Eminent Domain
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]
Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private
cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is
necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery
and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other
routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would
create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the
graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-
strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power
of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of
the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the
expropriation.
Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply
with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority
upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the
power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising
the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question that the courts have the right to inquire to.
G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-appellant
Facts:
powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of
Telecommunications.
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public
service corporation holding a legislative franchise, to install, operate and maintain a
telephone system throughout the Philippines.
BOT soon after its creation set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) utilizing its
own appropriation and equipment and by renting the trunk lines of the PLDT to enable
government offices to call private parties. The Bureau has extended its services to the
general public. Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS)
subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could
make a call to the former.
BOT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications (an American Co. party not in
interest of the case), Inc. for a joint telephone service whereby the BOT would convey
radio-telephone overseas call received by RCA to and from local residents.
PLDT complained that BOT violated conditions since BOT had used the trunk lines not only
for government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in
competition with the business of PLDT. PLDT sever the telephone connections of BOT
resulting to isolation of the Philippines on telephone services from the rest of the world
except the US.
The BOT had proposed that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the
government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting
facilities from the GTS to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT replied that it was willing to enter into an
agreement on overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the
BOT would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission
and in consideration sharing of the gross revenues. The proposals were not accepted by
either party.
The plaintiff commenced suit against the defendant, praying in its complaint for judgment;
(1) commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the BOT, for the use
of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such
terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and; (2) for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the
existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter
into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement;
Both parties appealed.
Issue/s:
Whether or not interconnection of Government Telephone System and PLDT can be subject
for expropriation.
Ruling:
Yes.
 The Republic of the Philippines through Bureau of Telecommunications may in the
exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the Telephone Company to
permit interconnection of the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, as
the needs of the government service may required, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court.
 The Republic’s cause of action is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the
BOT facilities from the outside world if the severance of interconnection were to be
carried out by the PLDT, thereby preventing the BOT from properly discharging its
functions, to the prejudice of the general public. The case should be for the compulsory
rendering of interconnection of services by the telephone company upon such terms
and conditions as the court may determine to be just.
 Since the lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as one of condemnation
of such services independently of contract and proceeded to determine the just and
reasonable compensation for the same, instead of dismissing the petition.
Under Section 79 of EO 94 paragraph (b)
To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire-telephone or radio
telephone communication service throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing
facilities in cities, towns, and provinces as may be found feasible and under such terms and
conditions or arrangements with the present owners or operators thereof as may be agreed
upon to the satisfaction of all concerned.
Under Section 6 Article XIII 1935 Constitution “Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources.”
The State may, in the exercise of national welfare and defense, establish and operate
industries and means of transportation and communication, and upon payment of just
compensation, transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the government.
Charter of PLDT expressly provides that Section 14.
The rights therein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and power to grant to any
corporation, association or person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or
electrical transmission of message or signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting
of this franchise.
PLDT’s right to just compensation for the services rendered to the GTS and its users is herein
recognized and preserved. To uphold PLDT’s contention is to subordinate the needs of the
general public to the right of the PLDT to deprive profit from the future expansion of its
services under its non exclusive franchise.
 The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the
plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since
1948, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been
maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and
their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim
misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical
connection of the trunk lines.
 There is high authority for the position that, when such physical connection has been
voluntarily made, under a fair and workable arrangement and guaranteed by contract and
the continuous line has come to be patronized and established as a great public
convenience, such connection shall not in breach of the agreement be severed by one of the
parties. In that case, the public is held to have such an interest in the arrangement that its
rights must receive due consideration.
 "Such physical connection cannot be required as of right, but if such connection is
voluntarily made by contract, as is here alleged to be the case, so that the public acquires
an interest in its continuance, the act of the parties in making such connection is
equivalent to a declaration of a purpose to waive the primary right of independence, and it
imposes upon the property such a public status that it may not be disregarded"
 "Where private property is by the consent of the owner invested with a public interest or
privilege for the benefit of the public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private
property only, but must hold it subject to the right of the public in the exercise of that
public interest or privilege conferred for their benefit.
People vs. Fajardo [GR L-12172, 29 August 1958]
En Banc, Reyes JBL (J): 9 concur
Facts: On 15 August 1950, during the incumbency of Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the
municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed Ordinance 7, series of 1950,
providing that “any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before
constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor,” that “a fee of not
less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit
issued,” and that any violation of the provisions of the ordinance shall make the violator liable
to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days
nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court; and that if said building destroys
the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense
of the owner of the building or house. 4 years later, after the term of Fajardo as mayor had
expired, he and his son-in-law, Pedro Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent
municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a
parcel of land registered in Fajardo’s name, located along the national highway and separated
from the public plaza by a creek. On 16 January 1954, the request was denied, for the reason
among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
On 18 January 1954, Fajardo and Babilonia reiterated their request for a building permit, but
again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, Fajardo and Babilonia
proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place
of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto
they had been living on leased property. On 26 February 1954, Fajardo and Babilonia were
charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for
violation of Ordinance 7. Fajardo and Babilonia appealed to the Court of First Instance (CDI),
which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced both to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as
well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of
Baao. From this decision, Fajardo and Babilonia appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
forwarded the records to the Supreme Court because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of
the ordinance in question.
Issue: Whether the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit on the ground that
the proposed building would destroy the view of the public plaza is an undue deprivation of the
use of the property in question, and thus a taking without due compensation.
Held: The refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to Fajardo and Babilonia was
predicated on the ground that the proposed building would “destroy the view of the public
plaza” by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates — to permanently deprive the
latter of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power,
and amounts to a taking of the property without just compensation. But while property may be
regulated in the interest of the general welfare such as to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents), and in its pursuit, the
State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight, the State may not, under the guise of police
power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the
case now stands, every structure that may be erected on Fajardo’s land, regardless of its own
beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with
the view of the public plaza from the highway. Fajardo would, in effect, be constrained to let
their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being
urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give Fajardo just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
Republic VS Vda. De Castellvi
Facts:
Appeal form the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, an expropriation
proceeding.
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines (referred to as the Republic) filed,
on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendants-appellees, Carmen M.
vda. de Castellvi (Castellvi) and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun (Toledo-Gozun) over parcels of land
situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga.
The Republic entered into a lease agreement with Castellvi on July 1, 1947 on a year
to year basis. The Republic occupied, erected and installed facilities for the Philippine Air Force
the land of Castellvi. Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956, the
Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When AFP refused to vacate the
leased premises after the termination of contract, Castellvi wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff
demanding that the property be vacated in 30 days for they had decided to subdivide the
property in order to sell to the general public. Thereafter, the Chief of Staff answered her
saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent
installations and other facilities worth almost 500k and there being no recourse to acquire the
her property by means of expropriation proceeding to be recommended to the Pres. Castellvi
then brought suit to eject the Phil Air Force from her property. While the ejectment case was
pending, the Republic instituted an expropriation proceedings, the Republic was placed in
possession of the lands on Aug. 10, 1959. The trial court appointed 3 Commissioners to
determine the actual fair market value of the lands sought to be expropriated. The
Commissioners recommended unanimously that the lowest price was P10 per square meter for
both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun. The court then ruled that Castellvi and Toledo-
Gozun be paid in the amount of P10 per square meter for their expropriated lands. But the
Defendants contended that it should be P15 per square. On one hand, the Republic averred
that the fair market value of the lands of the appellees was P.20 or at P2,000 per hectare, as the
lands in the year 1949 were valued at such.
Issue:
Whether or not the “taking” of the properties under expropriation commenced upon
the filing of the case or WHO the lower court erred in determining the value of lands
expropriated.
Ruling:
 No. The “taking” of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947
when the Republic first occupied the property pursuant to the contract of lease. It must be
reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

The Republic was ordered to pay the amount of P5 per square meter for the lands
expropriated of Castellvi (P3,796,495) and Toledo-Gozun (P2,695,225) with 6% per annum
interest until fully paid, attorney’s fees and costs of suits.

AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]

Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer
Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or
interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a
portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958,
Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion
of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then
filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca,
in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was
not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the
recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent
to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the
government.

Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the
government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the
government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any
deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner
of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at
this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the
government to make due compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking.