When The Subject of the Litigation isDeemed Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation

1. In an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, the basic issue is one other

that the recovery of a sum of money. The money claim in this type of action
is merely incidental. Where the action is principally the recovery of a sum of
money, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation and jurisdiction
would then depend on the amount of the claim exclusive of course of
interest, damages, of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses
and costs. Damages shall be included if the principal action is one for
damages (Raymundo vs. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 457; Singsong vs.
Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623; Jesusa Vda. De Murga vs. Chan, s5 SCRA 441;
De Jesus vs. Garcia, 19 SCRA 554; Lapitan vs. Scandia, 24 SCRA 479.

2. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which not

capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the MRC or RTC
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue
is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by the RTC.

3. Example of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for , specific

performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of
judgment, also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a
deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission
which is a counterpart of specific performance (Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA
739, 744-745.
 4. However, where a party does not merely seek the annulment of a sale but
is really asking the court to declare him as the winning bidder and
ultimately give him possession and ownership of the dispute assets, the
case is one which is not beyond pecuniary estimation but rather a simple
collection case where the value of the subject property or amount
demanded is pecuniarily determinable. (Colarina vs. Court of Appeals, 303
SCRA 647

5. An action to compel the removal of an illegal installation on a building is

one incapable of pecuniary estimation (Raymundo vs. Court of Appeals, 213
SCRA 457, 461.

6. An action seeking the nullity of an assignment of a right with chattel

mortgage is incapable of pecuniary estimation (Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill
88 SCRA 623, 627).

7. Where the pleadings of the parties and the annexes thereto, clearly show
that controversy hinges on the interpretation of a clause in the contract,
the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation (Jesusa Vda de Murga
vs. Chan, 25 SCRA 441, 449).

8. An action for specific performance to perform a stipulation in the contract

is incapable of pecuniary estimation (De Jesus vs. Garcia, 19 SCRA 554,
560), such as to make a refund under specific conditions. The payment of
money is only incidental (Ortigas Company vs. Herrera, 120 SCRA, 89, 91).

9. An action for injunction is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation

following the distinctions in Russel vs. Vestil because the issue in this action
is something other than for the recovery of money.

Illustration A (Bar 2000)

A brings an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila against B for the
annulment of an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of real property with an assessed
value of P50,000.00 located in Laguna. The complaint alleged prematurity of the
sale for the reason that the mortgage was not yet due. B timely moved to dismiss
the case on the ground that the action should have been brought in the Regional
Trial Court of Laguna. Decide with reasons.

Suggested answer: The case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. An action to annul a foreclosure sale is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Actions not capable of pecuniary estimation are within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court, not the Municipal Trial Court.

Comment: It is apparent that the motion to dismiss raises not only a jurisdictional
issue but also an issue of venue. The identification of Laguna as the location of the
property will not necessarily justify the filing of the suit in Laguna unless it is the
place of residence of one of the parties and Laguna was
the venue chosen by the plaintiff The action is a personal action and the residence
of either the plaintiff or the defendant in this case determines venue. No
residences of the parties were mentioned in the facts.

Illustration (Bar 2000)

A files an action in the Municipal Thai Court against B, the natural son of A’s
father, for the partition of a parcel of land located in Taytay, Rizal with an
assessed value of P20,000.00. B moves to dismiss the action on the ground that
the case should have been brought in the Regional Thai Court because the action
is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation as it involves primarily a
determination of hereditary rights and not merely a bare right to real property.

Suggested answer:

The answer depends upon the following distinctions. Where the material
allegations of the complaint clearly show that the action is primarily for the
determination of hereditary rights and the partition of the real property comes
merely as an incident to the main action, the suit is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The action should therefore, be dismissed because a suit of this
nature is within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. However, where the
suit is primarily for partition of real property the motion should be denied. The
suit would then be a real action irrespective of the allegations of the defendant in
his motion to dismiss. Real actions involving property with an assessed value not
exceeding P20,000.00 are within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

Comment: This distinction should be made to put the answer in its proper
context. The problem categorically states that the action is for partition of real
property while the defense alleges that the case is primarily for the determination
of hereditary rights. Basic is the rule that the nature of the action as well as the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint, not by
the defenses invoked by the defendant. An inquiry therefore, as to the material
allegations of the complaint, not by the defenses invoked by the defendant. An
inquiry therefore, as to the material allegations of the complaint has to be done.
It is submitted that an alternative answer denying the motion must be considered
even if the distinction in the suggested answer is not made by the examinee. This
is because the problem unequivocally describes the suit as an action for partition
of real property with an assessed value of P20,000.00. These facts are to be
reasonably construed as constituting the material allegations of the complaint.
Any other allegations in the motion to dismiss contrary to the material allegations
of the complaint would be immaterial to the determination of jurisdiction.

Illustration (Bar 1984)

On the basis of an alleged oral contract of sale, A filed a complaint against B in the
Municipal Trial Court to compel the latter to deliver a betamax with a value of
P8,500.00 and to accept the stipulated price. On what grounds, if any, can B assail
the complaint?

Suggested answer:

B can assail the complaint by way of a motion to dismiss by invoking lack of

jurisdiction over the subject matter and the statute of frauds. The action is one
for specific performance, an action that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. This
kind of action is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. Also, under Art. 1403 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the sale of goods
or chattels with a value of not less than P500.00 must be in writing in order to be
enforceable. The oral sale of the betamax is hence, not enforceable.

Illustration (Bar 1982)

Pedro filed in the Municipal Court of Makati an action against Maria to compel
her to finish the construction of his house valued at P20,000.00 or to pay him
P8,000.00 so that he himself could finish the construction thereof. Maria moved
to dismiss on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction because the
value of the house exceeds P10,000.00. Rule on Maria’s motion with reasons.

Suggested answer:

Note: This question was asked with the Judiciary Act of 1948 in the mind of the
examiner. Under this law, the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction covers claims not
exceeding P10,000.00. The issue here is obviously a question of jurisdiction. The
value of the house is an amount outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court
while the claim of P8,000.00, is an amount within the court’s jurisdiction. Where
the action is alternatively for specific performance (to compel to finish
construction), an action incapable of pecuniary estimation or a monetary claim
(which is capable of pecuniary estimation), the basis of jurisdiction is the amount
capable of pecuniary estimation. Since the money claim for P8,000.00 is within
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, the motion to dismiss should be
denied.

Comment:

The examiner should have realized that an obligation or a prestation to do such as

an action to compel the finish ing of the construction of the house, cannot be the
subject of specific performance without running afoul of the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude.

(See Art. 1167, Civil Code of the Philippines).

Policy of Judicial Hierarchy

1. While it is true that the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, such concurrence
does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which the
application for the writ may be directed. The application should be filed with the
court of lower level unless the importance of the issue involved deserves the
action of the court of higher level (Uy vs. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167, 17011994];
Cuñada vs. Drilon, GR. No. 159118, June 28, 2004).

2. Under a judicial policy recognizing the hierarchy of courts, a higher court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts (Santiago us. Vas quez, 217 SCRA 633, 652 [1993]). A
regard for that judicial hierarchy requires that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Tri1
Courts, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to is sue writs should be allowed only
where there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. ¡t is a policy to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court’s time and attention that are devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket (Ouano
vs. PGTT International Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 134230, July 17,2002;
People vs. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA 415,424(1989]; Ark Travel Express us. RTC of
Makati, G.R. No. 137010, August 29, 2003).

Doctrine Of Non-Interference Or Judicial Stability

1. Courts of co-equal jurisdiction and coordinate jurisdiction cannot interfere with

each other’s orders (Lapu-lapu Development and Housing Corporation vs. Group
Management Corporation, G.R. No. 141407, September 9, 2002).
2. Trial courts have no power to interfere by injunction

with the orders or judgments issued by another court of con

current or coordinate jurisdiction. A Regional Trial Court has

no power or authority to nuffily or enjoin the enforcement of

a writ of possession issued by another Regional Trial Court

(Suico Industrial Corporation us. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA

212, 223 [1999]). Certiorari and prohibition would be proper

to prevent a court from proceeding to nullify a decision ren

dered by a co-equal and coordinate branch (Sterling Inuestment

Corporation vs. Ruiz, 30 SCRA 318, 322 [1969]).