hijo plantation vs central bank

FACTS:

Hijo Plantation, Inc., Davao Fruits Corporation, Twin Rivers Plantation, Inc. and Marsman Plantation,
collectively referred to herein as petitioners, are domestic corporations duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, all of which are engaged in the production and exportation of bananas
in and from Mindanao.

Owing to the difficulty of determining the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar because of the floating
rate and the promulgation of Central Bank Circular No. 289 which imposes an 80% retention scheme on
all dollar earners, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6125 entitled "an act imposing STABILIZATION TAX
ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved and made effective on May 1, 1970 to eliminate the necessity for
said circular and to stabilize the peso.

During the first nine (9) months of calendar year 1971, the total banana export amounted to an annual
aggregate F.O.B. value of P8,949,000.00 thus exceeding the aggregate F.O.B. value of five million United
States Dollar, bringing it within the ambit of Republic Act No. 6125. Consequently, the banana industry
was in a dilemma as to when the stabilization tax was to become due and collectible from it and under
what schedule of Section 1 (b) of Republic Act 6125 should said tax be collected.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995, series of 1971 which in effect
reaffirmed Central Bank Circular No. 309, enacted pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 1179.

RULING:

It will be observed that while Monetary Board Resolution No. 1995 cannot be said to be the product of
grave abuse of discretion but rather the result of respondent's overzealous desire to carry into effect the
provisions of RA 6125, it is evident that the Board acted beyond its authority under the law and the
Constitution. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the case at bar, is proper.

Moreover, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation
issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond
the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned (University of Sto. Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376; Del Mar v. Phil.
Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340). Except for constitutional officials who can trace their
competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public official must locate to the statute relied upon
a grant of power before he can exercise it. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the
authority conferred by statute (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Santiago L-29236,
August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493; cited in Tayug Rural Bank v. Central Bank, L-46158, November
28,1986,146 SCRA 120,130).

chavez vs national housing authority

FACTS:

On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising
constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.

On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and
directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste
Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made
residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.

As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing
project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA
6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private sectors
as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to
SMDRP, among others. The same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and
evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).

Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were published in newspapers in
1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized
NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.

Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a
low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the
development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The
latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as
enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of
RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in
the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the
contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon
by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing,
levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the
cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site
disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.

Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and
restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to
successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to
2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which
was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided
for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.

Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an
incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the
project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties
agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34
temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.

ISSUES:

Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the
public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner

Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore
and submerged lands

Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as alienable
and outside the commerce of man

Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are
no longer needed for public use

Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands

Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public
domain

Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the SMDRP

Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position

HELD:

Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. This does not mean
that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval
by the President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were
seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under
contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to
reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).

Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to
reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which
provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are
exercises of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the
abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation
of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.

The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and
Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.

Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed for
public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be “disposed to qualified beneficiaries.”
Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands
under the BOT law.

Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests and
encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate.

There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its joint
venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted that notices were published in national
newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards Committee on May 18, 1992.

RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage
of the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation
with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the lands were transferred to
the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the
same to any qualified person.
This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of public
concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI
and NHA. The properties and rights in question after the passage of around 10 years from the start of
the project’s implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor
General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but did
not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

FACTS: Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City,
filed a letter-complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation
open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the
health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining
an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources.

After a public hearing, the LLDA found that the water collected from the leachate and the receiving
streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the
presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the sample during collection or
handling. The LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order 8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist
from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in
August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.

The LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order
by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a
dumpsite.

The City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an action for the
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction. In
its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered
to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced
ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. 9

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist order.
The LLDA filed motion to dismiss on the ground that under Republic Act No. 3931, known as the
Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the
complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by
the Regional Trial Court.

On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
restraining order with the Supreme Court seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992
issued by the Regional Trial Court denying its motion to dismiss.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the
said case was set aside.

Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, with
prayer that the temporary restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final
determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the
LLDA under its enabling law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the operation open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City deprives the residents of its right to a balanced and healthy ecology.

HELD: Yes, because as a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty
of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and
promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." It is to be
borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma
Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.

Buenaseda vs Flavier

In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and corruption against Dr. Brigida
Buenaseda and several other government officials of the Department of Health (DOH). The Ombudsman
(then Conrado Vasquez), ordered the suspension of Buenaseda et al. The suspension was carried on by
then DOH Secretary Juan Flavier, being the officer in charge over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, questioning the
suspension order. NCMH submitted its Comment on the Petition where they attached a Motion for
Disbarment against the lawyers of Buenaseda et al.

Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the suspension order, which is a
lawful order from a duly constituted authority. NCMH maintains that such advice from the lawyers
constitute a violation against the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenaseda’s lawyers as he maintained that
all the Ombudsman can do is to recommend suspensions not impose them. The Sol-Gen based his
argument on Section 13 (3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman
shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials. Whether or
not a Motion for Disbarment may be filed in a special civil action.

HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court clarifies that what the
Ombudsman issued is an order of preventive suspension pending the resolution of the case or
investigation thereof. It is not imposing suspension as a penalty (not punitive suspension). What the
Constitution contemplates that the Ombudsman may recommend are punitive suspensions.

Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the Ombudsman, the same is not proper. It
cannot be filed in this special civil action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of
discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial
officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the
present special civil action. However, the lawyers of Buenaseda were reminded not be carried away in
espousing their client’s cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be respectful and
restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his
brethren in the profession.

Eslao vs COA

Facts :

On 9 December 1988, PSU entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") for the evaluation of eleven (11)
government reforestation operations in Pangasinan. The evaluation project was part of the commitment
of the Asian Development Bank ("ADB") under the ADB/OECF Forestry Sector Program Loan to the
Republic of the Philippines and was one among identical project agreements entered into by the DENR
with sixteen (16) other state universities.

On 16 January 1989, per advice of the PSU Auditor-in-Charge with respect to the payment of
honoraria and per diems of PSU personnel engaged in the review and evaluation project, PSU Vice
President for Research and Extension and Assistant Project Director Victorino P. Espero requested the
Office of the President, PSU, to have the University's Board of Regents ("BOR") confirm the
appointments or designations of involved PSU personnel including the rates of honoraria and per diems
corresponding to their specific roles and functions.

The BOR approved the MOA on 30 January 1989 and on 1 February 1989, PSU issued Voucher
No. 8902007 representing the amount of P70, 375 for payment of honoraria to PSU personnel engaged
in the project. Later, however, the approved honoraria rates were found to be somewhat higher than
the rates provided for in the guidelines of National Compensation Circular ("NCC") No. 53. Accordingly,
the amounts were adjusted downwards to conform to NCC No. 53. Adjustments were made by
deducting amounts from subsequent disbursements of honoraria. By June 1989, NCC No. 53 was being
complied with.

On 6 July 1989, Bonifacio Icu, COA resident auditor at PSU, alleging that there were excess
payments of honoraria, issued a "Notice of Disallowance" disallowing P64,925 from the amount of
P70,37 stated in Voucher No. 8902007, mentioned earlier. The resident auditor based his action on the
premise that Compensation Policy Guidelines ("CPG") No. 80-4, dated 7 August 1980, issued by the
Department of Budget and Management which provided for lower rates than NCC No. 53 dated 21 June
1988, also issued by the Department of Budget and Management, was the schedule for honoraria and
per diems applicable to work done under the MOA of 9 December 1988 between the PSU and the DENR.

Issue :

Whether or not the evaluation project is in fact a "special project" and that there were excess of
payments of honoraria.

Held :

The instant evaluation project being a Foreign-Assisted Project, the PSU personnels involved in
the project shall be paid according to the Budget Estimate schedule of the MOA.

COA, under its constitutional mandate, is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any
applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which, however, it does not
agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set aside by the authorized agency of government –
i.e., the courts – as unconstitutional or illegal and void. The COA, like all other government agencies,
must respect the presumption of legality and constitutionality to which statutes and administrative
regulations are entitled until such statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or until set aside in
appropriate case by a competent court and ultimately the Supreme Court.

vda. de herrera vs. bernardo

Facts: The heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, respondents herein, represented by Emelita Bernardo, filed a
complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against Alfredo Herrera
(Alfredo) for interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing over a portion of a
parcel of land situated at Barangay Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, with an area of 7,993 square meters. The
respondents claimed that said parcel of land was originally owned by their predecessor-in-interest,
Crisanto Bernardo, and was later on acquired by Crisanto S. Bernardo.

On December 6, 1999, the COSLAP ruled that respondents have a rightful claim over the subject
property. Consequently, a motion for reconsideration and/or reopening of the proceedings was filed by
Alfredo. The COSLAP denied the motion.

Celia S. Vda. de Herrera, as the surviving spouse of Alfredo, filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA. Unfortunately, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of the COSLAP. The CA
ruled that the COSLAP has exclusive jurisdiction over the present case and, even assuming that the
COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the land dispute of the parties herein, petitioner is already estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction because Alfredo failed to raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction
before the COSLAP and he actively participated in the proceedings before the said body.

Issue: Whether or not COSLAP had jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership?

Ruling: No. The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, issued on September
21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an administrative body established as a means of
providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers,
landowners and members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest.

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers
which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP
has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to
the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the
matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and
explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or
emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving
whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the
COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the
nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent
injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the
COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.

In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' complaint.
The present case does not fall under any of the cases enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e)
of E.O. No. 561. Respondents' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of ownership
over the subject property, which is an action involving title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial
Courts depending on the assessed value of the subject property.

carino vs chr

On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to
stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for
90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño
ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was
appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for
certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR
continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cariño.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as
the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all
forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and
decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with
the trial.

Concerned officials of MWSS vs Vasquez

CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM

(MWSS) v. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE
LARGE DIAMETER PRESSURE PIPE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION (PLDPPMA) January
25, 1995 | Vitug | Petition for Certiorari | Topic PETITIONER: Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System RESPONDENT: Hon. Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and
Members of the Philippines Large Diameter Pressure Pipe Manufacturers Association SUMMARY:
PLDPPMA submitted the lowest bid for a project of the MWSS but their submission was lacking a
addendum which contained technical specifications required for the project. Because of this, the
project was awarded to the second lowest bidder who had complied with all the necessary
documentation. PLDPPMA filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman to hold the bidding process
in abeyance. DOCTRINE: All considered, it is our view that the issue here involved, dealing, such as
they do, on basically technical matters, dealing, such as they do, on basically technical matters,
deserve to be disentangled from undue interference from courts and so from the Ombudsman as
well. FACTS: 1. In order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million people in
the metropolitan area, MWSS launched the Angat Water Supply optimization ("AWSOP") which
would be, in most part, financed by funds loaned by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
("OECF") of Japan to the national government and allocated to MWSS in the form of equity. . . The
projects were denominated Projects APM-01 and APM-02. 2. On 30 August 1991, MWSS caused
the publication in 2 leading newspapers of an "Invitation for Pre-qualification and Bids" for Projects
opened for international competitive bidding, copies of the "Invitation for pre-qualification and Bids"
were sent to the respective embassies and trade missions of member countries of the OECF. . / Out
of the 25 prospective applicants, only 14 contractors submitted corresponding applications to the
PBAC-CSTE. 3. The PBAC-CSTE, after evaluating the applications for pre-qualification, issued a
report concluding that only 11 out of the 14 contractors were pre-qualified to bid for the 31st March
1992 scheduled bidding. The major factors considered in the evaluation were the applicants'
financial condition, technical qualifications and experience to undertake the project under bid. 4.
Meanwhile, private respondent Philippine Large Diameter pressure Pipes Manufacturers'
Association ("PLDPPMA"), sent 7 letters, between to the MWSS requesting clarification, as well as
offering some suggestions, on the technical specifications for APM-01 and APM-02. 5. The bidding
was conducted by PBAC on the previously scheduled date of 31 March 1992. The Three (3) lowest
bidders for the said project (APM-01) were the following: 1. PLDPPMA (Joint Venture)
P267,345,574.00 2. F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. P268,815,729.00 3. J.V. ANGELES DEVT. CORP.
P278,205,457.00 20 while the three lowest bidders for Project APM-02 included: 1. ENG'G.
EQUIPMENT, INC. (EEI) P219,574,538.00 2. FF CRUZ & CO., INC. P233,533,537.00 3. J.V
ANGELES DEVT. CORP. P277,304,604.00 6. After the three lowest bidders for both projects were
known, a meeting was held by the PBAC-CSTE, composed of MWSS Deputy Administrator for
Engineering Eduardo M. del Fierro, as Acting Chairman, and deputy Administrator for Operations
Ruben A. Hernandez, Acting Chief of Legal office Precioso E. Remolacio, and Project Manager
Cesar S. Guevarra, as members, to decide on what should be done about Contract APM-01. Three
of the members, namely, Hernandez, Guevarra and Asuncion, recommended for rebidding on the
following grounds: †œa. Ambiguity of Addendum No. 6 . . . subject to different interpretations
because there was no illustrations provided. Further, it could also be said that some contractors did
not use the FRP because said Addendum was not clearly explained.†• 7. Remolacio abstained;
he felt that "technical evaluation was more essential in deciding the issues in the Contract." For his
part, Del Fierro recommended that no rebidding should be undertaken and that an award should be
made to either the lowest or the second lowest bidder. 8. PBAC-CSTE met again to discuss and
evaluate the bids in APM-02. Guevarra, Hernandez and Asuncion, opined that a rebidding should be
conducted, while Del Fierro and Remolacio believed that the contract should be awarded to the
lowest bidder. 9. Finally, the PBAC-CSTE formally submitted its report saying that while Joint
Venture bid might have been the lowest it was, however, invalid due to its failure to acknowledge
Addendum No. 6, a major consideration that could not be waived. It recommended that the contract
be instead awarded to the second lowest but complying bidder, F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., subject to the
latter's manifestation that it would only hire key personnel with experience in the installation of
fiberglass pressure pipes (due to PBAC-CSTE's observation in the report that the company and its
key personnel did not have previous experience in the installation of fiberglass reinforced pipes). Del
Fierro, Guevarra and Asuncion, approved the PBAC-CSTE's findings and recommendation.
Hernandez and Remolacio both disagreed with the findings of the PBAC-CSTE; the former opted for
a rebidding while the latter batted for awarding the contract to Joint Venture. 10. On the following
day, the MWSS Board Committee on Construction Management and the Board Committee on
Engineering, recommended that Contract No. APM-01 be awarded to F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., being
the lowest complying bidder. 11. Prior thereto, or seven days after the submission of the bid
proposals, private respondent PLDPPMA, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint
(docketed Case No. OMB-0-92-0750) protesting the public bidding conducted by the MWSS for
Projects APM-01 and APM-02, detailing charges of an "apparent plan" on the part of the MWSS to
favor suppliers of fiberglass pipes, and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation thereon
and to hold in abeyance the award of the contracts. 12. The Ombudsman referred the letter-
complaint to the MWSS Board of Trustees for comment along with a directive to it to hold in
abeyance the awarding of the subject contract. MWSS asked for an extension of time within which to
submit its comment but called, at the same time, the attention of the Ombudsman to PD No. 1818
prohibiting the issuance of restraining orders/injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure
projects. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman, in its report set aside the recommendation of the MWSS
Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee for Construction Services and Technical Equipment
(PBAC-CSTE) to award Contract APM-01 to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes and awarded the
subject contract to a complying and responsive bidder pursuant to the provisions of PD 1594.
ISSUE: WoN the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take cognizance of PLDPPMA's complaint and to
correspondingly issue its challenged orders directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to set
aside the recommendation of the PBAC-CSTE. - NO RATIO: While the broad authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which ". . . appears illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient" may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of
judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully
vested. It would seem to us that the Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has
not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise pre-empted the exercise of discretion by, the
Board of Trustees of MWSS. Indeed, the recommendation of the PBAC-CSTE to award Contract
APM-01 appears to be yet pending consideration and action by the MWSS Board of Trustees. We
can only view the assailed 19th October 1992 Order to be more of an undue interference in the
adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring the
proper observance of and compliance with law. The report submitted by the Fact-Finding and
Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman reveals its predisposition against the use of
fiberglass pipes, a technical, rather than a legal, matter. The fact-finding report has dealt with such
matters as (1) the wall thickness of pipes; (2) the joints; (3) the pipe laying procedure; (4) the
technical expertise of the MWSS, on the one hand, and the fiberglass proponements, on the other;
and (5) the supposed negative international feedback on the use of fiberglass pipes. All considered,
it is our view that the issue here involved, dealing, such as they do, on basically technical matters,
dealing, such as they do, on basically technical matters, deserve to be disentangled from undue
interference from courts and so from the Ombudsman as well.
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IN RE: JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO (1988)

FACTS:

Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, an Executive Judge in RTC in Bangui, Ilocos Norte was appointed as a
member of Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential EO 856. Petitioner
requested the Court to allow him to accept the appointment and to consider his membership in the
committee as neither violative to his judicial function. He also added that his membership in the said
Committee is still part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.

Upon examination of EO 856 reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the
speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus
alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee
are—

3.3 RECEIVE COMPLAINTS AGAINST ANY APPREHENDING OFFICER, JAIL WARDEN, FINAL OR JUDGE WHO
MAY BE FOUND TO HAVE COMMITTED ABUSES IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTIES AND REFER THE SAME
TO PROPER AUTHORITY FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION;

3.5 RECOMMEND REVISION OF ANY LAW OR REGULATION WHICH IS BELIEVED PREJUDICIAL TO THE
PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.

ISSUE:

Whether the membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee discharges as
administrative functions and will be in violation of the Constitution.

HELD:

Yes. Administrativefunctions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry
out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic
law of its existence.

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Provincial Committee on Justice involves the
exercise of administrative functions, hence, it will be in violation of the Constitution.

Petition is denied.