Armed Forces & Society

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NATO’s Secretary General and the Use of Force: Willy Claes and the Air
Strikes in Bosnia
Ryan C. Hendrickson
Armed Forces & Society 2004; 31; 95
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0403100105

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Hendrickson 95

NATO’s Secretary General

and the Use of Force:
Willy Claes and the Air
Strikes in Bosnia
RYAN C. HENDRICKSON

S ince the Soviet Union’s collapse, the North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation (NATO) has undergone tremendous change. The
alliance has enlarged, has adopted new roles in crisis management and
peacekeeping, and has forged new relationships with its former enemies
in the Warsaw Pact. This evolution continues as it struggles to adapt to
the new challenge of terrorism after September 11. Of all the changes
at NATO, however, perhaps the most significant in its initial post-Cold
War transformation was its decision to conduct sustained military strikes
in Bosnia—also known as Operation Deliberate Force—in 1995. For the
first time since NATO’s creation in 1949, Operation Deliberate Force
demonstrated that the alliance was willing and able to engage in a
fundamentally different military role in transatlantic security. Almost
a decade after these strikes, it is clear that Operation Deliberate Force
was a critical step in NATO’s transformation.
Much research has been devoted to NATO’s post-Cold War transfor-
mation. On NATO’s activities in Bosnia, most of the existing literature
focuses on the operational and military aspects of Operation Deliberate
Force. Others have focused primarily on the failed diplomatic efforts
that preceded the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, which resulted in
a peaceful resolution of the four-year humanitarian catastrophe. In the
broader literature on NATO’s evolution, as well as on specific analyses
of NATO’s activities in Bosnia, however, little research has been
Ryan C. Hendrickson is an associate professor of political science at Eastern Illinois
University. Among his publications on NATO and US military action, he is the author of
The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress and War Powers (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt
University Press, 2002). Address for correspondence: Ryan C. Hendrickson, Department
of Political Science, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL 61920. E-mail: cfrch@eiu.edu
Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 31, No. 1, Fall 2004, pp. 95-117.

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96 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

devoted to the role played by NATO’s senior political leader at its

headquarters in Brussels—the secretary general. In 1995, when NATO
waged its two-week bombing campaign on the Bosnian Serbs, Belgian
Willy Claes served as secretary general. Yet most research and historical
surveys of this crucial time in NATO’s life barely mention Claes. This
article offers the first appraisal of his leadership during this crucial time
for the alliance, which laid a foundation for additional uses of force in
Kosovo in 1999 and reaffirmed NATO’s role in transatlantic security
after the Soviet Union’s demise.
Using an analytical framework of international organizational lead-
ership based on Michael Schechter’s previous research, this article
assesses Claes’ leadership from three perspectives: his leadership efforts
under the international systemic constraints prior to the use of force in
1995; his organizational leadership at NATO, focusing primarily on his
chairmanship of the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s principal deci-
sion-making body); and his relationship with NATO’s Supreme Allied
Commander, which speaks directly to the interplay between civilian and
military leaders at NATO. The findings demonstrate that Claes’ influ-
ence and role were substantial, and represent an unrecognized aspect of
Operation Deliberate Force’s success, and more generally, on the
secretary general’s role in assisting NATO to be a meaningful player in
European security. The findings also suggest an overlooked aspect of
NATO’s post-Cold War transformation: the key leadership role played
by NATO’s highest political leader in shaping the direction of this
military alliance. Before assessing Claes, however, the article presents an
overview of previous research and methodologies employed to study
NATO’s secretaries general. This discussion is followed by the develop-
ment of a new analytical framework, through the use of a case study, to
examine Claes’ leadership during this critical era in NATO’s evolution.

NATO’s Secretary General: Literature Review and

Research Methodology

During the Cold War, most analysts concur that the office of
NATO’s secretary general was filled with talented diplomats, whose
powers and abilities to shape NATO’s agenda were often severely
constrained by its member states.1 Most historical studies of NATO
make hardly any mention of the secretary general, which in part reflects
the wide consensus of the relative weakness of this position during the
Cold War.2 Rather, many analysts point to the importance of NATO’s
military leader, the Supreme Allied Commander, in shaping NATO’s

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Hendrickson 97

critical policy choices during the Cold War.3 This inattention to the
secretaries general continued in the post-Cold War era. Despite the vast
amount of literature on NATO’s evolution in the 1990s—whether it
concerns NATO’s expansion, its program to assist newly democratized
states in their transitional processes, its institutional and organizational
strength, or its peace-enforcement and peacekeeping activities in the
Balkans—very little analysis or even mention of the role of the
secretaries general in contributing to these changes exists.4
The dearth of analysis on NATO’s secretaries general corresponds
closely with the broader literature on leaders of multinational, intergov-
ernmental organizations. Despite the ostensibly growing importance of
such organizations after the Cold War, relatively little research has been
devoted to these leaders.5 Among the research that exists, nearly all
scholarship has been historical and descriptive case studies, without the
development of a widely accepted analytical model for studying such
leaders.6 Similarly, the only major work on NATO’s secretaries general
was essentially a historical chronology of its first four civilian leaders,
all of whom led the alliance during the Cold War.7 Thus, no accepted
analytical framework beside the historical and descriptive case study
exists for assessing NATO’s secretary general.
Given that the leadership provided by the secretary general is often
exercised in closed-door sessions of North Atlantic Council (NAC)
meetings or in informal meetings in NATO’s hallways, the case-study
approach—with reliance upon interviews with senior political and
military leaders at NATO—remains the most useful method for exam-
ining a secretary general.8 In the case of Willy Claes, enough time has
passed that many key decision-makers are no longer in office or have
retired from political life, and are able to now speak more candidly
about Claes’ role.
At the same time, the development of a new analytical model for
assessing NATO’s secretaries general may help analysts conduct broader
tests of its political leadership, and potentially, to make wider generali-
zations about other NATO secretaries general. As noted by methodolo-
gist Robert Yin, an analytical model can provide direction to a case
study, and if employed well, perhaps can be useful in theory develop-
ment and replication in future studies. 9 Michael Schechter’s framework
for assessing Cold War-era intergovernmental, organizational (IGO)
leaders offers a useful starting point in the development of such a
model. 10
When studying the leaders of the World Bank, United Nations
Development Program, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific,

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98 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

and Cultural Organization, Schechter argues that three aspects of IGO

leadership demand close scrutiny: the leader’s ability to operate within
the systemic political conditions, that is, how does the leader respond to
the wider political environment in which he or she operates; the leader’s
organization itself, asking what leadership opportunities exist for an
individual leader within the organization; finally, Schechter examines
the leader’s individual personality, asking how personal and idiosyn-
cratic qualities effect the leadership role. In general, much of this
framework can be useful for assessing NATO’s secretary general,
although some adaptation will help improve Schechter’s framework for
research on NATO’s leadership.
In this article, three leadership forums are examined. At the systemic
level, the primary factor for analysis is Claes’ role in influencing the
international political conditions prior to the use of force in August
1995. A secretary general has wide discretion in how he chooses to
address the international political conditions he faces. A secretary
general is, by definition, a representative of all the allies, and has little
independent authority apart from his organizational powers at NATO.
At the same time, the secretary general may or may not attempt to steer
NATO’s public political agenda in certain political directions as he
desires. The secretary general can do little without support from the
NATO allies, but can still choose to be active, passive, or a combination
of both strategies when facing political constraints or opportunities.
Thus, this initial framework attempts to capture Claes’ leadership role
within the broader political context in 1995.
At the organizational level, Claes’ leadership of the NAC, NATO’s
principal decision-making body, provides another useful avenue for
assessing his leadership. The secretary general is charged with oversee-
ing the NAC through his power to call meetings and set the Council’s
agenda. The secretary general has no vote within the NAC, but at NATO,
the Council provides a forum for him to exercise some formal (albeit
limited) leadership of the alliance.
Schechter’s third variable, personality, is less useful as an indepen-
dent category of analysis for the secretary general. At NATO, the
secretary general’s personality is often difficult to separate from his
systemic and organizational leadership.11 As will be demonstrated, this
division of variables is especially difficult in Willy Claes’ case, given
his own personal political troubles and his occasionally assertive
diplomatic style used in Council sessions. Rather, another factor for
analysis that potentially includes personality, but is crafted to more
specifically fit the secretary general’s leadership role at NATO, is an

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Hendrickson 99

assessment of Claes’ civilian-military relationship, which focuses on

Claes’ relationship with the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe
(SACEUR), who is always a general in the US Armed Forces. The first
SACEUR was Gen. Dwight Eisenhower. By examining this relation-
ship, some insight will also be gained on the secretary general’s role in
military planning for NATO during the bombing campaign. Given the
SACEUR’s previously recognized, historical importance at NATO, this
modification of Schecter’s framework seems justified. This assessment
model is summarized in table 1.
This revised model offers a guide for assessing Claes, but also may
help establish an analytical framework that has broader utility for future
research on political leadership at NATO or other military alliances and
organizations.

Systemic Leadership: Claes’ International Political Constraints

Willy Claes was appointed NATO’s secretary general on September

29, 1994, soon after the death of his revered predecessor, Manfred
Woerner. Woerner was seen by many as a forceful, articulate, and
passionate proponent of NATO’s expanded role after the Cold War.12
Given the wide international and personal respect for Woerner, follow-
ing in his footsteps would have been a difficult task for any new
secretary general.
Another systemic constraint that potentially worked against Claes
was that he entered office as a compromise candidate after other
prospects were openly rejected by the allies, and other candidates
declined nomination for the position. Claes was the second Belgian

Table 1
Leadership assessment model for NATO’s secretary
general

Potential Leadership Forums Factor(s) for Analysis

Systemic Contribution in shaping the international
political agenda on a given issue.
Organizational Leadership role exercised as chairman of
NATO’s North Atlantic Council.
Civil-military relations Relationship to the SACEUR, including
the role exercised in military planning.

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100 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

candidate to be considered seriously; this likely helped his candidacy

since the United Kingdom had already vetoed the first Belgian prospect,
Jean-Luc Dehaene.13
Perhaps most important, however, Claes inherited NATO’s leader-
ship role at a time when the alliance, the Clinton administration, and the
European Union (EU) were all struggling to define their post-Cold War
foreign policies, especially as they related to the Bosnia crisis. Much has
been written about the policy differences between the United States,
Europe’s great powers, and the European Union, as well as the
differences in views on the UN Security Council: all major states held
contrasting positions on the Balkan crisis.14 More specifically, until July
1995, the United States refrained from exercising assertive leadership in
NATO, mostly due to the Clinton administration’s unwillingness to
participate in any sort of serious or sustained troop engagement in the
Balkans.15 Without US leadership, the political reality is that NATO
cannot be a forceful actor on the world stage.
Claes was also limited by the considerable influence exercised by the
United Nations in Bosnia. In Bosnia, the UN Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) was attempting to provide humanitarian assistance and
shelter to thousands of civilians in need. Claes, and NATO more
generally, were constrained by the “dual-key” arrangement that had
been negotiated between the UN and NATO. Before NATO could use
force to enforce myriad UN Security Council resolutions, joint approval
from UN and NATO officials was necessary. In the case of the United
Nations’ key, consent was needed from the UN Secretary General
Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, who often received advice and
oversight from UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali.16 In this
respect, the UN essentially held veto power over NATO ground
commanders, which translated into additional limits on Claes’ ability to
influence the broader international environment.
Finally, it is important to recognize Claes’ personal political
scandal, which overshadowed nearly all of his term as secretary general
and eventually forced his resignation. Early in Claes’ tenure as secretary
general (in February 1995), he was accused of having knowledge of
bribes received on behalf of his former Belgian Socialist Party from the
Italian defense firm Agusta in 1988, during his earlier days in Belgian
politics. When these accusations became public, he initially indicated
that he had no knowledge of them, with specific statements made to all
NATO ambassadors that he knew nothing of these events. Yet soon after
making those comments, Claes was forced to admit that he knew of these
events—although he noted that he did not approve of the bribes at the

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Hendrickson 101

time. His association with bribes damaged his international reputation

and ended his tenure as secretary general after only thirteen months.17
Although Claes’ problems were personal in nature, the bribery issue
became international news, and thus became part of the systemic
conditions in which he operated. In sum, Claes faced a host of
international systemic constraints on his leadership maneuverability.
The previously omnipresent role played by his predecessor, the manner
in which he was chosen, NATO’s absence of consensus for much of
1995, the UN’s large presence in Bosnia, and his own personal political
troubles made for unfavorable systemic conditions to lead NATO.
Under these systemic circumstances, most of the evidence suggests
that Claes did not attempt to aggressively challenge the political
limitations that he faced as NATO’s leader, at least in the first months
of his leadership tenure. Individuals who worked at NATO note that
Claes was reserved initially, both personally and substantively,
upon becoming secretary general, hesitant to show policy prefer-
ences openly. 18 Claes’ initially reserved leadership style was likely
a reflection of the political realities within the alliance, where no
consensus existed for policy change, despite the escalating humanitarian
crisis in Bosnia.
In 1995, however, some evidence indicates that Claes recognized
that use-of-force options would be needed in order to address the crisis.
As the problems deepened in the Balkans, Claes’ independent assertiveness
increased. An advocate for military options, Claes began to more
publicly support such policy proposals. Those proposals corresponded
with the policy preferences of the Clinton administration, especially as
the United States moved toward military options in the summer of
1995.19 To some extent, Claes was ahead of the Clinton administration,
in that he recognized the need for military options in Bosnia much
earlier.20 In this regard, Claes was preparing the alliance for a much
broader use of force than the allies—including the United States—were
even contemplating.
At the same time, Claes’ actions were never openly out of synch with
the US position. Former US National Security Advisor Tony Lake notes
that Claes was never seen as an obstacle by the United States in moving
the alliance toward aggressive military action in 1995, and was a helpful
advocate for the US position.21 Another key participant noted that from
the US perspective, Claes was always on “the right side of the issue, as
far as we were concerned.”22 Unlike his predecessor Manfred Woerner,
who actively encouraged NATO intervention into the Balkans in
numerous public appearances, Claes remained far more reserved in

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102 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

openly calling for NATO strikes. Some at NATO considered this strategy
a wise diplomatic move, given the systemic constraints at the time.23
To some degree, Claes was helpful in moving NATO’s agenda
toward more aggressive military options in 1995. Claes was not a strong
supporter of the UN’s role under the dual-key framework, and would
refer derogatorily to “the UN” at times.24 As noted by a senior NATO
official, Claes was a “virulent critic of the United Nations, both publicly
and privately.” 25 This position squared with the US’s position as
dissatisfaction grew with the United Nations. One important change
implemented in early August 1995 was the removal of the UN’s key,
which was taken from Akashi and given to UN Field Commander Gen.
Bernard Janvier. Claes did not produce these results alone, but he was
certainly instrumental. The United States was helpful in removing
Akashi’s key because Akashi was viewed as tentative and too closely tied
to UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali. In this respect, Claes
helped to empower NATO vis-a-vis the United Nations; critics of the
UN knew that Claes was an ally in the cause.
Claes’ association with the bribery charge certainly damaged his
international reputation and eventually forced his resignation, although
reaction to this scandal was mixed in Brussels. While Claes was still in
office, at nearly all US senior policy-making levels (including the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council) and among the allies
as well, key participants were very concerned that his problems would
damage his ability to lead the alliance.26 Yet even though senior policy-
makers were concerned about Claes’ ability to lead, the accusations did not
politically destroy Claes in the short term. Some evidence actually suggests that
Claes’ power increased in NATO, especially from the US perspective, since
many viewed the accusations as part and parcel of Belgian politics. Since
Claes was no longer involved directly in Belgian domestic politics, it was
felt by many at NATO that Claes was being made the political scapegoat for
his previous political party affiliation, the Belgian Socialist Party.27 For
example, in his memoirs about the Dayton Peace Accords, Richard Holbrooke
openly expressed considerable doubt over the validity of these charges.28
Former Norwegian Ambassador to NATO Leif Metik writes similarly:

We who were close to him the year he was NATO’s Secretary

General, avoided forming definite opinions about his possible
guilt or innocence. That question was up to the Courts to
decide. This said, I believe we felt at the bottom of our hearts
that Claes was not “criminal” who willingly and consciously
had “enriched himself” in the Agusta affair.29

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Hendrickson 103

Claes’ domestic political problems evoked sympathy from some

allies, especially the United States, who felt that Claes was treated
unfairly but weathered the political storm admirably. These kinder
views toward Claes, however, should not imply that he went unscathed
by the accusations. Some ambassadors note that the scandal proved very
damaging to Claes’ ability to lead the alliance, and simultaneously
tarnished NATO’s credibility at a time when it badly needed legiti-
macy.30 Although the European allies considered the accusations more
serious than the United States did, it appears that few doubted Claes’
commitment in seeing the alliance succeed in Bosnia. The consensus
view is that Claes was still able to lead the alliance prior to and during
Operation Deliberate Force, although the allies simultaneously recog-
nized that the external political doubts about Claes and NATO’s
weakened credibility (resulting from his association with bribery)
would eventually force his removal from office.31 At a minimum, the
concerns expressed by many at NATO over Claes’ political problems
suggest the inherent importance of the secretary general. If Claes were
an irrelevant actor in the alliance, his political problems would not have
generated concern. The evidence suggests otherwise.
In sum, Claes operated under difficult systemic conditions, which
hampered his efforts to have an independent impact on the alliance. Most
of the evidence suggests that he recognized these systemic constraints,
and thus chose to lead the alliance cautiously. He chose not to stand alone
in calling for NATO action, and was careful in criticizing the United
Nations. Under such profound systemic political conditions (both
personal and political), Claes could have likely done little to impact the
international political views on Bosnia. In this respect, Claes clearly
chose to proceed carefully, at least in the public domain. Thus Claes
should not be viewed as a leader who was able to overcome systemic
constraints through independent political leadership. In contrast, how-
ever, his organizational influence within the NAC was considerably
different, and his leadership was far more substantial and meaningful in
NATO’s policies toward Bosnia.

Organizational Leadership: Leading the NAC

As noted earlier, the allies continued to struggle over how to handle

Bosnia for much of 1995. Major steps in changing policy toward Bosnia
occurred at a July 1995 summit meeting in London, where the major
allies in NATO and the UN adopted more aggressive use-of-force policy
options. However, many of the operational details that emerged from

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104 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

the London summit needed additional refinement and explanation. The

necessary policy articulation fell to the NAC, which consists of all
NATO member states’ ambassadors and is overseen by the secretary
general. As previously noted, the secretary general calls the meetings,
sets the agenda, and adjourns the Council. He has no vote in the Council,
but is charged with promoting consensus in the alliance.
At a series of Council meetings in late July and early August, NATO
agreed to use force to protect the Bosnian city Goradze if it came under
attack from the Bosnian Serbs. The UN key for using force was given
to the UNPROFOR ground commander, French Gen. Bernard Janvier.
Three sets of targets, known as options, were agreed to, allowing NATO
to strike option 1 and 2 targets upon the next provocation from the
Bosnian Serbs. These targets included Serbian air defense systems
located in southeastern Bosnia and other Bosnian-Serb military sites. In
a Council meeting on August 1, additional safe enclaves joined Goradze
as NATO protection zones.32
From interviews conducted with key participants, the evidence
indicates that Claes played a critical role in moving the alliance toward
use-of-force options at these Council sessions, especially at one mara-
thon session held on July 25, 1995. Claes did a number of things that
helped shape the agenda while fostering consensus within the alliance.
First, Claes was infamous for keeping NAC meetings in session regard-
less of time; he exercised a great deal of discretionary power over time
and the meeting’s atmosphere. The Council’s crucial meeting on July
25, 1995 went thirteen hours while working for policy consensus within
the alliance. Claes’ determination and use of time assisted the alliance
in adopting more aggressive military options. 33 During such long
sessions, Claes was known for bringing all issues into the open so that
there was little confusion on what states were agreeing to, and he
demanded that states take policy positions. Under Claes’ leadership, the
Council meetings were also very orderly, as Claes kept the allies focused
on the issue at hand. Claes’ style was unambiguous, with great attention
to detail.34
Former US Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter maintains that
Claes’ diplomatic style at these NAC meetings, and his support for the
US position, were especially helpful in terms of agenda-setting and
moving the alliance toward military options for some of NATO’s
European allies, especially the Netherlands and Norway.35 Claes also
worked closely with the Greek and Turkish delegations in efforts to
build and maintain their support of Operation Deliberate Force.36 NATO
works by consensus, so gaining the support of all member states—

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Hendrickson 105

regardless of a state’s military contribution to the alliance—is essential

for making policy. Claes’ open and vocal support of military options,
which at times was even more aggressive than the US position in August
1995, was likely important in persuading some of the European allies to
the US’s preferred policies.37
Another aspect of Claes’ influence in the Council that has not been
noted in any previous research was the diplomatic style he exercised in
Council meetings, which occasionally included theatrics. Despite his
initial reserved and tentative leadership style, Claes later became known
at NATO headquarters for his temperamental outbursts, which would be
invoked when necessary to promote consensus. Such outbursts were not
common, but did occur when an ally would begin to balk from past
commitments. Key participants felt that Claes’ diplomatic theatrics and
strong temper were effective in promoting consensus because states did
not want to be the recipient of Claes’ occasional venting.38
Besides these examples of Claes’ leadership of the Council, three
specific cases of his organizational leadership stand out in terms of his
significance at NATO. Recall that prior to Claes’ entry as secretary
general, many of the legal parameters involving military decisions for
NATO were already set. The UN Security Council, and most impor-
tantly Resolution 836, authorized NATO to use force to protect UN
peacekeepers. The UN Security Council had also authorized NATO to
use force for violations of the no-fly zones over certain areas of Bosnia.39
With Claes in office, important evolutionary changes in policy were
made at the Council meetings following the London summit. It was
agreed that Gen. Janvier and the Commander of NATO Allied Forces
Southern Europe, Adm. Leighton Smith, would hold the keys to use
force if any party violated UN international agreements. In this situa-
tion, Claes was not intended to be a central decision-maker on initiating
force; such decisions were delegated to Janvier and Smith.
On August 28, 1995, when a mortar fired on Sarajevo killed thirty-
eight civilians, the dual-key decision-making process went into motion.
After a brief investigation, it was determined that the Bosnian Serbs were
responsible. Gen. Janvier, who was away at his son’s wedding, had
temporarily relinquished his key to British Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith. Upon
learning that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible, he and Adm. Smith both
turned their keys without debate. Janvier returned immediately and supported
Rupert Smith’s decision.40 These decisions put into motion the strikes that
came only hours later, in the early morning hours of August 30.
Primae facie, little input could be expected from Claes, given that
the dual-key decision-making procedures had already been defined.41 In

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106 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

his memoirs, Richard Holbrooke gives Willy Claes considerable credit

for not initiating a Council meeting in the few hours before Operation
Deliberate Force. Holbrooke notes that Claes’ decision not to convene
the Council was crucial, because it prevented additional policy debate
and allowed the bombing campaign to ensue.42 With sixteen members in
NATO at the time, additional policy differences certainly could have
been raised if a meeting had been called. While it appears that most of
the alliance was already committed to using force, Claes prevented
discussion at the political level in Brussels by not calling for another
Council meeting.43 While Claes’ role was ancillary to the decisions made
by the dual-key decision-makers, he did exercise his discretionary
authority not to call a meeting, and thus played an important role in
assisting the alliance toward military strikes.
Another important example of his leadership occurred on Septem-
ber 1, when Gen. Janvier, with support from Adm. Smith and Richard
Holbrooke, requested a cease-fire in order to negotiate with the Bosnian
Serbs. Claes was not involved in these decisions. Where Claes become
more important, however, was in the effort to restart the bombings as
soon as possible. When the cease-fire lasted longer than Claes, Holbrooke,
SACEUR Joulwan, and others wanted, Claes personally phoned Gen.
Bernard Janvier, who was responsible for granting the extended cease-
fire. In what has been characterized as Claes’ “rage” at Janvier’s
decision, the secretary general expressed profound disagreement with
the cease-fire agreement that Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military
commander, had negotiated with Janvier.44 US Ambassador to NATO
Robert Hunter maintains that Claes’ role was critical here because he
placed additional responsibility for the cease-fire on UNPROFOR
leaders, who would now be blamed by the international community for
a failure in Bosnia.45 Although this example, arguably, applies equally
to his efforts to influence the systemic political conditions, his actions
certainly set the stage for his organizational leadership the following
day.
On September 2, when the Council reconvened to discuss the
extended cease-fire, Claes announced that the ambassadors were not
there to debate whether to use force, but rather how long a cease-fire to
permit. Again, Claes is credited with making an important decision at
the organizational level: he defined the military option for the alliance
by arguing that the Council had already authorized military action, and
therefore that question was not open to debate.46 Debate at this time
certainly was possible given the rapidly changing events and the
unknown political territory that NATO had entered as an alliance.47

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Hendrickson 107

Claes exercised considerable authority through this interpretation of his

own powers as secretary general. As a result, the bombings resumed on
September 4 and continued until September 14, when the initial peace
negotiations began prior to the eventual Dayton Peace Accords.
In sum, when examining Claes’ leadership of the Council (in
contrast to his much less influential role at the systemic level), the
evidence suggests that Claes was very important in promoting consensus
in the alliance. Through his own leadership style as exercised in Council
meetings, and the exercise of his discretionary powers as secretary
general, Claes may be given some credit for moving the alliance toward
use-of-force options at a time when NATO’s credibility was at stake and
the humanitarian conditions in Bosnia worsened by the day. Clearly, a
general consensus had already been achieved among the allies that
military action needed to occur in the Balkans in order to resolve the
situation, yet this consensus was actively promoted by Claes at NATO.
Similarly, Claes’ relationship with NATO’s Supreme Allied Com-
mander suggests important and unrecognized leadership roles during his
tenure as secretary general.

Civil-Military Relations: Claes and the SACEUR

During Claes’ tenure as secretary general, Gen. George Joulwan

served as NATO’s SACEUR. NATO’s office of the secretary general
was created in order to foster political consensus in the alliance, while
the SACEUR—a general from the US Armed Forces—is NATO’s de
facto military leader. These key leadership positions in the alliance
represent an especially fruitful area of research for examining civil-
military relations at NATO, especially given that Operation Deliberate
Force was the alliance’s first sustained military campaign. An examina-
tion of the development of NATO’s strategic bombing plan and target
selection process provides some insight on this element of Claes’
leadership at NATO.
It is first worth recalling that no research has linked Claes to any
element of NATO’s strategic military campaign against the Bosnian
Serbs. To some extent, this might be expected, given that NATO’s
military planning is the SACEUR’s responsibility and that the UN
played an extensive role in Bosnia in 1995. In fact, much of the historical
evidence generally supports the idea that Claes’s voice was limited in
terms of developing NATO’s military plans. The military strategy and
bombing plans were developed in the months preceding Operation
Deliberate Force by a joint NATO-UN planning board.48 After the

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108 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo in August 1995, when the keys were
turned by both the UN and NATO field commanders, it was the UN’s
Janvier and NATO’s Leighton Smith who debated the first set of targets
to hit.49 When the bombing campaign proceeded, Adm. Smith delegated
all tactical decisions to US Gen. Michael Ryan, Commander of Allied
Air Forces Southern Europe. The aircrafts used, as well as the targets,
sequence, and timing, were determined by Gen. Ryan, who closely
protected his own authority and prevented extensive political access to
him.50 Thus the evidence suggests that Claes was removed from much of
NATO’s military planning, as Gen. Ryan made many of the tactical
decisions for the alliance.
However, Gen. George Joulwan notes that Claes had detailed
knowledge of the bombing strategy and was privy to the operational
plans well before Operation Deliberate Force ensued. On two occasions
before the operation began, Claes and Joulwan met and discussed at
length the proposed military operation.51 In these planning phases, Claes
allowed Joulwan considerable leeway in determining the appropriate
military action within the constraints of the various options that the
Council had authorized. Joulwan views Claes’ decision to grant the
SACEUR some independence in exercising military judgments as very
helpful in achieving NATO’s eventual success.52 Even during Council
sessions prior to the strikes, additional evidence suggests that Claes
worked closely with the SACEUR, who pushed the alliance for “clar-
ity”—that is, detailed and specific instructions should the use of force
become a reality.53
Once the bombings began, Claes’ cooperation with the SACEUR at
Council meetings is another important yet overlooked aspect of civil-
military leadership relations during the campaign. Due to the SACEUR’s
sometimes forceful personality, the new type of mission that NATO was
about to engage in, and some natural distaste for strong US leadership
at NATO, Joulwan was viewed with some suspicion by the European
allies.54 To quell these concerns, Joulwan consulted extensively with the
Council on all aspects of the operation during the bombing campaign.55
When Joulwan attended Council sessions, Claes would occasionally ask
the SACEUR tough and detailed operational questions. Such questions
were not necessarily raised because of Claes’ personal concerns, but
rather they were voiced because Claes could serve as a proxy for allies
who may not have wanted to raise doubts in a Council session with the
SACEUR, but could do so indirectly through Claes.56 Claes thereby gave
“political cover” to any ambassador who wished to proceed in this
manner, without openly showing any opposition to the SACEUR or to

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Hendrickson 109

any other allies who favored vigorous military action. In this regard,
Claes worked to reduce political and military ambiguity between the
Council and SACEUR, and fostered consensus by serving as a proxy for
those allies who had real concerns.
Claes’ most significant operational-military role in Operation De-
liberate Force came through his decision not to consult with the Council
prior to NATO’s use of Tomahawk missiles in northern Bosnia, near
Banja Luka, on September 10. While these strikes officially fit within
the previously agreed-upon option 2 targeting plans, considerable
opposition was expressed later on the use of the Tomahawks, which
some ambassadors viewed as escalatory and a violation of the SACEUR’s
authority. France expressed the greatest concern, followed by Canada,
Greece, and Spain.57 Moreover, the strikes took place outside of the
“southeast zone of action,” which some NATO allies viewed as the
principal authorized area of military targeting.58
The request to use Tomahawks came from Gen. Ryan, and had not
been formally discussed by the Council. However, it was clearly
understood by NATO military officials that the use of Tomahawks was
a possible overextension of the mandate given to the SACEUR. 59
Recognizing the political problems that use of the Tomahawks could
cause, Gen. Joulwan did not immediately approve Gen. Ryan’s request.
Instead, Joulwan waited thirty-six hours in order to gain political
approval from the secretary general.60
Claes’ relevance and importance here is, first, that he did have
knowledge of the forthcoming Tomahawk strikes. The evidence sug-
gests that Claes was an integral part of the decision to use the Toma-
hawks, which has been viewed by military analysts as a strategically
critical military maneuver in demonstrating NATO’s advanced military
capabilities to the Bosnian Serbs.61 Richard Holbrooke writes that “the
psychological effect of such sophisticated weapons, previously used
only in the Gulf War, was enormous.”62 Second, Claes supported the
SACEUR’s and Gen. Ryan’s military judgment without verbal consul-
tations with the Council. The SACEUR’s discussions with Claes on the
Tomahawks occurred on a weekend, when many NATO ambassadors
were not readily available in Brussels.63 Yet in NATO’s first sustained
bombing campaign ever, Joulwan’s communication with Claes and the
thirty-six hour notice given to the secretary general would have
certainly allowed Claes ample opportunity to call an emergency meet-
ing, or at a minimum, to phone key allied ambassadors and notify them
of the forthcoming missile strikes. Moreover, if the use of Tomahawks
was viewed in US military circles as potentially controversial, it seems

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110 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

probable that Claes too understood their potential political significance.

Claes did provide written notification to the ambassadors prior to the
Tomahawk strikes; yet these written messages were placed in the NATO
ambassadors’ mailboxes, and were not received until after the strike.64
After the strikes, Claes called an early Council meeting the follow-
ing Monday morning. Some ambassadors noted that they first heard
about the attacks through an early Monday morning phone call from
Claes or by seeing the events on CNN. A number of ambassadors
expressed serious concern, and demanded improved communication
methods for NATO.65 Claes likely anticipated these reactions, and in
choosing to allow the Tomahawks’ use, played an important role in
supporting Joulwan’s request for more vigorous military action from
NATO. In retrospect, the Tomahawk’s use is viewed by military
analysts as instrumental in encouraging the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate.
Had the Council been notified in advance, a good chance exists that
serious objections would have been raised, and the use of those missiles
may have been prevented.
Thus, despite almost no mention in previous research of Claes’
military leadership role during Operation Deliberate Force, the evi-
dence indicates that he had some influence in NATO’s target selection
and a close relationship with the SACEUR. His decision to grant the
SACEUR considerable leeway in military tactical decisions, his previ-
ously unreported knowledge of the entire military strategy, and his
decision not to consult with the Council prior to use of the Tomahawk
missiles all must be acknowledged when examining Claes’ leadership of
the alliance. More broadly, regarding the civil-military relations be-
tween NATO’s leaders, the evidence suggests that Claes deferred to
Joulwan’s military judgment, but at the same time, had full knowledge
of the military plans for Operation Deliberate Force.

Conclusion

Much has been written about the tragic events in Bosnia as well as
NATO’s transformation in the post-Cold War era. In NATO’s first
sustained bombing campaign, Operation Deliberate Force involved a
host of decision-makers, including military and political leaders from
the UN and NATO, as well as the sixteen allied governments. Since
NATO had never engaged in a military operation of this nature, it would
be difficult to predict what sort of role the secretary general would play
in this operation. Based on Cold War-era experience and research,
coupled with the many leadership impediments that Willy Claes faced

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Hendrickson 111

upon becoming secretary general, it seems reasonable to expect that he

would be a minor (if not tertiary) player in the alliance. Moreover, in
recognizing the general dearth of research devoted to the secretaries
general in NATO’s transformation, one might conclude that Claes was
an ancillary player at NATO during this critical time for the alliance.
The present findings indicate otherwise, although Claes’ influence
varied according to the leadership framework examined in this study.
At the systemic level, the evidence demonstrates that a multitude of
international political obstacles prevented him from making an indepen-
dent impact on the alliance. When Claes began to openly advocate for
military action against the Bosnian Serbs, his position corresponded
with the direction of US foreign policy. Moreover, as the Bosnian
tragedy worsened, the political environment in which NATO operated
also lent itself to leadership from the secretary general. NATO was in
a political crisis, and needed an effective demonstration of force in order
to maintain its credibility in transatlantic security. As NATO entered an
era filled with uncertainty and without precedent, such an ambiguous
political environment likely worked to Claes’ advantage. NATO faced
its own political crisis of relevancy in European security affairs. If it was
going to play a new role in post-Cold War security, the conditions in the
Balkans eventually demanded action. Inaction would have caused
NATO’s international stature to sink deeper, and would have called into
question the need for NATO. In this respect, over time the systemic
conditions worked to enhance the leadership opportunities for Claes;
Claes responded with more assertive calls for NATO military interven-
tion.
Given that much of Claes’ legacy at NATO is remembered in a
negative light due to his association with the Agusta scandal, it should
also be recognized that Claes had personal political incentives to
cooperate with the United States. This crisis had a systemic impact, and
limited what he could do to influence the international political debate
on Bosnia. During the remainder of his tenure in office, it was the United
States that proved to be his best supporter, although many at NATO
viewed the accusations lodged against Claes as unfair. Had Claes been
openly opposed to aggressive military options, it seems likely that the
United States would have called for his removal. However, no evidence
suggests that Claes’ personal view of the situation in the Balkans
changed or adapted to the US view. In the SACEUR’s words, Claes
viewed Slobodan Milosevic as an “old school communist” who would
only respond to military strikes.66 Claes’ support of NATO military
action should not be equated with subservience to the US position, yet

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112 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

his public assertiveness did correspond with the changes in systemic

environment as the United States and eventually the allies recognized the
imminent need for military action in the Balkans.
At the organizational level, within the NAC, Claes’ leadership role
became much more visible and influential. As Council chairman, Claes
seized on his own discretionary powers and skillfully employed diplo-
matic techniques in managing the allies to enhance his powers as
secretary general. His resistance to calling an NAC meeting after the
Sarajevo strike, and his determination that the Council only debate when
to resume the bombing while the cease-fire was in effect, were important
in keeping consensus among the allies. Again, without the United States’
backing and readiness to use force, Claes would have not been able to
exercise the influence that he did in the Council. Yet Claes’ personal
diplomatic style, his occasional outbursts at Council sessions, and his
management of Council meetings all provide new insight on his
leadership. These traits are clearly specific to Claes and contributed to
his leadership role as secretary general at the organizational level.
In terms of his leadership within the context of civil-military
relations, and specifically with regard to his relationship with the
SACEUR, the evidence demonstrates that Claes and Joulwan worked
closely together to move the alliance toward military action. Claes’
detailed knowledge of the bombing plans, and most important, his
decision to allow the use of the Tomahawk missiles, represent critical
aspects of his leadership legacy, and provide insight on his views of
appropriate civil-military relations at NATO. Claes never stood in the
way of Joulwan’s military judgment, which likely resulted from Joulwan’s
extensive consultations with Claes and the NAC as well as Claes’ own
belief that tough military action was needed to defeat the Bosnian Serbs.
Claes’ decision to accept Joulwan’s request to use the Tomahawks,
without consulting the Council, was critical in helping to end the
bombing campaign and bring peace to the region.
In sum, this research demonstrates that Willy Claes was a critical
player at NATO as it adapted to new missions and roles in transatlantic
security. Operation Deliberate Force was instrumental in helping NATO
adapt to new security challenges after the Cold War, and has clear policy
implications for the United States and all NATO allies. The findings
demonstrate the need for an effective secretary general as NATO’s
evolution continues. While the current Bush administration seems less
inclined than Clinton was to use NATO as a political and military tool,
the secretary general should not be underestimated in promoting
consensus among NATO’s twenty-six allies. As the United States works

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Hendrickson 113

to build support for its global war on terrorism, an effective secretary

general may be essential in bridging the gap on policy differences
between the United States and Europe. Moreover, the Balkans remain a
region of only fragile peace. Additional conflict—whether it be in
Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, or Bosnia again—is certainly possible.
Should such a security crisis arise, an effective secretary general, with
excellent diplomatic skills and good political judgment, unquestionably
serves transatlantic interests.
In terms of theory development, the leadership framework devel-
oped here may potentially help generate additional insight and research
on other secretaries general. These findings suggest that systemic
political constraints represent serious (and perhaps insurmountable)
obstacles for independent leadership action by the secretary general,
although leadership may be exercised in more meaningful and influen-
tial ways at the organizational level or through a relationship with the
SACEUR. While Claes’ personal political problems were certainly
specific to his circumstances, and thus represent an important nuance in
the history of secretaries general, the model may serve as a starting point
for broader studies of leadership at NATO.

Notes

Author’s Note: The author thanks Jon Clausen, Col. Robert Owen, Patricia Shields, and
the anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for their assistance and helpful critiques.

1. Robert S. Jordan with Michael W. Bloome, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in

Multinational Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979); William T.R. Fox
and Annette B. Fox, NATO and the Range of American Choice (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1967). See also Robert S. Jordan, The NATO International
Staff/Secretariat 1952–1957: A Study in International Administration (London: Ox-
ford University Press, 1967).

2. See especially the three-volume set, Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO: The
First Fifty Years (New York: Palgrave, 2001). See also Ian Q. R. Thomas, The
Promise of an Alliance (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).

3. Robert Hunter, who later became US Ambassador to NATO, writes that the SACEUR
exercised the greatest influence during the Cold War: “civilian institutions in NATO
have paled beside the continuing influence of the military structure of the Alliance.”
Robert Hunter, Security in Europe (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1972), 61. See also Robert S. Jordan (ed.), Generals in International Politics (Lex-
ington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987).

4. Excellent research has been conducted on Operation Deliberate Force, but Claes’
role has gone untreated within this body of research. See Col. Robert Owen (ed.),

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114 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning (Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL: Air University Press, 2000) and Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force:
The UN and NATO Campaign in Bosnia, 1995 (Lancaster, UK: CDISS, 1999). Other
research that makes important contributions, but makes little mention of the secre-
tary general, includes Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strate-
gic and Operation Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001); Anthony S.
Cordesman, Lessons and Non-lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000–2015
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000); Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and
Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International Organization 54 (2000):
705–735; Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (eds.), Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and
NATO’s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies (New York: Palgrave, 2000). Some
recent research, although limited in scope, discusses the secretary general. See Ronald
D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
See also Michael Ruhle, “Preface: Manfred Worner’s Legacy and NATO,” in Anton
A. Bebler (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1997); and Ryan C. Hendrickson, “NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana
and the Kosovo Crisis,” Journal of International Relations and Development 5, 3
(2002): 240–257.

5. See Kent J. Kille and Roger M. Scully, “Executive Heads and the Role of Intergov-
ernmental Organizations: Expansionist Leadership in the United Nations and the
European Union,” Political Psychology 24, 1 (2003): 175–198.

6. For recent examples, see Helen Drake, Jacques Delors: Perspectives on a European
Leader (New York: Routledge, 2000); Michelle Cini, The European Commission:
Leadership, Organization and Culture in the EU Administration (Manchester, UK:
Manchester University Press, 1996); James Barros, Trygve Lie and the Cold War:
The UN Secretary General Pursues Peace, 1946–1953 (Dekalb: Northern Illinois
University Press, 1995).

7. Robert S. Jordan with Michael W. Bloome, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in

Multinational Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).

8. For a short discussion of the evolution of the secretary general’s role, see Sean Kay,
NATO and the Future of European Security (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,
1998), 36–39.

9. Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications, 1994).
10. Michael G. Schechter, “Leadership in International Organizations: Systemic, Organi-
zational and Personality factors,” Review of International Studies 13, 3 (1987): 197–
220.
11. Although little has been published on Secretary General Manfred Woerner’s leader-
ship at NATO, many of his colleagues maintain that Woerner’s personality impacted
NATO across a number of spectrums. See Ruhle, “Preface: Manfred Worner’s
Legacy.”

12. Ibid.

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Hendrickson 115

13. “NATO’s Gloomy Choice,” The Economist, October 1, 1994, p. 65.

14. Among the many sources, see Sonia Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup of Yugosla-
via: A Political Failure in Search of a Scholarly Explanation (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2000); James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International
Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997);
and David Rohde, Endgame (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997).

15. On the Clinton administration, see David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush,
Clinton and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001), 303–318. For more on the
United States’ policy evolution, see Douglas C. Foyle, “Public Opinion and Bosnia:
Anticipating Disaster,” in Ralph G. Carter (ed.), Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign
Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 2002).
16. Lt. Col. Ronald Reed, “Chariots of Fire: Rules of Engagement in Operation Deliber-
ate Force,” in Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4), 402–403.

17. Craig R. Whitney, “Facing Charges, NATO Head Steps Down,” New York Times,
October 21, 1995, sec. 1, p. 5; Paul Belien, “Meanwhile, In Europe’s Arkansas,”
National Review (March 20, 1995), 30.

18. Former NATO Ambassador from Norway, Leif Metik, notes in his book, Det nye
NATO (1999) that Claes seemed “nervous” in his initial meeting with the ambassa-
dors, and that his style remained “uncertain” when he first became secretary general.
English translation provided to author by Metik, January 2003. Also, author’s inter-
view with Christman (July 2002); background interview with senior US defense
official ‘A’ (July 2002).

19. Interview with former US Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter (July, 2002); back-
ground interview with senior NATO official ‘A’ (October 2002).

20. Interview with former SACEUR, Gen. George Joulwan (January 2003).

21. Interview with former US National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake (July 2002).
22. Background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002)

23. Interview with former Ambassador from the Netherlands to NATO, Lambert Willem
Veenendaal (July 2003).
24. Background interview with senior US defense official (June 2002).

25. Background interview with senior NATO official ‘A’ (October 2002).

26. Christman interview (July 2002); Lake interview (July 2002); Metik correspondence
with author (January 2003).

27. Interview with former US military representative to NATO, Lt. Gen. Thomas Mont-
gomery (July 2002); Metik correspondence with author (January 2003).
28. See also Richard Holbrooke, To End A War (New York: Random House, 1998),
120.

29. From Metik’s memoirs, Det nye NATO (1999), translation provided to author (Janu-
ary 2003).

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116 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 2004

30. Author interviews with former Canadian Ambassador to NATO John Anderson (July
2003) and Netherlands Ambassador Veenendaal (July 2003).
31. Background interview, senior NATO official ‘A’ (October 2002).

32. Ronald M. Reed, “Chariots of Fire,” in Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4),
406-407. See also Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2000), 77–79.

33. Background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002).

34. Author’s interview with Lt. Gen. Montgomery (July 2002); background interview,
senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002).

35. Hunter interview (July 2002).

36. Joulwan interview (October 2002).

37. Joulwan interview (January 2003). It should also be noted that former US Ambassa-
dor to NATO, Robert Hunter, was also at times ahead of his own administration in
his desire for NATO to exercise military options. Hunter’s view that use-of-force
options were needed was well known within the alliance before the Clinton adminis-
tration eventually came to that conclusion. Claes and Hunter shared the belief that
serious military strikes were needed much earlier than Operation Deliberate Force.
Background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002).

38. Montgomery interview (July 2002). Norwegian Ambassador to NATO Lief Metik
also notes that Claes was “short tempered.” Metik notes that he witnessed Claes on
one occasion when he “exploded in rage” at a NATO defense ministers’ meeting.
Metik correspondence with author (January 2003); background interview, senior US
defense official ‘A’ (June 2002).
39. For the full range of Security Council decisions, see Jane Boulden, Peace Enforce-
ment: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2001), 83–95.
40. Rick Atkinson, “Air Assault Set Stage for Broader Role,” Washington Post (Novem-
ber 15, 1995), A1; David L. Dittmer and Stephen P. Dawkins, Deliberate Force:
NATO’s First Extended Air Operation (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses,
1998), 20–21. See also Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, 242–244.

41. This understanding had been reached between Claes and SACEUR General George
Joulwan before these events occurred. Joulwan interview (January 2003).
42. Holbrooke, To End A War, 99.

43. Background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002).

44. Rick Atkinson, “In Almost Losing its Resolve, NATO Alliance Found Itself,” Wash-
ington Post (November 16, 1995), A1. Joulwan interview (January 2003).

45. Hunter interview (July 2002).

46. Richard Holbrooke, To End A War, 120; Robert Owen, “Summary,” in Owen (ed.)
Deliberate Force (see note 4), 499.

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Hendrickson 117

47. Hunter interview (July 2002); senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002).

48. Christopher M. Campbell, “The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan,” in Owen
(ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4), 99–110.

49. Mark A. Bucknam, “The Influence of UN and NATO Theater-Level Commanders

on the Use of Airpower Over Bosnia During Deny Flight: 1993–1995” (doctoral
dissertation, King’s College, University of London, 1999), 209–212.

50. John C. Orndorff, “Aspects of Leading and Following: The Human Factors of
Deliberate Force,” in Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4), 355–357. See also
Mark J. Conversino, “Executing Deliberate Force: 30 August–14 September 1995,”
ibid., 132–133.

51. One meeting between Claes and Joulwan took place at the NATO air base in Villa
Franca, Italy, and another in Claes’ office at NATO headquarters soon before the
bombings. Joulwan interview (October 2002).

52. Joulwan interview (January 2003).

53. Joulwan interview (October 2002); background interview, senior NATO official ‘B’
(October 2002).

54. Background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’ (June 2002). See also Gen. Sir
Michael Rose, Fighting For Peace: Bosnia 1994 (London: Harville Press, 1998),
122–123.

55. Hunter interview (July 2002); background interview, senior US defense official ‘A’
(June 2002); background interview, NATO military official ‘A’ (October 2002).

56. Hunter interview (July 2002); background interview with senior US defense official
‘A’ (June 2002).
57. Holbrooke, To End A War, 143.

58. Rick Atkinson and Daniel Williams, “NATO Rejects Demand to End Bombing;
Russia Warns Alliance on Bosnia Campaign,” Washington Post (September 12, 1995),
A1.

59. Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, 281.

60. Joulwan interview (January 2003).

61. For an excellent discussion of the symbolic importance of the Tomahawk missiles,
see Robert C. Owen, “Summary,” in Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force (see note 4),
491–492; Conversino, “Executing Deliberate Force,” ibid., 153.
62. Holbrooke, To End A War, 143.

63. Joulwan interview (January 2003). See also Bucknam, “The Influence of UN and
NATO Theatre-Level Commanders,” 228.
64. Joulwan interview (January 2003).

65. Ripley, 286; background interview, senior NATO official ‘B’ (October 2002).

66. Joulwan interview (October 2002).

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