term apply
as well to a rule that would, in petitioner’s words, require a stay “in all but the most exceptional cases.”
• The grant by the lower court of a stay is not a “functional equivalent” of an unconstitutional grant of temporary immunity.
Rather, it is just the power of the court to control its own docket.
• Moreover, the potential burdens on the President posed by this litigation are appropriate matters for that court to evaluate
in its management of the case. (i.e. The President may not go personally to the court, and his deposition may be taken
anytime, or in one occasion Clinton actually video-taped his testimony).

• Therefore, the stay is an abuse of discretion because it did not take into account the importance of Jones’ interest in bringing
the case to trial. (i.e. a prolonged delay may pose as significant risk of irreparable harm to Jones because of an
unforeseeable loss of evidence or the possible death of a party.)
• The Court is not persuaded of the seriousness of the alleged risk that this decision will generate a large volume of politically
motivated harassing and frivolous litigation and that national security concerns might prevent the President from explaining
a legitimate need for a continuance, and has confidence in the ability of judges to deal with both concerns. If Congress
deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it may respond with legislation.

Gloria v. CA (2000) – cabinet member
FACTS:
• June 29, 1989, private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City
Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino.
• October 10, 1994 - Petitioner Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the Philippines that Dr. Icasiano be
reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute of Science and Technology], to fill up the vacuum created by
the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag F. Lauro, on June 17, 1994.
• October 12, 1994 - The President approved the recommendation of Secretary Gloria.
• October 13, 199 - A copy of the recommendation for petitioner’s reassignment, as approved by the President, was
transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for implementation.
• October 14, 1994 - Director Rosas, informed Dr. Icasiano of his reassignment, effective October 17, 1994.
• Dr. Icasiano requested Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but the latter denied the request.
o The petitioner prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994 to the President of the Philippines, asking for a
reconsideration of his reassignment, and furnished a copy of the same to the DECS.
o However, he subsequently changed his mind and refrained from filing the letter with the Office of President.
• October 19, 1994, the petitioner filed for TRO in the CA.
o CA granted and restrained Sec. Gloria from implementing the re-assignment.
• CA issued assailed enjoining Sec. Gloria from implementing the reassignment of Dr. Icasiano.
ISSUE/ HELD:
Did the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational School
Superintendent of MIST violate his security of tenure? YES.
• (MAIN DOCTRINE) The doctrine of presidential immunity has no application where the petition for prohibition is
directed not against the President himself but against his subordinates.
o Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the
President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
o SC: Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and
not against the President.
§ The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President.
§ Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave
abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
• Petitioners’ submission that the petition of private respondent with the Court of Appeals is improper for failing to show that
petitioners constituted themselves into a “court” conducting a “proceeding” and for failing to show that any of the petitioners
acted beyond their jurisdiction in the exercise of their judicial or ministerial functions, is barren of merit.
o SC: Private respondent has clearly averred that the petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction and/or excess of jurisdiction in reassigning the private respondent in a way that infringed upon
his security of tenure.
o And petitioners themselves admitted that their questioned act constituted a ministerial duty, such that they could
be subject to charges of insubordination if they did not comply with the presidential order.
o What is more, where an administrative department acts with grave abuse of discretion, which is equivalent to a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner, there is a justification for the courts to set aside the administrative determination thus reached.
• The Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST “appears to be indefinite.”
o The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect
that the reassignment of private respondent will “best fit his qualifications and experience” being “an expert in
vocational and technical education.”
o It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been
described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field.
o Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is
temporary or would only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact
evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration.
o Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private
respondent.

Estrada v. Desierto (2001) – impeachment
FACTS:
• This case involves the impeachment of former President Joseph Estrada (Erap).
• Erap and Glora Macapagal-Arroyo were elected Pres and VP, respectively, in the May 1998 elections.
• Erap’s “sharp descent from power” started in Oct 2000.
o Ilocos Sur Gov Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of Erap, went on air and accused him, his family and friends of
receiving millions of jueteng money.
o Then Sen. Guingona, Jr. took the floor and delivered a fiery speech entitled “I Accuse,” accusing Erap of receiving
some P220M jueteng money from Chavit from Nov 1998-Aug 2000; receiving P70M on excise tax on cigarettes
intended for Ilocos Sur.
o Speech was referred by Sen. President Drilon to the Sen. Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice
o The HoR also decided to investigate through its Committee on Public Order and Security.
o Congressmen Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach
Erap.
• Calls for resignation of Erap filled the air – Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin’s pastoral statement, the CBCP, former Pres.
Cory Aquino asking Erap to take the “supreme self-sacrifice” of resignation, and former Pres. Fidel Ramos
• Erap’s cabinet members started to resign, like Gloria Arroyo as Sec of DSWD. She also asked for Erap’s resignation but
Erap can’t let go.
o Many resignations followed, like 4 members of Erap’s Council of Senior Economic Advisers (Jaime de Zobel de
Ayala, former PM Cesar Virata, Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip)
o Sen. President Drilon, House Speaker Manny Villar and some 47 reps also defected from the ruling coalition.
• By Nov 13: House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of impeachment signed by 115 reps, or more than 1/3 of the HoR
to the Senate.
• Nov 20: Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of Erap. 21 senators took their oath as judges with SC CJ Davide
presiding.
o Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte, and Reps Joker Arroyo,
Raul Gonzales, Antonio Nachura, former SoJ Perez, among others.
o In Erap’s defense are former CJ Narvasa, former SolGen Estelito Mendoza, Siegfried and Raymund Fortun,
among others.
o Day to day trial was covered by live TV, and enjoyed the highest viewing rating.
o Dramatic point of the December hearings was testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior VP of EPCI Bank, who saw
Erap when he affixed the signature “Jose Velarde” on docs involving a P500M investment
o Trial resumed after Christmas and the prosecution presented more witnesses, like Erap’s former Sec of Finance
Espiritu, alleging that Erap jointly owned BW Resources Corp.
• Jan 16, 2001: a vote of 11-10, senator judges ruled against opening of second envelope which allegedly contained
evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3B in a secret bank account under “Jose Velarde.”
o The prosecutors walked out and then Sen Pimentel resigned as Sen Pres.
• Ruling was made at 10pm and was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metro.
• Prosecutors resigned from the impeachment case.
• Jan 18: 10km line of people holding lit candles formed a human chain from Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala to the EDSA
Shrine. EDSA II!
• Jan 19: AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes, Secretary of Defense Mercado, PNP Chief Lacson, some cabinet secretaries,
usecs, and bureau chiefs defected and withdrew their support from the administration.
• JAN 20: DAY OF SURRENDER:
o 12:20 midnight: negotiations for peaceful and orderly transfer of power started in Malacanang
o 12:00 noon: CJ Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as President of the PH.
o 2:30pm: Erap and his family left Malacanang and he issued the statement (IMPT!)
At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic
of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about
the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the
restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for
the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come
ahead in the same service of our country.
o On the same day, Erap signed another letter:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that
I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President.

o This letter was sent to former House Speaker Fuentabella at 8:30 of the same day, but another copy was received
by Sen Pres. Pimentel only at 9:00pm.
• Jan 22: Arroyo immediately discharged her powers and duties of Presidency.
• Different bodies, like the SC, the House, and even then US President Bill Clinton expressed their recognition and support
of the new administration.
• The Senate declared the impeachment court as terminated, but then Sen. Defensor-Santiago stated for the record that
Senate has failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question whether Erap was still
qualified to run for another elective post.
• Several cases then were filed against Erap with the Ombudsman for bribery, graft and corruption, plunder, forfeiture, perjury,
malversation, among others – a total of 6 cases with the OMB
• Consequently, Erap filed for prohibition against these cases, enjoining the Omb from proceeding against him criminally until
his term as president is over.
• Erap also filed for a Quo Warranto case to confirm whether he is the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic
temporarily unable to discharge; that Arroyo is only holding the Presidency position ONLY in an acting capacity.
ISSUES/HELD:
Do the cases assail the “legitimacy of the Arroyo administration,” and therefore involve a political question? – NO
• Political questions are those which are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure (Tanada v. Cuenco)
• The 1987 Consti has narrowed reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded power of the judicial review to
determine whether there has been GADALEJ on any branch of gov’t.
• While Arroyo relies on cases to support her thesis that bar the court from reviewing cases that involve legitimacy of her
administration because they involve a political question, the SC concluded that these cases are inapplicable.
o The cases involve the “revolutionary government” of former Pres Cory Aquino, as a result of a successful
revolution, which was in defiance of the1973 Constitution operating then.
o Such revolutionary government is “extra constitutional” and its legitimacy cannot be subject of judicial review
o In this case, Arroyo’s admin is not revolutionary in character, and is well within the current 1987 Constitution; it is
intraconstitutional and was caused by the resignation of Erap as elected President.
o The succession of GMA as VP to Pres is subject to judicial review, and it involves legal questions which
can be tested and interpreted under the 1987 Consti.
Did Erap resign as President or considered resigned when GMA took her oath? – YES
• Erap denies that he resigned or that he suffers from permanent disability; he submits that the Office of the President was
not vacant when Arroyo took her oath.
• Note: under Sec. 8 of Art. VII:
o “Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice
President shall have been elected and qualified.
o x x x.”
• Two elements of resignation:
o Intent to resign
o Intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment
• No formal requirement as to form – so may be oral or written; express or implied, as long as resignation is clear.
• In this case, while Erap did not write any formal letter of resignation, the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence (totality test) show that ERAP RESIGNED.
o There is an authoritative window on the state of mind of Erap, through “Final Days of Joseph Ejercito
Estrada,” which is the diary of Exec Sec. Angara serialized in the PH Daily Inquirer.
o Diary reveals that in the morning of Jan 19, Erap’s loyal advisers created an ad hoc committee to handle the
swelling EDSA crowd.
o At 1:20pm of that day, Erap told Angara: “Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo Reyes.”
o Erap later decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. This is
an indicum that Erap had intended to give up the presidency at that time.
o Erap likewise listened intently to Sen. Pimentel to consider the option of a dignified exit/resignation.
o He did not object to the suggestion, and at 10pm, he told Angara: “Ed, guaranteed that I would have 5 days to a
week in this palace.” This is proof that Erap had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resigned.
His mind was already concerned with the 5-day grace period he could stay in the palace.
o Neither did he object to the initiation of negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The first
negotiation led to agreement on the transition period of 5 days, agreement to secure safety of Erap and his family,
nd
and agreement to open the 2 envelope
o Yet again, the resignation of Erap was not disputed.
o The diary further reveals what Erap disclosed to Angara:

“Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am
very tired. I don’t want any more of this—it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I
just want to clear my name, then I will go
o Second round of negotiation cements that Erap will resign “today, January 20, 2001.” Resignation in this
round was treated as a given fact. Only unsettled points were the measures to be undertaken by the
parties during and after the transition period.
o When informed of the 12noon oath-taking of Arroyo, Erap even asked “bakit hindi naman kayo makahintay?; Eh
di yung transition period, moot and academic na?”
• IN SUM: IT was curtain time for Erap. His resignation cannot be doubted.
o He acknowledged Arroyo’s oath taking, emphasized that he was leaving the palace, the seat of presidency for
peace and order, and did not say he was leaving due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-
assume office.
o Neither can he rely on his second letter stating that the VP is just an “Acting President.” Court notes this letter as
one “wrapped in mystery.” This letter was never referred to by Erap during the week-long crisis.
o Nor can he rely on the argument that he could not resign as a matter of law, pending an investigation (crim/admin)
(under RA 3019). The intent of his law was to prevent the act of resignation/retirement from being used as a
protective shield to stop investigation/prosecution.
o A public official has the right to not serve if he really wants to retire, but if at the time he resigns/retires, he is
facing investigation, such resignation will not cause the dismissal of the proceedings.
Is Erap only temporarily unable to act as President? – cannot be answered; a political question only to be determined by
Congress.
• Sec. 11, Art. VII of the Consti: Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until
he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President
as Acting President.
• Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
• Note that both houses of Congress have recognized Arroyo as the President through its Resolutions expressing their
support (Resolution Expressing the Support of the HoR to the assumption into Office by VP GMA as President of the RP,
Expressing its Congratulations and Expressing its Support for Her Administration…, House Reso No. 176; Resolution
Confirming Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s Nomination of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the RP,
House Resolution No. 178 and terminating the impeachment court (Resolution Recognizing that Impeachment Court is
Functus Officio, Sen. Resolution No. 83).
• Clear in such recognition that the inability of Erap is no longer temporary, and Congress has clearly rejected Erap’s claim
of inability.
Is Erap immune from suit? – NO
• Termination of the impeachment trial and its non-resolution does not bar Erap’s prosecution.
• “incumbents Presidents are immune from suit, but NOT beyond.” (In Re: Saturnino Bermudez)
• Besides, immunity from suit is not a blanket guarantee for public officers who do wrong. After all, “public office is a public
trust.”
Should prosecution of Erap be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity? – NO.
• Two principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with rain of unrestrained publicity during investigation
and trial of high profile cases:
o British approach – presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury, so stop trials when trial of accused suffers
threat;
o American approach – skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity; there are different
strains of tests like “substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
• Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial because the democratic settings, media
coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided.
• Freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, share a common core purposes of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government.
• To be prejudicial, however, there must be allegation and proof that judges have been unduly influenced, and not simply that
they might be, by barrage of publicity.
• Applying such, the SC ruled here that there is not enough evidence to enjoin preliminary investigation by the OMB.

Estrada v. Desierto (MR; Apr. 2001; evid case)
FACTS:
• This MR was denied, btw.

• For this MR, Erap brings the following issues before the Court: (focus on Consti issues; not evid)
Can Congress decide Erap’s inability to govern considering Sec. 11, Art. VII of the Consti? – YES
• Erap argues that Congress can only decide on his inability when there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the
Cabinet and the President.
• This is untenable.
• Erap himself made the submission in the original case that “Congress has the ultimate authority to determine whether the
President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in Sec. 11 of Article VII.”
• SC has sustained this claim and authority in that Congress has already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged
temporary inability to govern by Erap.
o Refer to House Reso No. 176 which cited as bases of its judgment (on Erap’s inability to govern) factors such as
“people’s loss of confidence of Erap to effectively govern,” and it has a constitutional duty of “fealty to the supreme
will of the people.”
o This is a political judgment which may be right or wrong, but Congress is answerable only to the people for its
judgment.
o Court cannot look into this.
o If Erap feels aggrieved, SC said he should seek redress from Congress itself.
• Erap’s insistence on whether one is a “de jure or de facto President” is a judicial question fails to impress the court.
o The case doesn’t present the general issue of whether PGMA is the de jure or de facto President.
o Specific issues were raised to the SC for resolution and SC rules on an issue by issue basis.
• Erap also faults Congress for its resolutions which brushed off his temporary inability to govern and President-on-leave
argument
o He argues that these Acts of Congress were post facto and
o A declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied.
• Wroooooong. There is nothing in sec. 11 of Art. VII which states that the declaration by Congress of the President’s inability
must always be a priori or before the VP assumes the presidency.
o Special consideration should be given in this case as well due to the events that transpired and culminated on a
Saturday – Congress was not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on Erap’s letter claiming
inability to govern.
o These post facto acts, however, were still supported by a priori recognition by the President of the Senate and
House Speaker of Arroyo as the “constitutional successor to the presidency”
o SC provides that the acts of Congress, a prior and post facto, cannot be dismissed as implied recognitions of
Arroyo as President. It did not discuss this extensively kasi it said that Erap’s claim here is a guesswork far
divorced from reality to “deserve further discussion.”
• Erap maintains that while Consti has made the Congress the national board of canvassers for presidential and vp elections,
the SC remains the sole judge in presidential and VP contests.
o He infers that such provision is indicative of the desire of the people to keep out of the hands of Congress
questions as to the legality of a person’s claim to the presidential office.
• Inference is ILLOGICAL. No room for inference.
o Consti clearly sets out structure on how vacancies and election contest in the office of the Pres shall be decided.
Coverage of Section 7, Art. VII Section 8, Art. VII Section 11
• President elect fails to qualify • Death • President transmits to the
• If President shall not have been • Permanent disability President of the Senate and
chosen, and • Removal from office or resignation Speaker of the House his
• If at the beginning of the term of the written declaration that he is
president, the President-elect shall unable to discharge
have died or shall have become
permanently disabled
• In each case above, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues that may arise from the contingency
• In case of inability to govern, Sec. 11 gives Congress the power to adjudge.
Was Erap resigned/considered resigned as of January 20, 2001? – YES.
• On whether resignation is voluntarily tendered, voluntariness is vitiated only when resignation is submitted under
government action. 3-part test for such duress:
o Whether one side involuntarily accepted the other’s terms;
o Whether circumstances permitted no other alternative; and
o Whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts fo the opposite side.
• Resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances it appears that the employer’s conduct in
requesting resignation effective deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors:

o Whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation
o Whether employee understood nature of the choice he/she is given
o Whether employee was given a reasonable time to choose
o Whether he/she permitted to select the effective date of resignation
• In this case, Erap had several options to him other than resignation.
o He proposed snap elections
o He transmitted to Congress a written declaration of temporary inability
o Hence, he could not claim that he was forced to resign.
o He was even fully protected by the Presidential Security Guard armed with tanks, when he left the palace. No
force/harm/injury was inflicted whatsoever.
Did prejudicial publicity affect Erap’s right to fair trial? – NO
• SC upheld its earlier ruling that it is not enough for Erap to conjure possibility of prejudice. Erap must prove ACTUAL
prejudice on the part of his investigators.
Was the Angara Diary inadmissible for violating rules on Evidence?
• FIRST, the diary is not an out of court statement. It is part of the pleadings in the case at bar.
o Estrada cannot complain that he was not furnished with a copy. Aside from it being (1) frequently referred to by
both parties, (2) it was also attached as Annexes in the memorandum and comments filed between the parties,
(3) it was also extensively used by the Secretary of Justice Perez in his oral arguments.
o Estrada had all the opportunity to contest the use of the diary but he failed to do so.
• SECOND, even assuming that the diary was an out of court statement, its use is not covered by the hearsay rule.
o Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of
some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.
o It is excluded because of three reasons: (1) absence of cross-examination, (2) absence of demeanor evidence,
and (3) absence of oath.
o However, not all hearsay evidence are automatically inadmissible. There are several exceptions to the rule.
o In this case, the diary is considered as an admission of the party which is an exception to the hearsay rule.
• Under the rules, the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
• WHY are admissions not covered? - A man’s acts, conduct and declaration, if voluntary, are admissible against him. It is
his own declaration and ‘he does not need to cross-examine himself’.
• The diary contains direct statements of Estrada which can be categorized as his admission
• (see facts for admissions)
• THIRD, even if the diary is not Estrada’s, it is still binding upon him under the doctrine of adoptive admission.
o An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action made by another person when it is reasonable
to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person.
o The basis for admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of the
statements which the other person had made.
o In this case, this scenario is seen when Angara asked Pimentel to advise Estrada to consider the option of a
“dignified exit or resignation” and Estrada did not object but simply said that he could never leave the country. His
silence therein can be taken as an admission by him.
• FOURTH, the use of the diary is not a violation of the rule on res inter alios acta (Rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by
an act, declaration, or omission of another).
o The rule has several exceptions and one of them is with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent.
o In this case, Executive Secretary Angara was an alter ego of Estrada. He was the Little President.
• This can be seen by the ff. events:
o Angara was authorized by Estrada to act for him during the days leading to his leaving Malacanang.
o In the diary, Estrada told Angara that “Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At
hangang huli, ikaw parin” - this shows the degree of full trust given by Estrada to Angara.
o Also in the diary, Estrada asked Angara during their final lunch in Malacang: “Ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis?”
to which Angara told him to go and he did.
o Angara headed the team of negotiators that met with the team of Arroyo to discuss the peaceful transfer of power.
o All these show that Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner. Hence, Estrada is bound by the acts and
declarations of Angara.
• FIFTH, the hearsay rule does not cover independently relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant
independently, whether they are true or not.
o These can be divided into two classes: (1) those statements which relate to the very facts in issue, and (2) those
which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue.
o In this case, the statement covers the second class, pertaining to statements of persons from which an inference
may be made as to the state of mind of another.
o While it does not relate to the main issue, the diary contains statements of Estrada which reflect his state of mind
at that time and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. These are admissible and not covered by
hearsay.

Was the best evidence rule and the rule on authentication violated by the admission of the
newspaper reproduction of the diary? – NO
• BEST EVIDENCE: It is true that the court relied on the newspaper reproduction in PDI and not on the original diary. However,
the court did not violate the best evidence rule.
o According to Wigmore, the production of an original may be dispensed with if the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document, and no other useful purpose will be served b requiring production.
o So secondary evidence may be received in evidence if (1) the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect
it, and (2) no objection was made to its reception.
o In this case, Estrada was given an opportunity to object to the admissibility of the diary several times during the
proceeding through his memorandum, reply memo, supplemental memo, and second supplemental memo, but
he failed to do so.
• Their reliance on the case of State Prosecutors v. Muro was misplaced.
o In Muro, the judge was dismissed for relying on a newspaper account in dismissing 11 cases against Imelda
Marcos.
o However, that case is different from this one because in Muro, the court used as basis the newspapers without
affording the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard, which is a blatant denial of due process.
o In this case, Estrada was given every opportunity to inspect the document and object to its admissibility, but he
failed to do.
• AUTHENTICATION: the rule requires that before a private document is offered as evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved by either (1) anyone who saw the document executed or written, or (2) by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
o However, this requirement provides for an exception: If a party does not deny the genuineness of the instrument,
he cannot now object to it not being properly authenticated or identified.
o Using the same ruling in the best evidence argument, Estrada was given every opportunity to question the
authentication of the document but he failed to do so.
• It is already too late to raise his objections since the diary has already been used as evidence and a
decision has been rendered partly on the basis thereof.

David v. Arroyo (SUPRA)
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC G.R. No. 221697 & 221698 – 700 (2016) – citizenship of foundling
SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.
FACTS:
• Dear Ate Charo,

o Poe was found as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by one Edgar Militar
o She was reported as a foundling with the Civil Registrar of Iloilo and was given a Foundling Certificate and a
Certificate of Live Birth
o When Poe was 5 years old, FPJ and Susan Roces filed a petition to adopt her with the MTC of San Juan City
o It was later found out that the lawyer who handled Poe’s adoption filed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating Poe’s new name and the name of her adoptive parents
§ This was fixed in 2006
o At 18, Poe registered to vote in San Juan City
o A few years later she was also issued a passport
o Initially, she pursued a degree in Developmental Studies in UP but continued her studies in Boston College as a
Political Studies major
o In 1991, she married Daniel Llamanzares, a dual-citizen of the PH and US
o They returned to the US two days after their wedding
§ Poe has 3 children (eldest was born in the US, two youngest borin in the PH)
o In 2001, Poe became a naturalized American Citizen and obtained a US passport
o In 2004, Poe returned to the Philippines with her second child to support FPJ’s Presidential bid
§ It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest child
§ She returned to the US with her two daughters shortly after the elections
o In a few months after returning to the US, Poe rushed back to the PH upon learning of her father’s deteriorating
medical condition
§ After her father died, she stayed for a few months to take care of the funeral arrangements and the
settlement of her father’s estate
o According to Poe, because of her father’s death, she and her husband decided to move and reside permanently
in the PH sometime in the first quarter of 2005
§ Poe already quit her US job in early 2004
o Finally, Poe came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005
§ without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
§ Children immediately followed
§ Husband stayed in the US a bit to complete pending projects and sell their home
o Poe and her children initially stayed with her mother until Poe and Daniel purchased a condo unit with a parking
slot at One Wilson Place in San Juan during the second half of 2005
§ Poe’s children began attending school in the PH
o On 14 February 2006, the Poe made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the family’s
remaining household belongings
§ She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
o In late March 2006, Daniel officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family’s change and abandonment of
their address in the U.S.
§ House was sold
§ Daniel quit his job and came to the PH to work
o In early 2006, Poe and Daniel acquired a 509squaremeter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built
their family home
§ Still where the couple and their children are residing.
o On 7 July 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003
§ Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor
children on 10 July 2006
o Again, Poe registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.
§ She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport
o On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Poe as Chairperson of the MTRCB.
§ Before assuming her post, Poe executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States
of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship” before a notary public in Pasig City on 20
October 2010 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.
§ Following day, Poe submitted the affidavit to the BI and took her oath as the MTRCB Chair.
§ From this point on, Poe stopped using her US passport

o On 12 July 2011, Poe executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an “Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.”
§ she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had
taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her US citizenship
§ In the same questionnaire, the Poe stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the
PH, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present
o On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with the COMELEC her COC for Senator for the 2013 Elections
§ she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in the Philippines before
May 13, 2013.”
§ She obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed a senator
o Poe obtained a Philippine Diplomatic passport
o On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections
§ In her CoC, she declared that she is a naturalborn citizen and that her residence in the PH up to the
day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.
§ Attached an Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of USA Citizenship subscribed and sworn to before a
notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015
• This case is triggered by filing of several COMELEC cases against her
o She lost all of those cases before the COMELEC, both Division and MR before the En Banc
ISSUES/HELD:
(MAIN ISSUE) What is the law’s treatment of foundlings? – Natural-born citizens
• As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.

• While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either.
• There is need to examine the intent of the framers of the Constitution
o the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered
by the enumeration.
• The 1935 Constitution is silent as to foundlings only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention
• Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed
the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
• Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
o These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
o Inter-Country Adoption Act, Domestic Adoption Act, and SC’s Rules on Adoption all expressly refer to “Filipino
children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
• Respondents argue that: the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling
certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which
make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best.
o SC: erroneous argument
o Naturalborn citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
§ “Having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done by the citizen.
• In this case, the determination of foundling status is done by the authorities, not the child
§ the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of
the child.
§ the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship,
or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
• Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.
o International law becomes part of domestic law through transformation or incorporation
§ Transformation – requires domestic law
§ Incorporation – generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause
of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
§ “Generally accepted principles of international law” include international custom as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations
§ International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements:
• the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and
• a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity).
o Implicit is belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence
of a rule of law requiring it
§ “General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles “established by a process of
reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles which are “basic to legal systems generally,” such as
“general principles of equity” and “general principles against discrimination” (embodied in UDHR,

ICCESCR, and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Convention against Discrimination in Education, Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation”)
o SC has interpreted the UDHR as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State
o PH has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the ICCPR
o Common thread of UDHR, UNCRC, and ICCPR is that they
§ oblige the PH to grant nationality from birth and
§ ensure that no child is stateless
• 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and the 1961 UN Convention on
Reduction of Statelessness, while unratified by the PH, contain certain principles that are generally accepted principles of
international law
o Art. 14 of 1930 Hague Convention… – principle that a foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the country
of birth.
o Art. 2 of UN Convention on Reduction of Statelessness – principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens
of the country where he is found
• PH is a signatory to the UDHR which affirm Art. 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention through Art. 15(1)
o Art. 2 of UN Convention on Reduction… merely gives effect to Art. 15(1) of the UDHR
§ In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the “International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.” Yet, we ruled that the
proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a
“generally accepted principle of international law.”
• Despite the fact that only 16 of the 20 states required for the Convention to come into force
had ratified the instrument
• Essentially, “generally accepted principles of international law” are based not only on international custom, but also on
“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the
ICJ Statute.
o Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have passed
legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen.
§ 42 of those follow the jus sanguinis regime
§ only 36 are parties to the Convention on Statelessness (26 are not signatories to the Convention)
§ During the oral arguments, the Chief Justice pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed
(87.83%) foundlings are recognized as citizens
§ These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally
accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the
country in which the foundling is found.
• Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and
reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution.
Did Poe’s repatriation under RA 9225 result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship? – YES.
• COMELEC ruled that it did not in disregard of consistent jurisprudence

o Bengson III v. HRET: repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. A natural-born citizen will be
restored in his prior status as a natural-born Filipino citizen
o Also all the other cases that talk about repatriation under RA 9225
§ Sobejana Condon v. COMELEC where we described it as an “abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one’s Filipino citizenship.”
§ Parreño v. Commission on Audit, which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, where we said that “[t]he
repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his naturalborn citizenship.
• The COMELEC construed the phrase “from birth” in the definition of natural citizens as implying “that naturalborn citizenship
must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth.”
o R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress’ sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be
lost or reacquired.
§ Congress saw it fit to decree that naturalborn citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once
lost.
o The requirement that natural-born status must be uninterrupted was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET
Did COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they ruled for the cancellation of
Poe’s COC? – YES.
• Issue before the COMELEC was whether or not COC of Poe should be denied due course or cancelled “on the exclusive
ground” that she made in the certificate a false material representation.
o The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the
issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority.

o The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.
o The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice President,
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. (HRET, SET,
and PET)
§ There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.
• Can COMELEC be the judge of the qualification of candidates for President? – NO.
o the lack of legal provisions for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere
rule
o Three reasons to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining the qualifications of a
candidate before the election:
§ First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for
determining his eligibility for the office.
§ Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates’ eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this
case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office.
• Contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy
§ Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre proclamation cases in elections for President,
Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives.
o Presently, the COMELEC rules require a declaration by final judgment of a competent court that the candidate
sought to be disqualified is “guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided
by law or the Constitution” before a candidate can be disqualified
o GR: a COC cannot be cancelled or denied due course on the ground of false representations regarding his or her
qualifications without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified.
§ XPN: selfevident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions
o In this case, the COMELEC essentially ruled that since foundlings are not mentioned in the enumeration of the
1935 Constitution, they cannot be citizens.
§ This borders on bigotry
o Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that Poe possesses blood
relationship with a Filipino citizen when “it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable,” proceeded to say
that “she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent.”
o However, Poe’s blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is Demonstrable
§ presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law
• Family Code has chapter on Paternity and Filiation
§ there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a naturalborn
Filipino.
§ Burden of proof to show that Poe was not a Filipino citizen was on respondents
§ Poe’s admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not
exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high
probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
• Factual issue is whether or not Poe’s parents are Filipinos (not who her parents are)
o Under Rules of Evidence, collateral evidence is allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue
o To this end, OSG offered official statistics from the years 1965 – 1975 the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278.
§ The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural born Filipino
was 99.83%.
o Other circumstantial evidence:
§ Poe’s parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
City
§ She has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and
an oval face.
o There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
§ All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic
Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that
there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would
indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos.
That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence.
§ To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm

Funa v. Executive Secretary (2013) – exception to the general rule of prohibition to hold other govt. offices)
Article 7, Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with,
and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.
FACTS:
• Facts according to petitioner Funa:

o March 1, 2010 - PGMA appointed Alberto Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Sec.
Agnes Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province.
o 4 days later, PGMA appointed Agra as Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity.
o Funa challenges that constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments/designations, claiming that such is
prohibited under Sec. 13, Art. 7.
o This case follows after Funa v. Ermita wherein Funa assailed the constitutionality of the designation of then USec.
of DOTC Maria Elena Bautista as concurrently the OIC of the MARINA.
• Facts according to respondent Agra:
o Agra argues that on January 10, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when PGMA designated
him as the ASG in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice.
o On March 5, Pres. Arroyo designated him as the Acting Sec. of Justice.
o He then relinquished his position as the GCC and that pending the appointment of his successor, he continued
to perform his duties as the ASG.
• Contentions of the parties:
o Funa: the position of SOJ, being a member of the Cabinet, is not exempt from the constitutional ban under Sec.
13, Art. 7, which does not distinguish between an appointment or designation.
§ The position of the Solicitor General is not an ex officio position in relation to the position of the SOJ,
considering that the OSG is an independent and autonomous office attached to the DOJ.
§ Fact that Agra was extended an appointment as the ASG shows that he did not occupy that office in
an ex officio capacity because an ex officio position does not require any further warrant or appointment.
§ There was no “prevailing special circumstance” that justified the non-application to Agra of Sec. 13, Art.
7.
o Agra: His concurrent designation as the ASOJ and ASG were only in a temporary capacity, the only effect of
which was to confer additional duties to him.
§ Thus, as the ASG and the ASOJ, he was not “holding” both offices in the strict constitutional sense.
§ An appointment, to be covered by the constitutional prohibition, must be regular and permanent, instead
of a mere designation.
§ Even assuming that Agra’s concurrent designation constituted “holding of multiple offices,” his
continued service as ASG was akin to a hold-over;
ISSUES/HELD:
Was the designation of Agra as the ASOJ, concurrently with his position of ASG, unconstitutional? – YES
• Art. 7, Section 13. The President, VP, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies/assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
• Art. 9-B, Section 7(2). Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
GOCCs or their subsidiaries.
• Sec. 7, Art. 9-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive officials and employees, while
Sec. 13, Art. 7 is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Congress,
their deputies and assistants.
• Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, VP,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiply offices or employment in the
government during their tenure, the exception to his prohibition must be read with equal severity.
• On its face, the language of Sec. 13, Art. 7 is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.
• Wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation.
• The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit:
o Art. 7, Sec. 3(2) – the Vice President being appointed as member of the Cabinet
o Art. 7, Sec. 7(2) and (3) – VP as acting President in those instances provided
o Art. 8, Sec. 8(1) – SOJ being ex officio member of the JBC.

• Being designated as the ASOJ concurrently with his position as ASG, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Sec. 13, Art. 7,
whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read.
• Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the ASG, because the Constitution
has not otherwise so provided.
Did the fact that the designation was in an acting/temporary capacity make it valid? – NO
• The text of Section 13, Art. 7 plainly indicates that the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the
Government or in GOCCs was concerned.
• To hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
• Section 13 makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation.
o The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed
objection of Sec. 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically
the President, the VP, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
o To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional
disqualification of officials in the Executive Departments and of limitations on the President’s power of
appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, Usecs and ASecs as officers in charge
of government agencies, instrumentalities, or GOCCs,
• According to Civil Liberties Union v. Exec. Sec: the phrase “Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants” found
in Sec. 13 referred only to the heads of the various executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries,
and did not extend to other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary and Assistant Secretary.
• Being included in the prohibition embodied in Sec. 13, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided
in Sec. 7(2), Art. 9-B to justify his designation as ASOJ concurrently with his designation as ASG, or vice versa.
• It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was “allowed by law or the primary function of his
position.”
o To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Sec. 13,
he needed to establish that his concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.
o But he did not do so.
• His concurrent designations as ASOJ and ASG did not come within the definition of an ex officio capacity.
• One position was not derived from the other.
o The powers and functions of the OSG are neither required by the primary functions nor included by the powers
of the DOJ, and vice versa.
• The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent unit of the latter, as in fact, the Revised Administrative Code
decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous.
• Moreover, the magnitude of the scope of work of the Solicitor General, if added to the equally demanding tasks of the SOJ,
is obviously too much for any one official to bear.
• Assuming that Agra, as ASG, was not covered by the stricter prohibition under Sec. 13 due to such position being merely
vested with a cabinet rank under Sec. 3, RA 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the general prohibition under Sec.
7.
• His concurrent designations were still subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision.
Was he a de facto or de jure officer? – De Facto
• Since Agra did not hold validly the position of ASOJ concurrently with his holding of the position of ASG, he was not to be
considered as a de jure officer for the entire period of his tenure as the ASOJ.
• A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not
expired.
• But notwithstanding, Agra was a de facto officer during tenure as Acting Secretary of Justice.
• As such, he was entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered and all official actions of Agra as a de facto ASOJ,
assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed
and qualified for the office.

Pimentel v. Joint Committee (2004) – non-leg.
(A2015)
SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall
begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such
for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall
be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of
the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof
in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
FACTS:
• Sen. Pimentel Jr. filed petition for prohibition to declare null and void and to cease and desist the continued existence of the
Joint Committee of Congress (JCC) to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and
preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following
the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004.
• Pimentel posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session,
the 12th congress passed out of legal existence."
o Hence, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress."
o To advance this view, he relies on "legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of
both Houses of Congress."
ISSUE/HELD:
Is the existence of the JCC valid? – YES
• Pimentel’s claim that his arguments are supported by "legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the
rules of both Houses of Congress" is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules
o The section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory
recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections
in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
o In fact precedents of 1992 and 1998 presidential election do not support Pimentel’s claim
§ 1992- both houses adjourned May25,’92,on June 16 ’92 JCC finished tallying the votes for Pres and
VP, thereafter on June 22’92, 8th Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of
Canvassers and on even date proclaimed Ramos and Estrada as Pres and VP respectively.
§ 1998- both houses adjourned May 25,98, JCC completed the counting May 27,98. 10th congress then
convened on May 29, 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and proclaimed Estrada and
Macapagal as Pres and VP respectively.
• As for petitioner's argument that “the existence of the JCC are invalid, illegal and unconstitutional following the
adjournment of both houses of their regular session on June 11, 2004, he cites in support Section 15, Article VI of the
Constitution which reads:
o Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless
a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine
until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
• Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire
upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.

o Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its
regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular
session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time).
o Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "the term of office of the Senators shall be
six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law,
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election."
• Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present
legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence."
o The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment
of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non- legislative functions, such as
that of being the National Board of Canvassers.
o In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and
Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally
mandated tasks.
§ For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its
membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes.
§ Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and
proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of
Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of
authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio.
• In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee completing the
tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both Houses of Congress, which
may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.

LOPEZ v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES (2004) – rules for canvassing
FACTS:
•
rd
This is a resolution of the SC En Banc of the petition of Cong. Ruy Elias Lopez (3 Dist., Davao) seeking to nullify Sec.13,
Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress (Canvassing Rules), which created a Joint Committee that
will conduct a preliminary canvass the votes of the candidates for President and Vice-President during the 2004 elections
• [super short Resolution, facts are from CJ Davide’s Separate Opinion]
• Lopez claims the Canvassing Rules was adopted by both Houses with grave abuse of discretion. He requests that a TRO
directing Respondents to cease and desist from implementing, executing, and/or enforcing the Canvassing Rules.
• Lopez contends that the Rules are unconstitutional because:
o It constitutes a delegation of legislative power to a Joint Committee of Congress;
o It constitutes an amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution;
o It deprives him of his rights and prerogatives as a Member of Congress; and
o By the passage of the Canvassing Rules, Congress has neglected to perform an act which the Constitution
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office.
• OSG, Senate and House of Reps’ argue that the adoption of the Canvassing Rules are internal matters of Congress which
is beyond this Court's scope of judicial inquiry.
o They are likewise unanimous in their argument that there has been no invalid delegation to the Joint Committee
of the Constitutional duties of Congress.
ISSUES/HELD:
Did Congress commit GADALEJ in providing for the Canvassing Rules? – No.
• SECTION 4, ARTICLE VII expressly provides that Congress has the power to promulgate its rules for canvassing the
certificates. (Congressional prerogative)
• JURISPRUDENCE:
o  Arroyo v. De Venecia – The Court ruled it has no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless
there is a clear violation of the Constitution.
o Santiago v. Guingona – Doctrine of separation of powers: no authority to interfere when there is no showing of
abuse of discretion; co-equal branches
• The decisions and final report of the Joint Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of both Houses of
Congress, voting separately.
o Thus, there is no GADALEJ and Congress cannot be deprived of their congressional prerogatives.
• Resolution approved unanimously, 14-0. Every other f****** justice had something to say about it. Read the separate
opinions!

Tecson v. Lim (2004) – need for post election issue
(there are consolidated cases to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course/cancel his CoC)
FACTS:
• December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (aka Fernando  Poe, Jr. or "FPJ") filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of President under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party.
o In his CoC, FPJ stated that (1) he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, (2) his name was either "Fernando
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, (3) date of birth was 20 August 1939, and (4) his place of birth to be Manila.  
• Fornier’s Petition
o Victorino X. Fornier, a petitioner in of the consolidated cases, filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his CoC upon the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation:
§ (1) That he was a natural-born Filipino citizen when in fact his parents were foreigners;
• Mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
§ (2) Even considering that that Allan Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, since he was an illegitimate child of an alien mother.
• (1) Allan Poe had a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley, and (2) even if no prior marriage existed, Allan Poe married Bessie Kelly a year after
the birth of FPJ.
o January 2004, COMELEC dismissed the case of Fornier for lack of merit.  Hence, this petition for certiorari.
• Tecson and Velez’ Petition
o Other petitions were made by Maria Tecson et al. against FPJ challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
asserting that under Sec. 4(7) Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, only the SC has original and exclusive jurisdiction
to resolve the issues of the case.
CITIZENSHIP (Discussed the long background and history of “citizenship”; will discuss only pertinent parts)
• According to the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United State in 1898:
o Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property... In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications
of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration
they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
reside.
• Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 or the Philippine Organic Act of 1902:
o The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time.
o “All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the
11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands [EN MASSE FILIPINZATION] and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to
the Crown of Spain xxx”
o “Citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11
April 1899  
§ The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native
of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. 
o An amendment to the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 in 1912:
o "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, (e.g.
children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was
extant in the Philippines) the natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United
States, if residing therein."
• Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April
1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date,
not a citizen of some other country.
Citizenship based on 1935 Constitution (applicable Constitution)

• There were divergent views on whether or not jus soli (place) or jus sanguinis (blood) to be the mode of acquiring PH
citizenship. The 1935 Constitution adopted jus sanguinis.
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution; The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had
been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines o

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
• Under the 1935 Constitution, women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign
husbands, this resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
ISSUE/HELD:
Is FPJ a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, hence, qualified to run for President?—YES!
SYLLABUS TOPIC: “need for post election issue”  

• SC held that it has no jurisdiction over the first 2 cases (Tecson and Velez).
nd rd
o Only the registered candidate for Pres. or for VP who received the 2 or 3 highest number of votes may contest
the election with the SC acting as the PET
o Said contests may only be done after the election has been conducted.
• Tecson and Velez invoked the provisions of Sec. 4(7), Art. 7 of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC when it took cognizance of the case and in urging the SC to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted
before it. (See provision)
o “Contest” would refer to a post-election scenario.
o Hence, election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto (aim of dislodging the winning
candidate from office).
o Rules on the PET provide that:
“Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
“Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice- President of the Philippines
who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-
President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.”
• The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President" and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President.
o A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.
o In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario.
o In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of
votes could file an election protest.
o This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
• SC held that its jurisdiction, defined by Sec. 4(7), Art. 7, would not include cases directly brought before it that questions
the qualifications of a candidate for the Pres. or VP before the elections are held.
BALIK TAYO KAY FPJ:

• Sec. 2, Art. 7 of the Constitution: “No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.”
• SC held that “natural-born citizens" includes "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.”
o Even since, there are 4 modes of acquiring citizenship—(1) naturalization, (2) jus soli, (3) res judicata, and (4) jus
sanguinis. Jus sanguinis was adopted by up the Constitution to qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen
of the Philippines.
FPJ’s Lineage to determine his citizenship (Documents that were presented to show lineage and citizenship)
• FPJ’s birth appeared to be 20 August 1939 (under the 1935 Constitution regime)
a. 1935 Consti: Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines are Filipino Citizen.
• Allen Poe’s citizenship is contested, so the SC looked at FPJ’s lineage.
• Documentary evidence show that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo
Pou the father of Allan Poe.
• Lorenzo Pou’s birth had not been presented in evidence . However, His death certificate identified him to be a Filipino, a
resident of Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 Sept. 1954 .
(1) Birth Certificate of Allan F. Poe.
a. 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes
(2) Marriage certificate of FPJ’s Parents  on 16 Sept. 1940.
a. Allan Poe was stated to be 25 years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen 
b. Bessie Kelley to be 22 years old, unmarried, and an American citizen
(3) Marriage certificate of Allan Poe & Paulita Gomez *but it  was uncertified.
(4) Birth certificate of FPJ,  

o Born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, 24 years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, 21
years old.
Lorenzo Pou, grandfather of FPJ is a Filipino since he was in the Philippines during the en masse Filipinization of the
Inhabitants of the Philippines (see the Organic Act and the Treaty of Paris).
• The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would show that he died on 11 September 1954.
• It could be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born in the year 1870 when the PH was still a colony of Spain.
• Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the PH during the crucial period of from 1898-1902 considering that
there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. However, petitioner failed to
show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period.
• In absence of the contrary, it should be sound to conclude or presume that the place of residence of a person at the time of
his death was also his residence before death
• SC held that it can only infer that their conclusion that since Lorenzo Pou is a Filipino, his son, Allan Poe was also Filipino,
and the latter’s son, FPJ, was also a Filipino by virtue of the 1935 Constitution which states a Filipino is one whose father
is a Filipino.
Illegitimacy: FPJ was a recognized illegitimate child following rules on Evidence. (NOT Really Important)
• SC also held out Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy.  
• SC held that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break
away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of
the greater interest and welfare of the child.
o The provisions are intended to govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little evidence to
show that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general,
his relationship to the State.
o While the provisions on  "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context
of private relations, the domain of civil law 
o The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should be deemed independent
from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.
o The Civil Code/Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity do not have preclusive effects on matters
alien to personal and family relations.
o The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern.
• Basically the SC held that the proof of filiation by the Civil Code and Family Code should not strictly govern this case since
what is involved is not family or personal relations.
o What is involved here are matters as to the exercise of political rights or a person’s relationship to the state.
o This is important because FPJ’s evidence of illegitimate filiation is an affidavit made by his maternal aunt, not his
father’s and under the Civil Code/Family code it is not allowed to prove filiation – but it is allowed under evidence
“pedigree”.
• Act or Declaration about pedigree.—The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
word `pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these
facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
(Section 39, Rule 130)
• Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted might be
accepted to prove the acts of Allan Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ:
o “Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, known in the Philippines as `Fernando
Poe, Jr.,’ or `FPJ’
o Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and
myself lived together with our mother at our family's house...
o I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino,
and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.”
• NOTE: Mangahas was in Stockton, California, USA 
• SC also said that in case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity.
SC held that it does not matter whether or not you are an illegitimate child of your father, you still get his citizenship as the
Constitution does not distinguish.
• Petitioners argue that if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, contracted marriage
with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an
illegitimate child.
o But documentary evidence introduced by FPJ, consisting of a birth certificate and a marriage certificate of his
parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were
married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940.
o Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. 
• Petitioners contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American
citizen.

• However, in the case of Paa vs. Cha o:
o Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. 
o Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from his father, Leoncio.
o SC held that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother 
o SC concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin
therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino .
o SC said in an obiter that even if Leoncio were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was
illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary
for the case.
• What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for
disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer?
o It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison.
• Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own?
o To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents
• Petitioner’s argument should necessarily fail.
o Jurisprudence provides that an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit
the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption
that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child.
o It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.  
• The 1935 Constitution, which is the governing law at the time of birth of FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is.
o Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are
“those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” It does not distinguish between legitimate or illegitimate
children.
SC SUMMARY (VERBATIM FROM THE CASE)
(1) SC, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petitions. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution
of the COMELEC for alleged GADALEJ in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of
respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has
committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both
having been directly elevated to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-
presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked
only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to
take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy
of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48]must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

Macalintal v. PET (2010) – constitutionality
FACTS:
• Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
• Macalintal concedes that the Supreme Court is authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose, but he chafes at the
creation of the purportedly separate tribunal, complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and
confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.
• He also relies on the decision in Buac v. COMELEC where it was declared that contests involving the President and the
Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, xxx in the exercise of quasi-judicial power.
o He reiterates that the constitution of PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and
Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of
Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative function.
ISSUES/HELD:
(RELEVANT ISSUE) Does the constitution of PET, composed of the members of the Supreme Court, violate Section 4, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution? – NO. The creation of PET is covered by the Constitutional provision under the last paragraph
of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
• Overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v. Comelec: Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and
vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
• The Court resorted to rules of statutory construction to address Macalintal’s contention that the Constitution did not expressly
provide for the creation of PET. On its face, the Constitutional provision does not specify, nor does it preclude the
establishment of PET.
o Verba legis: words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where the technical
terms are employed.
o Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
o Article VII, Section 4 should be read with other provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on
the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
• Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving our country’s highest public
officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in
the exercise thereof.
• Related to the separation of powers, the Court pointed out that a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative
power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government (Ocampo v. Cabangis)
• The Court traced historical antecedent of PET:
o 1935 Constitution: No provision for PET since the US Constitution, from where our Constitution was patterned,
does not contain a similar provision. Thus, to fill the void in the 1935 Constitution, RA 1793 was passed,
establishing an independent PET (composed of the justices of the SC) to try, hear, and decide protests contesting
the election of the President and Vice President.
o 1973 Constitution: PET was rendered irrelevant since the President was not directly chosen by the people but
was elected from members of the National Assembly.
o 1981: When the president was then again elected directly by the people, BP 884 was enacted to revive PET.
o 1987 Constitution: What was merely ‘statutory’ (RA 1783) before, was now constitutionalized under Section 4,
Article VII, though not in its traditional nomenclature. There was also deliberate intent to allow the tribunal to
promulgate its own rules.
• Deliberations also revealed the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as PET, to undertake the Herculean
task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates.
o The explicit grant of independence and of the plenary powers needed to discharge the burden or task, justifies
the budget allocation for PET.
• A plain reading of Section 4, Article VII readily reveals a grant of authority to the SC sitting en banc. Though not expressly
specified, the grant of power is also not limited, such that the conferment of full authority to the SC is equivalent to the full
authority given to the HRET and SET.
• PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal.
• It’s obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully
complies – not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive.
Does the constitution of PET violate Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution? – NO.
• Resolution of electoral contests is essentially an exercise of judicial power.

• Reliance in the case of Buac v. Comelec is not proper since the Court’s declaration that ‘the contests involving the President
and Vice-President is an exercise of quasi-judicial power’ is an obiter.
• The Electoral Tribunals (including PET), strictly and literally speaking are not courts of law. Nonetheless, they are
empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit
constitutional empowerment for the COMELEC and for the HRET/SET.
• PET is intended by the framers of the Constitution to be an independent, but not separate, from the judicial department (i.e.
Supreme Court).

Estrada v. Desierto (SUPRA) – CHECK SUPPLEMENT READINGS
RAFAEL v. EMBROIDERY BOARD (1967) – designation and ex-officio capacity
SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
FACTS:
• Cecilio Rafael was engaged in the manufacture of embroidery and apparel products for export and doing business under
“El Barato Alce Company”
o January 1961 – he was authorized by the Collector of Customs to operate a manufacturing bonded warehouse
in Santolan, Tenejeros, Malabon, Rizal (Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse No. 88)
• June 1961 – R.A. 3137 was enacted, creating an Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board and providing for
a special assessment to be levied upon all entities engaged in an amount to be fixed by the Board
o Sec. 1. No textile, leather gloves raw materials and/or supplies, of any kind relative thereto, may be imported into
the Philippines as consigned goods to duly registered and organized Philippine embroidery and apparel firms
without the necessary license issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act.  
o Sec. 2. This license required hereof under Section One of this Act shall be duly issued by an Embroidery and
Apparel Control and Inspection Board which is hereby created and hereinafter referred to as the Board,
composed of: (1) A representative from the Bureau of Customs to act as Chairman, to be designated by the
Secretary of Finance; (2) A representative from the Central Bank to be designated by its Governor; (3) A
representative from the Department of Commerce and Industry to be designated by the Secretary of
Commerce and Industry; (4) A representative from the National Economic Council to be designated by its
Chairman; (5) A representative from the private sector coming from the Association of Embroidery and
Apparel Exporters of the Philippines. The Board shall have the over-all control and shall administer the checks
and counter-checks of consigned textile, leather gloves raw materials and/or supplies to embroidery and apparel
manufacturers and corresponding counter-checks for liquidations of said goods prior to re-exportations. No other
government instrumentality or agency shall be authorized to qualify or question the validity of license so issued
by the Board. Questions of legality and interpretation of any license so issued shall be decided exclusively by the
Board subject to appeal to courts, of competent jurisdiction.  
• In compliance with the above, the Board was subsequently constituted with the representative from the Bureau of Customs
as Chairman and representatives from Central Bank, Dept. of Commerce and Industry, and National Economic Council as
members (each of them designated by their respective dept. heads).
• Quintin Santiago – was named as the representative from the private sector. He is the president of the Philippine Association
of Embroidery and Apparel Exporters, Inc. (PAEAE)
o This was questioned by the Philippine Chamber of Embroidery and Apparel Producers, Inc. (to which Rafael is
affiliated).
• Rafael brought this petition to restrain the enforcement of the provisions of RA 3137
o He argues that while Congress may create an office, it cannot specify who shall be appointed therein; that the
members of the Board can only be appointed by the President in accordance with Article VII, Sec. 10, subsection
3 of the 1935 Constitution;
o that since RA 3137 prescribes that the chairman and members of the Board should come from specified
offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by Congress as to who should be appointed, thereby infringing the
constitutional power of the President to make appointments.
ISSUES/HELD:
In providing that the chairman and members of the Board should come from specified offices, is RA 3137 unconstitutional
for bypassing the President’s power to appoint? – No.
• Sec.2 of RA 3137 reveals that for the chairman and members of the Board to qualify, they need only be designated by their
respective dept heads (with the exception of the representative from the private sector, they sit ex officio)
o To be designated, they must already be holding positions in the offices mentioned
o Thus, for example, one who does not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs cannot be designated
as the representative from that office.
o No new appointments are necessary! The representatives so designated merely perform duties in the Board in
addition to those they perform under their original appointments.

• Nothing in the Act suggests also that the designated representatives to the Board will lose or forfeit their original
appointments. Thus, for purposes of their tenure on the Board they can be considered as merely on detail, subject to recall
by their respective chiefs.
• Sec. 2 is not incompatible with the established doctrine that “the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the
President, upon which no limitations maybe imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the
concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power to prescribe the qualifications
to a given appointive office.”
• Congress took care to specify the offices from which the representatives will come from because these departments/bureaus
perform functions which have a direct relation to the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof into embroidery
and apparel products and their subsequent exportation abroad.
Does RA 3137 constitute class legislation and deprive the petitioner of equal protection when Congress vested the
appointment of the representative of the private sector in respondent Board, a private nongovernmental entity? – No.
• Petitioner asserts that the particular provision is designed to favor one private organization to the exclusion of others.
• SC: PAEAE was not singled out by the law in order to favor it over and above others, but rather because it is the dominant
organization in the field. No privileges are accorded PAEAE members which are not similarly given to non-members. Both
are within its coverage. Non-membership in the PAEAE does not mean that the benefits granted and the restrictions
imposed by the Act shall not apply to those who choose to venture into the business independently.
• Legislation which affects with equal force all persons of the same class and not those of another is not class legislation and
does not infringe the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
[minor issue] Is there undue delegation under Article XVI §4(2)? –No.
• The provision sets a reasonable basis under which the special assessment may be imposed.
• The true distinction between delegation of power to legislate and conferring of authority as to the execution of the law is that
the former involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter, the authority as to its execution has to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

Civil Liberties v. Exec. Secretary (2010) – stricter prohibition on the President’s official family against multiple offenses
FACTS:
• This case involves 2 consolidated petitions (CLU and the Anti-Graft League of the PH [AGLP]) seeking to declare
8
unconstitutional EO No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino.
• CLU and AGLP argue that the EO, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries
to hold other gov’t offices/positions, despite limitation under Art. VII, Sec. 13.
o Article VII, Sec 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
• Petitioners allege that the above constitutional provision prohibit the respondents, in this case all Cabinet secretaries, along
with other public officials from holding any other public office/employment during their tenure.
• In addition, AGLP seeks issuance of prohibition, mandamus and TRO to
o direct the cabinet secretaries to cease and desist from holding dual/multiple positions other than those
constitutionally authorized;
o from receiving any salaries/allowances/per diems/other forms of privileges connected to their questioned
positions; and
o compel the cabinet secretaries to return/reimburse/refund any/all amounts/benefits received.
• IMPT! AGLP specifically alleges that:
o Despite being “absolute and self-executing” provision (Art. VII, S13), Sec. of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez, in
9
construing AVII, S13 in relation to S7, par2, AIX-B of the Constitution, issued 1987 Opinion No. 73.
o The Opinion declares that Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries may hold other
public office, including membership in the boards of gov’t corp and enumerates the instances when this
10
is allowed.
• AGLP alleged that the Opinion and EO 284 “lumped together” the 2 constitutional provisions, each addressed to a distinct
and separate group of public officers:
o First group: President and her official family;
o Second group: public servants in general
• This “lumping together” is argued to have abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive, and mandatory constitutional
rank assigned to the prohibition against multiple jobs for the Pres, VP, Cabinet, and their deputies and subalterns.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants are concerned
admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials under Sec. 7, par 2, Art. IXB? – NO. Strict prohibition dapat.
• SC used statcon here, and looked into the intent of the framers.

8
Pertinent provisions state:
SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more
than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided,
that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
Chairman.
SECTION 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official of the Executive
Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of
the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary
position.
SECTION 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-
third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary."
9
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries
10
(a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio member of
the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or
(b) if allowed by law; or
(c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the President of the
Philippines, on July 25, 1987, or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987, promulgated Executive Order No. 284.

• Historically, practice of holding multiple offices/positions in the government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public
officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment.
o Particularly revolting in gov’t service were the data contained that Roberto V. Ongpin was a a member of 29
governmental agencies; Imelda Marcos of 23, Cesar Virata of 22, Arturo Tanco at 15, among others.
o Betrayal of public trust evolved during the Marcos regime.
o So the 1986 ConCom proposed provisions envisioned to remedy the evils that flow from holding of multiple gov’t
offices.
• Although Art IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against holding of multiple offices subsuming both elective and
appointive, the ConCom intended to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family, thus the
other provision Sec. 13, Art. VII.
Prohibition under Art IX-B Prohibition under Art VII (for President, VP etc)
Prohibition pertains to an office/employment in the gov’t or Prohibition pertains to “any other office/employment” à
GOCC/other subsidiaries ABSOLUTE disqualification; regardless if employment is “in the
government” (unlike in Art. IX-B) or not
Not imposed here Contains sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions: “They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”
General rule Exception as applied only to the President, VP, Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants
• The stricter prohibition is based on the fact that the President and members of his Cabinet exercise more powers, so more
checks and restraints on them are called for. (ConCom Vicente Foz)
• Given the difference above, the qualifying phrase in Sec 13: “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,” cannot
possibly refer to the broad exceptions under Art. IX-B.
• Such qualifying phrase must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances in the Constitution
itself:
o VP being appointed as a member of the Cabinet
o Or acting as President
o Secretary of Justice being an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
• Prohibition under Art. VII must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by Exec. Officials specified therein
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and required by the primary functions of their
office.
o These posts do not comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition.
• Given the strict prohibition against the President et al, the EO relaxing the prohibition is declared unconstitutional.

De la Cruz v. COA G.R. No. 138489 (2001) – alternates of cabinet member are also not entitled to additional compensation
FACTS:
• 20 petitioners were members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing Authority from 1991 – 1996
• On September 19, 1997, the COA issued Memorandum No. 970382
o Directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national government agencies and government owned and
controlled corporations which have effected payment of any form of additional compensation or remuneration to
cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple
positions, to
§ (a) immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation or remuneration given to and
received by the concerned officials, and
§ (b) effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in
the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary and AntiGraft League of the
Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al., promulgated on February 22, 1991.
o Memorandum also stated that the SC declared EO No. 284 unconstitutional
§ EO No. 284 – allowing Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other offices, in addition
to their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor.
• Following the Memorandum, NHA Resident Auditor Vasquez issued Notice of Disallowance No. 97 0110615
o disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and per diems of “Cabinet members who were the
exofficio members of the NHA Board of Directors and/or their respective alternates who actually received the
payments.”
• Petitioners appealed the COA’s Notice of Disallowance on the following grounds:
o Decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Union and AntiGraft League of the Philippines, Inc. was clarified
in the Resolution of the Court En Banc
§ Resolution: constitutional ban against dual or multiple positions applies only to the members of the
Cabinet, their deputies or assistants.
• It does not cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the
position of Assistant Secretary;
o The NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy positions
lower than the position of Assistant Secretary.
• COA denied appeal on the ground that:
o the Directors concerned were not sitting in the NHA Board in their own right but as representatives of cabinet
members and who are constitutionally prohibited from holding any other office or employment and receive
compensation therefor, during their tenure
o While the decision in Civil Liberties Union covered those positions of Assistant Secretary and above, and the
directorship positions petitioners occupied were below that of Assistant Secretary, these positions are derivative
§ they derive their authority as agents of the authority they are representing and their power and authority
is sourced from the power and authority of the cabinet members they are sitting for.
§ Therefore, if the principal (cabinet member) is absolutely barred from holding any position in and
absolutely prohibited from receiving any remuneration from the NHA or any government agency, for
that matter, so must the agent be.
ISSUES/HELD:
Are petitioners allowed to hold directorship positions in the NHA? – NO.
• Sec. 7 of PD 757 (Creating the NHA) mandates the following individuals to sit on the NHA Board:
o (1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications,
o (2) the Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority,
o (3) the Secretary of Finance,
o (4) the Secretary of Labor,
o (5) the Secretary of Industry,
o (6) the Executive Secretary, and
o (7) the General Manager of the NHA.
• Petitioners are alternates of the above officers. They are not the officers themselves.
• Civil Liberties and Anti-Graft League case interpreted Sec 13, Art. VII of the Constitution in the following manner:
o This prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment does not apply to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an exofficio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of said officials’ office.
§ These posts do not comprise ‘any other office’ within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition
§ They are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials
o The term exofficio means ‘from office; by virtue of office.’ It refers to an ‘authority derived from official character
merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.
o The exofficio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that
the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position.

§ These services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to the principal
office
• Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as exoficio members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving “extra
(additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism,” it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive such compensation.
• A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their principals.

Funa v. Ermita (2010) – in relation to Art. 9-B sec. 7
FACTS:
• PGMA appointed Maria Elena H. Bautista as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC).
• Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department.
• Following the resignation of then MARINA administrator Vicente Suazo Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer in Charge,
Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
• Dennis Funa filed the petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by
the prohibition on the President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any
other office or employment.
o He claims that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Usec. and MARINA OIC is in violation of Sec. 13, Art. 7
of the Constitution.
ISSUES/HELD:
Was Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC unconstitutional? – YES
• In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, a constitutional challenge was brought before the Court to nullify EO 284
issued by then Pres. Cory, which included Members of the Cabinet, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries in its
provisions limiting to 2 the positions that appointive officials of the Executive Department may hold in government and
government corporations.
o The EO was struck down as unconstitutional saying that it actually allows them to hold multiply offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13, Art. 7 of the Constitution prohibiting them
from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
o Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing, the disqualification
was held to be absolute, as the holding of any other office is not qualified by the phrase in the Government unlike
in Section 13 prohibiting Senators and Members of the House of Representatives from holding any other office
or employment in the Government.
o While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself.
o Sec. 7, Art. 9-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Sec. 13, Art. 7 is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the VP, Members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
• Bautista being then the appointed Usec. of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. 7
and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Sec. 7(2) of Art. 9-B where holding another office is allowed
by law or the primary functions of the position.
• Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties
Union.
• The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Sec. 13, Art. 7 was held inapplicable to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of said office.
o This is because these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.
• Bautista failed to demonstrate that her designation as OIC was in an ex officio capacity as required by the primary functions
of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
• MARINA was created by virtue of PD 474.
o Its management is vested in the Maritime Administrator, who shall be directly assisted by the Deputy Administrator
for Planning and a Deputy Administrator for Operations, who shall be appointed by the President for a term of 6
years.
o The Administrator shall be directly responsible to the Maritime Industry Board, MARINA’s governing body, and
shall have powers, functions and duties as provided in PD 474.
• With the creation of the DOTC, MARINA was attached to the DOTC for policy and program coordination in 1979.
• Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the Authority, it cannot be said that Bautista’s designation as
OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport.
• The DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board.
• Being just a designation, and temporary at that, Bautista was never really appointed as OIC Administrator of MARINA.
• While the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words hold the office were employed.
• Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties
and functions of the office.

• The Constitution, in prohibiting dual and multiple offices, as well as incompatible officers, refers to the holding of the office,
and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Sec. 13, Art. 7 nor in Sec.
7(2), Art. 9-B.
• To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and administration, which implies nothing
less than the actual discharge or the functions and duties of the office.
• The disqualification laid down in Sec. 13, Art. 7 is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically the President, VP, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
• Such practice during the Marcos regime led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme
for purposes of self-enrichment.

Espiritu v. Lutgarda (2014)
FACTS:
• This is primarily a case concerning the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Side issue lang yung main topic natin under
Consti which is the prohibition against holding another office/employment.
• In 1978, the City Council of Angeles City, Pampanga enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 13, classifying areas in Barangay
Margot and Sapang Bato as agricultural land.
o Pursuant to this, del Rosario requested the City Zoning Administrator that his lot be exempt from the zoning
classification.
o The request was approved and the lots were reclassified as nonagricultural or industrial lots.
• On June 10, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law was enacted.
• Del Rosario filed an application for exemption with the Department of Agrarian Reform, seeking to exempt his lots from the
CARP coverage.
o The Secretary of Agrarian Reform (Pagdanganan) granted the application. He held that the lands classified as
nonagricultural before the enactment of CARP are beyond its coverage.
• The farmers in del Rosario’s land, led by Espiritu, filed an MR of the order.
o They argue that under several zoning ordinances and city council resolutions of Angeles, the landholdings were
classified as agricultural and not industrial.
o That under the HLURB certification, the landholdings were within the agricultural zone and there was no zoning
ordinance reclassifying the same.
• The new Secretary of Agrarian Reform (Pangandaman) gave due course to the MR and revoked the earlier order.
• Del Rosario filed an MR alleging that:
o The order was sent to her house in Angelese City and not to the address on record which was in Cubao, QC.
o Note that the order of the secretary was on June 15, 2006 and del Rosario allegedly only received it on January
26, 2007, when the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer handed her a copy of the order.
• Pangandaman denied the motion.
• Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal before the Office of the President.
• OP, through the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Manuel Gaite, dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
• Del Rosario appealed to the CA on two grounds:
o She was denied due process when the order was sent to another address
o The decision of Gaite was void since he had been appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission two
months prior to the rendering of the decision.
• CA ruled in favor of del Rosario.
• Espiritu et.al (The farmers of the landholdings) filed a petition for review to set aside the CA decision on the ff. grounds:
o Del Rosario was not denied due process as she was able to actively participate in the proceedings before the
DAR and the OP.
o She was also not able to present proof that Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was not authorized to sign the
decision and, hence, his action is presumed to have been done in the regular performance of duty.
ISSUES/HELD:
Was del Rosario deprived of due process? – NO
• While it is true that she was prevented from filing a timely MR, the secretary still gave due course to the motion despite it
being filed late. It would be erroneous to conclude that she had been completely denied her opportunity to be heard.
• Where there is an opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due
process.
o In administrative proceedings, procedure due process has been recognized to include the ff:
§ (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent’s legal rights;
§ (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
§ (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
§ (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected
• When del Rosario filed her MR assailing the order, she was able to completely and exhaustively present her arguments.
Hence, she was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to present her side.
Is the decision of Executive Secretary Gaite valid, effective, and binding? – YES
• Under Article VII, Section 13: Section 13:

o The President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be

financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or -controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
• In this case, it is alleged that Gaite was appointed Commissioner to the SEC on March 16, 2009. So when he rendered the
decision on May 7, 2009, he already lost his authority as Deputy Executive Secretary since he is constitutionally prohibited
from holding two offices during his tenure.
o However, this is not conclusive since no evidence was presented as to (1) when he accepted the appointment,
(2) took his oath of office, or (3) assumed the position.
• Even assuming that Gaite’s appointment became effective on March 16, 2009, he can still be considered a de facto
officer at the time he rendered the decision.
o Using as basis the decision in Funa v. Agra, the SC held that assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer
of the OP after his appointment to the SEC, any decision he renders during this time is presumed to be
valid, binding, and effective.
§ In Funa v. Agra, a petition was filed against Alberto Agra for holding concurrent positions as acting
Secretary of Justice and as SolGen.
§ The SC, while ruling that the appointment violated Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution, held that
Agra was a de facto officer during his tenure in the DOJ.
§ A de facto officer is:
• One who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office
is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.
• He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under
color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular
or informal, so that the incumbent is a mere volunteer.
• Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes insofar as the
public or third persons who are interested are concerned.
§ In Funa, all the official actions of Agra as a de facto acting secretary of justice, were presumed valid,
binding and effective.
• Furthermore, with Gaite being a public officer, his acts enjoy the presumption of regularity which can only be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty which the respondent was not able to do.
NOTE: Will not go into the details of the landholding case. But the SC ruled that the landholdings were agricultural and not industrial.
It upheld the factual findings of the administrative agencies based on the certifications of the HLURB and their own ocular inspections,
finding that the area remained agricultural.

DOROMAL v. SANDIGANBAYAN (1989) – prohibited participation in a contract with the government; indirect interest)
FACTS:
• Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the PCGG was being investigated by for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of
the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic,
electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC).
• The Special Prosecution Officer Dionisio Caoili filed in the Sandiganbayan an information against the petitioner charging
that the DITC entered into a business transaction or contract with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the
National Manpower and Youth Council, which business, contracts or transactions [petitioner] is prohibited by law and the
constitution from having any interest.
• The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the "Tanodbayan" to file the
information without the approval of the Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
• In a Memorandum, the Ombudsman granted clearance but advised that "some changes be made in the information
previously filed."
• Complying with that Memorandum, a new information, approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan
alleging that Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the PCGG, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully,
participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the
President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted by the DECS and the NMYC, which act or participation
is prohibited by law and the constitution.
• Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash" the information for being:
o invalid because there had been no preliminary investigation which violates his right to due process
o defective because the facts alleged do not constitute the offense charged
• The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. Public respondent argues that another preliminary investigation is
unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter a violation of Section 3 (H) of R.A.
No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in relation to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUES/HELD:
Is a new preliminary investigation needed? YES.
• A new preliminary investigation of the charge against the petitioner is in order not only because the first was a nullity but
also because the accused demands it as his right.
• Moreover, the charge against him had been changed, as directed by the Ombudsman.
Does the prohibition under Article VII, Sec. 13 on  participation in a contract with the government include being a member of
a family corporation which has dealings with the government? –YES!
Should Doromal be charged for violating Art. VII, sec. 13? – YES!
• Petitioner insists that the information should be quashed  because the Special Prosecutor admitted in the Sandiganbayan
that he does not possess any document signed and/or submitted to the DECS by the petitioner after he became a PCGG
Commissioner.
o That admission allegedly belies the averment in the information that the petitioner "participated' in the business
of the DITC in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by law from having any interest. (Sec. 3-h, RA No.
3019).  
• SC: Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the presence of a signed document bearing the signature of accused Doromal
as part of the application to bid ... is not a sine qua non" (for, the Ombudsman indicated in his Memorandum/Clearance to
the Special Prosecutor, that the petitioner "can rightfully be charged ...with having participated in a business which act is
absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family corporation in
which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."  
o Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice- President, the members of the
Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any
business."  
o The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that
"Pursuit of private business ... without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a
ground for disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the civil service.  
Was Doromal validly suspended from office despite the President’s having previously approved his indefinite LOA “until
final decision” in this case? – He may be suspended but suspension cannot be indefinite.
• Since the petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid information with an offense punishable under the
Constitution and the laws (RA 3019 and PD 807), the law’s command that he “shall be suspended from office” pendente lite
must be obeyed. His approved leave of absence is not a bar to his preventive suspension for, as indicated by the Solicitor

General, an approved leave, whether it be for a fixed or indefinite period, may be cancelled or shortened at will by the
incumbent.
• However, Doromal’s preventive suspension has exceeded the reasonable maximum period of 90 days provided in Sec.42
of the Civil Service Decree of the Phils.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No.
12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the
result of such investigation. The preventive suspension of the petitioner is hereby lifted.

De Castro v. JBC (2010) – reversal of Valenzuela ruling
SECTION 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President within
ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
FACTS:
• This is a consolidation of 6 cases, having the same set of legal issues. This involves the appointment of the successor of
Puno for the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
• Chief Justice Reynato Puno was set for compulsory retirement on 17 May 2010.
th
o This was just days after the 2010 presidential elections on the 10 of May.
• Even before this event happened, it gave rise to many legal dilemmas, such as:
o Considering that Sec. 15, Art. 7 of the Constitution prohibits the President/Acting President from making
appointments w/in 2 months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, with
the exception of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety, may the incumbent President appoint the CJ successor?
o What is the relevance of Sec. 4(1), Art. 8 of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the SC shall be
filled w/in 90 days from the occurrence, to the matter of the appointment?
o May JBC resume the process of screening the candidates nominated or being considered to succeed CJ Puno,
and submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President even during the period of the prohibition under Sec.
15, Art. 7?
o Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?
• Petitioners
o De Castro and Peralta prays that JBC be compelled to submit to PGMA the list of at least 3 nominees for the
position of the next CJ.
o Soriano proposes to prevent the JBC from conducting its search and nomination proceedings.
o PHILCONSA wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees because the prohibition in Art. 7 of the Constitution only
applies to appointments in the Executive Department.
o Former SolGen Estelito Mendoza seeks a ruling from the SC for the guidance of the JBC on whether or not Sec.
15, Art. 7 applies to appointments in the Judiciary.
o Tolentino and Inting wants to enjoin JBC from submitting a list of nominees due to the prohibition under Sec. 15,
Art. 7.
• The main thrust of the petitions was an interpretation of the following provision:
o Under Sec. 4(1), Art. 8 of the Constitution, in relation to Sec. 9: “Vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.”
• December 2009, Cong. Matias Defensor, an ex-officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that
the process for nominations for CJ be commenced immediately.
• January 2010, the JBC issued the following resolution: 
o The JBC en banc unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of CJ to be vacated on 17 May
2010 upon the retirement of the CJ Puno.
o As to the time to submit the shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in the light of the Constitution, existing
laws and jurisprudence, the JBC welcomes and will consider all views on the matter. (In short, hindi rin alam ni
JBC kung kailan ibibigay yung shortlist)
• As a result, the JBC opened the position of JBC for application or recommendation, and published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer and Philippine Star.
o JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the 5 most senior of the Associate Justices of the
Court: Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Velasco (declined), and Nachura (declined).
o JBC also considered other persons for the position.
o A series of nominations, declinations, and withdrawals by the nominees happened.
• JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the candidates to invite the public to file their sworn
complaint, written report, or opposition to the candidates.  
• After all this, JBC is still not sure when to submit the shortlist to the President and the May 2010 elections was nearing.
ISSUE/HELD:
Does the prohibition under Sec. 15, Art. 7 not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the SC or to other Judiciary
appointments?–YES, the prohibition does not apply to SC or other judiciary appointments. (MAIN ISSUE)
First Point: Intent of the Framers of the Constitution

• Sec. 15, Art. 7 and Sec. 4(1), Art. 8 seem to conflict each other.
o Sec. 15, Art 7 - Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

o Sec. 4(1), Art 8 - The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
o SC tried to weigh both provisions and concluded that Sec. 4(1), Art. 8 is more important.
• SC held that the incumbent President CAN appoint the successor of CJ Puno upon his retirement on 17 May 2010 on the
ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Sec. 15, Art. 7 does not extend to Judiciary
appointments.
• Constitutional Commission deliberations reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging
the Constitution.
o The arrangement was a recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure.
o As Adolfo Azcuna explained that:  “We have in the political part of this Constitution opted for the separation of
powers in government because we believe that the only way to protect freedom and liberty is to separate and
divide the awesome powers of government. Hence, we return to the separation of powers doctrine and the
legislative, executive and judicial departments.”
o Article 7 is devoted to the Executive Department. It lists the powers vested to the President. The presidential
power of appointment is dealt with in Sec. 14-16.
o Article 8 is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the
Supreme Court, among others.
§ Sec. 4(1) mandates the President to fill the vacancy w/in 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
§ Sec. 9 states that the appointment of SC Justices can only be made by the President upon the
submission of a list of at least 3 nominees by the JBC.
o Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Sec. 15, Art. 7 to the appointment of Members of
the SC, they could have explicitly done so. They would have explicitly made the prohibition equally applicable to
the Judiciary appointments.
o SC held that the prohibition against the President/Acting President making appointments within 2 months before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term DOES NOT refer
to the Members of the Supreme Court.
• De Castro et al. cited the case of In Re: Valenzuela.
o In that case, SC held that the appointments made by the President on 2 RTC judges during the prohibition period
is VOID.
o Although Valenzuela case seem to hold that the prohibition covered judicial appointments, SC held that the
Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
o SC held that while Valenzuela referred to the intent of the Constitutional Commission, its reference to the records
did not support the final result.
o The records discloses the express intent of the framers “a command [to the President] to fill up any vacancy
therein w/in 90 days from its occurrence.” Valenzeula does not deny this.
• The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on further show that the filling of a vacancy in the SC
11
within the 90-day period was a true mandate for the President.
• SC held that the use of the word “shall” in Sec. 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment
of a Member of the Supreme Court w/in 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
o The failure to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.  
• SC reverses the Valenzuela case. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last
Second Point: The dangers surrounding the concept of “midnight appointment” are neutralized by the JBC.
• One of the reasons underlying the adoption of Sec. 15, Art. 7 was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by
an outgoing Chief Executive.  
• In Valenzuela, SC held that Sec. 15, Art. 7 is directed against 2 types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and
(2) those made for partisan considerations.
nd
o The 2 type (for partisan considerations) was dealt with in Aytona v. Castillo.
o In that case, Pres. Diosdado Macapagal defeated Pres. C.P. Garcia in the elections. Pres. Garcia issued 350
appointments in one night before the inauguration of President Macapagal was considered to be an abuse of
Presidential prerogative on the part of Pres. Garcia.
o EXCEPTION TO THE ABOVE RULE: SC recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions
which have to be made even after the proclamation of the new President.
o Such appointments, so long as they are “few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action
and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications,” can be
made by the outgoing President.

11
MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court, together with the Chief Justice, are only 11.  
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.  
MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection  reads: “Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
 occurrence thereof.”  
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.  
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the  vacancy?  
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that  in the past 30 years, seldom has the Court had a
complete  complement.

o Hence, several appointments by Pres. Garcia were still upheld to be valid.
• Sec. 15, Art. 7 has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling.
o It may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only “midnight” appointments but also appointments
presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential election.
o Whereas, the exception in the same Sec. 15 of Art. 7 is much narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The
exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
o In some instances, SC held that the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding
delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition. So it depends on the position.
• (IMPT) Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Sec. 15, Art. 7, SC held that the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department.
o The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to Judiciary appointments because the establishment of the
JBC and its nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions ensured that there would no longer be
midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
o If midnight appointments i were made in haste and with irregularities (i.e. Aytona case), or made by an outgoing
Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming
President, the Judiciary appointments would not invalid because of the JBC’s prior processing of candidates.
• SC held that thee intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the
purpose of buying votes, or of satisfying partisan considerations.
o SC held that this is because the nominees had to undergo the vetting of the JBC.
o JBC was created precisely to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission
on Appointments. This insulating process was absent in the Aytona case.
Third Point: Sec. 14 & 16 of Art 7 doesn’t apply to the Judiciary. So Sec. 15 shouldn’t apply too
• Sec. 14 and 16, Art. 7 provides for the appointing powers of the President.  
o Sec. 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments  made by an Acting President,
and evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It has no application to appointments in
the Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments can only undermine the independence of the Judiciary
due to their being revocable at will.  
o Sec. 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored requirement did not include appointments to the Judiciary.  
• Secs. 14-16 are obviously of the same character: the power of the President to appoint.
o The fact that Sec. 14 and Sec. 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive
that Sec. 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context.  
• SC held that it is absurd to assume that the framers placed Sec. 15 between Sec. 14 and Sec. 16, if they intended Sec. 15
to cover all kinds of presidential appointments.
Fourth Point: The wisdom of having the new President, instead of the incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice
is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence. This is because the appointee can also become beholden to the
appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising
judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.
Fifth Point: SC held that to uphold the ruling in Valenzuela that Sec. 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary will
undermine the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judiciary from the Executive and Legislative
Departments.
• Such reasoning will tie the whole Judiciary to the fortunes/misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a
presidential election.
Sixth Point: Some petitioners argue that there is no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition
period the successor of CJ Puno because anyway there will still be 45 days remaining out of the 90 days.
• SC held that this is untenable because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from CJ Puno’s retirement. It
ignores the need to apply Sec. 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the SC.
o Example: If the regular presidential elections are held on 8 May, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such
elections are held on 14 May, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer
than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the SC.
Seventh Point: SC can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President to appoint a Chief Justice
if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.
• Sec. 9, Art. 8 of the Constitution states that the Members of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President from a
list of at least 3 nominees.
o It clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the
Court aspiring to become one.
• Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief Justice (without JBC list)? The
question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend itself to a deeper analysis if and when circumstances
permit (and also a good thesis topic).

Is there a need to appoint a Chief Justice despite a provision in the Judiciary Act of 1948 which provides for Acting Chief
Justice?–YES, dapat may Chief Justice not an acting CJ!
SC held that an Acting Chief Justice was not intended by the framers.
• It has been argued that no urgency exists for the President to appoint the successor of CJ Puno, considering that the
Judiciary Act of 1948 addresses the situation of having the next President appoint the successor.
o Sec. 12 of which states that: In case of a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or of his
inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first
in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This
provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice.
• SC disagrees.
o With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed by the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment
is never in an acting capacity. No such “acting CJ” is found in the Constitution.
o Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the Constitution.
• In relation to the scheme of things under the present Constitution, Sec. 12 of the Judiciary Act only responds to a rare
situation in which the new CJ is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent CJ is unable to perform the duties and powers
of the office.
o This was enacted because the CJ appointed under the 1935 Constitution was subject to the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments, and the confirmation process might take longer than expected.
Is the JBC is mandated to submit the list of nominees to the President?—YES.
JBC MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO SUBMIT THE NAMES OF THE NOMINEES TO THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE
90-DAY PERIOD
• Sec. 4(1) and Sec. 9, Art. 8, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the SC w/in 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy, and w/in 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at
the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the
SC before the occurrence of the vacancy.  
• The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day
period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment.  
• The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President’s mandatory 90-day period to appoint is
ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the
discretion of the JBC.
• The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees
for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay
in performing that duty. So, there must be first an unexplained delay on the part of the JBC in its submission before
mandamus can be sought.

Government v. Springer (1927) – power to appoint as executive
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
FACTS:
• Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress.
o Under that act, the Governor-General (GG for short) was directed to subscribe to at least 51% of the capital of
NCC, but the government eventually owned 99% of the 30,000 outstanding stock. Only 19 shares were in the
names of private individuals.
• The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that:
o “The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President
of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
• In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the
Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC.
o The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the
government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs).
o A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.
• However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker,
notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board
of Directors of NCC.
• Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity
of their election into the Board of NCC
ISSUE/ HELD:
Does the power to appoint resides solely with the Executive? YES.
• While the Philippine Organic Act does not provide a general distributing clause, it is clearly deducible that there is a
distribution of powers among the Executive, Legislative and the Judiciary.
• It is beyond the power of any branch to exercise its functions in any way other than that provided under the Organic Law.
• The Organic Act vests the supreme executive power in the GG
o He is given general supervision and control of all departments and bureaus of the government
o He is also made responsible for the faithful execution of laws
o This was also enunciated in the Admin Code.
• The Organic Act vests the Philippine Legislature with general legislative power
o Legislative power refers to the power to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.
o However, while the legislature is only allowed to exercise legislative power, and not generally executive or judicial
powers, the legislature may nevertheless exercise auxiliary powers necessary and appropriate to its
independence and to make its express powers effective.
• And an independent judiciary completes the picture.
• Because of the separation of powers, the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no
authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.
Can the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC? NO. E.O. No 37 is
valid.
• It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers.

o The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with
designating the persons to fill the office.
o Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive.
• The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress.

o To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint
members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers.
• The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons
to fill public office.
o Thus, the only reference made to appointments by the Legislature relates to the selection of Secretaries of
Departments, of officers and employees for the Legislature, and of Resident Commissioners, from which it would
naturally be inferred that no other officers and employees may be chosen by it.
§ The exceptions made in favor of the Legislature strengthen rather than weaken the grant to the
executive.
§ The specific mention of the authority of the Legislature to name certain officers is indicative of a purpose
to limit the legislative authority in the matter of selecting officers.
§ The expression of one things not expressed. Had it been intended to give to the Philippine Legislature
the power to name individuals to fill the offices which it has created, the grant would have been included
among the legislative powers and not among the executive powers.
§ The administrative control of the Government of the Philippine Islands by the Governor-General to
whom is confided the responsibility of executing the laws excludes the idea of legislative control of
administration.
• The NCC, though on its face is a private corp., is actually a government agency
§ The government owns stocks of NCC, in order to insure proper governmental supervision
§ The government is the owner of the majority of the stock of NCC; thus, the govt naturally dominates
the management of NCC property
§ Being a stockholder, the government is justified in intervening in the transactions of the corporation,
and in protecting the corp’s property rights
§ The government also divested itself of its sovereign character when it comes to the transactions of the
corporation NCC was never created to be a private corporation
• Public funds were used to create the NCC, used to purchase stock
• The voting of the government stock is the prerogative of the stockholder, not the prerogative
of the corporation
• Among other corporations created by the Legislature, the majority stock of which is owned by the government, are: NCC;
PNB; National Petroleum Company; National Development Company; National Cement Company; National Iron Company,
etc
o In each of these instances, the Legislature directed that the majority stock should be purchased by the
government
o Likewise, in all these instances, the stock is to be voted by a committee or board of control, consisting of the GG,
Senate Pres and Speaker
o The power of the majority stockholders to vote the government stock carries with it the right to elect all directors,
to remove any or all of them, and to dissolve the corporation by voluntary proceedings.
o It must be noted that two of the members of the voting committee are members of the Legislative
o Thus, the Legislative somehow encroaches on the Executive’s responsibility in appointing and electing directors
But, is the court doing a violation of the legislative will by allowing the voting power be placed with the GG, until subsequent
legislation is enacted?
• Nope, no violation.
o The court may simply disregard the unconstitutional part of the statute, and read the statute as if the
unconstitutional part was never placed at all.
• But even if the entire provision is void, it is nevertheless the GG’s task, as the Executive, to protect public interests and
public property
o He is made responsible for the execution of laws, and if the govt agencies fail to function by inaction on his part,
then he would violate his duty
• The best interests of the Philippines would best be served by strict adherence to the basic principles of the Constitution

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the PH (SUPRA)
FACTS:
• Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes” was enacted.  
o Reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3)
years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections.  
o granted the President the power to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the
Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.”  
• SC issued a temporary restraining order
o enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153
o ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these cases not
be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.  
• ARMM History Time:
o On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic
Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.”
§ A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734,
thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
§ The initially assenting provinces were
• Lanao del Sur,
• Maguindanao,
• Sulu and
• Tawi-tawi.
§ RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not
earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
o RA No. 9054 (entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended”) was the next legislative act passed.
§ This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic
act, and
§ reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
o RA No. 9140 was passed on June 22, 2001.
§ This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26,
2001.
§ It set the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
o RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
§ The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date. 
o RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to
§ the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and
§ on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
§ Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
o Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
§ COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies
for the various regional offices to be elected.
o But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,
§ resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of
the country.
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections? – YES.
• Synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this
synchronization must include the ARMM elections.
• On this point, an existing law in fact already exists – RA No. 7166 – as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153.
• RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional elections.
• Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the exception of barangay and Sanggunian
Kabataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already
reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express constitutional recognition.
Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate Art. VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution? – NO.

• In the Tolentino ruling, the SC ruled that the President’s certification of the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement. (Sec. 26(2)
Art. VI) 
Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
– NO.
• Neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.

• As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and
does not fix the date of the regular elections.
• A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting
RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153.
Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section
16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws? – YES.
• Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a “majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.”
o In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,
these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session.
o Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
• In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two- thirds (2/3) of the Members of the
House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054.
o Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and
served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.
• Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires
on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators’ room for
action and flexibility.
Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution? – YES.
• Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions
and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions.
• While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite requirement in order to
become effective,
o questions on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seemingly
general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to be required
for every statutory amendment.
Does RA No. 10153 violate the autonomy granted to the ARMM? – NO.
• Synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this
synchronization must include the ARMM elections.
o To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections
(which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and
local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
• During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem:
o to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1),
Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office;
§ However, this is unconstitutional since it is an act of Congress that extends the term of the officials.
o to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or
§ But, COMELEC cannot conduct special elections and Congress would shorten the terms of those
elected from such special election if they pass a law calling for such.
o to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office.
§ Congress correctly chose this option.
• The limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of
governance – both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 – will not systemically be touched nor
affected at all.
o To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect
in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that synchronization of
elections requires.
• Finally, on the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, SC reiterates the established rule that every statute is
presumed valid.
o Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity
of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption.

Velicaria-Garafil v. Venturanza (2015) – revocation of GMA appointments
Congress.
FACTS:
• Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments to
various positions in several government offices.
o The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
• Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cut-off date for valid appointments and the next day, 11
March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments.
o Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments
only “temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.”
o None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.
• Summary of appointments:
Date of Appointment Date of Transmittal Date of Receipt by Date of Oath of Assumption of

G.R. No.
Letter Letter MRO Office Office
203372
(Atty. Velicaria- Garafil) 5 March 2010 8 March 2010 13 May 2010 22 March 2010 6 April 2010
206290
(Atty. Venturanza) 23 February 2010 9 March 2010 12 March 2010 15 March 2010 15 March 2010
209138
(Villanueva) 3 March 2010 4 May 2010 13 April 2010
209138
(Rosquita) 5 March 2010 13 May 2010 18 March 2010
212030 25 March 2010 and 6

(Atty. Tamondong) 1 March 2010 July 2010
• Issuance of EO 2 - On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments
issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments (refer to case for
whole text of the E.O.)
• E.O. No. 2 defined midnight appointments as:
• “SECTION 1. Midnight Appointments Defined. – The following appointments made by the former President and other
appointing authorities in departments, agencies, offices, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered as midnight appointments:
• Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all appointments bearing dates prior to March 11, 2010 where the
appointee has accepted, or taken his oath, or assumed public office on or after March 11, 2010, except temporary
appointments in the executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety
as may be determined by the appointing authority.”
• On 6 August 2010, Sol. Gen. Cadiz instructed a Senior Assistant Solicitor General to inform the officers and employees
affected by EO 2 that they were terminated from service effective the next day.
• The present consolidated cases involve four petitions:

1. G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-Garafil), who was appointed State Solicitor II at the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as petitioner;
2. G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (Atty. Venturanza), who was appointed Prosecutor IV (City Prosecutor)
of Quezon City, as petitioner;
3. G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva (Villanueva), who was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of
Administrators of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), and Francisca B. Rosquita (Rosquita), who was appointed
Commissioner of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as petitioners; and
4. G.R. No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong), who was appointed member of the Board of
Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), as petitioner.
• All petitions question the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2) for being inconsistent with Section 15, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE/ HELD:
Does petitioners’ appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution? YES.
• None of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal letters) have been issued (and released)
before the ban.”
• The dates of receipt by the MRO, which in these cases are the only reliable evidence of actual transmittal of the appointment
papers by President Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during the appointment ban.
• Thus, this ponencia and the dissent both agree that all the appointments in these cases are midnight appointments in
violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Is E.O. 2 Constitutional? YES.
• Aytona v. Castillo is the basis for Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Aytona defined “midnight or last minute”
appointments for Philippine jurisprudence.
o President Carlos P. Garcia submitted on 29 December 1961, his last day in office, 350 appointments, including
that of Dominador R. Aytona for Central Bank Governor.
o President Diosdado P. Macapagal assumed office on 30 December 1961, and issued on 31 December 1961
Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all appointments made by President Garcia after
13 December 1961 (President Macapagal’s proclamation date).
o President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as Central Bank Governor on 1 January 1962.
o This Court dismissed Aytona’s quo warranto proceeding against Castillo, and upheld Administrative Order No.
2’s cancellation of the “midnight or last minute” appointments.
• During the deliberations for the 1987 Constitution, then Constitutional Commissioner (now retired Supreme Court Chief
Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. referred to this Court’s ruling in Aytona and stated that his proposal seeks to prevent a
President, whose term is about to end, from preempting his successor by appointing his own people to sensitive positions.
• The 1986 Constitutional Commission put a definite period, or an empirical value, on Aytona’s intangible “stratagem to beat
the deadline,” and also on the act of “preempting the President’s successor,” which shows a lack of “good faith, morality
and propriety.”
o Subject to only one exception, appointments made during this period are thus automatically prohibited under the
Constitution, regardless of the appointee’s qualifications or even of the President’s motives.
o The period for prohibited appointments covers two months before the elections until the end of the President’s
term.
o The Constitution, with a specific exception, ended the President’s power to appoint “two months immediately
before the next presidential elections.”
o For an appointment to be valid, it must be made outside of the prohibited period or, failing that, fall under
the specified exception.
• The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and
effective) appointment:
o authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;
o transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;
o a vacant position at the time of appointment; and
o receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
§ The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is
made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment
process should always concur and operate as a single process.
o There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step.
§ And, unlike the dissent’s proposal, there is no need to further distinguish between an effective and an
ineffective appointment when an appointment is valid.

On Appointment Power:
• Appointing Authority.
o The President’s exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws.
§ Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of appointment.
o In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court we held: The power to appoint is, in
essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to
his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power
• Transmittal.
o It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the President
intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper may be dated and
signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of
his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President’s
intent of its issuance.
o The MRO was created by Memorandum Order No. 1, Series of 1958, Governing the Organization and Functions
of the Executive Office and General Matters of Procedure Therein. Initially called the Records Division, the MRO
functioned as an administrative unit of the Executive Office
o For purposes of verification of the appointment paper’s existence and authenticity, the appointment paper must
bear the security marks (i.e., handwritten signature of the President, bar code, etc.) and must be accompanied
by a transmittal letter from the MRO.
o The MRO’s exercise of its mandate does not prohibit the President or the Executive Secretary from giving the
appointment paper directly to the appointee. However, a problem may arise if an appointment paper is not coursed
through the MRO and the appointment paper is lost or the appointment is questioned. The appointee would then
have to prove that the appointment paper was directly given to him.
o Based on the testimony of Ellenita G. Gatbunton, Division Chief of File Maintenance and Retrieval Division of the
MRO, the transmittal of petitioners’ appointment papers is questionable.
§ (Note: The Q&A here on the conduct of the transmittals follow for the different petitioners)
§ Q: In the case of Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil, who was appointed as State Solicitor II of the Office of the
Solicitor General, was her appointment paper released through the MRO?
§ A: No. Her appointment paper dated March 5, 2010, with its corresponding transmittal letter, was merely
turned over to the MRO on May 13, 2010. The transmittal letter that was turned over to the MRO was
already stamped “released” by the Office of the Executive Secretary, but the date and time as to when
it was actually received were unusually left blank.
§ The possession of the original appointment paper is not indispensable to authorize an appointee to
assume office. If it were indispensable, then a loss of the original appointment paper, which could be
brought about by negligence, accident, fraud, fire or theft, corresponds to a loss of the office.56
However, in case of loss of the original appointment paper, the appointment must be evidenced by a
certified true copy issued by the proper office, in this case the MRO.
• Vacant Position.
o An appointment can be made only to a vacant office. An appointment cannot be made to an occupied office. The
incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly terminated, before one could be validly
installed to succeed him.

Pimentel v. Ermita (2005) – acting secretaries
FACTS:
• Case seeking to declare unconstitutional the appointments by PGMA through ES Ermita.

• July 26, 2004: regular session of the Senate and House commenced.
• August 25: Commission on Appointments was constituted.
• PGMA issued the following appointments, the appointees (Yap et al) instructed to be “acting secretary vice (name of person
replaced)”:
Appointee Department
Arthur C. Yap Agriculture
Alberto G. Romulo Foreign Affairs
Raul M. Gonzalez Justice
Florencio B. Abad Education
Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. National Defense
Rene C. Villa Agrarian Reform
Joseph H. Durano Tourism
Michael T. Defensor Environment and Natural Resources
• All took their oath and assumed duties as acting secretaries.
• September 8: Senators Pimentel, Angara, Enrile, Ejercito-Estradao, Estrada, Lacson, Lim, Madrigal, and Osmena filed the
present petition.
o They argue that “in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be
designated as Acting Secretary
o They base their argument on Sec 1, Chap 2, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.
o Paragraph 5 of the said provision provides that the Undersecretary shall:
§ Temporarily discharge the duties of the Secretary in the latter's absence or inability to discharge his
duties for any cause or in case of vacancy of the said office, unless otherwise provided by law. Where
there are more than one Undersecretary, the Secretary shall allocate the foregoing powers and duties
among them. The President shall likewise make the temporary designation of Acting Secretary from
among them.
o They further assert that there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting while Congress is in session,
without CoA’s confirmation.
• Yap et al argues that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to dept. secretaries without CoA
confirmation, and point to AVII, S16 of the Consti and the 1987 Administrative Code
o The Admin Code also provides that the President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided
for the Constitution;
o That the President may temporarily designate an officer already in the gov’t service/any other competent person
to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when:
(a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any
12
other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy.
• Congress adjourned in September 22, and PGMA issued ad interim appointments to Yap et al as secretaries to the
departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
ISSUES/HELD:
(MAIN ISSUE) Is PGMA’s appointment of Yap et al as acting secretaries constitutional without the consent of the CoA while
Congress is in session? – YES
• Power to appoint expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment.
o To reiterate Yap et al’s argument invoking the 1987 Admin Code (Section 17, Chap 5, Title I, Book III):
o "[t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch."
• Essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature.
o It’s a “stop-gap measure” intended to fill an office for a limited time until appointment of a permanent occupant to
the office

12
Succeeding provisions under same Section:
(2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position, unless he is already in the government
service in which case he shall receive only such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the
salary authorized by law for the position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of the funds
appropriated for the office or agency concerned.
(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.

• In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary,
the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her office could assume office.
• At the same time, Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically
the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego.
o An alter ego, whether temporary/permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence
o Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego
should be, who she should give her “great trust and confidence”
• Office of a department may also become vacant while Congress is in session, so the President can exercise the appointment
• Pimentel et al claim that Section 17 above under the Admin Code does not apply to appointments vested in the President
by the Constitution, because it only applies to appointments vested by law.
o BUT source of “law” is not only Congress
o “Law” includes municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, judicial decisions, and of
course, the Constitution.
• Further, Pimentel et al claim that the appointment is susceptible to abuse
o But the acting appointments cannot exceed one year, as per the Admin Code
• Note the difference between ad interim appointments vs. appointments in an acting capacity.
Ad interim Acting capacity
Both effective upon acceptance
Extended only during a recess of Congress May be extended any time there is a vacancy
Submitted to the CoA for confirmation/rejection Not submitted to CoA
A way of temporarily filling important offices, but if abused, may
be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the CoA
• Here, the Court did not find abuse.
o Apparent from PGMA’s issuance of ad interim appointments to Yap et al immediately upon recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year.
(Sub-issue) Is the petition moot? – Yes, but it doesn’t bar review
• Moot because PGMA had already extended ad interim appointments to Yap et al, after recess of Congress.
• However, courts will decide a moot question if capable of repetition yet evading review.
• Question of constitutionality of the President’s appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress
is in session will arise in every such appointment.
(Sub-issue) Do Pimentel et al have standing – only Senators Enrile (as Minority Floor Leader), Lacson (asst. Minority Floor
Leader), Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmena have standing
• SC says that since the CoA is an independent body from Congress, it is error for all to have standing as members of
Congress
• Only Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercity-Estrada, and Osmena are members of the COA, thus only they have standing.
Note:
• Nature of power to appoint is executive in nature
• Even if CoA is composed of members of the Legislative, its powers is executive, and it does not legislative when
it exercises its power to give/withhold consent to appointments.
o Its power is from the Constitution, not from Congress.
o Not an agent of Congress; functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature.

st rd
Sarmiento III v. Mison 156 SCRA 549 (1987) – 1 sentence – enumeration is limited, 3 sentence – use of the word “alone”
as mere lapse; head of bureau; no CA confirmation
FACTS:
• Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs,
o on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason
of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
• Mison’s arguments: maintain the constitutionality of his appointment
ISSUES/HELD:
Some preliminaries
• A reading of Sec. 16, Art. VII shows that there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1. the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution
2. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
3. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
4. officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
• First group of officers must clearly be appointed with consent of the CA
•
nd rd
It is the 2 and 3 group that presents the bone of the contention
nd rd
Must the CA consent to the appointments of the officers under the 2 and 3 group? – NO.
• By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes
others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
• SC looked at the historical development of the provision across constitutions:
o 1935 Constitution: Almost all presidential appointments required the consent of the CA
§ This transformed the commission, many times, into a venue of “horse-trading”
o 1973 Constitution: the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the
legislature.
• Given this history with the two extremes, the 1987 Constitution sought to strike the middle ground by requiring the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without
such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth
group,
• SC discussion on the Deliberations on Sec 16, Art VII
o The original text of the section was an almost verbatim copy of its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution
o Over the course of the debates, 2 major changes were proposed and approved by the Commission:
§ exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments
§ exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence of the section from the same requirement
o It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President
without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
• Amicus curie, Senator Neptali Gonzales, argues that the second sentence, with its particular reference to the word “also”
implies that the President shall "in like manner" appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence.
o In other words, the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner
as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent (confirmation)
of the Commission on Appointments.
o SC: Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive of the
conclusion he arrives at.
§ Word “also” can mean “in addition, as well, besides, too”
§ This says that the word "also" in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to
nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers
enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint, without such consent (confirmation) the officers
mentioned in the second sentence.
• Furthermore, the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments,
o whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President.
o this use of different language in two (2) sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message
conveyed and perceptions established,
§ in line with Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition"
o more so, because the recorded proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission clearly and expressly justify
such differences.

• This is why the appointment of Central Bank Governor requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even
if he is higher in rank than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
• Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character.
o Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed against them.
o Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.
o But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President
to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
th
Does the CA need to confirm the appointments of the 4 group of appointments? –
• Intervenor CA underscores the third sentence of Sec 16

o "The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards."
o CA argues that since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lowerranked officers in the President alone, this
implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
o And if this is so in lower-ranked officers, it follows that higherranked officers should be appointed by the President,
subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
• Respodents argue that:
o The above-quoted sentence merely declares that, as to lowerranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their
appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word' 'alone'' in said third
sentence.
• SC not impressed by either argument
o the use of the word "alone" after the word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is,
more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship.
• The 1935 Constitution subjected presidential appointments to confirmation by the CA as a general rule, the same 1935
Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception to the rule to provide that Congress may, however, vest the appointment of
inferior officers (“officers lower in rank” referred to by the 1987 Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments
• In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude
presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII.
o Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the
word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lowerranked officers in the
President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he
(the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
o Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of lowerranked
officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various
departments of the government.
o In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import
from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of
the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII.
o this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that
presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Was Mison’s appointment constitutional? – YES.
• it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first
group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.
• Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs through R.A.
No. 1937 and PD No. 34
o These laws have to be read in harmony with Sec 16, Art. VII
o Result: while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the
President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

st
Bautista v. Salonga (1989) – 1 sentence – “other officers” whose appointments are vested in the President; CHR Chair; CA
Confirmation
FACTS:
• [N.B. Jovito Salonga was the Senate President during this time. Hence, he was the Chairman of the CA.]
• In 1987, President Cory designated Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights.
• In 1988, Pres. Cory extended to Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the CHR.
• By virtue of such appointment, Bautista was advised by the President that she could qualify and enter upon the performance
of the duties and of the office of Chairman of the CHR, requiring her to furnish the office of the President and the CSC with
copies of her oath of office.
• Immediately after taking her oath of office as Chairman of the CHR, Bautista discharged the functions and duties of the
Office of the Chairman of the CHR, which she had originally held merely in an acting capacity.
• In 1989, Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CA) requesting her to submit to
the CA certain information and documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment
as Chairman of the CHR.
• Another letter was sent requesting Bautista’s presence at a meeting for the CA Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar
Council and Human Rights that would deliberate on her appointment as Chairman of the CHR.
• Bautista wrote to the Chairman of the CA stating that since the Constitution excluded the CHR from the enumeration of
constitutional commissions subject to its confirmation, the CA did not have jurisdiction to review her appointment as
Chairman of the CHR.
• Apparently also, the CA had disapproved the appointment of Bautista on January 14, 1989 as ad interim Chairman of the
CHR.
• And even before the CA could act on her ad interim appointment as Chairman of the CHR, Bautista had already filed with
the Court this petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order.
• The Commission on Appointments contends that granting that Bautista’s appointment as Chairman of the CHR is one that
under Sec. 16 of Art. 7 is solely for the President to make, it is within the president’s prerogative to voluntarily submit such
appointment to the CA for confirmation.
ISSUES/HELD:
Can the CA require Bautista to submit her appointment for confirmation? – NO
• Neither the Executive nor the Legislative can create power where the Constitution confers none.
• To the extent that the Constitution as blocked off certain appointments for the President to make with the participation of
the CA, so also has the Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in the Commission
over other appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution.
• Nor can the CA, by the actual exercise of the its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential appointments, create
power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
• When the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the President to make without the participation of the
CA, the executive’s voluntary act of submitting such appointment to the CA and the latter’s act of confirming or rejecting the
same, are done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
• Even if the president may voluntarily submit to the CA an appointment that under the Constitution solely belongs to her,
there was no vacancy to which an appointment could be made on January 14, 1989.
• When the President appointed Bautista in 1988 to the position Chairman with the advice to her that by virtue of such
appointment (not, until confirmed by the CA), she could qualify and enter upon the performance of her duties after taking
her oath of office, the presidential act of appointment to the subject position, which, under the Constitution, is to be made
without participation of the Commission, was then and there a complete and finished act.
• Upon acceptance of Bautista, as shown by her taking of the oath of office and actual assumption of the duties of said office,
she was installed indubitably and unequivocally as the lawful Chairman of the CHR for a term of 7 years.
• There was thus no vacancy in the subject office on January 14, 1989 to which an appointment could be validly made.
• It cannot be contended as well that the new appointment or re-appointment on January 14, 1989 was an ad interim
appointment because, under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the
President to make, i.e. without the participation of the CA.
• Ad interim appointments, by their very nature, extend only to appointments where the review of the CA is needed.
o That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment
of Congress.
o But appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
Does the Chairman of the CHR enjoy security of tenure? – YES, for a period of 7 years.
• Tenure in office should not be confused with term of office.

• The distinction is important because, pursuant to the Constitution, no officer of employee in the Civil Service may be
removed or suspended except for cause, as provided by law.

o This fundamental principle would be defeated if Congress could legally make the tenure of some officials
dependent upon the pleasure of the President, by clothing the latter with blanket authority to replace a public
officer before the expiration of his term.
• When EO 163 was issued, the evident purpose was to comply with the constitutional provision that “the term of office and
other qualifications and disabilities of the members of the CHR shall be provided by law.”
• As the term of office of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is 7 years, without reappointment, as provided by EO 163,
and consistent with the constitutional design to give the CHR the needed independence to perform and accomplish its
functions and duties, the tenure in office of said Chairman and Members cannot be later made dependent upon the pleasure
of the President.
• Bautista can be removed before the expiration of her 7 year term except for cause.

st
Quintos-Deles v. CA (1989) – 1 sentence – “other officers” whose appointments are vested in the President; sectoral
representative; CA confirmation
FACTS:
• On April 6, 1988, Petitioner Quintos-Deles and three others (Lopez, Arteche and Teves) were appointed sectoral
representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, Par. 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution
(See held for full quote of sections):
o Teresita Quintos-Teves – Women
o Al Ignatius Lopez – Youth
o Bartolome Arteche – Peasant
o Rey Magno Teves – Urban Poor
• The petitioner and other representative-appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties due to the
opposition of members of the Commission on Appointments.
o They insist that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could
take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives.
o This opposition compelled Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. to suspend the oathtaking of the four sectoral
representatives.
• The appointments were submitted to the Commission of Appointments.
o The Committee ruled against the position of Petitioner Deles.
• Deles comes before the SC arguing that:
o Her appointment as Sectoral Representative for Women by the President pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of
the Constitution, does not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to qualify her to take her seat
in the House of Representatives.
ISSUE/HELD:
Does the Constitution require the appointment of sectoral representatives to be confirmed by the Commission of
Appointments? – YES
• Relevant articles/provisions:
o Section (2), Article VI:
§ The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
o Section 7, Article XVIII:
§ Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective
sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this
Constitution.
o Section 16, Article VII:
§ The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may,
by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads
§ The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
• In the cases of Sarmiento v. Mison and Bautista v. Salonga – The SC held that only appointments to offices mentioned in
the first sentence of the said Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. (no conflict
with this case, it just qualified the previous cases)
• In this case, since the seats reserved for the sectoral reps may be filled by the President upon express provision
under Section 7, Art. XVIII, sectoral reps are then considered as those among the “other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution” whose appointments are subject to confirmation.
o While the court recognizes that there are appointments vested in the President which required no confirmation
(such as the members of the SC and judges of lowers courts, the OMB and his deputies etc) no such exemption
was extended to sectoral representatives.
• The ff. show that the appointment of the sectoral reps. Are vested in the President:
o Invocation of Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7, of the Constitution.
o The appointment of Deles was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, par. 2. This reference as additional authority
for the appointment is important to the case at bar.
§ The appointment was made during the recess of Congress hence the reference.
§ The invocation of the paragraph recognizes the President as the appointing authority which requires
confirmation.

nd
POBRE v. MENDIETA (1993) – 2 sentence – “those whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint”; PRC
Commissioner; no CA confirmation.
ARTICLE VII, Sec. 16. “The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.”
FACTS:
• This case clarifies that the President is empowered by the Constitution to appoint the heads of bureaus and offices; and
that the that every vacancy in the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) is filled by “succession” or “by operation of
law” because that would deprive the President of his power to appoint.
• Hermogenes Pobre filed this petition to set aside the decision and writ of prohibitory injunction issued by Judge Somera.
The decision annulled Pobre’s appointment by Pres. Cory as Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC and enjoined him from
discharging the functions of that office.
• Background:
o January 2, 1992 – Hon. Julio B. Francia’s term as PRC Comm/Chairman expired.
nd
o At that time, respondent Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Pobre was only 2
Associate of the PRC.
o January 6 – Executive Secretary Drilon sought opinion of Acting DOJ Secretary Silvestre Bello on whether the
President’s power to appoint the Commissioner of the PRC is restricted by the sec.2 of PD 223: “x x x any vacancy
in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most senior of the Associate Commissioners
succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal.
o Bello answered in the negative, because such interpretation would amount to a usurpation by the legislature of a
power which belongs to the Executive. – thus, Pres. Cory appointed Pobre as PRC Comm/Chairman.
o Feb. 17 – Pobre took his oath
• Before Pobre’s appointment, Mendieta filed a petition for declaratory relief. He claimed that as the senior Associate
Commissioner, he (Mendieta) was legally entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC.
o Judge Somera ruled in favor of Mendieta: “The unexpired portion emphasized under P.D. 223 merely pertains to
that of the Associate Commissioner’s term and has precisely nothing to do with the term of office of the
Commissioner.”
ISSUES/HELD:
What is the proper construction of the provision in sec.2 of PD 223 that “x x x any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled
for the unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the
expiration of his term, resignation or removal”? – [To answer this, SC had to consider the provision of the Constitution
vesting the power of appointment in the President of the Philippines.]
• Section 10, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973 (per Proclamation No. 1102) was the
source of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos’ authority to issue P.D. No. 223 on June 22, 1973, because under that
constitutional provision, the President was empowered to “appoint the heads of bureaus and offices.”
o Section 10, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution was modified by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
• The chairman of the PRC is the head of an office.
• SC holds that the succession clause operates only when there is an “unexpired term” of the Chairman/Commissioner to be
served.
o Otherwise, if the Chairman’s term had expired or been fully served, the vacancy must be filled by appointment of
a new chairman by the President.
• SC finds unacceptable the view that every vacancy in the Commission (except the position of “junior” Associate
Commissioner) shall be filled by “succession” or by “operation of law” for that would deprive the President of his power to
appoint a new PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners.
o The absurd result would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise his appointing power would be
when the position of junior (or second) Associate Commissioner becomes vacant.
• Since the appointment of the petitioner as PRC Chairman/Commissioner to succeed Julio B. Francia, Jr. at the expiration
of his term did not violate any provision of P.D. No. 223 and in fact conforms with the Chief Executive’s interpretation and
implementation of the law, the legality of said appointment should be upheld.

nd
Flores v. Drilon (1993) – 2 sentence – “all other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint”; SBMA chair and the Mayor of Olongapo City.
ARTICLE VII: The Executive Department: Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.
He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
FACTS:
• This case involves the constitutionality of Sec. 13(d) of R.A. 7227 or the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992”
(BCDA Act). The provision states that:
o (d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic
Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget,
who shall be the ex-officio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority: Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority.
o The main focus is on the proviso.
• Flores et al. are (1) taxpayers, (2) employees of the U.S. Facility in Subic, and (3) officers of the Filipino Civilian Employees
Association.
o Richard Gordon, the Mayor of Olongapo and appointed Chairman and Chief Executive of Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA). Drilon as Executive Secretary.
• Flores contend the unconstitutionality of the provision because they go against the ff:
o Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution provides that "the President shall… appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint.” (Syllabus topic)
o Sec. 7(1), Art. 9-B, of the Constitution states that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure.”  
o Sec. 261(g), of the Omnibus Election Code [Prohibited Acts] - "The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:…(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases xxx"
for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive
Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.  
• Basically, the provision in the BCDA appoints someone to be the Chairman of the SBMA. Petitioners contend that (1) this
legislative act encroaches upon the appointing power of the President, (2) allows an elective official to hold another public
position; and 3) violates the Omnibus Elections Code.
ISSUE/HELD:
Does the BCDA provision violate the constitutional provision against appointment of elective officials to other government
posts by the President?—YES, the appointment of the Gordon under the BCDA Act is unconstitutional.
• The provision directs the President to appoint an elective official (Mayor of Olongapo City) to other government posts (as
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA).
o This is precisely what the constitutional provision seeks to prevent.
13
o SC held that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7(1), Art. 9-B, of the Constitution.
nd
o The 2 paragraph of Sec. 7(1), Art. 9-B authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when
st
allowed, the 1 paragraph is more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post.
o Except when the Constitution provides otherwise (i.e. President as head of the economic and planning agency;
the Vice-President can be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated
ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council)
o SC cited constitutional deliberation to emphasize the distinction. Thus, the second paragraph cannot be extended
to elective officials.  

13
Art. IX-B, Sec. 7: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

• SC also held that Sec. 94 of the LGC permits the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his office.  
o However, Sec. 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13(d) of the BCDA Act. This is
because no legislative act can prevail over the Constitution.
o Moreover, since the validity of Sec. 94 of LGC is not an issue here, SC did not rule on its validity.
• Gordon argues that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio:
o SC held that Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as ex-officio or automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City w/o need of appointment.
o The phrase "shall be appointed" shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to
the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
• On the issue of legislative encroachment of the appointing authority of the president:
o SC held that an “appointment” is the designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority, to
discharge the duties of some office or selection/designation of a person, to fill an office or public function and
discharge the  duties of the same.  
o SC also held that the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.
o Appointment  involves an exercise of discretion on whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial  act of issuing
appointment papers to the appointee.  
o Based on the deliberations, Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee  for the
first year of the effectivity of the BCDA Act. The proviso limits the appointing authority to only one option: the
incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City.
o Since only one can qualify, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose. The power of
appointment with no power to choose is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment
whom to appoint.  
• SC held that as long as Gordon is an incumbent and an elective official, he remains ineligible for appointment to another
public office.
o When an incumbent elective official was appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit
his elective office nor remove the ineligibility found in the Constitution.
o On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or
designation is invalid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility.
• On Gordon as a de facto officer: He is ineligible for appointment to be the Chairman of the SBMA.
o However, he remains to be the Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null
and void.
• SC held Sec. 13(d) of the BCDA Act unconstitutional and the appointment of Gordon is invalid.
o However, as the de facto officer, his acts remain valid, as well as his allowances and emoluments received by
virtue of the position.

nd
Rufino v. Endriga (2006) – 2 sentence – “whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law”
(edited A2015)
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
FACTS:
• This quo warranto revolves on who between the contending groups, both claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board,
has the legal right to hold office.
• President Marcos issued EO No. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of
Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture.
• After Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15, the CCP's charter, which increased CCP's Board from 7 to 11 trustees.
• After the People Power Revolution, then President Cory asked the incumbent trustees to resign and appointed new ones.
• During the term of President Ramos, the CCP Board included the Endriga group.
• During his term, President Erap appointed 7 new trustees (Rufino Group) to the CCP Board to replace the Endriga group.
• The Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before the SC questioning President Erap’s appointment of the 7 new
members. They argue:
o Under Section 6(b) of PD 15 --- Vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of
the trustees held at the next regular meeting.
o It is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting
in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
o When President Erap appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa's
term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees:
§ Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, together with Cabili, Perez, De los Angeles, Lazaro, and Angara
§ President Estrada retained Fr. Perez, De los Angeles, Lazaro, and Angara as trustees.
o Under the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed 4-year term could only be terminated "by reason of resignation,
incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential action was neither necessary nor justified since the CCP Board
then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to fill by election any vacancy in the Board.
o The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President. The
Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation"
• SCàreferred the case to the CA "for appropriate action" in observance of the hierarchy of courts.
• CA à granted the quo warranto petition.
o Declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees.
o In their MR, the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint
officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board.
o CA denied Rufino group’s MR.
o CA also denied Endriga group’s motion for immediate execution.
• Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
• While the case was pending, the Rufino group tendered their resignations so PGMA appointed new trustees. However, the
SC found it necessary to rule on the merits to settle future controversies.
• *Interpreting Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
• At the heart of the controversy is Section 6(b) of PD 15, as amended, which reads:
Board of Trustees. — The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in, and exercised by, a Board
of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without compensation.
xxxx
(b) Vacancies in the Board of Trustees due to termination of term, resignation, incapacity, death or other cause as may be
provided in the By-laws, shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular
meeting following occurrence of such vacancy. The elected trustee shall then hold office for a complete term of four
years unless sooner terminated by reason of resignation, incapacity, death or other cause. Should only one trustee survive,
the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the Center. Such
officers shall be designated in the Center's Code of By-Laws. Should for any reason the Board be left entirely vacant, the
same shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the aforementioned ranking officers of the
Center. (Emphasis supplied)
• Inextricably related to Section 6(b) is Section 6(c) which limits the terms of the trustees, as follows:
(c) No person may serve as trustee who is not a resident of the Philippines, of good moral standing in the community and
at least 25 years of age: Provided, That there shall always be a majority of the trustees who are citizens of the Philippines.
Trustees may not be reelected for more than two (2) consecutive terms. (Emphasis supplied)

• The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by a
majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving
trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become entirely vacant, the
vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the same ranking officers of the
CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other
hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for more than two consecutive terms.
ISSUES/HELD:
Are the the provisions of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the Board are constitutional? NOPE
1. The Power of Appointment
• The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise.
Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation
of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government.
• Sec. 16, Art. VII, Const. --- the President appoints three groups of officers:
1. Heads of the Exec. departments, ambassadors, other With the consent of COA.
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the Pres. by the
Constitution.
2. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to Without the consent of COA
appoint.
3. All other officers of the Government whose appointments Without the consent of COA
are not otherwise provided by law. and
Only if the law is silent on the appointing power
or
if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency,
commission, or board to appoint is declared
unconstitutional
•
th
Under the same Section 16, there is a 4 group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
• Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board
because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.
2. The Scope of the Appointment Power of the Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions, or Boards
• Commissioner Father Joaquin Bernas --- While, generally, appointing authority belongs to the President, Congress could
let others share in such authority. The premise was that the power to appoint belonged to the President; but the Batasan
could diffuse this authority by allowing it to be shared by officers other than the President.
• The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked
officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
• The framers of the 1987 Constitution changed the qualifying word "inferior" to the less disparaging phrase "lower in rank"
purely for style. However, the clear intent remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint.
• The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion — the officers
whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested
by law with the power to appoint.
3. Congress May Vest the Authority to Appoint Only in the Heads of the Named Offices

• The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, orin
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
• The President's power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to
legislative limitations or conditions.
• The power to appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional
Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.
• The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of the
specified offices, and in no other person.
o The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members.
• As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the enumeration also applies to the succeeding offices
mentioned in the enumeration. Since the words "in the heads of" refer to "departments," the same words "in the heads of"
also refer to the other offices listed in the enumeration, namely, "agencies, commissions, or boards."
4. The Chairperson of the CCP Board is the Head of CCP
• The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board. Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who
may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers
of the CCP.
• Under PD 15, the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees.
o The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
5. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 Repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
• Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
• Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board,
allowing them to elect their fellow trustees.
o On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards."
• This excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him.
• It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to "elect" and not "appoint" their fellow
trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board.
o A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public
office through election by the co-workers in that office.
• Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their fellow trustees.
The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President's power to appoint.
• In the present case, the incumbent President appointed the Endriga group as trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees
elected the same Endriga group to the same positions.
o This has been the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing the President to appoint and the
CCP Board to elect the trustees.
o In effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive branch. Each appointing
power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are irreconcilable. The Court must put an end
to this recurring anomaly.
TINGA, DISSENT: on presidential appointing power over officials of government agencies established by Congress (joined
by J. Puno and Quisumbing)
In effect, there is a seeming new rule — that the President may ignore or countermand statutory limitations contained in the charters
of GOCCs. The President may thus abolish chartered GOCCs at whim, appoint persons Congress may have deemed as unqualified
to positions in the GOCC, alter the corporate purposes for which the GOCC was established, all in the guise of executive control.
Executive control may similarly be justified to alter or deprive statutory rights which may have been vested by Congress to private
persons via the corporate charter. The power of Congress to charter government corporations would be rendered worthless—an intent
hardly justified by the Constitution, which allocated the power to create GOCCs to Congress.

Calderon vs. Carale (1992) – NLRC: list is exclusive
Congress.
FACTS:
• In 1989, RA 6715 was passed which amended theLabor Code.

o RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law) provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA.
o Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor.
• Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing
the public, workers and employers sectors. (The appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation.)
o The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the
office.
o After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of
1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
• Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of
RA 6715.
o Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in
Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.
ISSUE/HELD:
May Congress, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by the President to government officers
additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments
require confirmation by the CoA? NO, the Congress may not expand the list of appointments needing confirmation.
• The Congress cannot, by law, require CA confirmation of the appointment of other officers for offices created
subsequent to the 1987 Constitution (i.e. NLRC Commissioners, BSP Governor)
• Recall: Mison Doctrine: four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
• Mison also opined: In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes proposed and
approved by the Commission. These were
o the exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments; and
o the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence of the section from the same requirement.
• The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
o Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the “third groups” of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
o Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence
of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
o To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of
respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional
because:
§ 1)it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
§ 2)it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only
with the President.

Tarrosa v. Singson (1994) – CB Gov; list is exclusive
FACTS:
• (Eto lang talaga yung facts) In July 2, 1993, Singson was appointed as Governor of the BSP by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos; his
term to be effective on July 6.
• Case involves petition for prohibition by Jesus Tarrosa, as a “taxpayer,” questioning the appointment of Gabriel Singson
as Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
• Tarrosa wants Singson not to exercise his functions until his appointment is confirmed by the COA, and for the Secretary
of Budget and Management Salvador Enriquez to not disburse Singson’s salaries and emoluments
• Tarrosa anchors on Sec. 6 of RA 7653, the law which established BSP as the Central Monetary Authority in the PH. The
provision provides:
o Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers and functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised
by the Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board, composed of seven (7)
members appointed by the President of the Philippines for a term of six (6) years.
o The seven (7) members are:
• The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko
Sentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable to attend a meeting of the Board, he shall designate a Deputy Governor
to act as his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board shall designate one of its members as acting
Chairman . . ."
• For their defense, Singson and Enriquez claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring COA
confirmation of the appointment of the BSP Governor, since such position is not among the appointments needing
confirmation by the COA under the Consti:
o Art. VII, Sec. 16: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of department,
agencies, commissions, or boards . . ."
ISSUES/HELD:
Does the appointment of a BSP governor require COA confirmation? – NO
• Case did not decide on constitutionality of Sec. 6, RA 7653 “in deference to a principle that bars judicial inquiry into a
constitutional question unless the resolution is indispensable for the determination of the case.” (see minor issue why there’s
no need to discuss constitutionality)
• Nevertheless, case refers to Calderon v. Caralde: Congress cannot by law expand confirmation powers of the COA and
require confirmation of appointment of other gov’t officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Art. VII, Sec. 16
of the Constitution.
(Minor issue; on why SC did not belabor on discussing the constitutionality of RA 7653) Is the action/suit filed proper? – NO
• The case is a quo warranto proceeding, which seeks the ouster of Singson and that he is unlawfully holding/exercising the
powers of BSP Governor.
• Such proceeding can only be commenced by the Solicitor General, or by a “person claiming to be entitled to a public
office/position unlawfully held/exercised by another.”
• In this case, being a “taxpayer,” Tarrosa cannot be the proper party filing for a QW proceeding.
• Otherwise, it would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, causing incalculable mischief and hindrance
to the efficient.
Concurring opinion, PADILLA, J.
• Justice Padilla concurs in the decision of dismissing the petition.

• However, he believes that instead of dismissing the petition based on technical grounds (standing of Tarrosa), the Court
could have just directly applied Calderon v. Carale, to the effect that appointments by the President, which are not among
those requiring COA confirmation, may not, by law, be made subject to the such confirmation.
Pimentel v. Ermita (SUPRA) –ad interim v. acting capacity

Marcos v. Manglapus (September 1989) - Residual Power

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Marcos v. Manglapus (September 1989) - Residual Power

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Marcos v.

Manglapus (September 1989) – residual power

Is the right to travel the individual right involved in this case? – NO

*N.B. Court voted 8 to 7. Petition dismissed.

Motion for Reconsideration (October 1989)

Is there basis for the warrants of arrest issued? – YES

Other issues not really related to syllabus topic.

Is the Roppongi property public property? – YES.

Can the Roppongi property be alienated? – NO.

• Being public property, it is outside the commerce of man

Does Japanese law govern the Roppongi property? – NO (Conflicts issue.)

• Government merely alleged that Japanese law should be applied

(ISSUE) Is EO 566 constitutional? – NO

• It is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands CHED’s jurisdiction

Power to Investigate Power to Adjudicates

Do petitioners have standing to question EO No. 1? – YES.

• Re: Petitioners from House of Representatives

Do the subpoenaed tapes contain admissible evidence? – YES

• Discussion on executive privilege:

Neri v. Senate (SUPRA)

AKBAYAN v. AQUINO (2008) - JPEPA

Is the petition moot and academic? Not entirely.

Is there sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege? –No.

Next issues not really related to the syllabus topic…

• Beltran was able to avail all the administrative remedies.

Gutierrez, Jr. J., concurring

Can presidential immunity from suit be applied in this case? - NO

o On the same day, Erap signed another letter:

Is Erap immune from suit? – NO

Should prosecution of Erap be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity? – NO.

• This MR was denied, btw.

Was Erap resigned/considered resigned as of January 20, 2001? – YES.

Did prejudicial publicity affect Erap’s right to fair trial? – NO

Was the Angara Diary inadmissible for violating rules on Evidence?

• Dear Ate Charo,

(MAIN ISSUE) What is the law’s treatment of foundlings? – Natural-born citizens

• As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural­ born citizens.

• COMELEC ruled that it did not in disregard of consistent jurisprudence

• Facts according to petitioner Funa:

Was he a de facto or de jure officer? – De Facto

Is the existence of the JCC valid? – YES

Citizenship based on 1935 Constitution (applicable Constitution)

SYLLABUS TOPIC: “need for post election issue”

BALIK TAYO KAY FPJ:

SC SUMMARY (VERBATIM FROM THE CASE)

• Resolution of electoral contests is essentially an exercise of judicial power.

RAFAEL v. EMBROIDERY BOARD (1967) – designation and ex-officio capacity

Are petitioners allowed to hold directorship positions in the NHA? – NO.

Was Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC unconstitutional? – YES

Was del Rosario deprived of due process? – NO

• Under Article VII, Section 13: Section 13:

Is a new preliminary investigation needed? YES.

First Point: Intent of the Framers of the Constitution

Is the JBC is mandated to submit the list of nominees to the President?—YES.

• It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers.

Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections? – YES.

• Neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.

Date of Appointment Date of Transmittal Date of Receipt by Date of Oath of Assumption of

212030 25 March 2010 and 6

Is E.O. 2 Constitutional? YES.

• Case seeking to declare unconstitutional the appointments by PGMA through ES Ermita.

(Sub-issue) Is the petition moot? – Yes, but it doesn’t bar review

• Intervenor CA underscores the third sentence of Sec 16

• Beltran was able to avail all the administrative remedies. 

Gutierrez, Jr. J., concurring 

• As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.

SYLLABUS TOPIC: “need for post election issue”  