Eminent Domain
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]
Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private
cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is
necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery
and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other
routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would
create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the
graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-
strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power
of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of
the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the
expropriation.
Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment
the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must
comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly
within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority,
is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.
G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-appellant
Facts:
through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications.
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public
service corporation holding a legislative franchise, to install, operate and maintain a telephone
system throughout the Philippines.
BOT soon after its creation set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) utilizing its
own appropriation and equipment and by renting the trunk lines of the PLDT to enable
government offices to call private parties. The Bureau has extended its services to the general
public. Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could
make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the
former.
BOT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications (an American Co. party not in
interest of the case), Inc. for a joint telephone service whereby the BOT would convey radio-
telephone overseas call received by RCA to and from local residents.
PLDT complained that BOT violated conditions since BOT had used the trunk lines not only for
government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in competition with
the business of PLDT. PLDT sever the telephone connections of BOT resulting to isolation of the
Philippines on telephone services from the rest of the world except the US.
The BOT had proposed that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the
government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities
from the GTS to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT replied that it was willing to enter into an agreement on
overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the BOT would submit
to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission and in consideration
sharing of the gross revenues. The proposals were not accepted by either party.
The plaintiff commenced suit against the defendant, praying in its complaint for judgment; (1)
commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the BOT, for the use of the
facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and
conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and; (2) for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone
connections and/or restore those severed.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into
an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement;
Both parties appealed.
Issue/s:
Whether or not interconnection of Government Telephone System and PLDT can be subject for
expropriation.
Ruling:
Yes.
 The Republic of the Philippines through Bureau of Telecommunications may in the exercise
of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the Telephone Company to permit
interconnection of the Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, as the needs
of the government service may required, subject to the payment of just compensation to
be determined by the court.
 The Republic’s cause of action is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the BOT
facilities from the outside world if the severance of interconnection were to be carried out
by the PLDT, thereby preventing the BOT from properly discharging its functions, to the
prejudice of the general public. The case should be for the compulsory rendering of
interconnection of services by the telephone company upon such terms and conditions as
the court may determine to be just.
 Since the lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as one of condemnation of
such services independently of contract and proceeded to determine the just and
reasonable compensation for the same, instead of dismissing the petition.
Under Section 79 of EO 94 paragraph (b)
To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire-telephone or radio
telephone communication service throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities
in cities, towns, and provinces as may be found feasible and under such terms and conditions or
arrangements with the present owners or operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the
satisfaction of all concerned.
Under Section 6 Article XIII 1935 Constitution “Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources.”
The State may, in the exercise of national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries
and means of transportation and communication, and upon payment of just compensation,
transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the
government.
Charter of PLDT expressly provides that Section 14.
The rights therein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and power to grant to any
corporation, association or person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or
electrical transmission of message or signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting
of this franchise.
PLDT’s right to just compensation for the services rendered to the GTS and its users is herein
recognized and preserved. To uphold PLDT’s contention is to subordinate the needs of the
general public to the right of the PLDT to deprive profit from the future expansion of its services
under its non exclusive franchise.
 The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the
plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since
1948, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been
maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their
interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse
of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the
trunk lines.
 There is high authority for the position that, when such physical connection has been
voluntarily made, under a fair and workable arrangement and guaranteed by contract and
the continuous line has come to be patronized and established as a great public convenience,
such connection shall not in breach of the agreement be severed by one of the parties. In that
case, the public is held to have such an interest in the arrangement that its rights must
receive due consideration.
 "Such physical connection cannot be required as of right, but if such connection is voluntarily
made by contract, as is here alleged to be the case, so that the public acquires an interest in
its continuance, the act of the parties in making such connection is equivalent to a
declaration of a purpose to waive the primary right of independence, and it imposes upon the
property such a public status that it may not be disregarded"
 "Where private property is by the consent of the owner invested with a public interest or
privilege for the benefit of the public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private property
only, but must hold it subject to the right of the public in the exercise of that public interest or
privilege conferred for their benefit.
People vs. Fajardo [GR L-12172, 29 August 1958]
En Banc, Reyes JBL (J): 9 concur
Facts: On 15 August 1950, during the incumbency of Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the
municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed Ordinance 7, series of 1950,
providing that “any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before
constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor,” that “a fee of
not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair
permit issued,” and that any violation of the provisions of the ordinance shall make the violator
liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12
days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court; and that if said building
destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the
expense of the owner of the building or house. 4 years later, after the term of Fajardo as
mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law, Pedro Babilonia, filed a written request with the
incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline
station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo’s name, located along the national highway
and separated from the public plaza by a creek. On 16 January 1954, the request was denied,
for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of
the public plaza. On 18 January 1954, Fajardo and Babilonia reiterated their request for a
building permit, but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, Fajardo
and Babilonia proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they
needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a
typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. On 26 February 1954, Fajardo
and Babilonia were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao,
Camarines Sur, for violation of Ordinance 7. Fajardo and Babilonia appealed to the Court of
First Instance (CDI), which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced both to pay a fine of P35
each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it destroys the view
of the public plaza of Baao. From this decision, Fajardo and Babilonia appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to the Supreme Court because the appeal
attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.
Issue: Whether the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit on the ground that
the proposed building would destroy the view of the public plaza is an undue deprivation of
the use of the property in question, and thus a taking without due compensation.
Held: The refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to Fajardo and Babilonia was
predicated on the ground that the proposed building would “destroy the view of the public
plaza” by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates — to permanently deprive the
latter of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power,
and amounts to a taking of the property without just compensation. But while property may be
regulated in the interest of the general welfare such as to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents), and in its pursuit, the
State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight, the State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As
the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on Fajardo’s land, regardless of its
own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere
with the view of the public plaza from the highway. Fajardo would, in effect, be constrained to
let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being
urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give Fajardo just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
Republic VS Vda. De Castellvi
Facts:
Appeal form the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, an
expropriation proceeding.
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines (referred to as the Republic) filed,
on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendants-appellees, Carmen M.
vda. de Castellvi (Castellvi) and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun (Toledo-Gozun) over parcels of land
situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga.
The Republic entered into a lease agreement with Castellvi on July 1, 1947 on a year
to year basis. The Republic occupied, erected and installed facilities for the Philippine Air Force
the land of Castellvi. Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956, the
Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When AFP refused to vacate the
leased premises after the termination of contract, Castellvi wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff
demanding that the property be vacated in 30 days for they had decided to subdivide the
property in order to sell to the general public. Thereafter, the Chief of Staff answered her
saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent
installations and other facilities worth almost 500k and there being no recourse to acquire the
her property by means of expropriation proceeding to be recommended to the Pres. Castellvi
then brought suit to eject the Phil Air Force from her property. While the ejectment case was
pending, the Republic instituted an expropriation proceedings, the Republic was placed in
possession of the lands on Aug. 10, 1959. The trial court appointed 3 Commissioners to
determine the actual fair market value of the lands sought to be expropriated. The
Commissioners recommended unanimously that the lowest price was P10 per square meter for
both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun. The court then ruled that Castellvi and Toledo-
Gozun be paid in the amount of P10 per square meter for their expropriated lands. But the
Defendants contended that it should be P15 per square. On one hand, the Republic averred
that the fair market value of the lands of the appellees was P.20 or at P2,000 per hectare, as
the lands in the year 1949 were valued at such.
Issue:
Whether or not the “taking” of the properties under expropriation commenced upon
the filing of the case or WHO the lower court erred in determining the value of lands
expropriated.
Ruling:
 No. The “taking” of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide
when the Republic first occupied the property pursuant to the contract of lease. It must be free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and
reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
The Republic was ordered to pay the amount of P5 per square meter for the lands their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for
expropriated of Castellvi (P3,796,495) and Toledo-Gozun (P2,695,225) with 6% per annum dissemination of vital election information.
interest until fully paid, attorney’s fees and costs of suits.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972] magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer
Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without
Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or
just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that
interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used
the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the
a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958,
Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period
Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion
to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner
then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas
Issue:
Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the
recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent
Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel
to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private personal
property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases.
Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the
Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent
government.
Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The
taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without
Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the
payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of
government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the
Sumulong v Hon. Guerrero and the NHA (GR L-48685; 1987)
government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any
deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner Cortes, J.
of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at Facts
this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the
government to make due compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking.  On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in
Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]
 Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters
respectively.
 The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per
square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in
accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in
expropriation proceedings
 Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the
properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine
National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject twenty five
hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy
on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation."
 Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession
 Petitioners challenge the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the
constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended
o The order was issued without notice and without hearing
o Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is unconstitutional for being violative of the
due process clause, specifically
 The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size
and no matter how small the area to be expropriated;
 Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation
proceeding, as defined in said Decree, is not really for a public
purpose;
 The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows
immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of
property without giving the owner his day in court;
 The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon
payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by
government assessors;
 The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to
determine what would be the "just compensation" in each and
every raise of expropriation.
Issue
 Is “socialized housing” as defined in PD 1224 not public use since it will benefit only a
handful of people? NO. It is within the definition of public use
 Does PD 1224 allow the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair
valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors, depriving the courts of their
judicial discretion to determine what would be "just compensation"? YES.
Unconstitutional.
 Is PD 1224 violative of procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of
possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day in
court? YES. Unconstitutional
Judgment
 Writ of possession annulled. Case remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings to determine the compensation the petitioners are entitled to be paid
Ratio
Public Use
 "Socialized housing" is defined by PD 1224 as, "the construction of dwelling units for
the middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the
supporting infrastructure and other facilities"
 The "public use" requirement for a and exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
flexible and evolving concept
o “There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be
for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of
the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play… It
is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use”
 To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has
been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
 urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is
recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public
use but also because of specific provisions in the (1973) Constitution
o The state shall by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation
with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and
housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and
basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment
opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the
State shall respect the rights of small property owners. (Art. XIII, sec. 9)
 Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since
it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum,
the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change
because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who
satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to
provide housing for are who need it, all at once.
 Petitioners further contend that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, would allow the
taking of "any private land" regardless of the size and no matter how small the area
of the land to be expropriated. (In effect: there are larger lands owned by only a few
landlords, why not take theirs first?)
 o JM Tuason v Land Tenure Admin: he propriety of exercising the power of
eminent domain under Article XIII, section 4 of our Constitution cannot be
determined on a purely quantitative or area basis.
o Departed from the ruling in Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration which
held that the test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands
was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be
benefited. Since then "there has evolved a clear pattern of adherence to
the "number of people to be benefited test"
Just compensation
 PD 1224 unconstitutional as it allows the taking of private property upon payment of
unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors
 Already ruled upon by this Court in the case of Ignacio vs. Guerrero which,
incidentally, arose from the same expropriation complaint that led to this instant
petition
 The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decree Nos. 1224, 1259
and 1313 are the same provisions found in Presidential Decree Nos. 76, 464, 794 and
1533 which were declared unconstitutional in Export Processing Zone All thirty vs.
Dulay
o Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the
taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. ALL the
facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities, should be considered
o Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just
compensation
Due Process
 Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows
immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving
the owner his day in court
 has also been ruled upon in the Export Processing Zone Authority case
o It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove
that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is
repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard
work of minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment
of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually
viewed the property
 Before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in expropriation proceedings, the
following requisites must be met:
o (1) There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in
substance;
o (2) A provisional determination of just compensation for the properties
sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on the basis of
judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and
o (3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied
with.
[G.R. No. 106440; January 29, 1996]
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, et al. petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Court is asked to resolve whether or not the “public
use” requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic
of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute (“NHI”) as
a national historical landmark.
Petitioners inherited a 492 sq.m. land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro
Manila. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical
landmark. It was approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, while the
Secretary of Justice, in his opinion on the legality of the measure, said in part that “the birthsite
of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made
contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a national landmark. It has
been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the
power of eminent domain may be authorized x x x. it is believed that the NHI… may initiate the
institution of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in question in
accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.”
In May 1989, the Republic, through the OSG, instituted a complaint for expropriation before
RTC Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, it filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion
was opposed by petitioners. The trial court ruled in favor of the Republic.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation
was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of
public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious
entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. Motion
was dismissed. Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expropriation of the land in the case at bar is for public use.
HELD:
YES. Petitioners ask about the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix
Manalo’s) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain” when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit. This
attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what
should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might
follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to
recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines,
rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical
reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most
others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental
and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation
of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. Respondent Judge Dulay issued
the order of condemnation declaring petitioner as having the lawful right to take the
properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined
as of the filing of the complaint. Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the
commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of
the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the
petitioner contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and
according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration were denied. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and
mandamus..
Issue: WON the mode of determining just compensation under PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held: YES. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible
encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which
under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination.
The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.

All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and jurisprudence. The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
The petition is DENIED. executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken
EPZA VS DULAY GR No. L-59603 for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate
that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
Gutierrez (J)
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
Facts: Under Proclamation No. 1811, a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in
P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint is unconstitutional and void.
Lapu-Lapu City, Mactan, Cebu was reserved for the establishment of an export processing
zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). However, not all the reserved area
was public land. Four parcels of the land were owned and registered in the name of the private
respondent, San Antonio Development Corporation. EPZA offered to purchase the parcels of
land from the respondent in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement. Petitioner filed a
complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession to
expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as amended, which
empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the
establishment of export processing zones, in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the