6 Held:
MARIVIC ZARATE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JULIAN
LALLAVE, JR
G.R. No. 129096. November 19, 1999
Topic:
En Banc and Divisions Cases
Facts:
During the 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections, respondent Julian
Lallave, Jr. won over the Marivic Zarate, by a single vote. The former
garnered a total of forty-six (46) votes as against the latters forty-five (45)
votes. Accordingly, the Barangay Board of Canvassers proclaimed
respondent Lallave, Jr. the duly elected SK Chairman.
Marivic Zarate lodged his election protest before the Municipal Trial
Court of Malasiqui, Pangasinan.
Marivic Zarate claimed that during the counting, tallying and
canvassing of votes for each of the candidates, respondent-members of the
Board of Election Tellers counted, credited and/or declared valid three (3) or
more votes that read JL in favor of respondent Julian Lallave, Jr., when they
should have voided the same or excluded as valid votes. Thus, the result of
the counting is 46 for protestee and 45 for the protestant.
She also alleged that the votes bearing JL are stray votes and are
therefore null and void. They are marked ballots because the votes (sic) can
identify the vote as his. More importantly, there is no candidate with a name
or nickname JL. Law and jurisprudence declare such type of votes irregular,
anomalous and void.
Zarate also claimed that had the three (3) or more ballots/votes
bearing JL been voided or excluded among the valid votes cast and
protestant should have been proclaimed as the SK Chairman of Brgy. Ican,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The MTC ruled in favor of Zarate.
Lallave, Jr. appealed to the Commission on Elections, theorizing that
subject five ballots marked Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E, bearing the initials JL,
should have been credited in his favor considering that such initials
sufficiently identify him as the candidate intended to be voted for as he was
the only one of the three candidates with the initials JL.
COMELEC En Banc came out with its assailed Resolution declaring
that while JL initials appeared in the ballots, the declared that Julian Lallave,
Jr., is the only candidate who possesses the JL initials and ballots containing
such initials SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFY Lallave as the candidate intended to
be voted for SK Chairman.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has the authority to decide
such case
The Court ruled on the negative.
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission
en banc.
Under the 1987 Constitution, election cases include pre-proclamation
controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a
Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have
the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance. In the
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are classified
as Special Cases and, in compliance with the above provision of the
Constitution, the two (2) Divisions of the Commission are vested with the
authority to hear and decide these Special Cases. Rule 27 thereof governs
Special Cases; specifically, Section 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals
from rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the
Divisions to which they are assigned and not by the commission en banc.
The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the
abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its
Divisions. Therefore, the resolution by the COMELEC en banc is null and
void.
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7
REYNATO BAYTAN, REYNALDO BAYTAN and ADRIAN BAYTAN vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 153945. February 4, 2003
Facts:
On June 1997, petitioners were on their way to register for the May
1998 elections when they met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto
Ignacio in Barangay 18, Zone II of Cavite City. Ignacio led petitioners to
register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18. Petitioners registered in this
precinct.
They then realized that their residence is situated within the
jurisdiction of Barangay 28. Thus, petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of
Barangay 28 and registered anew on June 22, 1997.
Petitioners wrote a letter to former COMELEC Assistant Executive
Director Jose Pio O. Joson and furnished a copy thereof to COMELEC
Registrar Francisco Trias requesting for advice on how to cancel their
previous registration. They also explained the reason and circumstances of
their second registration and expressed their intention to redress the error.
The Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of petitioners
Voters Registration Records to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty.
Juanito V. Ravanzo for evaluation. Ravanzo endorsed the matter to the
Regional Director for prosecution. Eventually, the Law Department endorsed
the case to Ravanzo for resolution.
Ravanzo recommended filing an information for double registration
against petitioners. In an en banc meeting, the COMELEC affirmed the
recommendation of Ravanzo. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The
COMELEC en banc denied the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has the authority to resolve
the matter
Held:
The Court ruled on the affirmative.
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the
COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers.
The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should
exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in division. The
Constitution merely vests the COMELECs administrative powers in the
Commission on Elections, while providing that the COMELEC may sit en
banc or in two divisions. Clearly, the COMELEC en banc can act directly on
matters falling within its administrative powers.
On the other hand, the COMELECs quasi-judicial powers are found
in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C.
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory,
and not appealable.
The COMELEC is empowered in Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution to prosecute cases of violations of election laws. The
prosecution of election law violators involves the exercise of the COMELECs
administrative powers. Thus, the COMELEC en banc can directly approve
the recommendation of its Law Department to file the criminal information for
double registration against petitioners in the instant case. There is no
constitutional requirement that the filing of the criminal information be first
decided by any of the divisions of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC acted in accordance with Section 9(b), Rule 34 of
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure governing the prosecution of
election offenses in meeting en banc in the first instance and acting on the
recommendation of Investigating Officer Ravanzo to file charges against
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
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8.
MANUEL MILLA, petitioner, vs. REGINA BALMORES-LAXA, respondent
G.R. No. 151216. July 18, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Manuel Milla and respondent Regina Balmores-Laxa were
candidates for councilor of Gerona, Tarlac in the May 14, 2001 elections.
On May 18, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed as the eighth winning candidate
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (BOC) based on the Statement of
Votes and the Certificate of Canvass showing the votes obtained by each
candidate.
One month after petitioner’s proclamation or on June 18, 2001, respondent
filed a petition with the COMELEC against petitioner and the BOC for
correction of entries in [the] Statement of Votes . . . based on fraud and
irregularities in [the] canvassing of votes.
Laxa prayed before the COMELEC for the correction of errors in the
Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass, the declaration as null and
void of the proclamation of Milla, and her proclamation as one of the duly
elected municipal councilors.
COMELEC En Banc declared herein petitioner’s proclamation null and void,
and proclaimed respondent as the eighth winning candidate.
Issue:
The Commission on Elections has jurisdiction to proclaim respondent as the
eighth winning candidate for councilor and to declare petitioner’s
proclamation null and void.
Held:
The Court ruled that if a candidates proclamation is based on a Statement of
Votes which contains erroneous entries, it is null and void. It is no
proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidates assumption of office
cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to annul the proclamation.
In the case at bar, as the Statement of Votes contained erroneous entries,
the COMELEC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over respondents petition for
the correction thereof and declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
proclamation. While our election laws are silent when such and similar
petitions may be filed directly with the COMELEC, the above-quoted Section
5, Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure sets a prescriptive period of five (5)
days following the date of proclamation. The COMELEC, however, could
suspend its own Rules of Procedure so as not to defeat the will of the
electorate. For adherence to technicality that would put a stamp on a
palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the
peoples will, cannot be countenanced.
The 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions,
and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election
cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
it should have first been heard and decided by a division of the
COMELEC, and then by the En Banc if a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the division were filed.
Since, as reflected above, the COMELEC sitting en banc acted on
respondent’s petition which was not first passed upon by a division, it acted
without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
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9 the meantime. The status quo ante Order had a life span of more than 20
NOEL Y. REPOL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
VIOLETO CERACAS, respondents
G.R. No. 161418. April 28, 2004
Facts:
Repol and Violeto Ceracas were candidates for Municipal Mayor of
Pagsanghan, Samar in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 16 May 2001,
Ceracas was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor with 66 votes more than
Repol.
Repol filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Tarangnan,
Samar, Branch 40 claiming that fraud and other irregularities marred the
elections in Precincts 3A, 5A and 71. Repol prayed for revision of the ballots
in these precincts. Judge Francisco Mazo dismissed the election protest.
The COMELEC First Division reversed the dismissal order of Judge Mazo
and directed the trial court to reinstate the subject election protest, conduct
the revision of ballots from the protested precincts and render its Decision
with immediate dispatch.
The COMELEC en banc denied Ceracas’ motion to reconsider. The
COMELEC en banc affirmed in toto the reinstatement of Repol’s election
protest. This time around, trial and revision of the ballots ensued with Judge
Roberto A. Navidad presiding.
The trial court declared Ceracas’ proclamation void and proclaimed Repol
the duly elected mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar.
The trial court granted Repol’s motion and issued a writ of
execution. Meanwhile, Ceracas appealed the trial courts judgment to the
COMELEC.
COMELEC First Division ruled that effective immediately, private respondent
Noel Repol, is hereby ordered to cease and desist from assuming the duties
and functions of Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Western Samar until
further orders from this Commission. In the meantime, petitioner Violeto
Ceracas shall assume the post of Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Western
Samar.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC is empowered under any statute, rule, or
jurisprudence to issue a status quo ante in effect overturning the effective
enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the trial court and suspending
indefinitely, without prior notice and hearing, the implementation of such writ.
Held:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Rule 30 of the 1993 COMELEC Rule of Procedure provides the metes and
bounds on the COMELECs power to issue injunctive relief.
A cursory reading of the Order dated 12 January 2004 or the so-called status
quo ante Order reveals that it was actually a temporary restraining order. It
ordered Repol to cease and desist from assuming the position of municipal
mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and directed Ceracas to assume the post in
days since the directive was qualified by the phrase until further orders from
this Commission. This violates the rule that a temporary retraining order has
an effective period of only 20 days and automatically expires upon the
COMELECs denial of the preliminary injunction. Thus, the status quo ante
Order automatically ceased to have any effect after 1 February 2004 since
the COMELEC First Division did not issue a writ of preliminary injunction.
While the hearing on Ceracas’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction
was held on 29 January 2004, the COMELEC First Division failed to resolve
the application. Instead, it issued an Order directing the parties to file their
memoranda until 3 February 2004 on their respective positions on the life
span of status quo ante orders and whether a writ of preliminary injunction
should be granted in the case. Clearly, the COMELEC First Divisions
indecision on the matter not only worked injustice to Repol but also failed to
dispel the uncertainty beclouding the real choice of the electorate for
municipal mayor.
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10
FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and CANUTO SENEN A. ORETA, respondents
G.R. No.133842. January 26, 2000
Federico S. Sandoval and Canuto Senen Oreta, together with Pedro
Domingo, Mariano Santiago, Symaco Benito and Warren Serna, vied for the
congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the
election held on May 11, 1998.
Counsels of Oreta made a written request upon Malabon Election Officer
Armando Mallorca to furnish them with a complete list of the statement of
votes so that they could verify whether all statements of votes have been
tabulated. They likewise requested for a complete list of precincts in the
municipality together with the number of canvassed votes for petitioner and
private respondent as of May 16, 1998. They also sought permission to
conduct an audit of the tabulation reports made by the municipal board of
canvassers. These requests were denied on the that any counsel for a
candidate has neither personality nor right to conduct an audit of the
tabulation report as the proceedings of the board are presumed to be regular,
and that the granting of the requests would delay the proceedings of the
board to the prejudice of the will of the people of Malabon.
Ma. Rosario O. Lapuz, authorized representative of Oreta wrote then
[5]
COMELEC Chairman Bernardo Pardo and informed him that several
election returns were not included in the canvass conducted by the Malabon
municipal board of canvassers. She moved that the certificate of canvass
issued by said board be declared "not final."
Oreta filed with the COMELEC an Urgent Petition entitled "In re: Petition to
Correct Manifest Error in Tabulation of Election Returns by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Malabon, NCR.
The district board of canvassers, however, denied the request on various
grounds.
Private respondent's counsel sought reconsideration of the decision of the
district board' of canvassers but it was likewise denied by the board.
After Ortega filed an urgent petition before the COMELEC, the COMELEC
Chairman directed the district board of canvassers to suspend the canvass
and proclamation pending the resolution of the petition for correction of
manifest error in the municipal certificate of canvass of Malabon; that the
district board of canvassers still proceeded with the canvass in spite of the
order; that the proclamation was made despite the non-inclusion of election
returns from 19 precincts in Malabon; and that the non-inclusion of these
election returns will materially affect the result of the election. Private
respondent prayed that the proclamation of petitioner as congressman be
annulled and that the municipal board of canvassers of Malabon be ordered
to reconvene to include the 19 election returns in the canvass.
The COMELEC en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the matter.
Held:
The Court uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the petitions filed by
private respondent. As a general rule, candidates and registered political
parties involved in an election are allowed to file pre-proclamation cases
before the COMELEC. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which
may be raised by, any candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission,
or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election
returns.
Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter
and issue of SPC No.98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of
its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the
proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due
process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing.
Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial
evidence to support its ruling.
In other words, due process requires that a party be given an opportunity to
adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence
should be considered in the adjudication of the case. The facts show that
COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner , without the benefit of
prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on
private respondent's allegations.
The COMELEC Resolution is therefore annulled.
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11
Soller v. COMELEC
Facts:
Ferdinand Thomas Soller and Angel Saulong were both candidates for
mayor of the Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 1998 elections.
On May 14, 1998, Soller was proclaimed by the municipal board of canvassers as the
duly elected mayor. On May 19, 1998, Saulong filed with the COMELEC a petition
for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return. On May 25, 1998,
Saulong also filed an election protest before the RTC. Soller moved to dismiss
Saulong’s protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping and failure to
state a cause of action. On July 3, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition filed
by Saulong. On the other hand, the RTC denied Soller’s motion to dismiss. Soller
then filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC contending that the RTC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the election
protest. COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition. Hence, this suit.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC, sitting en banc, has jurisdiction over Soller’s
petition
Held:
No. Sarmiento v. COMELEC applies. The authority to resolve a petition for
certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the questioned order of
the trial court falls within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by division and not en
banc.
Section 3, Subdivision C of Article IX of the Constitution reads: "The
Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by
the Commission en banc." COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the requisite
authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation controversies
in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any
decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the
first instance is null and void. Petitioner's petition with the COMELEC was not
referred to a division of that Commission but was, instead, submitted directly to the
Commission en banc. The authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving
incidental issues of election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls
within the division of the COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc. The order
denying the motion to dismiss is but an incident of the election protest. COMELEC
en banc acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of petitioner's petition in the
first instance.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in not ordering the dismissal of private respondent's election
protest
Held:
No. A close scrutiny of the receipts will show that Saulong failed to pay the
filing fee of 300 pesos for his protest as prescribed by the COMELEC rules. A court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon paymeny of the prescribed docket fee.
Patently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Saulong’s protest. The SC also
held that the verification of the protest was defective. Since the petition lacked
proper verification, it should be treated as an unsigned pleading and must be
dismissed. The protest likewise failed to comply with the required certification
against forum shopping. Saulong successively filed a petition for annulment of the
proclamation/exclusion of election return and an election protest. Yet, he did not
disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed a petition for annulment of
proclamation/exclusion of election returns.
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12
Garvida vs Sales 271 SCRA 764
Officers – Ineligibility – SK Chairman – “Labo Doctrine” Applied
In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of
the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her
candidacy was opposed by her rival Florencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that
she is over 21 years old (21 years old, 9 months at the time of the filing).
Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admitted as a candidate and
the SK elections went on. Sales, in the meantiume, filed a petition to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Garvida. When the elections results came in,
Garvida won with a vote of 78, while Sales got 76. Garvida was eventually
proclaimed as winner but had to face the petition filed by Sales.
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) provides that candidates for the SK must be at least 15 years of
age and a maximum age of 21 years. Garvida states that the LGC does not
specify that the maximum age requirement is exactly 21 years hence said
provision must be construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year but still less
than 22 years – so long as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible
because she is still, technically, 21 years of age (although she exceeds it by
9 months).
ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.
HELD: No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that
candidates for SK must be:
1. Filipino citizen;
2. an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;
3. 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and
4. duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the
official barangay list.
The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said
phrase is not equivalent to “less than 22 years old.” The law does not state
that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. If such was the
intention of Congress in framing the LGC, then they should have expressly
provided such.
Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he
should be declared as the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention?
No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate, though
obtaining the second highest number of vote, is not deemed to have been
elected by reason of the winner’s eventual disqualification/ineligibility. He
cannot be declared as successor simply because he did not get the majority
or the plurality of votes – the electorate did not choose him. It would have
been different if Sales was able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida
despite knowing her ineligibility, this would have rendered her votes “stray”.
Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by
the SK member who obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK
member obtaining such vote succeed Garvida?**
(**Not to be confused with Sales’ situation – Sales was a candidate for SK
chairmanship not SK membership.)
The above argument can’t be considered in this case because Section 435
only applies when the SK Chairman “refuses to assume office, fails to qualify,
is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently
incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for
more than three (3) consecutive months.” Garvida’s case is not what Section
435 contemplates. Her removal from office by reason of her age is a
question of eligibility. Being “eligible” means being “legally qualified; capable
of being legally chosen.” Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of
the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding
public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435
for succession of the SK Chairman.
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13
 ATTY. ROSAURO I. TORRES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
270 SCRA 315
Facts: On 9 May 1995 the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanza, Cavite,
issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
Candidates for Municipal Offices. Two (2) days after or on 11 May 1995 the
same Municipal Board of Canvassers requested the COMELEC for
correction of the number of votes garnered by petitioner who was earlier
proclaimed as the fifth winning candidate for councilor. Upon prior
authorization, the Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a corrected
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates
which included private respondent Vicente Rafael A. de Peralta as the eighth
winning councilor and excluded petitioner from the new list of winning
candidates.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to grant such authority.
Held: In Duremdes v. COMELEC, this Court sustained the power of the
COMELEC En Banc to order a correction of the Statement of Votes to make
it conform to the election returns in accordance with a procedure similar to
the procedure now embodied in Sec. 7, Rule 27, of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Since the Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of
Canvass and of the proclamation, any error in the statement ultimately
affects the validity of the proclamation.
The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes
obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. What is
involved in the instant case is simple arithmetic. In making the correction in
the computation the Municipal Board of Canvassers acted in an
administrative capacity under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
Pursuant to its constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections,
the COMELEC En Banc has authority to resolve any question pertaining to
the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
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14
Faelnar vs People
GR Nos. 140850-51 May 4, 2000
Facts:
Faelnar filed a certificate for candidacy for the position of Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu in the 1997 barangay elections.
The day after he filed his certificate, a basketball tournament, the “2nd Jing-
Jing Faelnar’s Cup,” opened opened at the Guadalupe Sports Complex. Due
to the basketball tournament, Antonio Luy filed a complaint for electioneering
against Faelnar and Cecilio Gillamac. It alleged that: 1) during the game, a
streamer with Faelnar’s name was placed on the facade of the complex, 2)
his name was repeatedly mentioned over the microphone, 3) the tournament
was widely published in the local newspaper, and 4) a raffle sponsored by
Gillamac was held (home appliances were given away). Faelnar calimed that
it was purely a sporting event for the benefit of the youth. Atty. Cadungog,
election officer of Cebu, investigated the complaint and recommended the
dismissal of the charges. The law department of COMELEC recommended
the filing of the case. The COMELEC en banc resolved to dismiss the case
(in a Resolution). Antonio Luy filed an MR, and COMELEC ordered the filing
of the necessary informations. Faelnar and Gillamac were formally charged
in the RTC (criminal cases). Petitioner moved to quash the information, or a
reinvestigation, due to the fact that the decision of the COMELEC is final and
executory and could no longer be reconsidered.
Issue: Whether the first resolution of COMELEC was final executory and
could not be reconsidered?
Held:
1. The first resolution of COMELEC (dismissing the case against Faelnar)
was not final and may be subject to a Motion for Reconsideration.
Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the 1988 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provide for
an exception in what pleadings are not allowed: o “motion for reconsideration
of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision, except in election offense
cases” An MR of a ruling, resolution or decision of the COMELEC en banc is
allowed in cases involving election offenses. There is no question that what
is involved in this case is a resolution in an election offense. Therefore, an
MR is allowed under the Rules. Faelnar, likewise, invokes Rule 34, Section
10 of the same Rules. However, this section does not apply to investigations
conducted by COMELEC, but to the resolutions of the State Prosecutor, or
Provincial or City Fiscal, who has the delegated power to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offense cases. But if COMELEC conducts the
investigation through its own investigating officer, the section does not apply.
2. However, even if it was final, Faelnar’s motion to quash was not the proper
remedy as it was an attempt to circumvent a final resolution of the
COMELEC. The proper remedy would have been a petition for certiorari
under Rule 64, which must be filed within 30 days from notice of judgment. In
this case, Faelnar filed his motion to quash more than a year after.
***************************************************************************************
15.
 KHO VS COMELEC, 279 SCRA 463
Facts:
On May 30, 1995, petitioner Kho, a losing candidate in the 1995 gubernatorial
elections in Masbate, filed an election protest1 against private respondent
Espinosa to set aside the proclamation of the latter as the Provincial
Governor of Masbate and to declare him instead the winner in the elections. Private
respondent Espinosa, on the other hand, argued that the five (5) day period of
filing an answer is not jurisdictional because the answer in not an
initiatory pleading and the time of its filing can be extended either through
motion or motu propio. He added that the COMELEC, in admitting the answer with
counter-protest, committed no error as it is allowed to suspend its rules in the interest of
justice and speedy disposition of matters before it. According to him, the order of the
COMELEC dated July 26, 1995 admitting his counter-protest is not subjected to a
timely motion for reconsideration by petitioner Kho, thus it became final and
executory and can no longer be disturb.
Held:
We find the petition meritorius. It is clear from the records that private
respondent Espinosa filed his answer with counter protest way beyond the
reglementary period of five (5) days provided for by law. It must be pointed out
that Espinosa received the COMELEC summons and the Petition of Protest of Kho on
June 6, 1995. Under Section 1, Rule 10 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the answer must be filed within five (5) days from service of summons and a
copy of the petition. Private respondent Espinosa, therefore, had until June 11,
1995 within which to file his answer. In violation however of the aforesaid rules,
Espinosa filed his answer with counter-protest only on June 15, 1995,
obviously beyond the five (5) mandatory periods. It should
be stressed that under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
protestee may incorporate in his answer a counterprotest.16 It has been
said that a counter-protest is tantamount to a counterclaim in a civil action and may be
presented as a part of the answer within the time he is required to answer the protest, unless
a motion for extension is granted, in which it must be filed before the
expiration of the extended time.17 Apparently, the counter-protest of
Espinosa was incorporated in his answer. And as what was revealed, this
answer with counter-protest was filed only on June 15, 1995, which was obviously late for
four (4) days. It appears that Espinosa did not file a motion for extension of
time within which to file his answer with counter-protest. In the absence
thereof, there is no basis then for the COMELEC First Division to admit the belatedly
filed answer with counter-protest.
***************************************************************************************
16
MUTILAN VS. COMELEC GR NO 171248
FACTS:
Petitioner Mutilan and Respondent Ampatuan were candidates for
ARMM Governor. Petitioner says, there were many parts of ARMM wherein
no voting actually happened, substitute voting occurred, etc. Petitioners
counsel admitted that the case is not an election protest but an annulment of
elections and prayed that it be elevated to the COMELEC en banc and not
the Second Division where it was originally in. Petitioner argued that
jurisdiction of this case may be heard by both division and en banc so the
second division can legally elevate the case to the Commission En Banc
pursuant to its rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election case.
The COMELEC Second Division ruled that jurisdiction over petitions for
annulment of elections is vested in the COMELEC En Banc. However, the
elevation of the case to the COMELEC En Banc is not sanctioned by the
rules or by jurisprudence. Thus, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. WON the COMELEC Second Division acted with GAD amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition to annul elections
and in not elevating the petition to the COMELEC En Banc.
2. WON the COMELEC En Banc acted in the same way in denying
petitioner as motion for reconsideration for lack of verification.
HELD:
The petition is partly meritorious
1. Division can elevate. While automatic elevation of a case
erroneously filed with the Division to En Banc is not provided in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such action is not prohibited.
2. MFR must be verified before it may be acted by the COMELEC en
banc.
***************************************************************************************
17.
CUA VS COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582
FACTS:
The first division of Comelec rendered a 2-1decision favoring the
petitioner but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone
congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous vote
required by the procedural rules in Comelec Resolution No. 1669. Section 5
of the said resolution states that, †œA case being heard by it shall be
decided with the unanimous concurrence of all three Commissioners and its
decision shall be considered a decision of the Commission. If this required
number is not obtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion, the case may
be appealed to the Commission En Banc, in which case the vote of the
majority thereof shall be the decision of the Commission.†• Petitioner
contends that the 2-1 decision of the first division was a valid decision
despite the resolution stated above because of Art. IX-A, Section 7 of the
Constitution. He argues that this applies to the voting of the Comelec both in
division and En Banc. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that no
decision was reached by the first division because the required unanimous
vote was not obtained. It was also argued that no valid decision was reached
by the Comelec En Banc because only three votes were cast in favor of the
petitioner and these did not constitute the majority of the body.
ISSUE:
Whether the 2-1 decision of the first division was valid.
RULING:
YES. The Court held that the 2-1 decision rendered by the first
Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the First Division
constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon
En Banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional
provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited
decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his seat in the
House of Representatitves.
***************************************************************************************
18
ESTRELLA VS COMELEC, 428 SCRA 789
FACTS:
Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May
14, 2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial
Court (RTC) an election protest which consequently annulled Salvador‘s
proclamation and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually
issued writ of execution. While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division
thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a
Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However, Commissioner Lantion
voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another Commissioner to
substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed with
modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected
mayor. Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion participated
by virtue of Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He
said that as agreed upon, while he may not participate in the Division
deliberations, he will vote when the case is elevated to COMELEC En Banc.
Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether a COMELEC Commissioner who inhibited himself in
Division deliberations may participate in its En Banc deliberation
HELD:
The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the
COMELEC En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantion‘s voluntary piecemeal
inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it
allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to
participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself
in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially
unethical but legally improper and absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the
issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring
therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the
COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number
of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order.
***************************************************************************************
19
DUMAYAS, JR. VS COMELEC, 357 SCRA 358
FACTS:
Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for
the position in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998 synchronized elections.
During the canvassing by the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of
election returns for 3 precincts of Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of
terrorism, intimidation and coercion committed in said precincts during the
casting and counting of votes. The MBC denied petitioner’s objections and
proceeded with the canvass which showed respondent Bernal garnering
more votes than the petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which
excluded election returns from 3 precincts and directed the MBC to
reconvene and finish the canvass of the remaining or uncontested returns
and then, to proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate. Private respondent
Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division with
the COMELEC en banc.
The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private
respondent Bernal filed an urgent motion to declare void petitioner’s
proclamation. The duly proclaimed Vice-Mayor Betita, and private
respondent Bernal filed n action for quo warranto against petitioner before
the RTC of Iloilo. Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel
Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and motion declare void petitioner’s
proclamation on the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to
have abandoned said motion when he filed quo warranto action.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second
Division, annulled the petitioner Dumayas’ proclamation; and constituted a
new MBC. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC
as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality.
Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set aside the
COMELEC en banc resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC was correct in including in the canvass the
election returns of the contested precincts?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence
presented by the petitioner to prove the alleged irregularities were the self-
serving contracts of his watchers and inspectors. Returns cannot be
excluded on mere allegations that the returns are manufactured or fictitious
when the returns on their face appear to be regular and without any physical
signs of tampering. The election irregularities cited by the petitioner would
require the presentation of evidence which cannot be done in a pre-
proclamation controversy which is summary in nature.
***************************************************************************************
20
Ambil v. COMELEC
344 SCRA 358
FACTS:
Petitioner Ruperto Ambil, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ramirez
were candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern Samar during the May
11, 1998 elections. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner
as the duly elected Governor. Private respondent filed an election protest
with the COMELEC, which was assigned to the First Division.
Commissioner Japal Guidani prepared and signed a proposed
resolution in the case regarding Ramirez’s protest. In said resolution,
Commissioner Julio Desamito had dissented while Commissioner
Luzviminda Tancangco did not indicate her vote because wanted to see both
positions first before giving her decision.
On February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guidani retired and was
replaced. On February 24, 2000, petitioner and respondent received a
purported resolution in favor of private respondent promulgated on February
14, 2000 and signed by Commissioners Guidani, Desamito and Tancangco.
The First Division later declared that the parties should ignore the
resolution since it was not yet promulgated. The Division later set a date for
promulgation of a resolution of the case, and said that the aggrieved party
could then challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the
Commission en banc or through a certiorari case before the SC.
The petitioner filed this case to annul the order for the promulgation
of the resolution and to direct the First Division to deliberate anew on the
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions
of the COMELEC.
HELD:
The SC dismissed the case for prematurity. It ruled that it has no
power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution
of a Division of the Commission on Elections. “The instant case does not fall
under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases
dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In
truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the
Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
The SC declared the resolution signed by Commissioner Guidani as
void for various reasons. First, one who is no longer a member of the
Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot
validly take part in that resolution or decision.
Second, the Clerk of the First Division denied the release or
promulgation of the resolution on February 14, 2000 resolution.
Third, the First Division even later said that the parties should ignore
the resolution since it was not yet promulgated.
Lastly, Commissioner Tancangco could not have affixed her
signature on the resolution, since on the same date an order was issued
where she said that she still wanted to see both positions before making her
decision.
***************************************************************************************
22
Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr.
January 29, 1993 218 SCRA 253
FACTS:
On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil
Action No. 465) before the court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and
restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works projects as it
violates the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they were initiated few
days before March 27, 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not
covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program of work
which are preconditions for the commencement of any public works project.
The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a)
those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for the
maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of the
Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those
designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which
include the construction of Human Development Center, various Day Care
cum Production Centers and waterworks systems; the extension and
renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and laboratory
equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment.
On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question TRO.
In the same order, he directed the petitioners to file their Answer
within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the application
for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992.
Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order. They contend that the case
principally involves an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus
the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the COMELEC, not the Regional Trial
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of Special Civil Action No. 465.
HELD:
The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably
link the private respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of
paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
There is particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which
read:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — xxx xxx xxx
(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. — xxx xxx xxx
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of
public funds. Any public official or employee including barangay officials and
those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a
special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for: (1) Any
and all kinds of public works, except the following: xxx xxx xxx
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of
materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar
devices.
During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and
thirty days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the
construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in
the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or
any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of
value chargeable against public funds.
The court ruled that COMELECc has jurisdiction to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The 1987 Constitution
implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and
regulations as provided in Section 2 of Article IX-C. Moreover, the present
Constitution also invests the Comission with the power to ―investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecutes cases of violations of election law, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court under the election laws is limited to criminal actions
for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution itself grants to
it exclusive jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials.
Neither can the Court agree with the petitioners' assertion that the
Special Civil Action filed in the RTC below involves the prosecution of
election offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident to or in
connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is sought is the
prevention of the further commission of these offenses which, by their
alleged nature, are continuing.
There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private
respondent has no legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent
any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from
filing a complaint in connection therewith.
On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation
of complaints for election offenses may be done motu propio by the
Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate
or registered political party or organization under the party-list system or any
of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission. However, such written
complaints should be filed with the Law Department of the Commission; or
with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or
Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City
Fiscal
As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously
concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He merely
sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of their alleged
adverse effect on his candidacy.
Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear and may have even
done the right thing, he committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked
the wrong authority. The court, therefore, has no alternative but to grant this
petition on the basis their resolution of the principal issue.
Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in so holding that
the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil
Action No. 465.
***************************************************************************************
23-24. Consolidated Cases
Cayetano vs. COMELEC
479 SCRA 513 and
Buac vs. COMELEC
421 SCRA 92
1
Before us for resolution are two (2) petitions for certiorari:
1. G.R. No. 166388 (497 SCRA 513)
The petition in this case, filed by Congressman Alan Peter S.
Cayetano, representing the District of Taguig-Pateros, against the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio
Bautista, mainly assails the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated
December 8, 2004 in EPC No. 98-102 declaring the ratification and approval,
through a plebiscite, of the conversion of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, into a highly urbanized city. Private respondents are residents and
duly registered voters of Taguig.
2. G.R. No. 166652 (421 SCRA 92)
The petition here, filed by the same petitioner against the same
respondents, questions the (a) COMELEC Resolution dated January 28,
2005 declaring the said Resolution of December 8, 2004 final and executory;
and (b) the recording of the said Resolution in the COMELEC’s Book of Entry
of Judgments dated January 28, 2005.
FACTS:
On April 25, 1998, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Taguig,
Metro Manila on the conversion of this municipality into a highly urbanized
city as mandated by Republic Act No. 8487. The residents of Taguig were
asked this question: “Do you approve the conversion of the Municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of
Taguig, as provided for in Republic Act No. 8487? ”
On April 26, 1998, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC),
without completing the canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns,
declared that the “No” votes won, indicating that the people rejected the
conversion of Taguig into a city.
However, upon order of the COMELEC en banc, the PBOC
reconvened and completed the canvass of the plebiscite returns, eventually
proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.
Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and
counting of votes, private respondents, Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio
Bautista, filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the annulment of the
announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of
the ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election protest,
docketed as EPC No. 98-102. It was raffled to the Second Division.
Petitioner Cayetano intervened in the case. He then filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He alleged that a
plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest.
The COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting
petitioner’s motion and dismissing the petition to annul the results of the
Taguig plebiscite for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this
Resolution.
Accordingly, on April 19, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division
issued an Order in EPC No. 98-102 constituting the committees for the
revision/recount of the plebiscite ballots.
On April 28, 2004, the revision/recount proceedings commenced and
upon its termination, the Committees on Revision submitted their complete
and final reports.
Thereafter, the COMELEC Second Division set the case for hearing.
As no witnesses were presented by petitioner, the parties were directed to
submit their respective memoranda, which they did.
Petitioner contends that “the revision of the plebiscite ballots cannot
be relied upon for the determination of the will of the electorate” because “the
revision is incomplete. He claims that:
“Based on the Final Report of the Committee on Revision for each of
the eight (8) Revision Committees, the revision of ballots yielded a total of
15,802 votes for ‘Yes’ and a total of 12,602 votes for ‘No.’ The revision
committee thus canvassed only a total of 28,404 ballots.
As shown by the records, the COMELEC considered not only the
total number of votes reflected in the Final Canvassing Report of the Taguig
PBOC, but also the voting results based on (1) the physical count of the
ballots; (2) the returns of the uncontested precincts; and (3) the appreciation
of the contested ballots, all summed up and tallied as follows:
Affirmative Negative
Total Number of Votes Per PBOC Canvassing Report 19,413 21,890
Minus: Number of Invalid Votes 253 419
Minus: Number of Votes Deducted from the
Plebiscite Returns After Physical Count (Table D) 0 2,024
Plus: Number of Votes Added After Physical Count 1,936 0
(Table D)
Plus: Credited Claimed Ballots 9 13
Total 21,105 19,460
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over controversies
involving the conduct of plebiscite and the annulment of its results.
HELD:
Yes.
Petitions dismissed for lack of merit
The above factual findings of the COMELEC supported by evidence,
are accorded, not only respect, but finality. This is so because “the conduct
of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the business of
the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the
appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an
independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the
COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related
laws.” Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties.
In fine, we hold that in issuing the challenged Resolution and Order
in these twin petitions, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion.
NOTA BENE:
The COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions contesting the results
of plebiscites under its power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of a plebiscite under Article IX-C, Section
2(1) of the Constitution. Implied in said power is the power to check and
verify the true results of the plebiscite either through a pre-proclamation case
or through revision of ballots.
In this case, private respondent questioned the jurisdiction of
COMELEC over a petition contesting the result of the plebiscite held in
Taguig the subject of which was the conversion of Taguig from a municipality
to a city. In the original result proclaimed, the NO votes won and it was
proclaimed that the people rejected the conversion.
A case assailing the regularity of the conduct of a plebiscite does not
fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial power—it does not
involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its enforcement.
In the case at bar, the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite is the core of
the controversy. This is a matter that involves the enforcement and
administration of a law relative to a plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution which
gives it the power “to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of a x x x plebiscite x x x.” Another reason why the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC to resolve disputes involving plebiscite results should be
upheld is that such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best
left to the COMELEC.
***************************************************************************************
25
FLORES vs. COMELEC
184 SCRA 484
FACTS:
Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvassers as
having the highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989
elections, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong
barangay in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election
was protested by private respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the
election with one vote less than the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong barangay in
place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter’s
total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the challenged decision in
toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast for “Flores” only, without any
distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid
instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores,
another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the petitioner was
correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place.
The petitioner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on
the ground that it had no power to review the decision of the RTC, based on
Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it
from the municipal trial court in barangay elections “on questions of fact shall
be final and non-appealable”. In his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is
faulted for not taking cognizance of the petitioners appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Metropolitan Courts in
barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679?
HELD:
The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different
and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution, providing that the COMELEC shall “Exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction”. Municipal or
Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited jurisdiction, their decisions in
barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the decision
rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been appealed
directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep.
Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or
metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the
RTC, must be declared unconstitutional.
***************************************************************************************
26
Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors
243 SCRA 422
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose M. Mercado was proclaimed winner in the election for
chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Batangas. The proclamation
was made by the Board of Election Tellers (BET) acting as the Board of
Canvassers, on the basis of its tally which showed Mercado winning by one
vote (49 to 48) over his rival, private respondent Crisanto P. Pangilinan.
Pangilinan filed a formal protest with the BES questioning the results
of the election. He alleged that the BET Chairman was inebriated during the
counting of the votes and that he had invalidated some of them without
consulting the other members. The Board of Election Supervisors (BES)
ordered a recount of the votes for SK Chairman. The recount reversed the
earlier tally to 51 to 49 in favor of Pangilinan, who was thereupon proclaimed
the duly elected SK Chairman by the BES.
Mercado filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC
praying for the annulment of Pangilinan’s proclamation by the BES and for
the DILG to recognize him as the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay
Mabalor. He assailed the jurisdiction of the BES to act on the protest filed by
Pangilinan, claiming that it was in the nature of an election protest properly
cognizable by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court in accordance with
Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code.
RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. It held that
Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC did not vest in the RTC jurisdiction
over controversies affecting SK elections. It held that the BES, which is under
COMELEC jurisdiction, is the final arbiter of all election controversies within
its level.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not BES could be the final arbiter of SK elections (WON
COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is valid and constitutional)
2. Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Mercado’s protest
regarding the decision of BES.
HELD:
(1) YES. SK elections are not like elective barangay officials, the
contests of which are vested in the proper metropolitan or municipal trial
court original jurisdiction over such contests.
(2) NO. HOWEVER, the petition of Mercado to reverse the dismissal
orders of the RTC (in effect, to recognize RTC’s jurisdiction over the election
controversy) is granted under the operative fact doctrine.
The contention that BES can’t be the final arbiter of election contests
involving the SK since it contravenes Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code
is without merit for it assumes that the SK election is an election involving
elective barangay officials within the purview of the aforesaid statutory and
constitutional provisions.
Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph (2),
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELEC's exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials refer
to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the time
the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the
Constitution. That law was the B.P. Blg. 337, or the old LGC.
The discussions of the Constitutional Commission shows that that
contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within Section 252 of
the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the
Constitution had made the SK chairman an elective barangay official.
 The Court recognizes the consequences of the quasi-judicial acts
performed by the BES pursuant to Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2499 under the operative fact doctrine; thus, the RTC is competent to review
the decision of the BES in election controversies within its level. As correctly
stated by the petitioner, it is a basic principle in administrative law that the
absence of a provision for the review of an administrative action does not
preclude recourse to the courts.
A Brief History of the Sangguniang Kabataan
SK, originally organized as the Kabataang Barangay (KB), is a youth
organization composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18
years of age which aims to provide its members with the opportunity to
express their views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance.
The Pambansang Katipunan ng Kabataang Barangay ng Pilipinas
was constituted as "a body corporate" with "the powers and attributes of a
corporation" and placed directly under the Office of the President.
Kabataang Barangay was later changed to the Sangguniang
Kabataan. It remains as a youth organization in every barangay, composed
of a chairman and 7 members to be elected by the katipunan ng kabataan,
and the secretary and the treasurer to be appointed by the SK chairman with
the concurrence of the SK. The katipunan ng kabataan is composed of all
citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least 6
months who are 15 but not more than 21 and who are duly registered in the
list of the SK or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay
secretary.
The IRR of the LGC states that the conduct and administration of the
elections for sangguniang kabataan members shall be governed by the rules
promulgated by the COMELEC.
Under Section 532 of the new LGC, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2499 which closely followed the pattern set in the Constitution
of the Kabataang Barangay providing for a Board of Election Supervisors
(BES) and Board of Election Tellers (BET), with the former having direct
general supervision in the conduct of such election and as the final arbiter of
all election protests.
27
Veloria Vs. Comelec
211 SCRA 907
FACTS:
The seven (7) petitioners, Ramon Veloria et.al, as well as the seven
(7) private respondents. Pedro Sales et.al were candidates for municipal
mayor (Veloria and Sales), vice-mayor (Espejo and Soriano) and members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Manaoag, Pangasinan, in the local elections of
January 18, 1988.
After the canvass of the election returns on January 31, 1988, the
private respondents were proclaimed duly elected to the positions they ran
for. Dissatisfied, the petitioners filed Election Protest. Several proceedings
were had, and some issues were brought up to the Court of Appeals and this
Court for determination.
Revision of Ballots was then set of February 26, 1990. During the
scheduled initial revision of the ballots in Precinct No. 22, Barangay Licsi, the
private respondents, as protestees, filed a “Motion to Dismiss” on the ground
that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the election protest on
account of the following: (1) that the election protest involves the contests
over three (3) different Municipal Offices joined together in one (1) single
petition which is in violation and clear disregard of the specific and
mandatory provisions of Section 2, Rule 35, Part VI of the COMELEC
RULES OF PROCEDURE, and/or Section 2, Rule II of Comelec Resolution
No. 1451. (2) that the Election Protest was in violation of COMELEC RULES
OF PROCEDURE, and/or Comelec Resolution No. 1451; and (3) that there
is no showing that the protestants paid the requisite filing fees and legal
research fees for each interest.
The petitioners-protestants opposed the Motion to Dismiss which
was subsequently dismissed. Instead of perfecting an appeal within five (5)
days as provided by law, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
March 20, 1990. The protestees opposed the Motion for Reconsideration,
and the petitioners filed a Rejoinder.
In the meantime, Judge Romulo E. Abasolo, was assigned to take
charge of the cases. Abasolo then denied the MFR which prompted the
petitioners to file Notice of Appeal. Respondents filed a “Motion to Dismiss
Notice of Appeal” on the grounds, that it was filed out of time and that the
resolution of the trial court was already final and executory.
Judge Abasolo then gave due course to petitioners’ Notice of
Appeal. The private respondents (as protestees) sought recourse in the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) by a petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Restraining
Order (SPR No. 8-90) to annul Judge Abasolo’s order giving due course to
the appeal.
On May 30, 1990, the Commission en banc issued a TRO enjoining
Judge Abasolo from implementing his Order of May 10, 1990. COMELEC
then granted the petition for certiorari.
Hence, this special civil action of Certiorari and Prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
There is no merit in this petition for review for the COMELEC
correctly found that the petitioners’ appeal from the court’s order dismissing
their election protest was indeed tardy. It was tardy because their motion for
reconsideration did not suspend their period to appeal. The petitioners’
reliance on Section 4, Rule 19 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE
which provides:
“Sec. 4. Effect of motion for reconsideration on period to appeal. – A
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling when not pro-
forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court.”
The “motion for reconsideration” referred to above is a motion for
reconsideration filed in the COMELEC, not in the trial court where a motion
for reconsideration is not entertained.
The rule applicable to decisions or orders of the court in election
protests is Section 20, Rule 35 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE
which provides:
“Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. – The decision of the
court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be
given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after promulgation. No
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.”
The above COMELEC rule implements Section 256 of the Omnibus
Election Code quoted below:
“Sec. 256. Appeals. – Appeals from any decision rendered by the
regional trial court under Section 251 and paragraph two, Section 253 hereof
with respect to quo-warranto petitions filed in election contests affecting
municipal officers, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court [now Commission on Elections] within five days after receipt
of a copy of the decision. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained
by the Court. The appeal shall be decided within sixty days after the case
has been submitted for decision.”
Petitioners admitted receipt of the resolution of the trial court dated
March 7, 1990 on March 15, 1990 but they filed a notice of appeal on April 3,
1990 only, instead of on or before March 20, 1990 (five days from receipt of
the trial court’s decision), because they filed a motion for reconsideration
which, as previously stated, is prohibited by Section 256 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 20, Rule 35 of the COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE.
The COMELEC, therefore, correctly ruled that the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners in the trial court on March 20, 1990 did
not suspend the period to appeal since a “motion for reconsideration” is
prohibited under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due
process, for it is merely a statutory privilege that must be exercised in the
manner and according to procedures laid down by law and its timely
perfection within the statutory period is mandatory and jurisdictional. Judge
Abasolo gravely abused his discretion when he gave due course to the
petitioners’ tardy appeal from his predecessor’s (Judge Santiago Estrella’s)
resolution of March 7, 1990 dismissing the petitioners’ election protest. Said
resolution had become final and unappealable.
Nevertheless, we must grant this petition for certiorari for the
COMELEC does not possess jurisdiction to grant the private respondents’
petition for certiorari.
COMELEC has not been given, by the Constitution nor by law,
jurisdiction to issued writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus:
“In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus,
such authority has always been expressly conferred, either by the
Constitution or by law. As a matter of fact, the well-settled rule is that
jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It is never derived
by implication. Indeed, ‘while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in
some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory
provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are
expressly designated’ “Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus by virtue of express constitutional grant
or legislative enactments.
“Significantly, what the Constitution granted the COMELEC was
appellate jurisdiction. The Constitution makes no mention of any power given
the COMELEC to exercise original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus unlike in the case of the Supreme Court which
was specifically conferred such authority.
***************************************************************************************
28
BESO vs ABALLE
326 SCRA 100
FACTS:
Petitioner Vito Beso (hereafter BESO) and private respondent Rita
Aballe (hereafter ABALLE) were candidates for the position of Barangay
Captain of Barangay Carayman, Calbayog City, in the barangay elections of
12 May 1997.
In the canvass of the returns of the four precincts of Barangay
Carayman, BESO was credited with four hundred ninety-five (495) votes,
while ABALLE obtained four hundred ninety-six (496) votes. The latter was
thus proclaimed the winning candidate.
BESO seasonably filed a protest with the Municipal Trial Court of
Calbayog City (hereafter MTCC).
After due proceedings, the MTCC, per Judge Filemon A. Tandico,
Jr., promulgated a decision in favor of BESO.
ABALLE filed a Notice of Appeal and purchased postal money orders
in the amounts of P500 and P20 in payment of the appeal fees and filed
them with the MTCC, which the latter transmitted to the Commission on
Elections. However, Records Officer IV Miguel T. Varquez, Jr. of the
Electoral Contests Adjudication Department of the Commission on Elections
returned these money orders for having become stale and directed ABALLE
to replace them within three days. BESO filed with the MTCC a motion for
execution pending appeal.
ABALLE sought to inhibit judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr. of MTCC,
however, the motion was denied.
MTCC, handed down a Resolution granting the motion for execution
pending appeal
ABALLE filed a motion to reconsider the Resolution, which the
MTCC denied
ABALLE filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City
(hereafter RTC) a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with an
urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction against MTCC Judge Tandinco, Jr. to set aside and
annul the latter’s order the motion for inhibition; the resolution granting the
motion for execution pending appeal; and the resolution denying the motion
to reconsider the resolution of 5 March 1998. BESO was impleaded as co-
respondent. The case was assigned to Branch 31 of the RTC
Judge Navidad issued a Temporary Restraining Order restraining
respondent Judge Tandinco, Jr. and all persons acting in his behalf "from
enforcing the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal." The temporary restraining
order was "effective within 72 hours only from its issuance."
BESO filed a comment to ABALLE’s petition for certiorari and
prohibition alleging therein that pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 28 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure and our decision in Relampagos v. Cumba,
et al. (243 SCRA 690 [1995]), the Commission on Elections, and not the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has primary jurisdiction on the petition
for certiorari.
HELD:
Since ABALLE has appealed to the COMELEC from the decision in
Election Protest Case No. 30 of the MTCC, by filing a Notice of Appeal, and
submitting at the same time the postal money orders for the appeal fees, it
follows that the COMELEC has primary jurisdiction on the petition
for certiorari to annul the execution pending appeal granted by the MTCC.
We ruled in Relampagos that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P.
Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect in such cases where, under
paragraph (2), Section 1 (should be Section 2) Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the
election contest in question. In such cases the COMELEC has the authority
to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. The last paragraph of Section 50 reads:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to
hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus involving election cases.
Under the second paragraph of Section 2 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the Commission on Elections has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over, inter alia, contests involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
The contested position in this case is that of a barangay captain. The
Municipal Trial Court of Calbayog City, a court of limited jurisdiction, had the
exclusive original jurisdiction over the election protest, and the COMELEC
has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over such protest. Sc
It follows then that the RTC of Calbayog City is without jurisdiction on
the petition for certiorari and prohibition which ABALLE filed to annul the
execution pending appeal the MTCC had issued in the election protest case.
ABALLE should have gone to the COMELEC and her allegation that it was
impossible for her to have invoked the power of the COMELEC to issue the
writ because the records of the Election Protest No. 130 were forwarded to
the COMELEC only in August 1998 merits no sympathy as certified copies of
the challenged resolutions or orders could easily be obtained and attached to
the petition.
***************************************************************************************
29
ANTONIO vs. COMELEC
315 SCRA 62
FACTS:
Antonio and Miranda, Jr. were rival candidates for the Punong
Barangay of Brgy. Ilaya, Las Pinas, Manila. After Antonio was proclaimed
winner, Miranda, Jr. filed an election protest.
The municipal trial court ruled in favor of the latter; and nine days
from receipt of the decision, Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal.
The Commission, however, dismissed the same on the ground that
Antonio failed to perfect his appeal within the prescribed time.
ISSUE:
Whether the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to
the COMELEC in an election protest involving a barangay position is 5 days
per COMELEC Rules of Procedure or 10 days as provided for in RA 6679
and the Omnibus Election Code.
HELD:
When the Court declared in the case of Flores v. COMELEC that
decisions of the Municipal/Metropolitan Court in election protest cases
involving barangay officials are no longer appealable to the RTC but to the
COMELEC, the same includes the 10-day period of appeal. The 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided a uniform 5-day period for
taking an appeal consistent with the expeditious resolution of election-related
cases. It would then be absurd and therefore not clearly intended, to maintain
the 10-day period for barangay election contests.
Petitioner points out that in Flores vs. Commission on Elections, this
Court had declared that decisions of the Metropolitan or Municipal Court in
election protest cases involving barangay officials are no longer appealable
to the Regional Trial Court but to the COMELEC pursuant to Section 2(2) of
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner submits that the dispositive
portion in the Flores case only declared unconstitutional that portion of
Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 providing for appeal to the Regional Trial
Court but not the ten (10) day period of appeal. Petitioner’s argument raises
the presumption that the period to appeal can be severed from the remedy or
the appeal itself which is provided in Section 9, Republic Act 6679 and
survive on its own. The presumption cannot be sustained because the period
to appeal is an essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the remedy.
What was invalidated by the Flores case was the whole appeal itself and not
just the question of which court to file the petition.
Section 6, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution grants and authorizes
the COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided a uniform five (5) day period
for taking an appeal consistent with the expeditious resolution of election-
related cases. It would be absurd and therefore not clearly intended, to
maintain the 10-day period for barangay election contests. In view of
the Flores case, jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling in election protests heard by a
regional trial court. The Court en banc has held in Rodillas vs.
COMELEC that the procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay election protest case is set forth in
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. More recently, in Calucag vs.
Commission on Elections, the Court en banc had occasion to state that:
xxx. Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with
jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which appeal must be filed within five days
after the promulgation of the MTC s decision. xxx. Significantly, Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution provides in part that [r]ules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The period for filing an appeal is by no means a mere technicality of
law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision
appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at
all. The right of appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of
the law. By virtue of Section 9 (d), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides that an appeal may be dismissed upon motion of
either party or at the instance of the Commission for failure to file a notice of
appeal within the prescribed period, the COMELEC is precisely given the
discretion, in a case where the appeal is not filed on time to dismiss the
action or proceeding.
***************************************************************************************
30
FRANCIS KING L. MARQUEZ, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
HON. NOLI C. DIAZ, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
80, Muntinlupa City, and LIBERTY SANTOS G.R. No. 127318
August 25, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Marquez and private respondent Santos both ran as candidates
in the May 6, 1996 SK elections. Marquez was proclaimed SK Chairman on
the same day, since he garnered the highest number of votes.
The following day, private respondent Santos, filed an election protest
before the MeTC, Br 80 of Muntinlupa City. Santos impugned the election of
Marquez on the ground that Marquez is disqualified by age to the office of SK
Chairman.
The MeTC issued a TRO commanding Marquez to refrain from taking his
oath of office as SK Chairman of Brgy. Putatan
Marquez filed a Motion to Dismiss with prayer for the cancellation of the
hearing, on the ground that the MeTC does not have any jurisdiction over the
subject of the action and private respondent Santos, failed to comply with SC
Admin Circ No. 14-94.
The MeTC dismissed the MTD and set the hearing of the case;
5. It interpreted the provision of Sec. 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824
as referring to those cases filed before the SK elections and do not
cover those cases filed after the election of candidates.
6. It ruled that quo warranto proceedings fall under its jurisdiction within
the purview of Sec. 253, par. 2 of the Omnibus Election Code, and
7. that the failure of the Election Officer of Muntinlupa to act on the
complaint warranted the filing by the protestant Liberty Santos of a
petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa
under the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by Marquez. He
contends that Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is controlling.
ISSUES:
1. Whether “Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824” or “Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code” is controlling?
2. Whether Section 49 of the COMELEC Resolution applies to both election
protests and quo warranto suits?
3. Whether the COMELEC correctly upheld the jurisdiction of the MeTC over
private respondent’s quo warranto? YES
RULING:
1. We hold that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code applies.
i
R.A. 7808 , which took effect on September 2, 1994 provides that “the
Omnibus Election Code shall govern the election of Sangguniang Kabataan
shall be governed by the following provisions of the OEC:
It was pursuant to this provision of R.A. 7808 in relation to Arts. 252-253 of
the OEC that in its Resolution No. 2824, promulgated on February 6, 19967.
Thus, any contest relating to the election of members of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (including the chairman)—whether pertaining to their eligibility or
the manner of their election is cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs.
The distinction is based on the principle that it is the proclamation which
marks off the jurisdiction of the courts from the jurisdiction of election
officials. Before proclamation, cases concerning eligibility of SK officers and
members are cognizable by the Election Officer or EO as he is called in
Section 6. But after the election and proclamation, the same cases become
quo warranto cases cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs.
2. Quo warranto suits are now cognizable by the MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs
pursuant to Art. 253 of the OEC and RA 7808.
Section 49 of Resolution 2824 must be understood to cover both election
protests and quo warranto cases, otherwise, to limit it only to election
protests would leave parties in an SK election to file their quo warranto cases
in the Regional Trial Court because of the absence of a specific provision.
To contend that quo warranto proceedings involving an SK Chairman should
be brought in the Regional Trial Court would, in effect, make the SK
Chairman, who is just an ex officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay,
more important than the Chairman and elective members of the same
Sangguniang Barangay.
If election protests involving SK members are cognizable by the MTCs, there
is no reason why quo warranto proceedings involving the same officers
should not be cognizable by the same courts.
If the objection to the election of an SK Chairman involves a question both as
to his eligibility for the office and of fraud in his election, two petitions would
have to be filed in different fora—one in the RTC (for the quo warranto suit)
and another one in the MTC (for the election protest). The same objection to
the splitting of jurisdiction which has led to a reform in our law of procedure
can thus be made to this interpretation.
3. The Commission on Elections correctly upheld the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City over private respondent’s petition
for quo warranto.
The disqualification case having been filed after the election and
proclamation of the winning candidate, the governing law therefore is second
paragraph of Sec. 253 of the Omnibus Election Code which confers upon the
respondent court the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the disqualification
case filed against Marquez. Corollary, while Sec. 49 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824 speaks of finality of the proclamation of the winning SK
candidates, it does not prevent the herein respondent court from exercising
original jurisdiction in the event an election protest is filed which in our
opinion includes matters which could be raised in a quo warranto
proceedings against a proclaimed SK candidate.
***************************************************************************************
31
Carlos v. Angeles
Facts:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, Jose Carlos was proclaimed as the
duly elected mayor of Valenzuela over Antonio Serapio. Serapio filed an
election protest challenging the results and the case was assigned to Judge
Angeles of the RTC of Caloocan (because of the inhibition of all the judges of
the RTC in Valenzuela). The final tally showed that Carlos won over a margin
of 17,007 votes. However, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes
because of its finding of “significant badges of fraud”. The trial court held that
the fraud was attributable to Carlos and it declared Serapio as the duly
elected mayor of Valenzuela City.
Issues:
3. W/N the SC has jurisdiction.
4. W/N the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The SC has jurisdiction over the present petition.
Both the Supreme Court and Comelec (in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction) have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general
jurisdiction (RTC) in election cases involving elective municipal
officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the case.
2. YES. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in proclaiming Serapio the duly
 elected mayor of Valenzuela even without a majority of votes cast in
his favor.
The trial court in its decision actually pronounced a failure of election
by disregarding and setting aside the results of the election. The trial
court erred to the extent of ousting itself of jurisdiction because the
grounds for failure of election were not significant and even non-
existent. More importantly, the commission of fraud cannot be
attributed to Carlos as there was no evidence on record that he had
a hand in any of the irregularities that Serapio averred.
The court annuls and declares void the trial court decision. The case
is remanded to the trial court for decision.
For recit purposes:
The “significant badges of fraud” are belied by the facts pointed out
by the SC:
a. that the keys turned over did not fit into the padlocks of the ballot
boxes: The mere inability of the keys to fit into the padlocks
attached to the ballot boxes does not affect the integrity of the
ballots.
b. that 7 ballot boxes did not contain any ballot and 2 of the 7 did not
contain any election returns: It is a standard procedure of the
Comelec to provide extra empty ballot boxes for the use of the
Board of Election Inspectors or the Board of Canvassers, in case
of necessity.
c. that some precincts experienced various brownouts: Witnesses
testified that the counting of votes proceeded smoothly and no
commotion or violence occurred during the brownout.
d. that some of the assigned watchers of Serapio were not in their
posts: As long as notices were duly served to the parties, the
counting and canvassing of votes may validly proceed in the
absence of watchers.
Even assuming that the TC was correct in holding that the final tally
of valid votes may be set aside because of the significant badges of
fraud, the same would be tantamount to a ruling that there was
failure of election. In a petition to annul an election, two conditions
must be averred: (1) the illegality must affect more than 50% of the
votes cast and (2) the good votes can be distinguished from the bad
ones. Neither of these conditions was present in the case at bar.
***************************************************************************************
32
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP vs. HON. JAIME N.
FERRER
G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985
COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of
voting booths. However, the losing bidder, petitioner in the instant case,
Filipinas Engineering filed an Injunction suit against COMELEC and Acme.
The lower court denied the writ prayed for.
Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower
court has no jurisdiction over the case which the court granted. Filipinas'
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal
for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit
involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising
from its invitation to bid; and
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the
premises against the COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin
them from complying with their contract.
RULING:
It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to review on certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election
laws.
The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence,
the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by
certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt
may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and
exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any
question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action
before the trial courts.
What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law
are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and
taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers.
***************************************************************************************
33
Nacionalista Party vs COMELEC, 84 Phil 49
FACTS:
Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of
the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. When Respondent San
Luis ran as Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972, he won.
The normal expiry for the term was 1975, but it was extended lawfully by the
President. Now (1980) he is running for Governor again under KBL. Under
the law, “No elective public officer may change his political party affiliation
during his term of office…or within six months immediately preceding or
following an election.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC was correct in dismissing petition which
contended that Respondent San Luis should be disqualified from running due
to turncoatism.
HELD:
No, he cannot be disqualified. He did not change affiliations during his term.
He was expelled from the LP in 1978 and this can’t be construed as
a willful change of affiliation. At that time, no one even knew when the next
elections were, so Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to
anticipate the next election. The constitutional prohibition cannot be applied
to the period beyond the frame-up (1971-1975) term to which public officials
were elected in 1971 because this would unduly impinge on freedom of
association guaranteed to all. Between two constructions, one of which
would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which
would not do so, the latter construction must be adopted.
***************************************************************************************
38
NPC v COMELEC
Topic: Regulation of public entities and media – Sec. 4, Art. IX-C
Facts:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media
which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for
national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections;
and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election
issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No.
6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom
of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11
(b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression
and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular
content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the
election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of
media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public
information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners
contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates,
and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda
except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on
Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a
substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right
of voters to information and opinion.
Issue:
WON Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.
Held:
The statutory text that petitioners ask us to strike down as unconstitutional is
that of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987:
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. — In
addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under
Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful;
xxx xxx xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television
station, other mass media, or any person making use of the
mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air
time for campaign or other political purposes except to the
Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate
for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence
from his work as such during the campaign period.
(Emphasis supplied)
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as
practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the
former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war
chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air
time "for campaign or other political purposes" except to the Commission on
Elections ("Comelec"). Upon the other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the
Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure "Comelec
space" in newspapers of general circulation in every province or city
and "Comelec time" on radio and television stations. Further, the
Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and
"Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all
candidates within the area served by the newspaper or radio and
television station involved.
No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective
sought to be secured by Section 11 (b) (of Republic Act No. 6646) in relation
to Sections 90 and 92 (of the Omnibus Election Code). That objective is of
special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is
characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the
economic elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with
the bulk of our population falling below that "poverty line." It is supremely
important, however, to note that objective is not only a concededly legitimate
one; it has also been given constitutional status by the terms of Article IX(C)
(4) of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows:
 Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the
election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation
of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges,
or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its
subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in
connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied)
The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been
spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time,
and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of
charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public
1
information campaigns and forums among candidates."
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be
that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory
or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing
equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such
supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free
speech and free press. For supervision or regulation of the operations of
media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such accompanying
limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time-honored one — that a
statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its
unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly
3
proving that assertion.
The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible
bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election
periods.
It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and
freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain important
limitations.
Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and
enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election
periods.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of
application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to
the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a
4
donation, of print space and air time for "campaign or other political
purposes." We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b).
Section 11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the
Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time Comelec is then
affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge,
among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the province or
city served by the newspaper or radio or television station. The Comelec is
entitled to the benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is being
regularly carried out.
The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b)
does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about
candidates, their qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper,
radio broadcasting and television stations remain quite free to carry out their
regular and normal information and communication operations. Section 11
(b) does not authorize any intervention and much less control on the part of
Comelec in respect of the content of the normal operations of media, nor in
respect of the content of political advertisements which the individual
candidates are quite free to present within their respective allocated Comelec
time and Comelec space. There is here no "officious functionary of [a]
repressive government" dictating what events or ideas reporters,
broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on
TV screens. There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise.
What Section 11 (b), viewed in context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan
political advertisements to for a other than modern mass media, and to
"Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in such mass media.
***************************************************************************************
40
Osmena v COMELEC 288 SCRA 447
Topic: Regulation of public entities and media – Sec. 4, Art. IX-C
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity
of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits
mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for
campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on
[1]
Elections. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the forthcoming
elections. Petitioner Emilio M. R. Osmea is candidate for President of the
Philippines, while petitioner Pablo P. Garcia is governor of Cebu Province,
seeking reelection. They contend that events after the ruling in National
Press Club v. Commission on Elections have called into question the validity
of the very premises of that [decision].
Issue:
WON Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is constitutional.
Held:
There Is No Case or Controversy to Decide, Only an Academic
Discussion to Hold
 NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against
[4]
claims that it abridged freedom of speech and of the press. In urging a
reexamination of that ruling, petitioners claim that experience in the last five
years since the decision in that case has shown the undesirable effects of
the law because the ban on political advertising has not only failed to level
the playing field, [but] actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor
[5]
candidate[s] by depriving them of a medium which they can afford to pay
for while their more affluent rivals can always resort to other means of
reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills.
No empirical data have been presented by petitioners to back up their
claim, however. Argumentation is made at the theoretical and not the
practical level. Unable to show the experience and subsequent events which
they claim invalidate the major premise of our prior decision, petitioners now
say there is no need for empirical data to determine whether the political ad
ban offends the Constitution or not.
Indeed, petitioners do not complain of any harm suffered as a result of
the operation of the law. They do not complain that they have in any way
been disadvantaged as a result of the ban on media advertising. Their
contention that, contrary to the holding in NPC, 11(b) works to the
disadvantage of candidates who do not have enough resources to wage a
campaign outside of mass media can hardly apply to them. Their financial
ability to sustain a long drawn-out campaign, using means other than the
mass media to communicate with voters, cannot be doubted.
What petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a case but simply the
holding of an academic exercise. And since a majority of the present Court is
unpersuaded that its decision in NPCis founded in error, it will suffice for
present purposes simply to reaffirm the ruling in that case. Stare decisis et
non quieta movere. This is what makes the present case different from the
[9]
overruling decisions invoked by petitioners.
Nevertheless, we have undertaken to revisit the decision in NPC v.
COMELEC in order to clarify our own understanding of its reach and set forth
a theory of freedom of speech.
No Ad Ban, Only a Substitution of COMELEC Space and COMELEC
Time for the Advertising Page and Commercials in Mass Media
The term political ad ban, when used to describe 11(b) of R.A. No.
6646, is misleading, for even as 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print
space and air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to
procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the
media. There is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the
time and manner of advertising.
Here, on the other hand, there is no total ban on political ads, much less
restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that print space and
air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the
disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate
governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the
COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution.
The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. They
only prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time to candidates but
require the COMELEC instead to procure space and time in the mass media
for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during the election
period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of newspapers or the
commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates these to the
candidates. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass
media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC, of print space and
air time to give all candidates equal time and space for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The State can prohibit campaigning outside a certain period as well as
campaigning within a certain place. For unlimited expenditure for political
advertising in the mass media skews the political process and subverts
democratic self-government. What is bad is if the law prohibits campaigning
by certain candidates because of the views expressed in the ad. Content
regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason.
Law Narrowly Drawn to Fit Regulatory Purpose
The main purpose of 11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is
only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of
promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political
advertising. The restriction on speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both
as to time and as to scope.
What petitioners seem to miss is that the prohibition against paid or
sponsored political advertising is only half of the regulatory framework, the
other half being the mandate of the COMELEC to procure print space and air
time so that these can be allocated free of charge to the candidates.
***************************************************************************************
41
TELEBAP v COMELEC
Topic: Regulation of public entities and media – Sec. 4, Art. IX-C
Facts:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines,
Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting
companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The
other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television
broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted
by Congress.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 of BP No. 881 on the ground (1)
that it takes property without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies
the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given
to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election.
Issue:
WON Sec 92 of BP No 881 is constitutional.
Held:
Airing of COMELEC Time, a Reasonable Condition for Grant of
Petitioner's Franchise
As pointed out in our decision in Osmeña v. COMELEC, §11(b) of R.A. No.
6646 and §90 and §92 of the B.P. Blg. 881 are part and parcel of a
regulatory scheme designed to equalize the opportunity of candidates in an
election in regard to the use of mass media for political campaigns.
Sec. 92. Comelec time. — The commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be
allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose,
the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are
hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of
charge, during the period of the campaign. (Sec. 46, 1978 EC)
It will be noted that while §90 of B.P. Blg. 881 requires the COMELEC to
procure print space which, as we have held, should be paid for, §92 states
that air time shall be procured by the COMELEC free of charge.
Petitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due process
6 7
clause and the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by taking air
time from radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just
compensation. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the
radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and that to
require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize a taking which is
not "a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private
property." According to petitioners, in 1992, the GMA Network, Inc. lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time of one (1) hour every morning from
Mondays to Fridays and one (1) hour on Tuesdays and Thursday from 7:00
to 8:00 p.m. (prime time) and, in this year's elections, it stands to lose
P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC'S requirement that radio and television
stations provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for the COMELEC
8
Time.
Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or
by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies
have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast
9
than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject,
among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires."
Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of
the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the
present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking
property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the Constitution
authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better
measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time
for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly
the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount."
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they
transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of
the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the
grantee of some form of public service.
In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter
supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable
18
public funds in licensing and supervising such stations. It would be strange
if it cannot even require the licensees to render public service by giving free
air time.
Giving Free Air Time a Duty Assumed by Petitioner
Petitioners claim that §92 is an invalid amendment of R.A. No. 7252 which
granted GMA Network, Inc. a franchise for the operation of radio and
television broadcasting stations. They argue that although §5 of R.A. No.
7252 gives the government the power to temporarily use and operate the
stations of petitioner GMA Network or to authorize such use and operation,
the exercise of this right must be compensated.
For the fact is that the duty imposed on the GMA Network, Inc. by its
franchise to render "adequate public service time" implements §92 of B.P.
Blg. 881. Undoubtedly, its purpose is to enable the government to
communicate with the people on matters of public interest.
Differential Treatment of Broadcast Media Justified
Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 singles out radio and television
stations to provide free air time. They contend that newspapers and
magazines are not similarly required as, in fact, in Philippine Press Institute
27
v.COMELEC, we upheld their right to the payment of just compensation for
the print space they may provide under §90.
The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy that broadcast
media are entitled to the same treatment under the free speech guarantee of
the Constitution as the print media. There are important differences in the
characteristics of the two media, however, which justify their differential
treatment for free speech purposes. Because of the physical limitations of the
broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast
frequencies to those wishing to use them. There is no similar justification for
28
government allocation and regulation of the print media.
In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be
imposed on the grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that, as already
noted, the government spends public funds for the allocation and regulation
of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print media.
To require the radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air time
for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
Requirement of COMELEC Time, a Reasonable Exercise of the State's
Power to Regulate Use of Franchises
Finally, it is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the
COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution does not include the power
to prohibit. In the first place, what the COMELEC is authorized to supervise
31
or regulate by Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, among other things, is the
use by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what
Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print space
or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of supervision or
regulation is different from the object of the prohibition.
In the second place, the prohibition in §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is only half of
the regulatory provision in the statute. The other half is the mandate to the
COMELEC to procure print space and air time for allocation to candidates.
To affirm the validity of §92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to
their obligation to see to it that the variety and vigor of public debate on
issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere
common carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public
trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the
diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to
the autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of §92, therefore, is
likewise to uphold the people's right to information on matters of public
concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the
state's duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find
their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they
may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common
good.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
***************************************************************************************
42
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution in 1998 approving the issuance of a
restraining order stopping ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents/representative
from conducting such exit survey during the May 11 elections. COMELEC believed
it might conflict with the official count, as well as the unofficial quick count of
NAMFREL.
The Court then issued the TRO prayed for by ABS-CBN.
ISSUE:
WON the act of COMELEC in restraining the conduct of the exit polls violates the
right to freedom of expression
HELD:
No. Our Constitution mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press. The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our
democratic government. It "is a 'preferred' right and stands on a higher level than
substantive economic or other liberties.
In the landmark case Gonzales v. Comelec, this Court enunciated that at the very
least, free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint (uninhibited, robust,
and wide open).
However, the freedoms of speech and of the press are not immune to regulation by
the State in the exercise of its police power. While the liberty to think is absolute, the
power to express such thought in words and deeds has limitations.
The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of
the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. Exit polls properly conducted
and publicized can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and
credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other electoral
ills. There can be no free and honest elections if the freedom to speak and the right to
know are unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the TRO by issued is made
PERMANENT. COMELEC resolution is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
***************************************************************************************
43
Montejo vs. COMELEC
242 SCRA 415
March 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte,
pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting
certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle
of equality of representation.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed
of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval,
San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.
Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by
virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section
spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the
territories comprised therein.
On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district.
Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or
province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one
consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to
composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one
total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census. legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to
the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters
and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held ***************************************************************************************
consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province
and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the 44
assailed resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Beso v. Aballe
Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th 326 SCRA 100
district to the 3rd district of Leyte. Facts:
Petitioner Vito Beso and private respondent Rita Aballe (hereafter ABALLE) were
Issue: candidates for the position of Barangay Captain of Barangay Carayman, Calbayog
City, in the barangay elections of 12 May 1997. In the canvass of the returns of the
Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative four precincts of Barangay Carayman, BESO was credited with four hundred ninety-
power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not. five (495) votes, while ABALLE obtained four hundred ninety-six (496) votes. The
latter was thus proclaimed the winning candidate. BESO seasonably filed a protest
Held: with the Municipal Trial Court of Calbayog City (hereafter MTCC). The case was
docketed as Election Protest No. 130. marie After due proceedings, the MTCC, per
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside. Judge Filemon A. Tandico, Jr., promulgated on 20 January 1998 a decision dated 13
January 1998, in favor of BESO. On 20 January 1998 ABALLE filed a Notice of
The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows Appeal manifesting therein that she is appealing from the decision "to the Regional
that COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as Trial Court, Calbayog City." It likewise appears that on 22 January 1998, ABALLE
it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the filed a Notice of Appeal indicating therein that she was appealing from the decision
enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the "to the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANILA." On 24 April 1998, ABALLE
reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City (hereafter RTC) a special civil
elections, the power was given to the Congress. action for certiorari and prohibition, with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction (id., 91) against MTCC
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 Judge Tandinco, Jr. to set aside and annul the latter’s order of 2 March 1998 denying
constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally the motion for inhibition; resolution of 5 March 1998 granting the motion for
regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states that: execution pending appeal; and the resolution of 21 April 1998 denying the motion to
reconsider the resolution of 5 March 1998. BESO was impleaded as co-respondent.
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make The case was assigned to Branch 31 of the RTC, presided over by public respondent
minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.” Judge Roberto A. Navidad, and was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 98- 040.
On 28 April 1998, Judge Navidad issued a Temporary Restraining Order (id., 104)
Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The number of restraining respondent Judge Tandinco, Jr. and all persons acting in his behalf "from
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was enforcing the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal." The temporary restraining order
created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is was "effective within 72 hours only from its issuance."
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission Issue:
on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over petition for certiorari in election contests
twenty days before the election. pending in inferior courts.
Held:
COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in election protests pending
before inferior courts. In Relampagos that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P.
Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect in such cases where, under paragraph (2),
Section 1 (should be Section 2) Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the election contest in question. In such cases
the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs ofcertiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The last paragraph of
Section 50 reads: The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear
and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election
cases. Under the second paragraph of Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the Commission on Elections has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, inter alia,
contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
***************************************************************************************
45
Carlos v. Angeles
G.R. No. 142907 (Nov. 29, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of
mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (later converted into a
City) during the May 11, 1998 elections. The Board of Canvassers
proclaimed petitioner as the mayor. The private respondent filed an election
protest with the RTC. The court came up with revision reports which also
showed that the petitioner got the highest number of votes. Nevertheless, in
its decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its
finding of "significant badges of fraud," which it attributed to the present
petitioner. The court then declared private respondent as the winner. The
petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, and also filed a petition to the SC
questioning the decision of the RTC. The private respondent questioned the
jurisdiction of the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N the SC has jurisdiction.
HELD:
Both the SC and COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of
general jurisdiction (RTCs) in election cases involving elective municipal
officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the
COMELEC, the same would not bar the present action as an exception to the
rule because under the circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The po wer to nullify an election must be exercised with the greatest
care with a view not to disenfranchise the voters, and only under
circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial measure. More
importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of
election. It is the COMELEC en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction
to declare a failure of election. Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to
declare a failure of election, the extent of that power is limited to the
annulment of the election and the calling of special elections. The result is a
failure of election for that particular office. In such case, the court cannot
declare a winner.
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46
RELAMPAGOS vs. CUMBA
243 SCRA 502
Facts:
In the elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner Relampagos and
private respondent Cumba were candidates for Mayor of Magallanes,
Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a
margin of twenty-two votes over the former. Unwilling to accept defeat, the
petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC which found the petitioner to
have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On 4 July 1994, the private
respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC. The petitioner, on 12
July 1994, filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal,
which the trial court granted On 3 August 1994. The private respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order of execution which was denied on 5
August 1994.
The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a
petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the
motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. On 9
February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the
petition. Accordingly, petitioner was ordered restored to her position as
Municipal Mayor, pending resolution of the appeal before the Commission.
Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed this special civil action.
Issue:
W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction.

Held:
The Court in concluding that the aforesaid last paragraph of Section
50 of B.P. 697 has not been repealed by the Omnibus Election Code, held
that the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Hence, the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of
discretion in granting the petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal
and in issuing the writ of execution. Any motion for execution pending appeal
must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Since the
motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after
the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act
thereon.
COMELEC has jurisdiction, hence, it correctly set aside the
challenged order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ
of execution issued by the trial court.
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48
MASANGCAY vs COMELEC
6 SCRA 27
FACTS:
On 24 October 1957, Benjamin Masangcay — then provincial
treasurer of Aklan designated to take charge of the receipt and custody of the
official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution,
among the different municipalities of the province— with several others, was
charged before the Comelec with contempt for having opened 3 boxes
containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of
Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in its
resolution promulgated on 2 September 1957, and its unnumbered resolution
dated 5 March 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence
of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and
the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party
and the Citizens’ Party, as required, which are punishable under Section 5 of
the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
Masangcay et.al. complied with the summons issued by the Comelec
to appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on
the basis of the charge. On 16 December 1957 the Commission rendered its
decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged
and sentencing each of them to suffer 3 months imprisonment and pay a fine
of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of 2 months in case of insolvency, to
be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were
exonerated for lack of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main
issue the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which
grants the Comelec as well as its members the power to punish acts of
contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of
said section which grants to the Commission and members the power to
punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying
the separation of powers that exists among the three departments of our
constitutional form of government.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from insofar as
Masangcay is concerned, as well as the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him; without pronouncement as to
costs.
ISSUE:
W/N the Comelec may punish Masangcay for contempt
HELD:
No. Under the law and the constitution, the Comelec has not only the
duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections,
but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be
submitted to it in connection with the elections. The Commission, although it
cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body,
may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that
by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction.
The Comelec lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted
out to Masangcay in the decision subject of review. When the Commission
exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish for
contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. The power to
punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the
administration of justice.
The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a
necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative
bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit
testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in
furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.
The resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose
violation the charge for contempt was filed against Masangcay merely call for
the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely
concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other
election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. The Commission,
thus, has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its
decision is null and void.
***************************************************************************************
49
Dumarpa v Dimaporo
Facts:
On February 3,1988, Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the
Board of Canvassers Mayor-elect of Marogong. The annulment of the
proclamation and the canvass on which it was based was sought in two (2)
separate petitions filed by defeated mayoralty candidates: one filed on
February 15, 1988 by Datu Abdulmadid Panondiongan Maruhom and the
other, on February 17, 1988, by Monabai Panondiongan Balt.
While these petitions were pending adjudgment by the COMELEC
First Division, the Secretary of Local Governments issued on May 1988 a
memorandum addressed to the Regional Director, Region XII of the
Department of Local Governments, designating Maclis Balt "Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur vice Abdullah
Imam." The memorandum precisely took account of said petitions. It stated
that the designation of the OIC was made "in view of the election controversy
that has arisen over the mayoralty race of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, and to
ensure that the democratic process is respected throughout the transition
period. Datu Dimaporo lost no time in seeking official recognition of his status
as mayor-elect of Marogong, as confirmed by the First Division's Decision of
July 11, 1988. Under date of July 18, 1988, his counsel, Mangurun
Batuampar sent a formal communication to Provincial Governor Saidamen B.
Pangarungan, praying "that communications and other official matters
involving the affairs of the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur be
accorded to DATU JAMIL DATU MULOK DIMAPORO whose proclamation
was aimed by the Commission on Elections as aforestated."
Datu Dimaporo filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion to hold
Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan, as well as Vice-Governor Alauya, in
contempt for stating that Datu Maclis Balt is still the Mayor of the Municipality
of Marogong, Lanao del Sur.
The essential accusation against the petitioners was that the
rendition by the petitioner fiscals of a legal opinion upon request of petitioner
Vice Governor had caused "chaos and confusion among the National,
Provincial, Municipal officials and the general public on who is really the legal
Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur, considering the conflict of the
defendants' legal opinion and the 'Resolution' of the COMELEC Division, as
aforesaid, resulting to damage, injury and prejudice not only upon the
complainant but to public service, particularly the people of Marogong, Lanao
del Sur."
Issue:
W/N COMELEC had validly made use of its contempt power on the provincial
fiscals for having prepared and submitted a legal opinion.
Held:
No, the contempt ruling here cannot be justified on the preservative
principle, there being no clear showing, either in the terms of the allegedly
insubordinate opinion or from the circumstances that led to its issuance, of
any intent to denigrate the authority of the respondent Commission or erode
the faith and respect due its decisions, orders or other actuations.
***************************************************************************************
50
REYES VS RTC OF ORIENTAL MINDORO
G.R. No. 108886 May 5, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Comia were candidates for
the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro in the May 11, 1992. On May 13, 1992, during the proceedings of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers, private respondent moved for the
exclusion of certain election returns, on the ground of serious irregularity in
counting in favor of petitioner Aquiles Reyes votes cast for "Reyes" only,
considering that there was another candidate Epitacio Reyes bearing the
same surname. However, without resolving his petition, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers proclaimed on the same day petitioner as the eighth winning
candidate with 7,205 votes. On May 25, 1992 petitioner took his oath of
office.
On June 1, 1992, private respondent filed an election protest before the trial
court. He alleged that "a vital mistake [had been] committed by the Board of
Canvassers in the mathematical computation of the total number of votes
garnered by petitioner [now private respondent]. petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss private respondent's petition on the ground that it was filed beyond
the reglementary period of ten days from proclamation. The Trial Court
denied his motion.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers file its answer in which it admitted that it
had made a mistake in crediting private respondent with only 858 votes when
he was entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of Votes. The trial court
rendered its decision annuling the proclamation of petitioner and declaring
private respondent as the eighth winning candidate for the position of
councilor of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Petitioner
filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC to compel the Sangguniang Bayan
to recognize him as the duly proclaimed member of that body and prohibit it
from further recognizing private respondent.
The Sangguniang Bayan met in inaugural session on July 3, 1992, during
which private respondent was recognized as the eighth member of the body
and thereafter allowed to assume office and discharge its functions and it
informed petitioner that it had recognized the private respondent as its
member.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC’s first division committed grave abuse of
discretion by dismissing petitioner’s appeal for late payment of the appeal
fee.
Held:
The First Division of the COMELEC properly dismissed petitioner's appeal
from the decision of the trial court because of his failure to pay the appeal fee
within the time for perfecting an appeal.
Rule 22, §9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly provides:
Sec. 9. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — The appeal may
be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance
of the Commission on any of the following grounds:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the appeal fee; . . .
In accordance with §2(b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 2108-A, the appeal
fee must be paid within the period to perfect the appeal. Thus:
Sec. 2. When docket and other fees shall be paid. —
The records show that petitioner received a copy of the decision of the trial
court on June 26, 1992. However, he paid the appeal fee of P1,020.00 only
on August 6, 1992. In other words, petitioner allowed forty (40) days to lapse
when the appeal fee should have been paid within five (5) days after
promulgation of the trial court's decision
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51
Guerrero v COMELEC
G.R. No. 137004. July 26, 2000
Topic: COMELEC’s power to declare valid or invalid a COC
Facts:
Guillermo Ruiz sought to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the
position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that
Farinas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May
11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said
office. On May 8, 1998, Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy substituting
candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998,
the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz for lack of merit. The election
pushed through.
After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Thereafter, Ruiz filed
a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not validly
substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate
of LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. Another person cannot
substitute for an independent candidate. Ruiz claimed that Farinas’ certificate
of candidacy was fatally defective. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of
office as a member of the House of Representatives. The COMELEC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of
respondent Farinas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) of the House of Representatives
Held:
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it
held that its jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of
office of respondent Farinas as Representative for the first district of Ilocos
Norte. While COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a
certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the
proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a recognition of
the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET.
Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and
the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision
to discontinueexercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference
to the HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions.
***************************************************************************************
52. Torres v COMELEC
[G.R. No. 121031. March 26, 1997]
Topic: Power of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to annul the
proclamation of a winning candidate
Facts:
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tanza, Cavite, issued a Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Municipal
Councilors. petitioner Atty. Rosauro I. Torres was proclaimed as the fifth
winning candidate for councilor with 12, 055 votes. Petitioner was proclaimed
as the fifth winning candidate for councilor with 12,055 votes. The same
Municipal Board of Canvassers requested the COMELEC for correction of
the number of votes garnered by petitioner. The letter-request from
the former stated that the votes intended for Mr. Dimaala in the sub-total as
reflected in the Statement of Votes by precinct was erroneously added to Mr.
Torres for a total of 934 votes. Mr. Torres should have been number 10 in the
winning column with 11,121 votes while Mr. de Peralta should have
been number 5 with 11,610 votes. In an En Banc resolution, COMELEC
granted the letter-request for the correction. It ordered the Municipal Board of
Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim de Peralta as the eighth winning
councilor.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a corrected Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates which
included private respondent Vicente Rafael A. de Peralta as the eighth
winning councilor and excluded petitioner from the new list of winning
candidates.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc has the power to order the
correction.
Held:
Yes. Under Sec. 7, Rule 27, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the board
may motu proprio or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party,
organization or coalition of political parties, correct the errors committed, (a)
where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors
were committed in the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates
of canvass, during the
canvassing as where… (3) there was a mistake in the adding or copying of
the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes by
precinct.
The above provision applies even if the proclamation of a winning candidate
has already been made as in the case at bar in which the validity of the
proclamation is precisely in question.
When what is involved is purely mathematical and/or mechanical error in the
operation of the adding machine committed by the board of canvassers but
does not involve any opening of ballot boxes, examination and appreciation
of ballots and/or election returns, all that is required is to reconvene the
board of canvassers to rectify the error it inadvertently committed.
Respondent COMELEC also contends that since it has the direct control and
supervision over the municipal board of canvassers, the former has authority
to direct the latter to reconvene and continue its assigned task in proclaiming
the rightful winner for municipal councilor.
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53
Ambil v COMELEC
[G.R. No. 143398. October 25, 2000]
Facts:
Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez were
candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern Samar, during the May 11,
1998 elections. On May 16, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected Governor, Eastern
Samar, having obtained 46,547 votes, the highest number of votes in the
election returns. respondent Jose Ramirez filed an election protest with the
COMELEC challenging the result of the elections.
Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared and signed a proposed resolution
in the case. To such proposed ponencia, Commissioner Julio F. Desamito
dissented. Commissioner Luzviminda G.Tancangco at first did not indicate
her vote but said that she would wish to see both positions, if any, to make
her final decision. On 24 Feb 2000, Commissioner Japal Guidani retired from
the service prior to the finalization of his proposed resolution in the Ramirez
protest.
On or about February 24, 2000, petitioner and respondent received a
purported resolution promulgated on February 14, 2000, signed by
Commissioner Guiani and Tancangco, with Commissioner Desamito
dissenting. The result was in favor of respondent Ramirez who was declared
winner by a margin of 1,176 votes. On February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First
Division, declared that the thirteen-page resolution is a useless scrap of
paper which should be ignored by the parties in this case there being no
promulgation of the Resolution in the instant case.
On March 31, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, issued an order setting the
promulgation of the resolution in the case on April 6, 2000, at 2:00 in the
afternoon. However, on April 6, 2000, petitioner Ambil filed a motion to
cancel promulgation challenging the validity of the purported Guiani
resolution.The Comelec, First Division, acting on the motion, on the same
date, postponed the promulgation until this matter is resolved.
Issue:
Whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of the
resolution in the case acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of Governor,
Eastern Samar. It is within the original jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections in division. Admittedly, petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration
of the divisions resolution or final decision. In fact, there was really no
resolution or decision to speak of because there was yet no promulgation,
which was still scheduled on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court from an order of promulgation
of the Resolution of this case by the First Division of the Comelec.
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within
the jurisdiction of the Comelec in division can not dispense with the filing of a
motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order of the
Division of the Commission on Elections because the case would not reach
the Comelec en bancwithout such motion for reconsideration having been
filed and resolved by the Division.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the
rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to
the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election
cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional
fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what
is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.
***************************************************************************************
54
Salva v COMELEC
[G.R. No. 132603. September 18, 2000]
Topic: Power of the COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, Calaca,
Batangas, filed a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) before the Regional Trial Court of
Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and
Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both enacted by the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, series of
1998, with prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order.
Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its
merger with Barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and
accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required
plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05,
thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas.
Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for being ultra
vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements
regarding the attestations or certifications of several government agencies
were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing
for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite
scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of
barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca,
Batangas.
The trial court denied the petition saying that any petition or action
questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought
before the Supreme Court. The petitioners contend that when the COMELEC
exercises its quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but
when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to
scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners submit that the conduct of a
plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial or administrative
in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction to enjoin the comelec
from implementing its resolution no. 2987, series of 1998, which provided for
the rules and regulations for the conduct of the plebiscite scheduled on
february 28, 1998 to decide on the abolition of barangay san rafael and its
merger with barangay dacanlao, calaca, batangas, pending the
determination of civil case no. 3442 for the annulment of ordinance no. 05,
resolution no. 345 and comelec resolution no. 2987.
Held:
The SC ruled that “…What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings
and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued
pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident
of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus,
the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by
certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said
resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
***************************************************************************************
60
Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of
suffrage. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189 or
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow
petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning that the petitioners failed to
comply with the requirement of 1-year residency prior to the elections as
provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election without the
compliance of the 1 year residency
Held:
Yes.
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 -
requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in
the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Congress
enacted RA 9189 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the
Constitution, identifying in its Section 4 of the said Act who can vote under it,
among others, are Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another
country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule under the
Section 5(d) of the same Act.
By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to actual residency requirement of
Section 1, Article 5 of 1987 Constitution, with respect to qualified Filipinos
abroad. Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country may
be allowed to vote even though they do not fulfill the residency requirement
of said Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.
Wherefore, the instant petition is granted. Accordingly, the Court
rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee
voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
***************************************************************************************
61
CIRILO I. MERCADO vs. JUDGE HECTOR F. DYSANGCO
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1301. July 30, 2002
Facts:
Complainants charged Judge Hector F. Dysangco and Teresita S.
Esteban, Clerk of Court, with grave misconduct alleging that prior to the
Barangay Elections of May 12, 1997, 48 persons filed with the said court
separate petitions for inclusion in the voters list. Of these 48 petitioners, 9
were supporters of complainant Cirilo I. Mercado, while 39 were supporters
of his opponent Alejandro Gonzales. Mercado and Gonzales were
candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Kabulihan, Gen.
Natividad, Nueva Ecija. Consequently, Mercado and the other complainants
filed an opposition to the petition of the 39 supporters of Gonzales.
The first three scheduled hearings were cancelled due to the absence of
either respondent judge or petitioners counsel. The May 8 hearing proceeded
but only the 9 petitioners supporting complainant Mercado presented their
evidence. The 39 petitioners supporting Gonzales requested the
postponement of the hearing to May 9. However, on that day, those
petitioners and their counsel failed to appear in court. Thus, respondent
judge dismissed their petitions in open court.
Respondent judge when approached by herein complainants, assured
them that he did not issue any order for the inclusion of the 39 petitioners in
the voters list of Barangay Kabulihan.
However, on the day of the election, complainants were surprised to find
34 of the 39 petitioners with an Order signed by respondent judge and
attested by respondent clerk of court, directing their inclusion in the voters list
of Barangay Kabulihan.
Complainants averred that the issuance of the Order by respondent
judge was highly anomalous, illegal, and patently of dubious origin because
not one of the 39 petitioners presented evidence or appeared in the
scheduled hearings.
Respondents filed separate comments on the complaint.
 Respondent judge denied committing any anomaly. He explained that
his Order was based on his interviews with those petitioners, who registered
as voters in the said barangay during the registration .
In her comment, respondent clerk of court denied any hand in the
issuance of the questioned Order, asserting that it was respondent judges
official and personal act. Moreover, she did not have any personal reason or
motive in aiding the thirty-four (34) petitioners.
On April 21, 1999, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, for investigation, report
and recommendation. Executive Judge Johnson L. Ballutay recommended
that for the said act of respondent Judge Hector F. Dysangco, he should be
meted a fine of P5,000 with warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt
with more severely. On the part of respondent Teresita S. Esteban, she must
be reprimanded and warned that she should be more careful in her actuation
and she should act strictly in accordance with her duties as stated in her job
description.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint against respondent
Clerk of Court Teresita S. Esteban.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and grave misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended
Held:
Section 143 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code, explicitly lays down the procedure governing
petitions for inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters, thus:
SEC. 143. Common rules governing judicial proceedings in the matter of
inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters.
XXX
(e) Any candidate who may be affected by the proceedings may
intervene and present his evidence.
(f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented. If the
question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance
on the day set for hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the registered
voter is fictitious. In no case shall a decision be rendered upon a stipulation
of facts.
(g)These applications shall be heard and decided without delay. The
decision shall be rendered within six hours after the hearing and within
ten days from the date of its filing in court. Cases appealed to the
regional trial court shall be decided within ten days from receipt of the appeal
in the office of the clerk of court. In any case, the court shall decide these
petitions not later than the day before the election and the decision rendered
thereon shall be immediately final and executory, notwithstanding the
provision of Section 138 on the finality of decisions. (Emphasis supplied)
The clear mandate of the law is for the municipal judge a) to decide the
petition on the basis of the evidence presented, b) to conduct a hearing
thereon, and c) to render a decision within 10 days from the filing of the
petition. Respondent judge, unfortunately, does not know the above legal
provisions.
He did not decide the petition on the basis of petitioners evidence. He
could not have done so. Extant in the record is the fact that the thirty-nine
(39) petitioners failed to attend any of the scheduled hearings.
And, second, respondent judge issued the Order beyond the ten-day
period required by Section 143. The petitions of the thirty-nine (39) Gonzales
supporters were filed prior to April 17, 1997, yet the Order granting them was
issued only on May 9, 1997.
Respondent judge’s issuance of the controversial Order sans hearing
and beyond the ten-day period constitutes gross ignorance of the law. His
failure to observe the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code is
inexcusable. As a judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court vested with the
jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for inclusion or exclusion of voters,
he is expected to be familiar with these legal requirements because it can be
assumed that these election cases were not the first cases he has decided.
Respondent judge likewise committed gross misconduct constituting
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
provides that, a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Surely, he did not
accord the same treatment to the petitioners supporting complainant
Mercado.
It needs to be reiterated over and over again, until it sinks into the
consciousness of every judge, that litigants are entitled to nothing less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process,
like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is
rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just,
correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
Wherefore, for gross ignorance of law or procedure and gross
misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent
Judge HECTOR F. DYSANGCO is SUSPENDED for four (4) months without
salary and other benefits. He is warned that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
***************************************************************************************
62
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 135927. June 26, 2000
Facts:
On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts
and annulment of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with
the COMELEC. Among the precincts sought to be annulled was Padian
Torogan, subject matter of the present petition for certiorari.
 On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC sent telegrams to the
respective Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of the questioned precincts to
file their answer to the petition for abolition of precincts and annulment of
book of voters.
On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del
Sur, Usman T. Sarangani, herein petitioner, together with other oppositors
who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the twenty- three (23) barangays
the "Books of Voters" and precincts of which were sought to be annulled and
abolished, respectively, filed an "Answer in Opposition" which included the
affidavits of the barangay chairmen of the affected precincts attesting to the
fact that the move to annul the book of voters and abolish the questioned
election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing the bailiwicks of the
incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur.
After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and
memoranda by the parties, the COMELEC issued an Order referring the
case to its Law Department for appropriate investigation. On June 18, 1998,
an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost precincts.
On the basis of the result, Election Officer Casan Macadato
submitted to the Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi City
its 1st Indorsement reporting the results of the ocular inspection that Padian
Torogan and Rakutan were uninhabited.
On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding
"Padian Torogan as ghost precinct."
On November 3, 1998, Petitioners filed the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus urging to nullify the Order issued by the
COMELEC, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
In a resolution, the petition was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct
Held:
It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should
be at least one precinct per barangay. In designating election precincts, the
COMELEC usually refers to them by number. Nevertheless, the
determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and
whether the voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual
matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the
COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence,
are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated
[14]
attack on the validity of the same. Upon review of the records, the Court
finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and
verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said place, hence
its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a
fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have
left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have
inhabitants considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist
on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does not result in its
automatic cessation as a unit of local government. Under the Local
Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU)
may be done by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any
other political subdivision. In the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan
Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglungsod concerned subject to the
mandatory requirement of a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the
political units affected.
The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on
appeal or certiorari particularly when no significant facts and circumstances
are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered
would have substantially affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC
has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means
available to it. The assailed order having been issued pursuant to
COMELECs administrative powers and in the absence of any finding of
grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said order
shall stand. Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. No voter is
disenfranchised because no such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage
guaranteed by the Constitutionis not tampered when a list of fictitious voters
is excluded from an electoral exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the
Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not otherwise
disqualified by law. On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all
the more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral process as well
as the right of suffrage because the "electoral will" would not be rendered
nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost votes. Election laws should give
effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed, and the assailed Order dated
June 29, 1998 of the Commission on Elections is UPHELD.
***************************************************************************************
63.
Ututalum v. COMELEC
181 SCRA 335
Facts:
Petitioner Nurhussein A. Ututalum prays for the reversal on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, of the Resolutions of public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which declined to reject the election
returns from all the precincts of the Municipality of Siasi, Sulu, in the last 30
May 1987 Congressional elections and to annul respondent Arden S. Anni's
proclamation.
Petitioner Ututalum and private respondent, Arden S. Anni were
candidates in the last 30 May 1987 Congressional elections for the Second
District of Sulu. The election returns from Siasi showed that petitioner
Ututalum obtained 482 votes while respondent Anni received 35,581 votes
out of the 39,801 registered voters.
 During the canvass of votes, petitioner Ututalum, without availing of
verbal objections, filed written objections to the returns from Siasi on the
ground that they "appear to be tampered with or falsified" owing to the "great
excess of votes" appearing in said returns.
It was dismissed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the ground that it was
filed out of time and that it should have been raised before the votes for Siasi have been
canvassed. Thereafter, he filed a written petition with the COMELEC seeking to annul the
elections in Siasi and to conduct another election.
The board of canvassers forwarded the appeal of petitioner with the COMELEC
with a request to proclaim Anni as the winner. The COMELEC resolved that there was no
failure of elections. Anni was thereafter proclaimed the winner.
While Ututalum’s petition was pending, the governor of Sulu sought to
annul the list of voters of Siasi which was upheld by the SC. Ututalum wanted to have the
case applied to his petition even if he was not a party to the case filed by the governor.
Issue:
WON the petition should be granted on the ground of vote-padding
Held:
Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation
controversy.—The following shall be proper issues that may be
raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material
defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain
discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof
as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats,
coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not
authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling
places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the
standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
As pointed out in Espaldon vs. COMELEC, L-78987, 25 August
1987:
Padded voters' list, massive fraud, and terrorism are clearly not
among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy. They are proper grounds for an election protest.
And as held in the case of Bautista vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78994,
March 10, 1988:
The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues
enumerated under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in a pre-
proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive
(see also Sanchez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-78461, 12 August
1987, 153 SCRA 67).
Moreover, the preparation of a voter's list is not a proceeding before
the Board of Canvassers. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to
challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers, not the Board of
Election Inspectors (Sanchez vs. COMELEC, ante), and such challenges
should relate to specified election returns against which petitioner should
have made specific verbal objections (Sec. 245, Omnibus Election
Code; Pausing vs. Yorac, et al., G.R. No. 82700, 4 August 1988, Endique vs.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 82020-21, 22 November 1988), but did not.
That the padding of the List of Voters may constitute fraud, or that
the Board of Election Inspectors may have fraudulently conspired in its
preparation, would not be a valid basis for a pre-proclamation controversy
either. For, whenever irregularities, such as fraud, are asserted, the proper
course of action is an election protest.
Such irregularities as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism are proper
grounds in an election contest but may not as a rule be invoked to
declare a failure of election and to disenfranchise the greater number
of the electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only a relative
few. Otherwise, elections will never be carried out with the resultant
disenfranchisement of the innocent voters, for the losers will always
cry fraud and terrorism (GAD vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 78302, May
26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665).
Wherefore, the Petition for Certiorari is dismissed and the assailed
Resolutions are affirmed.
***************************************************************************************
64.
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO VS. THE COMMISION ON
ELECTIONS
GR No. 161265; February 24, 2004
Facts:
On December 8, 2003, the General Counsel of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) informed the COMELEC by way
of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or
his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the
partys official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara
had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino,
on indefinite forced leave.
Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman
does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary
General. Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.
 The COMELEC issued an Order requiring the parties to file a verified
petition. It turned out that, two days before, Sen. Angara had submitted a
verified Petition, in essence, reiterating the contents of its
previous Manifestations.
Rep. Aquino filed his Answer to the Petition. The COMELEC heard the
parties on oral arguments on the same day, after which the case was
submitted for resolution.
Pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination of Sen. Panfilo Lacson
as LDP candidate for President was filed with the COMELEC. The Certificate
of Nomination was signed by Rep. Aquino as LDP Secretary General.
On January 6, 2004, the COMELEC came to a decision granting
with LEGAL EQUITY for both Petitioner and Oppositor. The candidates for
President down to the last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad nominated and
endorsed by LDP Chairman Edgardo J. Angara are recognized by the
Commission as official candidates of LDP Angara Wing. The candidates from
President down to the last Sangguniang Bayan Kagawad as nominated and
endorsed by LDP Secretary General Agapito Butz Aquino are recognized as
official candidates of LDP Aquino Wing.
Sen. Angara thus filed the present petition for Certiorari assailing the
COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Office of the Solicitor General submitted a Manifestation and
Motion praying for the granting of the Petition. The COMELEC thus filed a
separate Comment to the Petition.
Issue:
Who as between the Party Chairman and the Secretary General has the
authority to sign certificates of candidacy of the official candidates of the
party?
Held:
The LDP has a set of national officers composed of, among others, the
Party Chairman and the Secretary General The Party Chairman is the Chief
Executive Officer of the Party, whose powers and functions include to
represent the Party in all external affairs and concerns, sign documents for
and on its behalf, and call the meetings and be the presiding officer of the
National Congress and the National Executive Council.
The Secretary General, on the other hand, assists the Party Chairman
in overseeing the day-to-day operations of the Party. His authority to sign
documents, therefore, is only a delegated power, which originally pertains to
the Party Chairman.
SEC. 6. Certificate of nomination of official candidates by political party. The
certificate of nomination of registered political parties or coalitions of political
parties of their official candidates shall be filed not later than the last day for
filing of certificates of candidacy, which is January 2, 2004 duly signed and
attested under oath by the party president, chairman, secretary-general
or any other duly authorized officer and shall bear the acceptance of the
nominee by affixing his signature in the space provided therein.
Clearly, however, the above provision presupposes that the party
president, chairman or secretary-general has been duly authorized by the
party to sign the certificate of candidacy.COMELEC Resolution No. 6453
cannot grant a party official greater authority than what the party itself grants,
lest such Resolution amount to a violation of the partys freedom of
association.
Since the signature of Rep. Aquino was affixed either prior to, or on the
basis of, the challenged Resolution recognizing his authority to sign on behalf
of the LDP, the same would not constitute material representation that is
false. In such case, the candidates are simply deemed as not nominated by
the LDP and are considered independent candidates pursuant to Section 7 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6453:
SEC. 7. Effect of filing certificate of nomination. A candidate who has not
been nominated by a registered political party or its duly authorized
representative, or whose nomination has not been submitted by a registered
political party shall be considered as an independent candidate.
It is plain that the COMELEC misapplied equity in the present case. For
all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not
as its replacement. Equity is described as justice without legality, which
simply means that it cannot supplant, although it may, as often happens,
supplement the law. The COMELEC should have decided the case on the
basis of the party constitution and election laws. It chose not to because of its
irrational fear of treading, as respondent Aquino put it, on unchartered
[41]
territories. But, as shown above, these territories have long
been charted by jurisprudence and, in any case, the COMELEC need not
have sailed far from the shore to arrive at the correct conclusion. In truth, the
COMELEC Resolution is indecision in the guise of equity.
Worse, the COMELEC divided the LDP into wings, each of which may
nominate candidates for every elective position. Both wings are also entitled
to representatives in the election committees that the Commission may
create. In the event that the LDP is accorded dominant minority party election
status, election returns of odd-numbered precincts shall be furnished the
Angara wing and those of even-numbered precincts, the Aquino wing.
By creating the two wings, the COMELEC effectively diffused the LDPs
strength and undeniably emasculated its chance of obtaining the
Commissions nod as the dominant minority party.
Wherefore, the assailed COMELEC Resolution is ANNULLED and
the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. Respondent Commission on Elections is
directed to recognize as official candidates of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino only those whose Certificates of Candidacy are signed by LDP Party
Chairman Senator Edgardo J. Angara or his duly authorized representative/s.
***************************************************************************************
65.
 AKLAT-ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG LIPUNAN AT
ADHIKAIN PARA SA TAO, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC), respondent. G.R. No. 162203 April 14, 2004
FACTS:
On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-
qualification as a party-list organization for purposes of the May 2004
elections. It alleged in its petition that it participated in the 2001 elections but
was disqualified by the Comelec as it was found not to have complied with
the guidelines set by the Court in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Comelec (Bagong Bayani case)6 for party-list organizations to
qualify and participate as such in the party-list elections. Accordingly, Aklat
"re-organized itself in order that it will comply with the 8-point guidelines
enunciated by the Supreme Court"7 in the said case.
In its assailed Resolution dated January 8, 2004, the Comelec dismissed the
petition stating that Aklat cannot be considered as an organization
representing the marginalized and underrepresented groups as identified
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. 7941). According to the
Comelec, Aklat’s statement that it has reorganized itself does not cure this
defect as "there is nothing in the petition which will help us identify what
particular marginalized and underrepresented group AKLAT is now
representing."8 Further, the Comelec held that "AKLAT lumped all the
sectoral groups imaginable under the classification of regular members just
to convince us that it is now cured of its defect."
The Comelec denied the motion for reconsideration in its questioned
Resolution dated February 13, 2004, on three grounds, namely: the petition
was filed beyond the deadline set by the Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 for
registration of party-list organizations; the petition was not one for re-
qualification as Aklat was never a registered party-list organization having
failed to meet the eight-point guidelines set by the Court in the Bagong
Bayani case; and that its decision not to extend the deadline for registration
of partylist organizations is valid, the Comelec being in the best position to
make such a determination.
ISSUE:
WON the petition, which was filed on November 20, 2003, was filed within
the allowed period.
WON Section 5 of Resolution No. 632012 which requires the filing of such
petitions not later than September 30, 2003, is null and void as it amends
R.A. 794
HELD:
For its part, the Comelec filed a Comment dated March 29, 2004, stating that
the period of ninety (90) days prescribed in R.A. 7941 refers to the prohibitive
period beyond which petitions for registration may no longer be filed.
Furthermore, the documents submitted by Aklat do not prove that its
members belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society. Aklat’s contention that Resolution No. 6320 is null and void as it
amends and amplifies R.A. 7941 deserves scant consideration. R.A. 7941
provides:
Sec. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a
party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing
with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a
petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in
the partylist system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or
a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,
by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition
agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require:
Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals…[Italics supplied.]
By its wording, R.A. 7941 itself supports the Comelec’s position that the
period stated therein refers to the prohibitive period beyond which petitions
for registration should no longer be filed nor entertained. Put elsewise, it is
simply the minimum countback period which is not subject to reduction since
it is prescribed by law, but it is susceptible of protraction on account of
administrative necessities and other exigencies perceived by the poll body.
Verily, the Comelec has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to enforce and administer election laws. This power includes the
determination, within the parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for
the accomplishment of certain pre-election acts like filing petitions for
registration under the party-list system. This is exactly what the Comelec did
when it issued its Resolution No. 6320 declaring September 30, 2003, as the
deadline for filing petitions for registration under the partylist system.
Considering these, as well as the multifarious pre-election activities that the
Comelec is mandated to undertake, the issuance of its Resolution No. 6320
cannot be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
It should finally be emphasized that the findings of fact by the Comelec, or
any other administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of
endeavor, are binding on the Supreme Court.17 In view of the foregoing, the
Comelec can, by no means, be held to have committed grave abuse of
discretion to justify the setting aside of the assailed Resolutions.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DISMISSED.
***************************************************************************************
66
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190582April 8, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBT’s). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under
Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The
application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on
moral grounds.
Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First
Resolution, stating that “the party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s.
Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual
orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.”
That “the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and
Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said
religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral
norms.” COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition
was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that
the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution
and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list
organization under RA 7941.
HELD:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions
of the COMELEC. It also directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s
application for party-list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.
Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad
is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, “governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs
and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general
application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless of
sexual orientation.
***************************************************************************************
67
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R NO. 177314, 4 May 2007
FACTS:
There are two consolidated cases.
(G.R. 177271) Petitioner Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA7941) and the Urban
Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) assails various COMELEC Resolutions
accrediting Biyaheng Pinoy et. al to participate in the elections without
determining if their nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in
RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act.
(G.R. 177314) Petitioner Rosales impugn COMELEC Resolution 07-0724
effectively denying their request for the release of the names of the nominees
of the 14 accredited party-lists mention in Rep. Loreta Rosales’ (Kilosbayan
Foundation) letter-request.
On 12 January 2007 – COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 which
prescribed the rules and regulations to govern the filing and submission of
names under the party-list list of representation. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA
7941) and Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the COMELEC
an urgent petition to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organization.
On 29 March 2007 – Rosales sent a letter to the COMELEC Law Department
requesting a list of the groups’ nominees; another letter followed
emphasizing the urgency of the subject request. Neither COMELEC nor its
Law Department responded to the request. On 3 April 2007 – COMELEC
issued an en banc Resolution declaring the names as confidential.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without
determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis. While both
petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the
petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional prayers that the 33
private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from
allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.
ISSUES:
1. WON Comelec has violated the right to information and free access
of documents as guaranteed by the Constitution
 2. WON Comelec is mandated by Constitution to disclose the public
names of said nominees
HELD:
YES. Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the
given rationale is the right to information enshrined in the self-
executory Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. Complementing and
going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional
provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in
Government. We refer to Article II, Section 28 of the Constitution.
The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are
the public, or the citizens to be precise.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct
the exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by
mandamus. And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship
possesses the right to be informed, objections on
ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in
question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of
the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus,
therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of Republic Act 7941 (Party-List System
Act) reading “[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on
the certified list” is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the
requested disclosure. The prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said
Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to
the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling
places on Election Day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the
absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were,
there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from
disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the Certified
List the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread
the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public
disclosure before the May 2007 elections.
The Comelec’s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of
personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its
assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty
presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to
information. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a
party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
Petition G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. Petition in G.R. No.177314
and 177271, which aims to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of
party-list groups, sectors or organization accredited to participate in the May
14, 2007 elections, are GRANTED. Comelec is ORDERED to immediately
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,
sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 party-
list elections.
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68
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000
Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which
obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system
as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents,
who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution,
it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives come from the party-list representatives.
Issue:
1) Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a
ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2) Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit
provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3) How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
Held:
1) It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in
the House of Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the
broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress
deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at
least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a
party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress.
FORMULA FOR determination of total number of party-list representatives
= #district representatives/.80 x .20
additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of
party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes
of first party x additional seats for concerned party
2) Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that
only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed
bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government
authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives
chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the
proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant
legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.
3) Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the
private respondents, as well as the members of this Court that the initial step
is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then
the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes
cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two
percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties
shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the
“first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to
be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first
party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation.
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69
BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 147589 - June 26, 2001
Facts:
Bagong Bayani and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC
a Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC. This resolution approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in
the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system was intended to benefit
the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties
the none-marginalized or overrepresented.
Issues:
1) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections
2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and
underrepresented’ sectors and organizations.
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
COMELEC which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings,
whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed
Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. The resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC “to refrain
proclaiming any winner” during the last party-list election, shall remain
in force until after the COMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance.
1) Yes. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list
elections. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot
be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they
are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations. “Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system
of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is
"either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."

2) No. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does
not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group
for that matter -- maydo so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as
laid down in the Constitution and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution. The provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is,
in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be
provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.