‘The Courts in their equitable jurisdiction have more scope

from developing the law in a conscionable manner than they

have in their common law jurisdiction.’

EQUITY AND TRUST I

LXEB 3110

Assignment (25%)

Name: Winnie Choong Su Win

Matrics Number: LEB 150 144

Tutor: Dr. Ramy Bulan (Tuesday 10-11am)

Date of Submission: 11 December 2017

 QUESTION PRESENTED

‘The Courts in their equitable jurisdiction have more scope for developing the
law in a conscionable manner than they have in their common law jurisdiction.’

Hayton and Marshall, 2005.

With reference to the abovementioned statement, the author of this paper will:

I. Examine the growth of equity;

II. Evaluate and analyse the development of equitable remedy in
Malaysia;
III. Comment and conclude this paper.
 INTRODUCTION

Equity is a long established legal principle since 14 th century. In its true

and genuine meaning, it is the soul and spirit of all law. 1 Equity is like a white
knight, it protects the people from unjust and harsh decisions as a result from
the rigidity of the common law. ‘Conscionability’ and ‘justice’ made up the heart
of the white knight.2 It sought to remove injustices that are incapable of being
dealt in the common law courts based on moral principles. It was said to be a
gloss on the common law. 3 As it does not destroy the law but acts as a
supplementary jurisdiction4.

In Hayton & Marshall’s statement,5 it seems to suggest that equitable

jurisdiction is more flexible and less rigid than common law jurisdiction as the
role of ‘conscience’ has came into play. With this statement, it is pertinent to
examine how the courts in Malaysia incorporate and evaluate the fundamental
element of equity – conscience in those cases. By the end of this paper, the
reader should be able to capture the glimpse as to the development of equity
and the evolution of equitable remedy in Malaysia.

1Gary L. McDowell, ‘Equity and the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Equitable Relief and
Public Policy’. 31
2Ibid; Philip H. Pettit, ‘Equity and the Law of Trust’ 7th Edition 4; A Mason, The Place of Equity
and Equitable Doctrines in Contemporary Common Law World: An Australian perspective’.
3 F.W Maitland. Equity, 2nd (Brunyate) ed, 18.
4 Ibid.
5 Refer to question presented of this paper.
 PART I

Essentially, there are 3 elements under equitable jurisdiction.

Equitable Jurisdiction

a. Equity operates on the conscience

Historically, the court of Chancery did not have any clearly defined
jurisdiction, but dispensed an extraordinary justice remedying the defects of the
common law on grounds of conscience and natural justice. 6 Now, the key
question is, what is conscience? In Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row, Lord Walker
explained that conscience is an ‘objective value judgement on behaviour’.7 In
other words, it is an objective moral baseline against which to judge behaviour.

b. Equity acts in personam

Equitable jurisdiction is to make orders against the defendant

personally as opposed to common law which acts in rem, while the orders are
directed to the property itself instead8.

c. Equity remedies are discretionary

The only common law remedy that may be claimed as of right is

damages. All other remedies are equitable and are granted at the discretion of
the court. However, absolute discretion might sometimes lead to monarchy.
Hence, the discretion given has to conform with certain standards. In Haywood
v Cope9, the discretion of the court must be exercised according to fixed and
settled rules while in Beddow v Beddow,10 where the judge held that where

6 Philip H. Pettit, ‘Equity and the Law of Trust’ 7th Edition 4.

7Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 1754 [92]; consider Bailey v Angove’s
PTY Ltd [2016] UKSC 47 [28]
8Ewing v Ewing & Ors (1883) 9 App. Cas 34, 40; Philip H. Pettit, ‘Equity and the Law of Trust’
7th Edition 4.
9 (1858) 25 Beav 140.
10 (1878) 9 Ch D 89.
discretion is concerned, it is not by the caprice of the Judge but according to
sufficient legal reasons or on settled legal principles.

In a nutshell, with these 3 elements, talk about why is common

law too rigid. Lack of remedy. The court construed the law in a conscionable
manner, that’s why it is more flexible.

PART II

Growth of equity in Malaysia

1. Reception of Equity in Malaysia

Long before Civil Law Act 1956 (hereinafter referred as ‘CLA’). has came
into force, it was said the English rules of equity as administered by the Court
of Chancery, have no application in the Federated Malay States. However, as
per Terrel Ag. CJ in Motor Emporium v Arumugam held that, every court must
have inherent jurisdiction to do justice between the parties, and apply such
principles as are necessary or desirable for attaining such object, and for giving
decisions which are in conformity with the requirements of the social conditions
of the community where the law is administered. In other words, it would be
unreasonable to exclude the English principle in this sense.11

Formal importation of English common law and the rules of equity into
local system was made through CLA. The judges in our country are allowed to
make reference to the court case as administered in England on specified cut-
off-dates.12 It is also worth noting that English law shall only apply when there
is an absence of local statutes and so far as the local circumstances of the
states of Malaysia permit.13

11 [1933] MLJ 276.

12According to s 3 of Civil Law Act 1956, the cut off date for Penisular Malaysia is 7 April 1956.
For Sabah, it is on 1 December 1951 while for Sarawak, it is on 12 December 1949.
13 HG Warren v Tay Seng Geok & Ors. [1965] 1 MLJ 44. Where the judge held, ‘there is no
evidence that s 3 of the Civil Law Ordinance 1956 prevents the application of the English rules
to this case…’.
 Nonetheless, the application of equity shall subject to local statute as
well.14 According to s 6 of the CLA, the English doctrine of equitable notice has
no application to land dealings in Malaysia, especially when the National Land
Code (‘NLC’) is a complete and comprehensive code of law governing the
matters affecting land in Malaysia.15 Now, the pertinent question arises – in
what circumstances and to what extent the equitable principles are applicable
vis-à-vis the NLC?

In Lian Keow’s case,16 the court held that NLC does not abrogate the
principles of equity but alters the application particular rules of equity in so far
as is necessary to achieve its special objects. In this way, the court is entitled
to exercise jurisdiction in personam to insist upon proper conduct in accordance
with equitable principles and norms.17

Also, the application of equity also depends on local circumstances.18 It

can be seen in Malayan United Finance Bhd v Tay Lay Soon.19 It concerned on
the application of the equity of redemption in land which is well known in
England. In view of the vast difference between English land law and our NLC,
the nature of equity of redemption was specified for the people in England.
Hence, it did not conform with the local circumstances in Malaysia therefore
inapplicable.

In a nutshell, it can be concluded that by virtue of s 3 of the CLA, the

rules of equity are applicable in Malaysia based on a few conditions as

14 S 6 of Civil Law Act, Specific Relief Act 1950 (revised 1974).

15Lian Keow Sdn Bhd & Anor v Overseas Credit Finance (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 2 MLJ 449;
Than Kok Leong v Low Kim Hai [1983] 1 MLJ 187; UMBC Bhd & Anor v Pemungut Hasil Tanah,
Kota Tinggi [1984] 2 MLJ 87.
16 [1988] 2 MLJ 449.
17Wilkins & Ors v Kannammal [1951] MLJ 99; Registrar of Titles, Johore v Temenggong
Securities Ltd [1976] 2 MLJ 44; Oh Hiam & Ors v Tham Kong [1980] 2 MLJ 164-165. Note: The
exercise of jurisdiction in personam should be distinguished with the exercise of jurisdiction in
rem. It is important to note that the doctrine of English equity does not apply with equal force to
the system of registration of title to land cointained in NLC.
18
Gardner v Siau Kuan Chia (1912) Innes 159; Wong See Leng v Sarawhathy Ammal (1954)
MLJ 20.
19 [1991] MLJ 504.
mentioned above. Nonetheless, its application still subjection to local statutes
and also local circumstances.

2. Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel

Equitable estoppel is a supplement narrow rules of common law based

on the unconscionable or inequitable conduct of a party. In my point of view, I
think it is best to illustrate the meaning of ‘conscionable manner’ through the
cases related to estoppel, that is because it is beyond argument that estoppel
is a flexible doctrine by which justice is done according to the facts of each
case.20

There are generally 3 types of estoppels, namely, proprietary estoppel,

promissory estoppel, and estoppel by convention. Based on decided cases,
there are 3 elements under estoppel, which is first, there must be an
encouragement from the representor.21 Second, there was reliance based on
the encouragement. Third, the reliance has led to detriment. If it would be
unconscionable for the representor thereafter to enforce his strict legal right,
the representee will then entitled to equitable remedy.22

In Malaysia, there was a huge initiative with regards to the development

of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. It can be seen in Boustead Trading Sdn
Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd23 while Gopal Sri Ram JCA held that
detriment no longer formed an essential ingredient which had to be proved
before the doctrine of estoppel could be invoked. All that is needed to be shown
is that ‘in that particular circumstances of a case, it would be unjust to permit
the representor or encourager to insist upon his strict legal right.’

20
Chor Phaik Har v Choong. [1996] 2 MLJ 206 at 217; Boustead Trading Sdn Bhd v Arab-
Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1985] 3 MLJ 331 at p 344.
21Lim Teng Huan v Ang Swee Chuan; Cheng Hang Guan v Perumahan Farlim; Ramsden v
Dyson; Boustead Trading v Arab Malaysia Merchant Bank [1985] 3 MLJ 331
22Amalgamated Investment [1982] 1 QB 84 at p 105. See also Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank
AG Zurich [1981] 2 ALL ER 650, where the court held, ‘estoppel by conduct…is essentially the
application of rule by which justice is done where the circumstances of the conduct and
behavior of the party to an action are such that it would be wholly inequitable that he should be
entitled to succeed in the proceeding.’
23 [195] 3 MLJ 331.
 Here, the court’s point on this matter, albeit obiter, is important to
illustrate the moving away from the traditional approach of promissory
estoppel24 based on reliance and detriment towards a more flexible notion of
unconscionability.25

In Boustead,26 the court reiterates that this doctrine is of both wide utility
and flexible applicable to prevent a litigant from asserting that there was no
valid and binding contract between him and his opponent, which was
subsequently reiterated in Teh Poh Wah v Seremban Securities Sdn Bhd,27
that this doctrine is no longer restricted to defendant but ‘plaintiff too may have
recourse to it’ which seems to suggest the use of Promissory Estoppel as a
sword instead as a shield.28 These are strong indication to the Malaysian courts’
readiness to extend the use of promissory estoppel to non-contracting parties.29

3. Equity and Fiduciary Relationship

Essentially, the law on fiduciary relationship has been a primary basis of

by which equity has expanded the reach of equity’s concern with
unconscionable conduct. A person may raise breach of fiduciary obligation and

24The 5 traditional approaches in promissory estoppel can be seen in Hughes v Metropolitan

Railway Co (1877) 2 AC 439 at p 498, namely, (i) promissory estoppel only operates as a shield
and not as a sword; (ii) there must be a pre-existing contractual relationship; (iii) there must be
a clear and unequivocal undertaking; (iv) there must be a proof of detrimental reliance on the
representation; (v) there shall be a temporary suspension of contractual obligations and rights.
25Cheong, May Fong, ‘Estoppel in Boustead’s case: A Move Away From Reliance Towards
Unconscionability’, 1999, International Workshop on Estoppel (Kuala Lumpur), at 5; Wan Izatul
Asma Wan Talaat, The Threats To The Limitations Outlining The Present Parameters Of
Promissory Estoppel: A Comparative Study. Vol. 3 No. 6 at 160.
26 [1985] 3 MLJ 331.
27 [1996] 1 MLJ 701.
28 Teh Poh Wah v Seremban Securities Sdn Bhd. See also Dawsons Bank v Nippon Menkwa
Kabushiki Kaisha LR 62 IA 100 at p 108, the court held ‘Estoppel is not a cause of action, it
may (if established) assist a plaintiff in enforcing a cause of action by preventing a defendant
from denying the existence of some fact essential to establish the cause of action, or by
preventing a defendant from asserting the existence of some fact the existence of which would
destroy the cause of action.
29 Here, it can be said that the Malaysian courts, as compared to other common law countries,
like England and Australia, are more valiant to apply the doctrine of estoppel, beyond its
traditional scope to any kind of relationship.
it opens the spectrum for equitable remedies for the protection acting upon the
conscience of that other.30

Over the time, the jurisprudence that was originally applied to trustees
and beneficiaries was extended on a case-by-case basis to other relationships
akin to a trust, which came to be known as a fiduciary relationship. 31 Here,
flexibility of approach is the hallmark of equity. Therefore, equity had refrained
from laying down any strict rules for determining fiduciary relationship.32 This
doctrine had also departed from its traditional relationship and extended to
protect the right of indigenous peoples.33

Hence, it can be seen that the court had develop the law in a
conscionable manner to protect the parties which is in vulnerable position with
the emphasis of flexibility of equity.

4. Development of equitable remedy in Malaysia

Equitable remedy is generally granted at the discretion of the court. 34

Also, equitable relief is directed to the person rather than against the property
as equity acts in personam.35

a. Injunction

Injunction is one the equitable remedies and it is defined in Part III of

Specific Relief Act 1950 (“SRA”) classify injunction as either ‘temporary’ or
‘perpetual’ injunction. 36 There are other classifications such as prohibitory
injunction, mandatory injunction, Mareva injunctions and Eriford injunctions.37

30 Hospital Products Ltd v US Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41.

31 Tengku Abdullah Ibni Sultan Abu Bakar v Mohammad Latiff (1996)
32 Ibid.
33Sagong Tasi & Ors v Government of Selangor & Anors [2002] 2 MLJ 591; Bato Bagi & Ors v
Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak & Anors [2011]
34 Lamare Dixon [1873] LR 6 HL 414 at p 423; s 50 of Specific Relief 1950.
35Paterson, J., Robertson, A. & Heffey, P., “Principles of Contract Law.’ 2 nd Edition. (Melbourne:
Thomson Law Book Co., 2005) pp. 465.
36 SRA 1950.
37 Mohsin Hingun, Wan Azlan Ahmad. ‘Equity and Trusts in Malaysia’ 2 nd Edition. Chapter XIII
‘Injunction’.
 Here, where injunction is applied for in support of a legal right, it must be
shown that damages are inadequate remedy38. However, in Evans Marshall v
Bertola SA, it propounded a new development in granting injunction, that is, the
judicial concern nowadays is not on adequacy of damages in literal sense but
rather, whether damages alone are sufficient to do justice to the applicant.39
This is also consistent with the clear wordings of s 50 of the SRA that adequacy
of damages is not a limitation is respect of jurisdiction but one that relates to
discretion.

For the purpose of this paper, the author will only focus on the
development of Mareva injunction in Malaysia.

b. Mareva injunction

Mareva injunction generally results from a successful application

to freeze the assets of the defendant prior to trial.40 Before Mareva injunction
has come into picture, no injunction will be granted before trial and the only
exception is in the case of fraud.41

There are 2 landmark cases with regards to Mareva injunction,

namely Nippon Yusen Kaisha 42 and Mareva Companie Naviera. 43 In both
cases, actions were brought by ship owners against charterers regarding
unpaid hire.

With this bold statement, Lord Denning in Nippon Yusen Kaisha v

Karageorgis44 had introduced the modern-day freezing injunction into the legal
system and I quote, ‘We are told that an injunction of this kind has never been
granted before. It has never been the practice of the English courts to seize the

38 Filati Lastex Elastofibre (M) Sdn Bhd v Nikseng [2009] 8 MLJ 374.
39The reason being is because there are certain losses, i.e. loss of goodwill and reputation are
hard to be taken in to monetary account.
40 Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) [190.5-035].
41 Lister and Co. v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch.D 1 at p 13 where the court held ‘ you cannot get an
injunction to restrain a man who is alleged to be a debtor from parting with his property.’
42 Nippon Yusen Kaisha v Karageorgis [1975] 3 ALL ER 282.
43 Mareva Compania Naviera S.A International Bulkcariers S.A [1975] 1 WLR 1093.
44 [1975] 3 ALL ER 282
assets of a defendant in advance of judgment, or to restrain the disposal of
them…It seems to me that the time has come when we should revise our
practice.’

(i) The requirements

There are three requirements to be fulfilled in order for a Mareva

injunction to be granted, which is first, the plaintiff must have a good arguable
case.45 Second, there is a real risk of dissipation. Third, the plaintiff must satisfy
the court that is just and convenient to grant the injunction.46

(ii) Development of Mareva

Two common features of the early cases on Mareva injunction are that
they involved shipping disputes and defendants who were located outside
England. Now, the use of the Mareva injunction was soon extended to other
areas of commercial disputes.47

Nonetheless, the implementation of the Mareva injunction was not

smooth sail journey due to jurisdiction issue and the legal remedy available
under the Debtors Act 1957.48 This can be seen Zainal Abidin’s49 case, the first
case on the Mareva injunction in Malaysia. On appeal, the court had held that
Malaysia court had jurisdiction to grant a Mareva injunction in appropriate
circumstances and emphasized that it is for the businessmen needs 50. Also,
based on statutory provisions51, the question on jurisdiction to grant Mareva

45
Ninemia Maritime Corporation v Trave Schiffahrtsgessellschaft MBH & Co KG [1984] 1 ALL
ER 398.
46Pressurefast Ltd v Hall and Brushett Ltd (Court of Appeal) Transcript No. 336 of 1993 (March
9,1993), the court was in the view that they will consider the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the case before proceeding to grant a Mareva Injunction.
47 Chartered Bank v Daklouche [1980] 1 ALL ER 205.
48 Zuraidah Ali: ‘Mareva Injunction as a Preventive Relief: The Malsysia Experience’ (2009) 17
IIUMLJ 225.
49 Zainal Abidin bin Haji Abdul Raphman v Century Hotel Sdn Bhd [1982] 1 MLJ 260.
50 In his judgment, Raja Azlan CJ held that ‘In such a situation where foreign businessmen
including foreign multinational corporations have injected large sums of money and have
substantial assets in this country, it would be a potential vehicle of injustice if the plaintiff is
denied the facilities afforded by a Mareva injunction against the foreign defaulter who may try
to dissipate his funds and assets in this country.’
51Schedule of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of High Court
1980, Order 29 of the Rules of High Court and s 50 of the SRA. When Order 92 Rule 4 of the
injunction is no longer an issue as it has been proven in a series of cases in
Malaysia.52

In Bank Bumiputra Malaysia’s case53, Mareva injunction was granted to

freeze assets of defendant not only located in Malaysia but also in Hong Kong
and England. Also, in Kwasho International (HK) Ltd’s case,54 it was held that
Mareva injunction can be granted not only in cases concerning the dissipation
of assets within the jurisdiction but also in cases of removal of assets out of
jurisdiction. Here, it indicated the court’s willingness to extend the application
of the Mareva injunction in Malaysia to assets located out of jurisdiction.

Another interesting case to look at is Dato’ Kam Woon Wah’s case,55

where it concerned the question as to the applicability of Mareva injunction in a
defamation suit. The court lastly held that underlined that the defamatory
statement must be so obviously untruthful where the Mareva injunction is
subject to.56 This is interesting because the court had refused to follow English
principles and the decision was made in accordance with Malaysian needs, and
it highlighted one of the fundamental features in granting equitable relief, which
is discretion. It also mirrored the flexibility as shown in Hayton’s statement and
the fact that equitable relief is granted not only based upon inherent
jurisdiction57 but also subject to discretionary power of the judge.

As time goes and as requirement for Mareva injunction is concerned,

most of the judges in Malaysia opine that a good arguable case must exist in

Rules of the High Court 1980 provides ‘ For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that
nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to
make any order as may be necessary to prevent in justice or to prevent an abuse of the process
of the court.’
52
Zainal Abidin (supra 48); Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd v United Engineers Malaysia Bhd [1984] 2
MLJ 143; Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Ors v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 97.
53 Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad & Ors v Lorraine Osman & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 236.
54 Kwasho International (HK) Ltd v Jayawealth Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 CLJ 1213 at p 1217.
55 Dato Kam Woon Wah v Mohd Jalil bin Sarip [1998] 2 MLJ 201.
56Here, the judge refused to follow the decision in Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Lian Hong. While the
court applied the conventional approach of good arguable case, or that there are serious
questions to be tried. Further, they have to prove by ‘solid evidence’ that there is a real risk of
a defendant dissipating his assets here and abroad, before a judgement or award is satisfied.
57 RHB Bank Bhd v Zalifah Juan & Anor [2005] 4 CLJ 430.
all such applications.58 It has been reiterated by Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Hock
Hua Bank (Sabah)’s case, 59 that a higher standard of proof is required for
Mareva injunction as compared to usual application for an ordinary injunction.

CONCLUSION

All in all, it can be seen that Mareva injunction is one of the powerful
tools in the form of preventive relief in Malaysia as it can be extended to cover
fields from commercial law to personal disputes which is indeed ‘one of the
law’s two nuclear weapons’. 60 However, as Mareva injunction can have
significant repercussions on the defendant, the court shall examine the case
scrupulously before granting a Mareva injunction.61

58Aspatra v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad [1988] 1 MLJ 97; Algemene Bank Nederland
N.V v metromewah Sdn Bhd & 3 ors [1991] 2 CLJ 1493; Ang Chee Huat v Engelbach Thomas
Joseph [1995] 2 MLJ 83; Creative Furnishing Sdn Bhd v Wong Koi [1989] 2 MLJ 153; Pacific
Centre Sdn Bhd v United Engineers (Malaysia) Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 143; Yukilon Manufacturing
Sdn Bhd [No.4] & Anor v Dato Wong Gek Meng & Ors [1998] MLJU 60.
59 Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) v Yong Liuk Thin [1995] 2 MLJ 213.
60 Bank Mellat v Nikpour [1985] FSR 87.
61 Wako Merchant Bank (Singapore) Ltd v Lim Lean Heng & Ors [2003] 5 MLJ 233.
 LIST OF CASES

Algemene Bank Nederland N.V v Metromewah Sdn Bhd & 3 ors [1991] 2 CLJ
1493.
Amalgamated Investment [1982] 1 QB 84.
Ang Chee Huat v Engelbach Thomas Joseph [1995] 2 MLJ 83.
Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Ors v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor [1988] 1
MLJ 97.
Bailey v Angove’s PTY Ltd [2016] UKSC 47.
Bato Bagi & Ors v Kerajaan Negeri Sarawak & Anors [2011]
Beddow v Beddow (1858) 25 Beav 140.
Boustead Trading Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1985] 3 MLJ
331.
Boustead Trading v Arab Malaysia Merchant Bank [1985] 3 MLJ 331.
Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) HCA 18.
Chartered Bank v Daklouche [1980] 1 ALL ER 205.
Cheng Hang Guan v Perumahan Farlim [1993] 3 MLJ 352.
Chor Phaik Har v Choong. [1996] 2 MLJ 206.
Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 1754.
Creative Furnishing Sdn Bhd v Wong Koi [1989] 2 MLJ 153.
Dato Kam Woon Wah v Mohd Jalil bin Sarip [1998] 2 MLJ 201.
Dawsons Bank v Nippon Menkwa Kabushiki Kaisha LR 62 IA 100.
Ewing v Ewing & Ors (1883) 9 App. Cas 34, 40.
Filati Lastex Elastofibre (M) Sdn Bhd v Nikseng [2009] 8 MLJ 374.
Gardner v Siau Kuan Chia (1912) Innes 159;
Habib Bank Ltd v Habib Bank AG Zurich [1981] 2 ALL ER 650.
Haywood v Cope (1878) 9 Ch D 89.
HG Warren v Tay Seng Geok & Ors. [1965] 1 MLJ 44.
Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) v Yong Liuk Thin [1995] 2 MLJ 213.
Hospital Products Ltd v US Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41.
Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co (1877) 2 AC 439.
Kwasho International (HK) Ltd v Jayawealth Sdn Bhd & Ors [1992] 2 CLJ 1213.
Lamare Dixon [1873] LR 6 HL 414.
Lian Keow Sdn Bhd & Anor v Overseas Credit Finance (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors
[1988] 2 MLJ 449.
Lim Teng Huan v Ang Swee Chuan [1992] 1 WLR 1306.
Lister and Co. v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch.D 1.
Malayan United Finance Bhd v Tay Lay Soon [1991] MLJ 504.
Mareva Compania Naviera S.A International Bulkcariers S.A [1975] 1 WLR
1093.
Motor Emporium v Arumugam [1933] MLJ 276.
Ninemia Maritime Corporation v Trave Schiffahrtsgessellschaft MBH & Co KG
[1984] 1 ALL ER 398.
Nippon Yusen Kaisha v Karageorgis [1975] 3 ALL ER 282.
Oh Hiam & Ors v Tham Kong [1980] 2 MLJ 164.
Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd v United Engineers (Malaysia) Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 143
Pacific Centre Sdn Bhd v United Engineers Malaysia Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 143
Pressurefast Ltd v Hall and Brushett Ltd (Court of Appeal) Transcript No. 336
of 1993 (March 9,1993)
Ramsden v Dyson (1866) L.R. 1 H.L 129.
Registrar of Titles, Johore v Temenggong Securities Ltd [1976] 2 MLJ 44.
RHB Bank Bhd v Zalifah Juan & Anor [2005] 4 CLJ 430.
Sagong Tasi & Ors v Government of Selangor & Anors [2002] 2 MLJ 591;
Teh Poh Wah v Seremban Securities Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 701.
Tengku Abdullah Ibni Sultan Abu Bakar v Mohammad Latiff [1995] 3 CLJ 77.
Than Kok Leong v Low Kim Hai [1983] 1 MLJ 187.
UMBC Bhd & Anor v Pemungut Hasil Tanah, Kota Tinggi [1984] 2 MLJ 87.
Wilkins & Ors v Kannammal [1951] MLJ 99.
Wong See Leng v Sarawhathy Ammal (1954) MLJ 20.
Yukilon Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [No.4] & Anor v Dato Wong Gek Meng & Ors
[1998] MLJU 60.
Zainal Abidin bin Haji Abdul Raphman v Century Hotel Sdn Bhd [1982] 1 MLJ
260.
 LEGISLATIONS

1. Civil Law Act 1956

2. Courts of Judicature Act 1964

3. Rules of High Court

4. Specific Relief Act 1950 (revised 1974)

BOOKS

1. Gary L. McDowell, ‘Equity and the Constitution: The Supreme Court,

Equitable Relief and Public Policy’.

2. F.W. Maitland. ‘Equity, A course of lectures’ 2nd edition. Cambridge

University Press. 3 March 2011.

3. Mohsin Hingun, Wan Azlan Ahmad. ‘Equity and Trusts in Malaysia’ 2nd
Edition. Chapter XIII ‘Injunction’.

4. Paterson, J., Robertson, A. & Heffey, P., “Principles of Contract Law.’

2nd Edition. (Melbourne: Thomson Law Book Co., 2005) pp. 465.

5. Philip H. Pettit, ‘Equity and the Law of Trust’ 7th Edition 4;

6. A Mason, ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Doctrines in Contemporary

Common Law World: An Australian perspective’. (1994) Law Quarterly
Review.

ARTICLES

1. Cheong, May Fong, ‘Estoppel in Boustead’s case: A Move Away From

Reliance Towards Unconscionability’, 1999, International Workshop on
Estoppel (Kuala Lumpur), at 5; Wan Izatul Asma Wan Talaat, The
Threats To The Limitations Outlining The Present Parameters Of
Promissory Estoppel: A Comparative Study. Vol. 3 No. 6 at 160.

2. Zuraidah Ali: ‘Mareva Injunction as a Preventive Relief: The Malsysia

Experience’ (2009) 17 IIUMLJ 225.