JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO, Complainants, v. HON. RENATO E.

ABASTILLAS, Judge, Regional

Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod City, Respondent.

JUDGE RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ENRIQUE S. CHUA, Respondent.

Enrique S. Chua for complainants.

A.M. No. RTJ-92-863 and AC. No. 3815. July 11, 1994

FACTS:

Judge Renato E. Abastillas was the presiding judge of the Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, where
Johnson Lee and Bonny Moreno are defendants. Judge Abastillas solicited the amount of PhP50, 000.00
from Atty. Chua to secure a favorable decision on the said criminal cases, which he communicated to his
clients (Lee and Moreno). Johnson Lee then financed the PhP20, 000.00 as a down payment and was
delivered by Atty, Chua to Judge Abastillas. Lee had 3 meetings with Judge Abastillas to discuss the
merits of the case and the payment of $5, 000.00. Lee even recorded the telephone conversation he had
with the respondent judge.

On the other hand, Atty. Chua was charged administratively for allowing himself to be used as a conduit
for illegal and immoral act.

ISSUE(s):

1. WON Judge Abastillas has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct?

2. WON Atty. Chua has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:

1. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence (Rule 1.01). He should administer justice impartially and without delay (Rule
1.02). He should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary (Rule 2.01).

It is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be developed to a high
degree of proficiency, to gain the absolute confidence of the public in the integrity and impartiality of its
administration, because appearance is as important as reality, so much so that a judge, like Cesar’s wife,
must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. The actuations of Judge Abastillas transgressed against the
high standard of moral ethics required of judges.

2. Atty. Chua is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, canon 1, of the Code of Professional Responsibility in
view of his admission that he allegedly delivered PhP20, 000.00 as bribe money to Judge Abastillas,
thereby allowing himself to be used as a conduit for an illegal and immoral act. Rule 1.01 provides that
"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
MOISES S. BENTULAN vs. JUDGE MANUEL P. DUMATOL

FACTS:

Respondent, the incumbent Presiding Judge of Branch 112 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, was
charged with inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties in a verified letter-
complaint. Complainant, who is the defendant in Civil Case No. 9441-P, alleges in the letter-complaint
that the said case was instituted on 6 February 1984 and was submitted for decision as early as 29
September 1989. Yet, despite several oral and written requests and motions for its early decision made
by the complainant, the respondent failed to decide the case. More specifically, he alleges that since
eight months after the case was submitted for decision, he had been going to the sala of the respondent
to inquire about the status of the case. On each occasion, a certain Vida Garcia always informed him
that the respondent was either busy or not yet in. He also filed with the respondent’s court an Ex-parte
Motion to Render Decision on 5 May 1990, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve Motion to Render Decision on
14 September 1990, and another Motion to Resolve Motion to Render Decision on 21 December 1990.

Complainant further avers that in August 1991, he again inquired about the decision and the respondent
personally informed him that he would resolve the case the following month since he would have to
give priority first to cases involving prisoners. On 28 October 1991, Atty. Andrew Inocencio of the Office
of the Court Administrator told the complainant that the respondent would inform the Office about the
case on the last day of October. But since by November the said Office had not received any call from
the respondent, the complainant went to the sala of the respondent on 25 November 1991. He was
assured by Atty. Madamba that the decision would be released on 15 December 1991. On 16 December
1991, the respondent again assured the complainant that the decision would be released before the end
of the year. The respondent explained that since he heard only the last part of the case, he still needed
time to study the case records. On 27 December 1991, the respondent again assured him that the
decision would be released after New Year

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acts of the judge constitute an administrative offense.

RULING:

They found respondent JUDGE MANUEL P. DUMATOL guilty of gross inefficiency and neglect of duty.
Respondent Judge is further directed to decide Civil Case No. 9441-P, if he still has not done so, with
utmost dispatch.
ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES, Jr.

FACTS:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr.

Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent Judge was
cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he
has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965)
before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon
request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in
Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he married De
Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents
and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Respondent also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

ISSUE:

WON Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.

HELD:

Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a
rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case.
ALUMBRES v CAOIBES
DOCTRINE
Canon of Judicial Ethics: “A judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety and his personal behavior, not only on the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. Being the visible representation
of the law and the embodiment of the people’s sense of justice, he must be studiously careful
himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be demoralizing example of others.”

FACTS
Judge Caoibes was appointed presiding judge of Branch 253, a newly created branch of RTC Pasay
City. He had the privilege of recommending to the Supreme Court the appointment of his own
choice. Judge Alumbres, who was then the executive judge of the court, took this as an opportunity
to secure employment for his son. Alumbres lent an executive table to Caoibes for his
temporary use.
The judges had lunch together and both agreed to the appointment of Alumbres’ son as process
server of Branch 253. Later on, Caoibes withdrew his earlier recommendation of Alumbres’ son
and instead, recommended someone else.
Alumbres sent his deputy sheriff to take back his table from Caiobes but he refused to return the
table until his office furniture was delivered by the SC. Alumbres then went to Caoibes’ chambers
to take back his table. Caoibes greeted Alumbres “Hoy, ano ba ang atin?” The latter replied in an
angry tone “Joey, kukunin ko na ang table ko. Akin naman iyun, eh.” In response, Caoibes put
his left arm around Alumbres’ shoulder, extended his right hand to shake that latter’s right hand,
saying “Huwag naman. Halika, pagusapan natin dine.” Despite the cordial gesture, Alumbres
held Caoibes’ right wrist and forcefully jerked it.
Incensed at the fierce reaction of Alumbres, Caoibes shouted “Tarantado ito, ah” and swung his
left arm towards Alumbres, hitting him on the right temple. Caoibes also delivered a right
hook, grazing Alumbres’ lower jaw. One of the deputy sheriffs place placed himself between
the two. Alumbres swung at Caoibes while the latter was being led away but the blow missed.
ISSUES/HELD
(1) WON Judge Caoibes deliberately inflicted fistic blows to complainant Judge Alumbres - YES

RATIO
(1) Judge Caoibes threw two punches at Judge Alumbres, the first hitting his right temple and the
second, the left side of his jaw.

Contrary to the claim of Alumbres, the punches of Caoibes were not severe as the injuries sustained
by Alumbres were mere superficial, the size of a pinhead similar to a mosquito bite. BUT this does
not detract from the gravity of the offense committed. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
states that “A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.”
Rule 2.01 provides that “A judge should behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

Courts are looked upon by the people with high respect and are regarded sacred places.
Misbehavior within and around their vicinity diminishes their sanctity and dignity. By fighting
within the court premises, the parties have failed, not only to observe proper decorum
expected of member of the judiciary, they have failed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. More contemptible, the altercation arose out of a
squabble involving a mere table.

DECISION
Judge Caoibes is guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct, with the fine of P20,000.00 with
a warning that a repetition in the future will be dealt with more severely.

ROAN I. LIBARIOS VS JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS

A.M. NO. RTJ-89-286 July 11, 1991

Topic: CANON 1 SECTION 4

FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client Mariano Corvera,
Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion,
gross misconduct and partiality, relative to the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the respondent judge
against the accused Tranquilino Calo Jr. and Belarmino Alloco for the crime of murder fixing their bail
without any prior hearing.

ISSUE: W/N Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:
Yes. A judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan
or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. He should not have allowed himself to be swayed
into issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary release of the accused charged with murder, without a
hearing, which is contrary to established principles of law. It has been an established legal principle or rule
that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a
summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before
resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused.

A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be
free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.

The respondent judge is imposed of a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) and
WARNED to exercise more care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge, and that the
same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severally.
PEOPLE VS LASCUNA
GR No. 90626
August 18, 1993

FACTS
Accused were charged with robbery with homicide, rape and physical injuries before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
Each of the four pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The trial court directed the assistant public prosecutor to amend
the information by including another co-accused. After the principal prosecution witness had completed her testimony
on direct examination, 2 of the accused - Rosita Villena and Placido Palangoy, sought leave of court to change their
plea to guilty. The trial court granted the request, re-arraigned them and issued an order convicting them of the crimes
charged. Thereupon, trial proceeded against the rest.

Villena and Palangoy filed their notice of appeal but the records of the cases were erroneously forwarded to the CA
which, upon orders of the Presiding Judge thereof, properly transmitted the same to the SC. Villena filed a motion to
withdraw her appeal with the SC. This appeal concerns only Palangoy.

ISSUE
Whether appellant Palangoy was denied due process averring that the trial judge displayed manifest bias and prejudice
against him by asking questions which led witnesses to a preconceived notion of what the facts are, and of
promulgating a judgment "right in the hearing when the defense presented its case and within seconds after both sides
rested their cases"

HELD
The questions propounded by the trial judge merely sought to clarify important matters. Judges are not mere referees
like those of a boxing bout, only to watch and decide the results of a game; they should have as much interest as
counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, calling the attention of such counsel to points at issue
that are overlooked, directing them to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarifying
ambiguous remarks by witnesses and so on.

It is true that as earlier adverted to, the trial court orally "promulgated" its judgment by dictating the same to the
stenographer on 21 August 1989 after the completion of the testimonies of both Rosita Villena and the appellant and
the prosecutor's manifestation that no rebuttal evidence was to be presented.

It must, however, be stressed here that the "verbal" judgment promulgated by the trial court was incomplete as it does
not contain findings of fact and is not signed by the Judge. The Constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In criminal
cases, Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court requires that a "judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement
of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based."

Be that as it may, the infirmity was corrected by the trial court itself when it subsequently issued a full-blown Judgment
— dated 21 August 1989 — which contains a summary of the evidence for the parties, findings of fact and the signature
of the Judge. The records do not, however, yield any proof that this full-blown Judgment was promulgated. Such a
promulgation was necessary considering that the sentence dictated by the trial judge on 21 August 1989 is not similar
in all respects to the dispositive portion of the full-blown decision. In view of the fact that in the Notice of Appeal, the
appellant explicitly refers to the Judgment dated 21 August, 1989, it is logical to presume that the same was properly
promulgated.
Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid Lambayong vs. Malik
A.M. No. MTJ-92-691
226 SCRA 193
September 10, 1993

Facts: Judge Malik was a muslim judge and presides at the Municipal Trial Court in Jolo, Sulu of which
Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid Lambayong filed an administrative complaint with charges of
nepotism, graft and corruption, and immorality against the former.
Judge Malik had a second wife, named Lourdes, while his first marriage with Marina Malik
existed; with Marina’s knowledge.

Judge Nabdar Malik recommended the appointment of his nephew, Omar Kalim, the son of his
older sister, to the position of Janitor in his court of which he made a false certification that his
nephew (Omar Kalim) is not related to him (Judge Nabdar Malik) within the third degree either
by affinity or consanguinity. He continued to make false certification until his nephew was made
the process server.

Issues: 1. Whether bigamy applies to all individuals who engage into marriage x times while a previous
marriage exists.

2. Whether an appointing authority (gov’t official/employee) is obliged to disclose his relatives

also working in the government?

Ruling: 1. No, under the Muslim Law and the Holy Qua’an, marrying more than one wife is allowed
provided the man can afford financially and can give equity and justice to the wives. Also, article
180 of PD No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Laws of the Philippines, provides
that the penal laws relative to the crime of bigamy “shall not apply to a person married x x x
under the Muslim Law.” Judge Malik, being a Tausug, is engaging in a polygamous relationship
by Islam belief.

2. Yes, under section 8(b) Republic Act 6713 (Code of Cunduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees) states that: “It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to
identify and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the
government in the form, manner, and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.

Judge Malik violated Rep. Act 6714 by falsifying certifications as to their relationship with Omar
Kalim. The latter was in fact the son of Judge Malik’s elder sister therefore established an act of
nepotism as they are related “within the third degree of consanguinity.”

Judge Malik also violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires that “a judge shall not
allow family, social, or other relationship to influence his judicial conduct or judgement” of
which he failed to commit as he is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and falsification of a
public document.
BORROMEO-HERRERA vs. BORROMEO

152 SCRA 172

FACTS:

Vito Borromeo, a widower died without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu. Jose
Junquera filed a petition for the probate of a one-page document as the last will and testament left by the said
deceased. The probate court held that the document presented as the will was a forgery. The testate proceeding was
converted into an intestate proceeding. Several parties came before the court filing claims. Fortunato Borromeo, filed
a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the heirs. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver
of Hereditary Rights. In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate.
The petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial court's order declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled
to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the waiver of hereditary right is valid.

HELD:

No. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an existing
inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because the
heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased. The heirs, therefore, could waive
their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only in 1969. In this case, however,
the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements
are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish
such right. The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear
and convincing intention to relinquish their rights. Thus Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading
entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. This shows that
the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be.
MONTEROLA VS. Judge CAOIBES Jr
FACTS: Respondent Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., promulgated a decision in
favor of herein complainants Spouses Adriano and Hilda Monterola in a civil case.
Due to said decision, the spouse filed a Motion for Execution, since the defendant
Spouses Mario & Mavis Delagado did not appeal the decision and the period of
appeal had already lapsed.

Judge Caoibes, however, refused to grant the motion for the issuance of the Writ
of Execution.

In his comment, respondent judge denied the allegations in the complaint. He

made it clear that he would issue the order for the issuance of the Writ of
Execution but there was a necessity to determine first the exact amount due the
complainants. According to him, this delay could not be considered as dereliction
of duty because it was basically due to the sudden resignation of his personnel
which gave rise to confusion that affected the disposition of pending matters.
Additionally, the Motion for Execution filed by the complainants was a pro forma
motion for failing to comply with the requirements of sec.5, Rule 15 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as it lacked notice of hearing, and proof of service.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge’s refusal to issue a Writ of Execution

was an act unbecoming of a judge.

HELD: Yes. There is no dispute that the decision of respondent had already
become final & executory. Execution of the said decision should have issued as a
matter of right, in accordance with sec. 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

In failing to issue the Writ of Execution in compliance with the clear mandate of
the said rule, respondent either deliberately disregarded the rule or demonstrated
ignorance thereof. His justification for his admitted delay in the issuance of the
writ, namely, pro forma character of the motion for execution, necessity to
determine the exact amount and confusion of court records due to the resignation
of his key staff are very flimsy. In attempting to hide his ignorance by anchoring
his “inaction” on other provisions of the Rules of Court, respondent all the more
manifest a lack of familiarity on the harmonious interplay of the provisions of
procedural law.

While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of

occasional mistakes or errors of judgments, it is highly imperative that they
should be conversant with fundamental and basic legal principles in order to merit
the confidence of the citizenry.
Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77

Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack
of an appeal.
On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of
lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.
One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated as
Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of
certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a
portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn
Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and
his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the
corporation
Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion

Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge"
but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities
Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March
6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil
Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no longer
the subject of litigation.
In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have
been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New
Sovereign.
Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers
cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official
capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their
respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance from
the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes against Canon 25.
DAVID G. OMPOC vs. JUDGE NORITO E. TORRES Facts: A civil case no. R-26374 for ejectment
entitled, Marcos A. Escobar, plaintiff versus Deco Sales, defendant, was filed sometime in 1984 with
the City Court of Cebu. After the usual raffle it was assigned to Judge Norito Torres, Branch VII.
While the case was being tried on the merits, at one time he invited me to see him at his residence
at Banawa, Cebu City and he instructed me to bring my client, Mr. Charlie Taguiam, proprietor of
Deco Sales along with me. In that meeting Judge Torres requested Mr. Charlie Taguiam, who is
engage (sic) in the business of Car Decor to install a brand new airconditioner on his Toyota Hi-Ace
and said airconditioner was installed without Judge Norito Torres paying for it. As the ejectment case
progressed Judge Norito Torres had been pestering my client Mr. Charlie Taguiam with request for
loans which he never acknowledged by means of a receipt and he was given by my client sums of
money totalling Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) in various amounts and on different
dates. These loans have never been paid up to now and this certainly will not be paid, to the end of
time because Judge Norito Torres is smart enough not to sign anything. Before he penned (sic) his
decision on May 2, 1986, xerox copy is hereto attached Annex A, Judge Torres called my client and
pressured him to enter into an amicable settlement with the plaintiff by paying the back rentals
amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) because he may have entered into an
agreement with the plaintiff in the division of the spoils just in case my client would accede to it. My
client refused to enter into any kind of settlement because he believed in the justness of his cause3
Ruling: While he found the charges against respondent Judge to have been proven, the
Investigating Judge refrained from making a recommendation on the appropriate administrative
penalty for respondent. After having carefully examined the records in this case, the Court is
convinced that respondent Judge did commit the acts with which he was charged. In receiving
P5,000.00 and P3,000.00 from a party to a litigation before him, as loans which he never paid back
and which to all appearances he never intended to pay back, and in refusing or failing to pay for an
airconditioner installed in his wife's automobile van by a shop owned by a party litigant before him,
respondent Judge is guilty of serious misconduct in office and of acts unbecoming a member of the
judiciary. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those who are charged with
the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes
the respect for law and the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears apart
the very bonds of our politly. Members of the judiciary should display not only the highest integrity
but must at all times conduct themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion.
(Quiz vs. Cantano, 107 SCRA 196; Montemayor vs. Collado, 107 SCRA 258) The Court had
likewise stressed in De la Paz vs. Inutan (64 SCRA 540) that 'the judge is the visible representation
of the law and, more importantly of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to
obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests,
147 GG Case Title: Macias, et al. vs Pacana, et al.

G.R. Number & Date: 3048. June 3, 1991

Nature of the Case: The original Complaint filed by petitioner Jose C. Macias on his own behalf
and that of his co-complainants, implicated: (1) Judge Alejandro B. Pallugna, Municipal Judge
of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, and later City Judge of Gingoog City, same province; (2) Judge
Severo Malvar, District Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch VIII;
(3) Judge Eulalio Rosete of the same Court, Branch V, Cagayan de Oro City; (4) former Judge
Federico Alfonso, later Court of Appeals Justice; (5) Respondent lawyers; and (6) some
private parties.

Facts:

 The Court dismissed the complaint against three of the Judges (Judge Malvar, Judge
Rosete & former CA Justice Alfonso) for having become moot and academic.
 In this administrative case, complainants pray that Judge Pallugna be disbarred or
dismissed from the service for: (1) unauthorized practice of law, and violation of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics on "avoidance of appearance of impropriety," which resulted in
their having been cheated of their inheritance; (2) unauthorized notarization of private
documents; and (3) Perjury, for having submitted two inconsistent comments to the
investigating bodies, namely, the Tanodbayan and this Court.
 Chief Attorney recommended that respondent Judge Pallugna be suspended for 6
months for unauthorized notarization of private documents and that the complaint
against respondent lawyers including movant Atty. De Los Reyes, Jr be dismissed.

Respondent’s Arguments:
Atty. Delos Reyes, Jr: Complaint filed against him was baseless in fact and in law.

ISSUE: WON Judge Pallugna should be disbarred?

FALLO: WHEREFORE, for unauthorized notarization of three (3) private documents, in complete
disregard of the Decision of this Court in his own case, supra, Respondent Judge Alejandro B.
Pallugna, Jr., is hereby FINED Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a stern WARNING that
the commission of similar acts in the future will warrant a severer sanction.

HELD: NO.
1. Unauthorized practice of law: Complainants claim that Respondent Judge engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law by appearing, sometime in 1970, (1) for one of the oppositors
in Spec. Proc. No. 59-M entitled "Re Petition for Intestate Estate of Deceased Moises
Villamil, Dr. Agustin V. Tan, Petitioner"; and (2) for having filed Spec. Proc. NO. 1089 "For
Adoption of Manuel Pacana," both before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental.

The charge of unauthorized practice of law is a settled matter. First, he was authorized to
engage in private practice by the then existing law and Judge Pallugna’s acquisition of
estate property transpired after the proceedings had terminated and the property
adjudicated to the legal heirs. When the property was acquired, therefore, it was no
longer in litigation.

2. By and large, the questionable maneuvers attributed to Respondent Judge in the

handling of the subject cases do not provide basis for disciplinary action. Neither is
there sufficient evidence that Judge Pallugna had perjured himself.

3. The records, however, sufficiently provide a clear basis for a finding of Respondent
Judge's administrative liability for unauthorized notarization of three (3) private
documents, as follows: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale (2) Memorandum of Agreement
and (3) Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Cristina E. Vda. de Villamil.

It is well settled that Municipal Judges may not engage in notarial work except as
Notaries Public ex-officio. While Municipal Judges, under Section 77 of the
Judiciary Act, before its amendment by Rep. Act No. 6031 on 4 August 1969, were
permitted to pursue any other occupation or calling after office hours, such
authorization excluded engaging in the work of a regular notary public (In re
Appointment of Judge Alejandro B. Pallugna, Jr., as Notary Public, L-29321, 29
February 1972, 43 SCRA 446). As Notaries Public ex-officio, they may engage only
in the notarization of documents connected with the exercise of their official
functions. They may not, as such Notaries Public ex-officio, undertake the
preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts
of conveyances, which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as
Judges (Adm. Matter No. 89-11- 1303 MTC, 1989)

More importantly, Respondent Judge notarized the three (3) private documents
after this Court had affirmed, on 29 February 1972, the cancellation of his notarial
commission by the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental ("In Re
Appointment of Judge Pallugna, Jr., as Notary Public," supra), precisely because of
the prohibition against Municipal Judges engaging in notarial work, except only in
an ex officio capacity.
Vistan v Nicolas; A.M. No. MTJ-87-79; 13 Sep 1991; 201 SCRA
524 (1991)
FACTS:
Complainant Leonila Vistan alleged that as early as 10 Feb 1987, prior to the start of the campaign period, and while
still an MTC judge, respondent Ruben Nicolas started circulating handbills/letters addressed to electoral constitutents
in the second district of Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not respondent judge engaged in electioneering while still an MTC judge.

HELD:
YES. For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench, respondent took
advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the statude of his office, and must be pronounced guilty
of gross misconduct, a clear violation of Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

23 SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS V ROMANILLOS

Facts:
 This is a disbarment case against Atty. Roberto Romanillos, for representing conflicting interests and for using the title
“Judge” despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct (in Zarate v Romanillos).
 Apparently, Romanillos was previously an active board member as corporate secretary of Durano Corp. Inc. (DCI). But it
allowed itself to represent San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc (SJHAI) before the human Settlements Regulation Commission in
a case against the same DCI.
 Irrelevant info: the case above was an alleged violation of DCI of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protection
Act. DCI sold a land designated as a school site, without disclosing it as such. (page 106)
 When SJHAI’s petition over the land was denied, the SJHAI’s Board terminated Romanillos’ services.
 Also, Romanillos acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI.
 Thus, a disbarment case was filed for conflicting interests.
 The IBP handled the case, but he was merely reprimanded.
 In spite of this, he still continued to serve as counsel for Durano-Rodriguez. Thus, a second disbarment case was filed. It
also included his use of “judge” although he was found guilty of grave and serious misconduct.

Issue:
W/N Romanillos should be disbarred

Held:
 Yes.
 It is inconsequential that SJHAI never questioned the propriety of respondent’s continued representation of Durano-
Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean consent. As long as the lawyer represents 2 or more opposing clients, he is guilty
of violating his oath.
 His continued use of “judge” violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01. The penalty imposed on him in the Zarate case forfeiture of all
leave and retirement benefits and privileges: including the title judge. (he was a judge before, but he resigned instead of being
booted out)
 The title “judge” should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and retired, an not to those who were dishonorably
discharged from the service.