POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Assignment#2

Hareem Sattar
What impact might the US China relationships have on Pakistan and the
CPEC project?
If connectivity is becoming the basis of a new geopolitics, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
should be rated the year’s most potent symbol of this 21st century version of the Great Game. A Great
Game whose outwards manifestations are multi-lane highways, pipelines and container traffic. The $46
billion CPEC is the flagship project that would effectively convert the Middle Kingdom into the logistics
hub of Eurasia and, potentially, the centre of the global economy.

The CPEC functions on a number of different levels. Symbolically it would be potent evidence of what
economic benefits a country that allies with Beijing can expect. On another level, CPEC would also be a
sign of the ability of the Chinese government to act strategically on a grand scale. Completing the CPEC
would be evidence its public will support an expensive project of questionable economic benefits but
great strategic consequence. The CPEC, finally, will be a test of China’s ability to work holistically in a
foreign land. The China and Pakistan relationship has so far been military-to-military. Building CPEC will
mean working with almost every stakeholder in Pakistani society, not traditionally a strong point of
Chinese foreign policy.

The United States will expectedly have its own long-term concerns about the CPEC, as it represents the
leading edge of China’s expanding access to, and likely influence within, Eurasia. As Pakistan grows
closer to China, there may be temptation in Washington to compete for influence in Islamabad.

Islamabad, Washington, and even Beijing have something to lose from these dynamics. No matter how
generous Chinese infrastructure and military support turn out to be for Pakistan, having one major
power benefactor is half as good as having two. Washington will have less influence to change Pakistani
choices for the better, and will now need more of Beijing’s help with crisis management. And while
Beijing’s gains are likely to be real, so, too, will the responsibilities of being Pakistan’s top benefactor.

Washington is not inclined to compete with China for influence in Pakistan. Nor is the prospect of more
Russian engagement with Pakistan likely to alter US calculations. Washington’s current mood is to
continue offering assistance to support common interests — while conditioning a growing portion of aid
to demonstrable steps that confirm long-promised changes in Pakistan’s national security policies. All
this can be upended with another major act of terrorism that can be traced back to Pakistan.

A legitimate question is whether Washington is capable of acknowledging changes for the better in
Pakistan’s national security policies after such a long period of complaint. There has been clear
acknowledgement of Pakistan’s counterterrorism campaign against the Pakistan Taliban, and the
sacrifices this has entailed. But there is deep skepticism that the scope of this campaign will be widened.

One challenge for Washington during the Trump administration will be to keep the door open and to
recognize changes in policies that have weakened Pakistan’s well-being. A second challenge will be to
not fly off the handle in ways that badly affect ties. The challenge for Pakistan is to keep moving forward
rather than to fall back on bad habits. And to recognize that standard talking points will fall flat without
changes in national security policy. Even in the absence of changes in Pakistani policies, the US
continues to have important reasons to remain fully engaged on common interests. That sounds easy
enough, but sensible steps cannot be taken for granted in the Trump administration.