May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest?

1. HARVEY VS. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

Facts:
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months close
surveillance by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) agents in Pagsanjan Laguna. Two days after
apprehension 17 opted for self-deportation, one released for lack of evidenced, one was charged by another offense,
working without a valid working visa. Thus, three was left to face the deportation proceedings.
Seized during petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitute
shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sexual act. There were also posters and other literatures
advertising the child prostitution.
Warrant of arrest was issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration
act and sec. 69 of the revised administrative Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines immigration act clothed the commissioner with any authority to arrest and detained
petitioner pending determination of the existence of a probable cause

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there can be no question that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is
available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not.
One of the constitutional requirement of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon
probable cause.
The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months
during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of
the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest
and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal
deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens.

That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young
boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving
children"

2. MORANO VS. VIVO

Facts:

Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen, together with her minor son in her first marriage, Fuyan Fun arrived in the Philippines
to visit her cousin. they are permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they
posted a cash bond of 4,000. afterwards, Chan married Esteban Morano, native Filipino citizen. to prolong their stay in the
Philippines, chan and Fu obtained several extension. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962.

In a letter, the commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan and Fu to leave the country on or before September 10 with a
warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.

Instead of leaving the country they petitioned the court of first instance for mandamus to compel the commissioner of
immigration to cancel petitioners' alien certificate of registration, prohibition to stop the issuance of warrant of arrest and
preliminary injunction to restrain the confiscation of their cash bond.

Issue:
Whether or not the commissioner of immigration can issue warrant of arrest

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that Section 1 (3), Article III [Bill of Rights] of the Constitution, to wit:
(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest and that the legislative delegation of
such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of Rights.

Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order
of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of
judicial power4 as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action,
not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation,
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution aforesaid, requiring that
the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings

3. Lim vs. Ponce De Leon

FACTS:
Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April
9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale
Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the
Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take
custody of the motor launch.
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor
launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking
custody of the same. 2 So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando
Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant
Delfin Lim and impounded it.
Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case against Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that
on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away
the hull of the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew
fully well that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property; that said motor launch was
purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) of which has been given to Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a consequenceof the unlawful seizure of
the motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch had been moored at the
Balabac Bay, Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless and beyond repair.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defenses
alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was
sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with violence upon persons and with intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo
Timbangcaya without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a criminal charge of robbery against
Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to
seize and impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela
merely obeyed the orders of his superior officer to impound said launch. By way of counterclaim, defendants-appellees
alleged that because of the malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-appellants, they were constrained
to engage the services of lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral damages
in the amount of P5,000.00 each and actual damages in the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that each of them
awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00.
ISSUES/HELD:

Whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question
without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.

ANSWER: NEGATIVE. the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and
no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant
Whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them
granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.

ANSWER. AFFIRMATIVE. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith. Except
for Madella who was merely acting under orders.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

Since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the
constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.

Under the old Constitution 7 the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other
officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the time the act complained of was committed,
there was no law or rule that recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. In his vain attempt to
justify the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon invoked the provisions of Republic
Act No. 732, which amended Sections 1674 and 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law
which confers upon the provincial fiscal; the authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of a
personal property even if it is the corpusdelicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No. 732 has broadened the power of provincial
fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but said law did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to determine,
before issuing the corresponding warrant, whether or not probable cause exists therefor. 8

We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendantsshould
have acted with malice or bad faith.

But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon
the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior
officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records show that
after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to
impound the motor launch despite repeated orders from his superior officer. 21 It was only after he was furnished a copy of
the reply of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity
of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the
court from taking custody of the same, 22 that he impounded the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from
the legal officer of the province, Maddela was led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch.
Then came the order of his superior officer to explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor launch. 23 Faced with a
possible disciplinary action from his Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of
the above circumstances. We are not disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.

4. HORTENCIA SALAZAR vs HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under
Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having ascertained that the
petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was found that petitioner was
operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain
Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie
Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was
unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number
and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs.
Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated properties. They alleged
lack of hearing and due process, and that since the house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was robbery.
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait
accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest
involved.
ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search
and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it be done by a
mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in
the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is
null and void
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest
and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of
Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
3. THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989

FACTS:

On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of convenience, issued search warrants Nos.
156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the private respondents. The application for the issuance of said search
warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS
Task Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator
of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support
the application for the issuance of the 6 search warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty.
Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985. Shortly thereafter, the
private respondent went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants
in question. On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order [effective "for a period of five
days notice"] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985. The lower court declared Search Warrant Nos. 156,
157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void. Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent
Court of Appeals to contest. Appellate Court held that petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers
enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883.
Further, the petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in
the case at bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and void.

ISSUES:

(a) Whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial body and it is one co-equal in
rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction; and
(b) Whether or not such presidential body be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law" to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution.
HELD:
(a) No. It is the basic function of quasi-judicial bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its
decisions are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become
executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise
quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. The Presidential Anti-Dollar
Salting Task Force has the following powers and authority:
 a) Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute all dollar salting activities, including
the overvaluation of imports and the undervaluation of exports;

b) To administer oaths, summon persons or issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony
of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statements of accounts, agreements, and
other as may be necessary in the conduct of investigation;

c) To appoint or designate experts, consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals, investigators and hearing
officers to assist the Task Force in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities; gather data, information or
documents; conduct hearings, receive evidence, oath oral and documentary, in all cases involving violation of
foreign exchange laws or regulations; and submit reports containing findings and recommendations for
consideration of appropriate authorities;
d) To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate penalties therefor under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court; and To adopt such measures and take such actions as may be necessary to implement this Decree.
xxx xxx xxx
"f. After due investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges with the fiscal's office
or the courts as the case may be, to impose a fine and/or administrative sanctions as the circumstances warrant,
upon any person found committing or to have committed acts constituting blackmarketing or salting abroad of
foreign exchange, provided said person voluntarily admits the facts and circumstances constituting the offense and
presents proof that the foreign exchange retained abroad has already been brought into the country.
Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted against said person before any other judicial
regulatory or administrative body for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1883.
The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force and
paid in Pesos taking into consideration the amount of foreign exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate
differentials, uncollected taxes and duties thereon, undeclared profits, interest rates and such other relevant factors.
The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain Twenty percent (20%) thereof. The informer, if
any, shall be entitled to Twenty percent (20%) of the fine. Should there be no informer, the Task Force shall be
entitle to retain Forty percent (40%) of the fine and the balance shall accrue to the general funds of the National
government. The amount of the fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form part of its Confidential Fund and
be utilized for the operations of the Task Force."
The Court sees nothing in the provisions (except with respect to the Task Force's powers to issue search warrants)
that will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished
by Presidential Decree No. 1883. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the
blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such
activities, but nothing more. It cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is
nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.

(b) No. It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are exclusive upon
judges. Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it was so unceremoniously discarded in 1986,
its provisions conferring the power to issue arrest and search warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by fiat
of legislation have been at best controversial. In a case decided by the Court, the "responsible officer" referred to
by the fundamental law should be one capable of approximating "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." The
Court agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial
powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of
probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the
success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction
of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue
search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is
neither. That makes Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.
 Properties subject to seizure

1. Section 2, Rule 126, Rules on Criminal Procedure. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending. (n)

2. Espano vs. Court of Appeals [GR 120431, 1 April 1998]

Facts: On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino,
Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw Rodolfo Espano selling “something” to
another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached Espano, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him.
The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that
there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of
marijuana. Espano was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On
24 July 1991, Espano posted bail and the trial court issued his order of release on 29 July 1991. On 14 August 1992, the
trial court rendered a decision, convicting Espano of the crime charged. Espano appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, however, on 15 January 1995 affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Espano filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the search of Espano’s home after his arrest does not violate against his right against unreasonable search
and seizure.

Held: Espano’s arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was caught in flagranti as a
result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of
drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw Espano handing over something to
an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was,
therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the 10 cellophane bags of marijuana found at Espano’s residence, however, the same inadmissible in evidence. The
articles seized from Espano during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The
warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since
the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of
Espano. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.” An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Herein, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioner’s house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.

Warrantless Searches and Arrests

1. People vs. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990)
Facts: By the word of their civilian informer, Patrolmen Jose Luciano, Angelito Caraan, Nelson Dimatulac and Democrito
Cuenca immediately proceeded to the vicinity an alleged buy-and-sell of marijuana was taking place. They saw Marquez
giving something to Bati, who, thereafter, handed a wrapped object, which turned out to be marijuana worth P190, to
Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants in front of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed
the thing given to him inside his pocket. Marquez was arrested on the spot. Both Bati and Marquez were brought to the
Police station where they admitted they were in the buying and selling of the confiscated marijuana.
Issue: Appellant contends that the arrest was not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied
with.

Held: This contention is without merit.

Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules in Criminal Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it x x x

It is the considered view of the Court that there was no need for Luciano and Caraan to be armed with a warrant of
arrest when they arrested Marquez and the accused since they had personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime viz: They were eyewitnesses to the illegal exchange of marijuana and P190.00 between
Marquez and accused who were caught in flagrante delicto. The facts and circumstances attendant precisely fall
under Sec. 5, (a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The subsequent arrest of Marquez and accused were
made under the principle of "hot pursuit". The recovery of the marijuana from Marquez and the P190.00 from accused by
the said police officers were not violative of their constitutional rights since Marquez and the accused voluntarily
surrendered them to the police officers. But even for the sake of argument that the recovery of the marijuana and peso
bills were against the consent of Marquez and accused, still, the search on their persons was incidental to their valid
warrantless arrest. For,the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
rule. There are at least three exceptions: (1) search incidental to an arrest, (2) search of a moving vehicle and (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view. In the case at bar, the searches made on Marquez and accused were incidental to
their valid arrest.

Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but
were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest And since appellant's arrest
was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental to the arrest was also valid.

2. MANUEL ET. AL VS JUDGE TIRSO VELASCO

3. Josefina Garcia-Padilla vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al

Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine & Reinstatement of the Montenegro Doctrine
In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were
arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina,
mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest
hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later
transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.
HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case &
the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the
WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was
a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress
the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the
rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least
doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang
Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that “the right to bail shall not be impaired
even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.”
 4. People vs Maspil

FACTS: According to Jerry Valeroso, Sgt. Amador Ablang and Sgt. Florentino Baillo, all members of the First Narcotics
Regional Unit of the Narcotics Command stationed in Baguio City, (See also Exhibit "I") on October 30, 1986, they
established a checkpoint in front of the Municipal Hall at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, which is along the Halsema Highway,
to check on vehicles proceeding to Baguio City because their Commanding Officer, Maj. Basilio Cablayan had been earlier
tipped off by some confidential informers that the herein accused Maspil and Basking would be transporting a large volume
of marijuana to Baguio City. The informers went along with the operatives to Sayangan.

At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, the operatives intercepted a Sarao type jeep driven by Maspil
with Bagking as his companion. Upon inspection, the jeep was found loaded with two (2) plastic sacks which, when opened
contained several bundles of suspected dried marijuana leaves.

Maspil and Basking were arrested and the suspected marijuana leaves were confiscated.

The accused admitted that the marijuana dried leaves were indeed confiscated from the jeep being then driven by Maspil
with Bagking as his helper. However, they claimed that the prohibited drugs belonged to two of their passengers who loaded
them in the jeep as paying cargo for Baguio City without the accused knowing that they were marijuana.

The accused declared that on October 31, 1986, at the burned area along Lakandula Street, Baguio City, a certain Mrs.
Luisa Mendoza hired the jeep of Maspil to transport her stock of dried fish and canned goods contained in cartons to Abatan,
Buguias, Benguet, because her own vehicle broke down. They left Baguio City at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon (11:30
in the morning, according to Bagking) with Mrs. Mendoza, her helper and salesgirls on board the jeep with Maspil as driver
and Bagking as his own helper. They arrived at Abatan at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening.

After unloading their cargo, Maspil and Bagking repaired to a restaurant for their dinner before undertaking the trip back to
Baguio City. While thus eating, they were approached by two persons, one of whom they would learn later on to be a certain
Danny Buteng. Buteng inquired if they were going to Baguio City and upon being given an affirmative answer, he said that
he would ride with them and that he has some cargo. Asked what the cargo was, Buteng replied that they were flowers in
closed tin cans and sealed sacks for the commemoration of All Souls Day in Baguio City. After Buteng had agreed to
Maspil's condition that he would pay for the space to be occupied by his cargo, Buteng himself and his companion loaded
the cargo and fixed them inside Maspil's jeep.

Maspil and Bagking left Abatan at about 7:00 o'clock that same evening of October 31. Aside from Buteng and companion
they had four other passengers. These four other passengers alighted at Natubleng, Buguias, Benguet.

Upon reaching Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, Maspil stopped at the Marosan Restaurant where they intended to take coffee.
Their remaining passengers-Buteng and companion alighted and went to the restaurant. However, a soldier waved at Maspil
to drive to where he was, which Maspil did. The soldier secured Maspil's permission to inspect their cargo after which he
grabbed Maspil on the latter's left shoulder and asked who owned the cargo. Maspil told the soldier that the cargo belonged
to their passengers who went to the restaurant. The soldier called for his companions and they went to look for Maspil's
passengers in the restaurant. Later on, they returned and placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest since their cargo turned
out to be marijuana.

Lawrence Balonglong, alias Banawe, a radio reporter of DZWX Bombo Radio who was invited by Lt Valeroso to witness
the operation, affirmed the unsuccessful pursuit of the alleged two companions of Maspil and Bagking. He recalled that he
was awakened from his sleep at the townhall in Sayangan after the arrest of Maspil and Bagking. When he went to the
scene, the NARCOM operatives boarded the jeep of Maspil to chase the two companions of Maspil and Bagking. Balonglong
climbed on top of the jeep with his camera to join the chase. They proceeded toward the direction of Bontoc but failed to
catch anyone. Hence, they returned.

Thereupon, Maspil and Bagking were taken to the townhall where they were allegedly maltreated to admit ownership of the
confiscated marijuana. At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 1, the soldiers took them away from Sayangan
to be transferred to their station at Baguio City. On their way, particularly at Km. 32 or 34, they met Mike Maspil, an elder
brother of Moises Maspil, and the soldiers called for him and then Lt. Valeroso and his men mauled him on the road.

Mike testified that between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 1, he was informed by a neighbor that his
brother Moises was detained at the Atok Municipal Jail. So he called for Jose Pos-el and James Longages, his driver and
helper, respectively, to go along with him to see Moises. They rode in his jeep. On the way, they met the group of Lt.
Valeroso. For no apparent reason, Lt. Valeroso boxed and kicked him several times. Thereafter, Lt. Valeroso placed him
under arrest together with his driver and helper. They were all brought to a shoe store on Gen. Luna Road, Baguio City,
together with Moises and Bagking. There, Lt. Valeroso got his wallet containing P21000 and Seiko wrist watch but the
receipt (Exhibit "3") was issued by a certain Miss Pingil, a companion of Valeroso. He was released after nine days. He then
went to Lt. Valeroso to claim his wallet, money and watch but he was told that they were with Miss Pingil. However, when
he went to Miss Pingil, the latter said that the items were with Lt. Valeroso. He sought the assistance of then Tourism Deputy
Minister Honorato Aquino who assigned a lawyer to assist him. The lawyer advised him to file a case against Lt. Valeroso
but because of the intervening congressional elections, the matter has never been pursued

Issue: WON the evidence, the confiscated marijuana, is inadmissible because the marijuana allegedly seized from them
was a product of an unlawful search without a warrant.

Ruling:

The search was conducted within reasonable limits. There was information that a sizeable volume of marijuana will be
transported to take advantage of the All Saints Day holiday wherein there will be a lot of people going to and from Baguio
City. In fact, during the three day (October 30, 1986 to November 1, 1986) duration of the checkpoint, there were also other
drug related arrests made aside from that of the two appellants.

This case involves a search incident to a lawful arrest which is one of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search
warrant. This exception is embodied in Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:

Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.

and Rule 113, Section 5 (11) which state:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.

This case falls squarely within the exceptions. The appellants were caught in flagrante delicto since they were transporting
the prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest. (People v. Tangliben, G.R. No. 63630, April 6, 1990) A crime was actually
being committed.

The appellants, however, cite the case of People V. Aminnudin, (163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In said case, the PC officers
received information that the accused-appellant, on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City, was carrying marijuana. When the
accused-appellant was descending the gangplank, the PC officers detained him and inspected the bag that he was carrying
and found marijuana. The Court ruled that since the marijuana was seized illegally, it is inadmissible in evidence.

There are certain facts of the said case which are not present in the case before us. In the Aminnudin case, the records
showed that there was sufficient time and adequate information for the PC officers to have obtained a warrant. The officers
knew the name of the accused, that the accused was on board M/V Wilcon 9, bound to Iloilo and the exact date of the arrival
of the said vessel.

On the other hand, in this case there was no information as to the exact description of the vehicle and no definite time of
the arrival. A jeepney cannot be equated with a passenger ship on the high seas. The ruling in the Aminnudin case, is not
applicable to the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the appellants having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
 5. POSADAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS [188 SCRA 288; G.R. NO. 89139; 2 AUG 1990]
Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence
Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao
City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed
him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP.
Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the
petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of
live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber
gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the
petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his
possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles
recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

Issue: Whether or Not the warantless search is valid.

Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under Section
12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest
without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.

in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis
of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with
the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right
and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after
they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and
much too late.

Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence,
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.

6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLOS DELA CRUZ, G.R. No. 182348
7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROMEO ORTIZ y BALLARES, Accused-Appellant.

The accused-appellant was convicted of selling marijuana in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and sentenced to life
imprisonment plus a P20,000.00 fine. He asks for a reversal on the ground that he was the victim of frame-up and an
unsuccessful extortion attempt.: nad
According to the evidence of the prosecution, the Narcotics Command Unit in Calamba, Laguna, having received
information that a certain Meo, later identified as Romeo Ortiz, was selling marijuana in Canlubang, organized a buy-bust
team for his apprehension. The team consisted of Sgt. Arnel Angsioco as leader and CIC Edgar Groyon, Sgt. Agaton
Enriquez and Pat. Heidi Zulueta as members. The operation was scheduled on June 26, 1985, and was duly recorded in
the station log book. So was the serial number of the P20.00 to be used for the pretended purchase, which was delivered
by Major Vivencio Ramilo, the Unit Commander, to Angsioco. The latter marked it by dotting the nose on the picture of
President Quezon, then gave it to Groyon, who was to pose as the buyer. As a routinary precaution, Ramilo made sure
before they left that none of the team members was carrying any marijuana. 1
The team arrived at the Labor Hall in Canlubang, Laguna, at about 9:15 in the morning and waited for their informer.
Upon his arrival, the operation began. The informer, at Groyon's bidding, went to Ortiz and told him Groyon was looking for
marijuana. The informer returned to Groyon to tell him that Ortiz was willing to sell. Groyon then approached Ortiz and gave
him the marked bill in exchange for which Ortiz handed him two tea bags. At this juncture, Groyon gave the pre-arranged
signal by touching his hair. Angsioco and Zulueta, who were at the time about four to eight meters away, pounced upon
Ortiz and arrested him after introducing themselves as peace officers. After initial resistance, Ortiz submitted. The team
recovered the marked bill and confiscated the tea bags. Ortiz was later taken to the police station for interrogation. The tea
bags were sealed in a letter envelope initiated by Groyon, Angsioco and Zulueta and sent to the National Bureau of
Investigation, where they were subjected to microscopic and chemical and chromotographic examination. The contents
were found to be marijuana.: nad
 Groyon and Ramilo testified on the details of the buy-bust operation, while the results of the laboratory examination
were reported under oath by Carolyo Custodio, supervisor and research biologist of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section.
The P20.00 bill and the tea bags were among the exhibits submitted by the prosecution. 2
For his part, the accused-appellant entered a flat denial, insisting that he was playing billiards at the Labor Hall that
morning when Angsioco, accompanied by Groyon and another man, suddenly approached him and clamped handcuffs on
his wrist. Angsioco then put his closed hand inside Ortiz's pocket and pretended to draw out a P20.00 bill. The accused-
appellant claims he was dragged to a car and told he was under arrest for pushing marijuana ("Nagtutulak ka ng damo.")
On their way to Narcom headquarters, Groyon offered to drop the charge against him if he agreed to pay them P3,000.00.
Ortiz says he demurred, protesting he had no money and had not committed any offense. Groyon's reaction was to box him
several times in the chest. The accused-appellant said he was detained at the headquarters for three days before he was
taken to the municipal jail. 3
Assessing the conflicting evidence of the parties, Judge Odilon I. Bautista of the Regional Trial Court of Laguna opted
in favor of the prosecution. The issues being mainly factual, we defer to the findings of the trial judge, who had the
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses on the stand and to assess their credibility, not only by the manner of their
testimony but also by the plausibility of the testimony itself.
The accused-appellant submits that the prosecution version of the incident is not believable as he would not have sold
the prohibited drugs to a total stranger and at such a public place as a billiard hall. He also faults the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and cites certain inconsistencies therein that he claims have rendered their veracity suspect. It is
also his contention that his arrest and search were unconstitutional, having been effected without warrant in violation of the
Bill of Rights.:-cralaw
The accused-appellant was not exactly dealing with a total stranger as he was negotiating the sale through the informer,
who apparently had his confidence. The site of the sale was not that antiseptic, so to speak, as it was a billiard hall, where
shady transactions are not unheard of or even unusual among the habitues of the place. As for the alleged contradictions
of the prosecution witnesses, we have repeatedly held that minor discrepancies do not necessarily vitiate the essential
veracity of testimony and in fact may even contribute to its credibility. A witness cannot be expected to narrate past incidents
with perfect recall. Also, there is no evidence at all of the accused- appellant's claim of manhandling, which he did not
complain about to the fiscal who investigated him or to any physician who could have given him the proper treatment and
the corresponding medical certificate. We also find that he failed to prove the alleged extortion attempt, which does not
square with the fact that the buy-bust operation was previously recorded in the log book.
Ortiz's submission that he was subjected to an illegal search and seizure is not acceptable. The demonstrated facts are
that he was arrested in flagrante and so came under the exception to the rule requiring previous obtention of a warrant to
justify a search or seizure. Rule 113, Section 5, provides that a peace officer or indeed even a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person who, "in his presence, has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense."
In these circumstances, a search may also be made without warrant, being incidental to a lawful arrest. Articles seized as
a result of such lawful search are admissible in evidence.
The person accused of an offense is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence but this right may be offset
by proof of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That proof has been established in the case at bar. We are convinced from
the evidence before us that the accused-appellant did sell the marijuana to the narcotics team on the day in question and
so violated Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. For contributing to the spread of drug addiction, which is exacting a
heavy toll on the lives and future of our people, he is justly punished.:- nad
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the appeal dismissed. It is so ordered.
8. Rolito Go vs CA

Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguan’s car. Go alighted from
his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner’s car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.

Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being
hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the
shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.

Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary
investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted
and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and
Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to
situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after
the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the
time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting
of Maguan and accordingly none had the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since
there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception
to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

Issue/s:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;

Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation

Held:
1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the
terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.”

Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The “arresting” officers obviously were not present,
within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six
(6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within
the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating
that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able
to take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife’s name. That
information did not, however, constitute “personal knowledge.”

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section
5 of Rule 113.
2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary
investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that
they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.”
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one
omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash
bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver
of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a
legitimate one.
9. People of the Philippines vs. Andre Marti

Facts:
The appellant and his common law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders in the Pistang Filipino Complex Ermita, Manila carrying with them four gift wrapped packages to be sent in
Zurich Switzerland. The proprietress, Anita Reyes (not related to Shirley Reyes) then asked the appellant if he could
examine and expect the packages however appellant refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were just gifts to a friend. Anita no longer insisted. Before delivery of appellant’s box to the bureau
of Customs and or bureau of Post, Mr. Job Reyes, proprietor and husband of Anita, following standard procedure opened
the boxes for final inspection. When he opened a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. He squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Job prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting
laboratory examination sample he extracted from the cellophane. Therefore, job and three NBI agents and a photographer
went to the Reyes’ office at Ermita. Job brought out the box in which appellants’ packages were places and in the presence
of the NBI agents, open the top flaps, removed the Styrofoam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves.
Dried marijuana leaves are found inside the cellophane.

Issue: Whether or not there is violation of appellant’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that it is not the NBI who made the search. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was
Mr. Job who made search and inspection of the said packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating
procedure on the part of Mr. Job as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Custom or Post.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforces, a warrant must generally must be secured first if it to pass the test
of constitutionality. However, if the search is made in the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for
its own and private purpose, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of the police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcer, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individual as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

The alleged violation against unreasonable search and seizure may only invoked against the State by an individual
unjustly traduced by the exercise by the sovereign authority.

10. Horacio Morales Jr vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al

Habeas Corpus – The Right to Bail
In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC. They were
charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were arrested without any warrant
of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right
to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. Respondents countered that the group of Morales were already under
surveillance for some time before they were arrested and that the warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was already suspended.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.
HELD: Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
remains suspended “with respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be similarly detained
for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes
and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith,”
the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To
hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was
arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State. Just as an individual has right to self-
defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to
hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts that
endanger the State’s very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed
suspended with respect to these offenses. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive imprisonment.
Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable
reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite notable in this
case however is that the 2nd division of the SC reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what they ruled in the Garcia-
Padilla Case.