Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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Within 30 days after a decision is final in the Court of Appeal, any
person may request this court to order a published opinion be depublished.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1125(a)(1) and (a)(4).) Within 30 days after a
decision is final in the Court of Appeal, any person may request this court
to order a published opinion be depublished. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.1125(a)(1) and (a)(4).) A Court of Appeal decision in a habeas corpus
proceeding is final in that court 30 days after filing. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 8.387(b) & 8.490(b).) The Humphrey decision was issued on January
25, 2018, and will be final on February 24, 2018.
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Contemporaneous with this letter requesting the Humphrey
decision be depublished, the CDAA is lodging a separate letter requesting
921 11th Street, Suite 300, Sacramento, CA 95814 • 916.44.2017 • www.cdaa.org
California bail system by legislating new bail procedures not contemplated
by our statutes or the California Constitution, that conflicts with other case
law, and that are impractical to implement. Depublication is necessary to
avoid the inequities and inconsistencies the Humphrey decision will create
within our criminal bail system.
the court grant review of the decision pursuant to California Rules of Court,
rule 8.1125. The separate request for review of the decision is filed in the
event the court declines to depublish Humphrey.
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resident’s cellular telephone on the floor, took $2 from the resident, and
stole $5 and a bottle of cologne before leaving the apartment. (Humphrey,
Slip Opn. A152056, at p. 3.) The petitioner was a third-striker, charged
with first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), first degree residential
burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), inflicting injury on an elder adult (Pen. Code,
§ 368, subd. (c)), and misdemeanor theft from an elder adult (Pen. Code, §
368, subd. (d)). (Id. at p. 3, 5.)
On habeas review, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order,
holding that setting an amount of bail impossible for a defendant to pay
constituted a sub rosa or de facto detention. (Humphrey, Slip Opn.,
A152056, at pp. 2, 17, 24.) The court noted that before a trial court could
impose such a detention order, due process protections required a bail
inquiry in which the court would consider the defendant’s individualized
ability to pay and possible imposition of non-monetary condition as an
addition or alternative to money bail being paid. (Id. at pp. 16, 24.)
ARGUMENT
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CDAA recognizes that uncertified California opinions must not be
cited or relied upon in any other action except when the opinion is relevant
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philosophy of Humphrey, the Sanchez court directed the trial court to
vacate a $1,000,000 bail for a charged murderer (who also had various drug
and firearm charges), because the charged murderer claimed he was unable
to pay the amount of bail ordered. Without a single word about the danger
this charged murderer poses to public safety, the Sanchez court’s only
direction to the trial court was for it to consider the charged murderer’s
ability to pay bail and alternative methods to ensure the charged murderer
appeared for trial. The alarming result from application of Humphrey’s
philosophy here is a charged murderer walking public streets.
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or
when the opinion is relevant to a criminal action because it states reasons
for a decision affecting the same defendant or respondent in another such
action. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115 [citation of Sanchez opinion is
relevant, because it states reasons for a decision affecting the same
respondent, the People of the State of California, in another such action].)
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the safety of the victim shall be the primary considerations.” (Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(3).) Our very Constitution acknowledges that criminal
defendants may be released on bail, with conditions, but public safety and
the safety of victims in particular, must be of utmost importance when
setting that bail amount; bail is not simply an amount a criminal defendant
can afford to pay to assure appearance in court as mandated by Humphrey.
(See Humphrey, Slip Opn. A152056, at p. 21 [once admitted to bail, public
and victim safety are not the proper inquiry, but the inquiry should be the
amount a criminal defendant can afford to pay to secure his return to
court].)
II
On January 31, 2018, two days after Humphrey was decided, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal issued its decision in In re Webb (Jan. 31,
2018, D072981)
___ Cal.App.5th ___ (2018 WL 635962) (“Webb” or “Slip Opn.
D072981”), holding a court has no authority to impose a condition of
release outside of the statutory framework for imposing bail. According to
Webb, that statutory bail framework allows conditions of bail in only two
situations: 1) pursuant to Penal Code section 1270, which permits
misdemeanants to receive conditions in addition to money bail; and 2)
pursuant to Penal Code section 1269c, which permits money bail and
conditions prior to arraignment. Humphrey’s requirement that trial courts
impose conditions in addition or as alternatives to a felony money bail
amount, outside of the two exceptions identified by Webb, directly conflicts
with the Webb holding.
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The text of the pending Senate Bill No. 10 to create the reform act is
available at the California Legislation Information website
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720
180SB10.
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inherent authority to impose conditions on a defendant’s release” even
when a defendant posts the monetary bail amount set forth in the bail
schedule. (Webb, Slip Conc. Opn., D072981, at p. 1.)
III.
Although the Humphrey court describes the new bail rules in broad
strokes, it fails to provide actual workable procedures for a trial court to
follow. It provides no guidance regarding acceptable conditions of bail,
what is considered an “ability to pay,” what evidentiary requirements are
necessary at bail hearings, or the timing of bail hearings. Humphrey should
be depublished because this detrimental lack of guidance will cause
inequities and inconsistencies within the criminal bail system.
First, the appellate court fails to provide trial courts clear instruction
about what conditions would qualify as acceptable additions or alternatives
to money bail. Rather, the Humphrey court directed trial courts to rely on
Penal Code section 1275, subdivision (c) (setting, reducing, denying bail;
considerations) and United States v. Salerno (1987) 481 U.S. 739, 743-744
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(Salerno), to discern conditions suitable as additions or alternatives to
assuring the defendant’s continued appearances in court and the public’s
safety. (Humphrey, Slip Opn., A152056, at pp. 21–22.) That reference,
however, provides trial courts with inadequate guidance when deciding
what condition should be imposed additionally or alternatively to money
bail. Penal Code section 1275, and Salerno addressed a trial court’s
consideration of factors pertinent to deciding if a defendant is a danger to
public safety or likely to commit future crimes; neither section 1275 nor
Salerno addressed or suggested conditions a trial court was to impose in
addition or alternatively to a bail amount if a defendant was unable to pay
that amount. (Pen. Code, § 1275; Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 743-744.)
And finally, Humphrey does not address the timing of the bail
hearing. Although the appellate court recognized that the “timeliness
within which bail determinations must be made are short,” the opinion does
not specify a particular time within which bail review must occur.
(Humphrey, Slip Opn. A152056, at p. 24.)
These missing details described above are the very same that would
have been properly vetted by the Legislature before implementing those
changes into law. These missing details show why legislating should be left
to the Legislature. Even the Humphrey court acknowledges, “We are not
blind to the practical problems our ruling may present. The timeliness
within which bail determinations must be made are short, and judicial
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officers and pretrial service agencies are already burdened by limited
resources.” (Humphrey, Slip Opn. A152056, at p. 24.) Humphrey does not
“fix” a bail system the appellate court finds lacking but continues to create
inequities and inconsistencies in the application of bail to criminal
defendants. As a result, public safety will be all the poorer for it.
For all the reasons stated, CDAA urges this court to depublish the
Humphrey decision.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
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DECLARATION OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct, and
was executed on February 26, 2018, at Sacramento, California.
_____________________________
Laura Bell
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