SECOND DIVISION
The complainant bewailed the respondent's evasive attitude when she confronted him about her
OFELIA R. SOMOSOT, A.C. No. 7024
Complainant,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CORONA,*
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
BRION, JJ.
ATTY. GERARDO F. LARA, Promulgated:
Respondent.
January 30, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Once again, we are faced in this complaint for disbarment with the problem of a client-lawyer relationship
developing into a legal action between the lawyer and the client.[1] The complaining client is Ofelia R.
Somosot (complainant), a defendant in a collection case before the trial court; her defense was handled by Atty.
Gerardo F. Lara (respondent).[2]
The Factual Background
In support of her complaint for disbarment, the complainant alleged that she retained the services of
the respondent as her counsel in Civil Case No. Q01-43544, entitled Golden Collection Marketing Corporation v.
Ofelia Somosot, et al., filed against her and her co-defendants for the collection of a sum of money amounting
to P1.3 Million. Her defense was that it was the plaintiff who actually owed her P800,000.00. She claimed that she
had the evidence to prove this defense at the trial. The respondent agreed to handle the case and duly entered his
appearance as counsel after securing his acceptance fee.
The complainant expected the respondent to perform his duty as counsel and to defend her interests
to the utmost. She alleged, however, that after filing the Answer to the Complaint, the respondent failed to fully
inform her of further developments in the case. She only heard about the case when there was already a decision
against her and her co-defendants. She even belatedly learned that the respondent had sought his discharge as
counsel without her knowledge and consent. Contrary to the respondent's claim that he could no longer locate
her, she claimed that the respondent knew all along where she lived and could have easily contacted her had he
been in good faith.
After the court denied the respondent's motion to withdraw from the case, the complainant claimed
that the respondent represented her interests in a half-hearted manner, resulting in the grant of the plaintiff's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Allegedly, the respondent failed to properly oppose the motion and she
was thereafter deprived of the chance to present her evidence. Execution of the courts decision followed,
resulting in the sale of her house and lot at public auction despite her efforts to reverse the judgment with the
help of another lawyer.Thereafter, a third party to whom her property had been mortgaged sued her.
problem with his representation. She found the respondents excuse that he could not contact her because she
had changed her office address to be unsatisfactory. She accused the respondent of miserably failing to comply
with his oath as a lawyer and to discharge his duty of ably representing her.
In his comment,[3] the respondent denied that he failed to exercise the diligence required of him as
counsel in Civil Case No. Q01-43544. He argued that pursuant to his oath as counsel, he pursued the complainant's
case according to his own ability and knowledge. He alleged that:[4]
1. He filed the complainant's Answer with Counterclaim on July 16, 2001. He presented all the
complainants defenses and claims, but the plaintiff, Golden Collection Marketing Corporation,
filed for interrogatories and request for admission. He filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion
on the ground that the interrogatories and request for admission are, by law, properly addressed
to the complainant herself and not to him as counsel.
2. He filed a reply to the plaintiff's comment (on his objection) and the case proceeded despite the
complainants failure to pay his billing from May 3, 2001 to August 2, 2001 amounting
to P27,000.00
3. On November 1, 2001, he joined the government service as consultant in the Board of
Investments and full-time counsel to BOI Gov. J. Antonio Leviste. He tried to inform the
complainant of his appointment and to collect his billings at her office in Greenhills, but the office
was locked. A security guard told him that the complainant had moved without leaving any
forwarding address. He even tried to contact complainant and her husband's cellular phones, to
no avail.
4. Desperate, he filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance with the explanation that the conformity
of the complainant could not be obtained since the complainant's corporation had moved its
office without informing him of its new location, and the complainant had not been
communicating with him.[5] He later learned that the complainant had moved to Pasig City.
5. In late December 2001, he was able to talk with the complainant by phone and he informed her
that he could no longer handle cases for the complainant's company, thereby terminating his
relationship with complainant. He advised the complainant to look for another lawyer; the
complainant replied that she already had another lawyer.
6. Despite his situation and aware that the court had denied his motion to withdraw from the case,
the respondent continued rendering legal services as the complainant's counsel. He filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision dated June 3, 2002. He likewise filed an urgent
opposition to the winning partys motion for execution.
7. On September 2, 2005, he received a letter from the complainant giving him one final opportunity
to convince me, why she should not pursue disbarment proceedings. He promptly prepared a
reply which, upon her suggestion, he delivered at the complainant's residence.
8. He thought that he had given the complainant a satisfactory explanation only to learn later that
she filed a complaint for disbarment against him.
9. The respondent expressed his regret for what happened to the case, but stressed that he did not
abandon the complainant and the cases he had been handling for her company. He did not
likewise neglect to perform his duties as counsel. On the insinuation that he may have been
 bought, he emphasized he that cannot and will never abandon a client as a Christian lawyer and a
family man.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The complainant filed a Position Paper (dated January 12,
2007) before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline through her counsel Honorato V. Reyes, Jr.[6] She reiterated in
this position paper the allegations in her complaint. She could not understand how a simple collection case against
her where she felt she had a good defense and which she expected to go through a full-blown litigation could be
lost virtually through a mere technicality, i.e., through a judgment on the pleadings for her failure to answer the
plaintiffs interrogatories and request for admission. She insisted she had not been informed by the respondent of
the plaintiff's motion for written interrogatories and request for admission. Had he informed her, she could have
responded.
The complainant was even more surprised to learn that the respondent tried to withdraw from the
case because she (the complainant) could not be contacted. She maintained that she had never transferred her
residence where she could be reached had the respondent exerted a meaningful effort to contact her. She
claimed that the respondent was able to do so later when he was collecting the balance of his legal fees.She
denied that she had not paid respondent his retainer fees.
The complainant stressed that the respondent violated his oath as a lawyer by mishandling her case,
resulting in the loss of her house and lot and other damages.
The respondents Position Paper (dated January 3, 2007) essentially reflected the arguments presented
in his Comment before this Court.[7] He clarified that the complainant did not incur extra expenses in defending
herself in the collection case since its handling was part of the services covered by his retainer. He insisted that he
vigorously pursued the case and defended the complainant to the utmost despite the complainants unpaid billings
of P27,000.00.
The respondent contended that he had good reasons not to continue as the complainant's counsel. He
reasoned out that under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may withdraw from a case upon a good
cause such as when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the lawyers services, or fails to comply with the
terms of the retainer agreement, or when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office.[8] Two of these
possible causes applied to his situation; he was appointed legal consultant at the BOI requiring full-time work and
the complainant had failed to pay his legal fees to him amounting to P27,000.00. He filed the formal notice of
withdrawal without the conformity of the complainant because he could not locate her.
The respondent insinuated that that the complainant's real intent was merely to harass him and his
family as indicated by her non-appearance, despite due notice, at the preliminary conference before the IBP. He
argued that he could not be disbarred considering that it was the complainant who was negligent in informing him
of her whereabouts. While he expressed regret for what happened in the case, he insisted that he exerted every
effort to locate her, filed the necessary pleadings, protected her and her company's interest as best as he could.
The IBP Recommendation
In a letter to the Chief Justice dated January 28, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors, through the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, transmitted to the Court a Notice of Resolution[9] and the records of the case. The
resolution was for the adoption and approval of the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Rico A.
Limpingco who had investigated the case. [10]
Commissioner Limpingco recommended that respondent be reprimanded for lack of reasonable
diligence in representing the complainant.
His recommendation was based on the following evaluation:
It appears that the respondent was to some degree, remiss in fulfilling his duties to
complainant Somosot. While it may be true that he had filed an answer in Civil Case No.
Q01-43544, objected to the plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for admission, asked
for reconsideration of the decision rendered by the court and opposed the adverse party's
efforts to have the same executed, it can nevertheless be seen that the remedial
measures taken by the respondent were inadequate, especially in view of the direction
which the proceedings were taking.
The respondent is not incorrect in saying that a lawyer may be relieved of his duties even
without the conformity of his client when he lost all contact with the latter, and the
complainant's failure to settle his unpaid fees is not received without sympathy. The fact
remains,however, that the respondent's efforts to be discharged as counsel were
disallowed by the court, under the circumstances, he was bound by his oath to represent
complainant Somosot and to advocate her cause to the best of his ability.
The respondent claims that in late December 2001, he was finally able to talk to
complainant Somosot and was told that she already had another lawyer by the name of
Atty. Tomas Dulay. Considering his stated desire to withdraw from the case and his own
declaration that he had again come into the means of contacting the complainant, it is
thus entirely puzzling why he did not at this point, revive his efforts to be relieved of his
responsibilities in Civil Case No. Q02-43544 given complainant Somosot's alleged
engagement of Atty. Tomas Dulay and her presumed willingness to give her consent to
such discharge. As it is, respondent Atty. Lara remained as counsel of record and for some
undisclosed reason did not appeal the decision against his client.
This is not to say that the client is entirely without fault. While complainant Ofelia
Somosot's narrative is in many respects at odds with that of the respondent, it is
nevertheless clear from her submissions that she never made any effort to contact the
respondent to follow up the status of the case, but instead expected the latter to take
complete initiative in this regard.
It has been held that it is the duty of a party-litigant to remain in contact with his lawyer in
order to be informed of the progress of his case. True enough, the party-litigant should
not rely totally on his counsel to litigate his case even if the latter expressly assures that
the former's presence in court will no longer be needed. No prudent party will leave the
fate of his case entirely to his lawyer. Absence in one or two hearings may be negligible
but want of inquiry or update on the status of his case for several months (four, in this
case) is inexcusable. It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from
time to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case. Thus the complainant did
not do, and such circumstance can only mitigate in respondent's favor.
The Court's Ruling
As the IBP did, we find that the respondent deserves to be sanctioned for having fallen short of the standards
required of him as defense counsel in Civil Case No. Q01-43544. He violated the basic rule, expressed under Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[11]that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.[12]
While it may be said that the respondent did not completely abandon the case, his handing of the complainants
defense left much to be desired.
The records show that the plaintiff in the collection case filed interrogatories and a request for
admission. The respondent duly filed his objection to the plaintiffs move, but the court apparently allowed the
interrogatories and request for admission and directed the complainant (as the defendant in the civil case) to
respond. The complainant was never informed of this development and the omission eventually led to the grant
of the plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings, which in turn led to the decision against the defendants.[13]
In his submissions before this Court and before the IBP, the respondent alleged that he objected to the
interrogatories and request for admission and did all he could, even filing a reply to the defendants comment to
his objection. He likewise alleged that from May 3, 2001 to August 2, 2001, the complainant had not paid the
billings sent to her; that the complainant could not be contacted because she had closed her office without any
forwarding address;[14] that as of November 1, 2001, he had been appointed as a consultant in the office of BOI
Governor J. Antonio Leviste; and that he continued to represent the complainant even after the trial courts
decision by filing a motion for reconsideration and opposing the plaintiffs motion for execution.[15]
After examining the whole record of the case, we find the respondent's positions to be very revealing with respect
to what they say and do not say.
First, the respondent failed to precisely allege in his submissions how he tried to contact the
defendant on or about the time the interrogatories and request for admission were pending. It appears that he
really had not; by his own admission, his attempt to contact the complainant came in December 2001 and only to
inform her of his government appointment and to collect his billings. It was only after the discovery of the closure
of the defendants office did the respondent try to contact the complainant and her husband by cellular phone,
but they could not be reached.
Second. The interrogatories/admission issue happened in August 2001, which tells us that the
respondent at about that time was already very sensitive about his billing issue against his client as he had not
been paid from May to August 2001. Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should not be a reason
not to inform the client of an important development, or worse, to withhold vital information from her.As the
court held in Luisito Balatbat v. Atty. Edgardo Arias,[16] a client must never be left in the dark for to do so would
destroy the trust, faith and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer in particular and the legal profession in
general.
Third. The respondent failed to provide details on the developments that led to the adverse rulings on the
interrogatories/admissions and the judgment on the pleadings. We gather under Annex G of the respondents
Comment filed with this Court that the trial court ruled in open court on March 8, 2002 that a judgment on the
pleadings was appropriate. This was confirmed by an Order of the same date (attached as Annex B to the
complainants Position Paper before the IBP) which partly states;
The Court NOTES the manifestation of Atty. Honorato M. Guttierez, counsel for
the plaintiff that the defendants have not been appearing in the case for one (1) year as
per December 14, 2001 Order of this Court. The Court even denied the Notice of
Withdrawal of Appearance of Atty. Lara, counsel for the defendants, with the end purpose
of obviating the further delays of the proceedings of this case. Moreover, in the said
Order, this Court ruled that the Rule on judgment on the pleading under Rule 34 of the
Rules of Court will now obtain.
The respondent never bothered to explain this court order whose highlighted portions give hints on the reasons
for the adverse developments for the defendants. While the records do not explicitly state what remedies the
respondent took to react to the Order and to the trial court ruling on the interrogatories/admission issue, we feel
it safe to assume that the respondent did not move at all to question the trial courts rulings; nowhere in the
records, both from the complainants and the respondents end, is there any allegation that the respondent sought
to review the trial courts rulings. What intrigues us is that the respondent could have reacted to the trial court's
ruling on the interrogatories/request for admission; he was aware of the recourses open to him under the ruling
in Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 101682, December 4, 1992, that he cited in his objection to the
interrogatories and request for admission.
Fourth, on the matter of the respondents withdrawal from the case, the respondent might have had valid reasons
to withdraw and terminate his relationship with his client. As the respondent now states, he could withdraw
under paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Code of Professional Responsibility[17] - i.e., deliberate failure of the client to
pay the fees for the services, or failure to comply with the retainer agreement, or appointment or election to
public office. However, he does not appear to have cited these reasons before the trial court. Instead, he merely
filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance, citing his clients unknown location and failure to communicate as
reasons for his clients lack of express consent to his withdrawal.[18] It is undisputed that the trial court denied the
respondent's notice of withdrawal; thus, he remained as counsel of record burdened with all the responsibilities
that his representation carried.
By his own admission, the respondent succeeded in contacting the complainant in late December,
2001, i.e., soon after he filed his notice of withdrawal with the trial court. As Commissioner Limpingco observed, it
was quite puzzling that he did not then revive his efforts to be relieved of his responsibilities in the case, given the
complainant's reported engagement of a new counsel. He could have then secured his clients consent to his
withdrawal but did not.
Fifth. As Commissioner Limpingco did, we wonder why the respondent did not appeal the decision against his
client. It even appears from one of the annexes (Annex I of the respondents comment) that he did not
immediately inform the complainant of the decision against her. To quote the complainants letter (Annex I):
However, for reasons you have not fully explained, you virtually
abandoned the case and interest therein after having initially filed an answer in my behalf.
You never informed me of any further developments in the case. As a result, I lost the said
case by reason of default and technicality.
You never informed me of this loss, thus denying me the opportunity to appeal the
adverse decision. . .
The respondent never bothered to refuse this very damaging allegation; neither in his Position Paper before the
IBP nor in the Comment filed with us did he offer an explanation. Thus, it appears that the respondent could not
have really taken any instructions from his client on how to handle the trial courts adverse decision. He simply
took it upon himself to decide not to appeal the trial courts decision and the denial of his motion for
reconsideration.
While the respondent expressed regret for the reverses the complainant suffered, regret is a belated response
that will not bring back the complainants lost case. It cannot erase the fact that he mishandled the complainants
defense. By the exacting standards of the legal profession, he has been weighed and found wanting.
What lightens the impact of the respondents mishandling of the case is the complainants own failings as a
client. The non-payment of fees is a factor that we cannot simply disregard. As a rule, law practice is not a pro
bono proposition and a lawyers sensitivity and concern for unpaid fees are understandable; lawyers incur
expenses in running their practice and generally depend, too, on their law practice income for their living
expenses. Likewise, the respondents appointment as a consultant should be considered although it is a matter
that none of the parties have fully examined. Both the non-payment of fees and the appoint to a public
office, however, were not reasons properly presented before the trial court through a motion that informed the
court of all the surrounding circumstances of the desired withdrawal. Instead, another reason was given by way of
a mere notice lacking the clients express consent. Thus, the courts denial of the desired withdrawal was not totally
unexpected.
More than these reasons and as Commissioner Limpingco correctly noted, the complainant never made
any effort to contact the respondent to follow up the status of her case, expecting instead the respondent to take
full and complete initiative in this regard. While the respondent, as counsel, has the obligation to inform his client
of the material developments in the case, particularly of the aspects of the case that would require the clients
instructions or participation, this obligation is balanced by a complementary duty on the part of a party-litigant to
remain in contact with his lawyer in order to be informed of the progress of the case.
 The complainants failing in this regard is her failure to inform her counsel of her change of business
address, a serious lapse but one that a resourceful counsel could have easily handled. In a balancing, the greater
fault still lies with the respondent as he did not appear, based on the records of the case, to be a lawyer whose
practice routine included regular reporting to clients on matters other than billings. We note that he did not
bother to report (or even allege that he bothered to report) on the interrogatories and request for admission
incidents that can make or break a case as it did break the defendants case before the trial court. Despite
knowledge of his clients location gained in late December 2001, he did not likewise bother to inform the
complainant of the adverse decision against her in June 2002, taking it upon himself to simply file a motion for
reconsideration and to accept the courts ruling when his motion was denied. In our view, these are law
practice mortal sinsthat we cannot allow to simply be glossed over or be penalized by a simple reprimand.
However, we cannot also disbar the respondent as the complainant demands in light of the
complainants own contributory faults. Disbarment is an ultimate remedy in the professional world, no less serious
and weighty as the power to impose reclusion perpetua in criminal cases; in both, recovery from the penalty
although not totally impossible is extremely difficult to attain. Thus, we must at all times act with caution and due
consideration, taking into account not only the interests of the immediate parties, but the interest of the public,
the bar and the administration of justice as well.
The general public must know that the legal profession is a closely regulated profession where
transgressions merit swift but commensurate penalties; it is a profession that they can trust because we guard our
ranks and our standards well. The Bar must sit up and take notice of what happened in this case to be able to
guard against any repetition of the respondents transgressions, particularly his failure to report the developments
of an ongoing case to his clients. Unless the Bar takes a pro-active stance, we cannot really blame members of the
public who are not very well disposed towards, and who may even distrust, the legal profession after hearing
experiences similar to what the complainant suffered. The administration of justice is served well when we
demonstrate that effective remedies exist to address the injustice and inequities that may result from
transgressions by those acting in the dispensation of justice process.
In these lights, we hold that while the respondent is liable for a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects his standing and character as an officer of the Court and as a member of the Bar, this liability ought to be
tempered by the mitigating circumstances we pointed out above. We therefore cannot impose disbarment as
penalty. Given the mitigating circumstances and the extent of their effects on the respondents culpability, we hold
that a three-month suspension from the practice of law is the penalty that is more in keeping with the damage the
complainant suffered and the interests that the public, the bar and the administration of justice have to protect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent ATTY. GERARDO F. LARA is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
A.C. No. 2841 July 3, 2002
RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH IV, TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST
ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA.
PER CURIAM:
"Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest order. A lawyer is an
oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and
whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a
fearless crusader."1 These were the eloquent words of the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in exalting the
sacred and honorable legal profession. But he laments the pathetic and deplorable fact that, "many a law
practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the
court, has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary purveying the benefits of his
enlightened advocacy in direct proportion to a litigant's financial posture instead of a faithful friend of the courts
in the dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor alike."2 Here, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as later shown by his
disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such lawyer who has become an apostate to his exalted position as
an officer of the court. He thus deserves to be weeded out from the legal profession to protect its sanctity and
nobility.
This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator William C. Ogan which has since
been pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 423. In 1976, Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took over the case from Judge Paulino
S. Marquez who, in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting that the proceedings have been pending
for thirteen (13) years, Judge Ruiz then inquired into the principal causes of the delay. He found out, as will be
shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña caused the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by
willfully prolonging the litigation through his various maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that he
will not willingly sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any man's cause for money or malice.
Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late William C.
Ogan, his residuary estate was divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, was
named in the will as executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her
lawyer.
The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States of America), and real estate
in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left no debt. Thus, the settlement of the estate should have been
simple and speedy. However, since the death of the testator on February 1, 1963, the settlement of his estate
has not yet been terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occeña.
Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, filed a project
of partition on August 4, 1967. On September 22, 1967, the probate court approved the project except certain
portions. The executrix then interposed an appeal. In view of the delay caused by the pendency of the appeal,
the other heirs filed several motions praying that the estate's remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its shares of
stocks in the Philippines and in the United States be distributed among all the heirs. The executrix, through her
husband Atty. Occeña, vehemently opposed the motions, asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been
earmarked for her husband's attorney's fee and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could not be
distributed among the heirs because the stock certificates were not in her possession. The dispute between the
executrix, on the one hand, and the other heirs, on the other, which delayed the proceedings, centered mainly
on the P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.
Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, interposed numerous appeals from the orders of
the probate court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly prayed in their motions for the release of the shares of
stocks and the remaining cash. But the executrix and Atty. Occeña opposed the same, thus prolonging the
proceedings. In CA-GR No. 48716-R (December, 1974), the Court of Appeals, in remanding the case to the
probate court, had this to say:
 "It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their differences with the view to
closing the estate which has been pending since 1963. The executrix, the heirs, and the lawyers, are
reminded that the prolongation of administrative proceedings can only benefit the executor or
administrator or the counsels for the contending parties. It always results in the diminution of the
share of each of the heirs because the estate is burdened with the expenses of the administration
proceedings, the heir must have to pay attorney's fee and the longer the proceedings the bigger the
attorney's fee."3
Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty. Occeña's claim for attorney's fee
in the amount of P250,000.00 and the executrix's refusal, through her husband, to account for the shares of
stocks belonging to the estate which, according to her, were not in her possession. The other heirs could not
accept that explanation because as executrix, she was charged with the responsibility of collecting all the assets
of the estate.
Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to comment why the securities were
not in her possession. She filed her comment, through her husband, that some Philippine and American
securities were not in her possession. To determine which securities were in her possession, Judge Ruiz on
October 22, 1977, issued an order requiring her to submit within 30 days the latest inventory of all the securities
of the estate. However, she failed to comply with the order. Judge Ruiz then issued another order on February 6,
1978, "directing her to take possession of all certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate
and to make an up-to-date inventory thereof with a statement of their nature and their value." Again, she did
not comply with the order.
Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, appealed
the numerous interlocutory orders of the probate court to the Court of Appeals, hence, adding to the delay.
Because of the propensity of the executrix, through Atty. Occeña, to elevate interlocutory orders to the Court of
Appeals, Judge Ruiz issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing her to "refrain from instituting any action or
proceeding without first informing the court." The executrix and her husband disobeyed this order. In fact, he
filed six cases with the Court of Appeals and one with this Court.
On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson, one of the heirs, to go to Vinton
County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the five parcels of land owned by the estate and to submit a
report to the probate court. To provide money for the purpose, the court ordered the executrix to release to
Nancy Ogan-Gibson the sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund, the same to be liquidated with supporting
receipts upon her submission of her report on or before September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed the order
before the Court of Appeals in a petition for prohibition and certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G. R. No. SP-
10326. Dismissing the petition on January 13, 1981 for lack of merit, the Court of Appeals said:
"Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such an order of the court which is
and would be for the benefit of the estate and the heirs. All the other heirs completely agreed with
what the trial court did. xxx
"Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
orders he should be complimented in finding ways and means of promptly and expeditiously
determining the assets of the estate to be ultimately distributed among the heirs."
On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her failure to obey the orders of
October 22, 1977, December 8, 1977, February 6, 1978 and October 16, 1979 and directed her to report to the
court which securities were and were not in her possession and to give the reason therefor.
On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occeña were held in contempt of court and fined P250.00 each for
disobeying the court order of August 15, 1979 requiring the executrix to release $1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-
Gibson. Both were given the chance to explain their failure to comply with the order, but they did not submit
any explanation. On January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-10326.
It bears emphasis that this incident delayed the proceedings for four (4) years.
On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to distribute immediately among
the heirs all the shares of stocks of the estate in the Batangas-Laguna Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc.
and the Motor Service Co.; to report her compliance within 10 days from notice; and within the same period, to
file a written report to the court stating (a) what other certificates of stocks belonging to the estate are in her
possession; and (b) which certificates of stocks are not with her, giving the reasons therefor. Again, the executrix
and her husband, Atty. Occeña, did not comply with the said order. The probate court thus ordered her to
explain why she should not be punished for contempt of court. After several postponements at her instance and
that of her husband, the incident was set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them appeared, thus
delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the executrix unfaithful in the performance of her
duties, the probate court, on May 12, 1981, adjudged her in contempt of court.
Forthwith, Atty. Occeña and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil Case No. 14456 for damages
(P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of litigation) against Judge Ruiz. But, on October 13, 1981, the
court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occeña filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint against
Judge Ruiz, charging him with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders, in that without prior notice and
hearing, he punished the executrix for indirect contempt of court and censured her for non-compliance with the
probate court's order of October 16, 1979. For lack of merit, Atty. Occeña's complaint was dismissed by then
Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez in a Resolution dated November 19, 1984.
On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occeña filed with this Court Administrative Case No. 2345-CFI against Judge Ruiz
for gross inefficiency and dishonesty. In a Resolution dated October 11, 1982, this Court dismissed the complaint
for failure of Atty. Occeña to substantiate his charges during the investigation.
Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said administrative complaint, Atty. Occeña and his
wife filed with the CFI of Davao City Civil Case NO. 14957 for damages against the former. The couple alleged
that they suffered damages upon reading the judge's comment filed with the Supreme Court. On June 11, 1982,
the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, the comment being an absolutely privileged
communication.
By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints, found to be groundless, Atty.
Occeña further delayed with malice the probate proceedings and inflicted hardship and pain upon Judge Ruiz.
More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty. Occeña has inflicted greater harm to
the other heirs, with the executrix herself as his willing partner.
From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with this Court and the
Court of Appeals by Atty. Occeña, questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court. But most, if not all,
were without merit.
Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the same probate proceedings, was
also harassed by Atty. Occeña with groundless administrative charges and suits, both criminal and civil. These
cases, while pending, were then utilized by Atty. Occeña in securing restraining orders from the Court of Appeals
or as grounds for the judge's inhibition.
Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter alia that the CFI may suspend an
attorney from the practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz, on May 26, 1982, filed with the same probate court
Administrative Case No. 44 charging Atty. Occeña with gross misconduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer and
willful disobedience of lawful court orders. Instead of filing an answer, he submitted a motion praying for the
inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This motion was denied. Atty. Occeña was then directed to file his answer within 15
days from notice which was extended to another 15 days upon his motion. Still, he did not file an answer. What
he submitted was a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.
Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982, morning and afternoon. Upon Atty.
Occeña's motion, he was given an extension of 15 days from November 3, 1982 within which to file his answer.
However, he did not comply. Neither did he appear during the hearing.
Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court issued a temporary restraining order in
G. R. No. 62453, "Samuel Occeña vs. District Judge Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol" for prohibition. However, on
August 15, 1983, this Court dismissed Atty. Occeña's petition for lack of merit. The hearing of the administrative
case was set on January 30 and 31, 1984, but again, he did not appear.
The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occeña failed to appear. Upon his telegraphic request, the hearing
was reset on December 13 and 14, 1984. On December 7, 1984, he filed his Answer and Motion for Referral to
the Solicitor General or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion was denied. The hearing was reset on
May 8 and 9, 1985. Upon another telegraphic request of Atty. Occeña, the hearing was postponed to August 14
and 15, 1985. Again, he did not appear. Thus, in its order of August 15, 1985, the probate court considered his
failure to appear as a waiver of his right to present evidence.4
On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that Atty. Occeña has "abused,
misused and overused the judicial system,"5 Judge Ruiz rendered a decision suspending6 him from the practice
of law for three (3) years. The decision7 unfolded a long list of his administrative offenses, thus:
I
Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the probate court two actions for
damages which were both dismissed for lack of merit and lack of cause of action. Respondent also
filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint charging the judge of the probate court with knowingly
rendering unjust interlocutory orders. The complaint was likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
Respondent also filed with this Court an administrative complaint which was again dismissed for
failure of respondent to substantiate the charge.
By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative complaint and criminal charge
which were found to be groundless and unsubstantiated, respondent unduly delayed the settlement
of the estate proceedings by harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend time, effort and money to
defend himself against said frivolous and unmeritorious cases.
In fact, respondent's propensity to file groundless administrative charges, as well as civil and criminal
suits, harassed not only Judge Ruiz but also the previous judges who handled the case. As a measure
of self defense, these judges were compelled to prepare and file pleadings or comments thereby
using time which could have been devoted to expediting the closure of the estate proceedings.
Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed with the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court.
Most, if not all of these petitions, were determined to be groundless and without merit.
III
Disobeying the laws
Respondent violated his lawyer's oath of office by flagrantly disobeying the clear provision of Rule
140, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court, entitled "Charges Against Judges of First Instance," which
reads as follows:
"Sec. 6. Confidential – Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and
confidential."

During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345-CFI, Exh. "Z") filed by
Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court; gross misconduct in office
respondent against Judge Ruiz in the Supreme Court, he violated the private and confidential nature
thereof three (3) times, to wit:
During the probate proceedings, respondent Occeña, on behalf of his wife executrix, filed with the
Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with the Supreme Court one (1) case, assailing the order of the
1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and
probate court directing the said executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized to determine the assets
certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-
of the estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be taken from the estate; and the order ordering the same
10604", questioning an interlocutory order of the probate court (No. 2, Exh. "V") to which he
executrix to report to the probate court the securities belonging to the estate. Atty. Occeña's refusal
attached as Annex "AW" a complete copy of his aforesaid administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz
to obey the said orders and elevating the same to the higher courts unnecessarily delayed the
albeit the same is completely immaterial to the issue raised in said petition.
probate proceedings.

2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon.
II
Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-13162" (No. 4, Exh. "V"), impugning an interlocutory order of
the probate court, he attached as Annex "C" thereof a true and complete copy of the said
Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless suits and gave aid or consent to the same; administrative complaint although not relevant to the question therein raised; and
delayed persons for money or malice
3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint with the Tanodbayan (Exh.
"Y"), he also attached as Annex "A" thereof a true and complete copy of said administrative
complaint against Judge Ruiz even if said administrative complaint is not germane to the charge (Page
2, No. 1, Exh. "Y").
By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent, as an officer of the court, put
to naught one of the principal purposes thereof which is to protect the personal and professional
reputation of judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible clients,
litigants and counsels (In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; Murillo vs. Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March
23, 1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. VI, page 260). Respondent committed gross
misconduct in office and has not conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion.
IV
Did falsehood and consented to the doing of same in court.
In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh. "W"), respondent alleged
in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. "W-1") that his wife-executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña was held in
contempt and censured, "without any hearing," for not obeying the probate court's order of October
16, 1979 (Exh. "N").
However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423) would show that in the
order of February 26, 1980, the probate court directed said executrix to explain within 5 days from
notice why she should not be cited for contempt (Exh. "O"). In the order of April 8, 1980, the
contempt charge was set for hearing on June 23, 1980, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning (Exh. "P") but
was reset to October 22, 1980 after the lifting of the restraining order of the Court of Appeals (Exh.
"Q"). This was again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the denial by the Supreme Court of the
respondent's petition for review impugning the Court of Appeals' decision. As stated in the order of
May 12, 1981, page 2, paragraph 3 (Exh. "R"), copies of the order setting the hearing of the contempt
charge on said date (April 20, 1981) were received by the respondent and his wife-executrix on
March 24, 1981. On the date of the hearing, neither the executrix nor respondent appeared. The
following day (April 21, 1981), the court received executrix's motion for postponement of the
hearing, which was denied for lack of merit. Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981 (Exh. "R") was
rendered holding the executrix in contempt and penalized with censure.
In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel did not attend.
Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he subsequently alleged under oath
in his letter-complaint to the Tanodbayan, dated March 29, 1982, against Judge Ruiz (Exh. "Y")
that "without prior notice and without any hearing," Judge Ruiz adjudged executrix Necitas Ogan
Occeña guilty of contempt and censuring her (page 2, paragraph 2, Exh. "Y-2"; page 5, paragraph 9b,
Exh. "Y-3").
Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of August 15, 1979 (Exh. "C"),
directing said executrix to remit immediately the sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir Nancy Ogan-Gibson
with which to meet whatever necessary expenses that she might incur in inquiring into the status of
the 5 parcels of land owned by the estate at Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., respondent and his wife-
executrix committed falsehood when they stated in their petition filed with the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. SP-10326 that the said order was issued "without hearing" and thus a violation of
procedural due process. The Court of Appeals, in its decision which has become final (Exh. "E"),
confirmed this falsehood when it held that the petitioner-executrix "was not deprived of her right to
be heard when the respondent judge issued the two orders in question" (Page 6, Exh. "E").
In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 1388 and Section 9, Rule 1399 of the Revised Rules of Court,
Judge Ruiz, on November 26, 1985, transmitted to this Court a certified true copy of the order of suspension and
a full statement of facts.10
On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeña's motion, restrained Judge Ruiz from enforcing his decision
of November 14, 1985. The case then has remained pending so that on May 30, 1989, this Court issued an
Order11requiring "the parties to move in the premises, by informing the Court about the status of the decision or
order suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law, Judge Ruiz particularly indicating if he still
pursues the instant case, within ten (10) days from notice."
On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for this Court's action on his decision
suspending Atty. Occeña.
On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occeña filed an Explanation and Motion praying that the case be referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and recommendation. This Court denied the motion and
instead referred the case to Atty. Emilio Rebueno (now deceased), then Bar Confidant, for evaluation, report and
recommendation. After going over the records, he recommended "that the temporary restraining order
enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the decision dated November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel
C. Occeña from the practice of law for a period of three years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C.
Occeña be DISBARRED from the practice of law for grave violation of his oath of office as attorney; likewise, that
his name be DROPPED from the roll of attorneys."
We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the same being
supported by the facts on record.
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.12 His guilt, however, cannot be presumed.13 It must indicate the
dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must
have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses
in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel.14 All these requirements have been complied with in
the case at hand.
In fact, it was Atty. Occeña who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the administrative case against
him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times so that he could be accorded the full measure of due
process. The court a quo, therefore, appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex parte as Atty. Occeña
deliberately failed to appear and answer the accusations against him.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral
conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority to do so. Not only did Atty. Occeña commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and
willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these transgressions, he violated the lawyer's oath whereby he
imposed upon himself the following duties, thus:
 "I, ________________________,of ________________________,do
(place of birth)
solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willing promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these
voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God."
As shown by the records, Atty. Occeña gravely violated his oath of office in his handling of Special Proceedings
No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show that through his atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the
disposition of the case for the last thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not only to the
heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For respondent's part and that of his wife, such
prolonged litigation obviously benefited them. As aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay "can only
benefit the executor or administrator" and "the longer the proceedings, the bigger the attorney's fees." But the
more tragic reality is the fact that Atty. Occeña has caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted
injury to the administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral conduct.
Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law.
This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing
a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an instrument to
harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense
of truth and the administration of justice.15
The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally.16 A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.17 He
must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high
standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this Court which includes
suspension and disbarment.
Clearly, Atty. Occeña's conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession even for a single moment.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession.18 Atty. Occeña has
definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral
acts. This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a
lawyer's equipment in the practice of his profession,19 because it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants
for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.20
Thus, for his serious administrative offenses, punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occeña deserves the
ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing*, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 5162 March 20, 2003
EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MICHAEL DIONEDA, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY to the cause of his client mindful always of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.1An attorney-at-law must serve his client with competence and diligence at all times,2 and never neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him,3 for it is his sworn duty to delay no man for money or malice and to conduct
himself in a proper manner not just to his client, but also to the court, the legal profession and society at large.
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by the EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION (ECTHA) against ATTY. MICHAEL DIONEDA.
On 29 September 1997 ECTHA and respondent Dioneda entered into a Retainer’s Agreement wherein
respondent lawyer agreed to handle the case of the complainant against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family
Savings Bank by way of filing a Complaint-in-Intervention in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4890-V-96, for P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 as appearance fee per
hearing.4 It was further agreed that respondent lawyer would update the complaint and work on the
development of the case.5
In its Complaint ECTHA alleged that Atty. Dioneda, after receiving the amount of P20,000.00, did nothing for the
development of the case and to update the complaint on the status of ECTHA’s intended Complaint-in-
Intervention. Due to the insistence of the members of the Association, Mr. Fernando Garcia, ECTHA President,
was compelled to check the records of the case in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 75, and secured
a certification from the Branch Clerk of Court dated 5 July 1999 that there was no motion for intervention filed
in the case.6
On behalf of ECTHA Mr. Garcia repeatedly made oral demands for respondent to return the amount of
P20,000.00 because he did not do anything to protect the rights and interests of the Association. Respondent
Dioneda only made oral promises to pay, and in August 1999 he could no longer be contacted and the personnel
in his office simply made excuses to Mr. Garcia.7
Through Mr. Garcia ECTHA referred the matter to Atty. Antonio L. Umali, who contacted respondent by
telephone. Still, no response was made by respondent. On 18 August 1999 a letter dated 17 August 1999 was
sent to Dioneda, but again there was no response.8
In his Comment filed before this Court, respondent Dioneda admitted that he and ECTHA entered into
a Retainer’s Agreement; however, he averred that the Agreement did not cover only the Complaint-in-
Intervention as adverted to by the complainant. It also included the case before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) that the complainant filed against the developer of Emiliano Court Townhouses who
refused to release to the members of the ECTHA their respective Deeds of Sale.
At the time his legal services were engaged, Atty. Dioneda alleged that there was already a decision in favor of
the complainant. Thereafter, respondent entered his appearance and filed a Motion for Execution with the
HLURB. According to respondent Mr. Garcia would go with him and follow up the issuance of the Writ of
Execution with the HLURB National Office. Respondent Dioneda further alleged that he wanted to pursue
the Writ of Execution since he would attach it to the Complaint-in-Intervention, and that this was explained to
the members of ECTHA. Respondent claimed that there was delay in the filing of the Complaint-in-Intervention
because there was delay in the issuance by the HLURB of the Writ of Execution.
Respondent further averred that Mr. Garcia would call him at his residence and "spew invectives" at him. There
would be no day that Mr. Garcia would not call respondent and hurl expletives at him and his parents.
Respondent denied the allegation that ECTHA had made several demands on him and that he promised to pay
sometime August 1999.
After receiving the demand letter of ECTHA respondent immediately called up the residence of Mr. Garcia and
informed him that he could get the money and the records of the case at his office. However, respondent
informed ECTHA that a portion of the amount to be returned would be deducted as a reasonable fee for the
efforts exerted by him. According to respondent, no representative of the complainant showed up at his law
office.
Respondent Dioneda denied the charge that he never attended to the case of the complainant and that he did
nothing to protect the interest of its members. He asserted that there was no intention on his part to defraud
them.
The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation. Hearings were set on at least
five (5) separate dates. Despite due notice, respondent never attended the IBP administrative hearings. Thus the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline allowed the presentation of complainant’s evidence ex-parte against
respondent on the 14 December 2001 hearing.9
On 13 February 2002 the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), through the
designated Commissioner, recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Canons 17 and 18.10 The IBP held that the act of receiving professional fees and
thereafter failing to render the corresponding legal service is a violation of the Canons. The penalty of three (3)
months suspension from the practice of law and an order for Dioneda to return the amount of P20,000.00 to his
client in the interest of justice were recommended. On 29 June 2002, Resolution No. XV-2002-252 was passed by
the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
The sole issue in this case is whether Atty. Dioneda violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Admittedly respondent received the amount of P20,000.00 as acceptance fee for handling a case
to be filed in behalf of ECTHA. Despite receipt of the aforementioned fee, respondent allegedly failed to render
the corresponding legal services to the complainant.
We agree with the Report of IBP Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes as approved and adopted by the IBP Board
of Governors.
The Complaint-in-Intervention was never filed and despite the pronouncement of respondent that he would
return the attorney’s fees to complainant, he never did. The issuance of the Writ of Execution in the HLURB
should never have been a requirement imposed by respondent before a Complaint-in-Intervention could be
filed.
Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent Dioneda did not attend a single hearing to defend
himself. Despite due notice, he did not attend the hearings scheduled on 19 March, 9 May, 20 June, 8 August
and 14 December 2001. The parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers in the Order of 9
May 2001 of the CBD-IBP. Respondent never complied with the Order.
Respondent’s lamentable attitude towards his client’s case is clearly evident from his apparent disinterest in his
own case for disbarment. Dioneda never bothered to present evidence in his defense. He disregarded all notices
sent to him by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, which were personally served at his office address. He
never appeared before the Commission despite several opportunities to do so and explain his side.
It is reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondent committed an infringement
of ethical standards. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the case of
complainant ECTHA against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Bank and subsequently failing to render such
service is a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Not only that. The acts
of inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to him and disloyalty to his client constitute major breaches
of respondent’s oath as a lawyer.11 These acts that are inimical to his client’s interests render respondent liable.
A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.12 Public interest
demands that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client’s cause, for the unwavering
loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the corresponding duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A
lawyer’s inability to properly discharge his duty to his client may also mean a violation of his correlative
obligations to the court, to his profession and to the general public.
The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his client’s interests commences from his retainer until his effective discharge
from the case or the final disposition of the entire subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a
client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The
canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the
task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. Indeed, respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by
failing to file the Complaint-in-Intervention he undertook to handle, thus making him liable under Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18.
In Santos v. Lazaro this Court recognized Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a basic
postulate in legal ethics stating that when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting his rights.13 The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a
good father of a family makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him
answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.14
However, the recommended penalty by the IBP is not commensurate to the acts complained of. Jurisprudence
shows that heavier sanctions have been imposed for ethical violations of this nature, taking into consideration
the gravity of the offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal profession.
Following the latest rulings of this Court on disciplinary proceedings against erring attorneys, those found guilty
of the same or similar acts were suspended for not less than six (6) months from the practice of law.
The facts of Sencio v. Calvadores bear a striking similarity to the present case.15 The respondent lawyer
in Senciodid not return the money to the complainant after a demand therefor was made following his failure to
file the case. This Court took to task the respondent’s attitude of not answering the complaint and in
deliberately disregarding the orders and notices of the IBP on many occasions, holding that this attitude showed
a character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession as he chose not to appear at the
scheduled hearings despite due notice and warnings given.16 The IBP-appointed Commissioner had no other
recourse but to receive the evidence of the complainant ex-parte.17
Accordingly, the respondent in Sencio was found guilty of violation of the lawyer’s oath, malpractice and gross
misconduct, suspended for six (6) months, and ordered to return to his client the amount of P12,000.00 with
interest at 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of the resolution until the return of the amount.18
and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons
whose utter disregard of their lawyer's oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
It must be stressed that the power to discipline advocates of the law should be exercised with extreme care,
primarily on the notion of preserving the nobility of the law as a profession rather than on the incidental
purpose of vindicating the rights of private parties against erring lawyers. The indispensable duty of this Court as
the guardian of the bench and bar remains that of maintaining the people’s respect for the rule of law and the
efficient administration of justice, while at the same time restoring the community’s faith in the legal profession.

This Court in Garcia v. Manuel suspended the respondent lawyer from the practice of law for six (6) months and WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Michael Dioneda is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months,
ordered him to render an accounting of all monies he received from the complainant.19 The counselor-at-law which shall take effect from the date of notice of receipt of the finality of this Decision, with a WARNING that
was found guilty of gross misconduct, especially for ineffectively handling the case of his client and failing to repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty, and is ORDERED to RETURN to
return the money given by that same client. complainant Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of promulgation of this Decision
until the full amount as directed, is returned.
In Rabanal v. Tugade20 and Galen v. Paguirigan,21 the respondent lawyers who failed to file a brief to the
detriment of their respective clients were suspended by this Court for six (6) months on the first offense.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of
the Bar Confidant, and entered into respondent’s personal records as an attorney and as a member of the
The respondent attorney in Aromin v. Boncavil was found to have violated Canons 15, 17 and 18 of the Code of
Philippine Bar.
Professional Responsibility.22 He was suspended for six (6) months and warned that a repetition of a similar
offense would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
As to the amount of Atty. Dioneda’s compensation for his legal services, the general rule as to the
conclusiveness of a valid written contract fixing attorney’s fees cannot find application in the case at bar. This is SECOND DIVISION
due largely to the complainant’s request for a full refund of the attorney’s fees given, and the respondent’s
counter-proposal that a portion of the amount be deducted as a reasonable fee for the efforts exerted by him. In
a situation where both parties are deemed to have impliedly disregarded the contract and placed themselves in
the position as though there was no express stipulation as to the attorney’s fees, the lawyer’s compensation
shall be determined on the basis of quantum meruit.23 [G.R. No. 122934. January 5, 2001]

Despite this settled principle of law on the compensation of an attorney for legal services, we rule against
respondent lawyer in the present case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANGEL PRECIADOS (At Large), ARTURO ENAD, EMIGDIO
VILLAMOR, LEONCIO ALGABRE and FLORIANO ALGABRE @ LOLOY, accused.
To deserve compensation for his legal services based on quantum meruit, respondent Dioneda must prove by
substantial evidence that he is entitled to a reasonable fee for his efforts in pursuing the complainant’s case with ARTURO ENAD, accused-appellant.
the Court taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of his fees.24 However, due to respondent’s
conspicuous absence at the administrative hearings for his disbarment set by the IBP’s Commission on Bar
Discipline on at least five (5) different occasions, and the apparent lack of findings of fact to support the position DECISION
of respondent, evidence required to establish attorney’s fees was never adduced. For having missed several
QUISUMBING, J.:
opportunities to present evidence in his favor without any satisfactory explanation as to his non-appearance, we
are constrained to deny him compensation for his legal services on the basis of quantum meruit due to the lack
of any factual basis to determine the value of his work as complainant’s counsel. Accused-appellant Arturo Enad[1] assails the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran
City, Branch 1, in two consolidated cases, Criminal Case No. 7887 for murder and Criminal Case No. 7888 for
frustrated murder. It convicted and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua in the first case and to a prison terms of
Finally, Rivera v. Corral25 reiterates the purpose of administrative cases against lawyers in this manner -
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, in the second case.
The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the
erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts
 In Criminal Case No. 7887, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol charged Angel Preciados,
Arturo Enad, Emigdio Villamor, Leoncio Algabre, and Floriano Algabre alias Loloy with murder allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th to the 13th day of May 1992, in the municipality of Sagbayan, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously pour poison into the mouth of one Primo Hilbero whereby
causing the victims untimely death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased in the amount to
be proved during the trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the
aggravating circumstances of (1) treachery, the victim being unaware and unsuspecting and (2) abuse of superior
strength, two of the accused being armed with deadly weapons which they used in intimidating, threatening and
forcing the victim to drink the poison.[2]
In Criminal Case No. 7888, the same persons were charged with frustrated murder. The charge sheet
reads:
That on or about the 12th to the 13th day of May, 1992, in the municipality of Sagbayan, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pour poison into the mouth of one Antonio Hilbero thereby
inflicting serious injuries on the victims body; thus, the accused having performed in said manner all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but which nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of a cause independent of their will, that is, by the timely medical attendance and
treatment rendered the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount to be proved during the
trial (sic).
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 in relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, with the aggravating circumstances of (1) treachery, the victim being unaware and
unsuspecting and (2) abuse of superior of strength two of the accused being armed with deadly weapon which
they to used in intimidating, threatening and forcing the victim to drink the poison.[3]
The informations were both dated July 20, 1992 but the cases were tried before different salas. Branch 4
of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, tried Criminal Case No. 7887, while Branch 3 tried Criminal Case
No. 7888.
On August 26, 1992, the accused in Criminal Case No. 7888 were ordered arrested. But the police failed to
apprehend any of the accused. Preciados and the Algebres were reported to have gone into hiding in Mindanao,
while Enad and Villamor went to Cebu City. It was only on July 20, 1993, when appellant Arturo Enad was
arrested. Arraigned in Criminal Case No. 7887, he pleaded not guilty. He waived pre-trial and the case was set
for trial.
On September 13, 1993, Judge Achilles L. Melicor of Branch 4, RTC of Tagbilaran City, inhibited himself
from Criminal Case No. 7887, since the accused were the political leaders of Mayor Arthur Melicor-Aana, his
cousin, while the victims were supporters of the mayors political rival, Narzal B. Ermac.
On February 14, 1994, Criminal Case No. 7888 was revived and jointly tried with Criminal Case No. 7887 in
Branch 1, RTC of Tagbilaran City. Arraigned in Criminal Case No. 7888 on February 15, 1994, appellant entered a
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, Criminal Cases Nos. 7887 and 7888 were jointly tried, without prejudice to the
separate arraignment and trial of the other accused who continued to evade arrest.
The facts of the case, culled from the prosecutions presentation, are as follows:
Appellant and Antonio Hilbero,[4] the victim in Criminal Case No. 7888, are second cousins. Both are
residents of Ubujan, Sagbayan, Bohol. Appellant is also a cousin of Primo Hilberos mother-in-law. Primo Hilbero
is the victim in Criminal Case No. 7887.
During the May 11, 1992 elections, appellant and Antonio supported rival mayoralty candidates of
Sagbayan. Appellant was a supporter and poll watcher of Arthur Aana, while Antonio, a barangay councilman of
Ubujan, was a partisan of Narzal Ermac. Appellants co-accused were also identified with Aana who won.
At around 11:00 p.m. of May 12, 1992, Antonio with his common law wife and their two children, his
brother, Primo and his wife, Helen with their three children, Antonios mother, Dominga, and another brother,
Severino were at the second floor of the old rice mill at Ubujan. Except for Helen, the clan had retired for the
night. She was about to go to sleep when she noticed Antonio go downstairs. Minutes later, her husband Primo,
followed him. Then she heard someone utter, Dont move. Alarmed, she rose from her mat and peeped through
a two-inch hole in the floor.[5] The ground floor was illuminated by moonlight. She saw appellant holding a hand
grenade while his other arm was locked in a stranglehold around the neck of Antonio who knelt on the
floor.[6] Nearby stood Angel Preciados with a gun pointed at Antonio.[7] She then heard Emigdio Villamor say
Dont move so that your family will not die. She saw the latter forcing Primo to swallow an object. [8]The other
accused held her husband to prevent him from struggling. Shocked, Helen then soundlessly cried and embraced
her children. Shortly afterwards, Helens mother-in-law, Dominga, was awakened by the barking of the family
dog. Dominga went downstairs where she saw Primo lifeless on the floor, reeking of poison.[9]Antonio was
nowhere to be found. Dominga rushed upstairs and woke up Severino, all the while shouting for help. Minutes
later, the barangay captain and some neighbors responded to her shouts for assistance. They found Primo dead
on the floor. Informed that Antonio was missing, they searched the immediate surroundings for him but to no
avail.[10]
Early in the morning of May 13, 1992, the search for Antonio was resumed. He was finally found by his
uncle, Simeon Degamo, holding on to rock in a natural well, some 300 meters away from the rice mill. A rope
was thrown to him and he was pulled out from the well. Noticing that he smelled of some poisonous chemical,
his rescuers made him drink coconut milk.[11] He was weak and appeared on the verge of death and brought to
the hospital at Clarin, Bohol for emergency treatment.
The next day, prosecution witness Zosimo Viva,[12] a defeated municipal councilor candidate in the same
slate of Ermac, Antonios common law wife, and two police investigators transferred Antonio to the Gov.
Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital in Tagbilaran City.[13] According to prosecution witness Dr. Mayda[14]Reyes
who admitted Antonio to the hospital, Antonio told her that the latter was forced to drink a certain liquid, which
smelled like insecticide.[15] Another physician, Dr. Maria Luisa Tage, who attended to Antonio diagnosed,
Poisoning, Etiology not determined, Brief reactive psychosis.[16]
Since Antonio appeared to be dying, prosecution witness PO3 Leonardo Inoc, a police investigator, took
his ante-mortem statement[17] in which he named the aforementioned accused as the persons responsible for
poisoning him and dropping him in the well.[18]
Meanwhile, Ermac asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation.[19] The
toxicological examination of Primos body revealed the presence of methamidophos, the active ingredient of the
insecticide Tamaron in Primos organs.[20] The NBI also recovered two empty bottles, at the scene of the
incident. Chemistry tests on them revealed that the Hoechst bottle was positive for deltamethrine, an
insecticide, while the other bottle revealed traces of methamidophos.[21]
Appellant denied any involvement in the poisoning incident. He claimed an alibi. He said he spent the
whole night of May 11, 1992, in the municipal hall of Sagbayan, as a watcher for the party of Mayor Aana. He
went home early morning of May 12, 1992 and spent the whole day repairing his pigpens even if he had not
slept the previous night. At around seven oclock P.M. his wife and he went to the house of his co-accused Angel
Preciados to attend the birthday party of the latters son.[22] Afterwards, they returned home and went to
sleep.[23] He woke up at around 9:00 A.M. and learned about the incident. He went to the old rice mill to find out
more about the poisoning incident and saw the Hilberos. When he asked Helen what happened, she said she
knew nothing about the death of her husband.[24]Later that day, he returned to Cebu City where he worked as a
crane operator. He could not think of any reason why he would be suspected for committing a crime, as he was
on good terms with the victims.[25]
The defense offered a different version of the poisoning incident. According to the defense, Antonio and
Primo agreed to commit suicide by taking poison.[26] It presented Antonios affidavit dated February 28,
1994,[27] where he recanted his story in his affidavit of May 22, 1992.[28] Antonio testified that he and Primo
decided to commit suicide by drinking poison to prevent defeated candidates Ermac and Viva from harming their
families. Antonio refused to follow the orders of Viva to kill the political leaders of Mayor Aana, including the
appellant. Thus, Antonio said, he and Primo feared for the lives of their relatives. After Primo and he drank
poison, Primo immediately died. When he did not succumb right away, Antonio wrote a suicide note and tried to
drown himself in the well.[29] After his rescue, Ermac and Viva took him into custody and bought him to
Mindanao, allegedly for his safety.[30] The two, however, threatened to kill him and made him falsely charge the
appellant with murder and frustrated murder.[31] Antonio totally repudiated his ante-mortem statement and his
earlier affidavit charging the accused with murder and frustrated murder.
Testifying for the defense, P/Col. Benjamin Absalon, of the Bohol Provincial Command of the Philippine
National Police, testified that the police investigation revealed that Primos death by poison was not due to foul
play. He declared that they did not finish their investigation because Antonio disappeared from the hospital
before they could interview him.[32]
To rebut Antonios testimony, Dr. Mayda Reyes was called anew to confirm what Antonio had told her,
that he was forced to drink poison by several men.[33]SPO1 Leonardo Inoc testified again that he took
Antonios ante-mortem statement.[34] Apolinario Libranza, barangay captain of Ubujan, Sagbayan was presented
to refute Antonios claims regarding Zosimo Viva.[35] Antonios mother, Dominga, testified that her son was not
afraid of either Viva or Ermac[36]and affirmed the truthfulness of Helens testimony.[37]
In sur-rebuttal, Antonio maintained the veracity of his suicide account.
Finding the prosecutions version more credible, the trial court on January 2, 1995, convicted appellant of
the crimes charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 7887 and 7888. It concluded:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 7887 the Court finds the accused Arturo Enad GUILTY of the crime
of Murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessories of the law and to pay the costs.
The accused Arturo Enad is further ordered to indemnify the surviving spouse of the deceased Primo Hilbiro (sic)
in the amount of P50,000.00 representing indemnity and P50,000.00 representing moral and exemplary
damages. In both instances without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In Criminal Case No. 7888, the Court finds the accused Arturo Enad GUILTY of the crime of Frustrated Murder
under Article 248 in relation with (sic) Articles 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and hereby
sentences him to suffer an Indeterminate Sentence from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, the Minimum of the
Minimum Period of Prision Mayor, as Minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, the Minimum of the
Minimum Period of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum, with the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.
The Court makes no pronouncement as to indemnity and damages for the Court viewed the retraction of the
complainant Antonio Hilbiro (sic) of his previous testimony, as a waiver of indemnity.
It appearing that the accused Arturo Enad has undergone preventive imprisonment in Criminal Cases Nos. 7887
and 7888 he is entitled to the full time of his preventive imprisonment to be deducted from his term of
sentences (sic) if he has executed a waiver otherwise he will only be entitled to 4/5 of the time of his preventive
imprisonment to be deducted from his term of sentence (sic) if he has not executed a waiver.
SO ORDERED.[38]
On July 25, 1995, appellant filed his notice of appeal to this Court. On November 20, 1996, the Office of
Legal Aid of the U.P. College of Law entered its appearance as counsel.
Before us, appellant poses the following questions for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE CONTRADICTORY
AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES OF THE PROSECUTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING WEIGHT TO THE DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN DISMISSING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.
In sum, appellant raises the following issues: First, Did the trial court err in giving credence to the
testimony of alleged eyewitness Helen Hilbero? Second, Did the lower court err in relying on dying statement of
Antonio Hilbero? Third, Did the prosecution evidence successfully overcome the presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused?
The first issue deals with the credibility of prosecution witness Helen Hilbero. Appellant argues that the
testimony of the sole prosecution eyewitness, Helen Hilbero, is doubtful. He points out that it was odd that
despite witnessing her husband murdered and her brother-in-law poisoned, Helen did not make a statement to
the police on what she witnessed; that while the police took the sworn statement of Dominga, the mother of
Primo and Antonio, they did not take the statement of the widow, who allegedly saw everything; and that even
after meeting appellant face to face on the morning of May 13, 1992, no confrontation occurred between
appellant and her. Furthermore, the prosecution did not rebut appellants testimony that Helen admitted to
appellant that she did not know what happened to her husband and brother-in-law. The prosecution suggests
that Helens testimony was a mere concoction of the political opponents of Mayor Aana and that Helen was
coached on her testimony when it became apparent to Ermac and Viva that Antonio would not testify the way
they wanted.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, contends that there is nothing unnatural in Helens failure
to immediately disclose what she knew. The failure to reveal the identities of the perpetrators should not impair
her credibility since there is no set standards of human behavior when one is confronted with a strange, striking,
or frightful experience. Moreover, she had her reasons to keep what she knew to herself. The accused were her
neighbors and they could easily cause her and her family harm. Thus, the trial court, the OSG said, committed no
error in relying on her testimony to convict appellant.
Where the credibility of a witness is an issue, the established rule is that great respect is accorded to the
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court. It is in the best position to determine the issue of
credibility of a witness, having heard his testimony and observed his deportment and manner of
testifying.[39]But, where there is a showing that the trial court overlooked material and relevant facts, which
could affect the outcome of a case,[40] the Court will not hesitate to set aside the lower courts findings and
assessments regarding the credibility of witnesses.
 In giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court explained:
The findings of the court relative to the credibility of the witnesses militate in favor of the prosecution witnesses
(citations omitted). The court took into considerationthe most important factor(s) (of) each witness, his manner
and behavior on the witness stand and the general characteristics, tone, tenor and inherent probability of his
statement (citations omitted) for in most instancesthe demeanor of a witness on the witness stand is often a
better evidence of his veracity than the answer he gives (citations omitted) andit is perfectly reasonable to
believe the testimony of a witness with respect to other parts. Everytime when witnesses are found to have
deliberately falsified some material particulars it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated
testimony be rejected but some portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited. (emphasis ours).[41]
On record the lower court heavily relied on the testimony of Helen. However, it did not make any
categorical finding as to her credibility or the veracity of her account.
We find Helens testimony riddled with inconsistencies and improbabilities which could affect the
outcome of this case. Helen testified that upon hearing a different voice downstairs, she peeped through a two-
inch hole in the floor and saw, with the moonlight cascading through the windows of the old mill, the accused
forcibly make her husband, Primo, swallow poison.[42] On direct examination, she stated, she heard the words
Dont move.[43] Under cross-examination, she said what she heard was Dont move so that the grenade will not be
exploded. As the cross-examination progressed, however, she declared that what she actually heard was Dont
move otherwise your family will be included. She initially admitted that the first words were uttered by a voice
unknown to her. On further grilling by the defense, she claimed she recognized the voice as
appellants. Relentless cross-examination, however, yielded an admission that it was the voice of accused
Villamor she heard first.[44] The identification of an accused through his voice is acceptable, particularly if the
witness knows the accused personally.[45] But the identification must be categorical and certain. We observed
that the witness changed her version a number of times. A startling or frightful experience creates an indelible
impression in the mind such that the experience can be recalled vividly.[46] Where the witness, however, fails to
remain consistent on important details, such as the identity of the person whose voice she heard, a suspicion is
created that material particulars in her testimony had indeed been altered. If an eyewitness contradicts himself
on a vital question, the element of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly disregarded.[47]
Helens testimony contained contradictory statements. In one instance she said she witnessed the fatal
poisoning of her husband by the accused because the mill was lit by moonlight. In another instance she said the
mill was dark and unlit.[48] On further cross-examination she claimed that she witnessed the events because of
the bright moonlight.[49] First, she said the moonlight was very bright[50] then later she said the moon was not
very full.[51] The defense showed that during that night, five nights before its fullness, the moon was in its first
quarter[52] and it was not as bright as a full moon. Note also that Helens view of the event was limited because
she was only peeping through a small hole. Under these conditions, Helens flip-flopping testimony created
serious doubts regarding its veracity and credibility. Thus her testimony concerning the destruction of the
bamboo slats in one window of the mill invites serious doubt. The mill had two windows covered with bamboo
slats. To enter the mill through the windows, the bamboo slats must be destroyed. Yet, Helen did not hear the
sound of the bamboo slats being destroyed, which was the only way the intruders could have entered.
Her testimony regarding the murder of her husband, Primo, is less than credible. She said that while
Primo struggled not to imbibe the poison, he did not utter a sound. According to her, Primo could not utter a
sound as his neck was clipped, or headlocked as the trial court puts it.[53] There was no showing, however, that
the victims mouth was muffled to prevent him from shouting for help. From her testimony, she could have easily
asked for help. It will be recalled that barangay captain and their neighbors quickly responded to her mother-in-
laws shout for help after seeing Primos corpse.[54] Helens account, that her husband violently struggled against
his murderers yet soundlessly gulped down the poison they made him drink, is unnatural. It evokes
disbelief. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must also
be credible by itself, and must conform to the common experience and observation of mankind.[55]
As a rule, an eyewitness testimony cannot be disregarded on account of the delay in reporting the event,
so long as the delay is justified.[56] In this case, Helen kept silent for almost two years. She had no affidavit during
the preliminary investigation.[57] It was only at the trial that she came out to say she witnessed her husbands
murder. She did not explain why. Her long silence is out of character and appears inconsistent with her behavior
in immediately reporting to the police and the barangay captain an incident when an unidentified man accosted
her on the whereabouts of Antonio.[58]
Additionally, on direct testimony, she declared that she knew that Antonio was found in a hole filled with
water on the morning of May 13, 1992.[59] Yet, on cross-examination, she declared that she did not know where
his rescuers found Antonio that morning.[60] Such contradictory statements tend to erode Helens credibility as a
prosecution witness and raise serious doubt concerning the prosecutions evidence.
On the second issue, appellant submits that the trial court erred when it admitted and gave much weight
to the probative value of the ante mortem statement of Antonio.[61] Appellant contends that the statement can
neither be considered as dying declaration under Rule 130, Sec. 37[62] nor part of the res gestae under Rule 130,
Section 42[63] of the Rules of Court. It is inadmissible for being hearsay. Furthermore, he avers it was error for the
trial court to give weight to the first affidavit of Antonio,[64] since Antonio repudiated the same, stating that its
contents were false. According to appellant, Antonio claimed said affidavit was given under duress.
The Solicitor General, for its part, argues that Antonios actions during and immediately after the incident
were completely inconsistent with those of a person who allegedly wanted to commit suicide. Hence, his
retraction should be looked at with jaundiced eye, following our ruling in People v. Junio, 237 SCRA 826 (1994),
where we held that retractions are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor.
A dying declaration is the statement which refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarants death, made under the consciousness of an impending death.[65] It is admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule[66] because of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarants
death makes it impossible for him to take the witness stand[67] and trustworthiness, for when a person is at the
point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful
consideration to speak the truth.[68] The requisites for the admissibility of a dying declaration are: (1) the death is
imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify; (4) the
declarant thereafter dies; and (5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the
subject of inquiry.[69]
In the present case, the foregoing requisites were not met. A dying declaration is essentially hearsay,
because one person is testifying on what another person stated. This is because the declarant can no longer be
presented in court to identify the document or confirm the statement, but more important, to be confronted
with said statement by the accused and be cross-examined on its contents.[70] It was patently incorrect for the
trial court to have allowed prosecution witness PO3 Leonardo Inoc to testify on Antonios so-called dying
declaration because Antonio was alive and later even testified in court.
But was the purported ante-mortem statement part of the res gestae? Where a victims statement may
not be admissible as an ante mortem declaration, it may nonetheless be considered as part of the res gestae, if
made immediately after a startling occurrence in relation to the circumstances thereof and when the victim did
not have time to contrive a falsehood.[71] For res gestae to be allowed as an exception to the hearsay rule, the
following requisites must be satisfied: (1) that the principal act or res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) the
statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the statement is
made during the occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.[72]
In this case, the element of spontaneity is lacking in the alleged ante-mortem statement. Antonios
statement was taken by PO3 Inoc at around 3:00 oclock P.M., May 14, 1992 or some thirty-nine (39) hours after
the incident. Thirty-nine hours is too long a time to be considered subsequent immediately (stress supplied) to
the startling occurrence. Even as contemplated by the rules, statements given a day after the incident in answer
to questions propounded by an investigator cannot be considered part of the res gestae.[73] Furthermore, the
testimony of the declarant, that the statement was made under threats and with coaching from losing
candidates Ermac and Viva in order to get even with the winning candidate, Mayor Aana, is uncontroverted.[74]
Dying declarations and statements which form part of the res gestae are exceptions to the hearsay rule,
thus they must be strictly but reasonably construed and must extend only insofar as their language fairly
warrants.[75] Thus, doubts should be resolved in favor of applying the hearsay rule, rather than the
exceptions.Under said rule, Antonios so-called ante-mortem statement should not have been admitted in
evidence, for it is neither a dying declaration nor a part of res gestae.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 1, in Criminal Cases Nos.
7887 and 7888, finding appellant Arturo Enad guilty of murder and frustrated murder is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE for insufficiency of the evidence to convict him beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant is ACQUITTED
and ordered RELEASED from confinement immediately unless he is held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Next we consider whether the trial court could properly rely on Antonios affidavit dated May 22, 1994
naming the persons responsible for the poisoning incident, notwithstanding his subsequent repudiation of said
affidavit. As a rule, retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the
courts[76]because of the probability that recantation may later on be itself repudiated. [77] Furthermore,
retractions can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration,[78] and a
mere retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration.[79] When faced with a situation where a
witness recants an earlier statement, courts do not automatically exclude the original testimony. The original
declaration is compared with the new statement, to determine which should be believed.[80]

In this case, the trial court rejected Antonios retraction of his affidavit dated May 22, 1992, for being
contrary to human experience and inherently unworthy of belief. The trial court cited, by way of illustration, the
portion of the affidavit where Antonio claimed that after he and Primo agreed to commit suicide and drinking a
bottle of insecticide, Antonio wrote a farewell letter to his barangay-mates. We note, however, that Antonios
second affidavit should have been rejected together with the first affidavit. Unless an affiant himself takes the
witness stand to affirm the averments in his affidavit, the affidavit must be excluded from the judicial
proceeding for being inadmissible hearsay.[81] In this case the affiant expressly refused to confirm the contents of
his first affidavit. Instead, he testified that said affidavit, Exhibit E was prepared under grave threats and severe
pressure from Ermac and Viva.[82] His earlier affidavits contents were hearsay, hence inadmissible in evidence.

Noted further that Exhibit E and its sub-markings were offered, to prove that Antonio testified in detail
before NBI Agent Atty. Amador Robeniol about what happened to him and his brother Primo in the hands of the
five accused.[83] Even if said Exhibit was admissible, all that it proves is that Antonio testified and executed an
affidavit before the NBI. It does not prove the truthfulness of the allegations made and contained therein.

Coming now to the third issue: has the prosecution succeeded in proving appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt?

The records show that the only direct evidence linking appellant to the crimes charged and for which he
was convicted are the direct testimony of eyewitness Helen Hilbero and the contents of Exhibit E. But as
discussed earlier, neither can be given much probative value. As to the testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses, we find them insufficient to convict appellant as none of them had any personal knowledge of facts
that would directly link appellant to the offenses charged. Even if these witnesses testified in a straightforward
and categorical manner, their testimonies contained insufficient evidence to establish appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Appellants defense of denial in the present case is inherently weak.[84] Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law.[85] But such
weakness does not excuse the prosecution from presenting the adequate quantum of proof of the crime
charged. The guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. And the prosecutions evidence
must stand or fall on its own weight. It cannot rely on the weakness of the defense. In the instant case, the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of appellant with moral certainty. The testimony of its single purported
eyewitness, while positive, was less than credible. It did not meet the test such testimony of a lone witness to
sustain a judgment of conviction, must be both positive and credible.[86] In our view, the burden of proof
required for conviction of appellant has not been adequately discharged by the prosecution.