TAYLOR VS MANILA ELECTRIC

David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some
principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was a
mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said,
Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant where they
found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented
until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion
of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to children, they are
liable for damages due to the company’s negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they
used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection
between the company’s negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts
of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple
attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically
than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he
was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well
knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments
made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge
the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show
clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
“The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that
he cannot demand reparation therefor from another.”

_________________________________________________________________

DEL ROSARIO VS MANILA ELECTRIC

FACTS:
 August 4, 1930 2 pm: trouble developed in a wire used by Manila Electric Company on Dimas-Alang
Street for the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs
 Jose Noguera, who had charge of a tienda nearby, first noticed that the wire was burning and its
connections smoking
 the wire parted and one of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to the
way
 Noguera went to the nearby garage and asked Jose Soco, the timekeeper, to telephone the Malabon
station of the Manila Electric Company
 2.25 p.m.: Soco transmitted the message and the station told him that they would send an inspector
 4 p.m.: neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home
 Saturnino Endrina made a motion as if it touch the wire
 Jose Salvador, happened to be the son of an electrician and his father had cautioned him never to
touch a broken electrical wire, as it might have a current
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 Alberto del Rosario said that "I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires" and so feeling
challenged put out his index finger and touch the wire
 He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay! madre"
 The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post
 A crowd soon collected, and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body
 Upon arrival at St. Luke's Hospital he was pronounced dead.
 Trial Court: absolved Manila Electric Company
ISSUE: W/N Manila Electric Company should be held liable for negligence that caused the death of Alberto

HELD: YES. judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the plaintiff will recover of the defendant the
sum of P1,250, with costs of both instances
 The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special inspection
of these wires at least once in six months, and that all of the company's inspectors were required in
their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind.
 presumption of negligence on the part of the Manila Electric Company from the breakage of this wire
has not been overcome, and it is in our opinion responsible for the accident
 It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his
immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary,
and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not,
in our opinion, alter the case. But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure
be properly imputed to the deceased, — a proposition upon which the members of the court do not all
agree, — yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having
been the determining cause of the accident.

US vs. Bonifacio
GR No. L-10563March 2, 1916Carson, J:
Facts: Bonifacio was an engineer and was conducting the heavy freight train one morning in Batangas. The
train had just rounded a curve when Bonifacio saw a man (EligioCastillo) walking along the railroad
track. The former immediately blew his whistletwice; unknown to him, Castillo was a deaf-mute. Noticing
that Castillo did not stepaside from the track, Bonifacio tried to slow down the engine, but did not succeed
instopping in time to avoid running down the pedestrian, who, about that time, turnedand attempted to
cross the track.Bonifacio was charged in the trial court with homicide committed with recklessnegligence
and he was convicted of homicide committed with simple negligence

.Issue:Whether or not Bonifacio is liable for the death of Castillo.

Held:He is not liable. There is no obligation on an engine driver to stop, or even to slow down his
engine,when he sees an adult pedestrian standing or walking on or near the track, unlessthere is
something in the appearance or conduct of the person on foot which wouldcause a prudent man to
anticipate the possibility that such person could not, orwould not avoid the possibility of danger by stepping
aside. Ordinarily, all that mayproperly be required of an engine driver under such circumstances is that
he givewarning of his approach, by blowing his whistle or ringing his bell until he is assuredthat the attention of
the pedestrian has been attracted to the oncoming train.An engine driver may fairly assume that all persons
walking or standing on or nearthe railroad track, except children of tender years, are aware of the danger
to whichthey are exposed; and that they will take reasonable precautions to avoid accident,by looking and
listening for the approach of trains, and stepping out of the way of danger when their attention is directed to
an oncoming train. Any other rule wouldrender it impracticable to operate railroads so as to secure
the expeditioustransportation of passengers and freight which the public interest demands.Bonifacio was
without fault; and that the accident must be attributed wholly to thereckless negligence of the deaf-mute, in
walking on the track without taking thenecessary precautions to avoid danger from a train approaching him
from behind.
WRIGHT VS MANILA ELECTRIC

FACTS:
 August 8, 1909 night time: Wright who was intoxicated drove in his calesa and as his horse leap
forward along the rails of the Manila Electric company and it fell
 Wright was thrown and got injured

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 that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the
ground making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street
 RTC: both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as defendant's and
under the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. apportioned the damages and awarded
Wright a judgment of P1,000
ISSUE: W/N Wright's negligence contributed to the 'principal occurrence' or 'only to his own injury (NOT
contributory) thereby he cannot recover

HELD:NO. Affirmed

 Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other
evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk
or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care
is required than by a sober one.
 Manila Electric or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the rails and a part of the ties
uncovered in a street where there is a large amount of travel
 If the Wright had been prudent on the night in question and had not attempted to drive his conveyance
while in a drunken condition, he would certainly have avoided the damages which he received
 Both parties were negligent and both contributed to the resulting damages, although the Wright, in the
judgment of the court, contributed in greater proportion to the damages
 no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the Wright was negligent
 It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions
described
 It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the question
presented by the appellant company with reference to the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. &
P. Co. and we do not find facts in the opinion of the court below which justify a larger verdict than the
one found.
Dissenting Opinion by Carson:
 if the case is to be decided on the findings of fact by the trial judge, these findings sufficiently establish
the negligence of Wright
 The fact finding of the RTC judge, the fact that there is negligence though not fully sustained should be
assumed that there were evidentiary facts disclosed which were sufficient to sustain that there is
negligence

CULION ICE VS PHIL MOTORS

FACTS:
 January, 1925: Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a
gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner, expecting thereby to effect economy in the cost of running the
boat
 He made known his desire to McLeod & Co., a firm dealing in tractors, and was told by Mc Kellar that
he might make inquiries of the Philippine Motors Corporations
 Cranston repaired to the office of the Philippine Motors Corporation and had a conference with C.E.
Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment should be made
upon completion of the work.
 The Philippine Motors Corporation was at this time engaged in business as an automobile agency, but,
under its charter, it had authority to deal in all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well as to
build, operate, buy and sell the same and the equipment therof.
 Quest, in company with Cranston, visited the Gwendoline while it lay at anchor in the Pasig River, and
the work of effecting the change in the engine was begun
 Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the conclusion that the principal thing
necessary to accomplish the end in view was to install a new carburetor, and a Zenith carburetor was
chosen as the one most adapted to the purpose.
 After this appliance had been installed, the engine was tried with gasoline as a fuel, supplied from the
tank already in use. The result of this experiment was satisfactory.

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 The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil
mixed with distillate.
 In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed that the
carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to
the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's attention, but he appeared to think lightly of
the matter and said that, when the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear.
 January 30,1925 5 pm: The first part of the course was covered without any untoward development,
other than the fact that the engine stopped a few times, owing no doubt to the use of an improper
mixture of fuel. In the course of the trial Quest remained outside of the engine compartment and
occupied himself with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements
would give best results in the engine.
 7:30 pm: and when passing near Cavite, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made
with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched
to the tube connecting with the new mixture.
 A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the
carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which
the members of the crew were unable to subdue. They were therefore compelled, as the fire spread, to
take to a boat, and their escape was safely effected, but the Gwendoline was reduced to a mere hulk.
The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before
the accident occurred, as the court found, was P10,000.
ISSUE: W/N the incident was due to the negligence of Phil. Motors as experts.

HELD: YES. It results that the judgment appealed from, awarding damages to the plaintiff in the amount of
P9,850, with interest, must be affirmed; and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.
 Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would not be followed by any disaster, but in this case the leak
along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a
prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire
may have been due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
 In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being competent to
do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care
and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
 The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and
tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats.
 Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline
engines on boats = negligence.
 The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from
blame
 accident is chargeable to lack of skill or negligence in effecting the changes which Quest undertook to
accomplish; and even supposing that our theory as to the exact manner in which the accident occurred
might appear to be in some respects incorrect, yet the origin of the fire in not so inscrutable as to
enable us to say that it was casus fortuitus.

Cusi v. PNR

• Spouses Cusi attended a birthday party in Paranaque, Rizal. After the party which broke up at about 11
o'clock that evening, the spouses proceeded home in their Vauxhall car with Victorino Cusi at the wheel.
Upon reaching the railroad tracks, finding that the level crossing bar was raised and seeing that there was
no flashing red light, and hearing no whistle from any coming train, Cusi proceeded to cross the tracks. At
the same time, a train bound for Lucena traversed the crossing, resulting in a collision between the two.

• This accident caused the spouses to suffer deformities and to lose the earnings they used to enjoy as
successful career people.

• The defense is centered on the proposition that the gross negligence of Victorino Cusi was the proximate
cause of the collision; that had he made a full stop before traversing the crossing as required by section
56(a) of Act 3992 (Motor Vehicle Law), he could have seen and heard the approach of the train, and thus,
there would have been no collision.
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ISSUE: W/N Victorino Cusi was negligent and such was the proximate cause of the collision

Ruling: No.

• Negligence has been defined by Judge Cooley in his work on Torts as "the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."

• All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a person to use that care and diligence
expected of reasonable men under similar circumstances.

• In this case, the warning devices installed at the railroad crossing were manually operated; there were
only 2 shifts of guards provided for the operation thereof — one, the 7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P. M. shift, and the
other, the3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. shift. On the night of the accident, the train for Lucena was on an
unscheduled trip after 11:00 P.M. During that precise hour, the warning devices were not operating for no
one attended to them.

Also, as observed by the lower court, the locomotive driver did not blow his whistle, thus: "... he simply sped
on without taking an extra precaution of blowing his whistle.

That the train was running at full speed is attested to by the fact that notwithstanding the application of the
emergency brakes, the train did not stop until it reached a distance of around 100 meters."

• Victorino Cusi had exercised all the necessary precautions required of him as to avoid injury to -himself
and to others. We find no need for him to have made a full stop; relying on his faculties of sight and
hearing, Victorino Cusi had no reason to anticipate the impending danger

• The record shows that the spouses Cusi previously knew of the existence of the railroad crossing, having
stopped at the guardhouse to ask for directions before proceeding to the party. At the crossing, they found
the level bar raised, no warning lights flashing nor warning bells ringing, nor whistle from an oncoming train.
They safely traversed the crossing.

On their return home, the situation at the crossing did not in the least change, except for the absence of the
guard or flagman. Hence, on the same impression that the crossing was safe for passage as before,
Victorino Cusi merely slackened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks, driving at the proper rate of
speed for going over railroad crossings

________________________________________________________________

MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. 115024 [February 7, 1996]

Facts:

At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home. While travelling along Aurora Blvd.,
she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that
her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car’s condition, she parked along the
sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to
open the trunk.

She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the
tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and
registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown
against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She
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was pulled out from under defendant’s car. Plaintiff’s left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with
only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical
Memorial Center where she was found to have a “traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above
knee).” She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not Li was negligent.

2.) Whether or not Valenzuela was contributory negligent.

3.) Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer is liable.

Held:

1.) Yes. A witness testified that Li’s car was being driven at a “very fast” speed, racing towards the general
direction of Araneta Avenue. He also saw the car hitValenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the
defendant’s Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she eventually fell under the defendant’s car. Moreover the
witness declared that he observed Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk, contrary to
Li’s allegation that Valenzuela’s car was close to the center of the right lane.

2.) No. The Court held that Valenzuela was not negligent applying the emergency rule.

Under the “emergency rule,” an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.

Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to
have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her
lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not
of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously, the only
negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident.

3.) Yes. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to the Court’s satisfaction, that it exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were
made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able
to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company
car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally
liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. He admitted that his functions as Assistant
Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to
perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company
clients. These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial
employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both
social as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc.
therefore enabled both Li – as well as the corporation – to put up the front of a highly successful entity,
increasing the latter’s goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by
providing the former with a convenient mode of travel

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., vs. C & A Construction

G.R. No. 156034. October 1, 2003

Facts: C&A Construction (C & A for brevity) was engaged by the National Housing Authority (NHA) to
construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo Manila.
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M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., (Delsan)
anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil
tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express
received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about
eight (8) hours.
At approximately 8:35 in the morning of the next day, Captain Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North
Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested. At 10:00 am., Captain Jusep
decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth which is 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At
that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Captain Jusep ordered his crew to go full
ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge.
To avoid collision, Captain Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. He succeeded in avoiding the power
barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall
constructed by (C & A). C&A demanded payment of the damage from Delsan but the latter refused to pay.
Hence, the complaint for damages with the RTC.
RTC ruled against C&A and in favor of Delsan stating absence of negligence. The CA reversed. Hence,
this petition.
Issues: 1. WON Captain Jusep was negligent.
2. WON Delsan is solidary liable under Article 2180 of the NCC
Ruling:
1. Yes. Captain Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of the
next day when as early as 12:00 in the midnight beforehand, he received a report from his radio head
operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8 hours. This, notwithstanding, he did
nothing, until 8:35 of the next day.
The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the
North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision
that determines the existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and
appropriate action under the circumstances.
When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Captain Jusep showed
an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the
same situation.
Furthermore, the “emergency rule” is not applicable in this case because the danger where Captain Jusep
found himself was caused by his own negligence.
2. Yes. Delsan is vicariously liable for the negligent act of Captain Jusep. Under Article 2180, an employer
may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligence in the selection or supervision of its
employees. The proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he
exercised the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his
employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work.
Delsan cannot claim that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. In this
case, Delsan presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for the proper performance of
functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and monitored compliance therewith. Failing to
discharge the burden, Delsan should therefore be held liable for the negligent act of Captain Jusep.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED.

GUILLANG V BEDANIA & de SILVA

G.R 162987 | May 21, 2009 | Carpio, J. | Digester: Bernice Ares

SUMMARY: Collision between a truck and a sedan, wherein the truck, in making a U-turn along a highway,
violated numerous traffic rules (truck made the U-turn without signal lights and then after the collision, the
driver escaped and abandoned the victims and his truck). The Court said that under the Civil Code (Art.
2185), unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time
of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Such is what happened in this case.

IMPORTANT PEOPLE:
Genaro, Guillang, Jurilla, Dignadice and Llanillo – passengers of the brand new Toyota Corolla
Rodolfo Bedania – driver of the ten-wheeler truck
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Rodolfo de Silva – owner of the truck

FACTS:
1. On Oct. 25, 1994, the Toyota Corolla was along Aguinaldo Highway, Cavite, heading towards Manila.
The truck was going towards Tagaytay City.
2. Along the highway and on the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, the truck made a U-turn.
However, upon entering the opposite lane of the highway, the Toyota hit the right portion of the truck,
and was dragged along for another 5 meters to the right side of the road.
3. The car was a total wreck and as a result of the collision, the passengers were severely injured and
one of them, Guillang, died. The truck sustained minor damage.
4. The passengers of the Toyota (herein petitioners), filed a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict
against the respondents.
5. TC: in favor of petitioners: proximate cause was the sudden U-turn of the truck without use of signal
lights
- Truck made a sudden U-turn in the highway, instead of doing it in an intersection.
- Truck did so without signal lights
- Because of the violations of the traffic regulations, there is a presumption that the driver is
negligent.
- Aside from that, he even escaped after the collision, making him grossly negligent.
- The driver being negligent, there is also a presumption of negligence on the part of de Silva in the
selection and supervision of his employees.
- De Silva failed to prove the defense of exercise of diligence of a good father of a family; hence, he
is liable for damages
6. CA: in favor of respondents: proximate cause was Toyota’s failure to stop the car despite seeing the
truck
- TC overlooked substantial facts and circumstances
- Truck had properly positioned itself and had already made the U-turn before the impact
- The Toyota was driving really fast, and was unable to stop on time
- The truck could not have made the U-turn at a sudden and fast speed because of its size
- Gerano (the driver of the Toyota) had no reason not to be prudent because he was approaching an
intersection. His failure to observe the necessary precautions was the proximate cause of the death
and their injuries.
- There was testimony that because Gerano had overtaken another vehicle before the collision, he
did not see the truck as the other vehicle temporarily blocked his view.
- It was normal for trucks to make a U-turn in that area since the entrance to the Orchard Golf
Course was spacious.

ISSUES:
1. Which driver was negligent – the truck driver
 Conclusion of the CA that Genaro was negligent is not supported by the evidence on record.
- CA gave weight to testimonies of the Police Traffic Investigator that were contradicting with
the report that the same Investigator made after the collision and with the police records.
- The Toyota was not running fast: no skid marks, and the report or police records did not
indicate such
- PTI said the Toyota passengers were drunk: in the report, he indicated that they were
normal; no indication that they were drunk.
- He testified that when he arrived, Bedania was inside the truck: in the police records, he
stated that Bedania escaped and abandoned the victims; Bedania was later arrested at his
barracks.
- If the truck had already executed the U-turn, it should have been hit in the rear, or if halfway
there, in the middle portion of the trailer. But the car hit the truck’s gas tank, located at the
truck’s right middle portion.
- Truck did not U-turn at an intersection. Police sketch indicated no such thing.
- It was not normal for a truck to make a U-turn on a highway. If the truck wanted to change
directions, it should have sought an intersection, and should have used signal lights.
 Under CC Art. 2185, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
- He violated numerous traffic rules: turning without signal lights, and escaping and
abandoning the petitioners and his truck after the collision.
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 - Hence, the presumption arises that he was negligent at the time of the mishap.
- The sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that risk.
 The car had the right of way over the truck that was making a U-turn.
 Contrary to CA’s conclusion, TC did not say that the truck was travelling at a fast speed; it just
said that the truck made a sudden U-turn, meaning unexpectedly and with no warning.
 Bedania’s negligence was the proximate cause o the collision.
 De Silva, as Bedania’s employer is also liable for the damages since he failed to prove that he
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employees.

2. On damages
 Moral damages – Yes to the heirs of deceased, reduced in the case of the other passengers
 Funeral and burial expenses – Yes
 Hospitalization expenses – Yes
 Repair of the car – Yes (it was brand new and then poof total wreck. Huhu)
 Exemplary damages – Yes to serve was an example for the public good.
- In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence
- While the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that
he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider
the award of exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, CA decision REVERSED.

Albert Tison and Claudio Jabon vs Sps Pomasin, et. al. (No causal
connection between lack of driver’s license to a vehicular accident caused by another’s negligent driving.)

A tractor-trailer and a jeepney (jitney, lol) collided in Maharlika Highway I Alabay. Laarni was driving the
jeep towards the direction of Legaspi City while Jabon’s tractor-trailer was driving on the opposite direction
towards Naga City. Multiple deaths and injury resulted. Respondents, who rode the jeep, alleged that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of the petitioners.
Petitioners contend that it was the Pomasins’ driver Laarni’s negligence which was the proximate cause.
RTC considered that Laarni (jeep) caused the accident. CA reversed, it was Jabon’s (tractor-trailer) fault
because he was speeding, and Tison, the employer, was also at fault.

Issue: Who is at fault?

Held: The jeep was negligent, despite the tractor driver not having a license to drive, because there is no
causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven
that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate cause of the injury or that it substantially
contributed thereto. In the case at bar, there is no causal connection between the tractor trailer driver’s
restriction on his license to the vehicular collision. The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road shoulder,
an undebated fact, supports the trial court’s conclusion that the jitney was indeed going downhill which, it
may be repeated, was the original testimony of Gregorio that the road was “curving and downward.”[25] It is
this conclusion, prodded by the inconsistency of Gregorio’s testimony, that gives credence to the further
testimony of Jabon that the herein respondent’s jitney, “loaded with passengers with top-load” “was running
in a zigzag manner.”[26] Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The fall into the
shoulder of the road can result in the loss of control of the jitney, which explains why it was running in a
zigzag manner before it hit the tractor-trailer. There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding.
There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size and
the weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney which was
running downhill in a zigzagging manner. Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight, it
can be argued that Jabon should have swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging before it
collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents, though, happen in an instant, and, understandably in this case,
leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer uphill
and away from collision with the jitney oncoming downhill.

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., vs RODELIO ALBERTO and

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ENRICO ALBERTO REYES

Facts:
An accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City, involving four vehicles.
Based on the Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator, Senior Police Officer 1 Alfredo
M. Dungga (SPO1 Dungga), the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on
their right side shortly before the vehicular incident. All three (3) vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing
the south direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi
Galant and the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were
shoved forward and the front left portion of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion of the
Isuzu Tanker.
Previously, Malayan Insurance issued Car Insurance Policy in favor of First Malayan Leasing and
Finance Corporation,insuring Mitsubishi Galant against third party liability, own damage and theft, among
others. Malayan claimed that it paid the damages sustained by the assured amounting to P700, 000.
Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to respondent Rodelio Alberto and Enrico Alberto
Reyes, the registered owner and the driver of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring them to pay the amount it
had paid to the assured. The respondent refused to pay, thus, Malayan Insurance filed a complaint for
damages for gross negligence against the respondents.
The respondents claimed that they cannot be held liable for the vehicular accident’s proximate
cause was the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus Driver.
The trial court ruled in favor of Malayan Insurance and declared respondents liable for damages.
Dissatisfied, respondents filed an appeal with the CA. The CA then reversed and set aside the
Decision of the trial court. The CA held that the evidence on record has failed to establish not only
negligence on the part of respondents, but also compliance with the other requisites and the consequent
right of Malayan Insurance to subrogation. It noted that the police report was not properly identified by the
police officer who conducted the on-the-spot investigation of the subject collision. It, thus, held that an
appellate court, as a reviewing body, cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an unverified
and unidentified document, much less accord it evidentiary value.
Subsequently, Malayan Insurance filed its Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that a police report
is a prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it. And inasmuch as they never questioned the presentation
of the report in evidence, respondents are deemed to have waived their right to question its authenticity and
due execution.
CA denied the motion. Hence this petition.

Issue(s):

1. Whether or not the Ca is correct in dismissing the complaint for the failure of Malayan Insurance to
overcome the burden of proof required to establish the negligence of respondents

1. Sufficiency of Evidence

Malayan Insurance contends that since Reyes, the driver of the Fuzo Cargo truck bumped Mitsubishi
Galant, he is presumed to be negligent unless proven otherwise. The respondents failed to present any
evidence to overturn the presumption of negligence. This contention is correct. Respondents cannot evade
liability by the virtue of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity
of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish
negligence.
The requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following: (1) the accident was of a
kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury
suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
All the requisites for the application of the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur are present, thereby creating a
reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of respondents.
Disputable presumptions or inferences may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence to the contrary.
However, the respondents failed to present any evidence before the trial court. Thus, the presumption of

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 negligence remains. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the complaint for Malayan Insurance’s
adverted failure to prove negligence on the part of respondents.

As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of

the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following:

(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily

occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had
hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is
negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive
control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert
liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still,
this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally,
no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of
the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present,
thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part
of respondents.

DM Consunji vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria,
filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer,
D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.
2. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of
action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and
suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the
employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves
cumulatively of both actions,
RULING:
1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the
law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of
a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury
suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other
evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa
loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
2. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under
the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of
availing the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have
waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that
the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence

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when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware,
she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

Jarcia vs People of the Philippines

GR No. 187926 February 15, 2012

Facts: Belinda Santiago lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against the
petitioners, Dr. Emanuel Jarcia and Dr. Marilou Bastan, for their alleged neglect of professional duty which
caused her son, Roy Alfonso Santiago, to suffer physical injuries. Upon investigation, the NBI found that
Roy Jr. was hit by a taxicab; that he was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an emergency medical
treatment; that an X-ray of the victim’s ankle was ordered; that the X-ray result showed no fracture as read
by Dr. Jarcia; that Dr. Bastan entered the emergency room and, after conducting her own examination of
the victim, informed Mrs. Santiago that since it was only the ankle that was hit there was no need to
examine the upper leg; that 11 days later, Roy developed fever, swelling of the right leg and misalignment
of the right foot; that Mrs. Santiago brought him back to the hospital; and that the x-ray revealed a right mid-
tibial fracture and a linear hairline fracture in the shaft of the bone. A complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting physical injuries was filed against the petitioners for the alleged misconduct in the handling of the
illness of Roy.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners failed to exercise the degree of care expected of them as doctors and
are liable for negligence to the private respondent.

Held: Yes. The doctrine of res ipsa liquitor as a rule of evidence is unusual to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligencce may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute
for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine however, is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode
of proof or a mere procedural convenience the rule when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a
given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on
the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and helps
the plaintiff in proving a breach of duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absolute and not readily available.

The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor are:

1. The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
in charge; and
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person
injured.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand whereby such other
person suffers injury.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act.

In failing to perform an extensive medical examination to determine the extent of Roy’s injuries, Dr. Jarcia
and Dr. Bastan were remiss of their duties as members of the medical profession. Assuming for the sake of
argument that they did not have the capacity to make such thorough evaluation at that stage they should
have referred the patient to another doctor with sufficient training and experience instead of assuring him
and his mother that everything was all right.

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