Chapter4

The Battle of Stadtlohn:

The End of the German War

After Mansfeld and Brunswick departed (July 1622), Tilly's army easily overran
the Palatinate. Although the two Protestants had lifted the siege of Bergen-op-
Zoom, the Dutch only hired them for three months-their unruly bands had no
place in the disciplined Dutch army. In November they were again on their own.
Their late employers suggested that they capture the town of Emden-Iong
coveted by the Dutch. Under cover of the religious war, they struck-their target
was as Protestant as they were, but neutral in the conflict. By the end of 1622,
Emden and East Frisia were theirs.
Mansfeld was content to sit on his gains, but Brunswick retained faith in the
machinations of the Intemational. He marched into the Lower Saxon Circle with
less than 10,000 men (March 1623) and quickly occupied Halberstadt, his
brother's duchy of Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, and the neutral bishopric of
Hildesheim. Then, allied with Calvinist Hesse-Cassel, he induced the circle to
"hire" him as captain-general. He reconstructed his battered arrny, rebuilding
existing units with recruits and forming new ones. With the arrival of the
warlike Sax-Weimar brothers, he boasted nine regiments of cavalry, ten of
infantry, and one of dragoons, plus 16 guns, and four mortars, for a paper
strength of over 25,000. He had worked fast, but his time had run out. On July
13, Tilly entered the circle at the head of his veterans. The brash Brunswick
mocked Tilly's ultimatum (July 16), but the circJe princes, caught between
hammer and anvil, opted for neutrality. His contract unceremoniously abrogated,
Brunswick could only flee to Holland.
Brunswick's army was full of raw recruits and stragglers, it was poorly
organized, and it was encumbered by a long, slow baggage train, full of loot.
However, he enjoyed three days lead over TilIy, and safety lay at the Dutch
border. Brunswick wasted those days, lingering near Munster in the hopes that
Mansfeld would come to assist him.' Mansfeld had no interest in risking his
gains for Brunswick's sake. Tilly cJosed to within half-a-day's march of his
106 Battles of the Thirty Years War

opponent. On August 4, his vanguard made contact with Brunswick's outposts.

Belatedly realizing the danger, Brunswick regained a little ground by secretly
crossing the Ems river before dawn on the 5th• However, eight more "crossings,"
minor rivers, still lay between him and Holland. These obstac1es were
significant enough that they had to be crossed by bridge or ford. Given his vast
baggage train, it was a logistical nightmare.
It might seem to us now, as to many then, that Brunswick should have saved
his men by abandoning his train. But it wasn't quite that simple. Not only was it
carrying the accumulated loot of three years' plundering, it al so included the
families and whole property of his soldiers. The value carne to hundreds of
thousands, even millions of florins. The loss of his train could ruin the army as
surely as any battle.
In any case, Brunswick knew that he had been in a very similar position at
Hochst and that had worked out all right. Why not again?
Tilly's pursuing forces were on him again by the third crossing (near
Nienburg, Aug 5). Each crossing brought Tilly c1oser; his army was larger than
Brunswick's, but much less encumbered, thus faster. Camping for the night
between Heck and Ahaus villages, Brunswick directed that his troops be awake
and ready to move by 3:00 A.M. But when the hour arrived, he found his
lieutenants, Knyphausen and Isenburg, still in bed, the men asleep and
unformed. It was 8:00 before they were underway. By 9:00, Tilly's horse were
on their heels.
There followed a drawn out cavalry skirmish starting near Heck, then over the
fourth crossing, around Ahaus, and to the fifth and sixth crossings. Styrum,
commanding the rearguard, succeeded in holding off the Leaguers long enough
to cover the escape of the train. Losses were light, but Styrum himself was
seriously wounded and his troopers shaken. Brunswick now resolved to
duplicate the tactics which had pro ven "successful" at Hochst. He rushed
through the seventh crossing, then prepared a defensible position. A detachment
under Knyphausen would defend the west bank at the sixth crossing, which was
further obstructed by a small woods. The main battle line was farther back. They
would ward off Tilly's pursuit until the train had made the eighth crossing,
Stadtlohn bridge. Knyphausen's group might have to be sacrificed, like Kochler
at Hochst, but the army saved.
The Netherlands now lay only ten miles west, the route unobstructed from the
bridge. Safety was a matter of hours-how Brunswick must have cursed
Knyphausen for oversleeping!

THE COMMANDERS
Duke Christian of Brunswick, Administrator of Halberstadt (1599-1626), was
a younger son of the house of Guelf-Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel. As a child, he had
been declared "Administrator" (i.e., Protestant political ruler of a secularized
bishopric; half bishop, half military dictator) of Halberstadt. Young and
inexperienced, he was a zealous-not to say fanatical-Protestant, of
pronounced militaristic inc1inations. As early as 1619, he was trying to send
troops to the Bohemians. In 1621, he raised an entire army, and campaigned in
Westphalia, the Lower Palatinate, and the Netherlands. He took part in the
battles of Hochst and Fleurus, losing an armo After Stadtlohn, he raised a third
The Battle of Stadtlohn 107

army and joined the force s of King Christian of Denmark. He died during
operations, apparently from an intestinal parasite, "eaten by worms."
Brunswick was a self-taught soldier; some believe he was briefly a cadet with
the Dutch army. Nevertheless, most of his training was "on the job." As a
general, he showed some promise as organizer and leader, but also demonstrated
serious weaknesses in basic strategy and operations. He relied heavily on
experienced subordinates such as Knyphausen, but often disregarded their
advice. Brunswick's recklessness, irresponsibility, and irreverence quickly
became legendary, eaming him the nickname of "The Mad Halberstadter."
Field Marshal Baron Dodo zu Innhausen und Knyphausen (1583-1636), was a
professional soldier, colonel-commander for the free city of Hamburg. Needing
an experienced second-in-command, Brunswick made him a general. He served
in that position 1621-3, then under Mansfeld 1625-6. A competent officer,
Knyphausen was cautious, unlucky, and quarrelsome; at one time or another, he
fell out with nearly all of his associates.' His career was clouded by failure. Both
Brunswick and Mansfeld made him the scapegoat for their blunders. Only after
joining Gustavus did he find a degree of success.
Knyphausen took part in the battles of Hochst, Fleurus, Stadtlohn, Dessau
Bridge, Lutzen, and Oldendorf, but only the last can be considered an
unqualified success.
Field Marshal Count lean Jacob of Anholt (1580-1630) was Tilly's principal
subordinate 1619-30. A Walloon like Tilly, his long service in Flanders had
imbued him with a more cautious, conventional approach to war. His
independent operations were indecisive, but he did well as Tilly's lieutenant at
Stadtlohn and Lutter. When not commanding an independent corps, he acted as
Tilly's chief-of-staff. A sincere Catholic-again like Tilly-he registered many
complaints with Maximilian about poor conditions in the League army. His
decision to switch to the Imperials in 1630 was a final protest.' He died of
tuberculosis a few months later.
Anholt was a sound, competent soldier of the Spanish school, an able
organizer, and a respected leader. He is especially significant for his role in
grooming future generals; his regiment became a sort of academy, and such
important leaders as Gallas, Gronsfeld, and Geleen were among his "pupils."

THEARMIES
Catholic League Army-Tilly (see Appendix B)
Vanguard-Anholt: 1050 cavalry, 4000 infantry
UNIT DATE COY STR NOTES:
Herbersdorf CR 1622 7 500 Mixed cav; LtCol Werner Tilly
Holstein KUR 1621 6 550 IMP German; LtCol IIIow
Schmidt IR 1620 10 1700
Mortaigne IR 1620 10 1300
Musket Detachment 1000 From all 8 IRs

Cavalry-Lindelo: 3350 cavalry

Schonberg CR 1620 6 500 Wurzburg
Erwitte KUR 1620 4 300
Eynatten KUR 1620 5 400 Cologne
Lindelo CR 1620 5 400 IncIuded a Croat coy
108 Battles of the Thirty Years War

Furstenberg CR 1621 10 500

Nivenheim CR 1622 8 400 AKA Nievenheim; Co1ogne
Alt-Saxon KUR 1620 10 600 IMP German
Croats 3? 250

Main Body-TilIy: 1000 cavalry, 11,300 infantry, 14 guns

A1t-TillyIR 1620 6 1500 Wurzburg; Col Truchsess
Gronsfeld Bn 1620 23 4600 Anholt & Herliberg IRs
Hairnhausen IR 1620 9 1800
BuningenBn 1621/2 18? 3400 Herbersdorf & Blankhart IRs
Pappenheim CR 1622 7 500 Mxd: 1 KUR,4 ARK, 2 Croat
Nersen ARK 1622 8 500 AKA Firmont; Co1ogne
Artillery: 14 guns
Total: 15,300 infantry in 6 bns; 5400 cavalry in 11 sqds; 14 guns =20,700

Lower Saxon Army-Brunswick (see Appendix A)

Detachment-Knyphausen: 3300 infantry, 14 guns
UNIT DATE COY STR NOTES:
Knyphausen IR 1622 10 1500
Sparr IR 1623 10 1000
Bernhard IR 1623? 800 Sax-Weimar; all musketeers
Artillery: 14 guns

Cavalry Screen-Thum: 1600 cavalry

Jung-Thurn CR 1622 10 600 2 sqd
Isenburg CR 1622 10 500
Plato DR 1623 6 500

Infantry Main Body-Wilhelm Sax-Weirnar: 8300 infantry

Leib IR 1621 15 2000 LtCol Sidon
Pithan IR 1621 ? 600 Ex-Landschad
Meyen IR 1622 10 1000 AKA May; ex-Sax-Lauenburg
Spee IR 1623 10 1200
Gortzke IR 10 1000 Dutch; AKA Gorz, Gertishe
Sax-Weimar IR 1623 10 1500 Wilhelm Sax-Weimar
Franck IR 1623 10 1000 AKA Frank, Frenck; Sax-Weimar
Artillery: 6 guns

Cavalry Reserve-Brunswick: 2800 cavalry

Leib CR 1621 6 600 LtCol Nell
Styrum CR 1622 5 500
Rhinegrave CR 1623 4 300 LtCol Westphal
Saxon CR 1623 10 600 Duke Friedrich Sax-Altenburg
Sax-Weimar CR 1623 5 350 Johann Ernst Sax-Weimar
Wersabe CR 1623 4 300 Hessian
Gortzke CR 1623 2 150 French
Total: 11,600 infantry in 9 bns; 4400 cavalry in 11 sqds; 16-20 guns = 15,000

Brunswick acted as cornrnander-in-chief, Knyphausen was General of

Infantry, Wilhelm Sax-Weimar was LtGen of Infantry, the wounded Styrum was
Gen of Cavalry, Thurn (this was a son of FM Thum of Bohemia) was LtGen of
The Battle of Stadtlohn 109

Cavalry, and Isenburg held the title of Gen of Artillery. Fairly strong in
numbers, Brunswick's force was deficient in quality. Of 20 regiments, eleven
were newly formed, while even the veteran units were heavily diluted with raw
recruits. Equipment was uneven: some regiments, such as the Sax-Weimar
contingent, were well-arrned, others, such as Sparr, quite poorly. Although
Brunswick used the Protestant battalion, ten deep with 125 muskets per 200 man
company, many of his infantry regiments were more than half pike. Some
included men armed with clubs, or nothing at al!. As partial compensation,
Bernhard Sax-Weirnar had brought a regiment formed entirely of musketeers,
the first such of the war. As usual, the Protestant cavalry was good material,
adequately equipped, trained in the Dutch style.

DEPLOYMENT
Knyphausen's task was to obstruct the pursuit as long as possible. To hold the
defile, he had two infantry regiments, possibly his own and Sparr, some
musketeers (from Bernhard), and 14 guns, probably ten demicannon and four
mortars. The bulk of Bernhard's musketeers were a bit farther back, placed in the
stream bed (the seventh crossing) between Knyphausen and Brunswick.
Immediately west of the seventh crossing, Thurn was posted with the
dragoons and three squadrons of horse. This was another delaying force, to slow
down anyone who got past Knyphausen and Bernhard.
The main body was drawn up in the heath before the village of Stadtlohn, just
east of the eighth crossing, the Beecker "river." Brunswick gave the foot to
Wilhelm Sax-Weimar, and led the horse personally.
The infantry deployed in a sort of "V" or arrowhead, toward the enemy,
formed of five battalions. two more were behind, as a 2nd echelon. The position
was centered on a slight rise-one can't really call it a hill-surrounded by low
ground. The left flank was protected by a marshy bogo Brunswick placed his six
guns-probably five falcons and a demicannon-on the far right. Of his
remaining seven squadrons, one or two were posted on each flank, the rest held
behind the foot in reserve. At this time, the long tail of the train was still drawn
out the whole distance between Knyphausen and the bridge at Stadtlohn.
Brunswick hoped that TilIy could be held off long enough for the train to
complete this eighth crossing.
In its series of successive positions and emphasis on delay; this deployment
resembles that at Hochst. Unfortunately, there was not enough time for
Knyphausen to prepare works covering the defile. Nevertheless, the main line
occupied a very defensible position.
Tilly's array was still strung out in column of march, although the individual
tercios and squadrons were themselves in battle order. The actual pursuit had
been entrusted to the vanguard under the Anholt: Herbersdorf and Holstein
cavalry regiments, the Schmidt and Mortaigne infantry regiments, and a large
musket detachment. Behind them followed the main body of horse under
Lindelo, then four powerful tercios and 14 guns.

THE BATTLE OF STADTLOHN, AUGUST 6,1623

Around 2:00, Anholt's lead elements emerged from the woods west of the
sixth crossing. Knyphausen immediately opened fire, but the Catholic advance
110 Battles of the Thirty Years War

was cautious, and few of his shots scored. Staying at long range, Anholt
deployed to his right, northward, the cavalry moving sidewise to permit the
infantry to deploy. Knyphausen saw that he was accomplishing little and was in
imminent danger of envelopment; he had no intention of suffering Kochler's
fate. He fell back on the main body, abandoning his guns.
Knyphausen's retreat was covered by Bemhard's musketeers in the stream
bed, in any case, Anholt made no attempt at pursuit. The two battalions reached
Wilhelm's position and moved to take places in the rear. This should not have
disordered the line, as there were large intervals between each battalion."
Unfortunately, Brunswick's foot-never very well disciplined-were already
discouraged by a month-Iong retreat. They interpreted Knyphausen's movement,
and, worse, his los s of guns, as a defeated rout. If he did not actually disorder the
line, he demoralized it.
Tilly and Anholt, by way of contrast, were feeling unusually confident. Tilly
had IittIe respect for Brunswick or his army, and he knew that this time there
would be no lucky escape. The "omens" were favorable: Brunswick's motto
"Tout pour Dieu et pour elle"s would certainly cost the Protestants God's favor,
also, it was Transfiguration Sunday, an important Catholic feast. More
materialistically, his trained eye had spotted so me interesting possibilities of the
ground.
Bemhard's people had followed in Knyphausen's wake, with barely a pretense
of defending the stream. The taíl of the train was abandoned to Anholt's merey.
Thum bravely, if pointlessly, counterattacked. He gained the initial advantage,
pushing back Holstein Cuirassier Regiment. But when the Herbersdorf Cavalry
intervened, the result was reversed. The Isenburg Regiment and the dragoons
decamped en masse. Thum was himself struck down and barely escaped
capture. However, he succeeded in his purpose; only a single wagon was lost.
Having smashed Thurn, Anholt quickly (3:30) regrouped his forces and
swung them, horse and foot, toward the enemy left, the flank protected by the
bogo The gap between the infantry and the marsh was covered only by a
squadron of horse.
When they saw the threat to their flank, the two leftmost of Wilhelm's
battalions advanced. They paired off with Schmidt and Mortaigne, battalion
versus tercio in a prolonged firefight. Anholt's forlom engaged the center
battalion the same way. The three battalions received no support from the other
six, who may have been disorganized by Knyphausen, or from the battery,
which was effectively masked.
The left flank squadron fell apart the moment that Anholt (Herbersdorf and
Holstein regiments) made contact. Brunswick hastily moved to check this threat,
not only with his reserve, but summoning the right flank horse as well. His
cavalry had already failed three times, Styrum, Thum, and the left. Perhaps
overwhelming numbers could salvage the situation.
. He had played right into Tilly's hands. Even as he was drawn to the left, Tilly
was moving the bulk of his cavalry (Schonberg, Furstenberg, Erwitte, Eynatten,
Lindelo, Nivenheim, and Alt-Saxon), over 3000 strong, against Brunswick's
unprotected right. The attention of the Protestant infantry was fixed by the
sudden appearance of four tercios of League foot. As a final nail in Brunswick's
coffin, Tilly had placed a battery on a "commanding position" to the southeast of
The BattIe of Stadtlohn 111

the enemy line. Now the guns ruthlessly raked the front and flank of Wilhelm's
battalions.
Knyphausen seems to have realized what was happening; the four reserve
battalions moved right to block Lindelo's envelopment. It was too little, too late.
Brunswick's horse might have stopped them, but they were deadlocked with
Anholt. The League cavalry swept onto the open flank.
Outmaneuvered and outshot, the Protestants recoiled, stubbornly trying to
improvise a new position behind the wagons of the train. It was futile; in fact,
the detonation of a powder wagon helped convert defeat to panicked rout.
Lindelo folded up the Brunswicker wing, herding them north rather than west?
Brunswick, seeing the way things were going, fled with his horsemen, but for
the infantry there was no escape. The mass of them were cut off against the
marsh; instead of a protection, it pro ved a deathtrap. They had no option but a
general surrender (5:30). In two hours, 8000 of TilIy's people had destroyed
Brunswick's army. The survivors, especially such of the infantry as had evaded
capture, were harried by the Croats until dawn.
Of 15,000 in Brunswick's force, 6-7000 were dead on the field, 4000 were
captured, and the rest hopelessly scattered. The infantry had ceased to existo
Only 2000 men, cavalry and mounted officers, accompanied Brunswick in his
flight to the Dutch border. Some 85 infantry ensigns were taken, plus 16 cavalry
cornets, 16 guns, and four mortars. The train, for which so much had been
risked, was wholly lost, including two "silver-wagons'' carrying a fortune in
cash. Among the prisoners were nine senior officers: Isenburg, Wilhelm Sax-
Weimar, Sax-Altenburg, the Rhinegrave, Meyen, Franck, Spee, Sidon, and
Pithan. The total Catholic loss, killed and wounded, carne to less than a
thousand. This was TilIy's most complete victory.
Stadtlohn, like Lutter, has always been remembered more for its casualties
than its tactics, but Tilly's generalship is worthy of notice. First he forced a
reluctant enemy to accept battle, then he grasped the possibilities offered by the
terrain: the woods in screening his movements, the "commanding position" for
his guns, the stream bottleneck, and the "protecting" marsh.
Characteristically, TilIy gave the credit to Anholt, Lindelo, and his nephew
Werner (commander of Herbersdorf Cavalry Regiment). Bitterly disappointed,
Brunswick wanted Knyphausen sentenced to death. Styrum, now de facto
commander of the survivors, took them to Mansfeld.

EPILOGUE
Tilly next moved north against Mansfeld in East Frisia. T~ wily mercenary
was ready, and both were soon engaged in the sort of war of outposts and
sklrmiSfieS they'd learned in Flanders. Tilly gained the edge, winning the action
of Olden-Oyta and capturing Kirchhof. Nevertheless, the Protestants could have
held out much longer. But in January 1624, Mansfeld again abandoned the war.
In exchange for 300,000 talers (=450,000 florins; about four months pay for his
army), he handed Emden over to the Dutch government and disbanded his
troops. For the first time since 1618, the Protestants no longer had an army in
t~eld.
In Vienna, the emperor was also disbanding troops. By this point however,
the Leaguers had grown distrustful of the appearance of peace. Brunswick's
112 Battles ofthe Thirty Years War

collaborators, Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, had to be punished.

The bishoprics of Halberstadt, Hildesheim, and Osnabruck were to be occupied
by Tilly, their disposition to rest with the emperor. The attitudes of England and
Denmark were uncertain. Tilly and the obscure Imperial officer Wallenstein
eyed the Protestants suspiciously, expecting more trouble.
This time they were right.

SOURCES
There are no satisfactory accounts of Stadtlohn in any language. Reference
Opel, Heilmann, Villermont, Wertheim, and Theatrum Europeum.

APPENDIX A: THE ARMY OF CHRISTIAN OF BRUNSWICK

Brunswick had about ten regiments in March 1623, his share of the Protestant army of
1622, with a nominal strength of 12,000. These were the Leib (5 companiés), Styrum (6),
Mengersen (6), and Jan (6), cavalry regiments and the Leib, Knyphausen, Sparr, Meyen,
Gortzke, and Rhinegrave infantry regiments. Leib Cavalry Regiment, Styrum,
Mengersen, Jan (ex-Overfest), Leib Infantry Regiment, Knyphausen, and Meyen (ex-
Sax-Lauenburg) certainly had 1622 cadres; the same may have been true of others. The
Sax-Weimars provided 2000 horse and 6000 foot (two cavalry regiments and three
infantry regiments), which doubtlessly inc1uded elements of their 1622 units. Some units,
such as Wersabe, were completely new.
Unit Date List 1 List 2 Notes:
Leib CR 1621 1000 6 coy AKA Nell, Duke Christian
Thurn CR 1622 1000 10 coy Ex -Mengersen?
Rhinegrave CR 1623 500 4 coy AKA Westphal, Westfal
Styrum CR 1622 500 5 coy
Gortzke CR 1623 200 2 coy
Isenburg CR 1622 500 10 coy AKA Ysenburg; ex-Jan?
Sax-Altenburg CR 1623 1000 10 coy AKA Duke Friedrich, Saxon
Sax-Weimar CR 1623 500 5 coy AKA J. E Sax-Weimar
Wersabe CR 1623 500 4 coy Hesse-Cassel
LtCol Plato DR 1623 600
Leib IR 1621 3000 AKA Christian IR
Leibgarde Coys 1623 1000
W. Sax- Weimar IR 1623 3000 4000 AKA Duke of Saxony
Franck IR 1623 2000
Bernhard IR 1623 1000 1000 AKA B. Sax- Weimar
Knyphausen IR 1622 3000 3000 AKA Kniphausen
SpeeIR 1623 3000 3000
Meyen IR 1622 3000 3000 AKAMay
Sparr IR 1623 2000
Gortzke IR 2000 2000 Dutch
LtCol Pithan 1623 1000
The five companies of the "Leibgarde" may have been regarded as separate from the
Leib Infantry Regiment; they were probably musketeers.
LtCol Westphal acted as commander of Rhinegrave Cavalry Regiment, even though
the Rhinegrave was present. The short-lived Rhinegrave Infantry Regiment may have
been the later Spee. Gortzke appears to have been a Frenchman leading ex-Netherlands
troops.
Tilly reported the capture of 16 guns and four rnortars: Theatrum says eleven
demicannon and five smaller pieces. As Knyphausen had 14 at the defile, and the main
body another six, either he was counting the mortars or he managed to take four of his
The Battle of StadtIohn 113

guns back in his retreat. It is likely that the heavier guns had been left with Knyphausen.

APPENDIX B: TILLY'S ARMY AT STADTLOHN

In a letter of May 26, 1623, Tilly stated that he then had eight infantry regiments
totaling 15-16,000 foot; nine cavalry regiments, for about 4000, plus the Imperial
cuirassier regiments, Holstein (5-600) and Saxon (600). He added that he had "a lot" of
Croats, but does not elaborate. It is uncJear whether he was referring to the Croats
attached to Lindelo and Pappenheim, or to additional Imperial units. The most likely
candidates are the free companies Strozzi, Schlichting, and Scherpfenberg.
As for the eight infantry and nine cavalry regiments, Schmidt, Mortaigne, Herbersdorf,
Schonberg, Erwitte, Eynatten, Lindelo, Furstenberg, and Nivenheim are mentioned by
name. We know that Pappenheim, Anholt, and Blankhart regiments took part in the
campaign; Alt-Tilly, Herliberg, Hairnhausen, Herbersdorf, Firmont, and Cratz alJ appear
in the muster. There is some indication that Tilly detached so me troops before the battIe,
possibly Pappenheim, Firmont, and Cratz Cavalry Regiments, the Salzburg companies,
and an infantry regiment. This would explain why he only had four tercios in the main
body; it would also reduce his force to 17-18,000 men.
Unit Date ~ Str1622 EstStr Notes:
Alt-TilJy IR 1620 6 1500 1500 Wurzburg; Col Truchsess
Anholt IR 1620 13 3000 3000
SchmidtIR 1620 10 1800 1800
Mortaigne IR 1620 10 1400 1400
Herliberg IR 1620 10 2400 2400 LtCol Gronsfeld
Hairnhausen IR 1620 9 1800 1800
Herbersdorf IR 1621 8 1200 1400 1 new coy
Blankhart IR 1622 lO? 2000 Cologne
Schonberg CR 1620 6 400 500 Wurzburg
Erwitte KUR 1620 4 350 300
Eynatten KUR 1620 5 350 400 Cologne
Lindelo CR 1620 5 350 400 IncJuded a Croat coy
Furstenberg CR 1621 10 350 500 4 new coys
Herbersdorf CR 1622 7 1100 500 LtCol Wemer Tilly
Pappenheim CR 1622 7 350 500 1 KUR, 4 ARK, 2 Croat
Cratz CR 1620 10 800 800 Probably not present
Salzburg Coys 1622 3 280 250 Probably not present
Nersen ARK 1622 8 500 500 AKA Ners, Firmont; Colgn
Nivenheim CR 1622 8? 400 400 Cologne
Alt-Saxon KUR 1620 10 600 IMP; F.A.Sax-Lauenburg
Holstein KUR 1621 6 550 IMP German; LtCol IIlow
Croats 3? 250
It is possible that Cratz Cavalry Regiment was present and/or Nersen absent.
As regards the artilJery, Tilly said in the same letter that he had three "very good"
demiculverins, plus some guns he'd taken from Baden in 1622. At Wimpfen, Tilly had
had four demicannon and two falcons, and Baden had two cannon, six demicannon, and
four falcons. Therefore, Tilly had three demiculverins, five or six demicannon, and five
or six falcons.

APPENDIX C: OLDEN-OYTA, DECEMBER 19, 1623

Mansfeld dispatched a raiding force under Col Limbach to assault the League-held
village of Friess Oyta. The detachment consisted of:
Limbach IR (700) 30 cav coy
Lawich IR (150)
Goldstein IR
114 Battles of the Thirty Years War

Mansfeld "Red" IR
2000inf 1000 cav = 3000 total

Friess Oyta was held by 200 League foot under LtCol Blankhart; unknown to
Limbach, Gen Anholt was coming to relieve the outpost with Erwitte Cavalry Regiment
and the Salzburg horse (550?).
After two attacks were beaten off, Limbach fell back to the nearby village of Olden-
Oyta. Anholt joined Blankhart, and their combined force (about 700) took Limbach by
surprise, setting the place afire. About 150 Mansfelders were killed, another 100 drowned
trying to escape, and "a large number" (1000?) were captured, including Limbach,
Lawich, and two lieutenant colonels.
On December 26, the Erwitte Cavalry, supported by elements of the Anholt and
Blankhart infantry regiments stormed Kirchhof, capturing 36 officers, 800 men, and 15
ensigns. This effectively eliminated the Limbach detachment.
Map 4-1
The Battle of Stadtlohn, August 6, 1623

Height

1 - Knyphausen IR 9 - Leib IR A - Schmidt IR

(2nd position) 10 - Sparr IR (Ist position) B - Mortaigne IR
2 - Pithan IR 11 - Knyphausen IR C - Forlorn
3 - Sax-Weimar IR (1st position) O- Holstein KUR
4 - Sparr IR (2nd position) 12 - Plato DR E- Herbersdorf CR
5 - Gortzke IR 13 - Isenburg CR
6 - Franck IR 14 -lhurn CR (2)
7 - Meyen IR 15 - Baggage Traln
8 - Spee IR
116 Battles of the Thirty Years War

NOTES
1. Exactly as he had delayed at Hochst!
2. The exception, oddly enough, was Gustavus Adolphus.
3. Although it's unlikely that he'd have been happier with Wallenstein's plunderers!
4. Standard practice in the pre-linear periodo
5. "AIl for God and her" viz., Queen Elizabeth of Bohemia, wife of Friedrich. The
blaspherny (and many Protestants would have agreed) lay in equating the two.
6. Of course the train was blocking the Stadtlohn crossings.