Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
JOSEPHINE BAYONA
Facts:
Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets
known as Masiao Tickets” without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai and amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from
the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts and to which inquiry respondent judge replied “it is with the curt”. The judge then
handed the records to the Fiscal who attached then to the records
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under the constitution “no search warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge personally or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized b law after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce”.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and witnesses that he
may produce and to attach then to the records. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the judge may be able to properly determined the existence and nonexistence of the
probable cause, to hole liable for perjury the person giving It if it will be found later that his
declaration are false.
Deposition – any written statement certified under oath. – written testimony of a
witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trail or haring upon oral
examination
The search warrant is illegal, the return of the thing seized cannot be ordered. Illegality
of search warrant does not call for the return of the thing seize, the possession of which is
prohibited.
That the officers of the law believed that the books, papers, etc.,which they seized might be
used as evidence
against the petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a violation ofthe Opium Law,
is no reason or justification under the law for the seizure
: First, because they were not "particularlydescribed" or even mentioned in the search warrant;
second, because, even if they had been mentioned in the searchwarrant, they could not be legally
seized, for a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining evidence; andthird,
because to compel a person to produce his private papers to be used in evidence against him would
be equivalent tocompelling him to be a witness against himself.From all of the foregoing
our conclusions are:1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did
not comply with the requirements of section98 of General Orders No. 58, the
petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia which werefound
and seized under said warrant
, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge.2. That
the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search begun on the previous day, and,
therefore, did notrequire another search warrant.3. That the
seizure of the petitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no
inherent relation withopium and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was illegal
and in violation of the petitioners' constitutionalrights.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of the respondents herein, their
assistants or successors, be,and they hereby are, forbidden from examining or making any use of
said books, letters, telegrams, etc., and they are herebyordered to immediately return the said
articles to the petitioners.
ESPANO VS CA
RODOLFO ESPANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 120431 April 1, 1998
Facts:
Pat. Pagilagan together with other police officers went to Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They
saw petitioner selling something to another person. After the alleged buyer left,
they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him.
The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if
he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The
policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags
of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where he was
charged of possession of prohibited drugs.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught
in flagrante as a result of a buy bust operation conducted by police officers on the
basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area.
The police officer saw petitioner handling over something to an alleged buyer.
After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophane of
marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bag of
marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being fruits of the crime.
FIRST DIVISION
Petitioners,
Present:
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
THE HON. NELSONIDA T. ULAT-
GARCIA, JJ.
MARREDO, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,
La Trinidad, Benguet and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated September 15, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684.
That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, along the Halsema National Highway
at Acop, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually aiding each other and without any authority of law or
without any license or permit granted by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), and with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and
transport 870 bd. ft. of Benguet Pine lumber having a total market value of TWENTY
FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P24,360.00), Philippine Currency,
belonging to the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, to the damage and prejudice of the
GOVERNMENT in the actual sum aforesaid.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet
(presided by respondent Judge Nelsonida T. Ulat-Marredo), docketed as Criminal
Case No. 98-CR-3138.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6,
1998, SPO2 Alberto Ngina of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tublay Station
received an information from a confidential agent that a jeepney with Plate No.
AYB 117 at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber.
SPO2 Ngina immediately relayed the information to SPO4 Rentao Quitoriano and
SPO1 Domingo Pulig. They then swiftly established a checkpoint in Acop,
Tublay, Benguet.
At around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives spotted the jeepney
heading toward La Trinidad. They flagged it down but it did not stop. Hence, they
chased the vehicle up to Shilan, La Trinidad where it finally halted.
The police saw five persons inside the jeepney then loaded with assorted
vegetables, like womboc[3] and chili.
When SPO4 Quitoriano lifted a womboc, he found some pieces of lumber under
it. The driver and his companions admitted they have no permit to transport the
lumber. The police immediately arrested and investigated petitioners, Marso
Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners were charged
with violation of Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Suppress Evidence of the Prosecution on the ground that the pieces of
Benguet pine lumber were illegally seized.
In a Resolution[4] dated July 26, 1999, respondent judge denied the motion.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55684 assailing the said Resolutions
of the trial court.
On September 15, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petition, holding that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the search conducted without
warrant by the police officers is valid; and that the confiscated pieces of lumber
are admissible in evidence against the accused.
In this jurisdiction, the fundamental law of the land recognizes and protects the
right of a person to privacy against unreasonable intrusions by the agents of the
State. This right to undisturbed privacy is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3(2), also of Article III, provides that any evidence obtained in violation of
the above provision shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with
judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure constitutes derogation of a
constitutional right.[6]
In People v. Vinecarao,[10] we ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing
a checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, in an
apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection,
there exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law
enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were officers of the law or that
the vehicle contained objects which were instruments of some offense. This ruling
squarely applies to the present case. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in
holding that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she ruled that the warrantless
search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence against
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55684. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since
subversion is a form of a continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the
inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the
arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses
pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise,
it would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of
irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free
from error.
DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The “confidential information” was nothing but hearsay. The searches and
arrests made were bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or
in any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions.
2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state. People vs. Marti --Marti and his wife
went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped
packages. Marti informed the owner that the packages simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts
to his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the owner to examine and inspect the packages. However,
before the delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the package and
found marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his
right against illegal searches and seizure. Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant
that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the
State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution
Microsoft vs maxicorp
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares
(Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within the premises of
Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a
computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows.
For their purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a
certain “Joel Diaz”. Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC.
He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as
evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a
computer technician, who showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought
by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable
cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp,
issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it
highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s or Sacriz’ name hence the
proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From
what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright
infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano
and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed
and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some
cases, installed there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s name nor was it in Sacriz’ name does
not render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause
requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination
exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given
situation.Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply
because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is
not in his name.
Stonehill vs Diokno
20 SCRA 383
Facts:
Enrile vs Salazar
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime
Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts against then president Corazon
Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against
him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas
corpus questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being charged against him is
nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs
Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes
such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been charged against him
is simple rebellion – which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He
claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the
case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that it was
impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous record of the case
from the prosecution’s office – that being, the constitutional provision that a judge may only
issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the existence of probable cause has
not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling should be
abandoned and that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like
murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.
HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was actually
a previous law (P.D. 942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law
provided that graver crimes may not be complexed with rebellion. However, President
Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the 1986
Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law
under the Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts
can only interpret laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion law (which the SC
suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is correct, there
is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed.
He can only be charged with rebellion – which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and
twenty minutes to issue the warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the
fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record from the preliminary
investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows established procedure by
personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively
brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome
the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the
petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is
further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful
under the circumstances.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant
for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too
late.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions
heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.
PADILLA, J.:
I. THE FACTS
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the
purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing
an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be
directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people.
Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches
and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures?
NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do
not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas)
may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings
in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all
of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions –
which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the
inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community.
EN BANC
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present or offer
any evidence. Respondent opted not to present his evidence anymore because
according to him there is none to rebut vis--vis the evidence presented by the private
complainants. Respondent instead submitted a memorandum through counsel to argue
his position. As can be seen from the comment and memorandum submitted,
respondents counsel argues that the complaint is politically motivated since
complainants are political rivals of respondent and that the birth certificates Exhibits
D and D-1 which were offered to show that respondent sired the children namely
Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela
Fuente Mendoza out of his cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible
because they were allegedly secured in violation of Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1993. The rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to
respondent.
The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand,
categorically state in their affidavits [Exhibits A and B] particularly in paragraph 2
that Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente,
representing themselves to be husband and wife. In paragraph 10 of said affidavits the
witnesses also categorically state that respondent has even represented to all and
sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife. These categorical statements made under
oath by complainants are not hearsay and remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not
to rebut them.
With respect to Exhibits D and D-1, we believe that they are competent and relevant
evidence and admissible in this proceedings. The exclusionary rule which bars
admission of illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to evidence
obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. The instant case cannot be
analogous to an illegal search or seizure. A person who violates Rule 24 of
Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the penalty of
imprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make the document so issued
inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present case. Exhibits D
and D-1 which are duly certified birth certificates are therefore competent evidence to
show paternity of said children by respondent in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary.
Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good moral
character is a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing. The
continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in
the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs.
Cordova 179 SCRA 680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 682 (1990)]. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 (1997)].
In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of the
fundamental institution of marriage. Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit F
that he is separated from his wife. This fact and statement without any further
explanation from respondent only contributes to the blot in his moral character which
good moral character we repeat is a continuing condition for a member to remain in
good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent has
violated this rule against engaging in immoral conduct.
We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs.
Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts should not be used by private persons
particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on members of the Bar through
unjust and unfounded accusations. However, in the instant case the charges can hardly
be considered as unfounded or unjust based on the evidence presented. The evidence
presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moral character
necessary as a condition for him to remain a member of the Bar in good standing. He
is therefore not entitled to continue to engage in the practice of law.
(1) The records of a persons birth shall be kept strictly confidential and no information
relating thereto shall be issued except on the request of any of the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever absolutely necessary in administrative,
judicial or other official proceedings to determine the identity of the childs parents or
other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the persons death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of at
least two months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos, or both
in the discretion of the court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself
with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights
only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression
and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies.
Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case. The alleged
warrantless search made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurers office,
can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted
searches and seizures.
. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he
is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.
In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships
or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards and, thus, ruled that siring a child with a woman other than his wife
is a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer.[19]
We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that
respondent continues to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not
his legal wife, thus, siring children by her, shows his lack of good moral
character. Respondent should keep in mind that the requirement of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain ones good
standing in the legal profession.[20] In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr.,[21] we
emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of
members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is
made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the
public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him
one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw the privilege.