Committee Report Sereno Impeachment - As of March 19 - For Distribution

Republic of the Philippines
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Quezon City
SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
Second Regular Session
__________________________________________________________
1 COMMITTEE REPORT NO. ___________
2
3 Submitted by the Committee on Justice on __________________
4 Re: House Resolution No. ___________ entitled “RESOLUTION SETTING FORTH
5 THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE
6 MA. LOURDES P.A. SERENO”
7
8 Recommending its adoption, together with the findings, conclusions, and
9 recommendations of the Committee in the matter of the Impeachment Proceedings
10 against Supreme Court Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno.
11
12 Sponsors: Representatives Reynaldo V. Umali, Rodolfo C. Fariñas, Gwendolyn F. Garcia,
13 Vicente “Ching” S.E. Veloso, Doy C. Leachon, Henry S. Oaminal, Arnulfo P. Fuentebella,
14 Strike B. Revilla, Eugene Michael B. De Vera, Ruwel Peter S. Gonzaga and Rodante D.
15 Marcoleta
16
17 Mr. Speaker:
18
19 The Committee on Justice respectfully recommends the adoption of House
20 Resolution No. ___________ entitled:
21
22 “RESOLUTION SETTING FORTH THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST
23 SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE MA. LOURDES P.A. SERENO”
24
25 together with the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Committee in the
26 matter of the impeachment proceedings against Supreme Court Chief Justice Ma.
27 Lourdes P.A. Sereno.
28
29 On August 15, 2017, a complaint for impeachment against Chief Justice Sereno
30 was filed by Mr. Dante LA. Jimenez and Atty. Eligio P. Mallari with the Office of the
31 Secretary General (hereinafter referred to as the “JIMENEZ COMPLAINT”).
32
33 On August 30, 2017, a verified complaint for impeachment against Chief Justice
34 Sereno was filed by Atty. Lorenzo G. Gadon with the Office of the Secretary General
35 (hereinafter referred to as the “GADON COMPLAINT”) and was endorsed by twenty-
36 five (25) House members through a Resolution of Endorsement on even date. The
37 Gadon Complaint was received by the Office of the Speaker also on the same day.
38
39 The Jimenez Complaint was subsequently endorsed by sixteen (16) House
40 members and was transmitted to and received by the Office of the Speaker on
1 September 4, 2017. The Gadon and the Jimenez Complaints were then included in the
2 Order of Business and were simultaneously referred by the Plenary to the Committee
3 on Justice on September 7, 2017.
4
5 The first meeting to determine sufficiency in form and substance of the
6 impeachment complaints against Chief Justice Sereno was held on September 13, 2017.
7 In that meeting, the Jimenez Complaint was found to be insufficient in form due to its
8 defective verification and was accordingly dismissed by the Committee. On the other
9 hand, the Gadon Complaint was found to be sufficient in form and substance and
10 pursuant to Section 5 of the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings1, the
11 respondent Chief Justice was furnished a copy of the complaint with a written notice to
12 submit her Verified Answer, and the parties were then allowed to submit their respective
13 Verified Reply and Verified Rejoinder.
14
15 After the submission of the said pleadings, the Committee held a meeting on
16 October 5, 2017 where the Gadon Complaint was found to have sufficient grounds for
17 impeachment. Thus, the Committee conducted fifteen (15) hearings from November
18 22, 2017 up to February 27, 2018 to determine the existence of probable cause to
19 impeach Chief Justice Sereno.
20
21 A total of fifty-nine (59) witnesses and resource persons appeared and testified
22 before the Committee during the probable cause hearings, including eight (8)
23 incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, two (2) Associate Justices of the
24 Sandiganbayan, one (1) Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA), three (3)
25 retired Supreme Court Justices, four (4) Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges, seven (7)
26 members and officials of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the Secretary of Justice,
27 and seventeen (17) officials and employees of the Supreme Court. The Committee also
28 invited three (3) other Justices of the Supreme Court, who all declined the invitation of
29 the Committee, two (2) of whom submitted pertinent record as required by the
30 Committee.
31
32 GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT IN THE GADON COMPLAINT
33
34 The Gadon Complaint listed four (4) grounds for impeachment against Chief
35 Justice Sereno, with each ground supported by several charges totaling twenty-seven
36 (27) alleged impeachable acts committed by Chief Justice Sereno:
37
38 First Ground: CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUION
39
40 On the first ground for impeachment, complainant Atty. Lorenzo Gadon alleged
41 in his complaint that Chief Justice Sereno committed culpable violations of the
42 Constitution through the following acts:
43
1
Section 5. Notice to Respondents and Time to Plead. - If the committee finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance, it shall
immediately furnish the respondent(s) with a copy of the resolution and/or verified complaint, as the case may be, with written notice that the
respondent shall answer the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice thereof and serve a copy of the answer to the complainant(s).
No motion to dismiss shall be allowed within the period to answer the complaint.
Page 2
1 (1) Falsifying the Resolution of the Supreme Court in A.M. No. 12-11-9-SC, on
2 the reopening of the Regional Court Administration Office for Region 7 (RCAO-
3 7);
4
5 (2) Falsifying the Temporary Restraining Order of the Supreme Court in the case
6 of Coalition of Association of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior
7 Citizens Party List) vs. COMELEC;
8
9 (3) Falsifying the Resolution of the Supreme Court in A.M. No. 16-08-04-SC
10 (ordering the conduct of a motu proprio fact-finding investigation on the
11 alleged involvement of four (4) incumbent judges in illegal drugs);
12
13 (4) Delaying action on the numerous petitions for retirement and survivorship
14 benefits of Justices and judges and their surviving spouses;
15
16 (5) Manipulating and delaying the resolution of A.M. No. 17-06-02-SC on the
17 request of the Secretary of Justice to transfer outside of Mindanao the cases
18 involving the Maute group;
19
20 (6) Failing to truthfully disclose her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
21 (SALN);
22
23 (7) Manipulating the shortlist of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to exclude
24 then-Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza from the shortlist for personal and
25 political reasons, thereby disgracing then-Solicitor General Jardeleza and
26 curtailing the President’s power to appoint him;
27
28 (8) Manipulating the JBC shortlist through the clustering of nominees for six (6)
29 vacancies in the Sandiganbayan for personal and political reasons, thereby
30 limiting the President’s power to appoint the Justices of the Sandiganbayan;
31
32 (9) Failing to heed the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of
33 Aguinaldo vs. Aquino declaring the clustering of nominees as
34 unconstitutional, and continuing to cluster the nominees for the two (2)
35 vacancies in the Supreme Court vice Associate Justices Bienvenido Reyes and
36 Jose Mendoza, thereby impairing the President’s power to appoint the Justices
37 of the Supreme Court;
38
39 (10) Lying and making it appear that several Supreme Court Justices requested
40 that the Justice do away with their voting for the nominees to the Supreme
41 Court; and,
42
43 (11) Manipulating the JBC by influencing its four (4) regular members, effectively
44 destroying the JBC as a constitutional body mandated to fairly and impartially
45 screen and nominate applicants to the Judiciary.
46
47
Page 3
1 Second Ground: CORRUPTION
2
3 On the second ground for impeachment, Atty. Gadon alleged that Chief Justice
4 Sereno committed the following acts of corruption:
5
6 (1) Using public funds to finance her extravagant and lavish lifestyle by ordering
7 the purchase of a brand new luxurious 2017 Toyota Land Cruiser, amounting
8 to more than Five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00), as her personal vehicle;
9
10 (2) Using public funds to stay in opulent hotels when attending conferences in
11 the Philippines and abroad, and flying on business or first class together with
12 her staff and security; and,
13
14 (3) Using public funds to flaunt her extravagance by unnecessarily bringing a
15 huge entourage of lawyers in her supposed official foreign trips.
16
17 Third Ground: OTHER HIGH CRIMES
18
19 For the third ground, Atty. Gadon alleged that the respondent Chief Justice
20 committed the following acts constituting other high crimes:
21
22 (1) Obstructing justice by ordering the Muntinlupa judges not to issue warrants
23 of arrest against Senator Leila M. De Lima;
24
25 (2) Perverting justice by meeting the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of
26 the Court of Appeals and instructing them not to comply with the processes
27 of the House of Representatives and to immediately question its processes
28 before the Supreme Court;
29
30 (3) Failing to report her extortionate attorney’s fees and pay the appropriate
31 taxes therefor; and,
32
33 (4) Embellishing her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in her application for the
34 Judiciary to overstate her credentials.
35
36 Fourth Ground: BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST
37
38 For the fourth ground, Atty. Gadon alleged that Chief Justice Sereno betrayed
39 the public trust through the following acts:
40
41 (1) Hiring an Information Technology (IT) consultant with excessive
42 compensation and without public bidding, in contravention of existing laws,
43 Commission on Audit (COA) rules, and public policy;
44
Page 4
1 (2) Sending a strongly-worded but misplaced reply to President Rodrigo Duterte
2 on the Judges linked to drugs thereby inviting a head-on collision between
3 the Presidency and the Judiciary;
4
5 (3) Preventing the Justices of the Court of Appeals to do a courtesy call on
6 President Duterte;
7
8 (4) Attacking the imposition of Martial Law in a commencement address, while a
9 petition challenging the validity of the declaration of Martial Law was still
10 pending before the Supreme Court, and thereafter participating in the SC
11 deliberations on the said petition;
12
13 (5) Issuing a Joint Statement with the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
14 regarding CA-GR SP No. 151029 (Genedine Jambaro, et. al.vs. Lt. Gen.
15 Roland Detabali (Ret), which can very well be elevated to the Supreme Court;
16
17 (6) Practicing favoritism by allowing key positions in the Supreme Court to remain
18 unfilled for a long period of time in order to wait for her staff to qualify, to the
19 detriment of the service and great demoralization of qualified Supreme Court
20 employees;
21
22 (7) Appointing a key official to the Philippine Mediation Center Office (PMCO)
23 without authority or approval of the Supreme Court en banc;
24
25 (8) Giving her newly-hired staff foreign staff travels and granting them travel
26 allowances for their foreign travels without authority or approval of the
27 Supreme Court en banc;
28
29 (9) Usurping the mandate of the Supreme Court en banc by arrogating unto
30 herself alone the running of the Supreme Court and the Judiciary, thereby
31 destroying the Supreme Court as a collegial body.
32
33 I.
34 PERTINENT RULINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
35
36 This is the third impeachment proceeding initiated by the House of
37 Representatives in the 17th Congress. In this case, the House of Representatives,
38 through the Committee on Justice, is once again called upon to exercise its exclusive
39 Constitutional power to demand public accountability – the power to initiate
40 impeachment proceedings against impeachable officers under Section 2, Article XI of
41 the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “(t)he President, the Vice-President, the
42 Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions
43 and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction
44 of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
45 high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”
46
Page 5
1 The first two (2) impeachment proceedings initiated by the Committee were
2 against President Rodrigo Duterte and Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman
3 Andres Bautista, respectively. While the impeachment complaint against President
4 Duterte was found to be defective as to form, the Committee nevertheless declared the
5 same to be sufficient in form but insufficient in substance. In its Committee Report, it
6 was emphasized that it would be the last time that the Committee would exercise
7 liberality in declaring a defective complaint as sufficient in form. Following this
8 precedent, the impeachment complaint filed against COMELEC Chairman Bautista was
9 found to be insufficient in form due to its defective verification and was consequently
10 dismissed by the Committee2.
11
12 Applicability of the One-Year Bar Rule to
13 Subsequent Complaints
14
15 Sec. 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution provides the limitation that “no
16 impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
17 within a period of one year”. This is commonly referred to as the “One-Year Bar Rule”
18 in impeachment proceedings. In the case of Francisco, Jr. vs. House of
19 Representatives3, the Supreme Court ruled that the “initiation” of impeachment
20 proceedings which is the reckoning period of the one-year bar “takes place by the act
21 of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
22 Committee on Justice”. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent Supreme Court
23 decision in the case of Merceditas Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives
24 Committee on Justice4 where the Supreme Court held:
25
26 “The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be
27 accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the
28 filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial
29 action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the
30 complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.” 5
31 (Emphasis in the original)
32
33 In this case, the Jimenez Complaint was filed on August 15, 2017, and was
34 endorsed by sixteen (16) House Members on September 4, 2017, while the Gadon
35 Complaint was filed on August 30, 2017 and was endorsed by twenty-five (25) House
36 Members on the same day. Subsequently, both the Jimenez and Gadon Complaints
37 were simultaneously referred by Plenary to the Committee on Justice on September 7,
38 2017. Therefore, the one-year bar against the filing of impeachment complaints against
39 Chief Justice Sereno took effect on September 7, 2017.
40
2
On a vote of 137-75 (with 2 abstentions), the Resolution of the Committee dismissing the impeachment complaint
against COMELEC Chairman Andres Bautista was overturned by the House in Plenary, and the Committee was directed
to prepare the Articles of Impeachment against Chairman Bautista. However, the resignation of Chairman Bautista was
accepted by the President before the Articles of Impeachment were transmitted to the Senate.
3
460 Phil. 830 (2003).
4
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
5
Supra.
Page 6
1 Show Cause Orders Issued by the Committee
2
3 During the course of the hearings, the Committee issued show cause orders to
4 three (3) spokespersons of the Respondent, Atty. Aldwin Salumbides, Atty. Joshua
5 Jerome Santiago, and Atty. Anacleto Rei Lacanilao III, and to Commission on Human
6 Rights (CHR) Commissioner Roberto Eugenio Cadiz, for issuing statements that
7 adversely affected the impeachment proceedings before the Committee.
8
9 Atty. Salumbides and Atty. Santiago were ordered to explain why they should
10 not be cited in contempt for describing the impeachment proceedings as a “dog and
11 pony show” and for issuing other statements that cast aspersions to the members of
12 Committee and to the integrity of the impeachment proceedings. Commissioner Cadiz
13 was ordered to explain why he should not be cited in contempt for saying that the “law
14 of the jungle” seems to prevail in the House, referring to what he described as the “law
15 of the supermajority. Finally, Atty. Lacanilao was ordered to explain why he should not
16 be cited in contempt for issuing statements to the media that the Respondent took a
17 “wellness leave” for two (2) weeks when in fact the Respondent was “forced to go on
18 an indefinite leave” by the members of the Supreme Court en banc. Atty. Salumbides,
19 Atty. Santiago, Atty. Lacanilao and Commissioner Cadiz submitted their explanations
20 within the prescribed period which were duly noted by the Committee and referred to
21 a subcommittee headed by Senior Vice Chairman Vicente Veloso for the
22 recommendation of appropriate action.
23
24 II.
25 DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY
26 IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE
27
28 THE JIMENEZ COMPLAINT IS
29 INSUFFICIENT IN FORM; THE GADON
30 COMPLAINT IS SUFFICIENT IN FORM
31 AND SUBSTANCE
32
33 Section 4, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
34 provides:
35
36 Section 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form and
37 Substance. – Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice shall
38 determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and
39 substance. If the committee finds that the complaint is insufficient in
40 form, it shall return the same to the Secretary General within three
41 (3) session days with a written explanation of the insufficiency. The
42 Secretary General shall return the same to the complainant(s)
43 together with the committee's written explanation within three (3)
44 session days from receipt of the committee resolution finding the
45 complaint insufficient in form.
46
Page 7
1 Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in form, it shall
2 then determine if the complaint is sufficient in substance. The
3 requirement of substance is met if there is a recital of facts
4 constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction
5 of the committee. If the committee finds that the complaint is not
6 sufficient in substance, it shall dismiss the complaint and shall submit
7 its report as provided hereunder.
8
9 Pursuant thereto, the Committee held a meeting on September 13, 2017 to
10 determine the sufficiency in form and substance of the Jimenez and Gadon Complaints.
11
12 During the said meeting, a motion to declare the Jimenez Complaint sufficient in
13 form was made but was objected to on the ground that the verification made by the
14 complainants did not comply with the proper form. It was emphasized that the
15 verification in the Jimenez Complaint was substantially the same as the verification in
16 the impeachment complaint against COMELEC Chairman Bautista, which was dismissed
17 by the Committee due to insufficiency in form. The members cited the ruling of the
18 Committee as contained in the Committee Reports dismissing the impeachment
19 complaints against President Duterte and COMELEC Chairman Bautista, where it was
20 held that all subsequent complaints that were found to be insufficient in form shall be
21 dismissed by the Committee. The Committee then voted on the motion to declare the
22 Jimenez Complaint sufficient in form, and with only five (5) voting in favor while
23 twenty-eight (28) voting against the motion, the Jimenez Complaint was declared
24 not sufficient in form and was consequently dismissed. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule III
25 of the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings, the Committee returned the
26 Jimenez Complaint to the Secretary General on September 20, 2017, with a written
27 explanation as to its insufficiency.
28
29 In the same meeting, the Committee voted to determine the sufficiency in form
30 of the Gadon Complaint. A motion to declare the Gadon Complaint sufficient in form
31 was made, and an objection thereto was made on the ground that the complainant did
32 not have “personal knowledge” of all the allegations in his complaint. Several members
33 of the Committee noted that the based on the verification of the complaint, the
34 allegations made by the complainant were based either on his personal knowledge or
35 on authentic documents, and that there were original and certified true copies of
36 documents attached to the complaint and submitted to the Committee. Acting on the
37 said motion and its objection, the Committee voted with thirty (30) in favor and four
38 (4) against the motion. Thus, the Gadon Complaint was found to be sufficient in
39 form.
40
41 After declaring the Gadon Complaint sufficient in form, the Committee then
42 proceeded to determine if the said complaint was sufficient in substance. In determining
43 sufficiency in substance, the Committee was guided by Section 4, Rule III of the Rules
44 of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which state that “(t)he requirement of
45 substance is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
46 determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee”. A motion was then made, which
47 was also objected by some members of the Committee. There being an objection to the
Page 8
1 motion, the Committee proceeded to vote on the motion. With thirty (30) in favor
2 and four (4) against the motion, the Gadon Complaint was declared sufficient in
3 substance.
4
5 After finding sufficiency in form and substance of the Gadon Complaint, the
6 Committee furnished the respondent Chief Justice Sereno with a copy of the complaint
7 together with a notice to file her answer thereto within ten (10) days from receipt of
8 the notice. The parties were also notified that under the Rules, they are given three (3)
9 days from their receipt of each responsive pleading to submit their respective Reply
10 and Rejoinder thereto. Accordingly, the following pleadings were submitted to the
11 Committee:
12
13 (1) Verified Answer filed by Respondent Chief Justice Sereno through counsels on
14 September 25, 2017;
15
16 (2) Verified Reply filed by Complainant Atty. Gadon on September 28, 2017; and,
17
18 (3) Verified Rejoinder filed by Respondent Chief Justice Sereno through counsels
19 on October 2, 2017.
20
21 III.
22 DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY OF THE GROUNDS
23
24 Upon finding the Gadon Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the
25 Committee then proceeded to determine if the said complaint had sufficient grounds
26 for impeachment. In its meeting held on October 5, 2017, it was agreed that the
27 Committee shall determine if the entire Gadon Complaint alleges sufficient grounds for
28 impeachment, not per allegation in the said complaint as suggested by some members.
29 The Committee noted that in the previous impeachment proceeding against
30 Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez, the Committee voted and decided on the sufficiency
31 of the grounds based on the totality of the complaint, and not on each and every act
32 enumerated therein. In determining sufficiency of the grounds, Chairman Reynaldo
33 Umali guided the members by saying that they should take into consideration not just
34 the allegations in the complaint, but also those in the verified answer, verified reply,
35 and verified rejoinder. Thus, a motion to declare sufficiency of grounds in the Gadon
36 Complaint was made, and an objection thereto was raised. Acting on the motion and
37 its objection, the Committee proceeded to vote on the motion. With twenty-five (25)
38 in favor and two (2) against, the Gadon Complaint was found to have sufficient
39 grounds for impeachment.
40
41 Incidentally, the Committee noted that it received two (2) letters from the
42 counsels for Respondent Chief Justice Sereno on September 28, 2017 and October 4,
43 2017, with the subject “The Right to Confront and Cross-Examine Witnesses in the
44 matter of the Impeachment of Chief Justice Sereno”. In the same meeting held on
45 October 5, 2017, the Committee decided not to take action on the said letters
Page 9
1 considering that they were simply letters and not formal motions that should be acted
2 upon by the Committee.
3
4 Subsequently, between the period when the Committee found sufficient grounds
5 in the Gadon Complaint and the first probable cause hearing, the counsels for
6 Respondent Chief Justice Sereno submitted to the Committee on October 23, 2017 a
7 Motion to Resolve and Request Clarification the issues raised by the Chief Justice in her
8 two (2) previous letters on the matter of cross-examining the witness through counsel.
9 The Committee also received a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) from the counsels for
10 Respondent Chief Justice Sereno on November 21, 2017, with a letter stating that the
11 Respondent Chief Justice Sereno has chosen to attend the probable cause hearings
12 through her attorneys-in-fact as indicated in the SPA.
13
14 Additionally, position papers were submitted by Representatives Edcel Lagman,
15 Tom Villarin, Kaka Bag-ao and Jose Christopher Belmonte on the right of non-members
16 of the Committee to participate in the hearings, the right of the Respondent to counsel,
17 and the right of the Respondent to cross-examine the witnesses through counsel. These
18 letters, motions and position papers were resolved by the Committee in its first hearing
19 on the determination of probable cause in the Gadon Complaint.
20
21 IV.
22 DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
23
24 As mentioned earlier, fifteen (15) hearings were conducted by the Committee
25 between November 22, 2017 to February 27, 2018 to determine probable cause for
26 impeachment in the Gadon Complaint, with fifty-nine (59) witnesses and resource
27 persons who appeared and testified, under oath, before the Committee, including eight
28 (8) incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, two (2) Associate Justices of
29 the Sandiganbayan, one (1) Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA), three (3)
30 retired Supreme Court Justices, four (4) Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges, seven (7)
31 members and officials of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the Secretary of Justice,
32 and seventeen (17) officials and employees of the Supreme Court. Three (3) other
33 Justices of the Supreme Court were also invited by the Committee but declined to
34 attend for valid reasons. However, two (2) of the said Justices, namely Associate
35 Justices Estela Perlas-Bernabe and Marvic Leonen submitted pertinent records required
36 by the Committee. The twenty-seven (27) charges alleged in the Gadon Complaint were
37 exhaustively discussed, with testimonies given and documents submitted to the
38 Committee during the course of its three (3)-month hearings.
39
40 PRELIMINARY ACTIONS TAKEN AND
41 DECISIONS MADE BY THE COMMITTEE
42
43 During its first hearing on the determination of probable cause held on November
44 22, 2017, the Committee first discussed the issue on the right of non-members of the
45 Committee on Justice to participate in the impeachment hearings, as raised in the
46 letters and position papers of Reps. Lagman, Villarin, Bag-ao and Belmonte. In his
Page 10
1 position paper, Rep. Lagman stated that it is an immutable and inherent right of a
2 member of the House of Representatives to participate in any committee meeting, and
3 that such right is part of tradition and parliamentary practice, thus forming part of the
4 Rules of the House pursuant to Section 161, Rule 256 thereof. Non-members have been
5 always allowed to participate in committee meetings and are even allowed to attend
6 executive sessions. The only limitation to non-members is the right to vote, since such
7 right may only be exercised by regular and ex officio members of the Committee.
8
9 Several members agreed that while non-members of the Committee have the
10 right to attend and observe the hearings on the determination of probable cause, such
11 non-members do not have the right to participate in the discussions or to ask questions
12 to the resource persons, witnesses or guests during such hearings. This is to avoid
13 delay in the proceedings, since the Committee is mandated by the 1987 Constitution
14 to submit its report to Plenary within sixty (60) session days from the referral of the
15 impeachment complaint. Giving all 293 members of the House of Representatives the
16 right to speak during impeachment hearings could unduly hamper the Committee in its
17 work. Majority Leader Rep. Rodolfo Fariñas also highlighted the fact that the
18 proceedings before the Committee are not ordinary committee meetings and are not
19 part of the legislative process, and that the impeachment proceedings are part of a
20 constitutional duty solely vested by the 1987 Constitution in the members of the
21 Committee.
22
23 After thorough discussions on the matter, a motion was made to only allow
24 members of the Committee to participate, speak and ask questions during the
25 impeachment hearings. The motion was objected to, and the matter was put to a vote.
26 With thirty (30) Members voting in favor of the motion and only three (3)
27 voting against, the motion that only Members of the Committee are allowed to
28 participate, speak and ask questions during impeachment hearings was carried.
29
30 The next matter discussed by the Committee was the motion filed by
31 Respondent’s counsels to allow them to participate in the hearings and to cross-
32 examine the witnesses, on behalf of the Respondent Chief Justice Sereno. Several
33 members of the Committee opined that the proceedings being conducted by the
34 Committee to determine probable cause is akin to a preliminary investigation, where
35 parties are expressly prohibited from examining and cross-examining any party or their
36 witnesses. It was pointed out that when former Chief Justice Renato Corona was
37 impeached, he was not even given any opportunity to submit an answer or to cross-
38 examine any witnesses before the Committee, since no hearings were conducted by
39 the Committee due to the fact that the Articles of Impeachment against him were
40 directly filed with the Senate via a verified complaint for impeachment signed by more
41 than one-third of all the members of the House.
42
43 Thus, a motion was made to deny the motion of Respondent’s counsels to allow
44 them to cross-examine the witnesses during the probable cause hearings. The motion
6
Section 161. Suppletory Provisions. - The parliamentary practices of the Philippine Assembly, the House of
Representatives, the Senate of the Philippines and the Batasang Pambansa shall be suppletory to these rules.
Page 11
1 was objected to on the ground that the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment
2 Proceedings explicitly mention “cross-examination” in Section 67 thereof, and that it is
3 the constitutional right of the respondent to impeachment proceedings to be allowed to
4 cross-examine witnesses. Acting on the motion and its objection, the Committee
5 proceeded to a vote. With thirty (30) votes in favor and four votes (4) against,
6 the motion to deny counsels for the Respondent to cross-examine witnesses was
7 granted. Nevertheless, Chairman Umali declared that the Respondent is not deprived
8 of the right to ask questions of the witnesses, but may do so only through members of
9 the Committee. The Chairman also declared that the Respondent’s right to counsel is
10 not being deprived, especially considering that all the pleadings filed by the Respondent
11 were made through counsel and were properly considered by the Committee.
12
13 HEARING PROPER
14
15 The Gadon Complaint listed a total of twenty-seven (27) charges against
16 Respondent Chief Justice Sereno on the grounds of culpable violation of the
17 Constitution, corruption, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust. The Committee
18 proceeded to tackle the charges individually during its hearings. Following are the
19 summary of the charges, the answer of the Respondent, and the testimonies and
20 documents submitted to the Committee:
21
22 Charge No. 1: Falsifying the Resolution of the Supreme Court in Administrative
23 Matter (A.M.) No. 12-11-9-SC, on the reopening of the Regional Court
24 Administration Office for Region 7 (RCAO-7)
25
26 The following witnesses and resource persons testified before the Committee:
27
28 (1) Supreme Court Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro;
29 (2) Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Geraldine Faith Econg;
30 (3) Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez; and,
31 (4) Former Clerk of Court En Banc Atty. Enriqueta Vidal.
32
33 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that Respondent Chief Justice Sereno
34 unilaterally issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 175-2012 entitled “Designating the
35 Head for the Judiciary Decentralized Office (JDO) in the Seventh Judicial Region”, and
36 that in an effort to validate this unilateral act, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno made
37 it appear that the Supreme Court en banc ratified her action to revive the RCAO-7
38 through a “falsified” Resolution dated November 27, 2012 in A.M. No. 12-11-9-SC.
39 Atty. Gadon also alleged that Justice De Castro wrote a memorandum addressed to the
40 Chief Justice stating that the Supreme Court en banc did not ratify the revival of the
41 RCAO-7, and that the true consensus was to oppose the reopening of the RCAO-7.
42
43 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that she did not
44 “falsify” any Resolution of the Supreme Court. She claimed that under the Internal
7
Section 6. Submission of evidence and memoranda. – xxx. The Committee, through the Chairperson, may
limit the period of examination and cross-examination. xxx.
Page 12
1 Rules of the Supreme Court (SC Internal Rules), the resolutions of the Supreme Court
2 en banc are based solely on the notes of the Chief Justice on what transpired during
3 confidential and executive deliberations. Thus, she could not have “falsified” her own
4 notes; even assuming that there was poor note-taking on her part, it does not amount
5 to a culpable violation of the Constitution.
6
7 Justice De Castro testified before the Committee and corroborated the
8 allegations made by Atty. Gadon in his complaint. She stated that she only learned of
9 the issuance of A.O. No. 175-2012 when she was invited to attend the ceremonial
10 reopening of the RCAO-7 in Cebu. She was surprised to learn of the reopening of the
11 RCAO-7, which was done without approval from the Supreme Court en banc but merely
12 through an A.O. She further learned upon a cursory look at A.O. No. 175-2012 that
13 what was created in the said A.O. was an entirely different office from the RCAO-7.
14 Under A.O. No. 175-2012, a “Judiciary Decentralized Office” was created, whose head
15 was to report directly to the Chief Justice. According to Justice De Castro, this is
16 contrary to the power of administrative supervision by the Supreme Court en banc over
17 all courts and deprives the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of its authority over
18 lower courts granted by the law creating the OCA – Presidential Decree No. 828 entitled
19 “Creating the Office of the Court Administrator in the Supreme Court and Providing
20 Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”.
21
22 Justice De Castro further testified that when the matter was deliberated by the
23 Supreme Court en banc, several objections were raised by the Justices with regard to
24 A.O. No. 175-2012 and the reopening of RCAO-7 without approval by the Supreme
25 Court en banc. After deliberating on the issues raised during the en banc session,
26 Justice De Castro stated that the Chief Justice agreed to amend her A.O. to address
27 the said issues. Thus, Justice De Castro was shocked to learn about the issuance of
28 A.M. No. 12-11-9-SC which stated that the Supreme Court en banc “ratified” the action
29 of the Chief Justice to reopen RCAO-7. It was for this reason that Justice De Castro
30 wrote a memorandum addressed to the Chief Justice, detailing the objections raised
31 during the en banc session and stating that the Supreme Court en banc did not ratify
32 the actions of the Chief Justice. Justice De Castro also called for the recall or
33 amendment of A.M. NO. 12-11-9-SC to faithfully reflect the agreements made during
34 the said en banc session. Consequently, a corrective Resolution was released by the
35 Supreme Court en banc dated January 22, 2013 which supersedes all prior Resolutions
36 on the matter, including the Resolution purportedly “ratifying” the actions of the Chief
37 Justice, and instead creates a “Needs Assessment Committee” to study and determine
38 the necessity of decentralizing the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court,
39 through the OCA, over the lower courts.
40
41 Atty. Enriqueta Vidal, the Clerk of Court En Banc during that period (and has
42 since retired), submitted to the Committee a copy of the agenda of the en banc session
43 where there were handwritten notes that read “ratify action of CJ Sereno”, “revive
44 RCAO-7 with Phase 1 on a) procurement, b) approval of leave, and c) payroll
45 administration”. She testified that she merely relies on the handwritten notes of the
46 Respondent Chief Justice Sereno when she drafts Resolutions of the En Banc, and that
Page 13
1 she had no reason to doubt the veracity of the handwritten notes considering that it
2 was written by the Chief Justice herself.
3
4 Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Econg testified that she was surprised to learn
5 that she was designated as head of the JDO pursuant to A.O. No. 175-2012, since she
6 was already holding a plantilla position as head of the Project Management Office (PMO)
7 in the Supreme Court. She also stated that she was more surprised that the supposed
8 Resolution that “ratified” the revival of RCAO-7 also “appointed” her as Officer-in-
9 charge of RCAO-7 for a period of two (2) months, despite her holding the position of
10 head of the PMO. She surmised that her designation as head of an office in Cebu might
11 be a subtle way of easing her out of the PMO, since there have been rumors that the
12 Chief Justice wanted one of her loyal personnel to head the PMO.
13
14 Members of the Committee noted that the creation of an office through an
15 Administrative Order, as was done by the Chief Justice in designating the head of the
16 JDO, violates the principle of separation of powers since under this principle, only
17 Congress has the power to create new government offices that would entail the creation
18 of new positions and require funding. It also violates the collegiality of the Supreme
19 Court since under the Constitution, the administrative supervision of the courts is a
20 function of the Supreme Court en banc and is not lodged in the Chief Justice alone. It
21 was also noted that A.O. No. 175-2012 is in conflict with P.D. No. 828 which provides
22 for the functions of the OCA.
23
24 Charge No. 2: Falsifying the Temporary Restraining Order of the Supreme
25 Court in the case of Coalition of Association of Senior Citizens in the
26 Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens Party List) vs. COMELEC
27
29
30 (1) Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro;
31 (2) Mr. Jomar Canlas – Senior Reporter, Manila Times; and,
32 (3) Atty. Enriqueta Vidal – Former Clerk of Court En Banc.
33
34 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that Respondent Chief Justice Sereno
35 tampered with and altered the draft temporary restraining order (TRO) prepared by
36 Justice De Castro, who was the member-in-charge in the case filed by two (2) factions
37 within the Senior Citizens Party List against the COMELEC. He claimed that the
38 Respondent issued a blanket TRO affecting other Party Lists that were not parties to
39 the case. He also alleged, based on a news article written by Mr. Canlas, that the
40 Respondent received a “harsh tongue-lashing” from Justice De Castro due to this
41 tampering.
42
43 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that the TRO
44 issued was not falsified, and that she merely exercised her sound discretion in acting
45 on a recommendation from the member-in-charge.
46
47 Mr. Canlas testified that he wrote the article cited by Atty. Gadon in his complaint
48 based on information he gathered from confidential sources within the Supreme Court.
49 He categorically denied that the source was Justice De Castro. He also denied that he
Page 14
1 intimated to Atty. Gadon that the source for his article was Justice De Castro, contrary
2 to what was earlier claimed by Atty. Gadon.
3
4 In her testimony, Justice De Castro confirmed and corroborated the material
5 allegations made by Atty. Gadon on this particular ground. She stated that the cases
6 filed by the members of the Senior Citizens Party List were indeed raffled to her, and
7 as member-in-charge she immediately drafted a TRO to restrain the COMELEC from
8 implementing its resolution disqualifying the Senior Citizens Party List from the 2013
9 national elections, insofar as the said party list is concerned, and forwarded her
10 recommendation to the Office of the Chief Justice. She was therefore very surprised
11 when the TRO was finally issued which restrained the COMELEC from further
12 proclaiming all the winners from among the party list candidates. The said TRO stated
13 that it was issued by authority of the Chief Justice, upon recommendation by the
14 member-in-charge, who, in this case, was Justice De Castro. Justice De Castro then
15 wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice notifying her of the glaring difference in
16 the issued TRO from her draft and recommendation. When the matter was later raised
17 before the Supreme Court en banc, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a status quo
18 ante order, so as not to embarrass the Chief Justice by calling out the error in the issued
19 TRO, according to Justice De Castro.
20
21 Atty. Vidal testified that she wrote and signed the TRO based on the notes of the
22 Chief Justice. She stated that she never received the draft and recommendation of
23 Justice De Castro, and that she only received the draft as prepared by Respondent Chief
24 Justice Sereno.
25
26 Some members of the Committee noted that what Justice De Castro submitted
27 was merely a draft and a recommendation, and that the Chief Justice may either accept,
28 modify or reject the same. However, Justice De Castro stated that while the internal
29 rules of the Supreme Court do not prohibit the Chief Justice from modifying any draft
30 or recommendation made by a member-in-charge in similar cases, the same internal
31 rules do not give the Chief Justice absolute authority to set aside such draft or
32 recommendation without discussing with the member-in-charge who, having been
33 assigned the case, has thoroughly studied the case assigned. Justice De Castro also
34 noted that the TRO issued by authority of the Chief Justice contained a statement that
35 it was “upon the recommendation of the member-in-charge”, when in fact the TRO
36 issued is entirely different from the one recommended by Justice De Castro. Atty. Vidal
37 testified that she no longer confirmed with Justice De Castro if the draft was indeed
38 based on her recommendation as the member-in-charge, since the instruction to issue
39 the subject TRO came from the Chief Justice herself.
40
41 Charge No. 3: Falsifying the Resolution of the Supreme Court in A.M. No. 16-
42 08-04-SC (ordering the conduct of a motu proprio fact-finding investigation
43 on the alleged involvement of four (4) incumbent judges in illegal drugs)
44
46
48 (2) Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Jose Mendoza;
49 (3) Atty. Theodore Te – Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
50 Information Office (PIO), Supreme Court.
51
Page 15
1 Atty. Gadon alleged in his complaint that Respondent Chief Justice Sereno
2 unilaterally ordered the release on August 9, 2016 of a supposed en banc Resolution in
3 A.M. No. 16-08-04, ordering the conduct of a motu proprio fact-finding investigation
4 on the alleged involvement of four (4) judges in illegal drugs as mentioned in a speech
5 by President Duterte, stating that the Supreme Court resolved to “DIRECT Executive
6 Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea to submit Complaint-Affidavits against the four (4)
7 judges within seven (7) days”, which was released through the Twitter account of the
8 SC-PIO. After discovering the tweet, the Supreme Court Justices “chastised” the
9 Respondent Chief Justice since no such Resolution was approved by the En Banc.
10
11 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that the
12 Resolution in A.M. No 16-08-04 was not falsified, that a draft was duly circulated among
13 and adopted by the Supreme Court en banc, and that the final version of the Resolution
14 did not anymore contain a “directive” to the Executive Secretary to submit complaint-
15 affidavits.
16
17 Justice Perez recalled that they discussed the matter during the en banc session,
18 and that there was no consensus at that time to “direct” the Executive Secretary to file
19 complaint-affidavits as contained in the tweet of the SC-PIO. He added that the
20 subsequent Resolution dated August 16, 2016 reflected the correct agreement among
21 the Justices in the En Banc. Justice De Castro confirmed and corroborated the testimony
22 of Justice Perez and the allegations of Atty. Gadon.
23
24 Atty. Te testified that as part of standard procedure, he met with Respondent
25 Chief Justice Sereno right after the en banc session held on August 9, 2016, and he
26 was instructed by the Chief Justice to disseminate information regarding the motu
27 proprio fact-finding investigation on the alleged involvement of the four (4) judges in
28 illegal drugs. He confirmed the contents of the tweet that he sent out, as found in the
29 attachments to the Gadon Complaint, and further confirmed that it was, verbatim,
30 based on what the Respondent Chief Justice told him was agreed upon by the En Banc,
31 including the part on “directing” the Executive Secretary to file complaint-affidavits.
32
33 Charge No. 4: Delaying action on the numerous petitions for retirement and
34 survivorship benefits of Justices and judges and their surviving spouses
35
37
38 (1) Supreme Court Associate Justice Diosdado Peralta;
39 (2) Supreme Court Associate Justice Lucas Bersamin;
40 (3) Supreme Court Associate Justice Samuel Martires;
41 (4) Court Administrator Marquez;
42 (5) Atty. Anna Li Papa-Gombio – Deputy Clerk of Court En Banc and
43 Chairperson, Special Committee on Retirement and Civil Service Benefits
44 (SC-RCSB);
45 (6) Atty. Jocelyn Fabian – Court Attorney V, Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ)
46 and Member, SC-RCSB;
47 (7) Ms. Charlotte Labayani – Member, SC-RCSB;
48 (8) Atty. Regina Ignacio – Assistant Court Administrator;
Page 16
1 (9) Atty. Eden Candelaria – Deputy Clerk of Court.
2
3 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Supreme Court had previously
4 acted promptly on Petitions for Retirement and for Survivorship Benefits, considering
5 the urgency of such matters. Respondent Chief Justice Sereno then created a Technical
6 Working Group (TWG) to which were referred all such petitions. According to Atty.
7 Gadon’s complaint, the TWG hardly convened, and that practically all Petitions for
8 Retirement and for Survivorship Benefits were shelved and remained unacted upon for
9 two (2) years.
10
11 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that she did not
12 delay any petition for retirement or survivorship benefits. She stated that the Supreme
13 Court, through the Division Chairpersons8, created the SC-RCSB in order to improve
14 the efficiency, speed and consistency in the approval of petitions for retirement
15 benefits. The SC-RCSB then created a TWG (TWG-Screening) to screen applications for
16 retirement and other benefits, and another TWG (TWG-Legal) to study the legal
17 concerns with regard to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9946, which is the
18 latest law amending the special law on retirement for members of the Judiciary. She
19 further claimed that under the new system, there has been a significant improvement
20 in the efficiency, speed and consistency in the processing of retirement benefits.
21 Assuming that there was delay, such delay does not amount to culpable violation of the
22 Constitution, as alleged in the Gadon Complaint.
23
24 Court Administrator Marquez testified that prior to the creation of the SC-RCSB,
25 all petitions for retirement benefits were processed by the OCA (for judges in the lower
26 courts) and the respective Office for Administrative Services (OAS) of the
27 Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals. The OCA and the OAS
28 would then issue their recommendations for each petition, for approval by the Supreme
29 Court en banc. Under this process, petitions for retirement benefits are usually resolved
30 in two (2) to three (3) weeks, on the average. However, upon the creation of the SC-
31 RCSB on November 15, 2015, all petitions for retirement benefits remained unacted
32 upon because the TWG-Legal raised the question of whether or not spouses of judges
33 and Justices who died prior to the effectivity of RA 9946 may receive the survivorship
34 benefits under the said law. He noted that since the enactment of RA 9946 in 2010, the
35 Supreme Court en banc had granted survivorship benefits to such spouses in 271 cases
36 before the SC-RCSB was created. It was therefore very unfortunate that the SC-RCSB
37 had to halt the processing of applications pending the resolution of the TWG-Legal on
38 a question that had already been resolved by the Supreme Court in several cases. He
39 cited the case of the spouse of retired CA Justice Jose Colayco, who kept following-up
40 her petition for survivorship benefits since November 2016. Unfortunately, the said
41 spouse of Justice Colayco passed away before the decision of the Supreme Court was
42 promulgated reaffirming the retroactive application of RA 9946, and which would have
43 allowed the spouse of Justice Colayco to receive such survivorship benefit in the first
44 place. Court Administrator Marquez noted that there are other similar cases to that of
45 the spouse of Justice Colayco, and many have also died without receiving the benefits
46 that were supposedly due to them.
47
48 The members of the SC-RCSB (Atty. Papa-Gombio, Atty. Fabian, Atty. Labayani)
49 submitted to the Committee the two (2) memoranda that it sent to the Office of the
50 Chief Justice after the TWG-Legal completed its study on the retroactive application of
8
The Division Chairpersons are as follows: First Division – Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno; Second Division –
Senior Associate Justice Antonio Caprio; Third Division – Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco
Page 17
1 RA 9946. Memorandum “A” proposed that the application of RA 9946 should apply to
2 spouses of judges and Justices who died prior to its enactment, especially since the
3 Supreme Court had already resolved in similar cases that such spouses are entitled to
4 survivorship benefits. This Memorandum “A” was signed and concurred in by five (5)
5 out of the eight (8) members of the SC-RCSB. The three (3) other members, namely
6 Atty. Papa-Gombio, Atty. Fabian and Atty. Czarina Samonte-Villanueva, wrote a
7 separate dissenting opinion which was denominated as Memorandum “B” wherein they
8 recommended that the applications for survivorship benefits of spouses of judges and
9 Justices who died prior to the effectivity of RA 9946 be denied, and that the survivorship
10 benefits already granted by the Supreme Court to surviving spouses falling in the same
11 category be revoked. They based this recommendation on prudence and on their
12 interpretation of the letter of the law.
13
14 Justice Martires stated that he was not aware of any delay in the grant of
15 retirement and survivorship benefits when he handled the case in A.M. No. 17-08-01.
16 His only concern then was to resolve the question of law raised by the three (3)
17 members of the SC-RCSB in its Memorandum “B” the soonest possible time considering
18 the parties affected. He said that his Resolution in A.M. No. 17-08-01 speaks for itself;
19 in the said Resolution, he categorically stated that the position of the TWG-Legal was
20 incorrect, and that survivorship benefits should be granted retroactively, since RA 9946
21 is a social legislation, and that prior Resolutions by the Supreme Court had already
22 granted survivorship benefits under RA 9946 retroactively.
23
24 Justices Peralta and Bersamin testified that the TWG-Legal had no authority to
25 look into or question decisions of the Supreme Court outside of a petition for certiorari
26 filed before the Court. They noted that the members of the TWG-Legal acted like
27 Justices themselves, with their own separate and dissenting opinions. When asked by
28 members of the Committee, both Justices said that the TWG-Legal and the SC-RCSB
29 should be scrapped, since there are several Resolutions and Decisions issued by the
30 Supreme Court to serve as guidelines in the issuance of retirement and survivorship
31 benefits.
32
33 Members of the Committee noted that while the SC-RCSB took almost eight (8)
34 months to submit the two (2) memoranda, Justice Martires only took a little over a
35 month to resolve the issue, since he merely based his decision on the law and existing
36 resolutions of the Supreme Court. Committee members highlighted the fact that the
37 creation of the TWG-Legal empowered the members therein to practically challenge the
38 Resolutions of the Supreme Court en banc in all the 271 petitions for retirement benefits
39 granted during the effectivity of RA 9946. It was noted that the members of the TWG-
40 Legal had no authority to interpret the retroactivity of the law, much less to recommend
41 a different application of the law that is contrary to what was being applied by the
42 Supreme Court en banc in previous cases. The recommendation of the TWG-Legal to
43 revoke the survivorship benefits granted by the Supreme Court to spouses of judges
44 and Justices who died prior to the effectivity of RA 9946 was also beyond its functions,
45 since only the Supreme Court may revisit its own rulings and only upon a proper case
46 filed in court. This led some members of the Committee to conclude that the members
47 of the TWG-Legal, who were all lawyers, could not have acted in such a brazen manner
48 without the blessing of or instructions from someone in power, such as the Chief Justice.
49
50 Another issue was raised on the possibility that the delay was intentional
51 considering that the retirement benefits are already budgeted for the calendar year
52 since the year of retirement of judges and Justices are easily determined, and therefore
53 any unused or unexpended budget for the payment of such benefits may be realigned
Page 18
1 for other purposes. However, Atty. Fabian stated that any undisbursed budget for
2 retirement benefits programmed for the year are not realigned, and are used solely for
3 the payment of retirement benefits of judges and Justices.
4
5 Charge No. 5: Manipulating and delaying the resolution of A.M. No. 17-06-02-
6 SC on the request of the Secretary of Justice to transfer outside of Mindanao
7 the cases involving the Maute group
8
10
11 (1) Secretary of Justice Vitaliano Aguirre II;
12 (2) Supreme Court Associate Justice Noel Tijam;
14 (4) Justice Lucas Bersamin;
15 (5) Court Administrator Midas Marquez; and,
16 (6) Atty. Felipa Anama – Clerk of Court En Banc.
17
18 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that Secretary Aguirre wrote a letter to
19 Respondent Chief Justice Sereno requesting the transfer of Maute and similar cases
20 outside of Mindanao. Without following the ordinary procedure in such cases, the said
21 letter was not raffled to any member-in-charge and was never discussed in the en banc
22 session. Instead, it was discussed over lunch, where Respondent Chief Justice Sereno
23 suggested that the Maute cases may be heard in Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, a
24 Resolution dated June 6, 2017 was issued designating the courts in Cagayan de Oro
25 City to hear and decide the Maute cases. Secretary Aguirre then moved for the
26 reconsideration of the Resolution. Justice Tijam circulated a draft resolution granting
27 the request of Secretary Aguirre. However, the matter was not included in the agenda
28 for the en banc session of June 20, 2017 and was only included on the agenda for the
29 en banc session in June 27, 2017, where it was agreed that the cases should be
30 transferred to Taguig City. Respondent Chief Justice Sereno allegedly took the
31 responsibility of writing the draft resolution, which was released only on July 20, 2017.
32 According to Atty. Gadon, the 52-day period from the time Secretary Aguirre submitted
33 his initial letter to the issuance of the resolution granting the request was an undue
34 delay given the urgency of the matter.
35
37 cause any delay in the resolution of the letter-request of Secretary Aguirre. She stated
38 that the initial decision to transfer the Maute cases to Cagayan de Oro City was a
39 decision reached by the Supreme Court as evidenced by its Resolution dated June 6,
40 2017. Further, any supposed “delay” in the final resolution of the request was due to
41 the need to coordinate among the Supreme Court, the Philippine National Police (PNP),
42 the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the DOJ with respect to the security and
43 logistics issues.
44
45 Secretary Aguirre testified that he initially sent a letter to the Chief Justice
46 requesting the Supreme Court to transfer the Maute and other related ISIS cases
47 outside of Mindanao on May 29, 2017. However, a Supreme Court resolution was issued
Page 19
1 on June 6, 2017 designating the courts of Cagayan de Oro City, merely 2 hours away
2 from Marawi City, as special courts to try and decide the Maute cases. He then sent
3 another letter on June 13, 2017 asking for reconsideration of the said resolution, this
4 time particularly requesting the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Taguig City to be the
5 venue where trial in the said cases should be held, and the Special Intensive Care Area
6 (SICA) in Camp Bagong Diwa as the detention facility for apprehended members of the
7 Maute group and for all other high-profile and dangerous individuals relative to the
8 Marawi Siege. He then wrote another letter dated June 14, 2017, attaching a resolution
9 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Misamis Oriental Chapter strongly
10 opposing the transfer of the Maute cases to Cagayan De Oro City.
11
12 Secretary Aguirre also testified that he was requested to meet with Chief Justice
13 Sereno on June 19, 2017, where he said he was asked to tone down his letter
14 requesting for the transfer of the cases to Taguig City and that his letter should not
15 mention the dangers faced by prosecutors and judges, and instead to simply mention
16 that the transfer of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao would help the military focus
17 more on fighting the terrorists in Marawi City. Secretary Aguirre acceded to the request
18 of Respondent, but the revised letter was still not included in the agenda of the en banc
19 session the next day. He was thereafter informed that his request was granted, but no
20 resolution was released yet. Ultimately, when the resolution was received by Secretary
21 Aguirre on July 18, 2017, more than fifty (50) days had passed since his urgent request
22 to transfer the Maute cases outside of Mindanao.
23
24 Justice Tijam stated in his sworn statement and in his testimony before the
25 Committee that the Respondent did not circulate among the Justices of the Supreme
26 Court the other letters of Secretary Aguirre, aside from the initial March 29, 2017 letter.
27 He also stated that he received a call from the Chief Justice on June 6, 2017, who
28 informed him that the Supreme Court en banc agreed to transfer the Maute cases to
29 Cagayan de Oro City. According to Justice Tijam, this was an act of “mental dishonesty”
30 since there was no deliberation made by the Supreme Court en banc and no decision
31 was made during the en banc session, and that the matter was only discussed during
32 lunch after the en banc session.
33
34 Justices De Castro and Bersamin confirmed that the original letter of Secretary
35 Aguirre was not included in the agenda of the Raffle Committee on June 5 and was
36 therefore not raffled to any Justice of the Supreme Court. However, the matter was
37 suddenly included in the June 6 supplemental agenda as item No. 53 but was never
38 discussed in the en banc session. They also stated that the Supreme Court en banc
39 does not make decisions during lunch time, and all decisions and agreements are made
40 during en banc sessions.
41
42 Court Administrator Marquez stated that he received several letters from local
43 government units, concerned groups and stakeholders in Cagayan De Oro City stating
44 their objections to the proposed transfer therein of the Maute cases. Among the
45 objections are its close proximity to Marawi City, which is merely two (2) hours away
46 and the lack of infrastructure to handle such magnitude of cases, considering that the
47 Hall of Justice has just recently burned down and there are no adequate detention
48 facilities large and secure enough to detain more than 200 arrested individuals. He then
49 issued a memorandum addressed to the Chief Justice reiterating the objections of the
50 said groups and recommending the transfer of the Maute cases to Taguig City given its
51 close proximity to the SICA in Camp Bagong Diwa. He was therefore very surprised to
Page 20
1 learn that Assistant Court Administrator Theodore Te, the Spokesperson of the Supreme
2 Court, also issued a memorandum recommending the transfer of the Maute Cases to
3 Cagayan de Oro City, which apparently became the basis for the first Resolution dated
4 June 6, 2017.
5
6 Atty. Anama confirmed that the letter of Secretary Aguirre dated May 29, 2017
7 was not raffled, and it was only included in the supplemental agenda of the June 6,
8 2017 en banc session with a note stating “MS”, which meant it was already designated
9 to Chief Justice “Meilou Sereno” as member-in-charge. Thus, the June 6 Resolution was
10 based on the unilateral decision of Respondent Chief Justice Sereno and the draft that
11 the Respondent prepared.
12
13 Charge No. 6: Failing to truthfully disclose her Statement of Assets, Liabilities
14 and Net Worth (SALN)
15
17
18 (1) Justice Diosdado Peralta;
20 (3) Justice Lucas Bersamin;
21 (4) Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Jose Mendoza – Regular Member,
22 Judicial and Bar Council (JBC);
23 (5) Atty. Maria Milagros Fernan-Cayosa – Regular Member, JBC;
24 (6) Atty. Annaliza Ty-Capacite – Executive Officer, JBC;
25 (7) Atty. Socorro D’Marie Inting – Chief, Office of Recruitment, Selection and
26 Nomination (ORSN), JBC
27 (8) Judge Richard Pascual – Former Chief, ORSN, JBC
28 (9) Dr. Angela Escoto – Director, University of the Philippines Human
29 Resources Development Office (UP HRDO);
30 (10) Ms. Rosalia Cases – UP College of Law;
31 (11) Administrator Renato Bermejo – Land Registration Authority (LRA).
32
33 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that Respondent Chief Justice Sereno failed
34 to disclose in her SALN the exorbitant lawyer’s fees she received as counsel for the
35 Philippine government in its arbitration case against Philippine Air Terminals Company
36 Inc. (PIATCO) amounting to more than Thirty-seven million pesos (₱37,000,000.00).
37 In response, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that she fully disclosed her
38 investments and assets she acquired from the remainder of the fees she received as
39 legal counsel in the PIATCO cases, that she paid all the applicable taxes on her legal
40 fees, and that she truthfully disclosed all her assets, liabilities and net worth.
41
42 In preparation for the hearing on this particular charge, the Committee issued
43 subpoenas to the UP College of Law and the Office of the Ombudsman for the
44 submission of the SALNs of Respondent Chief Justice Sereno, who was a professor in
45 the UP College of Law at the time, for the years 2000-2010.
46
47 Surprisingly, the UP HRDO submitted a letter stating that only the 2002 SALN of
48 the Respondent was available in the records of the UP. There were no SALNs filed by
Page 21
1 the Respondent for the years 2000-2001, and 2003-2006. The letter also noted that
2 the Respondent resigned from her position as professor on June 1, 2006, and that she
3 was on leave for most of the time. There was also no record of her having been granted
4 authority to engage in a limited practice of profession during the period she was a
5 professor in the UP College of Law.
6 The Office of the Ombudsman submitted a letter stating that only a copy of the
7 1998 SALN of the Respondent is found in their files, and that the said SALN was
8 subscribed only in August 2003 and transmitted by the UP HRDO to the Office of the
9 Ombudsman in December 2003. It also issued a certification that there is no SALN filed
10 by Respondent Chief Justice Sereno for the years 1999-2009, except the said 1998
11 SALN filed in 2003.
12
13 For this reason, the Committee issued a subpoena to the JBC for the submission
14 of the SALNs filed by the Respondent Chief Justice when she applied for the position of
15 Chief Justice in 2012, since the Committee was informed that one of the requirements
16 for applying to the said position is the submission of SALNs for the past ten (10) years
17 prior to application. However, the JBC ORSN submitted a letter to the Committee
18 stating that the Respondent only submitted her SALNs for the years 20069, 2009, 2010
19 and 2011, and that she submitted a letter to then-ORSN Chief Atty. Pascual explaining
20 that it was infeasible to retrieve all of her SALNs considering most are more than fifteen
21 (15) years old.
22
23 Judge Pascual, Atty. Cayosa and Atty. Capacite all testified that the original
24 announcement for the opening of the applications to the position of Chief Justice in
25 2012 required the submission of all previous SALNs for those in the public service.
26 According to Atty. Capacite, Senator Francis “Chiz” Escudero – then-ex officio member
27 of the JBC – moved to relax such requirement and recommended that an “attempt to
28 comply” with the SALN requirement be sufficient. In the end, the JBC en banc agreed
29 to only require the past ten (10) SALNs for applicants to the Chief Justice position, or
30 from 2002-2012. However, the Committee observed that the Respondent only filed
31 four (4) SALNs, and that the explanation letter and attached “clearance” from the UP
32 HRDO that she submitted to the JBC did not substitute for the submission of the
33 remaining SALNs. It was also noted that the Respondent’s explanation that her records
34 are irretrievable for being more than fifteen (15) years old is not particularly truthful,
35 since Atty. Capacite had records showing that former Associate Justice Roberto Abad
36 was able to submit his SALNs from the 1980’s, or nearly thirty (30) years ago. In fact,
37 out of all the applicants who were shortlisted for the position of Chief Justice in 2012,
38 only the Respondent was not able to comply with the SALN requirement.
39
40 Justice Peralta, who was acting Chief Justice and ex officio Chairman of the JBC
41 at the time, testified that he never learned about the non-submission of the SALNs by
42 then-applicant Sereno, and that he also never saw the letter submitted by the
9
The Chief Justice later explained in a letter to the JBC that her 2006 SALN contains a typographical error, since the
year “2006” was already printed on top of the form. However, based on the date of signing and notarization, it is clear
that the said SALN is supposed to be as of June 2010, since such SALN was required upon her assumption as Associate
Justice in 2010.
Page 22
1 Respondent explaining why she could not submit her SALNs. He stated that had he
2 known about these matters, he could have raised these issues during the en banc
3 meeting of the JBC. Atty. Cayosa likewise stated that she never saw the letter-
4 explanation, and that she merely relied on the matrix prepared by the JBC Secretariat
5 which stated that the Respondent Chief Justice Sereno had already submitted her
6 complete requirements.
7
8 Based on these findings regarding the non-submission of SALNs to the JBC, the
9 Committee sent a letter to the Supreme Court en banc, considering that the JBC is
10 under its supervision, in order for it to take appropriate action on the significant issues
11 and concerns raised before the Committee in relation to the selection and nomination
12 process of the JBC that may involve the validity and legality of certain actions made by
13 the JBC, its Secretariat and its Executive Committee.
14
15 With respect to the real properties under the name of the Respondent and/or
16 her immediate family, records from the LRA show that there are at least two (2)
17 properties that were not declared in the SALN of the Respondent: a 2.2-hectare
18 property located in Mariveles, Bataan under the name of spouses Mario Sereno and Ma.
19 Lourdes Sereno with Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3896, and another property
20 located in Davao10.
21
22 The alleged non-declaration of her earnings as counsel in the PIATCO cases will
23 be discussed in Charge No. 17 below.
24
25 Charge No. 7: Manipulating the shortlist of the JBC to exclude then-Solicitor
26 General Francis Jardeleza from the shortlist for personal and political reasons,
27 thereby disgracing then-Solicitor General Jardeleza and curtailing the
28 President’s power to appoint him
29
31
32 (1) Supreme Court Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza;
34 (3) Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Arturo Brion; and,
35 (4) Atty. Jose Mejia – Regular JBC Member
36
37 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent manipulated the JBC
38 process to exclude then-SolGen Jardeleza from the shortlist to the position vacated by
39 retired Justice Roberto Abad. Respondent Chief Justice Sereno made a last-minute
40 objection and questioned Justice Jardeleza’s integrity, which brought into play the
41 “unanimity rule”, i.e. the voting must be unanimous instead of a simple majority.
42
10
In her SALNs, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno only lists one (1) property located in Davao, whereas the LRA has
records of two (2) titles registered in the names of Sps. Mario Jose Sereno and Maria Lourdes Sereno (TCT Nos. 300419
and 300420).
Page 23
1 In her answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that as ex officio
2 Chairperson of the JBC, she acted in accordance with JBC Rules when she voted to
3 exclude then-SolGen Jardeleza from the shortlist. She claimed that at the time, she
4 had genuine concerns about the integrity of then-SolGen Jardeleza, which she simply
5 brought to the attention of the JBC.
6
7 Justice Jardeleza testified that after his public interview for the position of
8 Associate Justice, he was informed that in the executive sessions conducted by the JBC
9 on June 5 and 16, 2014, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno questioned his integrity
10 because of his handling of the arbitration case involving the West Philippine Sea when
11 he was still the Solicitor General. He said he was described as “disloyal to the Republic”.
12 Having his integrity questioned means that then-SolGen Jardeleza would need a
13 unanimous vote from among the members of the JBC in order to be included in the
14 shortlist of nominees. This is known as the “unanimity rule” under the JBC Rules of
15 Procedure (JBC Rules). Of course, gathering a unanimous vote would be impossible
16 since it was the Chief Justice herself, who is also the ex officio Chairman of the JBC,
17 who questioned his integrity in the first place. Having learned of this, Justice Jardeleza
18 submitted a letter-petition to the Supreme Court asking that the JBC be directed to
19 provide a written statement of the sworn charges against him, that he be allowed to
20 cross-examine witnesses in a public hearing, that the JBC reset its next scheduled
21 hearing pending resolution of his letter-petition, and that the JBC be directed to disallow
22 Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting for the vacant Associate Justice
23 position. However, the JBC still proceeded with its scheduled hearing, and transmitted
24 to the Office of the President the shortlist of nominees, without the name of then-
25 SolGen Jardeleza. The Supreme Court then declared Justice Jardeleza’s letter-petition
26 moot and academic, which prompted Justice Jardeleza to file a petition for certiorari
27 with prayer for issuance of a TRO11 seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the list
28 of nominees. In the end, the Supreme Court granted the petition and then-SolGen
29 Jardeleza was included in the shortlist and was, subsequently, appointed as Associate
30 Justice. Justice Jardeleza then stated that when Respondent Chief Justice Sereno
31 described him as disloyal to the Republic, it was she who was disloyal and who
32 committed treason when she used a highly confidential document, one that could affect
33 the chances of the country in a pending international arbitration proceeding, for
34 personal reasons – i.e. to disqualify him from being nominated as Associate Justice of
35 the Supreme Court. Justice Jardeleza also described the actions of Respondent as
36 “inhuman” and not the acts of a “normal person”, and that what he went through in his
37 ordeal against the Chief Justice was a “career killer” and a “near-death experience”.
38
39 Justice Brion stated that then-SolGen Jardeleza should have been included in the
40 shortlist, had the Respondent not raised the question of integrity against him. He also
41 testified that he stands by his separate concurring opinion, where he stated that
42 Respondent Chief Justice Sereno manipulated the JBC processes to exclude Justice
43 Jardeleza as nominee. Justice De Castro stated that when the Respondent did not
44 inhibit herself from participating during the discussions on the nomination for the
11
Francis H. Jardeleza vs. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, et al. G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
Page 24
1 Associate Justice position where she raised the objection against Justice Jardeleza, she
2 acted as the complainant, prosecutor, and judge against him. Justices Jardeleza, Brion
3 and De Castro all agreed that there was malice and bad faith on the part of the
4 Respondent in her attempt to exclude Justice Jardeleza from the shortlist.
5
6 Atty. Mejia stated that the rule on unanimity was already deleted in the Revised
7 Rules of the JBC, possibly because of what transpired in the case of Justice Jardeleza.
8
9 Charge No. 8: Manipulating the JBC shortlist through the clustering of
10 nominees for six (6) vacancies in the Sandiganbayan for personal and political
11 reasons, thereby limiting the President’s power to appoint the Justices of the
12 Sandiganbayan
13
15
18 (3) Justice Lucas Bersamin
19
20 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent unilaterally and
21 arbitrarily introduced a new practice of clustering nominees by sorting them into six
22 (6) clusters, or one for each vacancy, when in the past the JBC only submitted one list
23 from which the President may choose to fill multiple vacancies in a collegial court. He
24 cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Aquino12 where it
25 was observed that the practice of clustering may be used as a device to favor or
26 prejudice a qualified nominee since a favored one may be included in a cluster with no
27 other strong contender, while a disfavored one may be placed in a cluster with many
28 strong contenders.
29
31 manipulate the shortlist for the six (6) vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, and that the
32 practice of clustering nominees was agreed upon by the JBC members and is not
33 expressly prohibited under the Constitution.
34
35 Justice Peralta testified that he was with the Supreme Court since 2009 and
36 clustering of nominees for a vacant position in the Supreme Court was never practiced
37 before. He also said that seniority is important, and if clustering is done, the President
38 cannot choose anymore from the other nominees who could be the most senior to be
39 appointed. He said that seniority is very important in a collegial body like the Supreme
40 Court. Clustering is unjustified especially if there are several vacancies because
41 seniority will not be observed. Clustering would limit or restrict the President’s
42 constitutional authority to appoint members in the Judiciary. He concluded that
43 clustering would favor a particular candidate by putting him or her in the same cluster
44 with those who have the least chance to be appointed. Such practice happened only
45 during the term of the respondent.
12
G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016.
Page 25
1 Charge No. 9: Failing to heed the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the
2 case of Aguinaldo vs. Aquino declaring the clustering of nominees as
3 unconstitutional, and continuing to cluster the nominees for the two (2)
4 vacancies in the Supreme Court vice Associate Justices Bienvenido Reyes and
5 Jose Mendoza, thereby impairing the President’s power to appoint the Justices
6 of the Supreme Court
7
8 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that even after the ruling of the Supreme
9 Court in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Aquino (supra), the JBC, upon instructions of the
10 Respondent, still proceeded with the clustering of the shortlist for the two (2) vacancies,
11 instead of submitting only one (1) shortlist.
12
13 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that each
14 vacancy for the positions left by retired Justices Bienvenido Reyes and Jose Mendoza
15 had a separate and distinct set of applicants and nominees.
16
17 Attached to the verified answer of the Respondent were the two (2) separate
18 announcements for the opening of vacancies in the Supreme Court vice Justices Reyes
19 and Mendoza. It appears that there was no clustering done since the vacancies were
20 opened separately and were at least thirty-five (35) days apart, as compared to the six
21 (6) simultaneous vacancies in the Sandiganbayan under the previous charge which was
22 covered by a single announcement by the JBC.
23
24 Charge No. 10: Lying and making it appear that several Supreme Court
25 Justices requested that the Justice do away with their voting for the nominees
26 to the Supreme Court
27
29
30 (1) Retired Justice Arturo Brion;
32 (3) Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; and,
33 (4) Justice Lucas Bersamin
34
35 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent distributed a letter
36 among the Justices of the Supreme Court stating that several Justices requested that
37 they do away with the voting for their recommendees to vacancies in the Supreme
38 Court. However, when later confronted by the Justices themselves, Respondent Chief
39 Justice Sereno could not name a single Justice who she claimed made such request.
40 This also shows another attempt to mislead the members of the Supreme Court and
41 shows the state of mind of the Respondent that is unfit to run the entire Judiciary.
42
44 lie, and that the Associate Justices who made such request approached her in
45 confidence thereby precluding her from naming them.
46
Page 26
1 Justice Brion also testified that prior to the interview of applicants for the vacancy
2 left by retired Justice Abad, the Respondent prepared a letter addressed to all members
3 of the Supreme Court en banc stating that several colleagues asked her to forego or to
4 do away with their votes, so they need not make their recommendations to the said
5 position. Honoring the principle of collegiality, they did not vote. Justice De Castro said
6 that in her conversation with fellow Justices, nobody would own up to the alleged
7 request and she made it of record during the en banc session that she never made
8 such a request. During the said en banc session, the Respondent could not mention a
9 single name until she said “Because I don’t like your recommendees. I don’t think you
10 are making the proper choice.” Justice De Castro said that based on the acts of the
11 Chief Justice, it would seem that she was finding ways to exclude SolGen Jardeleza.
12 She added that the Respondent took away the right of the incumbent Supreme Court
13 Justices to be heard with respect to the nominees in their chamber, and that in doing
14 so, only the voice of the Chief Justice will have weight during the JBC deliberations as
15 regards the nominees to the Supreme Court.
16
17 Justices Peralta and Bersamin said that they, too, did not request to do away
18 with the voting for their recommendees to the vacancies in the Supreme Court, and
19 that this was another deceitful act done by the Respondent. They both lamented that
20 the Respondent took away a privilege that they would have never voluntarily
21 surrendered, since it was the only way that the Justices could voice their opinion on
22 potential candidates for Associate Justice in the Supreme Court. By removing the right
23 of Justices to vote for their recommendees, Respondent ensured that the Chief Justice,
24 as ex officio Chairperson of the JBC, will be the only voice of the Supreme Court in the
25 JBC with respect to vacancies in the Supreme Court.
26
27 Charge No. 11: Manipulating the JBC by influencing its four (4) regular
28 members, effectively destroying the JBC as a constitutional body mandated to
29 fairly and impartially screen and nominate applicants to the Judiciary
30
32
35 (3) Atty. Jose Mejia – Regular member, JBC; and,
36 (4) Atty. Maria Milagros Fernan-Cayosa – Regular member, JBC
37
38 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent has clearly influenced
39 the four (4) regular members of the JBC to vote with her for the nominees in the
40 Judiciary. He further claims that the Respondent has transformed into a mafia-like
41 organization that adheres to her unquestionably.
42
43 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that she has
44 never manipulated any member of the JBC, and that the JBC has always acted as a
45 collegial body. She only expresses her views, opinions and preferences on applicants,
46 and that she has the right to do so as ex officio Chairperson of the JBC.
Page 27
1 Justice Peralta testified that as the ex officio Chairperson of the JBC, the
2 Respondent has moral ascendancy over its four (4) regular members, since the latter’s
3 travel authorities, allowances, perks and other requests are approved by the
4 Respondent. Justice De Castro noted that there are numerous instances where the
5 regular members and the Chief Justice had voted as a block, and a simple look at the
6 voting for nominees to vacancies would reveal a pattern where there are at least five
7 (5) votes for certain nominees.
8
9 Atty. Cayosa and Atty. Mejia both denied having been influenced by the Chief
10 Justice, and they testified that the JBC is a collegial body and any decisions made by
11 the JBC reflect the deliberations conducted by the JBC en banc.
12
13 Charge No. 12: Using public funds to finance her extravagant and lavish
14 lifestyle by ordering the purchase of a brand new luxurious 2017 Toyota Land
15 Cruiser, amounting to more than Five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00), as her
16 personal vehicle
17
19
20 (1) Supreme Court Associate Justice Mariano Del Castillo;
21 (2) Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Raul Villanueva – Chairperson, Bids and
22 Awards Committee (BAC) for Goods and Services;
23 (3) DCA Thelma Bahia – Member, BAC for Goods and Services;
24 (4) Atty. Eden Candelaria – Deputy Clerk of Court, Chief-Office of
25 Administrative Services;
26 (5) Atty. Corazon Ferrer-Flores – Deputy Clerk of Court, Chief-Fiscal
27 Management and Budget Office (FMBO);
28 (6) Atty. Ma. Carina Cunanan – Procurement Head; and,
29 (7) Atty. Michael Ocampo – Court Attorney-VI, Office of the Chief Justice
30
31 Atty. Gadon alleged in his complaint that the purchase of a Toyota Land Cruiser
32 as vehicle for the Chief Justice is still exorbitant, and shows her injudiciousness, lack of
33 economy and propriety.
34
35 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claims that the
36 acquisition of the Land Cruiser was neither illegal nor extravagant, and that the
37 Supreme Court En Banc itself approved the said acquisition in a Resolution in A.M. No.
38 17-03-06-SC. The Land Cruiser was purchased to ensure the safety and security of the
39 Chief Justice, who was exempted from the prohibition against the acquisition of luxury
40 vehicles by government officials since such purchase was for security reasons and
41 purposes, for the Chief Justice.
42
43 Based on the hearings of the Committee, the following facts were discovered:
44
45 • There was no purchase request approved by the Supreme Court En Banc for
46 the acquisition of a vehicle for the Chief Justice.
Page 28
1 • The certification of availability of funds specified the amount of
2 ₱5,263,815.00, which was the ACTUAL PRICE for a Toyota Land Cruiser,
3 instead of the actual ₱6,000,000.00 as provided in the Annual Procurement
4 Plan (APP).
5 • The original 1st Indorsement from the Procurement Planning Committee
6 showed the actual brand name Toyota Land Cruiser. Subsequently, the said
7 Indorsement was pulled out and replaced by an amended Indorsement that
8 no longer mentioned the brand name Toyota Land Cruiser (and only the
9 specifications for a Toyota Land Cruiser in its place).
10 • Atty. Cunanan and Atty. Bahia admitted that the procurement of the Toyota
11 Land Cruiser was predetermined as to the brand.
12 • There were no security threats to the Chief Justice before and during the time
13 the procurement for a Toyota Land Cruiser was being worked.
14
15 Justice Del Castillo testified that he was the member-in-charge for this particular
16 administrative matter, and that he referred the matter to the Supreme Court En Banc
17 which subsequently approved the Notice of Award to Toyota-Makati. Justice Del Castillo
18 also testified that former Chief Justices Reynato Puno and Renato Corona did not use
19 luxury vehicles during their tenure. He added that he never saw the 1st Indorsement
20 that indicated the brand name Toyota Land Cruiser.
21
22 Atty. Flores testified that there was a directive from the Office of the Chief
23 Justice, through Atty. Ocampo, to specifically purchase a Toyota Land Cruiser for the
24 Chief Justice. Atty. Ocampo, on the other hand, stated that they merely stated the
25 preference of the Chief Justice upon the query of the procurement planning committee.
26
27 Charge No. 13: Using public funds to stay in opulent hotels when attending
28 conferences in the Philippines and abroad, and flying on business or first class
29 together with her staff and security
30
32
33 (1) Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Zaldy Trespeses;
34 (2) Atty. Ferrer-Flores – Deputy Clerk of Court, Chief-FMBO;
35 (3) Ms. Meriam Ansama – Audit Team Leader, Commission on Audit (COA);
36 (4) Ms. Melissa Ann Santiago – Director of Sales, Shangri-La Boracay
37
38 Atty. Gadon alleged in his complaint that the Respondent committed corruption
39 when she used public funds to finance her extravagant lifestyle by staying in opulent
40 hotels when attending conferences in the Philippines and abroad, and flying on business
41 or first class together with her staff and security. He cited one instance where the
42 Respondent billeted herself in the Presidential Villa in Shangri-La Boracay during an
43 international conference.
44
45 In her answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that the approved
46 budget for the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices Meeting (ACJM) in Boracay specifically included
Page 29
1 the use of the “Presidential Villa” in Shangri-La Boracay as a meeting area for 24 hours
2 as part of the package offered by the resort. It was also the only resort that had the
3 facilities to ensure the security and safety of the ASEAN Chief Justices. She further
4 claimed that instead of booking additional rooms, she and her staff and some of the
5 secretariat were allowed to stay in the Presidential Villa at no additional charge. As to
6 travels on business class, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claims that she is allowed
7 under the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual to travel on full business class.
8
9 COA Audit Team Leader Meriam Ansama noted that bidding is not required for
10 the rental or use of venues, but the procurement law still requires that there must be
11 quotations from at least two (2) venues. Justice Trespeses, who was the Judicial Staff
12 Head at the time and in charge of booking the venue for the 3rd ACJM, testified that he
13 and the Respondent conducted ocular inspections and submitted quotations from
14 multiple venues in Boracay. However, based on the documents submitted to her office,
15 Ms. Ansama stated that no such quotations were submitted. Hence, there is a possibility
16 that an audit observation memorandum (AOM) may be issued on this particular
17 expenditure.
18
19 The Committee also noted that contrary to the allegation of the Respondent in
20 her verified answer that the choice of Boracay as the venue for the 3rd ACJM was made
21 by the ASEAN Chief Justices “by unanimous acclaim”, the minutes of the 2nd ACJM
22 revealed that it was the Respondent herself alone who declared that Boracay would be
23 the venue for the 3rd ACJM.
24
25 Charge No. 14: Using public funds to flaunt her extravagance by unnecessarily
26 bringing a huge entourage of lawyers in her supposed official foreign trips.
27
28 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon simply stated that the Respondent would bring her
29 “clique of relatively newly hired lawyers” on foreign trips. In her verified answer,
30 Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that out of her sixteen (16) official foreign trips,
31 she was assisted without any lawyer in four (4) of those trips, by one lawyer in nine
32 (9) of those trips, by two (2) lawyers in two (2) trips, and by three (3) lawyers in one
33 trip. Other members of the delegation would consist of fellow Justices of the Supreme
34 Court, Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court and senior court officials.
35
36 Atty. Flores submitted to the Committee lists of official foreign and domestic
37 travels of the Respondent and the officials and employees of the Office of the Chief
38 Justice. In her summary report, Atty. Flores stated that the Chief Justice travelled
39 abroad fifteen (15) times (with one continuous two-leg trip to the United Kingdom and
40 Switzerland) for a total cost of ₱3,727,460.28. Out of these fifteen (15) trips, only three
41 (3) trips were made by the Respondent without any companion.
42
43 Charge No. 15: Obstructing justice by ordering the Muntinlupa judges not to
44 issue warrants of arrest against Senator Leila M. De Lima
45
Page 30
1
2 (1) DCA Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino;
3 (2) Judge Juanita T. Guerrero – RTC Muntinlupa Branch 204;
4 (3) Judge Amelia Fabros-Corpus – RTC Muntinlupa Branch 205;
5 (4) Judge Patria Manalastas-De Leon -RTC Muntinlupa Branch 206.
6
7 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent instructed a Supreme
8 Court official to call Judges Guerrero, Fabros-Corpus and Manalastas-De Leon and order
9 them not to issue warrants of arrest against Senator Leila De Lima after three (3)
10 information were filed against her and raffled to the said judges.
11
12 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that this
13 allegation is a barefaced lie.
14
15 DCA Delorino categorically denied instructing the three (3) judges not to issue
16 warrants of arrest against Senator De Lima. She, however, called Judge Corpus and
17 Judge De Leon as part of her duties as DCA, to ask them if they needed assistance in
18 handling such a high-profile case. DCA Delorino also said she tried to call Judge
19 Guerrero, but the latter was on leave. Both Judges Corpus and De Leon denied having
20 received instructions from DCA Delorino or any official not to issue warrants of arrest
21 against Senator De Lima. Judge Guerrero likewise denied having received any phone
22 call from any Court official instructing her to do the same.
23
24 Charge No. 16: Obstructing and perverting justice by meeting the Presiding
25 Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals and instructing them
26 not to comply with the processes of the House of Representatives and to
27 immediately question its processes before the Supreme Court
28
30
31 (1) Supreme Court Associate Justice Andres Reyes, Jr; and
32 (2) Court of Appeals Associate Justice Remedios Salazar Fernando
33
34 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent met with the Presiding
35 Justice and Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals and instructed them to ignore and
36 defy the show cause order issued by the House of Representatives in relation to the
37 issue on the detention of the six (6) Ilocos Norte provincial officials. She also ordered
38 the CA Justices to immediately file a petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court.
39
40 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that she advised
41 then-CA Presiding Justice Andres Reyes, Jr. that the CA Justices who were issued show
42 cause orders should consider their own legal remedies. She did not instruct or direct
43 them to do or defy any lawful order.
44
45 Justice Fernando testified that then-CA Presiding Justice Reyes called an
46 emergency meeting on June 21, 2017 with other CA Justices and told them that he was
Page 31
1 told by the Respondent that they (the three CA Justices13 who were served show cause
2 orders by the House Committee on Good Government and Public Accountability) should
3 just file a petition for prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before
4 the Supreme Court, and that Respondent said, “Ako bahala.” When asked if the act of
5 the Chief Justice can be considered as intervention, Justice Fernando refused to say so,
6 but personally, she finds it inappropriate. She also stated that Justices and judges
7 should refrain from giving legal advice not only because they are precluded from doing
8 so but also because they may be accused of prejudging a particular case.
9
10 Justice Reyes confirmed that the Respondent asked him to relay to the thee (3)
11 CA Justices that if they had concerns or worries about the show cause order issued by
12 the House of Representatives, they can file a petition for prohibition in the Supreme
13 Court, and the Supreme Court will take care of it (“Supreme Court na ang bahala”). He
14 then relayed this message from the Respondent to the Justices of the Court of Appeals
15 during the same meeting described by Justice Fernando.
16
17 Charge No. 17: Failing to report her extortionate attorney’s fees and pay the
18 appropriate taxes therefor
19
20 The allegations in the Gadon Complaint and in the verified answer were discussed
21 in Charge No. 6 above. During the initial meetings on the said charge (failure to
22 truthfully disclose her SALN), Deputy Commissioner Arnel Guballa of the BIR was
23 instructed to investigate the allegation that the Respondent failed to pay the
24 appropriate taxes on her fees she collected from being the government counsel in the
25 arbitration case against PIATCO.
26
27 In his summary report, Deputy Commissioner Guballa stated that the
28 Respondent substantially declared all income from the PIATCO case in her income tax
29 returns from 2004 to 2009, but there were certain discrepancies observed. Based on
30 their preliminary findings, the Respondent is estimated to have a basic tax amounting
31 to ₱2,014,233.20 but paid only ₱1.6 million. He further stated that there are six (6)
32 possible violations for tax evasion, noting that Respondent failed to file value added tax
33 (VAT) returns as a professional, since she was registered in multiple revenue districts
34 while she was a professor in UP and engaged in private practice as a lawyer, and thus
35 she failed to pay the appropriate amount of taxes due thereon. Such failure to file the
36 VAT returns and to pay the taxes due amount to tax fraud under the National Internal
37 Revenue Code (NIRC).
38
39 Based on the documents submitted by the BIR, the Respondent received a total
40 of ₱32,494,805.27 as legal fees for her work as government counsel in the PIATCO
41 case. As compared to the admission by the Respondent in her verified answer, where
42 she stated that she received only a total of ₱30,300,000.00 as legal fees, there appears
43 to be more than ₱2,000,000.00 undeclared income by the Respondent with respect to
44 the said fees.
45
13
CA Justices Stephen Cruz, Edwin Sorongon and Nina Antonio-Valenzuela
Page 32
1 Charge No. 18: Embellishing her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in her application
2 for the Judiciary to overstate her credentials
3
4 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that Respondent misstated the following in
5 her PDS when she applied for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court:
6
7 (1) “Deputy Commissioner” of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
8 (2) Lecturer at the “Hague Academy of International Law”;
9 (3) Lecturer at the “University of Western Australia”; and,
10 (4) Lecturer at “Murdoch University”.
11
12 According to Atty. Gadon, the Supreme Court had previously dismissed from
13 service court personnel who made misrepresentations in her PDS for “dishonesty by
14 misrepresentation and falsification of a public document”.
15
16 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno responded to the above
17 allegations in the following manner:
18
19 (1) She possessed the “functional title” of Deputy Commissioner of the CHR,
20 when she acted as Deputy or Alternate Member to Commissioner Abelardo
21 Aportadera. Thus, in her subsequent 2012 PDS, she specifically stated
22 “Technical Consultant/Deputy Commissioner (Functional Title)”.
23
24 (2) She was a lecturer for the Cambodia Extension Program of the Hague
25 Academy of International Law. She never claimed she actually lectured in
26 the Netherlands.
27
28 (3) She was a lecturer of both University of Western Australia and Murdoch
29 University under their Manila Extension Programs.
30
31 The documents attached to the complaint, the 2010 PDS and the 2012 PDS of
32 the Respondent, are both subscribed under oath. All the material allegations of Atty.
33 Gadon are borne by said documents. It appears that based on the documents attached:
34
35 (1) The Respondent never stated that the position of “Deputy Commissioner”
36 was just a “functional title”;
37
38 (2) She never mentioned that she delivered lectures to the “Cambodia
39 Extension Program” of the Hague Academy of International Law; and
40
41 (3) She never mentioned that she delivered lectures to the “Manila Extension
42 Programs” of either the University of Western Australia or Murdoch
43 University.
44
45 Charge No. 19: Hiring an Information and Communications Technology (ICT)
46 consultant with excessive compensation and without public bidding, in
Page 33
1 contravention of existing laws, Commission on Audit (COA) rules, and public
2 policy
3
5
6 (1) Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro – Head, Committee on
7 Computerization and Library (CCL);
8 (2) Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Geraldine Faith Econg;
9 (3) DCA Raul Villanueva – BAC;
10 (4) DCA Thelma Bahia – BAC;
11 (5) Atty. Regina Ignacio – Assistant Court Administrator;
12 (6) Atty. Eden Candelaria – Deputy Clerk of Court, OAS;
13 (7) Atty. Corazon Ferrer-Flores – Deputy Clerk of Court, FMBO;
14 (8) Atty. Ma. Lourdes Oliveros – Chief Justice Staff Head (Chief of Staff);
15 (9) Atty. Michael Ocampo – Court Attorney VI, Office of the Chief Justice;
16 (10) Atty. Carlos Garay – Acting Chief, Management Information Systems
17 Office; and
18 (11) Ms. Helen Macasaet – Consultant
19
20 In addition, the Committee also invited Supreme Court Associate Justices Estela
21 Perlas-Bernabe and Marvic Leonen as members of the Committee on Computerization
22 and Library (CCL). However, both Justices submitted a letter respectfully declining the
23 Committee’s invitation, and instead submitted pertinent documents to the Committee
24 regarding the establishment and functions of the CCL.
25
26 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent unilaterally, without
27 public bidding and with abuse of discretion hired Ms. Macasaet as ICT Consultant with
28 a compensation of Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (₱250,000.00) a month to review,
29 assess and update the implementation of its Enterprise Information Systems Plan
30 (EISP). He claims that the hiring was done without public bidding, and violated
31 provisions of Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act.
32
33 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that the hiring
34 of Ms. Macasaet was through negotiated procurement because her services are “highly
35 technical in nature”, and therefore exempt from public bidding. She stated that Ms.
36 Macasaet’s initial 6-month service contract entitled her to receive a monthly salary of
37 ₱100,000.00, and that such contract was evaluated by the Procurement Planning
38 Committee (PPC), the BAC on Consulting Services, and the MISO of the Supreme Court.
39 After the review of the implementation of the EISP conducted by Ms. Macasaet under
40 the said contract, a 5-year work plan for the implementation of the updated EISP was
41 formulated, which required the services of a technical and policy consultant. Thus, Ms.
42 Macasaet was hired as such consultant after being recommended by the appropriate
43 officials for a new 6-month contract of services renewed several times until November
44 2017. According to the Respondent, the fee of ₱250,000.00 per month paid to Ms.
45 Macasaet was relatively lower than the cost of earlier ICT-related consultancies
Page 34
1 proposed by the Supreme Court Committee on Computerization and Library (CCL) in
2 2012, and such fees are justified by the result of Ms. Macasaet’s work.
3
4 During the course of the hearings, it was revealed that Ms. Macasaet indeed had
5 an initial 6-month contract for the review of the EISP, and that she received a
6 compensation of ₱100,000.00 per month for the said contract. She then entered into
7 another contract, this time for the implementation of the updated EISP which was the
8 product of her initial contract. This second contract was also for six (6) months, and
9 she received compensation of ₱250,000.00 per month. Pursuant to the 5-year work
10 plan, the contract for the implementation of the updated EISP was renewed six (6)
11 times until November 2017, when the said contract was subjected to review by the
12 Supreme Court en banc following allegations of irregularity and the filing of the instant
13 impeachment complaint.
14
15 The period of engagement of Ms. Macasaet and her compensation under each
16 contract are summarized below:
17
PERIOD OF ENGAGEMENT TOTAL COMPENSATION AVERAGE MONTHLY
COMPENSATION
October 1, 2013 – April 1, 2014 600,000.00 100,000.00
May 23, 2014 – November 23, 2014 1,500,000.00 250,000.00
November 23, 2014 – May 23, 2015 1,500,000.00 250,000.00
May 24, 2015 – November 24, 2015 1,500,000.00 250,000.00
November 24, 2015– May 24, 2016 1,500,000.00 250,000.00
May 24, 2016 – November 24, 2016 1,500,000.00 250,000.00
November 24, 2016 – May 24, 2017 1,500,000.00 250,000.00
May 24, 2017 – November 24 , 2017 1,500,000.00 250,000.00
TOTAL 11,100,000.00.00 11,100,000.00
18
19 For the second to eighth contract, the Terms of Reference for each contract are
20 exactly the same, with only minor differences on the Scope of Work for each succeeding
21 contract.
22
23 DCA Villanueva and DCA Bahia testified that only the first and second contracts
24 of Ms. Macasaet passed through the BAC-Goods and Services for review. The
25 succeeding contracts were no longer subject to review since they were renewals. DCA
26 Villanueva also stated that the hiring of Ms. Macasaet was done through negotiated
27 procurement, since the contract involved work that was “highly technical in nature”.
28
29 Atty. Ignacio testified that the “renewal” contracts should still have passed
30 through the BAC processes since each renewed contract is a separate contract with a
31 different cause, object and consideration. She stated that the hiring of a consultant by
32 the head of office should be done based on the recommendation of the BAC.
33
34 Atty. Ocampo testified that he and the late Mr. Edilberto Davis, then-Acting Chief
35 of MISO, issued a memorandum recommending the hiring of Ms. Macasaet after they
36 reviewed the qualifications of three (3) consultants. He also stated that the renewal of
Page 35
1 contracts is not prohibited under existing laws, and that the renewals of contracts
2 through negotiated procurement no longer needed to undergo BAC Processes.
3
4 Atty. Oliveros testified that she and Ms. Macasaet are very good friends, and that
5 she introduced Ms. Macasaet to the Respondent sometime in 2012. However, Ms.
6 Oliveros emphasized that she did not in any way influence the hiring of Ms. Macasaet,
7 since she was not involved in the procurement of services of consultants.
8
9 Sandiganbayan Justice Econg testified that she was approached by Atty. Oliveros
10 who told her that the Respondent did not like people who oppose her actions or have
11 opposing views (“does not like iyung taong kumokontra”), referring to her reaction to
12 the hiring of Ms. Macasaet. Justice Econg stated that she did not object but only wanted
13 to hold in abeyance the hiring of Ms. Macasaet in order to further study the need of
14 hiring a consultant.
15
16 Atty. Garay testified that Ms. Macasaet was supposed to upgrade the Judicial
17 Data Center but from the time she was hired, there was no substantial effect on the
18 system. He also testified that he had no direct supervision and control over Ms.
19 Macasaet, and that he merely signed the accomplishment reports of Ms. Macasaet as a
20 ministerial task because the reports were already prepared for his signature. He said
21 that if he were the head of the MISO at the time of the hiring of Ms. Macasaet, he would
22 have objected to the hiring because of the extremely high compensation compared to
23 the nature and scope of the work, since he himself was also hired as a consultant with
24 a monthly compensation of ₱30,000.00 prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court.
25 He also stated that it was more feasible to hire a number of consultants who are experts
26 in their field rather than award the entire contract for the implementation of the 5-year
27 work plan to a single consultant.
28
29 Justice De Castro testified that when she was the head of the CCL at the time,
30 the hiring of Ms. Macasaet as ICT Consultant did not pass through her committee. She
31 also stated that she only met Ms. Macasaet once, and that was after she was already
32 hired as consultant. Justice De Castro said that she felt like the Respondent did not
33 want her to continue as head of the CCL, and she later informed the Respondent that
34 she would step down from her position, which relieved the Respondent who then took
35 over as head of the CCL.
36
37 In their letter to the Committee, Justices Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen stated that
38 as members of the CCL, they had no personal knowledge of the circumstances
39 surrounding the hiring of Ms. Macasaet, and that they are not privy to any information
40 regarding the functions of the CCL at the time.
41
42 The members of the Committee noted that after the initial review of the EISP
43 under the first contract, it was already established that the implementation of the
44 updated EISP would take five (5) years as envisioned in the 5-year work plan. However,
45 the contracts for Ms. Macasaet as consultant were broken down into 6-month contracts,
46 with each succeeding contract simply being renewed. Questions were raised as to the
47 propriety of the separate 6-month contracts, since it may be considered as “splitting”
48 of a contract which is prohibited by the Procurement Law. The Committee also noted
49 that the splitting of Ms. Macasaet’s contract into piece-meal contracts worth ₱1.5 million
Page 36
1 each might have been done to put such contracts below the threshold of value of
2 contracts that should be approved by the Supreme Court en banc, thereby making such
3 contracts reviewable only by the Chief Justice. There was also an unusual interest by
4 the Respondent on contracts involving the EISP as she eagerly took over as head of the
5 CCL upon the resignation of Justice De Castro.
6
7 Throughout the hearing on this charge, the Committee was notified that there is
8 a pending review being conducted by the Supreme Court en banc on the subject
9 contracts of Ms. Macasaet. The witnesses and resource persons invited by the
10 Committee were all barred from discussing or answering questions on the validity of
11 the contracts of Ms. Macasaet, or the contents of the Report of the Office of the Chief
12 Attorney (OCAt) dated November 6, 2017, a copy of which was received by the Office
13 of the Chairman through an anonymous source.
14
15 According to the said OCAt Report, there were several irregularities in the hiring
16 of Ms. Macasaet under the abovementioned contracts:
17
18 (1) The determination of the most qualified consultant was conducted by Atty.
19 Ocampo and Mr. Davis, and not by the BAC;
20 (2) There was no Notice of Award issued by the BAC;
21 (3) The consultancy contracts for Ms. Macasaet provided for reimbursable
22 costs for travel and accommodation, violating the “fixed price” rule under
23 the implementing rules and regulations of the Procurement Law that states
24 that consultancy contracts should not entail additional costs to the
25 procuring entity;
26 (4) The compensation awarded to Ms. Macasaet was unreasonable, since the
27 “market research” conducted by Atty. Ocampo compared the
28 compensation of Ms. Macasaet vis-à-vis consulting firms, and not
29 individual consultants. The proper benchmark should have been the basic
30 monthly salary of the MISO Chief, which amounted to ₱73,099.00.
31 Allowing for the maximum consultancy fees of 120% as allowed in the
32 National Budget Circular, Ms. Macasaet should have been compensated by
33 ₱87,718.80 only; and,
34 (5) Based on all the contracts and its Terms of Reference, procurement of
35 services of Ms. Macasaet is for the 5-year implementation of the EISP, and
36 therefore public bidding for the procurement of such services was more
37 feasible. To split the implementation of the 5-year plan into short-term 6-
38 month contracts may be disadvantageous to the government. It may also
39 fall under the prohibition against the splitting of contracts under RA 9184.
40
41 Charge No. 20: Sending a strongly-worded but misplaced reply to President
42 Rodrigo Duterte on the Judges linked to drugs thereby inviting a head-on
43 collision between the Presidency and the Judiciary
44
45 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent sent a strongly-
46 worded letter to President Duterte stating that she would caution judges very strongly
Page 37
1 against “surrendering” absent any duly-issued warrant of arrest. However, according
2 to Atty. Gadon, the President did not tell the judges he named in his speech to
3 surrender to the police, and that the President did not accuse anybody. Thus, the letter
4 of the Respondent addressed to the President invited a head-on collision between two
5 separate branches of government.
6
7 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that in her letter,
8 she merely demonstrated genuine concern for the welfare of all members of the
9 Judiciary and her willingness to cooperate and work with the President in his campaign
10 against illegal drugs.
11
12 The letter of Respondent and the speech of the President being matters of public
13 record, the Committee no longer invited resource persons to testify on the matter.
14
15 Charge No. 21: Preventing the Justices of the Court of Appeals to do a courtesy
16 call on President Duterte
17
18 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon testified that in response to a publicized courtesy
19 call of thirty-six (36) CA Justices to the President Malacañang and four (4)
20 Sandiganbayan Justices in Davao City, the Respondent prevented then-Presiding
21 Justice Andres Reyes from pushing through with the courtesy call. In doing so, she
22 drove a wedge between the Judiciary and the Executive Departments.
23
24 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that she cannot
25 prevent any member of the Judiciary, much less the CA Presiding Justice, from visiting
26 the President. However, she merely reminded the magistrates of the Canon of
27 “Independence” of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
28
29 Justice Reyes testified that the Respondent instructed him to cancel the
30 scheduled courtesy call to the President and to submit a written explanation to the
31 Supreme Court en banc regarding his letter to the President which he copy-furnished
32 the Respondent. In his letter, Justice Reyes stated that he wished to discuss with the
33 President certain issues and problems hounding the Court of Appeals. When the
34 Respondent received the letter, she immediately had Justice Reyes come to her office,
35 where she said that she felt insulted by the letter he wrote to the President since
36 according to her, he made it appear that the Supreme Court was not doing anything
37 about the problems he mentioned in her letter. Justice Reyes then apologized, but the
38 Respondent replied that this incident might end his career. He then cancelled the
39 courtesy call. He also stated that he became sick for more than a week due to extreme
40 stress and anxiety caused by the threats of the Respondent that the courtesy call might
41 be career-ending for him.
42
43 Members of the Committee noted the admission of Justice Reyes that he was
44 prevented by the Respondent from paying a courtesy call to the President, in contrast
45 to the assertion made by the Respondent in her verified answer that she cannot prevent
46 any member of the Judiciary from visiting the President, and that she merely reminded
Page 38
1 them of the Canon of Independence. It was also noted that the Respondent’s statement
2 that she was offended by the letter sent by Justice Reyes to the President reflects
3 negatively on the mental and psychological temperament of the Respondent.
4
5 Charge No. 22: Attacking the imposition of Martial Law in a commencement
6 address, while a petition challenging the validity of the declaration of Martial
7 Law was still pending before the Supreme Court, and thereafter participating
8 in the SC deliberations on the said petition
9
10 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that during her commencement speech to
11 graduating students of Ateneo de Manila University, the Respondent imparted
12 prejudicial statements pertaining to the imposition of Martial Law in Mindanao, despite
13 the existence of pending cases before the Supreme Court challenging its proclamation.
14 After doing so, she still continued to participate in the oral arguments of the said cases
15 and thereafter, and unsurprisingly, dissented from the majority view upholding the
16 imposition of Martial Law.
17
18 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that she gave
19 the speech referred to in the complaint before the filing of the first of three (3) petitions
20 questioning the imposition of Martial Law in Mindanao. She did not attack the imposition
21 of Martial Law, and expressly recognized the power of the President to do so under the
22 1987 Constitution. She emphasized that the commencement address was an exercise
23 of her right to free speech.
24
25 The commencement speech of the Respondent subject of the allegation being a
26 matter of public record, the Committee no longer invited resource persons to testify on
27 the same. However, the Committee also noted that despite her public pronouncements
28 highlighting the evils of Martial Law thereby showing her prejudice and bias on the
29 subject, she still participated in the deliberations of the Supreme Court on the
30 abovementioned petitions.
31
32 Charge No. 23: Issuing a Joint Statement with the Presiding Justice of the
33 Court of Appeals regarding CA-GR SP No. 151029 (Genedine Jambaro, et. al.vs.
34 Lt. Gen. Roland Detabali (Ret), which can very well be elevated to the Supreme
35 Court
36
38
39 (1) Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro; and,
40 (2) Justice Andres Reyes, Jr.;
41
42 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon claimed that the Joint Statement issued by the
43 Respondent and then-CA Presiding Justice Andres Jr. was disowned by other Justices
44 in the Supreme Court, since courts should not give advisory opinions on cases pending
45 before it.
46
Page 39
1 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that the Joint
2 Statement did not comment on the proceedings pending before the CA. It focused only
3 on the unprecedented issuance of show cause orders against three (3) members of the
4 Special Fourth Division of the CA. The Respondent also inhibited herself when the
5 matter was elevated to the Supreme Court.
6
7 Justice Reyes testified that he was approached by the Respondent and shown a
8 prepared draft of the statement. He said that the Respondent asked him to read and
9 sign the statement, and that he did so only after the Respondent signed it first. Justice
10 Reyes said that at the time, he believed that the Respondent was acting as a “mother”
11 to the Judiciary, and that he thought that the statement was appropriate for the
12 situation. However, Justice Reyes also stated that he would not have signed such a
13 statement on his own, since he would have first consulted with the Justices of the CA
14 being a collegial and consultative body.
15
16 Justice De Castro stated that the joint statement was highly inappropriate,
17 considering that it was asking a co-equal branch of government to “reconsider” an
18 action taken by it, and through a mere letter at that. She further stated that the
19 statement was issued without the approval, much less the knowledge, of the Supreme
20 Court en banc, considering that such statement issued by the Chief Justice and the
21 Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals may be construed as a statement issued by
22 the Supreme Court and the CA itself.
23
24 Charge No. 24: Practicing favoritism by allowing key positions in the Supreme
25 Court to remain unfilled for a long period of time in order to wait for her staff
26 to qualify, to the detriment of the service and great demoralization of qualified
27 Supreme Court employees
28
30
31 (1) Justice Teresita Leonardo De-Castro;
32 (2) Court Administrator Midas Marquez.
33
34 In his verified complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Supreme Court had a
35 number of high-ranking key positions that have remained vacant since 2013:
36
37 (a) Two (2) Assistant Court Administrator positions, with salary grade 30;
38 (b) One (1) Deputy Clerk of Court position, with salary grade 29; and,
39 (c) One (1) Chief Attorney position, with salary grade 29.
40
41 Atty. Gadon further alleged that the Respondent refused to fill-up the said
42 vacancies because she does not have the majority vote. Her failure to act upon and fill-
43 up the vacancies despite the urgent need for them shows her incompetence and
44 unfitness to the position of Chief Justice.
45
Page 40
1 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno claimed that the matter
2 of unfilled positions is already pending before the Supreme Court en banc. She added
3 that the vacancies were deferred to await the resolution of a number of issues related
4 to the organizational development of the Supreme Court, such as the updating of salary
5 grades and benefits of certain key positions.
6
7 Justice De Castro testified that the Respondent was not being truthful in her
8 verified answer since the updating of salary grades and benefits may proceed even if
9 the vacancies are already filled and new officials are appointed. She does not see the
10 logic of leaving the vacancies unfilled while updating the salaries and benefits of Court
11 personnel, since the vacant positions mentioned by Atty. Gadon are important positions
12 for the orderly function of the offices in the Supreme Court. She also noted that after
13 more than four (4) years of inaction, the Respondent suddenly opened the vacancies
14 after the impeachment complaint was filed which included this particular ground. Court
15 Administrator Marquez echoed the observation of Justice De Castro that the positions
16 left unfilled for a long time were important positions that needed to be filled immediately
17 even pending the implementation of a holistic plan on organizational development. Both
18 Justice De Castro and Court Administrator Marquez lamented that there have been
19 several highly qualified and loyal employees in the Supreme Court who were not
20 promoted due to the inaction of the Respondent, and this also prevented other
21 employees from being promoted as well since the vacant positions left unfilled were
22 among the highest positions in the Supreme Court and the cascading effect of
23 promotion among the rank-and-file was stymied.
24
25 Justice De Castro and Court Administrator Marquez also stated that initially, only
26 one (1) position was opened, with Atty. Oliveros (Respondent’s Chief-of-staff) included
27 among the applicants. However, after the filing of the instant impeachment complaint
28 which included this particular charge, Atty. Oliveros was no longer included as an
29 applicant and all the other vacant positions were opened for application.
30
31 Charge No. 25: Appointing a key official to the Philippine Mediation Center
32 Office (PMCO) without authority or approval of the Supreme Court en banc
33
35
36 (1) Retired Justice Adolfo Azcuna – Chancellor, Philippine Judicial Academy
37 (PhilJA);
38 (2) Sandiganbayan Justice Geraldine Faith Econg;
39 (3) Court Administrator Midas Marquez
40
41 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent appointed the Chief
42 of the PMCO on June 28, 2016 without authority or approval of the Supreme Court en
43 banc, in stark contrast to the appointment of then-judge Geraldine Faith Econg as Chief
44 of PMCO which was approved by the Supreme Court en banc.
45
Page 41
1 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that the
2 appointment of Atty. Brenda Jay Angeles-Mendoza as Chief of Office of the PMCO is the
3 subject of a pending administrative matter before the Supreme Court en banc. She also
4 claimed that based on the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual, the position of
5 “Chief of Office” shall be filled through the appointment of the Chief Justice with the
6 concurrence of the Chairmen of the Divisions. A Supreme Court Resolution also provides
7 that the Chairpersons of the three (3) Divisions have the power to appoint personnel in
8 the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJA), including the Chief of Office of the PMCO. She
9 also alleged that the appointment of Atty. Mendoza as PMCO Chief was a collegial act
10 concurred in by Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio and Associate Justice Presbitero
11 Velasco, Jr.
12
13 Retired Justice Adolfo Azcuna, Chancellor of the PhilJA, testified that based on a
14 Resolution of the Supreme Court, the Chief of Office of the PMCO is appointed by “the
15 Supreme Court upon recommendation of the Philippine Judicial Academy”. In the case
16 of Atty. Mendoza, which is the subject of this charge in the complaint, Justice Azcuna
17 stated that he recommended to the Respondent the appointment of Atty. Mendoza as
18 PMCO Chief. However, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno referred his recommendation
19 to the three (3) Chairpersons of the Supreme Court Divisions, and not to the Supreme
20 Court en banc. According to Justice Azcuna, the best practice based on established
21 precedent is that the recommendation of the PhilJA should be approved by the Supreme
22 Court en banc.
23
24 Justice Econg and Court Administrator Marquez both confirmed that the
25 appointment of Justice Econg as Chief of PMCO in 2015 was with the approval of the
26 Supreme Court en banc. Justice Econg opined that she was recommended and
27 appointed as Chief of PMCO, even though she did not apply for and was not interested
28 in the said position, in order for her to be relieved as Project Management Office Head
29 after she voiced her objections to the appointment of Helen Macasaet as consultant.
30 She also stated that she was informed by Respondent’s Chief-of-staff Atty. Oliveros
31 that she should just accept this new position because the Respondent
32
33 Charge No. 26: Giving her newly-hired staff foreign staff travels and granting
34 them travel allowances for their foreign travels without authority or approval
35 of the Supreme Court en banc
36
38
39 (1) Court Administrator Midas Marquez;
40 (2) Atty. Corazon Ferrer-Flores – Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief, FMBO;
41
42 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent circumvented the rules
43 of the Supreme Court when she unduly delegated unto herself the approval of foreign
44 travel on official business of staff from the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ), when such
45 travel must be approved by the Supreme Court en banc. Respondent allegedly made it
46 appear that her staff was travelling on official time funded by partner or host
Page 42
1 organizations, but would grant them travel allowances charged against Supreme Court
2 funds.
3
4 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno stated that the matter
5 of foreign travel of OCJ personnel on “official time” or “official business” is likewise
6 subject of an administrative matter pending before the Supreme Court en banc. She
7 alleged that foreign travels and related travel expenses of court personnel do not need
8 the approval of the Supreme Court en banc.
9
10 Atty. Flores submitted to the Committee a list of official foreign travels of the
11 Respondent and the officials and employees of the Office of the Chief Justice. In her
12 summary report, Atty. Flores stated that for the period 2012-2017, the Chief Justice
13 and her staff travelled abroad a total of thirty-one (31) times for a total cost of
14 ₱8,726,688.64 charged against Supreme Court funds.
15
16 Charge No. 27: Usurping the mandate of the Supreme Court en banc by
17 arrogating unto herself alone the running of the Supreme Court and the
18 Judiciary, thereby destroying the Supreme Court as a collegial body.
19
20 In his complaint, Atty. Gadon alleged that the Respondent mismanaged the
21 Supreme Court and the Judiciary by granting huge allowances, purchasing vehicles,
22 distributing foreign travels, and doing other acts all by herself. She also ruled with
23 extreme bias, obvious favoritism and with utmost disregard for existing policies, rules
24 and tradition.
25
26 In her verified answer, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno simply stated that by
27 her conduct, she has been zealously protecting the independence of the Judiciary as
28 the third branch of government.
29
30 During the course of the hearings, the issue of the Respondent’s personality
31 surfaced. A Manila Times news report broke an exclusive story on August 4, 2012, the
32 same day that Respondent Sereno was appointed as Chief Justice, where it was
33 revealed that the Respondent received a grade of “4” (with “5” being the lowest) in
34 tests given by psychologists and psychiatrists of the JBC. She was also described in
35 that report as “dramatic and emotional”. The news report continued:
36
37 “She appears energetic and all smiles and agreeable, but with
38 religious preoccupation in all significant aspects of her life. She
39 projects a happy mood but has depressive markers. There is a
40 strong tendency to make decisions based on current mood thus,
41 outcome is highly subjective and self-righteous.”
42
43 Acting on this information, the Committee invited the psychiatrists who
44 conducted the interview of then-applicant Sereno, and the JBC psychologists who
45 prepared the report. The psychiatrists, Dr. Dulce Lizza Sahagun-Reyes and Dr. Genuina
46 Ranoy, and the psychologists, Ms. Bernaden De Leon-Jamon and Ms. Maria Caguingin,
Page 43
1 all invoked the privileged nature of the information sought from them. Upon the request
2 of the resource persons, the Committee voted unanimously to grant them all legislative
3 immunity in exchange for their testimony, and conducted an executive session where
4 they may reveal the privileged information. Subsequently, the Committee agreed,
5 without objection, to declassify the information revealed during the executive session.
6
7 Based on the testimonies of Dr. Sahagun-Reyes, Dr. Ranoy, Ms. Jamon and Ms.
8 Caguingin, it appears that the description in the Manila Times report quoted above was
9 an exact verbatim quotation of the psychological report submitted by the JBC. The
10 report also included the IQ score of the Respondent, which was 109 and described as
11 “average”.
12
13 Dr. Geraldine Tria, a licensed clinical psychologist, was requested by the
14 Chairman to give an interpretation of the psychological report based on the testimonies
15 of the psychiatrists and psychologists given during the executive session as well as the
16 findings of the Committee so far, including the allegations in the verified complaint and
17 verified answer.
18
19 According to Dr. Tria, Respondent Chief Justice Sereno exhibited five (5) of the
20 nine (9) symptoms of dramatic and emotional type of individual as described in the
21 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition (DSM-5):
22
23 1. Interpersonally exploitative – Respondent’s actions of arrogating upon
24 herself the powers of the Supreme Court as a collegial body reveal her
25 propensity to take advantage of others to achieve her own ends;
26 2. Preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power and brilliance
27 – Respondent has the tendency to usurp duties, disrespect other members of
28 the Supreme Court and substitute her own ideas and opinions;
29 3. Lacks empathy – Respondent failed to recognize or identify with the feelings
30 and needs of others, especially with respect to the surviving spouses of
31 deceased judges and Justices;
32 4. Has sense of entitlement on unreasonable expectation of favorable
33 treatment as automatic compliance with her expectation – Respondent
34 appears to believe that she is always correct and should be treated as such;
35 5. Has grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. expects to be recognized
36 as superior without commensurate to achievement) – Respondent’s
37 grandiosity to show self-importance manifests in her staying in opulent hotels
38 and occupying business class when traveling abroad.
39
40 Finally, based on the grade of “4” given to Respondent and her IQ of 109, Dr.
41 Tria stated that she would not have recommended Respondent since there could very
42 well have been other, more qualified applicants. This was echoed by Dr. Reyes and Dr.
43 Ranoy, who said that they were very surprised to have learned that despite their report
44 and negative recommendation, the Respondent was included in the shortlist and was
45 even appointed as Chief Justice. Ms. Jamon and Ms. Caguingin also testified that it was
46 a matter of practice that those who received a grade of “4” were not recommended to
Page 44
1 be included in the shortlist, except under very exceptional circumstances based on the
2 extraordinary achievement or qualifications of the applicant who received such grade.
3 The Committee noted that no such circumstance, achievement or qualification was
4 present in the case of the Respondent.
5
6 The Committee duly noted the observations of Dr. Tria based on her evaluation
7 of the records and the psychological report as described in the Manila Times report
8 (which was a verbatim reproduction of the said psychological report), and emphasized
9 that the description fits well into possible explanations as to the actions committed by
10 the Respondent as alleged in the complaint and discovered by the Committee during
11 the course of its hearings.
12
13 V.
14 FINDINGS
15
16 After fifteen (15) hearings spanning a period of four (4) months, the Committee
17 conducted its final meeting to determine if probable cause exists to impeach
18 Respondent Chief Justice Sereno. Thus, by a vote of thirty-eight (38) in favor and
19 only two (2) against, the Committee determined that PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS
20 to impeach the Respondent.
21
22
23 VI.
24 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
25
26 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Committee on Justice finds PROBABLE
27 CAUSE TO IMPEACH RESPONDENT CHIEF JUSTICE MA. LOURDES P.A. SERENO
28 for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, corruption, and other
29 high crimes
30
31 It is recommended that this Committee Report and its accompanying Resolution
32 Setting for the Articles of Impeachment Against Supreme Court Chief Justice Ma.
33 Lourdes P.A. Sereno be approved in a Plenary Roll Call vote pursuant to Section 3(3),
34 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
March 19, 2018. Constitution Hills, Quezon City.
Respectfully submitted,
REYNALDO V. UMALI
Chairman
Committee on Justice
Page 45

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