Reagan Was Right

Author(s): Richard Pipes

Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1995), pp. 200-201
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20047197
Accessed: 12-03-2018 17:15 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Foreign Affairs

This content downloaded from 193.225.200.92 on Mon, 12 Mar 2018 17:15:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Letters to the Editor

and its empire could mature. At that much understanding for U.S. policies as
point, however, Mikhail Gorbachev and he does for Soviet ones!
the transformation of Soviet policy Second, although I did not explicitly
brought the Cold War to an end." predict in the early 1980s the imminent
Pipes may disagree, but those are not collapse of the Soviet Union, I portrayed
the words of an "apologist" for Soviet it as a country in the grips of a "revolu
policy, of one who cannot see any tionary situation"?a concept that
differences between the two sides in the implies instability and the potential for
Cold War, or of one who is in "the camp" disintegration. There is no hint of a
of Russian communists and fascists today. Soviet crisis in any of Mr. Garthoff s
writings ofthat time.
Read the book to see what it really says.
RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF Third, in his eagerness to prove that
nsdd 75 was really not a major departure
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution
from traditional U.S. policy, Mr.
REAGAN WAS RIGHT
Garthoff overlooks its revolutionary
Richard Pipes replies: central thesis: "The United States recog
I regret that Raymond L. Garthoff nizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep
found my review of The Great Transition roots in the internal system," and hence
unfair. His letter, however, evades the America should promote political and
central issue. In the early 1980s, Coldeconomic pluralism in the U.S.S.R.
War doves like Mr. Garthoff argued (obviously, within, not beyond, our
against the Reagan administration's means).
pol In practice, subversion consider
icy because they said it would cause theably exceeded the language of nsdd 75.
Soviets to become more intransigent. Indeed,
In at the December 1982 National
Security Council meeting that reviewed
fact, the opposite occurred. Mr. Garthoff
reaffirms that Gorbachev was the "criti nsdd 75, President Reagan insisted on
cal factor" that ended the Cold War. the But deletion from the document of
neither in the book nor in his letter certain
does points dealing with economic
he explain what induced Gorbachev warfare
to lest they leak to the press and
embarrass
let go of the Soviet empire and allow him.
communist regimes to "stand or fall" onFourth, I fully appreciate the accom
their own merits. plishments of containment?in their day.
In 1984, with Soviet outposts scattered all
Space limitations prevent my answer
over the globe?Cuba, Nicaragua,
ing all of Mr. Garthoff's counterargu
ments, but I would like to make fourAngola, Vietnam, and so on?it seemed
brief points. to me that a policy devised four decades
earlier had become impracticable. The
First, he explains and thus implicitly
justifies the Soviet invasion of altered geopolitical situation required an
Afghanistan as a reluctant move to assault on the Soviet system itself.
protect "vital" security interests from I do join Mr. Garthoff in referring
diverse threats, including the Unitedreaders to his book. His apologetic tone
States. If only Mr. Garthoff showed as and inability to satisfactorily explain the

[200] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume74N0.3

This content downloaded from 193.225.200.92 on Mon, 12 Mar 2018 17:15:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Letters to the Editor

course of events will quickly become
apparent.
RICHARD PIPES
Baird Professor of History, Harvard
University
NO CANADA
To the Editor:
It is unfortunate that Foreign Affairs province?at a time when 70 percent of
handled the issue of Canada's future by
printing Conrad Black's Manichean
polemic, which presents the complex
issue of Quebec sovereignty as a tire
some debate between Canada?a
paragon of virtue and tolerance?and a
quarrelsome, intractable Quebec
("Canada's Continuing Identity Crisis,"
March/April 1995).
Black's article ignores the central
question of why many Quebeckers still
want to separate. The answer is simple.
The current Canadian constitution was
adopted in 1982 by the nine English
speaking provinces and the federal
government. The constitution was
rejected by all the political parties in
Quebec's National Assembly?federalist
and sovereigntist alike?because it radi
cally changed the original country that
Quebec helped found in 1867. Further
more, Canada's constitution makes any
future constitutional reform virtually
impossible, as seen in the consecutive
failures of the 1990 Meech Lake accord
and the 1992 Charlottetown accord.
As in 1982, the heart of today's prob
lem lies in Canada's failure to address
Quebec's desire for autonomy. For over
30 years, successive governments of
the Canadian framework. "Give us some
space" was the message. Over the years,
that message has been called "special sta
tus," "two nations," the "distinct society,"
or "asymmetrical federalism." To this day,
Canada does not recognize the existence
of Quebec as a nation, a people, a distinct
society, or even a somewhat asymmetrical
Quebeckers tell pollsters that they think
of themselves as Quebeckers first.
A growing number of well-informed
Americans view the debate on Quebec's
sovereignty with great interest. With a per
capita GDP similar to that of Austria or
Denmark, Quebec is the United States'
eighth-largest trading partner, with
exchanges between the two totaling $40
billion annually and amounting to 40
percent of U.S.-Mexico trade. Such
exchanges are two and a half times the
United States' trade with Brazil and eight
times its commerce with Chile. Such
figures explain Quebeckers' ardent support
for open trade. Quebec's enthusiastic sup
port for the 1988 U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement was crucial to the treaty's
adoption, as well as for the North Ameri
can Free Trade Agreement four years later.
While U.S. officials say they would
prefer a united Canada, the U.S. position
has always respected all options.
"Canada's political future," we are told,
"is for Canadians to decide." In a referen
dum later this year, Quebeckers will
indeed be asked to decide. Whatever the
outcome, Quebec's quest for a new status
should be treated with the same fairness.
KEVIN DRUMMOND

Quebec have tried to make Canada Delegate General, Government of Quebec,

accommodate Quebec's identity within New York

FOREIGN AFFAIRS May/June 1995 Uoi]

This content downloaded from 193.225.200.92 on Mon, 12 Mar 2018 17:15:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms