CHAPTER III.
THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS
CANON 10
A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent
the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing
counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as
law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall
not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK, petitioner,
vs. ANGELO KING
Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation MFC, and private
respondents, as directors and officers of MFC, for the recovery of money
market placements through certain promissory notes. They were charged
jointly and solidarily in accordance with Section 31 of the Corporation Code 5
which provides as follows:
Section 31. Liability of Directors, Trustees, Officers.-Directors or trustees who
willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the
affairs of the corporation shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages
resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members
and other persons.
The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the
summons to the defendant himself.
It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time that substituted service maybe resorted to
Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and private
respondents, Assistant Manager Mr. Nasario S. Najomot Jr. who
acknowledged receipt thereof for and in behalf of MFC and the private
respondents.
On June 13, 1983, said counsel for defendants filed a motion asking for a
suspension of the action for a period of sixty (60) days on the ground that
there was an on-going negotiation for an amicable settlement of the case
between the parties. The motion was denied
On June 27, 1983, counsel for plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendants in
default for failure
On July 14, 1983, the parties, assisted by their counsel, submitted a
compromise Agreement for the approval of the court. It reads as follows:
1. The defendants propose to pay, jointly and severally, then account with
the plaintiff as of June 15, 1983, in the sum of P707,500.01 with 20% interest
per annum as follows:
P100,000.00-on or before July 18, 1983
100,000.00-on or before August 30, 1983
100,000.00-on or before September 30, 1983
100,000.00-on or before October 30, 1983
100,000.00-on or before November 30, 1983
100,000.00--on or before December 30, 1983
100,000.00-on or before January 30, 1984.
2. Except those mentioned above, the plaintiff has no more claim against the
defendants.
3. The plaintiff agrees to the proposal of settlement offered by the
defendants provided that in case the latter fail to pay, jointly and severally,
two or more successive monthly installments, the plaintiff is entitled to
secure from the Court a writ of execution for the collection of the unpaid
account of the defendants.
Upon failure of private respondent to make the other payments, petitioner
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of judgment. The trial
court granted the motion on December 16, 1983.
On January 16,1984, counsel for defendants filed a pleading entitled
"Clarification" thereby seeking a correction of the compromise judgment on
the ground that he erroneously filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of
all the defendants when in fact he was the counsel for MFC only. On January
17, 1984, said counsel filed a "Motion To Correct Compromise Agreement"
attaching thereto a copy of the resolution of the Board of Directors of MFC of
July 6,1983 showing that he was the attorney-in-fact of MFC only, and praying
for the correction of the judgment, accordingly. The motion for clarification
was denied on January 20,1984.
there was no service of summons upon each of them as the corporate address
of the corporation was not their address as they were no longer connected
therewith; that Atty. Aragones had no authority to represent them.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a misrepresentation by petitioners.
Held:
Yes. The petition is devoid of merit.
Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as directors and
officers of MFC, they are, nevertheless, being held personally liable for the
obligation subject of the litigation under the complaint filed by petitioner.
sheriff does not show that such personal service of summons was effected.
the sheriff effected substituted service by leaving copies of the summons with
the Assistant Manager of MFC at the place of business of said
corporation.Such substituted service is not valid
, the lack of authority of Atty. Aragones was revealed when he produced the
resolution of the Board of Directors of MFC to the effect that the authority of
said counsel was in behalf of said corporation only and not in behalf of the
private respondents.
Since the Compromise Agreement was signed by Atty. Aragones in behalf of
the private respondents without their authority, the same is null and void in
so far as they are concerned.
Atty. Aragones' appears to be remiss in his duties and reckless in the
performance of his responsibility as counsel of record in said case. He
represented himself to be the counsel for the defendants including the
private respondents not only in the motions he filed but also in the
Compromise Agreement he submitted
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Let a copy of this decision be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for an appropriate administrative
investigation, report and recommendation on Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones
who holds office at the 9th Floor of the Finasia Building, 6774 Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Metro Manila. No costs. This decision is immediately executory.
Gomez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432
He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every
effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of Professional
Responsibility
Facts:
The petitioner seeks the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and
mandamus to annul and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ozamis City, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 85-49, the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals of 5 September 1990 in CA-G.R. CR No. 07482, and the
Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 108331; and to order the Court of Appeals
to give due course to the petitioner's appeal upon the filing of appellant's
brief.
Her motion to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals having been
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review
on certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No. 108331. This petition was,
however, denied for non-compliance with Circular Nos. 1-88 and 28-91.
Acting on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, this Court, in the
resolution of 31 March 1993, reinstated the petition but denied it
nonetheless "for being factual and for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently
show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in the
questioned judgment." Petitioner's motion and supplemental motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of 31 March 1993 were denied with finality.
While counsel for petitioner are aware that their first bounden duty as
officers of the Court is to honor and follow Court rules issued for the orderly
and efficient administration of justice. If they had overstretched the
parameters of the conduct required of lawyers in trying to protect their
client's liberty by resorting to this judicial process of certiorari, herein counsel
had acted in good faith and beg the kind indulgence of this Honorable Court
for such action.
Contrary to the representations of the Office of the Solicitor General, herein
counsel were candid in the presentation of the factual and procedural
antecedents based on pleadings given to them by their client. Counsel
disclosed in the petition in page 10 thereof that there is already an Entry of
Judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49.
Hence, it could not be stated that herein counsel misrepresented on the
procedural antecedents in this case.
Rather, when counsel did institute the present petition, they were invoking
the equity jurisdiction of this Honorable Court such that procedural rules be
set aside to serve the ends of justice, as the liberty of a person is at stake.
In the resolution of 9 August 1995, we then required the afore named lawyers
to inform the Court if they were willing to submit the disciplinary matter for
resolution on the basis of their Explanation. In compliance therewith, on 8
September 1995, they filed a Manifestation wherein they expressed that it
had not been their intention to violate the Code of professional Responsibility
and likewise apologized to the Court "for whatever inconvenience the filing
of the instant petition may have entailed."
Issue:
Whether or not the explanation of the atty of petitioner is valid
Held:
No. We find the explanation proferred unsatisfactory and the justification set
forth for their action flimsy.
attorneys for petitioner do not even claim that Atty. Pactolin unreasonably
refused to turn over the records to petitioner; ex hypothesi, he could have
legitimately retained them pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court until petitioner paid him his lawful fees.
the suppression of vital facts by counsel for petitioner, exposed by the Office
of the Solicitor General, was not due to the unavailability of such facts to
counsel nor the difficulty of obtaining them; in legal contemplation,
excusable negligence was not present in the instant case
the filing of the instant petition was nothing but a scheme to frustrate and
further delay the execution of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49.
Neither could a claim of denial of due process save the day for petitioner as
the judgment of the trial court was affirmed only after due proceedings by
the Court of Appeals which, parenthetically, even extended the utmost
liberality to petitioner who failed to file her Brief.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice.
While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of their rights; and the exertion of their
utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing be taken away or be
withheld from them, save by the rules of law legally applied (Canon 15,
Canons of Professional Ethics), they should not forget that they are officers
of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice (Canon 12, Canons of
Professional Responsibility). They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10, Id.) or unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes
(Rule 12.04, Canon 12, Id.).
As a final point, we wish to state that the apology contained in the
Explanation is misplaced. Counsel ought to know that they were not required
to show cause for the inconvenience the filing of the petition caused this
Court. The apology insinuates, rather smartly, that we required them to show
cause out of our whims or caprice, which, of course, is baseless, as
demonstrated by our observations in the resolution of 31 May 1995,
particularly on the suppression of vital facts by the attorneys for petitioner.
We do not then hesitate to declare that counsel for petitioner, Attorneys
Alvin C. Go, Fernando C. Cojuangco, Vigor D. Mendoza, II, and Antonio A.
Ligon have breached the foregoing Canons and Rules.
WHEREFORE, Attorneys ALVIN C. GO, FERNANDO C. COJUANGCO, VIGOR D.
MENDOZA, II, and ANTONIO A. LIGON are hereby CENSURED and warned that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
RE: letter to up law faculty
Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations
of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.”
Facts:
SC Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty.
Romel R. Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in
the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In said case, the Court denied the
petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain
officers of the executive department to espouse their claims for reparation
and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses
committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys.
Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
UP Law Faculty
37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law
published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation
relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially,
the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of
allegations of plagiarism in his work.
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on
the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such
allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they
expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he
cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary
conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members
of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less
than objective comments except to discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case
and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing
the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s
claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames
and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said
decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers
of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys,
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violations of Canons
10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Held:
Issuance of show cause order resolution to the respondents (UP Law Faculty)
as to why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar per issues
stated above.
[case is ongoing]
Dissenting Opinion:
(1) Serreno, J.
This Court, as complaining party, must state plainly how its ability to view the
motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision can be affected in any way
by the UP Law Faculty’s statement. It must also state plainly how its ability to
enforce its future orders would be eroded by the release of the UP Law
Faculty Statement. The milieu in which the Vinuya decision was received by
the public is well-known. It is not as if any outrage at the Vinuya decision was
caused by the UP Law Faculty Statement alone. It is also incredible how the
Court can claim that its honesty, integrity and competence could be eroded
by an extraneous act of any person other than itself. Either one is honest, has
integrity, or is competent – or he is not. No one can undermine those qualities
other than the one in whom they inhere.
Even more important to keep in mind is the apparently redemptive intent of
the UP Law Faculty when it issued its statement. The statement is headlined
by the phrase “Restoring Integrity.” In the second paragraph, the Faculty says:
“Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it
cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without
sanction, as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial
system.” In the next paragraph, it says: “The Court cannot regain its credibility
and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own conduct,
whether collectively or through its members, is beyond reproach.” In the
same paragraph, it further says: “It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the
position of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all controversies: a
position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and
all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and
professional ethics.”
Carpio Morales, J.
The Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive flexing of the judicial
muscle that could hardly be characterized as judicious. This knee-jerk
response from the Court stares back at its own face, since this judicial act is
the one that is “totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced
vigilance.”
CANON 11
A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.
Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the
proper authorities only.
IGOY v SORIANO
FACTS:
§ Igoy is one of the petitioners in the case of Heirs of Gavino Igoy, et al. vs.
Mactan Shangrila Hotel.
§ Eng. William Redoblado introduced Atty. Soriano to Igoy as a Justice of
the CA.
§ According to Igoy’s friend, Atty. Soriano will be able to help him in his case
which is pending in the CA
§ Atty. Soriano demanded from Igoy P20,000 but the former reminded the
latter the he will only be able to help in the case as soon as the case was lifted
to the SC
§ Igoy’s case received an unfavorable decision in the CA and Atty. Soriano
offered to prepare the Petition for Review to be filed in the SC.
§ Atty. Soriano asked for an additional P20,000
§ Igoy send the amount by courier to the address of Atty. Soriano which was
received by his son.
§ SC denied the petition for review of Igoy with finality
§ Igoy later found out that Atty. Soriano is not a CA Justice and filed this
complaint against Igoy in the SC
§ Arguments of Atty. Soriano:
o It is unnatural for a person to give money to someone whom he does not
know well and whom he met only for the first time
o The money was offered gratuitously by Igoy it is impossible the Igoy
handed the money to him on the SC parking lot for many employees were
passing in that place it is not Eng. Redoblado who introduced him to Igoy but
Mr. Taneo
o if the SC finds that he is guilty, he will retire from the service
§ Atty. Soriano filed his letter of resignation/retirement under RA 1616
ISSUE:
§ W/N Atty. Soriano violated Canon 6, Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD:
§ Yes! Atty. Soriano was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and is suspended from the practice of law.
§ Atty. Soriano’s offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever
penalty may be imposed on him. However, resignation will not extricate him
form the consequences of his acts
§ Resignation should not be used either as an escape or an easy way out to
evade administrative liability by court personnel facing administrative
sanctions
§ To accept the claim of Soriano that the money was offered gratuitously
will open the floodgates to fraud or graft and corruption.
§ Government lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the
public service for public service is a public trust. Government lawyers should
be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their reputable conduct
is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.
§ The nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the
Constitution are not mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly as idealistic
sentiments but as working standards and attainable goals that should
matched with actual deeds.
Tiongco v. Aguilar
Facts:
1. Atty. Jose Tiongco was charged for violating Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He characterized the decision of
respondent Judge as “having been crafted in order to fool the winning
party”; as a “hypocritical judgment in plaintiff’s favour”; one with
“perfidious character.”
2. Tiongco described respondent as a liar, perjurer or blasphemer
Ruling:
1. The duty contemplated in Canon 11 is closely entwined with his vow
in the lawyer’s oath “to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good
fidelity to the courts,” his duty under Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court “to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
of justice and judicial officers,” and his duty under the first canon “to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance.
2. The use of unnecessary /offensive and abusive/abrasive and
offensive language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates
or promotes distrust in judicial administration or tends necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members
of the Court and to degrade the administration of justice by the Court.
3. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making
the false and malicious insinuation against this Court. Such could only
come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted.
Anger or hate could only come from one who seems to be of that frame
of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice
whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to
law and justice whatever does not accord with his views.
4. Tiongco was ordered to pay fine of Php 5,000 plus warning.
Nestlé Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 , September 30, 1987
Courts; Supreme Court cannot be pressured to act one way or the other in
any case pending before it; Apologies of respondents accepted—We accept
the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the
imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described
earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the
earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should not,
however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the
euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed
freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the
full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure
the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it.
Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e.,
through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the
respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to
"proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."
Same; Same; Courts and juries immune from every extraneous influence.—
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under
all free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it
may be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety
entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of
civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of
fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts
should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.''
Same; Same; Same; Abuse of rights of free speech and of assembly not within
the ambit of constitutional protection; Counsel of record and all members of
the legal profession are reminded to apprise their clients on matters of
docorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice—We realize that the
individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in the
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as
the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution,
any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of
either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of
constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to
influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. The duty and
responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the
shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention
was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the
untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a
reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers
of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and
proper attitude toward courts of justice and to labor leaders of the
importance of a continuing educational program f or their members. [Nestlé
Philippines, Inc. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542(1987)]
BOQUIREN v. DEL ROSARIO-CRUZ
FACTS:
Herein complainant, Atty. Felixberto Boquiren was the plaintiff‘s counsel
in a certain civil case, where herein respondents, Atty. Saturnino Bactad,
was defendant‘s counsel, and Judge Emperatriz del Rosario-Cruz and Atty.
Melinda Gatdula, were the judge and clerk of court, respectively of
the MTC where the said civil case was docketed. Judge Cruz dismissed
the civil case due to plaintiff‘s lack of cause of action which Atty.
Boquiren, seasonably appealed to the RTC.
On July 5, 1993, Atty. Boquiren filed an administrative complaint against
Judge Cruz and Atty. Gatdula for misconduct, partiality, serious
nonfeasance, culpable dereliction of duty and ignorance of the law in
relation to the aforementioned civil case. Atty. Bactad was also charged with
false representation and employing scheme to defeat the
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, alleging Atty.
Bactad‘s claim and false representation that a motion to dismiss is an
allowable pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Proceedings.
On Jan. 26, 1994, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice to the
refilling of an administrative case in the proper time since there is already an
appeal pending with the RTC in relation to the aforementioned civil case
wherein relief is available. Atty. Boquiren filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Court on March 2, 1994. Atty.
Boquiren filed another motion for reconsideration dated March 26, 1994.
Both motions for reconsideration filed by Atty. Boquiren contained certain
words which tend to undermine the integrity of the Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Atty. Boquiren is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility?HELD: Yes, Atty. Boquiren is guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RATIO:
Atty. Boquiren violated Canon 11 which states that ―A LAWYER SHALL
OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.‖It appears that the words used byAtty. Boquiren are aimed at
seriously undermining the integrity of the Supreme Court.Atty. Boquiren is
ordered to explain within 5 days from receipt of the Resolution why he
should not be cited in contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action
VICTORIA C. HEENAN vs. ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO
FACTS:
Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother,
Corazon Eusebio. Following the introduction, Corazon told Victoria that Atty.
Espejo was her lawyer in need of money and wanted to borrow two hundred
fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) from Victoria. Shortly thereafter, Since
Atty. Espejo was introduced to her as her godmother’s lawyer, Victoria found
no reason to distrust the former.
Hence, during the same meeting, Victoria agreed to accommodate Atty.
Espejo and there and then handed to the latter the amount of PhP 250,000.
To secure the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously issued and
turned over to Victoria a check dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred
seventy-five thousand pesos covering the loan amount and agreed interest.
After a couple of months of waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty.
Espejo as to whether or not the check was already funded enough.
In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009 in
the amount of fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000) representing the interest
which accrued due to the late payment of the principal obligation. Victoria
deposited the said check but, to her dismay, the check bounced due to
insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay despite Victoria’s repeated
demands.
Worried that she would not be able to recover the amount thus lent, Victoria
decided to deposit to her account the first check in the amount of PhP
275,000, the said check was also dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an Order directing Atty.
Espejo to submit her Answer to Victoria’s administrative complaint failing
which would render her in default. The warning, notwithstanding, Atty.
Espejo did not submit any Answer.
On May 5, 2010, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Malala notified the
parties to appear for a mandatory conference set on June 2, 2010. The notice
stated that non-appearance of either of the parties shall be deemed a waiver
of her right to participate in further proceedings. which only Victoria
appeared.
In its Report and Recommendation The failure of a lawyer to answer the
complaint for disbarment despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled
hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves
disciplinary sanction. Moreover, respondent’s acts of issuing checks with
insufficient funds and despite repeated demands she failed to comply with
her obligation and her disregard and failure to appear for preliminary
investigation and to submit her counter-affidavit to answer the charges
against her for Estafa and Violation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that
also warrant disciplinary action against respondent.
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting
the Report and Recommendation of the CBD with the modification lowering
Atty. Espejo’s suspension from five (5) years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was
also ordered to return to Victoria the amount of PhP 250,000 within thirty
(30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time
the demand was made. On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court
the Notice of the Resolution.
Court’s Ruling : We have held that the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a
lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack
of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of
public confidence.
ISSUE:
WON, He Violated Canon Codes of Professional Responsibility in his Acts that
Violates also BP 22.
Ruling:
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant
refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and the
IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
CANON 11 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE
TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo found guilty of gross misconduct and violating Canons
1, 7 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Suspending the
respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years.
CANON 12
A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND
CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has
adequately prepared himself on the law and the facts of his case, the
evidence he will adduce and the order of its proferrence. He should
also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the
copies.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the
same cause.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness
during a break or recess in the trial, while the witness is still under
examination.
Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to
misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.
Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness
nor needlessly inconvenience him.
Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client,
except:
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or
custody of an instrument, and the like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is
essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must,
during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another
counsel.
VDA. DE BARRERA V. LAPUT
Gross Misconduct as ground for discipline of lawyer
(Lawyer suspended for intimidating his client to sign papers by placing his
revolver on his lap when she refused to do so)
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Laput represented petitioner Vda. de Barrera (Mrs. Barrera)
in the estate proceedings of her late husband. Laput presented to her several
papers or pleadings for her signature. However, Mrs. Barrera refused to sign
the pleadings but requested Laput to leave them so that she may ask
somebody to translate the same for her (she was from Cebu). Laput got angry
and drew his revolver from its holster and placed it on his lap to intimidate
the 72-year-old woman into signing the papers. Mrs. Barrera was compelled
to sign them, but is now before the court seeking the disbarment of Laput.
Issue:
W/N Laput should be disbarred for gross misconduct
Held:
Yes. The acts are inherently improper and censurable, more so considering
that they were performed by a man dealing with a 72-year-old woman. The
offense is compounded by the circumstance that, being a member of the BAR,
the offender should have set an example of a man of peace and champion of
the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the offended party is the very
person whom the offender had pledged to defend and protect – his client.
He was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
ued failure to make good the amounts of the checks.
JONAR SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. EDISON V. RAFANAN
A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS:
Complainant Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology,lodged a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty.
Edison Rafanan before the Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines alleging, inter alia,
that Atty. Rafanan violated Rule 12.07 and Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility when the latter executed an affidavit in favour
of his clientand offered the same as evidence in a case where he is actively
representing his client. The complaint also alleged that after the hearing of
the case, respondent accompanied by several persons waited for
Complainant and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and
thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.
In his answer, respondent denied having disarmed the complainant and
uttered insulting words nor veiled threats against the latter. He however
admitted that he executed an affidavit in favour of his client and offered the
same as evidence in a case where he is actively representing his client but
interposed the defense that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients
"on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the
ends of justice." Complainant charged respondent’s clients with attempted
murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the
alleged crime occurred, "his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.”
The IBP, while finding that administrative offense was committed by
respondent for violating the notarial law, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for alleged violation of Rule 12.07 and Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for insufficiency of evidence.
Hence, the present action was commenced.
ISSUE:
May a lawyer testify on substantial matters relative to the cause of the party
which he is actively representing in a case without violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
HELD:
YES. Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a
witness, except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication
arising from an attorney-client relationship. The reason behind such rule is
the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to
their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to
tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans
-- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the
zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of
competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at
the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from
testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so,
to withdraw from active management of the case.
Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by
Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him
administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense
that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal
action in which the latter’s life and liberty are at stake. Having undertaken
the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus
expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. The
Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of
his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the
alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and
could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably,
in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent
or suggest the falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which
lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit
was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was
merely inquisitorial. Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a
preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent
persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting
them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well
as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless
and expensive prosecutions. The investigation is advisedly called preliminary,
as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to
refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has
reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective
client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become
essential to serve the "ends of justice," the canons of the profession require
him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., COMPLAINANTS,
VS. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of
the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. The
Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against
the Association and Ely Mabanag before the RTC for building a concrete wall
which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The
spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in
violation of Quezon City Ordinance which prohibits the closing, obstructing,
preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of
or free access to any subdivision or community street. The Law Firm of
Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the
Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer.
After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Spouses
Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm, appealed to the CA.
The CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal on the ground that the
original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days even before
the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also
stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six
subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious.
The CA resolution became final.
Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and
Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint for
Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
(CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule
12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his
negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an
officer of the court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated the code of professional responsibility
Ruling:
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of
protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the
appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his
duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to
unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of
the same Code also states that:
Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability
and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159)
A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence
on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed
committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to
the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of
justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban,
43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).
Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo
A.M. No. 7006
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the Criminal case
proceeding originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser. Judge
Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that
the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the
crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. The counsel of the defense
filed a Motion to fix the amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty Bagabuyo,
then Senior state Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case,
objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder,
punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject of bail under the Rules
of Court.
Judge Buser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the
harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo that he lacks the
cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing of
the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
Respondent appealed to the CA. Instead of availing himself only of judicial
remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article regarding the
Order granting to the accused in the issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.
The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambast Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out.
The RTC of Surigao City directed respondent and the writer of the article to
appear in court to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt
of court for the publication of the article which degrade the court and its
presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but
refused to answer whether he made the statement in the article until after
he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial
court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON Prosecutor Bagabuyo violated the canons and his oath as a
lawyer?
Held: YES
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar
imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by
others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances
against a judge to the proper authorities only.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the
holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order
dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be
released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan
was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor
lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which
appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily.
Respondents statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case
No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13,
which states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated
Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not
resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against
Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court
and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as
a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law,
and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have
set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has
taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic
institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
CANON 13
A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS
CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH
TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF
INFLUENCING THE COURT.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with
Judges.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by
another branch or agency of the government in the normal course
of judicial proceedings.
Section 4, Canon 1, New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, 27 April 2004
SEC. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used
or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others
to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge.
Judge Capco-Umali failed to live up to the standard of propriety entrenched
in the aforequoted code of conduct. While, she might have been provoked by
Judge Acosta-Villarantes referral to her as a liar, she should have maintained
her composure instead of shouting back at a fellow judge. She should have
exercised self-restraint instead of reacting in such a very inappropriate
manner considering that she is in the presence of fellow Judges and other
employees of RTC, Mandaluyong City. She should have put more
consideration and effort on preserving the solemnity of the said meeting, and
on giving those who are present the courtesy and respect they deserved.
It was held in Quiroz vs. Orfila (272 SCRA 324 [1997]) that [f]ighting between
court employees during office hours is disgraceful behavior reflecting
adversely on the good image of the judiciary. It displays a cavalier attitude
towards the seriousness and dignity with which court business should be
treated.
Shouting at one another in the workplace and during office hours is arrant
discourtesy and disrespect not only towards co-workers, but to the court as
well. The behavior of the parties was totally unbecoming members of the
judicial service. Judge Capco-Umali, however, does not bear this
responsibility alone .

Judge Acosta-Villarante should also be required to answer for her failure to

observe the basic norm of propriety demanded from a judge in relation with
the aforementioned 23 March 2007 incident.

At the outset, it was Judge Acosta-Villarantes unseemly behavior, calling

Judge Capco-Umali sinungaling in front of their fellow Judges that initiated
the altercation between the two Judges. Judge Acosta-Villarante should have
been more cautious in choosing the words to address the already volatile
situation with Judge Capco-Umali.

Judge Acosta-Villarante also repeated the uncalled for conduct when she
wrote the memorandum dated 27 March 2007 and caused its circulation. If
indeed the memorandum was produced strictly to allow the parties to cool
off and avoid a repetition of the incident, on this ground alone, there was no
need to mention the alleged misbehavior of Judge Capco-Umali during the
meeting. The memorandum was thus written as a medium for retaliation
against Judge Capco-Umali. Judge Acosta-Villarante cannot also use as
justification in writing and circulating of the memorandum the claim that she
has an obligation to bring to the attention of concerned officials the personal
demeanor of another member that would put the Judiciary in constant public
scrutiny and disrespect pursuant to her oath of office. As a Judge, respondent
Acosta-Villarante is aware that there are proper avenues for ventilation of
grievance against anyone in government service.