I.

Practice of Law

A. Concept

1. AC-1928. August 3, 1978.* In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues

Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-
1)

Bar Integration; Attorneys;Disbarment; Payment of membership dues; Integration of the

Bar, its concept and purpose.—An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process
by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to hear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which
all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual
fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason
for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member. The integration of the Philippine Bar was
obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such
an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers.
Same; Same; Same; Police power; Integration of the Bar is a valid exercise of police power
of the State; Practice of law, nature of.—Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all
legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained
as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not
a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession,
to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State—the administration of justice—as an officer of the court. The practice of law being
clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for
the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court
through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression “affected with a public interest” is the
equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police power”.
Same; Same; Same; Courts;Supreme Court authorized to adopt rules of court to effect
integration of the Philippine Bar; Purposes of integration of the Bar.—When, therefore.
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 authorizing the Supreme Court to “adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit,”
it did so in the exercise of the paramount-police power of the State. The Act’s avowal is to
“raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.” Hence, the Congress in
enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May
4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a
desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity. The State, in order to promote the
general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. Gomez, Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin
maxim goes, “Salus populi eat suprema lex.” The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70, Phil. 726). It
is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all
individuals from some freedom.
Same; Same; Same; Practice of law and exercise of the legal profession clothed with
public interest and lawyers must be bound by such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good; Reasons.—Thus, when the respondent Edillon
entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession,
which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities
for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not
wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
Same; Same; Same;Constitutional Law; Constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration sustained by explicit grant of precise power to the Supreme Court under Art. X of
the 1973 Constitution resting the Court with plenary power in all cases regarding admistion
to and supervision of the practice of law.—But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar Integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal
grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines. xxx Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even
without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power “to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law,” it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme
Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the
practice of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Membership dues; Effect of Bar integration upon a lawyer’s
freedom of association; Compelling a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar not violative
of the constitutional freedom to associate but the only compulsion a lawyer is subjected is the
payment of annual dues which is not violation of the Constitution; Compulsion upon a lawyer
if any justified by exercise of police power of the State; Reasons.—The first objection posed by
the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for
it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our
answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is no violative of his
constitution freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group
of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer
is already a member. Bar Integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the professional in his fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program—the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense
compel a lawyer to be member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State.
Same; Same; Same: Same; Same;Provisions of the Court Rule requiring payment of
membership dues by lawyers not violative of the Constitution; The 1973 Constitution does not
prohibit the Supreme Court from requiring lawyers to pay reasonable membership fees; Nature
of membership fees.—The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the
Court Rule repairing payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution
that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)—which power the respondent acknowledges—
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;Penalties; Enforcement of penalty provisions for non-
payment of membership dues not a deprivation of due process; Reasons; Practice of law in the
courts subject to regulation and inquiry; Practice of law is not property right but mere
privilege.—That respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of
his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practise of law is a property right, in the
sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practise a profession, we do not
here pause to consider at length, as it is clear that under the police power of the State, and
under necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s
right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to imposed the fee as regulatory measure is
recognized, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But we must here emphasize
that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s public
responsibilities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court has
power and jurisdiction to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys; Court’s
jurisdiction provided for in the 1973 Constitution.—Relative to the issue of the power and/or
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it
is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion. The Court’s jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our
1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to “promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice . . . . . . . and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar . . . . .” (Article X, Sec. 5[5]) The power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the
Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same;Rule of Court 139-A and ByLaws of the Integrated Bar
providing for payment of membership dues are neither unconstitutional nor illegal;
Respondent lawyer disbarred and his name striken from the Roll of Attorneys in the Supreme
Court for repeated failure to pay membership dues; Case at bar.—We thus reach the
conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. x x x It is the
unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is
hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the
Court.

2. A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. June 7, 2011.* RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY
ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT.

Attorneys; Contempt; The same incident of contumacious speech and/or behavior directed
against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an
ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court.—Contrary to Professors Catindig
and Laforteza’s theory, what established jurisprudence tells us is that the same incident
of contumacious speech and/or behavior directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer
may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of
the Court.
Same; Same; A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal
sanctions such as imprisonment or a fine or both.—A charge of indirect contempt, if proven
in due proceedings, carry with it penal sanctions such as imprisonment or a fine or both.
Same; Same; In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935), for the same act of filing in court
a pleading with intemperate and offensive statements, the concerned lawyer was found guilty
of contempt and liable administratively.—In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935), for
the same act of filing in court a pleading with intemperate and offensive statements, the
concerned lawyer was found guilty of contempt and liable administratively. For this reason,
two separate penalties were imposed upon him, a fine (for the contempt charge) and
reprimand (for his failure to observe his lawyerly duty to give due respect to the Court).
Same; Same; The lesson is that, when the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and
behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same— the degradation
of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of justice.—The lesson imparted by
the foregoing authorities is that, when the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and
behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same—the degradation
of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of justice. For this reason, it is not
unusual for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving the duty to give due
respect to the courts) in contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa.
Same; Same; When the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent
lawyer, the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of
jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not transform the action from a
disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt.—When the Court chooses to institute an
administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere citation or discussion in the orders
or decision in the administrative case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does
not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt.
Respondents’ contrary position in their motion for reconsideration is bereft of any rational
merit. Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is punishable by
imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in accordance
with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the Court did not opt to do so. We cannot see why
respondents would stubbornly cling to the notion that they were being cited for indirect
contempt under the Show Cause Resolution when there is no basis for such belief other than
their own apparent misreading of the same.

3. A.C. No. 7676. June 10, 2014.* AMADO T. DIZON, complainant vs. ATTY.
NORLITA DE TAZA, respondent.

Attorneys; The Supreme Court (SC) has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings
are investigations by the Court to ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither
a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.—The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary
proceedings are investigations by the Court to ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be one.
There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. As this Court held in Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406 (1999), citing In the Matter of
the Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay, 31 SCRA
562 (1970): “Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.

Administrative Proceedings; Substantial Evidence; In administrative proceedings, only

substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.—“In administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.” Based on the documentary evidence
submitted by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a propensity for
borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid without
any reason. The complainant even submitted a document evidencing Atty. De Taza’s
involvement in an estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against a
closed account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other creditors. Such
conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more
abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza
must remember that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity and
fairness.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; The issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on her.—“We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as
to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also
shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act
to the public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her
commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably
tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.”

Same; Same; When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer
is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that
particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to his client.—When a lawyer receives money from the client
for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing
that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for
the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. In this
case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and nonexistent.
Thus, her demand should not have even been made in the first place.

Same; Same; Disbarment; Grounds for Disbarment or Suspension of Lawyers.—Section 27,

Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a lawyer
for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.

Same; Same; Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important,
morally.—“Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.
Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times
conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large,
with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.” “The Judiciary has been besieged
enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession
to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible
representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated.”

4. A.C. No. 5359. March 10, 2014.* ERMELINDA LAD VDA. DE DOMINGUEZ,
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, VICENTE A. PICHON, complainant, vs.
ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR., respondent.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to
serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and
devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.—Atty. Agleron violated Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that: Rule 18.03—A lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable. Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to
serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and
devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.

Same; Same; Even assuming that complainant had not remitted the full payment of the filing
fee, he should have found a way to speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency
of the filing fee so he could file the complaint.—As stated, every case that is entrusted to a
lawyer deserves his full attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming
that complainant had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a
way to speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could
file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with
complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action such as
suspension ranging from three months to two years.—In a number of cases, the Court held
that a lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence
renders him liable for disciplinary action such as suspension ranging from three months to
two years. In this case, the Court finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) months sufficient.

5. A.C. No. 10164. March 10, 2014.* STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA
ROMANILLOS BRUNET, complainants, vs. ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN,
respondent.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture,

and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.—The practice of law is not a
business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be
a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves. Brunet vs. Guaren, 718 SCRA 224, A.C. No. 10164
March 10, 2014

6. A.C. No. 10543. March 16, 2016.* NENITA D. SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. ATTY.
ROMEO G. AGUILOS, respondent.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Misrepresentation of Professional Competence; Clearly, the

respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. He did
not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of
marriage.—Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to
the complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between
the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have
been basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either
causes of action. His explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for
legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably contemplated by the parties
and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an action for annulment of the
complainant’s marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancée.
They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to remarry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had
prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney’s fees if
she desired to have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other
than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.

Attorney’s Fees; The attorney’s fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer’s agreement
between the client and the attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as
long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.—
The attorney’s fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer’s agreement between the client
and the attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order. The underlying
theory is that the retainer’s agreement between them gives to theclient the reasonable notice
of the arrangement on the fees. Once the attorney has performed the task assigned to him in
a valid agreement, his compensation is determined on the basis of what he and the client
agreed. In the absence of the written agreement, the lawyer’s compensation shall be based
on quantum meruit, which means “as much as he deserved.” The determination of attorney’s
fees on the basis of quantum meruit is also authorized “when the counsel, for justifiable
cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion.” Moreover, quantum meruit becomes
the basis of recovery of compensation by the attorney where the circumstances of the
engagement indicate that it will be contrary to the parties’ expectation to deprive the attorney
of all compensation.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Misconduct; The attorney who fails to accomplish the tasks he
should naturally and expectedly perform during his professional engagement does not
discharge his professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The respondent
was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to the degree of the
misconduct.—The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De La Rama, Jr. in favor of the
respondent was too generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any compensation
because he did not really begin to perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his
version, he would prepare the petition for legal separation instead of the petition for
annulment of marriage. The attorney who fails to accomplish the tasks he should naturally
and expectedly perform during his professional engagement does not discharge his
professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The respondent was thus guilty
of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to the degree of the misconduct. As a
consequence, he may be ordered to restitute to the client the amount received from the latter
in consideration of the professional engagement, subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if
warranted. Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his
misrepresentation of his professional competence, and he is further to be ordered to return
the entire amount of P70,000.00 received from the client, plus legal interest of 6% per annum
reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.

Same; Same; This duty of lawyers is further emphasized in the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR), whose Canon 8 provides: “A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.”—The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to
“abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged.” This duty of lawyers is further emphasized in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: “A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.” Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands that: “A lawyer shall
not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.”

Same; Same; In maintaining the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s
language — spoken or in his pleadings — must be dignified.—The Court recognizes the
adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated lawyers to use strong language
in the advancement of the interest of their clients. However, as members of a noble
profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their clients’ cause, or,
as in this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but that should
not be used as license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language — spoken or in his pleadings
— must be dignified. As such, every lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in
the administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards his clients,
the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal Profession.

Same; Same; Simple Misconduct; The respondent’s statement in his answer that the demand
from Atty. Martinez should be treated “as a mere scrap of paper or should have been
addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) where it may service its rightful purpose” constituted simple misconduct
that the Supreme Court (SC) cannot tolerate.—The respondent’s statement in his answer
that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated “as a mere scrap of paper or should
have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may
service its rightful purpose” constituted simple misconduct that this Court cannot tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and improper
language by asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper. He
explained that he had sufficient cause for maintaining that the demand letter should be
treated as a mere scrap of paper and should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not
excuse the offensiveness and impropriety of his language. He could have easily been
respectful and proper in responding to the letter.

7. A.C. No. 11246. June 14, 2016.* ARNOLD PACAO, complainant, vs. ATTY.
SINAMAR LIMOS, respondent.
Attorneys; Disbarment; The Supreme Court (SC) does not hesitate to impose the penalty of
disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat offender.—Despite her two (2) prior
suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is she
unfit to stay in the legal profession for her deceitful conduct but is also remiss in following
the dictates of the Court, which has supervision over her. Atty. Limos’ unwarranted obstinacy
is a great insolence to the Court which cannot be tolerated. The present case comes clearly
under the grounds given in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court,
however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has
become a repeat offender. Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light
of Atty. Limos’ prior misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession, the imposition
of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is warranted.

Same; Same; In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Supreme Court
(SC) is aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as a
legal professional and as an officer of the Court.—In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon
Atty. Limos, the Court is aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character
of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. However, Atty. Limos’
recalcitrant attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court’s warning, which is deemed
to be an affront to the Court’s authority over members of the Bar, warrant an utmost
disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her repeated desecration of her ethical commitments
proved herself to be unfit to remain in the legal profession. Worse, she remains apathetic to
the need to reform herself.

Practice of Law; The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege.—“[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions.” “Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the
world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious example to
the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic”.

8. A.C. No. 11350. August 9, 2016.* (formerly CBD Case No. 14-4211) ADEGOKE R.
PLUMPTRE, complainant, vs. ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA, respondent.
Attorneys; Administrative Complaints; The unjustified withholding of funds belonging to the
client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against the lawyer.—In Macarilay v.
Seriña, 458 SCRA 12 (2005), this Court held that “[t]he unjustified withholding of funds
belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against the lawyer.” By
absconding with the money entrusted to him by his client and behaving in a manner not
befitting a member of the bar, respondent violated the following Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Same; A lawyer is duty-bound to protect his client’s interest and the degree of service
expected of him is his entire devotion the interest of the client.—As his client’s advocate, a
lawyer is duty-bound to protect his client’s interests and the degree of service expected of him
in this capacity is his “entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.”
The lawyer also has a fiduciary duty, with the lawyer-client relationship imbued with utmost
trust and confidence.

Same; A lawyer must, at no time, lack probity and moral fiber.—A lawyer must, at no time,
lack probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the
bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership.

Same; A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal
or legislative body.—“A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.” Further, “a lawyer shall not state or imply
that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body”.

B. Qualifications

1. Bar Matter No. 712. July 13, 1995.* IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO
THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

Attorneys; Admission to the Bar; The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified .—The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted
to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following
excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect.

Same; Same; Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of ustice is concerned.—It has also been
stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far
as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.

Same; Same; All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of
those seeking admission to the Bar.—All aspects of moral character and behavior may be
inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is,
indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in
proceedings for disbarment.

Same; Same; Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected
from members of the general public.—The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied
by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the
norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to
prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people’s confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it.

Same; Same; Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was possessed of good moral
character.—Mr. Argosino’s participation in the deplorable “hazing” activities certainly fell
far short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the
death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the
part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a “neophyte” who had, by
seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that,
at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Same; Same; Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be

demonstrated at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations and more
importantly at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney’s oath
of office .—Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired,
the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino
has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress
that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not
only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney’s
oath of office.

2. A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997.* (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 96-1-SDC(P)
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI,
Shari’a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

Civil Service Law; Public Officers; Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees [RA 6713] inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard
of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.—The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy
of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section
4 of the Code commands that “(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the
rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.” More than once has this Court
emphasized that “the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all
times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep
the respect of the public for the judiciary.

Same; Same; As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.—Now, it does not appear to the Court
consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others,
to couch denunciations of acts believed—however sincerely—to be deceitful, fraudulent or
malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, Alauya is evidently
convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he
exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone;
in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he “act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.” Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari’a Bar and an officer of a
Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive,
offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected
that his accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every
act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by
his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
Attorneys; Integrated Bar of the Philippines; The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing, and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.—As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already
had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members
of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has
been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice
law in this jurisdiction.

3. Bar Matter No. 1036. June 10, 2003.* DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant,
vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Practice of law means any activity in or out of court which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience; To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of
the legal profession.—In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that “practice of law” means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which
are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to
render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Same; Same; Having held himself out as “counsel” knowing that he had no authority to
practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.—
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself “counsel”
knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as “counsel”
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to
be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Same; Same; The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has
passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.—The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege.
It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has
passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.

Same; Same; Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in
the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.—The regulation of
the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the
bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held
in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3
(e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law
is liable for indirect contempt of court.

Same; Same; It is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-pledged
lawyer; Fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.—True, respondent
here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing
in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for
becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

4. B.M. No. 1678. December 17, 2007.* PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME
PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions—it is so
delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through
this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.—
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Adherence to rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him
for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.
Same; Same; Resumption of Law Practice; Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9225); The loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates
the privilege to practice law in the Philippines—the practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners—except when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225; A Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship
if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225, but, although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.—The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines
shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship
is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. The exception is when
Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he
reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have
terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his practice, he must first secure from the Supreme Court
the authority to do so.—Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession
in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he)
shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.”
Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225
can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on: (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the
IBP; (b) the payment of professional tax; (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of
mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philip-pine laws and update him of legal developments
and (d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

5. A.C. No. 6484. June 16, 2015.* ADELITA B. LLUNAR, complainant, vs. ATTY.
ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.—The respondent in this case
committed several infractions making him liable for grave misconduct. First, the respondent
did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant’s case. He failed to act promptly in
redeeming the complainant’s property within the period of redemption. What is worse is the
delay of three years before a complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court.
The respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant’s case and wasted precious time and
opportunity that were then readily available to recover the complainant’s property. Under
these facts, the respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), which states that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”

Same; Same; A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds or property he holds for his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for his
own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.—After
the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had not filed any case in
court, she demanded that the respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but her demand
was left unheeded. The respondent later promised to pay her, but until now, no payment of
any amount has been made. These facts confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of
the CPR, which mandates every lawyer to “hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession” and to “account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client.” In addition, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the
funds or property he holds for his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated these funds or property for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of
the trust reposed in him by his client.

Same; Same; The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a member of the Bar when
he accepted the complainant’s case despite knowing that he could not and should not practice
law.—The respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant
that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should have
disclosed this fact at the time he was approached by the complainant for his services. Canon
15 of the CPR states that “a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his clients.” The respondent lacked the candor expected of
him as a member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant’s case despite knowing that
he could not and should not practice law.

Same; Same; Practice of Law During Indefinite Suspension; Aggravating Circumstances; The
respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension imposed
on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed.—The respondent
was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension imposed on him. This
infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the above facts alone,
the penalty of suspension for five (5) years from the practice of law would have been justified,
but the respondent is not an ordinary violator of the profession’s ethical rules; he is a repeat
violator of these rules. In Nuñez v. Atty. Ricafort, 382 SCRA 381 (2002), we had adjudged the
respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing to turn over the proceeds of the sale of a
property owned by his client and in issuing bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of
execution issued by the court in the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed against
him by his client. We then suspended him indefinitely from the practice of law — a penalty
short of disbarment. Under his current liability — which is no different in character from his
previous offense — we have no other way but to proceed to decree his disbarment. He has
become completely unworthy of membership in our honorable profession.

Same; Same; The complainant should not be burdened with the expense of hiring another
lawyer to perform the services that the respondent was hired to do, especially in this case
where there was an inexcusable nondelivery of such services.—With respect to the amount
to be returned to the complainant, we agree with the IBP that the respondent should return
the whole amount of P95,000.00, without deductions, regardless of whether the engagement
of Atty. Abitria as counsel was with the complainant’s knowledge and consent. In the first
place, the hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have been necessary had the respondent been
honest and diligent in handling the complainant’s case from the start. The complainant
should not be burdened with the expense of hiring another lawyer to perform the services
that the respondent was hired to do, especially in this case where there was an inexcusable
nondelivery of such services.

6. A.C. No. 11316. July 12, 2016.* PATRICK A. CARONAN, complainant, vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. “ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN,” respondent.

Attorneys; Admission to the Bar; Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no
applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed a pre-law course.—The IBP was also correct in ordering that
respondent, whose real name is “Richard A. Caronan,” be barred from admission to the Bar.
Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law
course, viz.: Section 6. Pre-Law.—No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be
admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education
that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an
authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of
concentration: political science, logic, english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases
supplied) In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he
enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was
discharged in 1993 without graduating. Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite
pre-law degree.

Same; Same; Respondent’s false assumption of his brother’s name, identity, and educational
records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar.—The Court does not discount the
possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and earn a law degree
under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother’s name, identity, and
educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all,
is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyonewho demands it.
Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character. In In the Matter of the
Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for
Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez, 431
SCRA 146 (2004), the Court explained the essence of good moral character: Good moral
character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where
he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct
as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.

Same; Same; Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers.—Respondent
exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he
assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter
into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC
where he had been working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who would
be lawyers. This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which
exists between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.

Same; Same; Respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the
necessary qualifications to be a lawyer.—Respondent made a mockery of the legal profession
by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image
of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several
criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the
legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and
dignity.

C. Appearance of Non-lawyers

1. A.M. No. 93-7-696-0. February 21, 1995.* In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO. Ex Rel.

Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Administrative Law; Contempt; There can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of
contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to
courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the
administration of justice.—Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any
doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and
processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding,
obstructing and degrading the administration of justice. He has stubbornly litigated issues
already declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings
rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final
and executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his own
individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite
erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and court
officers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the
court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court employees who have had
to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions.

Same; Same; It is axiomatic that the power or duty of the court to institute a charge for
contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is
essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers
and the public. —It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for
contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is
essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers
and the public. Were the intervention of the prosecuting officer required and judges obliged
to file complaints for contempts against them before the prosecuting officer, in order to bring
the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to perform
their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of charges by the
prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt
amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a
charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by
himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private
person.

Same; Same; The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious
litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees and
other persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and
bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.—Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his
other contention that in making the allegations claimed to be contumacious, he "was
exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for
redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance
with the accountability of public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no
justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers,
judges, court employees and other persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts,
wasting their time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.

Same; Same; Public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest
and the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality.—To be sure, there may be, on
the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions
therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but
the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite
time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute
finality.

Same; Same; Judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other
agency, branch, department or official of Government.—The sound, salutary and self-evident
principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that judgments of the highest tribunal
of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or official of
Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision
should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or
modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings of fact or conclusions of law,
flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. This, on the
indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional and traditional
principle.

Same; Same; Should judgments of lower courts become final and executory before or without
exhaustion of all recourse of appeal they too become inviolable, impervious to
modifications.—ln respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies
available under law to a party who is adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a
motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an appeal to either the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on whether questions of both fact and law, or of
law only, are raised, in accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the
hierarchy of courts. Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground that it
was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may
be had through the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. However, should judgments of lower courts—which may normally be subject
to review by higher tribunals—become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of
all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may,
then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court,
not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of
Government.

Same; Judges; Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders.—Judges must
be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should
not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts
they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions.
Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are
not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith. This
Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively
accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or
incurred with evident bad faith; it is only in these cases that administrative sanctions are
called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme Court.

2. No. L-51813-14. November 29, 1983.* ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B.

MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners, vs. HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ,
JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, and
FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.

Attorneys; Criminal Procedure; Litigations; Prosecution of criminal actions; Private

Prosecutors; Non-lawyers, including senior law students, can appear in the municipal trial
court as private prosecutors for accused persons under the supervision and control of the
fiscal; Permission of the fiscal not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private
prosecutor.—Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the municipal
court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him
for the purpose, Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was
allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City
Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It
is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing
Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in
conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his
appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition.
What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private
prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other
hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just
manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the
prosecution of the case under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-
lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal
trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the
supervision and control of the trial fiscal.

Same; Same; Same; Institution of separate civil action; Where petitioner did not expressly
waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately, the civil action is deemed
impliedly instituted in the criminal action; Since complainant has personal interest in the
success of the civil action and in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his
right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.—ln the two criminal cases filed before
the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not
expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore,
the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant
Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the
prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is
not a lawyer.

3. G.R. No. 154207. April 27, 2007.* FERDINAND A. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, respondents.

Criminal Procedure; Law Student Practice Rule; As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No.
730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.—Section 34, Rule
138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective
of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue
of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Same; Recovery of Civil Liability; When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.—Under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage,
violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.
The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Same; Same; Petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver nor prior
institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect
arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with criminal action; Private prosecutor
may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.—The petitioner is correct in stating
that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed
instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully
intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

4. No. L-23959. November 29, 1971. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF F’REE LABOR

UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS,petitioners,
vs. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGARCOMPANY,COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS,& QUINTINMUNING,respondents.

Legal ethics; Attorney’s fees; Division of fees with non-lawyers not allowed.—–An agreement
providing for the division of attorney’s fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed
to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral
and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney’s fees is no less immoral in the
absence of a contract.

Same; Same; Court of Industrial Relations; Allowance of non-lawyers to appear in the Court
of Industrial Relations does not entitle them to fees.—–The permission for a non-member of
the bar to represent or appear or defend in the Court of Industrial Relations on behalf of a
party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. The award for attorney’s fees provided by law imports the existence of an
attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney’s fees.

Same; Only lawyers may represent litigants in courts.—– Public policy demands that legal
work in the representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing
tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession,
as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and
the public.

Pleading and practice; Real party in interest; Labor Organization may appeal award of
attorney’s fees—–A legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney’s fees
which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such labor organization is
permitted to institute an action in the industrial court on behalf of its members.

D. Sanctions for Practice or Appearance Without Authority

1. A.C. No. 7325. January 21, 2015.* DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR.,
complainant, vs. ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, respondent.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a
presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client.—The Rules of Court under Rule
138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client,
hence: SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear.—An attorney is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney
who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who
employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully
appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.

Same; Same; Contempt; If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of
the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.—Lawyers must be mindful that an
attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being retained nor may he appear
in court without being employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney appears on a client’s
behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to
represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance unless the
purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority. If a lawyer corruptly
or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be
disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his
official transaction.

E. Public Officials and Practice of Law

2. [No. L-2610. June 16, 1951.] CEFERINA RAMOS, ET ALS., petitioners, vs.
ANATOLIO C. MAÑALAC, or his successor, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Second Branch, and FELIPE LOPEZ, respondents.

1.JUDGMENTS; SEPARATE ACTION REQUIRED TO ATTACK A VALID AND REGULAR

JUDGMENT.—It is a well-known rule that a judgment, which on its f face is valid and
regular, can only be attacked in a separate action brought principally for the purpose. (Gomez
vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil., 717.)

2.ATTORNEY-AT-LAW; AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEY TO APPEAR IN A CASE,

PRESUMED.—Since an attorney is presumed to be authorized by his client in a case in which
he appears (section 20, Rule 127), Attorney M who appeared for the petitioners must be
presumed to have been authorized by them when he appeared in their behalf in all the stages
of the case. The security and finality of judicial proceedings require that the evasions and
tergiversations of unsuccessful litigants should be received with undue favor to overcome
such presumption (Tan Lua vs. O'Brien, 55 Phil., 53.)
3.WRIT OF POSSESSION; ITS ISSUANCE IN A FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING, NOT AN
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; POWER OF COURT TO ISSUE WRIT.—The issuance of a
writ of possession in a foreclosure proceeding is not an execution of judgment within the
purview of section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, but is merely a ministerial and
complementary duty of the court to put an end to the litigation which the court can undertake
even after the lapse of five years, provided the statute of limitations and the rights of third
person have not intervened in the meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61 Phil., 201). This is the
correct interpretation of section 6, Rule 39, in relation to section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. This is a case where the judgment involved is already final and executed, and the
properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the purchaser thereof has transferred
them to a third person, who now desires to be placed in their possession. In the exercise of its
interlocutory duty to put an end to the litigation and save multiplicity of action, no plausible
reason is seen why the court cannot issue a peremptory order to place the ultimate purchaser
in the possession of the property.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.—The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a
foreclosure suit, the court has the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the latter
will not be driven to an action at law to obtain possession. The power of the court to issue a
process and place the purchaser in possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has
power to enforce its own decree and thus avoid circuitous actions and vexatious litigation
(Rivero de Ortega vs. Natividad, 71 Phil., 340).

3. In Re David – In Spanish

4. No. L-19450. May 27, 1965. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. SIMPLICIOVILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Attorneys-at-law; Attorneys-at-law employed in the government; Prohibition to engage in

private practice; Meaning.—Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of law by
attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statute, has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The word private
practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

Same; Same; Assistant City Attorney handling case for relative with permission of superior
not prohibited private practice.—The isolated appearance as a private prosecutor, previously
authorized by his superior, of an assistant city attorney in a criminal case for malicious
mischief before a justice of the peace court where the offended party is his relative, does not
violate Section 32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars
certain attorneys from practicing.

5. Adm. Case No. 2266. October 27, 1983.* HERMINIO R. NORIEGA, complainant,
vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON, respondent.

Attorneys; Nature of office of Attorney.—In resolving this disbarment case, We must initially
emphasize the degree of integrity and respectability attached to the law profession. There is
no denying that the profession of an attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By
years of patience, zeal and ability, the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself
and his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of
this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising
from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer
of the court.

Same; Same.—“On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual
and the prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to
be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that
the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench
should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be
exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.”

Same; Purpose of disbarment.—The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a

punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be
competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose
confidence in them.

Same; Complainant has burden of proof in disbarment case. He must present a convincing
case.—In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for
the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequences
of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that
clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty.

Same; Public Officers; Civil Service; A government employee does not violate the civil service
law for appearing as attorney where same had permission of department head.—There is no
violation of the Civil Service rules and regulations for his appearance as counsel for the
defendant in the JDRC Case No. E-01978 was with authority given by the Associate
Commissioner of SEC. Julio A. Sulit, Jr.

Same; A government employee who appeared as counsel for a close family friend in an
isolated case cannot be considered to be engaged in the private practice of law.—This Court
also holds that under the facts complained of supported by the annexes and the answer of
respondent, likewise sustained by annexes attached thereto and the reply of the complainant,
the accusation that respondent with malice and deliberate intent to evade the laws, assumed
a different name, falsified his identity and represented himself to be one “ATTY. MANUEL
SISON” with offices at No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City at the times that he will handle
private cases, is not meritorious. Neither is the charge substantiated. The only case referred
to is that pending the JDRC, Case No. E-01978 wherein respondent appeared as counsel for
the defendant. It being an isolated case, the same does not constitute the practice of law,
more so since respondent did not derive any pecuniary gain for his appearance because
respondent and defendant therein were close family friends. Such act of the respondent in
going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close family friend should not be allowed to be used
as an instrument of harrassment against respondent.

Same; Same; There is no showing that respondent Atty. Emmanuel Sison was motivated by
bad faith where he signed a pleading as Atty. Manuel Sison, as there is no reason for him to
conceal his true name as he was permitted already by his department head to appear as
counsel in a JDRC case.—A perusal of the records however, reveals that whereas there is
indeed a pleading entitled “Objection/Opposition to the Formal Offer of Evidence” (Annex “C”
to the Complaint for Disbarment, which is signed as “Manuel Sison”, counsel for defendant,
605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, p. 7 of the Records), there is, however, no showing that
respondent was thus motivated with bad faith or malice, for otherwise, he would not have
corrected the spelling of his name when the court staff mis-spelled it in one of the minutes of
the proceeding. Moreover, We find no reason or motive for respondent to conceal his true
name when he has already been given express authority by his superior to act as counsel for
Juan Sacquing in the latter’s case pending before the JDRC. And while it may be true that
subsequent errors were made in sending notices to him under the name “Atty. Manuel Sison,”
the errors were attributable to the JDRC clerical staff and not to the respondent.

Same; Same; Complainant’s motive in filing several charges against government hearing
officer not due to honest and sincere objectives he being a loser in a ruse resolved by the
respondent.—At this point, We are constrained to examine the motives that prompted the
complainant in filing the present case. An examination of the records reveals that the
complainant was a defendant in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case No.
1982 filed by the Integrated Livestock Dealers Inc. and Teofisto Jiao against seven (7)
respondents including the complainant, seeking to oust the complainant and his co-
defendants from acting as officers of the Integrated Livestock Dealers Inc., then pending
before respondent as Hearing Officer of the SEC, who after trial decided the case against the
herein complainant. From this antecedent fact, there is cast a grave and serious doubt as to
the true motivation of the complainant in filing the present case, considering further that
other administrative charges were filed by the complainant against respondent herein before
the SEC, JDRC, and the Fiscal’s office in Manila.

6. A.C. No. 5377. June 30, 2014.* VICTOR C. LINGAN, complainant, vs. ATTYS.
ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, respondents.

Attorneys; Practice of Law; Words and Phrases; Practice of law is “any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.”—Practice of law is “any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.” It includes “[performing] acts
which are characteristics of the [legal] profession” or “[rendering any kind of] service [which]
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” Work in government that requires
the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA
210 (1991), this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring “[the use of]
legal knowledge or legal talent” is practice of law.

Administrative Agencies; Commission on Human Rights; The Commission on Human Rights

(CHR) is an independent office created under the Constitution with power to investigate “all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.”—The Commission on
Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with power to
investigate “all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]” It is
divided into regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to investigate
human rights violations in its territorial jurisdiction. Each regional office is headed by the
Regional Director who is given the position of Attorney VI.

Commission on Human Rights; Regional Directors; Powers and Functions of the Regional
Director of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).—Under the Guidelines and Procedures
in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses, and the
Provision of CHR Assistance, the Regional Director has the following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to “[Commission on Human Rights]
matters”; b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices; c. To conduct
preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the absence of
the legal officer or investigator; d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among
parties and discuss “immediate courses of action and protection remedies and/or possible
submission of the matter to an alternative dispute resolution”; e. To issue Commission on
Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas within
the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office; and f. To review and approve draft resolutions
of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer. These powers and functions are
characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually performed by
members of the judiciary and notaries public — officers who are necessarily members of the
bar. Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission’s
legal officer. Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing
and approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require
the use of extensive legal knowledge.

Same; Same; The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) Regional Director constitutes practice of law.—The exercise of the powers and
functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constitutes practice of law.
Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney — a member of the bar in good standing
and authorized to practice law. When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as when
he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended
lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.

Same; Same; Performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Regional
Director constituted practice of law.—Atty. Baliga’s performance of generally managerial
functions was not supported by the record. It was also immaterial. He held the position of
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of his authority to practice law.
Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold that position. All told,
performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constituted
practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as Regional
Director.

Attorneys; Practice of Law; Disbarment; Suspension; Willful Disobedience to Any Lawful

Order of a Superior Court; Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law.—Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Commission on Human Rights; Practice of Law; The Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
cannot, by mere resolutions and other issuances, modify or defy the Supreme Court’s orders
of suspension from the practice of law.—We remind the Commission on Human Rights that
we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. The Commission cannot, by
mere resolutions and other issuances, modify or defy this court’s orders of suspension from
the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its
officers and employees, it can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the
positions they are holding.

Attorneys; Practice of Law; To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must “adhere
to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintain the highest degree of morality, and
faithfully comply with the rules of the legal profession.”—As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him
that the practice of law is a “privilege burdened with conditions.” To enjoy the privileges of
practicing law, lawyers must “[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain]
the highest degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal
profession.”

7. A.C. No. 10465. June 8, 2016.* SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO and

GLORIA J. EUSTAQUIO, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDGAR R. NAVALES,
respondent.

Attorneys; Practice of Law; When the Supreme Court (SC) orders a lawyer suspended from
the practice of law, he must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of
legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a
position in government requiring the authority to practice law.—It is settled that the Court
has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. As such, when the Court orders
a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from performing all functions
requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes
desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law. The
practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts which are
characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

Same; Same; The government office of Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder to be
authorized to practice law. Hence, respondent’s continuous discharge of his functions as such
constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) order of
suspension against him.—Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071, otherwise known as the
“Prosecution Service Act of 2010,” provides the powers and functions of prosecutors, to wit:
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor.—The
provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor shall: (a) Be the law officer of the province of the
city officer, as the case may be; (b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of
crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and filed
against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he/she or any of his/her
assistants shall receive the statements under oath or take oral evidence of witnesses, and for
this purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath before
him/her, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced
by application to any trial court; and (c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts at the province or
city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal actions, subject
to the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 5 hereof. Verily, a plain reading of the
foregoing provision evidently shows that the government office of Assistant City Prosecutor
requires its holder to be authorized to practice law. Hence, respondent’s continuous discharge
of his functions as such constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court’s
order of suspension against him.

Same; Same; Willful Disobedience to Lawful Order of a Superior Court; Disbarment;

Suspension; Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to
do so — acts which respondent is guilty of in this case — are grounds for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.—Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and wilfully appearing as an
attorney without authority to do so — acts which respondent is guilty of in this case — are
grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to wit: Section 27. Disbarment
or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC), in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is
inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the
errant lawyer is possible.—As a final note, it must be stressed that “[d]isbarment of lawyers
is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is
intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court
has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does
so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle.

8. A.C. No. 9018. April 20, 2016.* TERESITA P. FAJARDO, complainant, vs. ATTY.
NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, respondent.
Attorneys; Practice of Law; Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading.—
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this case, his
surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized practice, his
acts also show badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; Practice of
Profession; Government Employees; Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 1986, government officials or
employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their profession unless
authorized by their department heads.—Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 1986, government officials or
employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their profession unless
authorized by their department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the practice of
profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the official functions of the government
official or employee.

Attorneys; Practice of Law; Conflict of Interest; By assisting and representing complainant

in a suit against the Ombudsman and against government in general, respondent put himself
in a situation of conflict of interest.—In this case, respondent was given written permission
by the Head of the National Center for Mental Health, whose authority was designated under
Department of Health Administrative Order No. 21, Series of 1999. However, by assisting
and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and against government in
general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest. Respondent’s practice of
profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the requirement that his practice will
not be “in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a whole.”

Same; Same; Same; By appearing against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going
against the same employer he swore to serve.—There is basic conflict of interest here.
Respondent is a public officer, an employee of government. The Office of the Ombudsman is
part of government. By appearing against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going
against the same employer he swore to serve. In addition, the government has a serious
interest in the prosecution of erring employees and their corrupt acts. Under the
Constitution, “[p]ublic office is a public trust.” The Office of the Ombudsman, as “protectors
of the [P]eople,” is mandated to “investigate and prosecute . . . any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient.”

Same; Same; Same; A conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee
represents another government employee or public officer in a case pending before the Office
of the Ombudsman.—A conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee
represents another government employee or public officer in a case pending before the Office
of the Ombudsman. The incumbent officer ultimately goes against government’s mandate
under the Constitution to prosecute public officers or employees who have committed acts or
omissions that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Furthermore, this is
consistent with the constitutional directive that “[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all
times, be accountable to the [P]eople, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”

Government Employees; The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the erring officer
or employee but to continue to uplift the People’s trust in government and to ensure excellent
public service.—The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the erring officer or
employee but to continue to uplift the People’s trust in government and to ensure excellent
public service: [W]hen an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the
punishment of that officer or employee, but the improvement of the public service and the
preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the government. . . . These
constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical
flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in the
public service.

Attorneys; Disbarment; In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the
complainant must prove his or her allegations through substantial evidence.—In disbarment
or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the complainant must prove his or her
allegations through substantial evidence. In Advincula v. Macabata, 517 SCRA 600 (2007),
this Court dismissed a complaint for disbarment due to the lack of evidence in proving the
complainant’s allegations: As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party
who makes the allegations — ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum
naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed
to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing
does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.

Same; Same; Lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or penalized unless it is shown that
they committed a transgression of their oath or their duties, which reflects on their fitness to
enjoy continued status as a member of the bar.—Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily
disciplined or penalized unless it is shown that they committed a transgression of their oath
or their duties, which reflects on their fitness to enjoy continued status as a member of the
bar: The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only
on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral
character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor
erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are
of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the
practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which
induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the
commission of the offense should also be considered.

Same; Lawyer’s Oath; Respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to
complainant that he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them
get a favorable decision in complainant’s case.—We find that respondent violated the
Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he communicated to or, at
the very least, made it appear to complainant that he knew people from the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in complainant’s case. Lawyers
are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of their profession.
Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain a favorable outcome for
complainant’s case by resorting to his influence among staff in the Office where the case was
pending.

Same; Dishonesty; Respondent’s act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of
his personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is
unlawful and dishonest.—Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.02 prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct. Respondent’s act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed
because of his personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the
Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires lawyers to always “uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.” In
relation, Canon 13 mandates that lawyers “shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause
and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.” A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive
a favorable outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. This act of influence peddling is highly immoral and has no place in the legal
profession.

Same; Influence Peddling; In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who encourage
influence peddling, and in the interest of maintaining the high ethical standards of employees
in the judiciary, the Supreme Court (SC) did not hesitate in dismissing its own employee from
government service when she peddled influence in the Court of Appeals (CA).—In the interest
of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who encourage influence peddling, and in the interest of
maintaining the high ethical standards of employees in the judiciary, this Court did not
hesitate in dismissing its own employee from government service when she peddled influence
in the Court of Appeals: What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the
actuations of a few erring court personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the
impression that decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the disillusionment
of the public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called “bad
eggs” in the judiciary. And whenever warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme
penalty of dismissal in an administrative case is meted to erring personnel.

Same; Same; In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, “[t]he transaction is always
done in secret and often only between the two (2) parties concerned.”—In response to his
alleged text messages, respondent claims that complainant must have confused him with her
other contacts. Respondent found it “mesmerizing” that complainant was able to save all
those alleged text messages from two (2) years ago. Moreover, assuming these messages were
“true, still they [were] not legally admissible as they [were] covered by the lawyer-client
privileged communication as those supposed texts ‘[had been] made for the purpose and in
the course of employment, [were] regarded as privileged and the rule of exclusion [was]
strictly enforced.’” In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, “[t]he transaction is
always done in secret and often only between the two parties concerned.” Nevertheless, as
found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the records, we rule that there is
enough proof to hold respondent guilty of influence peddling.

Same; Same; Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or relationships with
regulators, investigators, judges, or Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and
debase themselves even as they claim to be members of a noble profession.—Lawyers who
offer no skill other than their acquaintances or relationships with regulators, investigators,
judges, or Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and debase themselves even
as they claim to be members of a noble profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to
one’s ability to have illicit access. Rather, it should be about making an honest appraisal of
the client’s situation as seen through the evidence fairly and fully gathered. It should be
about making a discerning and diligent reading of the applicable law. It is foremost about
attaining justice in a fair manner. Law exists to temper, with its own power, illicit power and
unfair advantage. It should not be conceded as a tool only for those who cheat by unduly
influencing people or public officials.