Eminent Domain
designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct
1919]
Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a
portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue.
Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in
the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within
their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary
because other routes were available. They further claimed that the
expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to
them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and
monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on
the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have
the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have
no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the
same filed an appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the
necessity of the expropriation.
Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain
to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes
attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent
domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not
the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case
under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the
courts have the right to inquire to.
G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-appellant
Facts:
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental
powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of
Telecommunications.
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public
service corporation holding a legislative franchise, to install, operate and maintain a
telephone system throughout the Philippines.
BOT soon after its creation set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) utilizing its
own appropriation and equipment and by renting the trunk lines of the PLDT to enable
government offices to call private parties. The Bureau has extended its services to the
general public. Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS)
subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could
make a call to the former.
BOT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications (an American Co. party not in
interest of the case), Inc. for a joint telephone service whereby the BOT would convey
radio-telephone overseas call received by RCA to and from local residents.
PLDT complained that BOT violated conditions since BOT had used the trunk lines not only
for government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in
competition with the business of PLDT. PLDT sever the telephone connections of BOT
resulting to isolation of the Philippines on telephone services from the rest of the world
except the US.
The BOT had proposed that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the
government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting
facilities from the GTS to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT replied that it was willing to enter into an
agreement on overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the
BOT would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission
and in consideration sharing of the gross revenues. The proposals were not accepted by
either party.
The plaintiff commenced suit against the defendant, praying in its complaint for judgment;
(1) commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the BOT, for the use
of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such
terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and; (2) for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the
existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter
into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement;
Both parties appealed.
Issue/s:
Whether or not interconnection of Government Telephone System and PLDT can be subject
for expropriation.
Ruling:
Yes.
 The Republic of the Philippines through Bureau of Telecommunications may in the
exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the Telephone Company to
permit interconnection of the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, as
the needs of the government service may required, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court.
 The Republic’s cause of action is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the
BOT facilities from the outside world if the severance of interconnection were to be
carried out by the PLDT, thereby preventing the BOT from properly discharging its
functions, to the prejudice of the general public. The case should be for the compulsory
rendering of interconnection of services by the telephone company upon such terms
and conditions as the court may determine to be just.
 Since the lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as one of condemnation
of such services independently of contract and proceeded to determine the just and
reasonable compensation for the same, instead of dismissing the petition.
Under Section 79 of EO 94 paragraph (b)
To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire-telephone or radio telephone
communication service throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities in cities, towns, and
provinces as may be found feasible and under such terms and conditions or arrangements with the
present owners or operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned.
Under Section 6 Article XIII 1935 Constitution “Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources.”
The State may, in the exercise of national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and
means of transportation and communication, and upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public
ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government.
Charter of PLDT expressly provides that Section 14.
The rights therein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and power to grant to any corporation,
association or person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or electrical transmission of
message or signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise.
PLDT’s right to just compensation for the services rendered to the GTS and its users is herein recognized
and preserved. To uphold PLDT’s contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public to the right
of the PLDT to deprive profit from the future expansion of its services under its non exclusive franchise.
 The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had
extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by
the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and
the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public
convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty
to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.
 There is high authority for the position that, when such physical connection has been voluntarily
made, under a fair and workable arrangement and guaranteed by contract and the continuous line
has come to be patronized and established as a great public convenience, such connection shall not in
breach of the agreement be severed by one of the parties. In that case, the public is held to have such
an interest in the arrangement that its rights must receive due consideration.
 "Such physical connection cannot be required as of right, but if such connection is voluntarily made by
contract, as is here alleged to be the case, so that the public acquires an interest in its continuance, the
act of the parties in making such connection is equivalent to a declaration of a purpose to waive the
primary right of independence, and it imposes upon the property such a public status that it may not
be disregarded"
 "Where private property is by the consent of the owner invested with a public interest or privilege for
the benefit of the public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private property only, but must hold it
subject to the right of the public in the exercise of that public interest or privilege conferred for their
benefit.
People vs. Fajardo [GR L-12172, 29 August 1958]
En Banc, Reyes JBL (J): 9 concur
Facts: On 15 August 1950, during the incumbency of Juan F. Fajardo as mayor
of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed
Ordinance 7, series of 1950, providing that “any person or persons who will
construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain
a written permit from the Municipal Mayor,” that “a fee of not less than P2.00
should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit
issued,” and that any violation of the provisions of the ordinance shall make
the violator liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or
imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the
discretion of the court; and that if said building destroys the view of the Public
Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense of
the owner of the building or house. 4 years later, after the term of Fajardo as
mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law, Pedro Babilonia, filed a written
request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a
building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in
Fajardo’s name, located along the national highway and separated from the
public plaza by a creek. On 16 January 1954, the request was denied, for the
reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or
beauty of the public plaza. On 18 January 1954, Fajardo and Babilonia
reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the request was
turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, Fajardo and Babilonia proceeded
with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed
a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by
a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. On 26
February 1954, Fajardo and Babilonia were charged before and convicted by
the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of
Ordinance 7. Fajardo and Babilonia appealed to the Court of First Instance
(CDI), which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced both to pay a fine of P35
each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it
destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao. From this decision, Fajardo and
Babilonia appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the
records to the Supreme Court because the appeal attacks the constitutionality
of the ordinance in question.
Issue: Whether the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit on
the ground that the proposed building would destroy the view of the public
plaza is an undue deprivation of the use of the property in question, and thus
a taking without due compensation.
Held: The refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to Fajardo
and Babilonia was predicated on the ground that the proposed building would
“destroy the view of the public plaza” by preventing its being seen from the
public highway. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates — to permanently deprive the latter of the
right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police
power, and amounts to a taking of the property without just compensation.
But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general welfare
such as to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the
comfort and happiness of residents), and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit
structures offensive to the sight, the State may not, under the guise of police
power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that
may be erected on Fajardo’s land, regardless of its own beauty, stands
condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with
the view of the public plaza from the highway. Fajardo would, in effect, be
constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose
for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that
result, the municipality must give Fajardo just compensation and an
opportunity to be heard.