ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS AND SECTIONS 1, 4, 7, 11, 21 WITH RELATED CASES AND

ARTICLES

1.
UP Oblation Run (Note: Running naked men)
In 1977 the UP Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity sponsored a play entitled Hubad na Bayani (The Naked Hero).
To drum up interest in the play, some fraternity members decided to run around the campus, well, naked.
The run coincided with the founding date of the fraternity so that afterwards, for the last thirty years, and
every December 16 or so, the fraternity conducts what would eventually be known as the Oblation Run.

When the Run started, the runners (or "streakers" as they were called in the 70's and 80's) were chased by
policemen and school authorities. Organizers had to devise ways to elude arresting officers. Routes were
carefully planned, getaway vehicles were assigned, etc.. Through the years, however, what was once a
publicity stunt has evolved into an indelible part of the UP institution. So many students anticipate the Run
that by the late eighties the corridors of the AS Building were so crowded with onlookers that the "runners"
were forced to walk. By that time, school authorities had given up on banning the activity.

The Run had likewise attained a measure of social and political relevance, as the fraternity eventually made
full use of the publicity opportunity to air the students' stand on issues such as opposition to charter change,
resistence to tuition fee increases and, rather consistently, calling for the resignation or removal of the
President GMA (Hey, it's UP. What did you expect?).

Today the Oblation Run is covered by all major television stations. Marshalls are stationed, corridors are
cordoned off, and the event is included in the university calendar. Some contestants of Pinoy Big Brother
were even in attendance to witness the event (echh). Well, I'm sure you've read about it in the papers and
seen it on television.

>>>REACTION: The said article is related on ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS SECTION 4 of the
Philippines, “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances.” People of the Philippines have the right or freedom of speech and expression, even
though UP students run naked within their vicinity map it is still acceptable and also need to respect
by other people. It is also dictated on this article that UP students have the supervision of police
officer which is very essential during the oblation run. These students did not just come up on this
running event, they have something to express and to show publicly their stand on opposition to
charter change, resistance to tuition fee increase and calling for resignation of PGMA. It is one way
for them to communicate their ideas from mind to mind. But everything has a limitation; they must
run only within their territory and does not violate the law or injure someone’s character, reputation
or business.

2.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC

PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM
LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF THE GOOD Present:
SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
PUNO, CJ,
QUISUMBING*,
YNARES-SANTIAGO*,
CARPIO,
 CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO**,
and ABAD**, JJ.

Promulgated:
August 19, 2009

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi,
administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote:

The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is very grateful for your 1rst. Endorsement to pay a nominal
fee of Php 5,000.00 and the balance upon the collection action of 10 million pesos, thus giving us access to
the Justice System previously denied by an up-front excessive court fee.

The Hon. Court Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to the need of complying with OCA Circular
No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 that reserves this “privilege” to indigent persons. While judges are appointed to
interpret the law, this type of law seems to be extremely detailed with requirements that do not leave much
room for interpretations.

In addition, this law deals mainly with “individual indigent” and it does not include Foundations or
Associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons. As seen in our Article of Incorporation,
since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. reached-out to the poorest among the poor, to the newly
born and abandoned babies, to children who never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who cannot
afford a few pesos to pay for “common prescriptions”, to broken families who returned to a normal life. In
other words, we have been working hard for the very Filipino people, that the Government and the society
cannot reach to, or have rejected or abandoned them.

Can the Courts grant to our Foundation who works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same
option granted to indigent people?

The two Executive Judges, that we have approached, fear accusations of favoritism or other kind of
attack if they approve something which is not clearly and specifically stated in the law or approved by your
HONOR.

Can your Honor help us once more?

Grateful for your understanding, God bless you and your undertakings.

We shall be privileged if you find time to visit our orphanage – the Home of Love – and the Spiritual
Retreat Center in Antipolo City.
 >>>REACTION: To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to
foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees
granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged
people. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in
Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:

Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to
adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the
Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated
by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor.

OTHER RELATED SECTIONS: In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution,
the Supreme Court promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141,
Rules of Court, which respectively state thus:

Sec. 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an
indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no
money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket
and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment
rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered
by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact
a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and
collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall
issue for the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. (22a)

Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.– Indigent litigants (a) whose gross
income and that of their immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of
an employee and (b) who do not own real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax
declaration of more than three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from payment of
legal fees.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant
unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with
the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the
litigant’s affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant’s affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the
complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal
liability may have been incurred.
 The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate
that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of
its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all
kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and
regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from
legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.

That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no
moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a
condition that only a natural person can suffer.

There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor of a
juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for
indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid
documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on
payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too
time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be extended the
exemption from legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and underprivileged people.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

(On official leave) (On official leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Part)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Part)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

3.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3580 March 22, 1950

CONRADO CARMELO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, respondent-
appellees.

Jose A. Fojas for petitioner.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for respondents.

MORAN, C.J.:

Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on December 27, 1949, with
frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with
intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a
period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period
of time. On December 29, 1949, at eight o'clock in the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged, and at 10:15 in the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds.
Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January 3, 1950, and on the following day,
January 4, 1950, an amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. The
accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied
by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from
further entertaining the amended information.

Brushing aside technicalities of procedure and going into the substance of the issues raised, it may readily
be stated that amended information was rightly allowed to stand. Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, is as
follows:

If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

>>>REACTION: For me, under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first
information and order the filing of a new one for the treason that the proper offense was not charged
in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical
offense. "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense," according to
article III, section 21 of our constitution. The rule of double jeopardy had a settled meaning in this
jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated. It meant that when a person is charged
with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It must be noticed
that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense,
the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act." The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been construed to mean
not only the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but
also that the two offenses are identical. There can be no double jeopardy on this situation.

There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one
offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This so called "same-evidence test" which
was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate
form. Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly
the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof, or when it necessary includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information. (Rule 113, sec. 9; U.S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484; U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., vs. Martinez,
55 Phil., 6.) In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the
essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an
offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a
part of the elements constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words, on who has been charged with
an offense cannot be again charged with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater
than the former. "As the Government cannot be with the highest, and then go down step to step, bringing
the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither can it begin with the lowest and ascend
to the highest with precisely the same result." (People vs. Cox, 107 Mich., 435, quoted with approval in U.
S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484; see also U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431 and People vs. Martinez, 55 Phil.,
6, 10.)

This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence at the time of
the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during
the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against
the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. This is the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the Philippines case of Diaz vs. U. S., 223 U. S. 442, followed by this Court in People
vs. Espino, G. R. No. 46123, 69 Phil., 471, and these two cases are similar to the instant case. Stating it in
another form, the rule is that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at
the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in
second jeopardy if indicated for the new offense.

This is the meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by our constitution for was the one prevailing in
jurisdiction at the time the Constitution was promulgated, and no other meaning could have been intended
by our Rules of Court.

Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another offense,
for the purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in existence
during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistence, no
jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the
same cannot constitute second jeopardy. By the very nature of things there can be no double jeopardy under
such circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to recognize the existence of a condition
where such condition in reality does not exist. General terms of a statute or regulation should be so limited
in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always,
therefore, be presumed that exceptions have been intended to their language which would avoid results of
this character. (In re Allen, 2 Phil., 641.)

When the Rules of Court were drafted, there was absolutely no intention of abandoning the ruling laid
down in the Diaz case, and the proof of this is that although the said Rules were approved on December
1939, yet on January 30, 1940, this Court decided the Espino case reiterating therein the Diaz doctrine. Had
that doctrine been abandoned deliberately by the Rules of Court as being unwise, unjust or obnoxious,
logically it would have likewise been repudiated in the Espino case by reason if consistency and as a matter
of justice to the accused, who should in consequence have been acquitted instead of being sentenced to a
heavy penalty upon the basis of a doctrine that had already been found to be wrong. There was absolutely
no reason to preclude this Court from repealing the doctrine in the Espino case, for as a mere doctrine it
could be repealed at any time in the decision of any case where it is invoked, is a clear proof that the mind
of the Court, even after the approval of the Rules, was not against but in favor of said doctrine.

For these reasons we expressly repeal the ruling laid down in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil., 260, as followed
in People vs. Villasis, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to No. 1), p. 268. Such ruling is not only contrary to the real
meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by the Constitution and by the Rules of Court but is also
obnoxious to the administration of justice. If, in obedience to the mandate of the law, the prosecuting
officer files an information within six hours after the accused is arrested, and the accused claiming his
constitutional right to a speedy trial is immediately arraigned, and later on new fact supervenes which,
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a more serious offense, under the Tarok ruling, no
way is open by which the accused may be penalized in proportion to the enormity of his guilt. Furthermore,
such a ruling may open the way to suspicions or charges of conclusion between the prosecuting officers and
the accused, to the grave detriment of public interest and confidence in the administration of justice, which
cannot happen under the Diaz ruling.

Before closing, it is well to observe that when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense,
is charged with a new and greater offense under the Diaz doctrine herein reiterated, said penalty may be
credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense.

For all the foregoing, the petition is denied, and the respondent court may proceed to the trial of the
criminal case under the amended information. Without costs.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BENGZON, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree that People vs. Tarok and People vs. Villasis should be overruled. But I submit that the effect of
such overruling should be prospective, in the sense that it should not affect the herein petitioner who has
relied thereon in presenting his case. (Moncado vs. Tribunal del Pueblo, 45 Off. Gaz., p. 2850.)
4.

Philippines: Will Hospital Be Held Accountable For Violating Gay Man?

05/06/2008

Background

On December 31, 2007, 39-year old Jan Jan (pseudonym), a gay man from Cebu, Philippines, had a sexual
encounter on his way home from a party, during which a perfume canister was inserted into his rectum
allegedly without his knowledge or consent, requiring him to have surgery. On January 1, 2008, Jan Jan
went to the Vincente Sotto Memorial Medical Center in Cebu where rectal surgery was performed to
remove the canister. A nursing student videotaped the procedure and posted the video on YouTube without
Jan Jan’s knowledge or consent. The videotape shows hospital personnel laughing and making jokes at Jan
Jan’s expense. Jan Jan knew nothing about the video until the head of his housing ward/district, Barangay
Captain Dave Tumulak heard out about it, investigated, approached the hospital, got the video, and showed
it to Jan Jan. Tumulak helped Jan Jan file an affidavit and found him an attorney. Jan Jan has been
devastated by the experience. "I trusted them and yet they ridiculed me. Was that something a professional
would do? I can’t even walk on the streets without being laughed at by my neighbors. I want my ordeal to
end. I hope it doesn’t happen to anyone else."

Ongoing Problems With Healthcare Delivery

The Philippines Department of Health has a standing policy that it must pre-authorize any documentation
of medical procedures on film, even before a patient’s consent is requested. However, Magdalena Lepiten,
of Lepiten and Bojos Law Office in Cebu and executive director of GAHUM 1 does not believe this case is
about privacy or consent. "Even if there was consent to being videotaped by the hospital, the filming was
clearly outside professionalism. It shows clear malice. That’s why even the heterosexual public is so
outraged."

Lepiten was initially asked to handle the administrative case to revoke the license of the hospital and
doctors involved. She adds, "Patients have no rights in the Philippines. They can’t even access their own
medical records. One woman gave birth at this hospital and asked for her medical records and was told she
had to perform sexual favors. This was in the newspapers and the hospital staff involved was fired. When
single mothers go to this hospital, they are treated badly and told, ‘Oh you are not married and you are
pregnant!’ Since abortion is illegal in the Philippines, women who have abortions privately and go to the
hospital face discrimination. So the issue here is not just a gay issue. It’s a communitywide issue. What we
need is a comprehensive healthcare bill."2

Ging Cristobal, co-founder of Lesbian Advocates Philippines (LeAP) and media relations officer for Ang
Ladlad, a national organization of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender Filipinos in the Philippines sheds
more light on the hospital. "Jan Jan’s case is a reflection of the entire medical establishment working
against a certain group of people, namely LGBTQ people. Vincente Sotto Medical Center is a government-
run teaching hospital and the only one in Cebu that treats HIV positive people. A former medical resident
and closeted gay man who received his training at the same hospital was not surprised by what happened to
Jan Jan because he had witnessed homophobic jokes during his training there."

Activist Lawyer Taken Off Case

Although Lepiten joined Jan Jan’s legal team on April 15, she was taken off the case on April 30 by Jan
Jan’s lead counsel, Guiller Ceniza. Lepiten believes this may be because she is an out lesbian and too
radical. She also believes it’s about money. "Ceniza decided his firm would handle the administrative and
civil cases. The doctors involved in this case are very rich and there’s pressure to stop litigation and settle
this case before it goes to court. Although the newspapers are saying that the civil suit claim is for 6 million
pesos, the suit hasn’t actually been filed. There’s been ongoing negotiation for damages. The filing fee is
two hundred thousand pesos. Jan Jan doesn’t have the money for the filing fee."

Cristobal adds, "There’s also shame involved and highlighting Jan Jan’s case will highlight the family and
they will face furter discrimination from the community. The family has told Jan Jan, ‘You have disgraced
the family already. Don’t get involved with LGBT groups. Let’s just settle this.’ The family is poor. It’s not
surprising that they want the money."

Patrick Ty, a paralegal at GAHUM says, "I met Jan Jan’s sister on May 1. We told Jan Jan about the
conference call with IGLHRC [on May 3]. He decided on his own that he wanted to join the conference
call. When I went to his house to get him, Jan Jan’s older brother said no. As of now they want privacy.
They want money for his counseling and legal fees. They only want him to talk to Tumulak and Ceniza and
they stopped him from going out of the house. Even the counseling is being provided by a psychiatrist and
a priest which given the Church’s stand against homosexuality is troubling. So Jan Jan is not making his
own decisions, the family is influencing him. In the Philippines it’s part of the culture for elder brothers and
sisters and parents to make decisions for the younger members of the family. Also Jan Jan finished school
only up to fifth standard and the family thinks he doesn’t have the capacity to make decisions."

Cristobal points out that although Jan Jan’s family knows that he is gay their acceptance may be
ambivalent. "In the Philippines, you can be gay but you are told, don’t have a partner, don’t profess you are
gay. So it’s one thing to be gay and one thing to be recognized as a sexual being. The family’s acceptance
is only up to a point." She says that Ang Ladlad is trying to find a psychologist who is supportive of the
LGBT community to work with Jan Jan.

>>>REACTION: For Lepiten, the public interest aspects of the case are significant. Even if she is no
longer allowed to represent Jan Jan, she plans to file two suits. "If Jan Jan settles out of court we can
still file a taxpayer suit and get the public to sign a petition that says we should have a say in how a
government-run hospital is managed. This will allow us to investigate the hospital. The suit will be
based on the right to health and right to life which are in the Bill of Rights of the Philippines
Constitution, Section 1." In this section, they should protect and respect the person, the gay or any
persons include both the citizen and the alien. Life of the involved person also needs to be protected
and the person has the right to his body in its completeness and was being violated. The liberty
includes the right exist and right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The
second suit will be a class action suit on behalf of the LGBT community to challenge the institutional
discrimination against LGBT people.

5.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts
on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI"
for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new
agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. PEA asserts that in cases of on-going negotiations the
right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does
not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage
when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."

Are negotiations leading to a settlement with PIATCO within the scope of the constitutional
guarantee of access to information?
>>>REACTION My answer is yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's
right to information on matters of public concern: “The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law." Further, The State policy (Sec 28, Art II) of full transparency in all transactions
involving public interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional rights. Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or
proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under
the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government.