cov1PMJ1112.

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December 2008

Volume 39, Number 4

5 Systematic Biases and Culture in Project Failures

Barry Shore

17 Managerial Perceptions of Project Stability

Stephen M. Swartz

33 Development of a Project Management Model

for a Government Research and Development
Organization
Andrew E. Procca

58 Do Project Managers' Leadership Competencies

Contribute to Project Success?
Linda Geoghegan and Victor Dulewicz

68 CordNet: Toward a Distributed Behavior Model

for Emergency Response Coordination
Liaquat Hossain and Matthew Kuti

95 Analysis of the Front-End Loading of Alberta

Mega Oil Sands Projects
George Jergeas

105 Developing an Effective Project: Planning and

Team Building Combined
Michael Thomas, Paul H. Jacques, John R. Adams,
and Julie Kihneman-Wooten
cov2PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:39 PM Page 1
EDITORIAL REVIEW BOARD
Vittal Anantatmula, PMP, Western Carolina University
Rick Bilbro, The Innova Group, Inc.
Tomas Blomquist, Umeå University, Sweden
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Wanda Curlee, PMP, BearingPoint
Darren Dalcher, Middlesex University
Steven V. DelGrosso, PMP, IBM
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Ken Hartley, Parsons Brinckerhoff
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Peter Kapsales, Belcore
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Stephen Leybourne, Plymouth Business School
Rolf A. Lundin, Jönköping University
Fred Manzer, PMP, Center for Systems Management
Peter Morris, University College, London
Ralf Müller, Umeå University, Sweden
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Partners LLC
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Anders Soderholm, Umeå University
Paul Solomon, PMP, B-2 Earned Value Management
Systems
Charles J. Teplitz, University of San Diego
Janice Thomas, Athabasca University
Zeljko M. Torbica, PMP, Cabi Developers, LLC
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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Frank R. Anbari, PMP, The George Washington University
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Finland
David Cleland, University of Pittsburgh
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Technology
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001PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:11 PM Page 1

DECEMBER 2008
Volume 39, Number 4

The Professional Research Journal of the Project Management Institute

2 From the Editor

Christophe N. Bredillet, PhD, DSc, MBA, Ingénieur EC Lille

PAPERS
5 Systematic Biases and Culture in Project Failures
Barry Shore

17 Managerial Perceptions of Project Stability

Stephen M. Swartz

33 Development of a Project Management Model for a Government Research and

Development Organization
Andrew E. Procca

58 Do Project Managers' Leadership Competencies Contribute to Project Success?

Linda Geoghegan and Victor Dulewicz

68 CordNet: Toward a Distributed Behavior Model for Emergency Response Coordination

Liaquat Hossain and Matthew Kuti

95 Analysis of the Front-End Loading of Alberta Mega Oil Sands Projects

George Jergeas

105 Developing an Effective Project: Planning and Team Building Combined

Michael Thomas, Paul H. Jacques, John R. Adams, and Julie Kihneman-Wooten

114 Cover to Cover—Book Reviews

Kenneth H. Rose, PMP

118 Index of 2008 Papers and Authors

120 Guidelines for Project Management Journal Book Reviews

December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal 1

002_004PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:12 PM Page 2
From the Editor
Christophe N. Bredillet, PhD, DSc, MBA, Ingénieur EC Lille
Mapping the Dynamics of the Project Management
Field: Project Management in Action (Part 1)
Introduction
In this next series of “From the Editor,” I am going to
present the results of ongoing research undertaken in
order to investigate the dynamic of evolution of the field
of project management.
Focusing on the role within and between organiza-
tions of the project/program/portfolio management dis-
cipline to design and implement strategy as a source of
competitive advantage leads me to question the scientific
field behind this discipline. This science should be the
basis for the development and use of research of bodies
of knowledge, standards, certification programs, educa-
tion, and competencies, and beyond this as a source of
value for people, organizations, and society.
Thus, the importance of characterizing, defining, and
understanding this field and its underlying strength, basis,
and development is paramount. For this purpose, I pro-
pose to give some insights on the current situation. This
will lead me to clarify our ontological and epistemological
position and demonstrate that mixed approaches are
required to seize the full dimension and dynamics of the
field. I will referee to sociology of actor networks and quan-
titative scientometrics leading to the choice of the co-word
analysis method in enabling us to capture the project
management field and its dynamics. Results of a study
based on the analysis of the EBSCO database will be pre-
sented and some future trends and scenarios proposed.
Project(/Program/Portfolio) Management:
A Knowledge Field
First, hypothetically, it might be useful to assume that the
project management1 knowledge field does exist.
Consider Audet’s definition (1986): “A knowledge field is
the space occupied by the whole of the people who claim
to produce knowledge in this field and this space is at the
same time a system of relationships between these peo-
ple. Those persons are competitors to gain the control of
the definition of the conditions and the rules of produc-
tion of knowledge” with respect to the behavior of pro-
fessional bodies, authors, and academics.
1We are using project management here as equivalent for project/program/portfolio
management. It is not the purpose of this letter to discuss the different definitions
of these constructs or objects and how they are interrelated.
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2–4
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute Published online in Wiley
InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20091
2 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Looking at the network of relationships among rec-
ognized professional bodies, for example, the Project
Management Institute (PMI), the International Project
Management Association (IPMA), the Project Manage-
ment Association Japan (PMAJ), the Association for
Project Management (APM) (looking for chartered status
in the United Kingdom); other well-established or newly
established “professional” organizations, such as the
APM Group, the International Centre for Complex
Project Management (ICCPM) coming from the split in
two of the former College of Complex Project Managers
(CCPM) (launched in November 2006), the Major
Projects Association (MPA), the Global Alliance for
Project Performance Standards (GAPPS) (launched in
November 2006), and the ISO TC 236 on Project Manage-
ment; and industries, sectors, national and international
agencies, and nongovernmental organizations, for
example, the information systems/information technol-
ogy industry, the construction industry, the World Bank,
the United Nations, and the aerospace sectors (NASA
and the European Space Agency) and their methods of
development (standards, certifications, research fund-
ing, SIGs) through individualism and collaboration
exemplify Audet’s definition.
I could add to this the development of research net-
works (formal and informal), research (and practitioner)
conferences, workshops, and seminars, and the way they
are interrelated and interactions through researchers,
practitioners, and institutional relationships (professional
bodies, various “professional” organizations, national and
international research agencies, and academic organiza-
tions) in order to “produce knowledge,” for example, the
PMI Research Community, the International Network on
Organizing by Projects (IRNOP), the European Academy
of Management (EURAM), the Academy of Management
(AoM), and the European Institute for Advanced Studies in
Management (EIASM), to mention a few.
The evolution of bodies of knowledge is evidenced
further by themes in papers and books, citing techniques
of psychosociology of temporary groups through knowl-
edge creation and organizational learning to strategic
management. In addition, the field is currently character-
ized by this abundance of initiatives, update and devel-
opment of standards at various levels (project, program,
portfolio, maturity models, etc.), and, in various areas
(risks, contracts, WBS, scheduling, etc.), an increasing use
002_004PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:12 PM Page 3
of project management methods and techniques at a
strategic level.
This phase is the place of revolution, inaugurated by
a growing but still narrow subdivision within the project
management community that the existing positivist par-
adigm has ceased to function adequately in the explo-
ration of the nature. The Engineering and Physical
Sciences Research Council (EPRSC) Network in the
United Kingdom “Rethinking Project Management”
(2004–2006), the PMI-funded research project “Impact
of Complexity Theory on Project Management: Mapping
the Field of Complexity Theory, and Using One Concept
of Complexity as an Interpretive Framework in Studying
Projects and Project Management Practice” (2005–2008),
and the development of the College of Complex Project
Managers (2006) exemplify this trend.
A second and more profound aspect upon which the
significance of the first depends is that the success of
revolution necessitates the full or partial relinquishment
of one set of institutions in favor of another. For instance,
considering the deployment of different certifications or
credentials and of categories of standards and practices
in various industries, geographic areas, types of projects
is quite interesting in this regard.
At this stage, I can argue that the field is in a prepar-
adigmatic phase according to Kuhn’s sense (1983): There
is no consensus on any particular theory, though the
research being carried out can be considered scientific in
nature. The current phase of development of the field is
characterized by several incompatible and incomplete
theories and perspectives (see, for instance, PMJ’s “From
the Editor” from issue 38(2) to issue 39(3)). If the actors
in the preparadigm community eventually gravitate to
one of these conceptual frameworks and ultimately to a
widespread consensus on the appropriate choice of
methods, terminology, and what kind of experiment is
likely to contribute to increased insights, then the phase
of “normal science” begins.
But at the same time, considering, for instance, the
“Nine Schools of Project Management,” the “Complexity,”
and the “Rethinking PM” researches, I could argue that
we are moving from an old paradigm—positivist—to a
new one, or to a more balanced one, combining posi-
tivism, constructivism, and subjectivism, enabling us to
address complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity, because
the old one is not working anymore.
As a consequence, if the project management knowl-
edge field exists and is in a preparadigmatic or paradigm
shift phase, it is not surprising . . .
. . .that it is not (that) clear
In order to develop bodies of knowledge, standards,
certification programs, education, and competencies, a
knowledge field is needed. Yet in both the academic and
the business world, the field of project management is
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
not clearly established and defined. In addition, the field
is still evolving in breadth and depth. In breadth, it is
embracing information systems, human resource man-
agement, change management, strategic management,
economic value management, psychology, management
of technology, quality, sociology, multicultural manage-
ment, systems thinking, knowledge management, orga-
nizational learning, team management, temporary
group, systems engineering, and the like. In depth, it is
going further into cost engineering, finance, specific
aspects of risk management, earned value management,
scheduling methods, resource allocation, project life
cycle, processes, studying phases, types of projects, proj-
ect portfolio management, and the like. Also, a number
of books and papers explore issues that contribute both
depth and breadth in several technical, methodological,
and managerial dimensions. They aim to fill a long-
standing need for a comprehensive, unified, and practi-
cal description of the field. Over the last 25 years, the
profession has been working on its recognition. Both
standards and certifications have been addressed by
professional associations, working both on the field def-
inition and on the recognition of project management as
a profession.
This supports the need for various perspectives, as
we have not yet any “grand unified theory”! A particular
perspective, if valid in a specific area, cannot produce
answers to every type of problem or in any type of situa-
tion. Furthermore, I argue that many applications of
project management are done without questioning the
deep nature of projects. What is a project in a given con-
text, according to a specific perspective (ontological
consideration)? On which epistemological foundations
can we build the project management field? Which
hypotheses apply to the field? What are the conse-
quences on the development and use of theories, con-
cepts, methods, and techniques?
Epistemological Issues and Considerations
Following the work of Polanyi (1958), I propose an
alternative epistemological perspective to positivism,
constructivism, and subjectivism. I have no intention to
separate personal judgment from scientific method. I
argue that, especially in project management, knowl-
edge creation and production have to integrate both
classical scientific aspects and “fuzzy” or symbolic
aspects. A “reality” can be explained according to a spe-
cific point of view or perspective and also can be consid-
ered as the symbol of higher order and a more general
reality (for example, a two-dimensional form can be seen
as the projection on a plan of an n-dimensional figure). I
argue that the “demiurgic” characteristic of project man-
agement involves seeing this field as an open space,
without “having” (Have) but rather with a raison d’être
(Be), because of the construction of Real by the projects.
3
002_004PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:12 PM Page 4
From the Editor
It could be considered to be a fundamental explanation
of the preparadigmatic or paradigm-shift nature of this
field (see Kuhn, 1983): the dominant paradigm, source of
well-established theory(ies) is NOT to find. The deep
nature of project management implies this paradox of
being built on moving paradigms reflects the diversity
of the creation process by itself.
This field is thus composed of both quantitative
aspects (Have—being ontology placing emphasis on
permanent and unchanging reality), dependent upon
the positivist and constructivism paradigms where reali-
ty is considered to exist independently of consciousness,
or where meaning is constructed—not discovered—so
subjects construct their own meaning in different ways
but still address an objective reality “out there.” People
have few degrees of freedom (operational research in
network optimization, cost engineering, statistical
methods, bodies of knowledge, application of standards,
best practices, code of ethics—all of these are seen as
being sort of “truth”) and qualitative aspects (Be—
becoming ontology placing emphasis on change and
emergence), dependent upon the subjectivist paradigm
where meaning is imposed on the object by the subject.
People thus have many degrees of freedom (organiza-
tional design, learning, knowledge management, change
management, systemic approaches, contextualization,
and meta-rules). Some of these aspects are linked
together—for example, the creation and evolution of
standards seen from the theory of convention (social
construct and becoming “object”) and their application
(positivism). Thus, my vision for project management
would be one of an integral function: The knowledge field
is made up of differential elements, each of them being
4 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
able to be defined (for example, cost control, scheduling,
communication, quality, information system, temporary
group). Seen as a whole, it is a transition to the limit, and
in mathematics the result of an integral is quantitatively
and qualitatively more than the sum of the parts.
From this point of view of the conceptual field of
management of projects, it seems to me that there is
“inseparability of the knowledge and its representation
understood in their distinctable activity, the intentional
experience of the knowing subject and the groping con-
struction of the subject representing knowledge, this
undoubtedly constituting the strong assumption on
which are defined teachable knowledge today, both sci-
entific and ordinary” (Lemoigne, 1995, p. 70).
These epistemological considerations will lead me to
define in meaningful foundations in the next “From the
Editor” the method we propose in mapping the dynam-
ics of the project management field. ■
Ordo ab chaos
Christophe N. Bredillet
References
Audet, M. (1986). Le procès des connaissances de l’ad-
ministration dans La production des connaissances de
l’administration sous la direction de Audet et Malouin.
Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval.
Kuhn, T. S. (1983). La structure des révolutions scien-
tifiques. Paris: Flammarion.
Lemoigne, J.-L. (1995). Les épistémologies construc-
tivistes. Paris: PUF.
Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge: Towards a post-
critical philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
005_016PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 2:50 PM Page 5
PAPERS
Systematic Biases and Culture
in Project Failures
Barry Shore, Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire,
Durham, NH, USA
ABSTRACT ■
Project success rates have improved, and much
of the credit can be given to the knowledge,
practices, and standards that have contributed
to the professionalization of the field.
Unfortunately, too many failures still occur.
Because many of them can be traced to man-
agement and decision-making practices, it
might be useful at this stage to explore a set of
systematic biases to determine if understand-
ing them can help diagnose and perhaps even
prevent failures from occurring. This article
begins with a framework identifying the influ-
ences on project outcomes, defines the
systematic biases that may derail projects,
summarizes eight project failures, uses the
framework to diagnose those failures, and con-
cludes by suggesting how organizational and
project culture may contribute to these very
common and natural biases.
KEYWORDS: project failure; project cul-
ture; systematic biases; project success
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 5–16
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20082
Why Do Projects Fail?
Project failure rates are certainly cause for concern, but consider that more
and more organizations are adopting a project-based model of organization,
called PBO, and it is not surprising to find that addressing failures and learning
from them has become increasingly important (Eden, Ackermann, & Williams,
2005; Gray & Larson, 2006; Hyvari, 2006; Robertson & Williams, 2006; Thiry &
Deguire, 2007).
Failures occur despite the fact that we have significantly improved the
process of planning, executing, and controlling projects. Two contributions
would include the Project Management Institute’s (PMI’s) A Guide to the
Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide) (2004) and the
literature on critical success factors (CSFs) (Cooke-Davies, 2002; Fortune &
White, 2006; Hyvari, 2006; Pinto & Slevin, 1987; Sutterfield, Friday-Stroud,
& Shivers-Blackwell, 2006).
To help us understand how projects fail, it may be useful to classify the
approaches represented by the PMBOK® Guide, Capability Maturity Model
Integration (CMMI), Earned Value Management (EVM), Critical Chain
Project Management (CCPM), and CSFs as the Rational Expectation view
of project management. They assume that project leaders follow a rational
and consistent approach to project management and strive to achieve spe-
cific organizational goals (Bazerman, 1994; Beach & Connolly, 2005). It is a
view that emphasizes what “should” be done. Argyris (1999) referred to this
as the “espoused” theory of individuals and organizations.
There is, however, another view, and it focuses on the way in which indi-
viduals within an organization actually behave and make decisions.
Borrowing from the work of Simon (1955) and Tversky and Kahneman (1974,
1981), it can be classified as the “behavioral” view of project management. It
emphasizes what individuals and groups “actually” do and how managers
make decisions involving values and risk preferences (Bazerman, 1994).
Argyris (1999) called this the “theory-in-practice.”
This article focuses on the behavioral view of project management and
how an understanding of systematic biases—those common to the human
decision-making process—can prove useful in diagnosing project failure. By
studying these systematic biases, we can learn how decision makers respond
to ambiguity, complexity, and uncertainty, as well as how their own particu-
lar psychological processes influence project decision making (Schwenk,
1984). From this behavioral view we can learn more about why management
approves an overly ambitious scope, why communications between teams is
limited, why a manager might ignore signs that the project is going badly, or
why a manager discourages the participation of a wider constituency in the
project management process.
The article begins with a framework for analyzing project outcomes,
introduces the systematic biases commonly associated with decision
processes, briefly summarizes eight project failures, uses these biases as a
diagnostic tool in understanding how these projects failed, and develops an
approach that links these biases to the project culture of failed projects. The
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 5
005_016PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 2:50 PM Page 6

PAPERS
Systematic Biases and Culture in Project Failures

article concludes with two examples of
how organizations have limited the
damage from systematic biases.
The Interaction of Cultural,
Leadership, Project, Management,
and Behavioral Factors on
Project Outcomes
The outcome of a project can be related
to the influence of cultural, leadership,
project, management, and behavioral
factors. These relationships are summa-
rized in Figure 1. National culture can
be defined as the values and belief sys-
tems held by a group of individuals,
learned early in life, and difficult to
change (Hofstede, 1997). Given the
international reach of an increasing
number of projects, a contemporary
view of project management must
acknowledge the influence of national
culture on the management of projects
(Shore & Cross, 2005; Wang & Liu, 2007).
Executive
Leadership
Project Leadership
Project
Goals
Budget
Schedule Control Processes
Complexity
Figure 1: Influence of cultural, leadership, project, management, and behavioral factors on project
outcome.
Organizational culture develops
within the context of national culture
and executive leadership. It can be
defined as the shared perceptions
of organizational work practices within
organizational units (Hofstede, 1999). It
also represents the particular ways of
conducting organizational business and
is instrumental in establishing the com-
petence of the organization (Belassi,
Kondra, & Tukel, 2007; Schein, 1985;
van den Berg & Wilderom, 2004; van
Marrewijk, 2007). While executive lead-
ership shapes the culture of the organi-
zation, project leadership shapes project
culture (Turner & Müller, 2006).
Project culture is then the shared
perceptions of project work practices,
influenced by both the project leader
and organizational culture. It is charac-
terized by the way in which project
planning, execution, and control are
exercised.
Organizational National
Culture Culture
Project Systematic
Culture Biases
Project Planning Management and
Execution and Team Decision
Processes
Project Standards
Project Outcome
PMBOK ® Guide
The systematic biases, common to
human decision processes and to be
addressed in this article, influence
management and team decisions,
which in turn influence the planning,
execution, and control of the project
process.
Methodology
The first step in this study was to iden-
tify and define the systematic biases
that have been studied in the decision
literature (Bazerman, 1994; Beach &
Connolly, 2005; Hammond, Keeney, &
Raiffa, 2006; Keil, Depledge, & Rai,
2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
These biases, defined in the next sec-
tion, include the following:
• available data,
• conservatism,
• escalation of commitment,
• groupthink,
• illusion of control,
• overconfidence,
• recency,
• selective perception, and
• sunk cost.
Establishing a clear distinction
between them is difficult. For example,
Keil et al. (2007) contended that selec-
tive perception plays an important role
in escalation of commitment. Langer’s
(1975) illusion of control overlaps with
overconfidence (Russo & Schoemaker,
1989). While the apparent overlap in
the definition of these biases is prob-
lematic, they have still proven useful
in studying failures (Keil et al., 2007;
Roberto, 2002).
In the second step of this study, the
following project failures are briefly
summarized:
• Airbus 380,
• Coast Guard Maritime Domain
Awareness Project,
• Columbia Shuttle,
• Denver Baggage Handling,
• Mars Climate Orbiter and Mars Polar
Lander,
• Merck Vioxx,
• Microsoft Xbox 360, and
• NYC Police Communications System.

6 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

005_016PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 2:50 PM
Data for these projects was
obtained from public and government
sources. Case studies were written for
each failure (Siggelkow, 2007). Twenty-
two business professionals attending a
graduate program in “Management of
Technology” discussed the nine sys-
tematic biases. The participants were
then divided into five groups and pre-
sented with summaries of the eight
cases. None of these professionals was
employed by the organizations includ-
ed in the study. Using a modified
Delphi Method, each group was asked
to read the cases and reach consensus
on the systematic biases that could
best explain why the projects failed
(Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).
Finally, each of the five groups present-
ed their results and a discussion fol-
lowed, during which consensus for the
group as a whole was reached.
Systematic Biases
Systematic biases represent common
distortions in the human decision-
making process. They reflect a particu-
lar point of view that may be contrary
to rational thought. Further, they are
systematic in contrast to random errors
that, on average, cancel each other out
(Bazerman, 1994; Beach & Connolly,
2005). These biases are summarized in
Table 1.
Project Failures
This section briefly summarizes the full
version of the eight case studies pre-
sented to the 22 participants. At the end
of each case is a summary of the con-
sensus reached by the entire group.
Airbus A380
Airbus was founded in 1970 as a loose
consortium of 16 independent aero-
space companies with facilities in France,
Germany, Britain, and Spain. In 2000,
Airbus started the A380 project, the goal
of which was to design and manufacture
a superjumbo jet capable of carrying up
to 800 passengers. The aircraft was to
usher in a new era of travel.
In the fall of 2006, when the aircraft
was in the assembly stage at Toulouse,
Page 7
Systematic Bias Definition
Available data A data-collection process that is restricted to
data that is readily or conveniently available
(Bazerman, 1994)
Conservatism Failure to consider new information or negative
feedback (Beach & Connolly, 2005)
Escalation of commitment to Additional resources allocated to a project that
a failing course of action is increasingly unlikely to succeed. (Keil &
Montealegre, 2000; Keil et al., 2007; Schwenk,
1984; Staw, 1981)
Groupthink Members of a group under pressure to think
alike, and to resist evidence that may threaten
their view (Haslam, 2004; Haslam et al., 2006;
Janis, 1971)
Illusion of control When decision makers conclude that they have
more control over a situation than an objective
evaluation of the situation would suggest
(Langer, 1975; Martz, Neil, & Biscaccianti, 2003)
Overconfidence Level of expressed confidence that is
unsupported by the evidence (Bazerman, 1994;
Fischoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977;
Russo & Schoemaker, 1989; Schwenk, 1984)
Recency Disproportionate degree of emphasis placed on
the most recent data (Beach & Connolly, 2005;
Chan, 1995)
Selective perception The situation where several people perceive
the same circumstances differently; varies with
the ambiguity of the problem or task (Dearborn &
Simon, 1958; Russo & Schoemaker, 1989)
Sunk cost The inability to accept that costs incurred earlier
can no longer be recovered and should not be
considered a factor in future decisions
(Beach & Connolly, 2005; Staw & Ross, 1987)
Table 1: Summary of systematic biases.
France, a preassembled wiring harness a result, hundreds of miles of cabin
produced in the Hamburg, Germany, wiring failed to fit. There was no choice
plant failed to fit into the airframe. but to halt production, postpone deliv-
The problem, according to several eries of the aircraft for two years, and
press reports, was that the wiring har- redesign the wiring system. Not only
ness had been designed in Hamburg was the cost expected to exceed $6
using an older version of CATIA, soft- billion, but it also placed the program
ware commonly used in aircraft design. two years behind schedule. When
The assembly plant in Toulouse, how- this delay was announced, the stock
ever, used the most recent version of lost one-third of its value. Worse, the
the software. Unfortunately, the ver- copresident of the company was
sions were incompatible, and the ability accused in June 2008 of selling his
to share design specifications between stock before the problems were made
these two plants was compromised. As public.
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Systematic Biases and Culture in Project Failures
What had been apparent for a long
time, and confirmed in Business Week
and the Wall Street Journal, was that
Airbus had failed to transform itself
from a balkanized organization into an
integrated company, and as a result suf-
fered from a convoluted management
structure. Managers, moreover, acted to
protect their former constituency and
made political rather than economic
decisions (Gauthier-Villars & Michaels,
2007; Matlack, 2006).
When the research groups were
presented with this case, they conclud-
ed that several systematic biases could
be identified, including selective per-
ception, groupthink, illusion of control,
and availability bias.
Selective perception occurs when a
problem is viewed from a limited or
narrow frame. This, the group conclud-
ed, explained why the organization was
unable to move toward an integrated
enterprise and why, as a practical
example, top managers acted to protect
their former constituents, unaware that
incompatible software would jeopard-
ize the project.
Second, the research groups sug-
gested that the insular nature of the
separate organizations created a proj-
ect culture that limited communication
among these units. It created, they
maintained, a breeding ground for
groupthink, where each group was iso-
lated from others in the organization.
As a result, many of the practices and
procedures within these organizational
units went unchallenged.
Third, while management at the
central facilities in Toulouse initially
envisioned a centralized organization
with some control over its divisions, the
inability of these divisions to use the
same version of CATIA suggested that
this transition was far from effective.
Senior management, the research
groups concluded, suffered from the
illusion of control.
The fourth explanation was attrib-
uted to availability bias, in which
management at each of the plants was
limited to the data that was available to
8 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
them, and thereby concluded that the
project was meeting its local objectives.
From their perspective, they were on
schedule and within budget.
Coast Guard Maritime Domain
Awareness Project
In 2001, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security and the U.S. Coast
Guard undertook a project that prom-
ised to create the maritime equivalent
of an air traffic control system. It was a
project that would combine the use of
long-range surveillance cameras, radar
systems, and information technology
to automatically identify vessels as they
entered U.S. ports. It was also a project
that would span 24 federal agencies
responsible for the protection of water-
ways and coasts.
In the first phase of the project, a
complete surveillance system, called
Project Hawkeye, was to be developed
and implemented for the port of Miami.
It would track larger vessels with radar,
and smaller vessels, even jet skis, with
infrared cameras. Finally, a software
system would process the data to deter-
mine which vessels posed a security
threat and deserved closer scrutiny.
The first test of the system was
declared a failure (Lipton, 2006). The
cameras were ineffective in tracking the
small boats, the radar system proved
unreliable when it incorrectly identi-
fied waves as boats, the Automated
Identification System used for large
boats failed to meet its objectives, and
the software systems needed to make
sense of the data had yet to be installed.
Although some data from the system
was available to the Coast Guard, they
were unable to use it. Because the test
failed, the implementation of this sys-
tem in 35 ports was delayed until at
least 2014.
When the research groups present-
ed their conclusions, they focused on
the complexity of working with 24
agencies. They concluded that since so
many components of the system had
failed, project leaders succumbed to
the illusion of control bias; these lead-
ers assumed that they had control over
the agencies and subcontractors, when
in fact they did not. Control issues, the
research groups continued, should
have been resolved before the project
was undertaken, not after.
The groups also suggested that
selective perception contributed to the
failure. Each separate agency focused
only on its immediate task, with appar-
ently little effort directed at integrating
their role with that of others; there was
no suggestion of a strategic relationship
among vendors and agencies.
Columbia Shuttle
On February 1, 2003, seven astronauts
perished when their Columbia Shuttle
disintegrated as it re-entered the earth’s
atmosphere. During launch, a piece of
foam insulation, similar in composition
to a Styrofoam cup and about the size
of a briefcase, broke away from the
main propellant tank. The foam struck
the left wing, seriously breaching the
protective panels on its leading edge
(Gehman, 2003).
It was not the first time that a sec-
tion of foam had broken away during
launch. In fact, it had happened on
every previous flight. But on each of
these flights, the spacecraft reentered
the earth’s atmosphere without incident
and safely returned home. Management
assumed that it was a problem of minor
significance and that it did not increase
the risk level of the flight (Starbuck &
Farjoun, 2005).
Many concluded, certainly just
after the 2003 tragedy occurred, that
technology was to blame. But a more
thorough and comprehensive investi-
gation, undertaken by the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board (CAIB),
concluded differently. It maintained
that management was as much to
blame for the failure as was the foam
strike. The Board described a culture
where, at every juncture, program man-
agers were resistant to new informa-
tion. It was a culture where people were
unwilling to speak up, or if they did
speak up, they were convinced they
005_016PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 2:50 PM
would not be heard. They also conclud-
ed that the organizational failure was a
product of NASA’s history, culture, and
politics (Columbia Accident Investiga-
tion Board, 2003).
The study participants concluded
that NASA had created a culture in which
systematic biases went unchecked. First,
the participants identified the recency
effect. Foam insulation had broken
away on previous flights and caused no
harm. To them this was confirmation
that these recent events distorted the
real danger presented by this problem.
Conservatism was also suggested,
because the data from these previous
flights was largely ignored by senior
managers; they failed to revise their
prior belief that the system was operat-
ing properly. There was also evidence of
overconfidence. During the flight, engi-
neers, concerned that the foam strike
may have caused a problem, asked a
manager of the Mission Management
Team (MMT) to request satellite imagery
of the spacecraft. Management, howev-
er, was apparently confident that there
was no safety issue, and a decision was
made against imagery. Had the imagery
been authorized, and the damage dis-
covered, the conjecture is that a rescue
attempt would have had a reasonable
chance of success.
Selective perception was suggested,
since management of the shuttle pro-
gram had shifted from an engineering
focus to a managerial focus. This mor-
phed the organization in such a way
that engineering problems were less
likely to be recognized and more likely
to be dominated by schedules and
budgets (Gehman, 2003).
Denver Baggage Handling
The new airport in Denver, with a
budget of $4.9 billion and originally
scheduled for completion in October
1993, would be one of the nation’s
largest public works projects of the
1990s (Brooke, 1995). It would cover 53
square miles and include five runways,
with future expansion to 12 runways.
Due to its size and the necessity to
Page 9
move baggage quickly between flights,
the airport would feature a completely
automated baggage-handling system.
In April 1995, after many delays, the
baggage system project was completed.
Reporters were invited to attend a
demonstration but instead witnessed
a public disaster. Delivery carts were
derailed, luggage was torn, and piles of
clothes and other personal items were
strewn beneath the tracks (Myerson,
1994). After scaling back the scope of
the baggage system and making the
necessary design changes, the airport
finally opened, 16 months behind
schedule and almost $2 billion over
budget (Keil & Montealegre, 2000).
The baggage-handling project at
Denver was more complex than any-
thing that had been attempted before at
any airport. Luggage was to be first
loaded onto conveyor belts, much as it is
in conventional baggage-handling sys-
tems. These moving conveyors would
then deposit the luggage into moving
computer-controlled carts at precisely
the right moment. The luggage would
then travel at 17 miles per hour to its des-
tination, as much as one mile away. This
underground rail system would be com-
pletely automated and would include
4,000 baggage carts traveling throughout
the airport and under the control of 100
computers. It would be capable of pro-
cessing up to 1,400 bags per minute.
After the system failed its public
test, and after design changes were
implemented, the system still had
problems. Only United Airlines used it,
and then only for outgoing flights.
Other carriers turned to a hastily
constructed manual system, since no
contingent plans had been made
should the automated system fail.
Finally, in 2005, after a decade of frus-
trating attempts to solve its problems,
the system was abandoned. Under the
lease agreement, United Airlines, one
of the major stakeholders in the proj-
ect, would still be liable for $60 million
per year for 25 years.
In two papers that raised concerns
about the scope and feasibility of the
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
project, deNeufville (1994, 2000)
contended that this baggage-handling
system represented an enormous
technological leap over current
practices. He concluded that the prob-
lem of accommodating the variable
demand made on the system, charac-
terized in the literature as a classic line-
balancing problem, would be difficult
to solve.
After discussing the case, the
research group identified overconfi-
dence as a major factor in the failure.
They referenced a quote in the case
summary taken from the New York
Times: “While the airport was being
designed, United insisted that the air-
port have the fancier baggage handling
system, which it contended would
sharply reduce delays” (Johnson, 1994).
Overconfidence was also suggested in
another quote from the New York Times
(Myerson, 1994), in which Gene Di
Fonso, president of BAE, the prime
contractor for the project, declared,
“Who would turn down a $193 million
contract? You’d expect to have a little
trouble for that kind of money.” With
widespread support, the group con-
cluded that no one questioned whether
it could be done.
They also identified the sunk cost
trap. In spite of years of disappoint-
ments, when all the airlines, with the
exception of United, opted out and
used a manual backup baggage-
handling system, the project continued.
Both the City of Denver and United
Airlines had already incurred high costs
and were unwilling to disregard these
past expenditures, even as their prob-
lems persisted and grew worse.
The illusion of control was also
identified for its role in keeping the
project alive too long. It helped explain
why, after evidence was presented at
the beginning, a line-balancing prob-
lem of this magnitude was very difficult
to solve, and why, after an embarrass-
ing preview of the system to reporters,
management was still confident that it
could fix the problems and control the
outcome.
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Systematic Biases and Culture in Project Failures
Mars Climate Orbiter and Mars
Polar Lander
As part of the NASA Mars Surveyor
Program, the Mars Climate Orbiter was
to orbit Mars and collect environmen-
tal and weather data. But as the
spacecraft approached its destination,
telemetry signals fell silent, and a $125
million mission failed.
The root cause identified by NASA
was the failure to convert between met-
ric and English units. When the fatal
error was detected, Noel Hinners, vice-
president for flight systems at Lockheed,
the company that built the spacecraft,
said in disbelief, “It can’t be something
that simple that could cause this to hap-
pen” (Pollack, 1999). But it was.
Apparently, Lockheed had used
pounds during the design of the
engines, while NASA scientists, respon-
sible for the operation and flight,
thought the data was in metric units.
There were early signs during its
flight that something was wrong with
the craft’s trajectory, and an internal
review later confirmed that it may have
been off course for months (Oberg,
1999; Pollack, 1999). Project culture,
however, required that engineers prove
that something was wrong rather than
“prove that everything was right.” This
difference in perspective prevented the
team from looking into the problem.
Edward Weiler, NASA associate adminis-
trator for space science, said, “The prob-
lem here was not the error; it was the fail-
ure of NASA’s systems engineering, and
the checks and balances in our processes
to detect the error” (Oberg, 1999, p. 34).
The Mars Investigation Panel report
identified several contributing factors to
the failure: the system engineering
process did not adequately address the
transition from development (Lockheed)
to operations (NASA); inadequate com-
munications between project elements;
and inadequate staffing and training.
Within a few months of the Orbiter
failure, the Mars Polar Lander, a related
NASA project with a price tag of $165
million, suffered the same fate. Its flight
was uneventful until it began its landing
10 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
approach. Then, during its descent to
the rough terrain of the polar cap,
telemetry signals fell silent. With no data
to pinpoint the precise cause of failure,
the teams investigating the accident
speculated that the vehicle’s descent
engines prematurely shut down. Unable
to slow the descent, the speculation was
that the engines quit when the Lander
was 130 feet high, crashing into the sur-
face of Mars at about 50 miles per hour.
The inappropriate response of its engines
was attributed to software glitches (Leary,
2000).
The prevailing culture at NASA of
“Better, Faster, and Cheaper,” which
defined the period when these projects
were in development, has been high-
lighted many times as the contributing
factor behind these failures. Thomas
Young, a former NASA official, said that
they were trying “to do too much with
too little.” He continued, “No one had a
sense of how much trouble they were
actually in” (Broad, 1999).
The prevailing culture was best
expressed in an internal memo written
by a laboratory official at the Jet
Propulsion Lab: “There might have
been some overconfidence, inadequate
robustness in our processes, designs or
operations, inadequate modeling and
simulation of operations, and failure to
heed early warnings” (Oberg, 1999, p. 35).
While the trajectory problem asso-
ciated with the Orbiter and the engine
ignition problem associated with the
Lander could be characterized as tech-
nical, the Mars Climate Orbiter Failure
Board Report (2000) said that manage-
ment failures were also to blame. They
found that these projects suffered from
a lack of senior management involve-
ment and too much reliance on inexpe-
rienced project managers. The Board
also criticized the strategy where proj-
ect managers in one organization
(Lockheed) were responsible for devel-
opment and a separate organization
(NASA) was responsible for operations
after launch.
The study group first identified the
sunk cost trap. If the orbiter did not
launch on schedule, it would have to
wait several months before its next
opportunity to launch. With launch
windows far apart, and with budgets
unable to tolerate a substantial delay,
managers were under pressure to meet
the deadline; it was important not to
“waste” the effort put into the project
to that point.
Selective perception bias was iden-
tified and used to explain why the engi-
neers at the Jet Propulsion Lab, the
design team, failed to coordinate with
the operational team at NASA. In large-
scale complex projects such as the
Orbiter and Lander, with countless
activities, contractors, and suppliers, it
is very possible that teams may take a
narrow view of their own activities. The
risk is that the work of one team may be
incompatible with the work of another.
Conservatism, the group contin-
ued, explained why engineers failed to
take action when they noticed that the
trajectory of the spacecraft was off.
They even held a meeting in Denver
to address the issue, but it was
never resolved. Even as the spacecraft
approached its destination and data
showed that it was drifting off course,
controllers largely ignored the real data
and assumed it was on course (Oberg,
1999).
Merck Vioxx
In 2000, the New England Journal of
Medicine published an article suggest-
ing that Merck misrepresented clinical
trial data on the risks of Vioxx, a drug
used to treat arthritis pain. Suspicions
were raised again when the Journal of
the American Medical Association, pub-
lished a paper in 2001 finding that
those who took Vioxx were more than
five times more likely to experience
a cardiac event than those taking a
commonly used over-the-counter anti-
inflammatory drug, Naproxen. Merck
denied these claims, insisting the find-
ings were “flawed” (Topol, 2004). Then,
under increasing pressure, they revised
the Vioxx label in 2002 to reflect these
added risks.
005_016PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 2:50 PM
During this period, Merck had
undertaken a separate study focusing
on the use of the drug in treating colon
polyps. New data from this trial simply
confirmed the risks that had been
raised earlier.
Shortly thereafter, on September
30, 2004, five years after it had been
introduced to the market, after 84 mil-
lion people had taken the drug, and
after three years of denying the drug
could induce heart attacks and strokes,
it was pulled from the shelves (Topol,
2004).
The legal consequences were signif-
icant. Over 27,000 claims were filed
contending that certain incriminating
data were withheld during the FDA
review process. In an early trial, a New
Jersey jury ruled unanimously in March
2007 that Merck committed consumer
fraud by intentionally suppressing,
concealing, or omitting information on
the risks of Vioxx. Eventually, Merck
proposed an out-of-court settlement to
the remaining complainants at a cost of
over $5 billion (Berenson, 2007).
The study group identified organi-
zation and project culture as important
contributors to the Vioxx project fail-
ure. They cited a Business Week article
contending that Richard Clark, CEO,
had watched the company degenerate
into a “collection of fiefdoms” more
focused on their own agendas than on
the company’s agenda (Weintraub,
2007).
Financial pressures, the group con-
tended, also shaped the culture. Drug
discovery is a costly and lengthy
process, fraught with risk. The average
cost to bring a drug to market exceeds
$1 billion. As drug trials proceeded
from animal to human trials and even-
tually to FDA review, it was not unrea-
sonable to conclude that the pressure
to continue with the project increased
as investment increased.
These cultural problems, together
with financial pressures, continued,
creating a breeding ground for system-
atic biases to emerge. The sunk cost
trap was identified as the dominant
Page 11
bias. After incurring nearly $1 billion to
develop the drug, after generating $2.5
billion in sales during 2003, it was not
difficult to understand why the compa-
ny resisted pressure to remove Vioxx
from the market.
While the sunk cost trap dominat-
ed, conservatism was also identified as
contributing to the failure, because
Merck suppressed early data suggesting
that the drug could have serious and
sometimes tragic side effects.
Microsoft Xbox 360
When Microsoft rushed its Xbox video
game console to market in November
2005, it had a one-year advantage over
Sony and Nintendo. By 2007, Microsoft
had sold over 11.6 million units at $279
to $479, depending on configuration.
Unresolved issues plagued the proj-
ect from the beginning. When journal-
ists and reviewers were invited to try
the Xbox 360 in 2005, before it became
available on store shelves, they
encountered problems connecting it to
the Internet (Croal, 2007). Shortly after
it was introduced to the public, users
complained that that the console dam-
aged game disks, so much that they
could no longer be used (Cliff, 2007). In
2005, Microsoft recalled the power
cords, concerned that they posed a fire
hazard (Wolverton & Takahashi, 2007).
Then, in December 2006, in an appar-
ent response to these and other issues,
Microsoft extended the warranty from
90 days to one year.
But problems persisted. Blogs and
forums complained about the “Red
Ring of Death,” referring to a string of
three lights that illuminate on the con-
sole when a serious malfunction occurs.
One survey found that the return rate
was 33% (Cliff, 2007).
Then, in July 2007, Robbie Bach,
president of Microsoft’s Entertainment
and Devices Division, said that there
had been an “unacceptable high num-
ber of repairs” (Taub, 2007). Shortly
thereafter, Microsoft announced an
extension of the warranty from one
to three years at an expected cost of
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
$1 billion. This represented about $100
for every Xbox sold since its introduc-
tion in 2005.
Later in the same month Microsoft
announced that its top gaming execu-
tive, Peter Moore, was leaving the com-
pany, but denied that his departure was
related to the Xbox’s engineering prob-
lems (Wingfield, 2007).
Three systematic biases were iden-
tified by the group. The first was con-
servatism. In the face of a continuous
stream of product returns and cus-
tomer complaints, those who were
responsible for the project were unwill-
ing to acknowledge that the problem
was serious, that customer satisfac-
tion and loyalty were deteriorating
rapidly, that the product needed to be
redesigned, and that customer satisfac-
tion needed to be addressed.
It was also suggested that manage-
ment fell prey to the sunk cost trap.
Considerable investment in the prod-
uct had already been made, sales were
strong, and since the division had yet to
turn a profit, there was pressure to con-
tinue at any cost. Returning to earlier
stages of design, issuing a recall for the
defective units, and replacing them
with new units were apparently not
realistic options.
Because Microsoft declined to com-
ment on the exact cause of the prob-
lem, which many suspected was tied to
either a power cord or component that
was overheating, it was concluded that
groupthink was also an issue. The only
public comment, made by Robbie
Bach, president of the Entertainment
and Devices Division responsible for
the Xbox, was that the company made
manufacturing and production changes
that should reduce hardware lockups
(Taub, 2007). It was suggested by the
group that this could be interpreted as
protecting the company to prevent
exposing its failures.
New York City Subway
Communications System
In New York City, police officers who
worked underground in the city’s
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Systematic Biases and Culture in Project Failures
extensive rapid transit subway system
were routinely unable to communicate
with officers working the streets above-
ground. Incompatible systems were at
fault. Not that this was a new problem
to law enforcement and emergency
organizations in New York City. On
September 11, 2001, for example, it was
not possible for police to communicate
with firefighters and warn them that
the World Trade Center towers were in
jeopardy of collapsing.
As early as the 1990s, preliminary
plans for an integrated communication
system had been proposed. In 1999, a
contract was signed with two firms. The
project was scheduled for completion
in 2004, with an approved budget of
$115 million.
In 2001, a report warned of an inter-
ference problem that could jeopardize
the ability of the systems to work
together. Rather than return to the
design stage and study the validity of
this concern, subcontractors continued
with the project. It was completed in
October 2007, but during the trial of the
system it became apparent that inter-
ference did indeed create serious
communication problems. As a result,
implementation was halted. Fixing the
problem was expected to increase
the cost of the project to $210 million.
The group linked the failure of the
New York City Subway Communi-
cations Project to conservatism, over-
confidence, and illusion of control.
Conservatism was suggested when the
project managers failed to take the
interference warning seriously enough
to change their plans early in the proj-
ect. Overconfidence was also suggested
to explain why they ignored the warn-
ing: project managers were apparently
convinced that the proposed design
would work or that all problems could
eventually be solved.
Illusion of control was also identi-
fied. The project management team
presumably believed that they could fix
the interference problem later, that
somehow they had enough control to
assure a successful outcome. Another
12 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
explanation is that they believed that
Sunk
Cost
the vendor would take responsibility
X
X
X
X
to solve the problem.
Perception
Selective
Discussion
A summary of the biases identified by
X
X
X
X
the 22 participants can be found in
Table 2. Four biases were mentioned
more frequently than the others.
Recency
Conservatism, or the failure to consid-
X
er new information, was mentioned
for the Columbia, Merck, Microsoft,
and New York City Subway projects.
Overconfidence
Illusion of control was mentioned for
the Airbus, Coast Guard, Denver
Baggage, and New York City Subway
X
X
projects. Selective perception was
mentioned for the Airbus, Coast
Guard, Mars, and Merck projects. Sunk
cost was mentioned for the Denver
Illusion of
Control
Baggage, Mars, Merck, and Microsoft
X
X
X
projects. Both groupthink and over-
confidence were mentioned some-
what less. Two biases, recency and
Groupthink
available data, were mentioned only
once, while escalation of commitment
X
was not mentioned at all.
The results from this small sample
prevent making conclusive statements
about the dominant biases in project
Escalation of
Commitment
management, but the data begins to
suggest that conservatism, illusion of
control, selective perception, and sunk
cost may be more common than the
other biases. Whether they were iden-
Conservatism
tified more frequently in this study
Table 2: Summary of biases affecting each case study.
because they were more easily under-
X
X
X
X
stood by the participants or whether
they actually contribute more than the
others to project failure is difficult to
conclude at this juncture. At the other
extreme, the study suggests that esca-
Available
Data
lation of commitment, available data,
X
and recency are more difficult to iden-
tify and may not contribute signifi-
cantly to project failure.
New York City Subway
Coast Guard Marine
It is rather surprising that escalation
Microsoft Xbox 360
Columbia Shuttle
Denver Baggage
was not mentioned at all, because the
Denver Baggage, Coast Guard, and the
Mars Orbiter
Airbus A380
Merck Vioxx
New York City Subway projects required
additional funding after evidence
became available that these projects
were in trouble. One possible explana-
005_016PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 2:50 PM
tion is that the 22 participants behaved
somewhat like the project managers in
these ill-fated projects and concluded
that allocating additional funds to pre-
vent failure was a reasonable strategy and
did not constitute escalation. Another
explanation is that escalation and the
other biases mentioned less frequently,
such as available data and recency, are
very difficult to identify. Recognizing
those biases may require inside informa-
tion, usually difficult to obtain.
In addition to using systematic bias-
es as a vocabulary for understanding
failures, it is also useful to consider the
role of culture, as suggested in Figure 1,
in creating an environment within
which these biases may emerge.
Culture does affect outcome.
Hansen and Wernerfelt (1989) showed
that organizational factors explain
about twice as much of the variance in
profit as do economic factors. Henrie
and Sousa-Poza (2005), in a compre-
hensive review of the literature, sug-
gested that culture may be a significant
factor in project failure. They also con-
tended that culture is not widely report-
ed in the literature, nor have there been
many attempts to measure it. Ajmal and
Koskinen (2008) also concluded that the
failure of many projects can be attrib-
uted to organizational culture, and that
a significant role of the project manager
is to merge several different organiza-
tional and professional cultures into
one project culture.
To link issues of organizational and
project culture to systematic biases
requires that organizational culture be
measured. Five dimensions were identi-
fied in van den Berg and Wilderom
(2004), including autonomy, external ori-
entation, interdepartmental coordina-
tion, human resource orientation, and
improvement orientation. Livari and
Huisman (2007) used the Competing
Values Model to measure culture. That
model includes four dimensions:
• internal focus,
• external focus,
• stability, and
• change.
Page 13
Cognitive Bias Competing Case in Which Cognitive
Values Model Bias Was Observed
Available data Internal focus, stability Airbus
Conservatism Internal focus, stability Columbia, Merck, Microsoft,
New York City Subway
Escalation of commitment Internal focus, stability
Groupthink Internal focus, stability Airbus, Microsoft
Illusion of control Internal focus, stability Airbus, Coast Guard, Denver
Baggage, New York City
Subway
Overconfidence Internal focus, stability Columbia, Denver Baggage
Recency Internal focus, stability Columbia
Selective perception Internal focus, stability Airbus, Coast Guard, Mars,
Merck
Sunk cost Stability Denver Baggage, Mars,
Merck, Microsoft
Note. The results suggest that the failed projects studied in this article reflect a project culture
that can be characterized as having a preference for an internal focus and stability.
Table 3: Cognitive biases mapped onto the competing values model.
Several of the dimensions used in literature that focuses on the study of
van den Berg and Wilderom overlap systematic biases. There is also a long
with the Competing Values Model. tradition in the project management lit-
The nine systematic biases used in erature that focuses on project failures.
this article were mapped onto the The objective of this article has been to
Competing Values Model. The results determine if bringing these two tradi-
are summarized in Table 3. For exam- tions together could prove useful in
ple, the available data bias suggests an learning more about project failures
organization and project culture char- and then in understanding how culture
acterized by an internal focus and a may provide the environment within
concern that external data may lead to which these biases may emerge.
unwelcomed changes. Airbus is an Twenty-two professionals partici-
example of a case study in which this pated in the study. They were intro-
bias was observed. It can be concluded duced to systematic biases and then
that the Airbus project culture, at the asked to determine which of these bias-
very least, could be characterized as es could help explain eight failed proj-
having a preference for an internal ects. Their responses suggest that the
focus and stability. One can hypothe- vocabulary of systematic biases could
size from Table 3 that failed projects, in prove very useful in understanding how
general, can be associated with organi- the rational processes of project man-
zational and project cultures character- agement can be derailed by the human
ized by an internal focus and a prefer- decision-making process.
ence for stability, not change. What this result underscores is that
the skills and techniques expressed in
Summary the rational view of project manage-
There is a long tradition in the organiza- ment, regardless of how aggressively
tional psychology and decision-making they are pursued, may be insufficient to
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 13
005_016PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 2:50 PM Page 14
PAPERS
Systematic Biases and Culture in Project Failures
assure project success. If indeed, as
suggested by the literature, systematic
biases are common in the human deci-
sion-making process, then there are
fundamental reasons why project fail-
ure should not be an unexpected result.
The study also provides some
insight into the organizational and
project cultures of failed projects. It
suggests that when these systematic
biases are overlaid on the Competing
Values Model, failed projects appear to
be related to organizational and project
cultures characterized by an internal
focus and stability. This suggests that
those organizations protecting their
own structures and management
processes, as well as those organiza-
tions resisting change and dismissing
external threats, may have created an
environment in which systematic bias-
es should not be unexpected, even
when the application of the traditional
tools of project management is vigor-
ously enforced.
Although the purpose of this study
was to explore the usefulness of sys-
tematic biases in understanding failed
projects, additional work needs to be
undertaken to validate the framework,
results, and theories expressed in this
article. This might include a larger
number of participants, greater partici-
pant training to better understand the
systematic biases, the use of survey
instruments to undertake more focused
empirical studies, or additional in-
depth case studies.
Unfortunately, studies of project
failure, including the failures summa-
rized in this study, are limited by the
extent to which organizations are will-
ing to reveal and discuss their failures.
Because most are unwilling to do so, we
are often limited to public projects or
those projects whose products or serv-
ices are subjected to government regu-
lation, such as the Challenger and Vioxx
failures. Regardless of whether an
organization engages in a postmortem
analysis within the organization or
whether it is an independent study of
the failed project, much is still left
14 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
hidden. Sometimes it is hidden to
protect organizations, teams, project
managers, and careers; at other times
to protect brands, market share, or
investments.
Because organizational culture and
project culture may play an important
role in creating an environment within
which systematic biases emerge, and
since culture, as Hofstede (1999) con-
tended, is difficult and slow to change,
a logical strategy for some organiza-
tions would be to change management
practices, which in turn may set into
motion events that may minimize the
emergence of systematic biases. Two
examples are worth mentioning.
When Boeing established a radical-
ly new approach to project manage-
ment for the 777 project, it hoped that it
would improve the outdated engineer-
ing and management processes that
had been in place for decades. At the
center of this approach was an open
culture requiring teams to include
representation from engineering, pro-
duction, management, suppliers, and
customers. It was a culture that did not
discourage conflict, and if a suggestion
was ignored, team members were
encouraged to take it to the next high-
est level. It was a radically new approach
to project management at Boeing and
produced one of the most successful
aircraft in its history (Cohen, 2000).
Another strategy is to create a cul-
ture that reduces the fear of failure
(Staw & Ross, 1987). Merck, recognizing
that it may have gone too far in empha-
sizing success and punishing failure, is
now promising stock options to scien-
tists who terminate unpromising proj-
ects. They say it is not the loss they are
rewarding, but the scientist’s willing-
ness to accept the fact that the project
lacks promise and that he or she is will-
ing to move on (Weintraub, 2007).
Certainly, one advantage of this cul-
tural shift is that managers are less
likely to succumb to the sunk cost
trap.
In conclusion, the real objective of
this study was not to conclusively relate
specific systematic biases to project
failures. Moreover, it was to suggest a
vocabulary that could prove useful by
providing insight into why projects fail,
as well as understanding how project
culture may inadvertently create an
environment within which these very
natural biases emerge. The evidence
from this study suggests that this
vocabulary is worth further study. ■
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Barry Shore is a professor of decision sciences
in the Whittemore School of Business and
Economics at the University of New Hampshire.
He holds a BS in electrical engineering from
Tufts University, an MBA from the University of
Massachusetts, and a PhD from the University
of Wisconsin. Prior to becoming a faculty mem-
ber, he worked for Boeing, General Electric, and
Hewlett-Packard. He has written four books and
authored over 100 peer-reviewed research arti-
cles that have appeared in such journals as the
Communications of the ACM, International
Journal of Project Management, International
Journal of Technology Management, and
Engineering Management Journal. In 2007, he
was named a fellow of the Global Information
Technology Management Association. He has
been a consultant to a wide range of organiza-
tions and is a member of the faculty in the
University of Naples Federico Secundo’s (Italy)
PhD program in science and technology
management.
017_032PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:22 PM Page 17
PAPERS
Managerial Perceptions
of Project Stability
Stephen M. Swartz, Marketing and Logistics, University of North Texas, Denton, TX, USA
ABSTRACT ■
This research investigated the importance of
stability (ability of schedules to absorb disrup-
tion) to project outcomes. Managers involved in
aviation systems development were surveyed
for their perceptions of importance and useful-
ness for project attributes and performance
management measures. Traditional measures
of cost, schedule, performance, and earned
value were compared to proposed measures of
stability. Stability and earned value had both
importance and usefulness to the managers.
Stability was perceived to be as important as
the more common measures. Perceptions dif-
fered depending on program size, scope, and
stage of completion and between managers
depending on experience and certification level.
KEYWORDS: project management;
performance measurement; project stability
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 17–32
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20078
INTRODUCTION ■
T
his research investigated the managers’ perceptions of the impor-
tance of stability to overall project outcomes. The relative stability of a
project refers to how resistant to disruption (stable) or sensitive to dis-
ruption (unstable) the activities and resources are under conditions of
uncertainty (Pagell, 1995; Swartz, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). If a project is able to
absorb disruption as a result of unplanned events, it is said to be stable.
Similarly, if a project is particularly sensitive to disruptions (resulting
in many deviations from the original schedule), it is said to be unstable.
Figure 1 provides a graphical description of the concept of stability (stable,
neutral, unstable) in a project network. In each case, the original project
schedule is shown in a subdued background. A disruption (“X”) causes a
delay in one of the activities. In case A, the disruption is absorbed by the
schedule, and the activities quickly get back to the original schedule. This
could be described as “positive” stability. In case B, the disruption is simply
carried forward throughout the schedule, neither increasing nor decreasing
in magnitude. This could be described as “neutral” stability. In case C, the ini-
tial disruption has caused increasing levels of delay, resulting in a change to
project duration well beyond that of the initial delay. This could be described
as “negative” stability or instability.
A schedule is developed in order to synchronize the accomplishment of
multiple, interdependent activities performed by resources in a large proj-
ect. The schedule provides the planned start and stop times for the activities
and instructions for the resources needed to perform the activities. On a
basic level, performance to the schedule is important in order to ensure that
the higher-level objectives of cost, schedule, and performance are met and
constraints are satisfied. Once the project begins, however, variability in the
duration of the activities and disruptions to the resources begin to occur.
Variability and disruption result in deviations to the schedule. These devia-
tions, in turn, may cause other deviations to future scheduled events. As the
deviations spread throughout the project network, a loss of the synchroniza-
tion of the activities and resources in the project begins to occur. This loss of
synchronization in the project may result in a degradation of project per-
formance. The degree to which the initial deviations increase or decrease
over the life of the project indicate the degree of stability or instability in the
execution of the project. The purpose of this current investigation was to
determine if, or to what degree, proposed measures of stability have value
to managers apart from the more traditional measures.
Project Performance Measurement
In order to properly manage projects, accurate information is needed to
diagnose the accomplishment of objectives. Accomplishment is reflected by
measurements upon which corrective action is suggested and taken.
Traditionally, project objectives have been characterized into the three
broad areas of cost, schedule, and performance (Badiru, 1988; Chang & Ibbs,
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 17
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Managerial Perceptions of Project Stability
A ⴙ
B 0
C ⴚ
Figure 1: Positive, neutral, and negative stability.
1998; Tukel & Rom, 2001). These meas-
ures reflect performance along single
dimensions, which generally describe
the overall project performance. In
addition, several multidimensional
performance measures have been
developed to consider more complex
attributes. Net present value and
earned value measurement systems
track both time and cost, or time and
quality, at the same time. In the next
section, several commonly used single
and multidimensional project per-
formance measures are described, such
as schedule, cost, net present value,
and earned value. In addition, the con-
cept of stability and stability measures
will be introduced.
Single-Dimension Measures: Cost,
Schedule, Performance
Cost, schedule, and performance
measures for project management
(during execution) and evaluation
(upon completion) have been used
widely since the inception of the earli-
est project management techniques
(Kelly & Walker, 1959; U.S. Navy, 1958;
Wiest, 1964). Cost is commonly meas-
ured as the expenditures over time
18 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Page 18
when executing the project activities.
Schedule measures track the comple-
tion of the required activities—usually
in comparison to the project plan or
schedule. Performance is a measure of
project success, generally measured
against the desired project outcomes.
Various disaggregate as well as
aggregate cost, schedule, and per-
formance measures have been used
for monitoring and guiding project
performance.
The single-dimension measures of
cost, schedule, and performance have
been noted to be insufficient for man-
agers to guide project effort as the proj-
ects increase in size, duration, and
complexity. Extensions to these basic
measures have, therefore, been devel-
oped. For example, Badiru (1988) noted
that duration alone was insufficient
for evaluating the performance of
various project-scheduling heuristics.
He developed a family of duration-
based metrics involving the use of vari-
ous ratios of duration with respect to
the planned schedule. The study con-
cluded that the more sophisticated
multidimensional measures were bet-
ter indicators of performance than the
traditional measures, particularly for
larger networks. A more recent reap-
praisal of the traditional measures
noted widespread dissatisfaction with
the “iron triangle” of cost, schedule,
and performance (Atkinson, 1999). He
proposed an alternative process
intended to bring in and explicitly
consider desires of a variety of stake-
holders involved in the project.
Relative Importance of Cost, Schedule,
and Performance Over Time
While all projects share the generic
goals of cost, schedule, and perform-
ance, it is the job of the project manager
to trade off performance against these
goals in such a way that the total proj-
ect outcome is optimized. One key
question for the project manager to
answer is whether or not the relative
degrees of importance or weights of
the three generic goals change over the
life of a project. For example, it could be
assumed that performance is the most
important of the three goals during the
initial stage of the project life cycle
when attention is focused on the tech-
nical specifications on the project.
Once the specifications are set and
work on the project begins in earnest,
priority could shift to cost, then to
schedule as the project approaches
completion. However, the assumption
of changing performance priorities
over time has been challenged in the
literature both in nature and scale.
Members of the Project Management
Institute (PMI) have been surveyed for
practices in project management with
respect to performance priorities
(Kloppenborg & Mantel, 1990; Tukel &
Rom, 2001). In order to determine if
cost, schedule, and performance goal
weights do change systematically over
the life of the project, Kloppenborg and
Mantel (1990) reviewed data from
approximately 300 (60% response rate)
members of the PMI on their individual
opinions about the relative importance
of cost, schedule, and performance
goals at various stages of the project life
cycle. At the same time, the managers’
017_032PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:22 PM
choices of relative priority were investi-
gated in order to determine the influ-
ence of environmental or situational
factors. With the project life cycle divid-
ed into four major parts (formation,
buildup, main program, and phaseout),
this research found the importance
assigned to cost, schedule, and per-
formance goals varied systematically
across the project life cycle. The pri-
mary managerial implications of these
findings are that a number of separate
variables should be taken into account
when making trade-offs. Second, con-
scious decisions should be made con-
cerning which of the project objectives
to subject to primary control and which
should be left comparatively free.
A contrary finding was provided by
Tukel and Rom (2001). They analyzed
117 (18% response rate) responses from
project managers in the PMI database.
Their analysis of the classic measures
found that while project managers at all
levels measured and responded to
deviations in cost and schedule, the
dominant measure of success tended
to be performance (Tukel & Rom,
2001). The “internal measures” of cost
and schedule were perceived to have
relatively low priority throughout the
duration of the project. Quality (per-
formance), when considered to be an
“external measure” of responsiveness
to customer needs, remained most
important regardless of industry or
project type. This was found to be con-
sistent over the life of the project.
The differences between the studies of
project performance priority were
somewhat unmistakable. It could be
suggested that the differences could
be explained by variations in sampling,
instrument design, or perhaps changes
in management practice over the inter-
vening time period between surveys.
Irrespective of the exact nature of the
differences noted between the studies,
the differences themselves indicate
perhaps a weakness or lack of uniform
agreement in performance measure-
ment systems for management control
and reporting in projects.
Page 19
Complex Measures: Net Present Value,
Earned Value
Net present value (NPV) is a measure
that takes into account both schedule
and cost, using the time value of money.
NPV is an absolute measure of the
expected value of a project in constant
dollar terms. It is calculated by discount-
ing (or inflating) the cost and benefit
time series to the reference year and
subtracting the present value of costs
from the present value of benefits to
yield the net present value of the invest-
ment. Varying forms of this measure are
widely used by industry, where it is often
referred to as discounted cash flow. Like
most metrics, its use is affected by the
selection of a discount rate, which is
used to adjust the time series of benefits
and costs for risk, time preferences of
money, and inflation (Russell, 1970).
This selection is not straightforward
because of different views with respect
to how many of these three factors to
include in determining the discount
rate. However, NPV remains a legitimate
metric for project managers in both the
private and public sectors (Blanchard,
1995; Pinder & Marucheck, 1996).
The earned value management sys-
tem (EVMS) for program management
is designed to effectively integrate
the work scope of a program with the
schedule and cost elements for opti-
mum program planning and control.
The primary purpose of the system is to
support program management under
the broad principles of cost/schedule
control systems criteria (Anbari, 2003;
Fleming & Koppelman, 1994; Haupt,
2003). The cost/schedule control system
criteria were developed by the Depart-
ment of Defense in 1967 (Department
of Defense, 1991) to establish standards
for the management of large-scale,
long-term projects (Fleming &
Koppelman, 1994; Haupt, 2003). The
EVMS is the current application used to
ensure these standards are being met
and has become widely accepted in
practice in both public- and private-
sector enterprises (Christensen, 1994;
Garrett, 2006).
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
The essence of EVMS is that stan-
dards or target values (budgeted cost)
can be determined or estimated,
appropriate for the degree of technical,
schedule, and cost risk or uncertainty
associated with the program, for each
scheduled element of work. As these
elements of work are completed, their
target values are considered to be
earned. Work progress over time can,
therefore, be quantified, and the
earned value becomes a metric against
which to measure both what was spent
to perform the work and what was
scheduled to have been accomplished
(planned value). The rate of work
accomplished can be compared to the
cost accrued (both actual and sched-
uled) over time to produce perform-
ance measurements assessing progress
and variance from schedule for
management feedback (Anbari, 2003;
PMI, 2004). The earned value concept is
an effective method for tracking
progress because it combines all facets
of productivity into a single value. Also,
it enables the project manager to esti-
mate and update how much it will cost
to finish the project. This “estimate at
completion” problem is of some inter-
est to practitioners and academics alike
and has received some attention in the
literature (Christensen, 1992, 1993;
Zwikael, Globerson, & Tzvi, 2000).
While these techniques are extensively
used on government projects today,
they are also valid for projects in the
private sector and more companies are
voluntarily implementing such meth-
ods for project control (Bonnal, de
Jonghe, & Ferguson, 2006; Christensen,
1994; Stuckenbruck, 1989).
Alternative Comprehensive
Performance Measurement
Systems
While the EVMS represents a relatively
new comprehensive cost/schedule
control system for project management
in common use, the issue of perform-
ance measurement for projects is by no
means settled. Several performance
measurement systems that represent
19
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Managerial Perceptions of Project Stability
alternatives to the EVMS have received
attention in practice, as reflected in the
literature. While it is beyond the scope
of this article to provide a comprehen-
sive literature review and survey of
practice on all measurement systems,
the following examples are notable.
Chang and Ibbs (1998) developed a
set of 42 process versus deliverable
metrics for evaluating the performance
of consultants involved in the manage-
ment of design projects for the
California Department of Transportation
(CalTrans). CalTrans had a need to eval-
uate the performance of the consult-
ants with respect to how well the proj-
ects were managed. The authors con-
cluded that while the measures had
validity in an overall sense, tailoring or
customization to specific circum-
stances (as was performed by the
study) improved the usefulness of the
measures considerably: “. . . there is
probably no single system of measures
reflecting all requirements and expec-
tations . . .” (Chang & Ibbs, 1998, p. 47).
The balanced scorecard (BSC)
approach to organizational perform-
ance measurement (Kaplan & Norton,
1992) has received attention in the
literature. A system applying the BSC
principles to the management of
projects has been proposed (Stewart,
2001). Stewart departs from traditional
project performance measurement
approaches by tailoring the perform-
ance measures according to the needs
of each project phase, implying that as
the project matures to completion, the
specific measures (and their manage-
ment priority) would change.
It has been noted that great increas-
es in information technology and the
explosion of information available for
managers has led to a movement from
a centralized to a decentralized (dis-
persed) management approach. This
has led to a critical review of existing
measures for project management and
suggested that appropriate metrics can
support the decentralized control of
activities (Hauser, 2001). The author
proposes that firms involved in product
20 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
development (1) already have a system
of metrics for managing the projects;
(2) have a need to “fine tune” the met-
rics to provide the proper emphasis
or culture; and (3) have the ability to
allow individual projects to increase or
decrease emphasis on a particular
metric. The conceptual premise now
applied to the problem of selecting
appropriate metric emphasis is that
of response surface methodology,
where multiple independent variables
(actions taken to manage the project)
can be associated with a resultant proj-
ect profit. Specific actionable metrics
can be developed to monitor and
report on the achievement of these
actions. If the relationships between
the actions and profit result, the project
team can incrementally adapt their
metrics to achieve higher levels of per-
formance. The incremental changes in
the importance of the various metrics
will then contribute to changes in focus
of the project team culture through
associated performance rewards
systems.
Performance measurement for
projects in research and development
groups is problematic, as the classical
financial-based measurement systems
do not really capture the purpose and
role of these projects (Loch & Staffan
Tapper, 2002). Indeed, the authors note
that “. . . a recent study found that
financial measures are the worst
method for funding decisions in new
product development . . .” (p. 185).
Many nonfinancial measures have
been developed for assessing project
performance for product develop-
ment teams. Time to market, new prod-
uct sales ratio, ratio of R&D to sales,
and similar measures have been used
by R&D-intensive firms. However,
these measures (and other nonfinan-
cial measures similar to them) may be
more or less relevant for different new
product development (NPD) environ-
ments; again, context-unique measures
must be developed. The authors pro-
posed a process for developing meas-
ures of this type, tailored to the specific
strategic needs of the firm or industry.
This process was tested in a case-study
format with one company and was well
received by senior management.
Project teams engaged in the devel-
opment of new products face perform-
ance measurement and control
problems similar to those of research
and development groups (Bonner,
Ruekert, & Walker, 2002). The study
focused on the use of six types of con-
trol mechanisms for managing cross-
functional teams in new product devel-
opment processes. A survey of project
managers attempted to relate three
“formal” controls (process control, out-
put control, team rewards) and three
“interactive” controls (team opera-
tional influence, team strategic influ-
ence, management intervention) to
project performance outcomes. While
statistical validity was nominally pres-
ent for the constructs in this survey,
interpretation of the relationships
between the control mechanisms and
project performance was complicated
by the presence of interaction effects
between various measures and the
absence of strong effect sizes. However,
a general finding that the performance
of cross-functional NPD teams would
be improved through the use of flexible
and self-determined project controls
was suggested.
Measures of Stability
Scheduling stability refers to the
ability of a schedule to resist or absorb
unplanned variance or events (Pagell,
1995; Swartz, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). As pre-
viously described, the relative stability of
a project refers to how resistant to dis-
ruption (stable) or sensitive to disruption
(unstable) the activities and resources
are under conditions of uncertainty. If a
project is able to absorb disruption as
a result of unplanned events, it is said to
be stable. Similarly, if a project is particu-
larly sensitive to disruptions (resulting in
many deviations from the original
schedule), it is said to be unstable.
It must be noted that while there
may indeed be some overlap between
017_032PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:22 PM
the multidimensional measures of EVMS
and the proposed single-dimension
measures of stability, they are indeed
separate program control factors.
The overlap between stability and
EVMS involves the measurement of
“variance” or deviation; both concepts
are based on departures from plan
(as are typical cost, schedule, and per-
formance measures). In general, one
could presume that as a project showed
less stability, this would also be cap-
tured in some way by the various
EVMS measures. Once the schedule
has been disrupted, improvements
must be made to the remaining work
plan in an effort to “catch up” to the
original performance objectives; recent
work (Cioffi, 2006; Vandevoorde &
Vanhoucke, 2006) has investigated how
to forecast the amount of “catching up”
that must be done and whether that
level of improvement is even possible.
To clarify the differences between
EVMS and the proposed stability con-
cept, additional explanation of stability
is required.
Stability is an important issue in
scheduling when resources are limited
and must be carefully managed. The
schedule represents a plan for how to
best use the resources available in
order to achieve some set of objectives
within the constraints imposed upon
the project. When the schedule or plan
cannot be met, several direct and
indirect undesirable consequences
may result (Cioffi, 2006; Eden,
Williams, Ackerman, & Howick, 2000;
Vandevoorde & Vanhoucke, 2006). First,
the desired objectives toward which the
schedule is optimized may not be
achieved. If the schedule is unable to
resist an unplanned variation, or loses
validity when a disturbance occurs, the
resources may not be put to their best
use from that point forward. In addi-
tion, when the schedule breaks down or
loses validity, resources that must be
secured from outside the system may
be brought in (and paid for) too early or
too late, resulting in idle time and addi-
tional costs. Learning and unlearning,
Page 21
as well as other tangible set-up costs,
may take place when resources are set
up and broken down as priorities
change. When the schedule loses valid-
ity, local decisions (based on the invalid
schedule) may no longer integrate well
with the global objectives.
This study defined several new
project management stability meas-
ures. It tried to provide insight into the
relationships between the traditional
factors of project performance and
some proposed stability measures.
These traditional factors included the
nature of the project environment
(activity variability and resource disrup-
tion) and the scheduling and execution
methods used to manage the project.
The results demonstrated that studying
both project stability and the relation-
ships between project stability, other
outcome measures, and the traditional
factors of project performance could be
extended into practical significance for
the management of projects.
The stability measures divide into
two distinct groups: the offset meas-
ures and the deviation measures.
Resource offset is the total person-days
of overtime or under time (idleness)
experienced by resources used to com-
plete the project, scaled based on the
total size of the project. Offset meas-
ures how much time resources spend
waiting to work or catching up in terms
of scheduled activity. Activity deviation
is the total amount of earliness or late-
ness for activities in a project (sum of
days early or days late for all tasks). It is
scaled based on the total size of the
project and measures how much time
the project is “off-track” in terms of
scheduled completion. Specific meas-
ures will be described toward the end of
the next section.
Methodology
The purpose of this current effort is to
assess the project manager’s percep-
tions of the importance and usefulness
of various project attributes and
performance measures, primarily with
respect to a new concept of stability.
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
The focus is, therefore, on establishing
the validity of proposed stability con-
structs, followed by an investigation of
how these new constructs (if supported)
relate to more traditional constructs
under various project environments.
The assessment is based on both the
general attributes of management for
the activities in a specific program
and the specific measures being
employed by the managers. In this
research, the scope is limited to the
management of relatively complex,
large-scale projects. Projects studied
involve the design, development, and
delivery of aircraft and support systems.
Specifically, the research surveyed man-
agers in aircraft design and develop-
ment offices for the U.S. military.
Research Questions
The overall research context is the
assessment of the managers’ percep-
tions of the stability concept to overall
project outcomes, and stability meas-
ures in managing project tasks. Five
investigative questions were posed and
answered in addressing this issue:
• Have stability measures or concepts
been previously used in project per-
formance measurement?
• With respect to existing attributes of
overall project performance, is the
concept of stability separable from,
but comparable to, existing concepts?
• Compared to traditional measures of
project performance used for project
management, are some proposed
measures of stability separable from,
but comparable to, existing project
management measures?
• Are the perceptions of stability and tra-
ditional measures affected by project or
managerial context (project size, scope,
or maturity; managerial level; experi-
ence; association with specific project)?
• Of what use are the analysis results for
the management of future projects?
Each of the investigative questions
was answered employing a survey of
managerial opinions as described in
the next section.
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Managerial Perceptions of Project Stability
Developing the Survey Instrument
The survey was structured in three
parts, starting with demographic ques-
tions and two parts with the scale and
the rank of items representing the con-
structs to be surveyed. In the first part,
questions were asked about general
position and experience of the respon-
dent and his/her personal information
like gender and age. The questions in
the demographics part were structured
as both open-ended and with alterna-
tive answers for the respondent to
choose from. The second section elicit-
ed information about the project
attributes or characteristics of the proj-
ect environment. The third section
concerned specific project perform-
ance measures.
As the survey instrument was of a
new design, tests for construct validity
and reliability were conducted using
the multi-item method. The last two
sections included ranked, scaled, and
open-ended items representing the
same constructs. Three copies of the
instrument were designed, with item
order randomly scrambled between
versions to reduce the possibility that
item order may have affected perceived
priority or ranking. A copy of the instru-
ment is available upon request from
the authors.
Demographics
Questions asking supervisory position
(rank/grade), age, occupational spe-
cialty area (career field), years of expe-
rience, name of the program, and
duties with regard to the program were
in the open-end form. Questions
regarding the program (what stage of
execution, size, scope, etc.) and the
respondent’s gender were selected
from the choices provided. The demo-
graphic categories were selected in
anticipation of their role as potential
mediating or moderating factors. In
order to process the returned survey
data on the computer, the categorical
data obtained from the demographic
section was converted into numeric
codes. Most of the variables in this
22 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
section were coded as they were entered
(for example, the variable age). Only
gender (male for 0, female for 1), project-
assignment (1–3), program-stage (1–4),
and program-level (1–3) variables were
converted to numeric codes.
Creating Item Scales
The second section of the instrument
used item scales (7-point Likert) and
associated ranks. It was further subdi-
vided into two parts. The first part cap-
tured perceptions on constructs related
to general project attributes, and the
second part covered specific perform-
ance measures. The project attributes
and performance measures used were
defined for respondents in the instru-
ment, and are described as follows:
• General Attributes: Characteristics
that a project or task will assume as it
is executed.
• Cost: How much does the project or
task cost overall (a lot or a little)?
• Schedule (Sched): How long does the
project or task take to complete
(a short time or a long time)?
• Performance (Perf): How many desir-
able features does the project or task
successfully deliver (many or few)?
• Earned Value (EV): Deviation or
variance measure combining per-
formance, schedule, and cost param-
eters of a project. Baseline is the
budget that is spread over time to
accomplish the scope of work and
against which progress can be meas-
ured. Earned value is described as
“how much progress am I making
against my original plan?”
• Stability (Stab): Deviation or vari-
ance recovery measure combining
cost, schedule, and performance.
Measures the ability of a project or
task to get “back on track” after being
disrupted.
• Specific Performance Measures: The
metrics used to measure performance
of a project.
• Cost Variance (CV): The difference
between the budgeted cost of work
performed and the actual cost of
work performed.
• Cost Performance Index (CPI): The
ratio of the budgeted cost of work
performed over the actual cost of
work performed. This is a measure
of efficiency and can be used to pre-
dict the final range of costs.
• Schedule Variance (SV): The differ-
ence between budgeted cost of work
scheduled and budgeted cost of
work performed.
• Schedule Performance Index (SPI):
The ratio of budgeted cost of work
scheduled over budgeted cost of
work performed. A productivity
measure that can be useful in assess-
ing how much work has been
accomplished.
• Activity Deviation (AD): The total
amount of earliness or lateness for
activities in a project (sum of days
early or days late for all tasks). The
scale was based on the total size of
the project. This measures the pro-
portion of how much time the project
is “off-track” in terms of scheduled
completion.
• Resource Offset (RO): The total man-
days of overtime or undertime (idle-
ness) experienced by resources used
to complete the project. The scale
was based on the total size of the
project. This measures how much
time resources spend waiting to
work or catching up on work in
terms of scheduled activity.
For both the general project attrib-
utes and the specific performance
measures, linear and ranking scales
were used to measure each construct.
At the end of the page for each section,
space was provided for additional
inputs from the respondents in the
form of open-ended responses.
When items are to be judged on a
single dimension and arrayed on
a scale with equal intervals, a simple,
linear numeric scale with extremes
labeled appropriately is the most advis-
able method of scaling. For this
research, we also used multiple-rating
lists, which are slightly different from a
linear numeric scale. For the ranking
section of each part, respondents were
017_032PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:22 PM
asked to rank the constructs they pre-
viously identified. For clarity, they were
provided with an appendix at the last
page of the survey briefly defining each
construct in addition to the instruc-
tions at the beginning of every one of
the scales.
Selecting the Sample
A survey method was used for the col-
lection of data for this research. The
objective of the research was to assess
the manager’s perceptions of the
importance and usefulness of a new
performance measurement construct
for projects (stability) within the
common performance constructs
and measures of cost, schedule, per-
formance, and earned value. The
researchers did not want to bias or
favor the perception of stability by
selecting respondents from among a
project environment where stability
would be particularly important. In
addition, when performing research on
emergent or new constructs, a large-
scale survey across many different proj-
ect environments and respondents
with different experiences would create
an excess amount of variation not
relevant to the study. Therefore, gener-
alizability was sacrificed for internal
validity in this initial, exploratory effort
by limiting the respondent pool to a rel-
atively homogenous group of project
managers in an environment charac-
terized by relatively large, long-term,
inherently stable projects. It was, there-
fore, believed that program managers
in the design, development, and acqui-
sition of aircraft and support systems
would form the population of interest.
The specific population is not identi-
fied here to ensure anonymity, but a
more detailed description is available
upon request from the authors. A com-
plete list of the target population was
provided by industry officials. The pop-
ulation of interest numbered 455. The
unit of analysis is the individual man-
ager in a program office. As a result, the
sampling frame took the form of an
address list including names, positions
Page 23
(rank or grade), and office symbols
associated with aircraft development
project teams.
There are times when it is useful to
divide a population into two or more
segments (strata) and sample a portion
of each. The selection of sample strata
is usually based on some demographic
characteristics known or suspected to
have an influence on the result (Leedy
& Ormrod, 2004). In this research, the
sample was stratified according to the
dimensions of authority level and proj-
ect affiliation. In our population, there
were military (short-duration affilia-
tion) and civilian (long-term affiliation)
employees ranging from lieutenant to
colonel for the military, and the com-
plete spectrum of government service
(GS) levels for civilian managers.
According to their proportions in the
population, the sample was stratified
according to authority level and affilia-
tion and response rates were tracked
within each stratum to ensure repre-
sentation. After dividing the entire pop-
ulation into specific groups (small
groups were combined), the dimen-
sions included three levels for civilian
affiliation and five levels for military
affiliation. Numbers were assigned
to each name in the population list,
and each member was identified by
level and affiliation. Participants were
selected randomly from within each
stratum to conform to proportional
representation.
Sample-Size Determination
Sample size determines the degree of
statistical confidence available for
analysis and interpretation. A higher
reliability can be bought through a
larger sample by additional time, effort,
and money. Conversely, there is a mini-
mum sample size below which the data
are worthless. The object of proper
sample size is to find the optimum
point between those two extremes for
the survey project currently ongoing.
When sample size increases, sample
error decreases and sample reliability
increases. Similarly, when population
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
variance increases, sampling error
increases and sample reliability
decreases (Alreck & Settle, 1985). In
sample-size determination, there are
minimum and maximum practical
sample sizes that apply virtually to all
surveys. Normally, a size of 30 or less
would not provide certain practical
results. On the other hand, it is seldom
necessary to sample more than 10% of
the population to obtain adequate con-
fidence. For a population size of 455 for
this research, a sample size of 46 was
assumed to be minimally representa-
tive. In order to maintain the required
number of usable surveys, 120 surveys
were sent out, anticipating that the
expected nonresponse rate for surveys
would be around 40%. Similar surveys
in this population have received higher
response rates; however, because the
people in the system program offices
are busy, and they work with sensitive
information, they might not be willing
to share information by means of sur-
veys even though they were approved
by higher management levels in their
organizations. For these reasons the
response rate was anticipated at
around 40%.
Initial Analysis and Reliability
For tracking purposes (sample repre-
sentation) and to increase response
rates, the randomly assigned name list
was used to make follow-ups. Four
weeks after the initial mailing, response
rates within strata were inspected for
proportionality. Based on the response
rate and the expected number of
returned usable questionnaires, direct-
ed (within strata), random resampling
was performed, and additional surveys
were mailed as required.
Collecting and Processing the Data
As the surveys were returned, the ques-
tionnaire responses were sight-edited for
usability. Incomplete, unusable, or blank
questionnaires were set aside as declined
to participate. Monitoring was per-
formed to guard against nonresponse
bias, by analyzing the demographic
23
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PAPERS
Managerial Perceptions of Project Stability

table; scaled “usefulness” means and p

Auth Lvl Pop Sent % Sent Received % Received
values are indicated in the upper right
Civ1 25 7 28 5 71 quadrant of the table. Values of p that
Civ2 137 38 28 13 34 are smaller than 0.10 are indicated in
bold type. The results indicate that sig-
Civ3 57 14 25 6 43 nificant differences exist in the minds of
Mil 1 18 5 28 5 100 the respondents as to the relative
importance and usefulness of the vari-
Mil 2 53 14 26 10 71 ous project attributes, according to the
Mil 3 56 14 25 7 50 order indicated, between most of the
attributes. While stability cannot be
Mil 4 55 14 25 6 43
separated from either cost or earned
Mil 5 54 14 26 6 43 value in either importance or useful-
Total 455 120 26 58 48 ness at the a
0.10 level, it is distin-
guishable from performance and
Table 1: Response rates within strata. schedule. Nonparametric tests per-
formed on the rank data (both
Friedman and Kendall’s W tests) sup-
subcategories (within the strata) to Descriptive Statistics, Means, ported the t tests, with overall a
0.000
check for representation of completed and Ranks for the overall test of “at least one attrib-
responses. As there were no patterns in Considerable agreement was found ute is ranked significantly differently
the demographic data to suggest nonrep- between scale means and ranks with from another.”
resentation of the sample (respondents respect to both importance and useful- Similar agreement was found
completed or failed to complete the sur- ness of the project attributes. Referring between scale means and ranks with
vey on an other than random basis), the to Tables 2 and 3, we find that the rela- respect to both importance and useful-
possibility or magnitude of nonresponse tive order of attributes follows (most to ness for the performance measures
bias was mitigated (Alreck & Settle, 1985). least) performance, schedule, cost, sta- (refer to Tables 4 and 5). There was no
The response rates of the received sur- bility, and earned value for scaled deviation in relative order between
veys are presented in Table 1. The importance, and both scaled and scaled or ranked importance or useful-
received survey percentages within the ranked usefulness. The order varies for ness (most to least): cost variance,
sampling strata were generally in accor- ranked importance: (most to least) per- schedule variance, cost performance
dance with the overall response rate. The formance, cost, schedule, stability, and index, schedule performance index,
response rates and proportionality were earned value. For the scaled attributes activity deviation, and resource offset. For
considered sufficient for the purposes of (Table 2), paired-difference t tests were the scaled measures (Table 4), paired-
this research, although some underrepre- run to determine the significance of the difference t tests were run to determine
sentation appears in the higher level of difference. Values are given for the actu- the significance of the difference.
authority for the military (short-duration) al scaled “importance” means and p Values are given for the actual scaled
affiliation. values in the lower- left quadrant of the “importance” means and p values in the

Mean Performance Schedule Cost Stability Earned Value Mean

6.21 Performance – 0.914 0.078 0.002 0.000 5.90
Usefulness
Importance

5.98 Schedule 0.180 – 0.109 0.006 0.000 5.88

5.84 Cost 0.070 0.521 – 0.208 0.021 5.52
5.19 Stability 0.000 0.002 0.018 – 0.152 5.14
4.93 Earned Value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.240 – 4.76
p-values
0.10 noted in bold.

Table 2: Differences of mean attributes, scaled importance/usefulness.

24 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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project attributes and specific perform-

Importance Mean Rank
Performance 2.28
Cost 2.31
Schedule 2.78
Stability 3.67
Earned Value 3.97
Table 3: Differences of mean attributes, ranked importance/usefulness.
lower-left quadrant of the table; scaled
“usefulness” means and p values are
indicated in the upper-right quadrant
of the table. Values of p that are smaller
than 0.10 are indicated in bold type.
The proposed stability measures (activ-
ity deviation and resource offset) were
distinguishable from all other meas-
ures at the a
0.15 level and distin-
guishable from all but the schedule
performance index at a
0.05. Non-
parametric tests performed on the rank
data (both Friedman and Kendall’s W
tests) supported the t tests, with overall
a
0.000 for the overall test of “at least
one measure is ranked significantly dif-
ferently from another.”
Reliability Analysis
Constructs representing each of the
five attributes and six performance
measures were created from the
importance, usefulness, scale, and
rank data. In order to synchronize
the numeric scale with the rankings, the
Usefulness Mean Rank
Performance 2.43
Schedule 2.60
Cost 2.64
Stability 3.59
Earned Value 3.72
data from the rankings were reversed.
A rank of “first” was changed to “last”
so that smaller values were less impor-
tant on both the Likert scales and rank-
ing. In order to check the internal
validity of the combined constructs,
Cronbach’s alpha was used. Cronbach’s
alpha is based on the average correla-
tion of items in a measurement scale.
The standardized alpha (unbiased) was
calculated, as the individual items had
unequal variances (Cronbach, Gleser,
Nanda, & Rajaratnam, 1972; Nunnally &
Bernstein, 1994). While reliance on
this measure alone is somewhat
arguable (Cortina, 1993; Cronbach &
Shavelson, 2004; Liu & Zumbo, 2007), it is
suggested that a Cronbach’s alpha value
of 0.7 or greater (as a rule of thumb) is an
acceptable level of agreement. Table 6
describes the Cronbach’s alpha values
along with the common interitem corre-
lation (true variance/common variance)
and overall model significance (x2 test)
values for the variables from both general
ance measures.
The level of agreement between the
scaled and ranked importance and use-
fulness data for each construct is
acceptable. The five attribute constructs
all exhibited Cronbach’s alphas above
0.70; three of the five were above 0.8.
Mean common interitem correlations
ranged from 0.449 (stability) to 0.619
(cost); three of the five were above 0.500.
x2 tests for significance of the interitem
correlation models were all at or below
0.000. The six measure constructs all
exhibited Cronbach’s alphas above 0.70;
four of the six were above 0.8. Mean
common interitem correlations ranged
from 0.467 (cost variance) to 0.597 (cost
performance index); three of the six
were above 0.500. x2 tests for signifi-
cance of the interitem correlation mod-
els were at or below 0.000 except for
0.006 associated with the activity devia-
tion measure. For both the attributes
and measures, it is, therefore, concluded
that sufficient item, scale, and construct
validity (internal, convergent) exists to
support additional analysis. These
results also support the contention that
stability as an attribute, and the pro-
posed stability measures, are recogniza-
ble by the respondents as performance
constructs with face validity.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Based on the positive results from the
reliability analyses, factor analyses

Mean CV SV CPI SPI AD RO Mean

5.55 CV – 0.656 0.059 0.006 0.001 0.000 5.20
5.40 SV 0.366 – 0.194 0.016 0.001 0.000 5.09
Usefulness
Importance

5.16 CPI 0.042 0.313 – 0.091 0.042 0.001 4.79

5.02 SPI 0.022 0.085 0.363 – 0.254 0.001 4.48
4.63 AD 0.001 0.001 0.045 0.107 – 0.009 4.23
3.91 RO 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 – 3.73
Note. AD  activity description, CPI  cost performance index, CV  cost variance, RO  Resource Offset, SPI  schedule
performance index, SV = schedule variance.
p-values
0.10 noted in bold.

Table 4: Differences of mean measures, scaled importance/usefulness.

December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 25

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Managerial Perceptions of Project Stability

Importance Mean Rank Usefulness Mean Rank
CV 2.36 CV 2.47
SV 2.67 SV 2.74
CPI 3.33 CPI 3.40
SPI 3.60 SPI 3.51
AD 4.26 AD 4.18
RO 4.76 RO 4.58
Note. AD  activity description, CPI  cost performance index, CV  cost variance,
RO  Resource Offset, SPI  schedule performance index, SV  schedule variance.
Table 5: Differences of mean measures, ranked importance/usefulness.
were performed on the attributes and results of the factor analysis for the
measures. The concept of stability as a attributes are included in Table 7.
project attribute, and the proposed The items a priori associated with
measures of stability, have not been the attributes of cost, schedule, per-
confirmed by previous research and formance, stability, and earned value
indeed are proposed by this investiga- load against factors as expected. The
tion. Therefore, exploratory factor five factors provided a cumulative total
analysis was used to distill the factors variance explained of 77%; the individ-
out of the data matrix with no a ual factors explain from 14% of vari-
priori assumption of variables loading ance (schedule) up to 17% of variance
against any particular construct (cost). Each factor explains a satisfacto-
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). While ry amount of variance of each individ-
arguments have been made for the ual item (factor loadings); greater than
superiority of confirmatory factor 50% in all cases, with all but five vari-
analysis in determining construct uni- ables out of 20 loading at better than
dimensionality (Gerbing & Anderson, 0.700. Individual factor scores were
1988), the researchers believed unre- considered representative of the con-
stricted models would be instructive structs for additional analysis.
for the initial examination of the data. Exploratory factor analysis did not
SPSS v. 12.0 for Windows was used to produce such consistent results for the
run the principle components model, measures. While internal (convergent)
with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 for validity appeared to be demonstrated
extraction, followed by a Varimax rota- by the reliability analysis discussed pre-
tion with Kaiser normalization. The viously, discriminatory validity was not
supported at this time. The rotated
component matrix constructed six fac-
tors as expected, but the a priori items
loaded against their corresponding
factors uniquely only for the activity
deviation construct. Additional research
is suggested in this area. Even the well
accepted, long-established perform-
ance metrics used for project manage-
ment in this population did not cluster
together in a logical way. This is an
interesting, if contrarian, result.
Analysis of Variance
The initial phase of the analysis was
intended to assess and demonstrate the
reliability and validity of the proposed
stability constructs (attributes and
measures) with respect to the existing,
traditional measures. This final phase
of analysis was performed to assess the
degree to which the stability constructs
exhibit behaviors different from the tra-
ditional measures based on the envi-
ronmental characteristics of the project
management situation. Factor scores
computed in the previous section were
used to represent the constructs for the
project attributes. Additional analysis
for the project measures was aban-
doned for this phase of the investiga-
tion.
Environmental characteristics of
the project management situation
included three characteristics of the
project (stage of completion and size of
budget) and three characteristics of the
project manager surveyed (experience
on this project, project management

Attribute C–A Common I-I Corr Model X2 Measure C–A Common I-I Corr Model X 2
Cost 0.872 0.619 0.000 CV 0.787 0.467 0.000
Sched 0.784 0.463 0.000 CPI 0.862 0.597 0.000
Perf 0.829 0.537 0.000 SV 0.794 0.478 0.000
EV 0.830 0.537 0.000 SPI 0.861 0.596 0.000
Stab 0.774 0.449 0.000 AD 0.837 0.549 0.006
RO 0.801 0.488 0.000
Table 6: Reliability analysis, attribute and measure constructs.

26 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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Factor (%VE) Item Corr Factor (%VE) Item Corr Factor (%VE) Item Corr
Cost (17%) Earned Value (16%) Performance (16%)
Scaled Usefulness .850 Ranked Usefulness .855 Ranked Usefulness .899
Scaled Importance .848 Scaled Usefulness .791 Ranked Importance .865
Ranked Importance .845 Scaled Importance .774 Scaled Importance .743
Ranked Usefulness .830 Ranked Importance .731 Scaled Usefulness .638
Stability (15%) Schedule (14%)
Scaled Usefulness .857 Scaled Usefulness .856
Scaled Importance .850 Scaled Importance .847
Ranked Importance .588 Ranked Importance .602
Ranked Usefulness .554 Ranked Usefulness .583
Note. VE  variance explained.

Table 7: Factor analysis, attribute constructs.

Pearson’s r (parametric)
Coeff
Sig PXP CXP APL STG SIZ CST EV PRF STB SCH
PXP – .822 .511 .175 –.122 .148 .355 .111 .268 –.106
.000 .000 .210 .410 .289 .009 .428 .053 .451
CXP .753 – .635 .129 –.063 .055 .258 .188 .228 –.349
.000 .000 .356 .672 .695 .062 .177 .100 .010
APL .601 .710 — .038 –.003 .028 .108 .395 .267 –.289
.000 .000 .787 .985 .842 .443 .003 .053 .036
Spearman’s R (nonparametric)

STG .175 .134 .062 – .050 –.241 –.004 –.110 .344 –.157
.209 .338 .658 .736 .085 .980 .438 .013 .267
SIZ –.102 –.029 –.016 .056 – –.170 –.126 –.099 .091 –.196
.489 .843 .914 .704 .255 .398 .508 .544 .187
CST .227 .074 .068 –.198 –.164
.103 .597 .629 .160 .270
EV .359 .251 .123 –.049 –.121
.008 .070 .380 .730 .419
PRF .204 .245 .368 –.116 –.085
.143 .076 .007 .414 .570
STB .277 .251 .327 .289 .147
.044 .070 .017 .038 .324
SCH –.094 –.344 –.269 –.168 –.181
.505 .012 .051 .233 .224
Note. APL  acquisition professional level, CST  cost, CXP  career experience, EV  earned value, PRF  performance, PXP  project
experience, SCH  schedule, SIZ  size, STB  stability, STG  project stage of completion.
p-values
0.10 indicated in bold.

Table 8: Biserial correlations, demographics versus attributes.

December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 27

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Managerial Perceptions of Project Stability
experience in general, and professional
project management certification
level). The first stage in analyzing the
relationships between the attributes
and characteristics was the perform-
ance of both parametric and nonpara-
metric biserial correlations (see Table 8)
on all variables. The data below and to
the left of the diagonal represents the
Spearman’s r and significance levels;
above and to the right are the Pearson’s
r and significance levels. With two
exceptions (mentioned in the follow-
ing), the parametric and nonparamet-
ric correlations were in general agree-
ment on the dimensions of statistical
significance and effect size.
The first noteworthy results from
Table 8 are the correlations between the
project characteristics. Not surprisingly,
there are positive and statistically sig-
nificant relationships between the
managers’ career experience (CXP),
program experience (PXP), and acqui-
sition professional level (APL), the proj-
ect managers’ professional certification
achieved. As a manager gains experi-
ence, they achieve higher levels of cer-
tification and are generally placed in
long-term, supervisory positions in any
single project. Next, note that the stan-
dardized coefficients (created by the
factor analysis) between the project
attributes create zero or near-zero cor-
relations and unit significance scores.
This quadrant of Table 8 was left empty
for this reason.
The key relationships of interest are
found in the quadrants relating the
project situational characteristics and
the attribute constructs. Surprisingly, the
cost attribute appeared not significantly
correlated with any of the situational
characteristics. The single exception
to this is the relationship between
cost and stage of completion (STG),
which showed a –0.241 Pearson’s r and
a similar (but under the 0.10 threshold
for significance) relationship for
Spearman’s r. Therefore, we generally
conclude that perceptions of the
importance and usefulness of the cost
metric are uniform with respect to the
28 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
characteristics studied, but the impor-
tance of cost decreases as the project
nears completion. Earned value covar-
ied with both program experience
and career experience. As experience
increased, the perceived importance and
usefulness of earned value increased.
Performance (quality of project output)
was positively related to professional
certification level, but none of the other
characteristics. The nonparametric
test found a relationship between
performance and career experience
in addition to certification level. This
interesting result merits investigation, as
one would expect similar and closer
relationships between performance and
the other experience-related variables.
Stability was positively related to all
of the attributes except project size.
Stability was perceived with increasing
importance and usefulness as project
managers gained in experience and
professional certification—and increased
as the project matured. This result is
surprising, in that one might expect sta-
bility to be more important earlier in
the project life cycle. An alternative
explanation might hold that those
experiencing the project over a longer
period of time have become sensitized
to project stability, whereas in the early
stages of a project stability has not yet
been recognized as an important con-
struct. The project attribute of schedule,
on the other hand, was negatively corre-
lated with both types of experience.
Apparently, as project managers gain
experience, the attribute of schedule
Attribute IV
Cost Stage
Schedule Experience
Performance Certification Level
Earned Value Experience
Stability Certification Level
Experience
Table 9: Univariate ANOVA.
importance and usefulness decreases.
This finding appears in opposition to
the stability results. This information
supports, perhaps indirectly, that stabil-
ity and schedule are indeed separable
constructs from the perspective of the
project managers surveyed.
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
performed with the univariate proce-
dure in SPSS. Based on an inspection
of the correlation results, only the most
promising characteristics were select-
ed for study. Two independent vari-
ables were selected to represent the
environmental characteristics (pro-
gram size and stage of completion),
and two were selected to represent
project managers’ characteristics
(career experience and certification
level). These were selected based on
the practical and statistical signifi-
cance demonstrated in the biserial cor-
relations. Given the small sample size
and the loss of degrees of freedom
experienced when performing full-
factorial ANOVA, the independent
variables were analyzed, one at a time,
against the dependent variables. This
prevents an analysis of any interaction
effects between the factors.
The statistically significant results
are shown in Table 9. Results indicating
model significance below 0.9 were not
included. The results are generally con-
sistent with the biserial correlations;
however, effect-size estimates were gen-
erally quite low. For the cost attribute,
the only significant factor having an effect
was the project stage of completion.
Model Model
Significance Adjusted R 2
.048 .124
.010 .105
.012 .129
.062 .048
.007 .149
.100 .034
017_032PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:22 PM
While the overall model was statistically
significant, the model-adjusted R2 was
low at only 0.124. Schedule was associ-
ated with career experience, with a
model R2 of 0.105, and performance
associated with certification level, with
an R2 at 0.129. The association between
earned value and career experience
was very slight at R2  0.048. Stability
was associated with both certification
level (R 2  0.149) and career experience
(R 2  0.034). It must be noted again that
the small sample n most likely plays a
great role in preventing more definitive
conclusions about the relationships
among the independent and dependent
variable in this study.
Results
In this section, the results of the statis-
tical analyses are applied to the five
research questions asked earlier. This
section represents a summary of the
results of both the review of the litera-
ture and specific data collected in this
investigation.
Have Stability Measures or Concepts
Been Previously Used in Project
Performance Measurement?
An extensive survey of the literature,
both in project management and man-
agement in general, did not find any
specific mention of the use of stability
as either a project attribute or manage-
rial concern. While stability concepts
have known utility in disciplines
including engineering, biology, and
information technology, this was not
the case for project management. It is
concluded that additional study on the
application of the concept of stability in
project management would provide a
contribution to theory and practice in
this discipline.
With Respect to Existing Attributes of
Overall Project Performance, Is the
Concept of Stability Separable From,
but Comparable to, Existing
Concepts?
Several results support the contention
that stability exists as an attribute and
is separate from existing concepts. Both
Page 29
convergent and discriminant validity
were found for the construct of stabili-
ty. When factors representing the con-
struct are used in correlational variance
analysis, the construct exhibits behav-
iors and relationships consistent with
both an important, and distinct, proj-
ect attribute.
Compared to Traditional Measures of
Project Performance Used for Project
Management, Are Some Proposed
Measures of Stability Separable From,
but Comparable to, Existing Project
Management Measures?
The proposed measures of stability
exhibited convergent validity, but dis-
criminant validity was not established
separating the measures from more tra-
ditional measures, with the exception of
the activity deviation construct. However,
the traditional measures did not exhibit
discriminant validity either. While this
question cannot be answered with any
certainty at this time, the initial results
may indicate that the particular meas-
ures lacked merit, and that improved
measures may be found with additional
investigation.
Are the Perceptions of Stability and
Traditional Measures Affected by
Project or Managerial Context
(Project Size, Scope, or Maturity;
Managerial Level; Experience; and
Association With Specific Project)?
The importance and usefulness of the
stability attribute was positively cor-
related with the project managers’ expe-
rience (both career and project), the
professional certification level of man-
agers, and the stage of the project life
cycle. The nature of these relationships
was different from the relationships bet-
ween the situational characteristics and
the other project attributes. No investi-
gation on the specific project perform-
ance measures was attempted.
Of What Use Are the Analysis Results
for the Management of Future
Projects?
Applying the potential usefulness and
importance of a new project attribute
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
termed stability requires further inves-
tigation. First, if the manager cannot
measure stability in a meaningful
sense, the utility of such a concept is
limited. However, when appropriate
measures are developed, the next step
in developing the concept from an
applied sense is to determine what
trade-offs exist for managerial decision
making between the accomplishments
of various project outcomes, including
stability. In some instances, it is con-
ceivable that scheduling or execution
decisions might be made that value sta-
bility over cost or schedule. It is incum-
bent upon the researchers to attempt to
determine what those circumstances
might be and how such a trade-off
would be made.
Conclusions, Summary, and
Recommendations
This research investigated the man-
agers’ perceptions of the importance of
stability to overall project outcomes.
The assessment was based on both the
general attributes of management for
the activities in a specific program
and the specific measures being
employed by the managers. In this
research, the scope was limited to the
management of relatively complex,
large-scale, long-duration projects.
Projects studied involved the design,
development, and delivery of military
aircraft and support systems. The
research results were applied to the five
research questions, and the questions
were answered. Finally, additional
notes on project performance meas-
urement and inputs from the respon-
dents will be given.
Additional Observations
Within the composition of the survey,
there were blank spaces left for addi-
tional thoughts of project managers for
both project attributes and perform-
ance measures. The reason behind this
was to identify if there are any other
attributes or measures that program
managers use and to get their opinions
about them. After examining all the
surveys that were returned, several
29
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Managerial Perceptions of Project Stability
additional attributes and some impor-
tant implications were found.
Respondents proposed several
objectives in addition to the existing
project attributes. Risk assessment and
task management were offered with
average importance and usefulness. For
software development and acquisition
projects, innovativeness, subcontractor
management, and experience level
were noted as being important attrib-
utes on par with those specifically
provided. In addition, other comments
implied that the nature of the contract
paying the vendors of a project plays an
important role in deciding which
performance measure to choose. For
example, for fixed-price contracts, the
cost attribute loses its importance rela-
tive to schedule and performance, and
perhaps also to stability. While these
additional responses to the open-
ended questions provide guidance for
future research, their appearance was
not widespread enough to warrant for-
mal inclusion in the results.
In summary, the research results
were not unsurprising. The cost, sched-
ule, and performance attributes turned
out to have the greatest importance and
usefulness, followed by stability and
earned value. In the performance meas-
ures section, composite measures such
as cost variance, cost performance
index, schedule variance, and schedule
performance index led the stability
measures of activity deviation and
resource offset. At this point, an assess-
ment of managers’ perceptions of the
importance of stability to overall project
outcomes appears to be comparable
with the traditional project objectives.
Similarly, the specific stability measures
have a comparable (but lower) level of
perceived relative importance and use-
fulness to the measures based on cost,
schedule, and performance.
Factors constructed around the
project attributes were found to be reli-
able, while factors were not evident
among the performance measures.
Relationships were detected between
the characteristics of the project
30 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
managers, the characteristics of the
projects, and the attribute constructs.
The importance and usefulness of cost
decreased as the project completion
stage increased. The importance and
usefulness of earned value increased as
manager experience increased. The
importance and usefulness of project
performance (quality) increased as
project manager certification level
increased. The importance and useful-
ness of the project schedule decreased
as project manager experience
increased. Finally, the importance
and usefulness of the new project
attribute stability increased as project
manager experience, the certification
level, and the project completion stage
increased.
A recommendation arising from
this research would be the expansion of
the scope to a variety of projects, espe-
cially based on the contract types.
Because different contract types become
effective on the selection of perform-
ance measurement metrics, the gener-
alizability of the attributes and specific
measures existing in this research can-
not be justified within certain types of
contracts.
Another recommendation would
be assessing the managers’ perceptions
in a larger population, with refined def-
initions and measures of stability to
consider. Because this current research
was targeted primarily to a narrowly
focused population of managers and
project types, it is believed that the
extension of the targeted population
would yield more reliable and general-
izable results.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to extend a spe-
cific thanks to graduate student Yigit
Sen, who assisted greatly in the data-
collection effort and initial analysis. His
indefatigable efforts in formatting,
administering, and tracking the survey
instruments were instrumental in
securing access to the data required to
support the effort. I wish him the best of
luck in future academic endeavors! ■
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31
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PAPERS
Managerial Perceptions of Project Stability

positions in aircraft maintenance. After complet-
ing his bachelor’s degree in 1986, he was com-
missioned as an officer and continued to serve
until 1991 in managerial and leadership positions
in aircraft fleet maintenance. After graduating
with a master of science degree in logistics man-
agement from the Air Force Institute of
Technology in 1991, he was selected to start up
and lead an internal consulting and training office
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straints for the corporate headquarters of the
Air Force Materiel Command. In 1994 he was
selected by the Air Force to attend Michigan State
University in the doctoral program in business
administration. His PhD was awarded in May
1999, with a major area of study in operations
and sourcing management and a minor in logis-
tics management. He was assigned to the faculty
of the Air Force Institute of Technology, where he
served on active duty as an assistant professor
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from the Air Force in 2004. He is currently an
assistant professor of logistics management for
the Department of Marketing and Logistics at the
University of North Texas. His active research
efforts include compressing time to market in
supply chains under conditions of uncertainty
and risk, the leveraging of information technolo-
gies (particularly radio frequency identification)
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optimal resource allocation across distributed
transportation networks. In addition, his teaching
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urement. His teaching focus is currently on
international logistics and supply-chain
management.

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Development of a Project Management
Model for a Government Research and
Development Organization
Andrew E. Procca, National Research Council of Canada—Institute for Biodiagnostics,
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
ABSTRACT ■
This article presents the results of an under-
graduate project to develop a project manage-
ment model for integration into a government
research and development (GR&D) organiza-
tion. The project was divided into three main
phases: literature review, creation and execu-
tion of an organizational culture survey, and the
development of a project management model
compatible with GR&D organizations. It was
found that, although there are cultural gaps
between the GR&D and project management
cultures, it is possible to bridge these gaps by a
combination of training, organizational struc-
ture, and the application of project management
techniques blended to match the type of
research project and fundamental cultural
assumptions.
KEYWORDS: research and development;
project management; organizational culture;
organizational planning
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 33–57
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20081
INTRODUCTION ■
Purpose
Canada’s universities and government laboratories have a long history of
stunning discoveries and successes. Inventions such as the pacemaker,
satellite receiver antennas, and canola have a daily beneficial impact on
Canadians and people around the world.
In spite of these past triumphs, Canadian government research and
development (GR&D) organizations are facing new challenges. Two of these
challenges are the focus of this project. The first, as highlighted in the 2006
budget (Department of Finance, 2006), is increased pressure to be account-
able and demonstrate the value of the research projects undertaken. The
second, as indicated in the Sussex Circle Inc. (2003) report to the Council of
Science and Technology Advisors, is the tendency to underestimate the
extent of effort associated with managing technologically complex, multi-
disciplinary, multi-institutional projects. The existence of the latter chal-
lenge demonstrates a lack of organizational project management maturity at
the basic level. The former indicates an increased need for performance
measurement systems. The implementation of project management prac-
tices was seen as a tool to meet these challenges.
The purpose of this project was to develop a project management model
for integration into a GR&D organizational culture that addressed these
challenges without stifling creativity. The purpose of this article is to com-
municate the key findings of the research and describe the project manage-
ment model developed, as well as conditions for its application.
Background
The challenges GR&D organizations are facing today originate in a shift
in government policy after a series of science and technology reviews that
were initiated in 1994. This policy shift was articulated in the document
“Science and Technology for a New Century—A Federal Strategy” published
by the government in March 1996. While the efficacy of the review to improve
Canada’s competitive ability is subject to some debate (Cruikshank &
Holbrook, 2002), the following key elements relevant to this report are found
within the strategy as well as in later budget and policy papers:
1. Science and technology is the new engine of economic growth and
prosperity.
2. The need to exit research areas that are either outside of core competencies
or where the private sector has the capacity for independent execution.
3. The need to focus on research areas that:
a) support the formation of optimum public policy;
b) are beyond the private sector’s level of commercial interest; and
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 33
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Development of a Project Management Model
c) are carried out in partnership with
the private sector and academic com-
munity.
4. The need to engage in multidisciplinary
interregional research and be account-
able for the management of research
activities (Industry Canada, 1996).
Exiting areas of research where the
private sector has the capacity for inde-
pendent execution forces the federal
science and technology organizations
to take on research projects where the
private sector sees no commercial
potential or too large a risk. These
research areas are typically beyond
the capacity of any single organization,
are inherently multidisciplinary, and are
fraught with both technical and project
risk. Scientists typically find technical
challenges motivating (Jordan, 2005),
but the new generation of projects has
introduced project-related risks and
organizational complexities that are
beyond the normal scope of their expe-
rience and training (Clarke, 2002b).
Besides this, because of the
economic footprint of science and
technology in this era of fiscal responsi-
bility, GR&D organizations are held
accountable for and must demonstrate
the value of their research activities
while finding more efficient means of
execution.
In short, GR&D organizations are
daily challenged to do more with less
under increased stakeholder scrutiny.
A review of the science and technol-
ogy reports issued by Industry Canada
since the release of the initial science
and technology strategy in 1996
revealed a wide variety of initiatives
taken to realign GR&D organizations
with the needs and priorities of the gov-
ernment. These initiatives were aimed
at the department and program levels
of effort, with little attention paid to the
activities at the project management
level (Industry Canada, 2001, 2002,
2003).
The efficacy of management meth-
ods employed in the execution of
34 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
research projects has fallen under the
scrutiny of the Auditor General. In
reports published as early as 1981, the
Auditor General has been critical of
the project management practices
found in several of Canada’s research
and development organizations.
Criticisms include a lack of formal
documented project management
practices, inadequate practices or sys-
tems, or inconsistent application of
practices within organizations. Even
more recent reports issued in 2004 and
2005 uncovered lingering issues indi-
cating a continuing lack of organiza-
tional project management maturity
(Office of the Auditor General, 1981,
2004, 2005).
These findings are corroborated in
a Sussex Circle Inc. (2003) report,
which stated that, although the use of
professional (nonscience) managers is
increasing, on many collaborative proj-
ects a scientist is given the project man-
agement role in addition to scientific
responsibilities. Unfortunately, this
added responsibility is typically not
accompanied by the necessary training
or tools to fulfill the role. The result is
an increased risk of missed perform-
ance targets and that resources
will be inefficiently managed. This
same report concluded that strong
leadership at both the institution and
program levels is a key success factor
(Sussex Circle, 2003).
Without great science, Canada’s
position among the world economies
will slip. Without great leadership, the
success of Canada’s science and tech-
nology programs are at risk. Without
great management, the success of
Canada’s science and technology proj-
ects and therefore the future economic
well being of Canada is at risk of being
marginalized.
As stated in the Auditor General’s
(1994) report, managing research and
development is a difficult task due to
the large risks inherent in the projects
and due to the culture associated with
scientific personnel.
Four specific cultural characteris-
tics of scientific personnel, listed in
exhibit 11.2 of the report (Office of
the Auditor General, 1994), appear
to thwart the application of
classical motivation and management
approaches. In general, scientific per-
sonnel:
1. Thrive on intellectually challenging
assignments;
2. Value the autonomy and flexibility
within an organization’s environ-
ment that allows them to pursue dif-
ferent lines of research;
3. Are very curious and imbued with a
strong desire to seek knowledge for
its own sake; and
4. Possess strong individualized per-
sonalities, thought processes, and
value systems.
The Auditor General (1994) recog-
nized that, along with a need to
improve GR&D organizations’ project
management practices, there is also a
need for a cultural shift toward a more
“business-like” culture.
Shifting the scientific culture to suit
project management practices, if it is
possible, may not yield the expected
improvements in project performance.
In general, scientific personnel are
highly intelligent and creative, both
highly desirable traits for superior proj-
ect performance. The cultural disso-
nance created by the change of culture
may act as a demotivator, resulting in
poor performance and, ultimately,
separation. Both results are not con-
ducive to improving Canada’s scientific
prowess.
Project Scope and Objectives
The project scope of work included
three main activities: literature review;
creation, execution, and analysis of an
organizational culture survey; and
development of a GR&D-compatible
project management model and condi-
tions for its application.
The overall objectives of the project
were to diagnose barriers to and develop
a prescription for the successful
033_057PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:23 PM
implementation of project manage-
ment practices in GR&D organizations.
The literature review had four
objectives: (1) to develop an under-
standing of the cultural elements
embedded in a project management
culture; (2) to review techniques for
increasing organizational project man-
agement maturity and competence;
(3) to examine existing project manage-
ment models; and (4) to develop an
understanding of the organizational
culture of GR&D laboratories and their
level of project management maturity.
The objectives of the organizational
culture survey were to validate the liter-
ature review findings and provide
insight into the cultural artifacts of
GR&D organizations.
In the final phase, the development
of the project management model, the
objectives were: to identify what gaps
exist between the GR&D organizational
structure/culture and the preferred
project management structure/culture,
provide recommendations on how to
bridge the identified gaps, and develop
conditions for the application of the
model.
Methodology
The execution of the project proceeded
through three distinct phases. The first
phase was the collection and analysis
of secondary data in the form of: peer-
reviewed publications, textbooks, gov-
ernment reports, and select documents
from the Web sites of subject-matter
experts. The collected information was
organized into four themes: project
management organizational culture,
organizational project management
maturity, project management models,
and lastly GR&D organizational culture
and project management maturity.
In the second phase, an organiza-
tional culture survey was developed
using the information gleaned from
the literature review. The objective of the
survey was to validate and supplement
the literature review by probing the
underlying organizational assumptions
Page 35
and attitudes about project manage-
ment practices. The survey was
delivered via a free Web-based service
to a sample of employees of the
National Research Council of Canada.
The results were analyzed to elicit key
factors of GR&D culture, keeping in
mind that it is difficult to assess an
organization’s culture with only a sur-
vey instrument.
In the last phase, a project manage-
ment model was developed by
adapting relevant models (Cooke-
Davies & Arzymanow, 2003; Dvir,
Shenhar, & Alkaher, 2003; Graham,
1998; Kendra & Taplin, 2004; Kerzner,
1998; Payne & Turner, 1998; Project
Management Institute [PMI], 2004) and
incorporating the dominant cultural
factors of GR&D organizations (Brown,
1999; Clarke, 2002a; Jordan, 2005;
Larson, 2005; Office of the Auditor
General, 1994). Literature review results
were also used in the development of
criteria for the application of the
model.
Procedure and Findings
Literature Review
The process of integrating project man-
agement into an organization usually
includes a diagnosis of the current
organizational states and barriers to
change; the development of a desired
end-state; the centralization of
project management control; the
improvement of organizational project
management infrastructure and com-
petence; and finally the decentraliza-
tion of project management control
(Firth & Krut, 1991).
Achieving the desired end-state,
organizational project management,
involves alteration of processes, meth-
ods, tools, organizational structures,
and behavioral patterns. This change
may affect either or both the technical
and social systems in the organization
(Martinsuo, Hensman, Artto, Kujala, &
Jaafari, 2006). These facets of an organ-
ization are all artifacts of organization-
al culture (Schein, 1988), implying that
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
implementing project management is
much a cultural change as a process
change. Schein (1988) also noted that
organizational culture is a powerful
force, spread throughout an organiza-
tion and resistant to change. This
understanding of the nature of organi-
zational culture led to the decision that
the first theme of the literature review
would focus on developing an under-
standing of the facets of organizational
culture that are conducive to the imple-
mentation of project management
practices.
The improvement of organizational
project management infrastructure
and competence as described by
Firth and Krut (1991) strongly parallels
PMI’s (2003) concept of organizational
project management maturity. Based
on this, it was decided that the second
theme of the literature review
would focus on examining techniques
for increasing an organization’s project
management maturity.
As indicated by Martinsuo et al.
(2006) as well as Firth and Krut (1991),
the implementation of project manage-
ment also requires changes in the
processes, methods, and tools used to
accomplish organizational goals. The
key is to determine the right processes,
methods, and tools to implement. It
was decided to examine other project
management implementation models
and assess how they may be applied to
GR&D organizations as the third theme
in the literature review.
The final theme corresponds to
Firth and Krut’s (1991) diagnostic step
in the process of implementing project
management. In this theme, the litera-
ture review was centered on developing
an understanding of the state of the
organizational culture and project
management maturity of GR&D organ-
izations, as well as any barriers to
implementation.
Organizational Culture Factors
Organizational culture has a nebulous
character, making it moderately easy to
35
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Development of a Project Management Model
define but hard to measure. In general,
when asked to describe an organiza-
tion’s culture, people refer to the
organizational charts or other tangible
elements. These “observable symbols
and signs of an organization’s culture”
are artifacts that provide an indirect
means to decipher an organization’s
culture (McShane, 2004, p. 459). In the
example of the organizational chart,
the culture of the organization
influenced the width and height of the
hierarchy.
Organizational culture is defined as:
The basic pattern of shared assump-
tions, values and beliefs considered
to be the correct way of thinking
about and acting on problems and
opportunities facing the organiza-
tion. (McShane, 2004, p. 456)
Assumptions, considered the most
potent aspect of culture, are the shared
mental models that organizational
members use intuitively to guide their
behavior and perceptions. The power
of assumptions is that the members of
the culture act on them without know-
ing why . . . it’s just the way things are
done. Beliefs “reflect an individual’s
perceptions of reality,” and values are
“long standing beliefs about what is
important in a variety of situations”
(McShane, 2004, p. 457).
These fundamental components of
an organization’s culture may be few,
but their effects are far ranging and per-
meate the entire organization from the
janitor’s closet to the CEO’s office
(Schein, 1988). An organization’s cul-
ture has a strong pervasive influence on
how business processes are organized
and carried out. A significant potential
for conflict is created when project
management practices are introduced
to alter these same business processes
(Firth & Krut, 1991). This emphasizes
the importance of understanding the
cultural elements that support project
management practices prior to attempt-
ing to design a model for GR&D organ-
izations. This is made even more
important given the difficulty in altering
36 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Page 36
a company’s culture due to the inherent rather than from their professional
stability of an organization’s culture peers.
and potential for resistance to change 2. Work is organized predominantly
(Johns, 1996; Schein, 1988). around teams, implying that the
Two of the reviewed articles provid- tasks are interdependent and multi-
ed a good perspective on the cultural disciplinary so that one person alone
factors and artifacts that nurture a proj- cannot do the work.
ect management culture. 3. Management’s focus is balanced
Gray and Larson (2006) identified between the people and tasks. The
ten aspects of organizational culture impact on people is a factor in the
(see Figure 1). The location of the bars decision-making process.
in the figure indicates the degree of bal- 4. Organizational units have a high
ance, or in some cases imbalance, nec- degree of interdependence, working
essary for the optimum blending of cul- together as an organizational team.
ture traits to create an environment 5. Control processes are flexible, allow-
conducive to project management. ing employees to seek optimal solu-
Based on Gray and Larson (2006), tions for problems that do not fit
an environment supportive of project organizationally imposed processes.
management practices has the follow- Micromanagement is banished, and
ing qualities: employees are largely self-directed.
1.Employees identify more with their 6. There is a high-risk tolerance and
organization than their job type employees are encouraged to be
or profession, seeking advancement creative, innovative, and take risks in
and recognition from their employer solving problems.
1. Member identity
Job Organization
2. Team emphasis
Individual Group
3. People focus
Task People
4. Unit integration
Independent Interdependent
5. Control
Loose Tight
6. Risk tolerance
Low High
7. Reward criteria
Performance Other
8. Conflict tolerance
Low High
9. Means-ends orientation
Means Ends
10. Open-system focus
Internal External
Figure 1: Factors supportive of project management (courtesy of McGraw-Hill).
033_057PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:23 PM
7. Reward criteria are slanted toward
performance, as opposed to senior-
ity or other factors.
8. There is a high tolerance for con-
flict, in the form of constructive crit-
icisms, needed to resolve problems.
9. Management balances the out-
comes with the techniques and
processes used to achieve them.
10. The organization is focused on the
external environment, ensuring that
the right projects are undertaken to
adjust to the dynamic environment
surrounding the organization.
After reviewing this model, it was
determined that it could provide a
foundation for assessing an organiza-
tion’s cultural alignment or misalign-
ment with project management cultural
values.
In the second article, Kendra and
Taplin (2004) developed a cultural val-
ues framework that consists of five suc-
cess factors combined with supporting
values that, when aligned with cultural
values at the organizational level,
allowed for adoption of PM practices in
information technology organizations.
The five project success factors that
anchor the framework are: project
manager competencies, organization
structure, supporting business process-
es, performance measurement sys-
tems, and project management culture.
Each element is interlinked by the
shared values of the organization’s
members (K. Kendra, personal commu-
nication, September 6, 2006). The suc-
cess factors, cultural values associated
with them, and aligned organizational
values are graphically presented in
Figure 2, based on the Kendra and
Taplin (2004) model.
The five success factors of Kendra
and Taplin’s (2004) model are a reflec-
tion of the core project management
culture, representing the organization-
al framework within which a project
management culture can flourish.
Intuitively, the first component of the
framework is project management
competencies, which is embodied in
competent project managers, a value
Page 37
within the project management sub-
culture. Without project management
competencies, it is impossible for a
project management culture to exist.
The second ingredient in the foundation
is specific to the nature of the project
work; the success of the projects must
be contingent upon application of proj-
ect management as a supporting
business process. Kendra and Taplin
(2004) expand upon this by including
system development, supplier manage-
ment, and business planning. The
author’s view is that these processes are
under the umbrella of project manage-
ment processes. The next identified
ingredient deals with the organization-
al structure in which the project is exe-
cuted. Problems in project execution
will be encountered if the parent orga-
nization’s structure is too rigid, as it will
prevent a customized project organiza-
tional structure from being created to
meet the needs of the project (Brown,
1999). Performance measurement sys-
tems are also crucial to the execution of
projects. Kendra and Taplin (2004)
identified that there are three levels of
performance measurement: individual,
project, and organizational. All three
are required to ensure that a complete
feedback loop exists for the team mem-
bers, the project managers, and the
executives of the organization. The last
ingredient discussed by Kendra and
Taplin (2004) is that the organizational
culture must see the importance of the
preceding ingredients to project suc-
cess. As long as the parent organization
believes that project management
competencies, business processes,
project organization structures, and
performance measurement systems
are irrelevant to the success of its proj-
ects, the project management culture
will never receive the support neces-
sary to flourish.
While some values, such as the
CMM-Six KPAs business process and
the information technology subculture,
seem to be specific to the information
technology industry, the author
believes the majority of the values
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
could be applied to a broad spectrum
of organizations. It is with this funda-
mental assumption that there is suffi-
cient overlap between information
technology and GR&D organizations
that the decision was made to use the
Kendra and Taplin (2004) project
management values framework as the
basis for a GR&D project management
framework.
Organizational Project Management
Maturity
The second research theme focused on
the concept of organizational project
management maturity and methods
utilized to increase an organization’s
project management maturity.
The Project Management Institute
defines organizational project manage-
ment as the systematic management
of projects, programs, and portfolios in
alignment with the achievement of
strategic goals. Organizational project
management maturity is the degree to
which an organization practices this
type of project management (PMI,
2003).
Key to understanding these two
definitions is an understanding of the
keywords project, programs, portfolios,
and project management.
• Project: “A temporary endeavour
undertaken to create a unique prod-
uct, service or result” (PMI, 2004,
p. 368).
• Project management: “Application of
knowledge, skills, tools and techniques
to project activities to meet project
requirements” (PMI, 2004, p. 368).
• Program management: “Centralized
coordinated management of a pro-
gram to achieve the program’s strategic
objectives and benefits” (PMI, 2004,
p. 368).
• Portfolio management: “Centralized
management of one or more portfo-
lios, which includes identifying, prior-
itizing, authorizing, managing, and
controlling projects, programs
and other related work to achieve spe-
cific strategic business objectives”
(PMI, 2004, p. 367).
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Development of a Project Management Model

Corporate Culture (Values)

Customer enthusiasm

Project Manager Competencies

Integrity Values: Teamwork
Leadership
Project management and other business processes
Organization culture
Team development
Communication

Project Management Subculture

Organizational Structure
Values:
Cross-functional teams
Stakeholder (client) involvement
Project management office (PMO)
Values:
Common project management
language
Collaborative teams
Competent project managers
Information technology
Process oriented
Performance oriented
Performance Measurement System
Values:
Project-based
Business objectives
Individual performance management
Process compliance

Supporting Business Processes

Values:
System development process
CMM- Six KPAs
Project management Continuous
Innovation People development improvement
Business planning
Supplier management

Individual respect and

responsibility

Figure 2: Project management values framework (adapted from Kendra & Taplin, 2004).

Kwak and Ibbs (2002) propose a
five-level maturity model. The model
progresses from a complete absence of
even elementary application of project
management knowledge and practices
to the informal then the formal appli-
cation of the practices coupled with
program management techniques and
finally to a level of maturity where the
organization is infused with project
management knowledge and prac-
tices. At this level, the epitome
of project management maturity,
project management practices are
fully understood and continuously
improved, and the infrastructure sup-
porting the collection of project man-
agement data is fully developed. This
model generally agrees with the
Project Management Institute’s OPM3
standard (PMI, 2003) and Kerzner’s

38 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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(1998) project management maturity
model.
Not surprisingly, organizational
changes occur with changes in the
maturity level. According to the Kwak
and Ibbs (2002) model, in parallel with
the development of project manage-
ment practices, the team orientation
would progress from weak to strong
and finally the point where the organi-
zation is transformed into a project-
driven organization with creative
improvements in project management
processes and practices.
While the above references describe
a framework addressing the level of
competence of an organization’s proj-
ect management practices and its char-
acteristics, Anderson and Jessen (2003)
draw an explicit link between project
management maturity and organiza-
tional culture. Their concept of matu-
rity differs by the inclusion of attitude
in addition to the facets of knowledge
and action. Attitude, a person’s stable
value orientation (Anderson & Jessen,
2003), is closely aligned with Schein’s
(1988) definition of culture. In the con-
text of project management maturity,
attitude will have an effect on how an
individual behaves or reacts toward the
concept of project management. A per-
son with a low level of understanding
and/or appreciation of project manage-
ment is anticipated to ascribe a lower
value to project management tech-
niques and the concept of project man-
agement in general. This implies that an
adjustment in individual attitudes (cul-
ture) will be required in order to imple-
ment project management practices.
Lastly, progress through each matu-
rity level is not a series of fortunate
spontaneous events. It requires a sus-
tained organizational change program
to alter not only the organizational
project infrastructure and processes,
but also its culture (Firth & Krut, 1991).
This program would include an educa-
tional program focused on project
management theory and tools; the
development of project management
models, procedures, and processes;
Page 39
pilot projects to assess the validity of
the models; and the creation of a proj-
ect infrastructure (Firth & Krut, 1991;
Raz, 1993). Pilot projects may be a key
component in shifting an organiza-
tion’s culture since they provide organi-
zational learning opportunities that
form the basis for an organization’s cul-
ture (Schein, 1988). Given sufficient
intensity and repeated success, the new
lessons will validate the content of the
educational program and will alter
the organizational culture.
In summary, implementing project
management requires a cultural as
well as structural change and any ini-
tiative undertaken to implement proj-
ect management will have to address
the gaps between the existing and
desired culture before a progression
through the maturity phases can be
initiated.
Project Management Models
The third theme dealt with examining
the project management models
used in other types of organizations to
uncover what other industries are
doing to manage their project activities,
and to determine if these models are
applicable to the GR&D environment.
In general, a model is a simplified
abstraction of an object that is used to
explain and predict behavior (Raz, 1993;
Schermerhorn, Templer, Cattaneo,
Hunt, & Osborn, 1992).
The PMI’s model of project man-
agement is composed of three main
elements: processes, process groups,
and knowledge areas (PMI, 2004).
These elements are described in PMI’s
project management standard, A Guide
to the Project Management Body of
Knowledge (PMBOK ® Guide)—Third
edition, and are broken down into 44
project management processes that are
unequally distributed across five proj-
ect management process groups and
nine knowledge areas (PMI, 2004).
While the PMBOK model is extensive,
the PMI states that it is the responsibil-
ity of the project manager to determine
“what processes are appropriate, and
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
the appropriate degree of rigor for each
process, for any given project” (PMI,
2004, p. 37).
In the course of reviewing the liter-
ature available on different industry
project management practices (Cooke-
Davies & Arzymanow, 2003; Graham,
1998; Kerzner, 1998; Raz, 1993), it was
found that the PMI’s fundamental
model applies and that the degree
of competency, depth, and breadth of
processes in each of the knowledge
areas was the delineating factor
between the different project manage-
ment “models.” Hence, the factors
influencing the optimal blend of proj-
ect management techniques, and the
level at which project management
process standardization can occur,
needed to be further reviewed.
Payne and Turner (1998) concluded
that projects could be classified along
two dominant dimensions: size and
resource type. They further concluded
that selecting project management
focuses and techniques based on these
criteria could improve project success.
According to Payne and Turner
(1998), projects of different sizes have
different management focuses. Small
projects are focused primarily on the
prioritization of resources across sever-
al projects. In larger projects, activity
management is the primary focus with
the bulk of the effort going into allocat-
ing resources in such a manner as to
meet key time constraints. In major
projects where the existence of the par-
ent organization is at stake, the empha-
sis is more on program management
and managing the associated risk.
In projects of different resource
types, Payne and Turner (1998) found
four main classifications: engineering,
product development, systems devel-
opment, and research and organiza-
tional change. These four project types
are arranged on a two-dimensional
matrix, shown in Figure 3, dependent
upon the quality of definition in their
goals and methods. The poorer
the definition of goal or methods, the
greater the risk of failure requiring
39
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Development of a Project Management Model

three classifications differ primarily

by the number of stakeholder interac-
tions, number of functions required of
INCREASING CHANCES OF FAILURE
the product of the project, and the
degree of formality in the project’s
command, control, and communica-

INCREASING CHANCES OF FAILURE

Type 2 Projects Type 4 Projects tions structure. With each ascending
level of project complexity, there is an
increase in the number of stakeholder
Methods Well Defined?

Product Research and

NO

Development Organizational interactions and functions that the

Change product of the project will provide.
INCREASING CHANCES OF SUCCESS

The increase in these two factors forces

Type 1 Projects Type 3 Projects the adoption of a more formal com-
mand, control, and communications
Engineering Systems
YES

structure.
Development
The pace of a project is determined
by the time-sensitive nature of the
YES NO project and the organizational conse-
Goals Well Defined? quences of failure. The UCP model
(Dvir, Shenhar, & Alkaher, 2003) pro-
vides three levels of pace—regular,
INCREASING CHANCES OF SUCCESS fast/competitive, and critical/blitz—
each of which is associated with a
higher degree of criticality and time
pressure. The underlying theme of pace
Figure 3: Goals and methods matrix (Payne & Turner, 1998).
can best be described by the word
urgency. The urgency of a project is
the application of different project Technological uncertainty is divid- directly proportional to the amount of
management approaches to manage ed into four levels (low, medium, high, authority, control, and resources that
the higher degree of risk. and super-high technology) that differ the project manager will need in order
The decision of which planning by their level of required innovation, for the project to be successful.
methods to use on a project is critical to rate and formality of information The interactions of the three dimen-
the success of the project due to the exchange, time to design stability, sions of the UCP (Figure 4) model have
impact that the plan will have over team skill composition, and manage- additional implications for the risk
the life of the project (Payne & Turner, ment- versus leadership-style balance. inherent in projects. This is particularly
1998). The appropriate methods for A change in the technological uncer- evident from the conflicting demands
planning and control of the various tainty has a cascading effect on the on a project with characteristics at the
projects are outlined in Table 1. management of a project. Increased extreme end of all three dimensions.
Obviously, in the context of GR&D levels of innovation result in an In such a case, the project manager
organizations, the insights provided increased intensity of development and will need to implement a formal project
into planning and controlling R&D testing cycles. There is a corresponding management structure and practices in
projects will be important in the devel- increase in the required project team order to manage the complexity of the
opment of the model. skill and education level necessary for project. This creates a conflict since
Shenhar and Dvir (1995) initially project success. Linked to this increase the high degree of technological inno-
developed a two-dimensional model, in skill level is a corresponding vation will require a team with highly
based on technological uncertainty increase in the rate of information efficient and informal communication
and system scope. Eventually, the exchange and a decrease in the formal- structures.
model (Figure 4) was refined into ity of the exchange. The shift in the The time-sensitive nature of the
the Uncertainty Complexity Pace (UCP) team dynamic forces the project man- project will put pressure to reduce
model by relabeling system scope as ager to alter the team management the number of development cycles.
complexity and the addition of a time- approach from managing to leading. However, in developing new technolo-
related dimension called Pace (Dvir, Complexity has three categories: gies, it is possible that more, not fewer,
Shenhar, & Alkaher, 2003). assembly, system, and array. These cycles will be required.

40 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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Project Type Generic Description
1 Engineering
2 Product Development
3 Systems Development
4 Research and
Organizational Change
Illustrative Industry
Engineering construction
and building
Weapons systems development
Information systems
n/a
Planning and Control Method
Activity-based
Bill of materials (product break-down
structure) base. PBS elements based on known
goals. Schedule milestones represent components
of the final product.
Project life-cycle-based. Schedule milestones rep-
resent completion of life-cycle stages.
Research projects lend themselves to management
by life cycle with stage-gate go/no-go decision
points. (Type 3)
Organizational change projects lend themselves to
bill of materials management. (Type 2)

Table 1: Planning and control methods (Payne & Turner, 1998).

Shenhar (2001) suggests that the
risk created by these conflicts can be
mitigated by intensifying configuration
and risk management practices and
implementing system-level practices
such as systems engineering and sys-
tems integration.
Graham (1998) compared the
process of managing aerospace and
construction projects. One of the key
elements found to be dependent upon
the nature of the project is communica-
tion (Graham, 1998). Larger better-
defined projects require the adoption
of techniques that are more formal but
with broadly defined communication
paths. The reverse is true in construction
projects, while project management
Complexity
Risk
Uncertainty
Pace
Figure 4: UCP model (Dvir, Shenhar, & Alkaher,
2003).
planning practices are not as exacting,
the communication between the vari-
ous project management team mem-
bers is tightly defined (Graham, 1998).
The author believes this implies that in
order to compensate for a looser proj-
ect structure dictated by the nature of
the project, communication channels
must be tightened to ensure the
exchange of information necessary for
project success. This may be an impor-
tant element in managing research
projects which, due to the greater
uncertainty and risks involved, will
need greater flexibility.
Cooke-Davies and Arzymanow
(2003) surveyed pharmaceutical research
and development project managers
and determined that ten core factors
constituted important elements of
project management practice (Table 2).
These factors include elements not
captured explicitly within PMI’s model
but discussed in the PMBOK ® Guide
(PMI, 2004). Of the ten factors identi-
fied, the ones in bold type are clearly
affected by the organization’s culture.
This is due either to a cultural artifact,
as in the case of the PM structure, or to
the cultural assumptions, as in the
degree of authorization granted to a
project team. The conclusion that can
be drawn from this listing is that the
concept of a project management
model extends beyond the simple
methods used in execution of a project
to the organizational structures and
culture that surround the project team.
One project management struc-
ture described by Kerzner (1998)
involved splitting the responsibility
for the project management triad
(cost, time, technical performance)
between the project manager and a
deputy project manager called the
project engineer. This model evolved
when projects became too complex for
one person to manage both the tech-
nical and managerial aspects of a proj-
ect. The project manager remained
responsible for the cost and time
aspects of the project while the project
engineer, also called chief engineer,
became responsible for the technical
side of the project. The situation that
caused this shared responsibility—
namely, increased complexity and the
size of the projects being managed—
has a strong parallel with the situation
being faced by GR&D scientists. The
author has used this model in practice
and experienced success by using
the servant-leader (McShane, 2004)
approach to managing project teams.
This approach involves developing an
understanding of the needs of the

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Development of a Project Management Model

Factor Subfactor Description

Project Culture Pervasiveness of Culture
Team Member Identification
Depth of Project Identification
Organizational Commitment of Upper
Leadership Management
Understanding of Upper
Management
Business Culture Business Focus
Business Awareness
Multiproject Prioritizing Projects Strategically
Management
Resourcing Projects Fully
Reacting to Changing
Circumstances
PM Structure, Extent of PM Systems, Methods,
Methods, and Systems and Processes (SMPs)
Integration of PM SMPs
Degree of Authorization Project Authorization
Location of Information Centralization of Information
in Each Project
Matching Team to Project
Capability of PM Staff Competency of PM Staff
Strength of Project vs. Matrix Strength
Functional Management
Table 2: Important elements in project management practice (Cooke-Davies & Arzymanow, 2003).
Depth project culture has penetrated the host organization
Degree team members identify with project versus their functional
discipline
Depth within project organizational structure that team members
identify themselves primarily with the project
Degree that management is committed to developing project
delivery capability
Degree that management communicates its understanding of the
scope of work necessary to develop capability
Degree that team makes decisions based not on technical but on
business basis
Degree to which the project team knows the business case and
project execution strategy.
Degree that projects are prioritized according to their strategic
importance to organization
Degree that resources allocated to a project reflect the strategic
importance of the project
Degree of organizational flexibility to suit changes in strategic
priorities and adjustment of project goals to meet new resource
level
Degree of organizational commonality of project SMPs
Degree of integration of SMPs with business systems
Degree of authority vested in project team to meet agreed project
strategy
Degree to which all project and functional plans are centralized
under the project control
Degree of conformance between project team and project
management techniques
Degree PM staff have capability to deliver projects, and have suffi-
cient staff to deliver project portfolio
Degree resources (human and financial) are allocated and under
control of the project

team and facilitating their ability to
perform project tasks (McShane,
2004).
While there are several theoretical
project management models pub-
lished by professional associations
worldwide, project management mod-
els in practice revolve around differing
levels of maturity in the core elements
of project management, methodolo-
gies employed and the organizational
environment or structure in which
they exist. This is important in the
context of this project, since it indi-
cates that a successful project man-
agement model for a GR&D organiza-
tion should be focused more on the
application of techniques than a
specific project management model or
standard. It is also important to note
that the various elements within a
project are not necessarily homoge-
neous, particularly with respect to
complexity and novelty. Project man-
agement techniques and styles will
need to be matched to the characteris-
tics of the project elements.

42 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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Government Research and Development
Organizational Culture and Project
Management Maturity
The fourth theme, building upon
the previous three themes, attempted
to gain insight into the culture and
project management maturity of the
sampled GR&D organizations.
A core assumption made during
this component of the review was that
the scientific personnel dominate or
are the key drivers of the organizational
culture. It was also assumed that, due
to their leadership position, they have a
profound influence on the project
management maturity of the organiza-
tion. This is not due to their numbers.
For example, although the National
Research Council of Canada has
approximately 4,500 employees, just
1,600 (35%) of these are directly
involved in research projects, and only
502 are permanent staff scientists, con-
stituting approximately 11% of the total
employee base (National Research
Council of Canada, n.d.). The basis for
the assumption of this small group’s
influence lies in the extent of the orga-
nization’s reliance upon the scientific
personnel to operate. No scientists, no
science.
Scientific personnel are in general
difficult to manage using classical man-
agement techniques due to cultural
factors such as:
1. They are antibureaucratic, prefer
communal culture, and resent top-
down organizational changes
(Maccoby, 2006);
2. They thrive on intellectual chal-
lenges, value autonomy and flexibili-
ty, seek knowledge for its own sake,
and are strongly individualistic in
thought processes and value systems
(Brown, 1999; Clarke, 2002b; Office of
the Auditor General, 1994); and
3. They identify more with their profes-
sion than their organization, general-
ly prefer working more with things
than people, want to establish their
reputation through publishing, and
have a strong expectation that imme-
diate R&D managers will have a
Page 43
scientific or engineering background and multiple project management sys-
(Brown, 1999; Clarke, 2002a; Office of tems within the same organization
the Auditor General, 1994). (Office of the Auditor General, 1981,
1994, 2002, 2004, 2005).
These characteristics can be sum- Based on these reports, it can be
marized into a theme of independence concluded that the level of organiza-
in thought, word, and action. tional project management maturity of
From an organizational point of the various GR&D organizations is
view, research and development proj- highly variable at both the corporate as
ects also do not fit the classical models. well as at the business-unit levels. The
Key differences are the uncertainty of lack of both consistent application of
outcome, and the difficulty in develop- project management practices and
ing metrics due to the uniqueness of integrated performance measurement
each project (Clarke, 2002a; Levi & systems is hampering GR&D organiza-
Slem, 1995; Pillai, Joshi, & Rao, 2002). tions from progressing through the
Payne and Turner’s (1998) model, organizational project management
discussed in the previous section, indi- maturity levels.
cates that research projects suffer from
Cultural Survey
poor definition of both goals and meth-
A cultural survey was conducted with
ods, resulting in an increased risk of
two objectives. The first was to assess
failure. A competent scientist can
the attitudes harboured by GR&D
undertake to solve a research problem,
research personnel with respect to
manage the project according to good
project management practices. The
practices, and still not solve the prob-
second was to assess the corporate
lem, through no fault of the scientist
environment according to Gray and
(Clarke, 2002a). The key element is that
Larson’s model (2006).
while most professions use an estab-
The Web sites of Canadian GR&D
lished knowledge base, in many cases
organizations (Table 3) were evaluated
scientists have to develop new tech-
to determine if the information neces-
niques to solve a problem for which
sary to develop a focused recipients list
there is no known solution. Failure is
for a survey was readily available. It was
and must always be an option in the
found that only the National Research
R&D organizational culture.
Council of Canada (NRC) Web site con-
Developing metrics for measuring
tained the necessary information in an
the success of a research project is
easily accessible format. Given this,
equally difficult given that the immedi-
the limited time in which to execute the
ate benefit may pale in comparison to
survey, and the author’s familiarity with
the eventual outcome. An example
the organization, it was decided that
is the laser that “languished for years
before practical applications were
developed” (Clarke, 2002a, p. 2).
• Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
These factors may contribute to the
• Canadian Space Agency
lower level of project management
• Environment Canada
maturity indicated in the Auditor
• Fisheries and Oceans Canada
General’s reports (1981, 1994, 2002,
• Health Canada
2004, 2005) on various GR&D organiza-
• Industry Canada
tions. A key criticism was that, if the
• National Defence
organizations had adequate and docu-
• National Research Council Canada
mented project management practices,
• Natural Resources Canada
they were not uniformly applied across
• Transport Canada
the organization. Other criticisms
included the existence of separate proj- Table 3: Federal government research
ect and business information systems organizations (Industry Canada, 2005).
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 43
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PAPERS
Development of a Project Management Model
the survey would focus exclusively on
NRC. Since NRC has a diverse research
portfolio that overlaps with several of
the other Canadian GR&D organiza-
tions, it was anticipated that a survey of
the NRC institutes would provide an
indication of Canadian GR&D organi-
zations as a whole, as well as a good
rudimentary understanding of the cul-
ture of NRC.
A list was developed that focused
on the core stakeholders who would be
directly affected by the implementation
of project management practices. The
groups included were management,
scientists, advanced research support
personnel, and project managers. It is
important to note that the majority
of managers at NRC are scientists
who have made the transition into the
leadership role, so considerable com-
monality between the management and
scientist responses was anticipated.
To develop the list of survey recipi-
ents, NRC’s employee listing was ana-
lyzed to identify and remove all guest
workers, visiting scientists, students, and
postdoctoral fellows. These individuals
are temporary organizational members
whose responses would be less likely to
provide an accurate cultural viewpoint.
In addition, administrative and support
staff that could not be classified into the
advanced research support category
were also struck from the list. The break-
down of the final random survey sample
is presented in Table 4.
Due to its small size, the entire
population of the project management
Classification Population
Advanced Research 934
Support
Management 201
Project Management 25
Scientist 501
Grand Total 1661
Table 4: Base survey group populations and responses.
44 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Page 44
category was sampled. In addition, the
president, vice-president and director-
generals were also included to ensure
that their impressions of the culture
were captured. The remaining classes
were randomly sampled to produce a
listing of 559 individuals. This sample
size, assuming a 10% return rate, was
deemed a sufficient sampling of the
entire pool, while still being manage-
able within the time constraints of the
project.
The survey was composed of 41
questions. The first 38 questions asked
the survey participants to indicate
the degree to which they agreed or
disagreed with the statement. Of these
questions, 28 canvassed the partici-
pant’s attitudes toward the project
management best practices as
identified in the Project Management
Institute’s Organizational Project
Management Maturity Model (PMI,
2003), while ten questions attempted
to determine the balance of the
organization’s cultural aspects as
per Gray and Larson (2006) of the
“Organizational Culture Factors” sec-
tion, with the exception of reward
criteria. This cultural aspect was
excluded due to difficulty in developing
a generic question to cover several dif-
ferent occupational groups. Questions
39 and 40 classified the participant’s
responses into two groups based on
their institute and role. The last ques-
tion was an optional open-ended ques-
tion canvassing the participant’s opin-
ion on research project management
Sample Responses
56% 293 52% 13
12% 68 12% 8 12%
2% 25 4% 10
30% 173 31% 37
559 68
and industrial project management. A
copy of the survey and interpretation
key is located in Table 5.
As outlined in Table 4, the number
of responses to the survey produced, in
general, suitable accuracy when con-
sidering the qualitative nature of
measuring an organization’s cultural
attributes. It was also noted that the
distribution of responses no longer
conformed to the population with an
overrepresentation of the scientist cat-
egory. In addition, only a small sample
of each institute was obtained. Based
on these factors and the larger confi-
dence intervals, it was decided to ana-
lyze the culture only at the top level
across all of NRC and not to delve into
the subculture issues of the four classes.
The answers to each question in the
survey were weighted according to
Table 6. The exclusion of the neutral
selection from scoring by giving it a
null weight created a quandary.
Several survey statements elicited a
neutral response from more than 25%
of respondents. The question was
whether or not to modify the scale to
somehow include the neutral response.
It was reasoned that a large number of
neutral responses represent either a
poorly worded question or a concept
requiring further study. In either case,
the author decided that it would be
futile to second-guess the participants
by giving the neutral response a differ-
ent weight. Therefore, the simple
scoring method was maintained for the
survey.
Confidence Interval (95%)
19% 27%
34%
15% 26%
54% 16%
12%
 Table 5: Organizational culture survey and aggregated results.

Neither
Concept Being
/ – Agree Agree Nor Disagree
Statement Canvassed Cultural Themes Relation Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Disagree Score
033_057PMJ1112.qxd

1 Communication between Importance of Team Orientation Belief 82.4% 13.2% 2.9% 1.5% 0.0% 1.76
team members and communication
stakeholders (customer and
management) is critical to
project success.
11/11/08

2 Formal project management Efficacy of project Project Management Disbelief 16.2% 20.6% 13.2% 25.0% 25.0% 0.22
policies and procedures are management in Efficacy
ineffective in managing research project
research projects. execution
3:23 PM

3 Planning a research project Efficacy of planning on Project Management Disbelief 1.5% 2.9% 11.8% 22.1% 61.8% 1.40
is ineffective in increasing project results Efficacy
project success.
Page 45

4 Performing a risk analysis on Efficacy of risk Project Management Disbelief 11.8% 19.1% 19.1% 26.5% 23.5% 0.31
a research project is analysis on project Efficacy
ineffective in preventing results
project failure.
5 Project team training Project organization Project Management Belief 20.6% 25.0% 25.0% 13.2% 16.2% 0.21
should be funded by has responsibility for Efficacy
project budgets. improvement of HR
6 Most projects are radically Research and Project Management Belief 5.9% 39.7% 10.3% 33.8% 10.3% –0.03
different upon completion development is Efficacy
than originally envisioned. unpredictable
7 Standard purchasing Policies/bureaucracy Project Management Belief 22.1% 35.3% 22.1% 14.7% 5.9% 0.53
policies are more of an degrade project Efficacy
obstacle than aid to performance
executing a project.
8 In project performance Project cost Project Management Belief 0.0% 14.7% 16.2% 35.3% 33.8% –0.88
reporting, the most orientation Efficacy
important line item is
the budget.
9 Scientific creativity takes Core value: intellectual Research Belief 11.8% 26.5% 23.5% 29.4% 8.8% 0.03
precedence over freedom Independence
schedule and budget
issues.
10 The primary end of a Core value: knowledge Research Belief 50.0% 30.9% 7.4% 10.3% 1.5% 1.18

December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

research project is to is its own reward Independence
increase knowledge

45
and understanding.
(Continues on next page)
 PAPERS

46
Neither
Concept Being
/ – Agree Agree Nor Disagree
Statement Canvassed Cultural Themes Relation Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Disagree Score
11 A lead scientist on a Project management Project Management Belief 47.1% 19.1% 7.4% 11.8% 14.7% 0.72
033_057PMJ1112.qxd

multicenter, multidisciplinary and scientific leadership and Scientific

project with a large team of role integration Leadership Role
10+ personnel should Integration
perform both the technical
11/11/08

and management roles

equally well.
12 Nonscientific management Core assumption: Project Management Belief 29.4% 38.2% 5.9% 19.1% 7.4% 0.63
of a research project can Management of science and Scientific
3:23 PM

never be optimal. requires scientific Leadership Role

background Integration
13 To lead and manage a Core assumption: Project Management Belief 64.7% 27.9% 4.4% 2.9% 0.0% 1.54
Page 46

large project, technical Management is and Scientific

knowledge is essential. task-oriented not Leadership Role
people-oriented Integration
14 Stakeholders are difficult Research is done in Research Belief 7.4% 33.8% 17.6% 23.5% 17.6% –0.10
to identify for research isolation of external Independence
projects. environment

December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

15 Corporate project Belief that project Project Management Belief 19.1% 25.0% 30.9% 14.7% 10.3% 0.28
Development of a Project Management Model

reviews are superficial reviews occur only at Efficacy

compared with the the end of a project
scientific peer review
process.
16 Core techniques to Research and Project Management Belief 4.4% 23.5% 26.5% 29.4% 16.2% –0.29
managing research development is Efficacy
projects are elusive. unmanageable
17 Due to the uncertainty Research and Project Management Belief 0.0% 19.1% 4.4% 27.9% 48.5% –1.06
involved in research projects, development is Efficacy
planning is ineffective unpredictable
beyond a 1-month
planning horizon.
18 Research projects can Research and Project Management Belief 7.4% 29.4% 8.8% 25.0% 29.4% –0.40
never take a single direct development is Efficacy
aim at an objective. unpredictable
19 Private industry project Research project Project Management Belief 13.2% 17.6% 23.5% 29.4% 16.2% –0.18
management practices management alien to Efficacy
are ineffective in managing industrial project
research projects. management
 20 Budget control is essential Research is done in Research Belief 14.7% 30.9% 32.4% 13.2% 8.8% 0.29
to scientific freedom. isolation of external Independence
environment
033_057PMJ1112.qxd

21 Project plans need to be Research and Project Management Disbelief 70.6% 26.5% 1.5% 1.5% 0.0% –1.66
regularly updated as new development is Efficacy
information is discovered unmanageable
during the execution of
11/11/08

the project.
22 Project manager and Project management Project Management Belief 8.8% 7.4% 16.2% 29.4% 38.2% –0.81
project scientist are and scientific leadership and Scientific
3:23 PM

always the same person. role integration Leadership Role

Integration
23 Project management Research and Project Management Belief 10.3% 27.9% 11.8% 23.5% 26.5% –0.28
practices do not provide development is Efficacy
Page 47

the flexibility necessary in unpredictable

research projects.
24 My organization has Awareness of process Project Management Belief 45.6% 38.2% 4.4% 5.9% 5.9% 1.12
processes for Efficacy
managing projects.
25 NRC’s project management Research and Project Management Disbelief 14.7% 30.9% 27.9% 10.3% 16.2% –0.18
processes are effective development is Efficacy
guides for managing our unmanageable
research projects.
26 On a multidisciplinary Collaborative orientation Team Orientation Belief 38.2% 42.6% 16.2% 1.5% 1.5% 1.15
project, a strong degree
of respect often evolves
between all team members.
27 Knowing when you are Research is done in Project Management Disbelief 64.7% 22.1% 5.9% 7.4% 0.0% –1.44
behind schedule is isolation of external Efficacy
important. environment
28 The lead scientist is always Project management Project Management Belief 27.9% 32.4% 7.4% 23.5% 8.8% 0.47
the focal point for and scientific leadership and Scientific
technical and management role integration Leadership Role
issues. Integration
29 I value recognition from Member identity Organization Negative 4.4% 13.2% 30.9% 36.8% 14.7% 0.44
my employer more than job/profession
from my professional peers. versus organization

December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

(Continues on next page)

47
 PAPERS

48
Neither
Concept Being
/ – Agree Agree Nor Disagree
033_057PMJ1112.qxd

Statement Canvassed Cultural Themes Relation Agree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Disagree Score
30 Modern research projects Team emphasis, Team Negative 47.1% 38.2% 8.8% 2.9% 2.9% –1.24
are organized around individual versus group
multidisciplinary teams
of scientific and engineering
11/11/08

professionals.
31 There is more value in Member identity, Profession Positive 23.5% 14.7% 42.6% 14.7% 4.4% 0.38
attending a conference job/profession
3:23 PM

than a training course. versus organization

32 To create an effective People focus, task Balance People/Task Strength 67.6% 27.9% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.63
organization management’s versus people
focus must be balanced
Page 48

between people and tasks

33 In my organization, the right Means-ends orientation Balance Means/Ends Strength 23.5% 45.6% 17.6% 5.9% 7.4% 0.72
research techniques are (means versus ends)
applied to the right problems.
34 Most research projects Unit integration, Interdependent Negative 47.1% 27.9% 16.2% 5.9% 2.9% –1.10

December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

involve significant independent versus
collaboration with members interdependent
Development of a Project Management Model

of other groups both

inside and outside NRC.
35 The bureaucracy is Control, loose versus Tight Negative 27.9% 29.4% 11.8% 22.1% 8.8% –0.46
stifling and inflexible. tight
36 Healthy conflict between Conflict tolerance, High Negative 11.8% 30.9% 30.9% 11.8% 14.7% –0.13
all research team members low versus high
(scientists and
nonscientists) is encouraged
in problem solving.
37 All employees are Risk tolerance, low High Negative 27.9% 41.2% 11.8% 7.4% 11.8% –0.66
encouraged to be creative, versus high
innovative, and to take
risks to solve problems.
38 NRC is heavily focused Open-system focus, External Negative 35.3% 38.2% 13.2% 7.4% 5.9% –0.90
on the external environment internal versus external
and adjusts its research
portfolio to suit the changing
needs of its stakeholders.
033_057PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:23 PM Page 49

Agree Neither Agree Disagree as shown in Figure 1 and the cultural

Agree Somewhat Nor Disagree Somewhat Disagree survey results shown in Figure 5 show
three factors that are misaligned signifi-
2.0 1.0 0.0
1.0
2.0
cantly and may impede the implemen-
Table 6: Weighting of cultural responses. tation of project management practices:
1. Member Identity: NRC employees
identify more with their profession
Additionally, after the survey had The remaining questions of the sur-
than with their employer.
started it was also discovered that, due vey explored the cultural dimensions
2. Control: There is a higher perceived
to oversights in the wording, questions identified by Gray and Larson (see the
degree of inflexibility at NRC.
32 and 33 inaccurately canvassed the “Organization Culture Factors” section).
3. Conflict Tolerance: NRC employees
concept. In this case, the scores were A comparison with Gray and Larson’s
indicated a lesser degree of tolerance
unchanged, but the cultural dimension optimum blend of cultural dimensions
of conflict.
affected was denoted by the addition of
an asterisk in Figure 5.
Once the responses were scored,

2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00
they were inverted if an affirmation
indicated a disbelief in the concept
being canvassed. The first 38 scored Member Identity
(Job/Organization)
responses were then organized accord-
ing to four cultural themes: project
management and scientific leadership
Team Emphasis
role integration, project management (Individual/Team)
efficacy, research independence, and
team orientation. As Figure 6 shows,
the responses indicate that NRC’s
Management Focus
culture demonstrates belief in the inte- (Task/People)*
gration of the project manager and sci-
entific leadership role, the independ-
ence of research, and the disbelief in Unit Integration
the efficacy of project management (Independent/Interdependent)
practices on research and develop-
ment projects. The fourth factor, team
orientation, while demonstrating a
Control (Loose/Tight)
strong belief was only canvassed in two
questions so this may be weighted
inaccurately. This representation of the
culture provides some hope since a Risk Tolerance (Low/High)
strong team orientation is one of the
success factor values identified by
Kendra and Taplin (2004).
Research independence differs Conflict Tolerance (Low/High)
from the other themes, as it is a com-
posite of three values of R&D culture.
The first is intellectual freedom, which
Means-Ends Orientation
is the autonomy to select and develop (Means/Ends)*
one’s own ideas, and the participation
in decision making that impacts one
and his or her work (Clarke, 2002a). The Open-system Focus
second value is that the acquisition of (Internal/External)
knowledge itself is its own reward. The
third and perhaps most significant
value is that research is to some degree
Figure 5: NRC survey results based on Gray and Larson’s (2006) cultural dimensions.
isolated from stakeholders.

December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 49

033_057PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:23 PM
PAPERS
Development of a Project Management Model
1.600
1.400
1.200
1.000
Score Average
0.800
0.600
0.400
0.512
0.200
0.000

0.200

0.400
Project Management
and Scientific Leadership
Role Integration
Figure 6: Strength of cultural themes.
Member identity presents a signifi-
cant problem for GR&D organizations
for two reasons. The scientific peer
review and publication process is a core
element in establishing the reputation
of a scientist and for advancing their
career. While internal acclaim is well
received, recognition from other
experts in the scientist’s field is and
always will be more important. The sec-
ond element is that in order to attract
the best and brightest senior and junior
scientists, it is very helpful to have the
best and brightest scientists in your
organization to bolster its reputation
(Clarke, 2002a). In order for the profes-
sion to know that the scientists are
among the top tier in their field, it is
necessary that they publish in respect-
ed journals.
The degree of control experienced
by GR&D scientists and staff may in
part be due to the public service nature
of the organizations. The need for
accountability for tax-derived funds
will never subside; hence, it can be
assumed that a high level of control will
50 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Page 50
0.349

0.138
Project Management Research Independence
Efficacy
Cultural Theme
always be desirable to elected officials
if not the researchers. In this case, it
becomes a question of how to facilitate
the application of the controls to
enable the project teams to do their
tasks.
With respect to conflict tolerance,
the survey focused primarily on the
conflict in a problem-solving context,
while Gray and Larson (2006) applied it
in a more general sense as “the degree
to which employees are encouraged to
air conflicts and criticisms openly”
(Gray & Larson, 2006). In this focused
application of conflict tolerance, NRC
employees demonstrated a balanced
attitude. A higher tolerance of con-
structive conflict is beneficial in both
problem solving and developing team
cohesion (McShane, 2004, p. 374).
Fostering a higher level of conflict toler-
ance could be achieved via training at
the organizational level as well as
team development within a project’s
subculture.
In the event that the organization’s
culture does not permit or foster project
1.456
Team Orientation
management, Gray and Larson (2006)
suggest as a remedy to insulate a dedi-
cated self-sufficient project team from
the organization. In this manner, team-
and project-oriented norms and values
can evolve into a subculture optimized
for the execution of the project. Given
that the GR&D culture does not
appear openly hostile toward project
management, it was felt that project
management isolation should not be
required.
Lastly, the free-form opinion ques-
tion generated 26 responses. As expect-
ed, the comments demonstrated a
great deal of variation, but one theme
reappeared in several of the comments:
research projects require more flexibili-
ty in the management approach.
The survey highlighted several
facets of GR&D culture that may
impede the implementation of project
management practices: integration of
project scientist and manager role, dis-
trust of efficacy of project management
practices, independence of research
projects, member identity focused on
033_057PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:23 PM
profession, tight controls, and low con-
flict tolerance. These factors will have
to be addressed in order to develop a
successful project management model
for GR&D organizations.
Project Management Model
Development
Upon evaluating the core cultural
aspects of GR&D culture, which coin-
cide strongly with the R&D culture liter-
ature, it was determined that these
aspects correspond well with the four
project management success factors
that surround the project management
culture in the model developed by
Kendra and Taplin (2004). When the
GR&D cultural values are inserted in
the model, replacing the project man-
agement culture (Figure 7), a gap exists
between the R&D cultural values and
the necessary project management val-
ues. In order for project management
to flourish within an R&D culture, it is
necessary to bridge these gaps.
Framework Core
The core aspects of the framework are
the uncertainty, size, and importance
of the projects being undertaken.
These factors drive the need, or lack
thereof, to apply project management
practices; the project management
competencies required; the planning
and control methods to employ; the
design of performance measurement
systems; the application of processes;
and the organizational structure need-
ed to support the project. In short, the
nature of the project determines
the optimal configuration required for
successful execution.
Framework Cultural Gaps
Surrounding this core factor are the
four cultural assumptions revealed in
both the literature review and cultural
survey—namely, integration of the
chief scientist and project manager
role, autonomy of the project, flexibil-
ity in execution, and orientation
toward profession. Each of these
cultural factors must be aligned or
bridged to implement the success
Page 51
factors identified by Kendra and Taplin
(2004).
The strong assumption that the
chief scientist and project manager
roles are always integrated becomes an
issue when the project becomes too
large and/or complex. In this case, the
project is at risk if the scientist is too
busy to adequately perform both roles,
or if the scientist lacks project manage-
ment competencies. In the former case,
the scientist is faced with a tough deci-
sion: sacrifice one of the two roles or
risk project failure. In the latter case,
even if the project is nominally small
enough to manage but the scientist
lacks key competencies such as plan-
ning, coordination, and communica-
tion, then the risk of failure is still
increased.
Two bridging techniques are pro-
posed to resolve this difficulty. The first
is training the scientists in project
management techniques to improve
their competency (Firth & Krut, 1991).
However, as discussed by Clarke (2002a)
and Brown (1999), some scientists are
more comfortable working with tech-
nology than with people. In this case,
training may improve the competency,
but by forcing managerial tasks on a
highly science-oriented individual, the
organization may “lose a highly moti-
vated scientist and gain an unfulfilled,
mediocre manager” (Clarke, 2002a).
Since the person may be unable or
unwilling to develop the competency to
fulfill the project management role,
someone must be assigned the role
without jeopardizing the scientific and
in some cases ethical leadership role of
the scientist. The proposed solution
is the second bridging technique and is
an adaptation of the project manager/
project engineer model. As described
earlier, the project engineer role as a
deputy project manager evolved due to
increases in project size and complexi-
ty. In this adaptation, the project scien-
tist would delegate the cost and time
responsibilities to a project manager,
while retaining responsibility for tech-
nical performance and the project as a
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
whole. The degree of authority provid-
ed to the project manager would be
flexible, as in the case of a matrix
organization or projectized organiza-
tion. If executed properly, this
approach should free up the scientists
to focus on their core competencies.
The second strong cultural factor is
autonomy. In general, scientists are
strongly if not fiercely independent
(Brown, 1999; Office of the Auditor
General, 1994) and are motivated when
allowed “the freedom and autonomy to
make operational decisions about their
work” (Clarke, 2002b). Giving the scien-
tist the authority and power to run the
project is congruent with project man-
agement practice and closely matches
the PMI’s definition of a strong matrix
or projectized organization (PMI,
2004). As long as the correct executive
support is provided in relations with
upper management (Clarke, 2002b),
and the scientist has the ability to work
with and lead a multi-disciplinary
team, there is little risk of this cultural
factor being a liability.
The next factor is the flexibility in
application of the process. As seen
earlier, the customization of project
management practices to suit the
needs of the project is acknowledged
by the PMI. Payne and Turner (1998);
Dvir et al. (2003); and Shenhar and
Dvir (1995) revealed that different
styles and levels of management, plan-
ning, and control are required for dif-
ferent project types, sizes, complexity,
and urgency.
Specific to the management of
research projects is that the application
of planning at the activity-level types of
projects increases the chances of fail-
ure. It would seem that the need to
completely customize a set of practices
for each project would make successful
program management an impossibility.
Payne and Turner (1998) resolved this
difficulty by dividing the planning
process into strategic and tactical lev-
els. At the strategic level, projects are
planned in an identical manner, but
at a level of detail suited to their
51
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PAPERS
Development of a Project Management Model

Corporate Culture

Participative or collegial management / decision making process

Project Manager Competencies

Values:
Leadership
Project Management and others' business processes
Organization culture
Team development
Communication

Scientific Teamwork
Integrity
Common PM Language
Competent Project Managers

GAP

Integration of Chief

Process compliance
Individual performance management
Business objectives
Project-based
Values:

Performance Measurement System

Scientist & Project
Project management office (PMO)
Stakeholder (client) involvement

Manager Role

Performance Orientation
Organizational Structure

Information Technology
Execution (Authority)
Autonomy of Project

Orientation Towards
Collaborative Teams

Scientific Peers
Profession/
Cross-functional teams

Research Project
GAP

GAP
Uncertainty, Size
Importance
Values:

Flexibility in
application of management
practices and execution

GAP

Process Orientation

Supporting Business Processes

Scientific Continuous
Innovation Values: Learning
System development process
CMM- Six KPAs
Project management
People development
Business planning
Supplier management

Individual respect and

responsibility

Figure 7: GR&D project management model framework.

size (Payne & Turner, 1998). Different At the integration level, a project ect requirements, communicate the
approaches are adopted at the tactical proposal or charter is developed with a project’s needs to the organization, and
or operational level. They go on to sufficient level of detail to provide deci- authorize the project (University of
describe a three-tiered planning system sion makers with the ability to commit Technology Sydney, 2006).
involving integrative-, strategic-, and resources, set project priorities with The strategic-level plan outlines
tactical-level plans. respect to operational and other proj- the milestones and responsibility

52 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

033_057PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:23 PM
assignments for the project. The objec-
tive of the responsibility chart is to
identify who is responsible for specific
important aspects of the management
and execution of the project. For engi-
neering and product development
(Types 1 and 2) projects, the milestones
should be based on the components of
the project. For systems and research
projects (Types 3 and 4), the milestones
should be life cycle–based. Larger proj-
ects could be broken down into sub-
projects with their own milestone plan.
This structure provides a common
basis for program-level evaluation and
comparison (Payne & Turner, 1998).
At the tactical level, project plans
are customized to suit the nature and
size of the project. For small projects,
there may be no need for additional
planning. This is probably an optimal
level of planning given that small proj-
ects cannot tolerate the bureaucratic
overhead that is associated with larger,
more organizationally complex proj-
ects (Payne & Turner, 1998). For engi-
neering projects, the detailed plans will
be developed based on the known
activities to be performed. For product
development and systems develop-
ment projects, Payne and Turner
recommend the use of a planning tech-
nique called rolling wave. In this tech-
nique, detailed plans are developed
only for the early stages of the project,
where there is greater ability to make
reasonable estimates with the informa-
tion at hand. As the project proceeds
through the life-cycle phases, the plans
for the next phase are revisited and
developed in greater detail, incorporat-
ing the increased knowledge gained
during the previous stage (Kerzner,
1998).
One aspect implied but not dis-
cussed in Payne and Turner’s model is
inhomogeneous research and develop-
ment projects. With the growth
of multidisciplinary projects, it is
conceivable that a core research ele-
ment is surrounded by development
activities. In this case, it would be nec-
essary to apply different planning and
Page 53
control techniques to different aspects
of the project.
Research projects are more likely to
have a higher level of uncertainty,
requiring a team composed of higher-
skilled performers. According to the
UCP model (Dvir et al., 2003), this
would require a project management
style more heavily weighted toward
leadership than management. It would
also require efficient, but less formal
communication structures. For proj-
ects of higher complexity, the need for
more formal command, control, and
communications is in potential conflict
with the optimal management style for
leading a research team.
As with Payne and Turner’s model,
the UCP model does not seem to
address the inhomogeneity potentially
inherent in projects. While it will make
the project manager’s job harder, the
author believes that the management
style should be adapted to the various
sublevels of the project or program. For
example, in the case of a system project
(level 2) that incorporates both low-
tech (type A) and high-tech (type B)
subsystems, three distinct styles are
required. A more rigid managerial style
would be appropriate for the type
A subsystem development, while a
more flexible leadership style would
suit the type B activities. Finally, where
the two subsystems interact, more for-
mal control and possibly a third team
will be required to focus on the systems
integration aspects of the project.
The remaining cultural factor is the
strong orientation that scientists and
engineers have toward their profession
and peers. This orientation manifests
itself as four goals for which scientists
typically aim: “advancement of knowl-
edge for its own sake, establishing a
reputation through publishing, having
research achievements that will bring
professional recognition, and advanc-
ing and moving ahead as specialists in
their field” (Clarke, 2002a, p. 62). For a
scientist, the basic measure of perform-
ance is the number of patents, publica-
tions, or presentations achieved. The
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
mantra uttered jokingly in some organ-
izations is publish or perish.
According to Kendra and Taplin
(2004), the purpose of performance
measurement systems is to allow the
project manager to compare actual
performance against planned perform-
ance on factors such as schedule,
budget, objectives, requirements, and
quality. Furthermore, the Auditor
General reports indicate a need for the
implementation of just such project
management practices to enable the
effective management at the project
and program levels (Office of the
Auditor General, 1994, 2005). This
brings to light a significant cultural
divide. On the one side, the scientific
staff, in general, look to their peers for
performance appraisal at the personal
level, while on the other the govern-
ment is looking for more quantifiable
metrics to evaluate the performance at
the project and program level. This
obviously poses a significant problem
in the development of and compliance
with project performance measure-
ment systems for R&D projects. From a
scientist’s point of view, there is no ben-
efit to completing a time card, as this is
not a factor upon which their scientific
work will be evaluated (Brown, 1999).
One alternative is for management
to impose a performance measurement
system. This would produce resistance
because scientists in general oppose
organizational changes that flow from
the top-down (Maccoby, 2006). This
resistance could manifest itself in many
ways both open and covert. Given that
independence is a strong facet of the
scientific culture, it is unlikely that
imposing a performance measurement
system would be the most effective way
to achieve compatibility with the proj-
ect management success factors.
Another alternative is to demon-
strate how the performance measure-
ment system is valuable in achieving
the scientist’s objective of a publication
as well as achieving the project’s objec-
tives. By compressing the time frame of
the project’s execution or at least keeping
53
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PAPERS
Development of a Project Management Model
it from expanding, the scientist will be
able to publish sooner. More impor-
tantly, it is conceivable that the per-
formance measurement system can be
designed to provide some of the inputs
needed for a publication. In short,
incorporating R&D performance meas-
urement values by integrating and
improving the resulting publication
will align the research with the per-
formance measurement success factor.
Successfully bridging this cultural
gap is potentially the most important
achievement of the proposed project
management model as it influences a
key motivational factor for researchers
(Clarke, 2002a). A linking of the success
of the research to the performance
measurement system will provide
motivation for the acceptance of the
competencies, structures, and processes
upon which the performance measure-
ment system relies.
Project Management Infrastructure
Firth and Krut (1991) outline infra-
structure requirements that span the
strategic, tactical, and operation levels
of an organization and mirror three of
Kendra and Taplin’s (2004) project suc-
cess factors.
At the strategic level, management
needs to explain the role and principles
of project management in the organi-
zation’s business model. Management
also needs to describe the support that
is available for the project teams (Firth &
Krut, 1991).
At the tactical level, the organiza-
tion’s structure, management process-
es, and information systems need to be
optimized for project-focused activi-
ties. Firth and Krut (1991) call attention
to the need for simple and effective
means to authorize projects, the mini-
mization of interdepartmental bureau-
cracy, and good information systems.
Extending the concepts of the Dvir et al.
(2003) and the Payne and Turner (1998)
models to the information system (IS),
this would require the optimization of
the IS system to meet the needs of the
54 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
project. Applying the wrong IS struc-
ture to a project will increase the risk of
failure.
At the operational level, advice and
support services need to be available to
project managers and their teams.
These services would include: project
management consultants (internal or
external), technical specialists, and
library support (Firth & Krut, 1991).
Criteria for Application of Project
Management Practices to Research
Projects
In a general sense, project manage-
ment practices can be applied to any
research project. There are two funda-
mental criteria to be satisfied: Is the
activity a project? Does the project
have sufficient criticality to merit
application of project management
practices?
With respect to the first criterion,
the PMI defines a project as “a tempo-
rary endeavor undertaken to create a
unique product, service or result” (PMI,
2004, p. 5). A key element of this defini-
tion is that the project must have a def-
inite end. When the project’s objectives
are obtained or it becomes clear that
they either cannot or, for organization-
al reasons, will not be achieved, the
project is terminated. If the activity has
no objectives or objectives that are too
vague as to make a judgment as to
when they have been reached, the
activity is not a project.
The second criterion is the criticali-
ty of the project. This is normally meas-
ured along the triad of factors: time,
performance, and cost (Kerzner, 1998).
If any of these factors are important to
the organization, then project manage-
ment practices should be applied. For
example, if a project must be complet-
ed within a fixed time frame, at a mini-
mum basic planning should be per-
formed to see if and how it is possible to
meet the time frame. Likewise, if a proj-
ect will consume significant resources,
again project management practices
should be implemented.
Once it has been determined that
project management practices should
be applied, it is necessary to determine
what blend of planning and control
techniques should be used. To apply
the UCP and Payne and Turner’s
model, it is necessary to develop an
understanding of the nature, size,
complexity, and urgency of the pro-
ject’s main components. Is the project
a small, medium, or large project? Is
the product of the project an assembly
or collection of integrated subsystems?
Is it homogeneous with only research
activities, or is it a composite of differ-
ent project types, such as engineering
and research? Depending on the
answer to these questions, the man-
agement style, project structure, focus,
planning, and control techniques uti-
lized on the project and its subcompo-
nents should be adapted as described
in Payne and Turner (1998) and Dvir
et al. (2003).
Criteria for Implementing Nonscientific
Management of Research Project
As discovered in the literature review
and reinforced by the cultural survey,
scientists see a nonscientific manager
of a research project as an untenable
situation (Brown, 1999; Clarke, 2002a).
This cultural assumption probably
stems from the graduate studies train-
ing model in which the student works
under the mentorship of a professor
for several years. In the workplace, the
scientific manager is expected to con-
tinue to fulfill the role of mentor by
providing advice and feedback on
technical ideas or proposals (Clarke,
2002a). This cultural assumption
becomes a project liability when there
are serious deficits in the lead scien-
tist’s ability to fulfill the project man-
agement role.
Given the strong cultural issues, it is
evident that a nonscientific manager
should be put in absolute charge of a
research project only as a last resort.
Even so, the project manager should
strive to form a strong collaboration
033_057PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:23 PM
with the lead scientist using the ser-
vant-leader style as described earlier.
Implications for Future
Research
The alignment of performance meas-
urement criteria and systems with the
research culture is a critical facet of
the model. It is also possibly one of the
most difficult to achieve, given that
career advancement via peer-reviewed
publication is a strongly entrenched
cultural value. To further compound
the issue, it is in the best interests of the
organization that the scientists publish,
since it will enable the organization to
attract both established senior and ris-
ing junior scientific staff, further
increasing the scientific competency of
the organization.
While some techniques have been
suggested for accommodating the gap
between the performance measure-
ment criteria of project management
and scientific cultures, further research
is needed to test and refine the suggest-
ed methods as well as explore new
ones.
Conclusion
Canada’s continued prosperity relies in
a large part upon the success of its sci-
ence and technology strategies, a key
component of which are GR&D organi-
zations. However, a low level of project
management maturity appears to be
systemic throughout GR&D organiza-
tions, potentially impeding the success
of their projects, their programs and
ultimately the nation’s science and
technology strategies. To resolve this, it
is necessary to increase the organiza-
tional project management maturity of
GR&D organizations.
Advancing the project management
maturity of GR&D organizations is a
task made difficult by fundamental
value misalignments between the proj-
ect management and research cultures.
The task is further complicated due to
the assumption that certain aspects of
GR&D culture are essential to their sci-
entific performance, negating the
Page 55
option of a wholesale reorientation of
the GR&D culture into a project man-
agement or business culture.
The model developed in this proj-
ect seeks to bridge key gaps between
the GR&D and project management
cultures and their inherent values. The
gaps are centered on four project man-
agement success factors: project man-
ager competencies, organizational
structure, supporting business process-
es, and performance measurement sys-
tems. The GR&D cultural values that
need to be aligned with these values
are, respectively, integration of the
chief scientist and project manager
role, project autonomy, flexibility in
management practices and execution,
and orientation toward profession.
Of these, bridging the gap created by
the researcher’s orientation toward his
or her profession as opposed to the
employer is vital to the success of
the model and the advancement
of project management maturity within
GR&D organizations.
The assignment of nonscientific
managers to a research project is gen-
erally discouraged due to the strong
cultural value regarding the integration
of the chief scientist and project man-
ager roles. As an alternative, a modified
project engineer model is proposed as a
viable option based on both industry
experience as well as the author’s.
Implementing project manage-
ment requires a sustained effort to alter
not only the structure of an organiza-
tion but also its culture. The author
believes this model contains a frame-
work in which project management
practices can be successfully imple-
mented in GR&D organizations, meet-
ing the needs of the researchers as well
as the expectations of the government
and Canadians.
Acknowledgments
First, I would like to thank my under-
graduate project supervisor, Richard
Bernhardt, who put up with a deluge of
information throughout the project
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
and provided much-needed guidance,
direction, and critiques of multiple
report drafts.
Second, I would like to thank Dr.
Korin Kendra for her clarification of
certain aspects of her and Dr. Taplin’s
article and for providing significant
constructive criticism on this article.
Last, I wish to acknowledge the par-
ticipation of many of the National
Research Council of Canada’s person-
nel in the organizational culture survey.
Their responses to the questionnaire
shed light on several areas of research
and development culture. ■
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57
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PAPERS
Do Project Managers’ Leadership
Competencies Contribute to
Project Success?
Linda Geoghegan, Electronic Data Systems, Ascot, Berkshire, United Kingdom
Victor Dulewicz, Henley Business School, Greenlands, Henley-on-Thames,
United Kingdom

ABSTRACT ■ INTRODUCTION ■

This article explores the following hypothesis:
There is a statistically significant relationship
between a project manager’s leadership compe-
tencies and project success. Two proven question-
naires, the leadership dimensions questionnaire
(LDQ) and the project success questionnaire
(PSQ), were used to gather data from 52 project
managers and project sponsors from a financial
services company in the United Kingdom. The
results from the LDQ and PSQ are presented in
this article. A factor analysis of PSQ revealed three
independent factors: usability, project delivery,
and value of output to clients. The last factor is not
related to project leadership or management,
so the article concentrates on correlations
between the other two factors and project leader-
ship. Eight separate leadership dimensions were
found to be statistically significantly related to
performance, so the hypothesis was largely sup-
ported. Identifying such relationships provides
managers with guidance on possible selection
and project improvement models, whereby
increased capability in leadership dimensions can
lead to increased success in project management.
KEYWORDS: project managers; leadership
competencies; leadership effectiveness; proj-
ect success; emotional intelligence
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 58–67
©2008 by the Project Management Institute
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20084
T
here are many schools of thought on leadership and according to
Dulewicz and Higgs (2005), leadership has been studied more than
any other aspect of human behavior. In a literature review on leader-
ship from the early 20th century to the present, Higgs (2003) identified
six major schools: trait, behavior, contingency, visionary, emotional intelli-
gence, and competency schools. These “emerging” schools of thought on
leadership see leadership as a combination of personal characteristics and
areas of competency. In other words, it is the combination of skills and
knowledge, such as empowerment and achievement, with personal charac-
teristics, such as intuitiveness, that makes a leader. The more recent emerg-
ing schools relevant to this study will now be reviewed.
Bass (1985) has had a major influence on leadership theory. He researched
different types of organizational change, identified different sets of behavior
and characteristics required in times of organizational transformation and
times of stability, and produced relevant transactional and transformational
leadership styles. Bass and Avolio (1995) developed the multifactor leader-
ship questionnaire (MLQ) to assess leadership competencies and, in a series
of studies, showed that transformational leadership has significantly greater
impact on the organization than transactional leadership. Turning to per-
sonal characteristics, Hogan (2002) saw the personality of leaders as being a
determinant of effectiveness as he believed skills are built on personality
characteristics. It was this combination of personality and competency that
potentially produced different leaders suited to different circumstances:
transactional leaders for times of low complexity and transformational lead-
ers in time of increased complexity. This is similar to Bass’s (1990) assertion
that certain leaders are more suited to stable environments and others more
suited to a rapidly changing environment.
The combination of personality and competency is unprescribed and
very much individual-dependent. Goffee and Jones (2000) captured the
essence of this with the statement “being yourself, with skill” (p. 64). To some
degree this emerging school of thought on personality and competencies
may seem similar to the trait theory—the idea that effective leaders all share
the same inherent characteristics. However, competencies can be learned
and developed, whereas personality characteristics are more enduring.
This idea that personality characteristics and personal competencies
predict long-term managerial advancement was formed by Goleman’s (1997)
paper on competencies, where he defined emotional intelligence (EI) in
competency terms. Goleman’s (1996) basic proposition is that EI and intel-
lectual aptitude (IQ) are both important for success. Dulewicz and Higgs

58 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

058_067PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 2:53 PM Page 59
(2005) take this work further by consid-
ering the skills that need to be exercised
in a way that is congruent with the
underlying personality of the leader.
Building on this view and Bass’s work,
they proposed a new model for leader-
ship, which recognized that leadership
encompasses competences and per-
sonal characteristics, and since organi-
zations’ characteristics, such as culture,
vary, different competence profiles are
appropriate in different circumstances
(Dulewicz & Higgs, 2005). This view is
similar to the earlier contingent school
of thought where the influence of the
environment was considered signifi-
cant in determining leadership success.
Dulewicz and Higgs (2005) discov-
ered through their earlier research
(Dulewicz & Herbert, 1999; Dulewicz &
Higgs, 2000a, 2000b) into EI that many
of the elements in their EI model also
appeared in the leadership literature.
They found that an increasing number
of academics and practitioners were
beginning to explore, accept, and pro-
mote the importance of EI at the top of
the organization. They showed that
many authors identified four types of
competencies that determined leader-
ship performance: cognitive, emotion-
al, behavioral, and motivational (Gill,
2002; Kets de Vries & Florent-Tracy,
2002; Marshall, 1991; Zaccaro, Rittman,
& Marks, 2001).
Dulewicz and Higgs (2000a, 2000b)
showed that EI can explain variations
in the performance of managers and
other staff. They produced a question-
naire to measure emotional intelli-
gence directly. The questionnaire
contained seven emotional intelligence
dimensions. Statistically, significant
correlations were found between EI
scores and the job performance of mid-
dle management. Dulewicz and Higgs
(2000a) showed that IQ accounts for
27% of performance, managerial com-
petency (MQ) accounts for 16%, and EI
account for 36%. Their studies high-
lighted EI as the most significant of the
three, although IQ and MQ are also of
importance. Through their research
and their literature review (Bennis,
1989; Goffee & Jones, 2000; Goleman,
Boyatzis, & McKee, 2002; Hogan, 2002;
Kotter, 1990; Kouzes & Posner, 1998),
Dulewicz and Higgs (2005) developed
eight additional leadership dimensions
relating to IQ and MQ competencies. IQ
consists of intellectual competencies,
MQ of management competencies, and
EI of both social and emotional compe-
tencies. The 15 leadership dimensions
can be used to explain performance of
managers on different types of change
projects.
Project Manager Competencies
A few studies have identified compe-
tencies relevant to project managers.
Rees, Turner, and Tampoe (1996) identi-
fied six traits of effective project man-
agers and assert that effective managers
are usually of above-average intelli-
gence and have good problem-solving
ability. Such traits are similar to
intellectual competencies (IQ) that
Dulewicz and Higgs (2005) referred to
as part of leadership competencies.
Other traits identified by Rees et al. are
behavioral or motivational, such as
energy, and skills-based traits, for
example, communication. However,
they do not provide evidence that these
traits contribute directly to increased
project success. Andersen, Grude, and
Haug (1987) recognized the importance
of the project manager’s personal char-
acteristics, such as initiative, when
selecting a project manager. This view
is similar to that of Hogan (2002), who
saw the personality of the leader as
being a determinant of effectiveness.
However, they do not directly show the
significant contribution of personality
characteristics to project success.
Pinto and Trailer (1998) recognized
the characteristics of an effective proj-
ect leader: credibility, creative problem
solving, tolerance for ambiguity, flexi-
ble management style, and effective
communication. They also identified
the skills needed for project managers:
technical, administrative (planning,
budgeting, etc.), and leadership skills
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
(vision, example setting, etc.). Such
skills make a good project manager, but
again, Pinto and Trailer (1998) did not
explicitly link such characteristics and
skills to project success.
Crawford (2007) defined project
manager competence as a combination
of knowledge (qualification), skills
(ability to do a task), and core personal-
ity characteristics (motives
traits

self concepts) that lead to superior
results. Crawford stated that project
success and competence of project
management personnel are closely
interrelated, and the competence of the
project manager is in itself a factor in
the successful delivery of projects.
However, Crawford noted that leader-
ship appears consistently in the highest-
ranking category among project
manager competence factors, but it did
not appear in the highest-ranking cate-
gory for project success factors.
Based on the literature on project
manager competencies, it could
be claimed that the competencies
required by project managers in
today’s organizations are not dissimilar
to the leadership competencies high-
lighted earlier. There is recognition
that an effective project manager
possesses a combination of personal
characteristics such as flexibility and
competencies such as problem
solving—not dissimilar to the emerg-
ing schools of thought on leadership
discussed earlier. However, the litera-
ture so far does not make a direct con-
nection between project manager
leadership competencies and project
success. Is project leadership not
perceived as a significant factor in suc-
cessful delivery?
Project Success and the Project
Manager
There are few topics in the field of project
management that are so frequently dis-
cussed, and yet so rarely agreed upon, as
the construct of project success (Pinto &
Slevin, 1988a). Critical success factors
(CSFs) are common in projects today as
a means of assessing project success.
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Project Managers’ Leadership Competencies
During the past two decades, there has
been a broadening of measurement
from simply time, cost (on budget), and
functionality improvement measure-
ment in the 1970s to a more quality-
based focus in the 1980s and 1990s.
Project success today takes stakeholder
satisfaction, product success, business
and organization benefit, and team
development as measures of project suc-
cess (Atkinson, 1999; Baccarini, 1999).
In the 1980s, research into project
success factors intensified. Some
authors identified functionality (per-
formance), project management
(schedule, on budget), commercial suc-
cess, termination efficiency, and client
satisfaction as success factors (Baker,
Murphy, & Fisher, 1988; Morris, 1988;
Pinto & Slevin, 1988a). No explicit refer-
ence is made to the leadership charac-
teristics of project managers and their
influence on success. Andersen et al.
(1987) examined the pitfalls that may
prevent project success and increase the
chances of failure. Such pitfalls include
the way the project was planned, organ-
ized, and controlled. Baker et al. (1988)
defined “perceived” project success as
meeting the project’s technical specifi-
cation and/or project’s mission and
attaining a high level of satisfaction
from the client, the users, and the proj-
ect team. They emphasized planning as
opposed to leadership as a key factor in
maximizing potential project success.
Pinto and Slevin (1988b) conducted
a study of project success and identi-
fied 10 factors for success. They found
the need for communication channels
extremely important, as well as the
need for available problem-solving
ability. Interestingly, project manager
leadership or even management skills
are not mentioned as success factors.
However, they did mention the absence
of project management characteristics
such as adequate project manager
administration, human skills, and
influencing skills as strongly contribut-
ing to the failure of projects.
Lee-Kelley and Leong Loong (2003)
suggested that there is a significant
60 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
relationship between the project man-
ager’s perception of project success and
his or her own personality. Inner
confidence and self-belief are likely
to play a significant part in the
project manager’s ability to deliver a
project successfully.
Turner (1999) defined a strategy for
the successful implementation of proj-
ects. This seven forces model (based on
the work of Morris, 1988, and Morris &
Hough, 1987) contains a “people” force,
representing the people on the project
and their management, leadership,
teamwork, and industrial relations. He
recognized the need for leadership as a
part of the project strategy or approach,
which in turn leads to successful project
implementation. In contrast, Cooke-
Davies (2001) stated that despite well-
known research results and decades of
individual and collective experience
of managing projects, project results
continue to disappoint stakeholders.
Cooke-Davies focused on cost, time,
and quality when studying project
success and identified related success
factors. He did not mention the people
side of project management or mention
overtly the project manager’s compe-
tence and leadership ability when
defining the success factors.
Jugdev and Müller (2005) reviewed
the literature on project success and
concluded that four conditions are nec-
essary, but not sufficient, for success:
1. Success criteria should be agreed
with stakeholders before and during
the project.
2. A collaborative working relationship
should be maintained between proj-
ect owner/sponsor and manager.
3. A project manager should be
empowered to deal flexibly with
unforeseen circumstances.
4. The project owner/sponsors should
take an interest in the performance
of the project.
Turner and Müller (2005) recently
reviewed the contribution of the project
manager’s competence and leadership
style to project success and concluded
that “the literature has largely ignored
the impact of the project manager, and
his/her leadership style and compe-
tence, on project success” (p. 59). They
found that in the general management
literature, it is widely recognized that
the functional manager’s leadership
style contributes to the success of the
organization or organizational unit he
or she manages; the project manager’s
leadership style is generally ignored
when identifying project success fac-
tors. These authors called for more
research.
Method
While much of the literature on project
management that was just reviewed has
neglected the influence of the project
manager’s leadership ability in deliver-
ing project success, a few studies cited
previously have asserted the importance
of leadership for project management
success and have identified some lead-
ership competencies as being impor-
tant. Therefore, this study has been
designed to test the hypothesis that:
There is a statistically significant
relationship between a project man-
ager’s leadership competencies and
project success.
The Organization
The study was conducted in a leading
financial services company based in
the United Kingdom. The target popu-
lation was the company’s business
transformation community, and the
sample frames are a subset of the
target population—namely, the project
management and project sponsor
communities. Business changes in the
company are managed by the business
transformation division where approxi-
mately 80 project managers are
employed. The projects in the company
range from product changes and tech-
nology changes to manpower changes.
The company, like all organizations,
faces the challenges of leading projects
and implementing change. The project
managers must be equipped with the
right skill set to ensure projects are
058_067PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 2:53 PM
implemented as successfully as possi-
ble to meet the changing market
demands.
Procedure
To test the hypothesis, a quantitative
study was selected as the most appro-
priate research method. The research
would operate at two levels with data
being collected from two different sam-
ple groups. The target population was
the company’s business transformation
group, but the sample frames were a
subset of the target population—namely,
the project management community
and the project sponsor community.
The primary targets in both samples
were related through common projects,
but their responsibilities on these
projects are significantly different. At
the outset, a proposal was submitted
to the company detailing the research
objectives and its value to the organiza-
tion and the individuals involved. To
maximize response rates, all efforts
were made to promote the research, and
a short promotional slot was secured
at a project management conference in
July 2005. During this conference,
project managers were encouraged to
participate, and afterward, 65 project
managers were issued questionnaires.
Instruments
The fieldwork utilized two different
questionnaires: (1) the leadership
dimensions questionnaire (LDQ)
(Dulewicz & Higgs, 2005) and (2) the
project success questionnaire (PSQ)
(Pinto & Slevin, 1986, 1988a, 1988b).
These were selected as the most appro-
priate methods of obtaining data
because the primary target groups are
likely to be in different locations across
the United Kingdom; questionnaires
allowed the researcher to contact a rea-
sonably sized sample within the
defined time frame. The LDQ and PSQ
are proven questionnaires supported
by previous research. As noted, Jugdev
and Müller (2005) reviewed the litera-
ture on project success but did not
provide new scales to measure per-
formance.
Page 61
Leadership Dimensions
Questionnaire
The LDQ was selected as the instru-
ment on which to base the research
because it provides an indication of the
respondent’s leadership competencies
measured on 15 dimensions. Dulewicz
and Higgs (2005) provided full details of
the LDQ, but essentially the model pro-
poses seven EQ dimensions, five MQ
competencies, and three IQ competen-
cies. Titles of the 15 leadership dimen-
sions appear in Table 1. The LDQ has
been deployed in a variety of public
and commercial organizations, includ-
ing the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force,
the Home Office, and the Cabinet
Office, as well as in private companies
such as DHL. The LDQ is a reliable
instrument, with each dimension
reaching acceptable levels of reliability
(Cronbach’s alpha  0.7) with some
dimensions, such as vision and imagi-
nation, engaging communication,
managing resources, and developing,
even obtaining a higher reliability score
(Cronbach’s alpha  0.8), according to
Dulewicz and Higgs (2005).
Project Success Questionnaire
This short questionnaire (PSQ) was
used to gather data on project success.
It was based on Pinto and Slevin’s
(1986) project implementation profile
(PIF) questionnaire that uses a model
of project success composed of two key
themes: the project and the client. First,
the project must be technically correct
and performed in the manner intend-
ed. Second, the project team must
interface effectively with the client
organization to maximize the likeli-
hood of acceptance. The PIF covered
the common measures of project suc-
cess: the schedule, on budget, and the
performance. The questionnaire also
covered client measures relating to the
usage of the project (i.e., results of
the project will be used by the intended
client), client satisfaction with the per-
formance of the project, and the impact
of the project on organizational effec-
tiveness (i.e., the project will directly
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
benefit the intended users). The PIF
success measure has been developed
and tested as a generalized project
manager success measure (Pinto &
Slevin, 1986) and has been, for exam-
ple, used in the measurement of infor-
mation systems projects (Finch, 2003).
To ensure the reliability of the project
success questionnaire, the Cronbach’s
alpha was tested, and a coefficient of
0.81 was found. Hair, Babin, Money,
and Samouel (2003) asserted that an
alpha coefficient between 0.8 and 0.9
shows a very good strength of associa-
tion, and so this coefficient represents a
very good association between the 12
questions.
Sample
The first sample frame comprised 80
project managers. However, only a sub-
group of the sample frame was consid-
ered suitable for the study (i.e., those
who have sufficient project manage-
ment experience). The subgroup
selected had managed projects with
budgets of over £350,000 and had
served at least 4 years in project man-
agement. This group has a significant
amount of exposure to both manage-
ment and leadership activities such as
influencing stakeholders, motivating
and inspiring staff, and managing the
day-to-day running of their projects.
Of the 52 respondents who com-
pleted the LDQ, 38 (73%) were male and
14 (27%) were female. Their average age
was 39.5 years old with a standard devi-
ation of 6.7, and a 32-year range with a
minimum age of 25 and the maximum
of 57. Of the eight categories of job
functions available on the LDQ, the
majority (75%) worked in an IT-related
job function, 4% worked in finance and
administration, 6% worked in general
management, and 16% worked in other
functions. In terms of their highest level
of education, 15 (29%) were educated
to high school level, 18 (35%) to first-
degree level, 7 (13%) to a higher degree
level, and 12 (23%) have professional
qualifications. All respondents were
from the private sector. Additionally,
61
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Project Managers’ Leadership Competencies

LDQ Dimension Test Value
5.5

Mean Mean Differential Standard Deviation t df Sig
IQ Dimensions
Critical analysis 5.75 0.25 1.81 0.99 51 0.32
and judgment
Vision and Imagination 4.37 –1.13 1.86 –4.40 51 0.00
Strategic perspective 5.15 –0.35 1.53 –1.64 51 0.11
EQ Dimensions
Self-awareness 5.92 0.42 1.47 2.08 51 0.04
Emotional resilience 5.54 0.04 1.65 0.17 51 0.87
Intuitiveness 5.56 0.06 1.70 0.25 51 0.81
Sensitivity 5.92 0.42 1.41 2.16 51 0.04
Influencing 5.56 0.06 1.51 0.27 51 0.78
Motivation 5.33 –0.17 1.84 –0.68 51 0.50
Conscientiousness 5.98 0.48 1.66 2.09 51 0.04
MQ Dimensions
Managing resources 5.88 0.38 1.97 1.41 51 0.16
Engaging communication 5.15 –0.35 1.90 –1.31 51 0.20
Empowering 5.27 –0.23 2.01 –0.83 51 0.41
Developing 5.17 –0.33 1.96 –1.20 51 0.23
Achieving 5.06 –0.44 1.69 –1.89 51 0.06
Table 1: Comparisons with LDQ norm group between LDQ sten scores using one-sample t-test.

all respondents were U.K. nationals,
except one, who was of African/Caribbean
origin.
The second sample comprised
project sponsors whose sponsored
projects ranged from £350,000 upward.
In this context, they have had the
responsibility of ensuring that the proj-
ect fits within the overall strategy of the
area under change and ensuring that all
areas are aware and prepared for the
change. The sponsor also had responsi-
bility for funding the project (i.e., seing
that it was on budget). It was decided,
therefore, that this sample was best
placed to gauge project success from
both a client and project perspective
and, therefore, would be asked to com-
plete the project success survey. Their
demographic data showed that, of the
52 PSQs completed, 37 (71%) were from
male respondents and 15 (29%) were
from female respondents. The average
age was 42 years old with a standard
deviation of 5.5, and a range of 21 years,
with the youngest at 35 and oldest at 56.
No other demographic data was col-
lected, as it was considered not relevant
for this study.
The final sample of 52 who com-
pleted both LDQ and PSQ, while not
large, is respectable for an exploratory
study of this nature. It constitutes 81%
of all project managers in the company
(some were not invited) and two-thirds
(65%) of the total population of project
managers. Therefore, the sample
should be representative of the project
managers in the company. The study is
exploratory in the sense that the results
relate to only one company, which is
based in the United Kingdom.
Results
Comparison of Project Managers’
LDQ Scores With Norm Group
The mean and standard deviation (SD)
of the sten (standardized 10-point
scale) data for each of the 15 leadership
dimensions are presented in Table 1
together with results of a t-test to com-
pare them with equivalent scores from
the LDQ standardization sample on
which the norms are based. By defini-
tion, sten scores have a mean of 5.0 and
an SD of 2.0. The conscientiousness
leadership dimension had the highest
sten mean score at 5.98. The next high-
est sten mean scores are for sensitivity
and self-awareness, both 5.92. All three

62 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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sten scores are significantly higher than
for the standardization sample. Vision,
which has the lowest mean score at
4.37, is the only leadership dimension
that is significantly lower than the
mean scores for the standardization
sample.
Factor Analysis of PSQ Items
Factor analysis was conducted on the
PSQ to simplify the process of under-
standing the data. Factor analysis was
performed for the 12 project success
factors that form the PSQ using a statis-
tical package for the social sciences
(SPSS). Three factors were identified as
shown in Table 2. Factor loading of
greater than  0.50 was identified when
relating variables to the factors. Hair
et al. (2003) considered this range to be
moderately important, and loadings
of  0.70 are considered very impor-
tant. Excellent item separation across
factors was achieved. The three factors
identified were named as follows:
Factor 1—Usability
As seen from Table 2, the five success
questions with high loadings all relate
PSQ Items
Q1 Schedule
Q2 On budget
Q3 Deliverable works
Q4 Solves problem
Q5 Improves performance
Q6 Used by client
Q7 Important clients make use
Q8 Ready accepted by users
Q9 Good project process
Q10 Benefits users
Q11 Provides improvements
Q12 Positive impact on users
Note. Extraction method: principal component analysis; rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser normalization;
rotation converged in five iterations.
Table 2: Rotated component matrix of PSQ items.
Page 63
to the project deliverable being a work- Factor 3—Project Delivery
able and usable solution. To ensure the The three questions loading onto this
statistical reliability of the grouping, factor (see Table 2) relate to the project
Factor 1 was tested for reliability, and delivery process. To ensure the statisti-
the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of cal reliability of the grouping, Factor 3
0.805 found represents a very good was tested for reliability using the
association between the four success Cronbach’s alpha, and a coefficient
variables. Hair et al. (2003) asserted score of 0.806 represents a very good
that an alpha coefficient between 0.8 association between the three success
and 0.9 is a very good strength of asso- variables and reflects that they are
ciation. This coefficient, therefore, measuring a similar construct.
shows that the five success variables are
Correlations Between LDQ and PSQ
measuring a similar construct.
In order to test the hypothesis, a bivari-
Factor 2—Value of Project Outcome ate correlation was performed between
to Users the 15 leadership dimensions of the
All of the four success questions load- LDQ raw data and the two factors iden-
ing onto this factor in Table 2 relate to tified in the previous section. It was dis-
how the project deliverable will benefit covered that Factor 1 was correlated to
the user through, for example, improved managing resources at a significance
performance. Factor 2, therefore, relates level of 0.05, while Factor 3 shows no
to value of project outcome to users, significant correlation with any leader-
and so does not relate to the way in ship dimensions. In order to explore
which the project was led and man- the data further, each PSQ item loading
aged. Thus, it does not appear relevant onto Factors 1 and 3 was correlated
to the hypothesis under investigation, with each leadership dimension. Only
and so results relating to Factor 2 are those correlations represented by the
not directly relevant to this study and Pearson correlation coefficients were
will not be reported and discussed here. statistically significant at the 0.01 and
0.05 levels and are shown in Table 3.
Factor 1 demonstrated significant cor-
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
relations, some highly significant,
0.167 0.157 0.890 between the leadership dimensions
0.401 –0.219 0.729 managing resources (0.422), empower-
ing (0.421), developing (0.388), motiva-
0.773 0.154 0.201 tion (0.357), critical analysis (0.323),
0.567 0.008 0.156 and influencing (0.29) and the success
variable “solves problem.” Significant
0.085 0.727 0.099 positive correlations were also found
0.846 –0.008 0.100 between the leadership dimensions
self-awareness (0.270) and sensitivity
0.896 0.032 0.007
(0.312) and the success variable “used
0.624 0.205 0.146 by client.” Factor 3 also demonstrated
0.065 0.222 0.841 significant correlations: the item “on
budget” shows significant positive
0.137 0.901 0.049 correlations with the leadership dimen-
–0.119 0.893 0.040 sions managing resources (0.297) and
empowering (0.280).
0.215 0.837 0.066
IQ, MQ, and EQ Group Scores
In Table 3, leadership dimensions were
grouped into IQ, EQ, and MQ cate-
gories, as defined by Dulewicz and
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Factor 1 (Usability)
Factor 3
Solves Used by (Project Delivery)
Problem Client On Budget
IQ Dimensions
Critical analysis 0.323* 0.167 0.192
EQ Dimensions
Self-awareness 0.145 0.270* 0.052
Sensitivity 0.252 0.312* 0.265
Influencing 0.349* 0.132 0.127
Motivation 0.357** 0.187 0.222
MQ Dimensions
Manage resources 0.422** 0.252 0.297*
Empowering 0.421** 0.181 0.280*
Developing 0.388** 0.084 0.148
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
Table 3: Significant correlations between LDQ dimensions and Factor 1 and 3 items.
Higgs (2000b, 2005). It shows that only Sten data were used to relate the
one IQ leadership dimension is posi- abilities and performance of the target
tively correlated with a project success sample against the current LDQ data-
variable, while five MQ and three EQ base. Respondents’ mean scores on
dimensions are positively correlated. all 15 dimensions of the LDQ were
Of the five MQ leadership dimensions, between 4.37 and 5.98. The results
three correlations are highly significant were largely in line with previous
at a 0.01 level. Of the three EQ leader- responses to the LDQ and approximat-
ship dimensions, only one correlation ed to a normal distribution. Three
is highly significant at a 0.01 level. leadership dimension scores were sig-
These findings will be discussed further nificantly higher than for the norm
in the following section. group. This project manager group
shows strength on the conscientious-
Discussion ness leadership dimension and has a
Leadership Dimensions Findings small standard deviation that high-
The LDQ descriptive data provide lights a good level of consistency
information based on the target sample across the group. This group also had
group’s responses to the leadership significantly higher scores (than the
dimensions questionnaire. The litera- norm group) on sensitivity and self-
ture review has shown that these awareness. All three dimensions are
dimensions of leadership provide some emotional competencies, as defined by
of the critical determinants of effective Dulewicz and Higgs (2000b, 2005),
leadership and have also shown that and the high scores may be a result of
the really important aspects of leader- the significant amount of exposure the
ship relate broadly to emotional project community receives to leader-
and social competencies, intellectual ship activities such as influencing
competencies, and managerial compe- difficult stakeholders and the need
tencies. to obtain commitment and buy-in
64 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
from senior management in order to
progress projects successfully.
The lowest three leadership dimen-
sion scores were found in vision, strate-
gic perspective, and achieving. Vision
was the only dimension to have a sig-
nificantly lower score than the norm
group. The low score in vision can be
explained by the nature of the work
performed by the project management
community where project managers do
not actively engage in setting the orga-
nization’s vision but instead focus on
implementing projects that fulfill a pre-
defined vision.
Relationship Between Leadership
and Project Success
The hypothesis set out to identify the
specific dimensions of leadership that
contribute to successful projects. Table 3
highlights several dimensions that pos-
itively correlate at significant levels of
0.01 and 0.05 with the success vari-
ables. Using project success factors as a
measure of success, these correlations
begin to uncover the specific leader-
ship dimensions that contribute to suc-
cessful projects. Factor 1 shows the
leadership dimensions managing
resources, empowering, developing,
and motivation as each having highly
significant correlation with the “solves
problem” success variable. In other
words, respondents who are rated high-
ly for “solves problem” are more likely
to empower and develop their col-
leagues, manage resources efficiently
and effectively, and be highly motivated.
These are findings that are perhaps to
be expected. What is surprising is that
they do not score highly on critical
analysis, but the total group scores
highly on this dimension, when com-
pared to the norm group.
Factor 3 showed significant
correlation between the leadership
dimensions managing resources,
empowering, and the “on budget” suc-
cess variable. This is not surprising,
considering the relationship between
managing resources and managing the
budget.
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Lessons for Practitioners
It is possible to develop many aspects
of leadership by planned and sustained
development activities. Some dimen-
sions can be developed, whereas others
are more difficult to develop. This
article presents the company with a
possible project improvement model
whereby increased capability in leader-
ship dimensions can lead to increased
results in aspects of project implementa-
tion. Therefore, leadership dimensions
that are directly linked to successful
projects should be the focus of project
manager training. Such focused train-
ing has the potential to have a direct
impact on project success, thereby pro-
viding a greater return on investment.
This research shows how leadership
dimensions can contribute to the suc-
cess of projects. It is important that
senior management, who directly man-
age the project management commu-
nity and who are very much involved in
change, are made aware of the impact
of leadership competencies on the per-
sonnel with whom they work and ulti-
mately on the success of their programs
of change. If senior management were
to complete the LDQ, they would prob-
ably gain an understanding of the range
of skills and behaviors that need to be
in place to provide effective leadership.
Leaders of projects could be select-
ed or developed on the basis of their
leadership profile, as identified by the
LDQ, and how that profile links to proj-
ect success factors, as demonstrated
through this research. Leadership com-
petencies measured by a proven ques-
tionnaire, such as the LDQ, could be
taken into account when appointing
new project managers or as part of the
appraisal process where feedback from
colleagues on performance against
selected leadership dimensions could
be obtained.
Limitations and Areas of
Further Work
Although the research gained the sup-
port of senior management prior to
conducting the fieldwork, the response
Page 65
rate was lower than desired, although
still relatively high. The main difficul-
ties were gathering questionnaires dur-
ing the summer and the fact that each
LDQ required a corresponding PSQ.
This pairing limited flexibility and
required synchronized lobbying of
potential participants who reside in dif-
ferent business units. Greater and
broader engagement by the company
in supporting a study might have
produced a higher response rate.
Nevertheless, this should be seen as an
exploratory study because it is based
on findings from one, albeit large com-
pany with respondents working in the
United Kingdom.
Notwithstanding, the leadership/
project success model developed in
this research is likely to be of interest to
any organization that is project-based.
However, a further, broader study
encompassing a cross-section of indus-
tries and countries would be required
to produce relationships between lead-
ership dimensions and project success
factors that could be transferable to any
organization. Additionally, a further,
broader study might be conducted to
include the role of the follower in suc-
cessful change, ideally involving a 360°
appraisal (a 360° version of the LDQ is
available). Such work would need to
relate to the significance of the follower
to the success of the project. If follower
commitment proved to be a key com-
ponent of successful projects, then
further work might determine what
organizations can do to generate high
levels of commitment.
Summary and Conclusions
To summarize our findings, the signifi-
cant correlations for both factors and
the leadership dimensions are shown
in Table 4. Of these 10 leadership
dimensions, five are management
(MQ), four are social/emotional com-
petencies (EQ), and one is an intellec-
tual competence (IQ), as defined by
Dulewicz and Higgs (2000b, 2005). It
can be asserted, therefore, that MQ
leadership dimensions contribute
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
most to successful projects and there-
fore are highly significant in support-
ing the hypothesis. This is perhaps not
a surprising result considering the
amount of resource development and
management involved in project man-
agement.
These findings highlight a link
between managerial competencies and
project success. The MQ leadership
dimensions seem to play a significant
role in influencing or affecting project
success. According to Dulewicz and
Higgs (2000a, 2000b), emotional intelli-
gence can explain variations in the per-
formance of managers and other staff.
This research found that both manage-
rial and emotional/social competen-
cies could explain variations in project
success. Perhaps this is not surprising
considering the nature of project man-
agement and project implementation
and the sample groups involved in the
study. Wren and Dulewicz (2005), from
research performed on the Royal Air
Force, found similar results and
concluded that the MQ dimensions of
leadership were the most important in
RAF officers leading change projects.
Furthermore, Porthouse and Dulewicz
(2007) found that the 10 significant
LDQ dimensions in this study were also
significantly related to the leadership
performance of agile project managers
and concluded that both “MQ and EQ
competencies are important for leaders
of Agile teams” (p 33).
The research also provides other
valuable information on the capability
of the project manager community as
leaders. The project manager group
demonstrated some EQ strengths.
Dulewicz and Higgs (2000a, 2000b)
showed that EQ accounts for 36% of
leader advancement (i.e., success). It
can be concluded, therefore, that the
company’s project managers have
demonstrated a level of emotional
competencies that should enable them
to perform better in leadership.
However, along with the strengths,
weaknesses have also been identified
across the target group in which the
65
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PAPERS
Project Managers’ Leadership Competencies
Factor 1 (Usability)
Highly significant
• Managing resources (MQ)
• Empowering (MQ)
• Developing (MQ)
• Motivation (EQ)
Significant
• Critical analysis (IQ)
• Influencing (EQ)
• Self-awareness (EQ)
• Sensitivity (EQ)
Table 4: Summary of significant correlations between LDQ dimensions and Factors 1 and 3.
company will need to build appropriate
programs of development. Interestingly,
the weakest competency was in an IQ
leadership dimension, vision and
imagination, which could prove diffi-
cult to improve through training,
according to Dulewicz and Higgs
(2005).
In conclusion, the hypothesis for
this research was largely supported, in
the sense that certain leadership
dimensions demonstrate a positive
relationship with certain project
success variables. Identifying such rela-
tionships provides the company with a
possible project improvement model
where increased capability in a leader-
ship dimension can lead to increased
success in aspects of project imple-
mentation. ■
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Linda Geoghegan received a degree in
computer science and an MBA from Henley
Business School. This article is based on
research she conducted as part of her MBA
dissertation while she was working as a project
manager for a leading financial services compa-
ny in the United Kingdom. She currently works
as a consultant for EDS.
Victor Dulewicz is a chartered occupational
psychologist, a fellow of both the British
Psychological Society and the Chartered Institute
of Personnel and Development, and a member of
the Institute of Directors. Currently he is manag-
ing partner of VDA Consultants and a part-time
faculty member of Henley Business School where
he was, until 2007, director of the Centre for
Board Effectiveness and head of HRM and OB
faculty. Previously, he was an occupational psy-
chologist for Rank Xerox and the Civil Service
Selection Board. In addition, he was manager of
assessment and occupational psychology for 9
years at the STC Group (now Nortel). He has coau-
thored three books, written more than 100 arti-
cles and papers, and presented papers at numer-
ous national and international conferences on
management assessment and development.
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CordNet: Toward a Distributed
Behavior Model for Emergency
Response Coordination
Liaquat Hossain, Project Management Graduate Program, Faculty of Engineering and IT,
The University of Sydney, NSW Australia; IBM Australia, Sydney, Australia
Matthew Kuti, IBM Australia, Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT ■
Existing studies of coordination theory in
human networks have looked at coordination
problems requiring stable working relationships
with no environmental uncertainties. With emer-
gency response management demanding dis-
tributed coordination in volatile situations, the
designs of existing models are useful as a build-
ing block, yet flawed for application. We hypoth-
esize that changes to interconnectedness of
nodes in the network may have implications on
the potential to coordinate. To test our hypothe-
ses, we investigate survey data from state law
enforcement, state emergency services, and
local law enforcement by performing agency-
based (macro) and cross-agency (micro)
analysis to identify attributes of each network
and coordination.
KEYWORDS: coordination; distributed
behavior; social networks; emergency response
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 68–94
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20086
68 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
INTRODUCTION ■
T
he effect of a disaster, regardless of whether it is naturally occurring or
man-made, brings about a disrupted state of negative social and eco-
nomic conditions (Kapucu, 2005). The aim of an Emergency Response
Network (ERN) is to respond to extreme events as quickly and effi-
ciently as possible in order to return the society to a “business as usual” state,
and thus restore social confidence and economic stability (Waugh, 2003).
Extreme events trigger the launch of what is known as consequence manage-
ment, which is the motivation for establishing an ERN with the condition to
save the lives of the victims involved. Consequence management requires
the mobilization of a complex network of organizations designed to be able
to form rapidly to coordinate a multifaceted disaster response and then
quickly dissolve once the incident has been controlled (Kapucu, 2003, 2005).
The effectiveness of consequence management may be defined through
quantifiable measures, such as the number of lives lost, property damage, or
perhaps overall time until recovery. These quantifiable measures are what
define a society’s “resilience” to extreme events and are the gauge for assess-
ing a society’s ability to cope (Kapucu, 2005).
Current literature on the state of American ERNs has identified several
existing flaws that require further development for effective disaster relief
and response (Comfort & Kapucu, 2003; van Scholten, Zlatanova, & van den
Brink, 2005; Waugh, 2003). The specific challenges of an ERN spur from the
network’s need for cooperation and coordination within the complex net-
work of interdependent organizations. Van Scholten et al. (2005) described
common horizontal cooperation issues, such as police, fire, and medical
crews having problems when interaction is necessary to respond to interde-
pendent tasks that are outside the scope of any one organization, especially
when coordination is necessary in a highly stressful and turbulent environ-
ment, such as a disaster. Waugh (2003) further suggested that cooperation
flaws are also apparent within the communication and coordination of
organizational actors across vertical levels of leadership, such as federal gov-
ernment agencies working with nonprofit organizations. The ability to coor-
dinate between sectors, such as with unaffiliated volunteers, can potentially
create a significant challenge and put strain on the coordination of the
network. This is supported by literature revealing that some organizations in
the network are reluctant to rely on other sectors in times of disaster and cri-
sis (Kapucu, 2005). This is especially directed toward nonprofit agencies,
which, according to Waugh (2003), other sectors commonly assert are poor-
ly skilled, lack resources, and can potentially inhibit the response by placing
themselves in danger or obstructing professionals in the response effort.
068_094PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:26 PM
The ability for an ERN to preserve suffi-
cient information flow in the network
rests in its ability to maintain a struc-
tured and stable distributed network
where all avenues of communication
remain open. Kapucu’s (2005) study
into the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, documented the challenges of
such a task when faced with a disaster
of significant magnitude. The problems
with maintaining information flow
directly affected the ability of leading
organizations in the network to make
informed decisions based on whole
information, and of other organiza-
tions to work together to carry out the
directions (Van Scholten et al., 2005).
Van Scholten et al. (2005) argued that
the decision-making process must be
made in extreme events regardless of
circumstance, and the results of an
impaired communication network can
allow poor decisions to be made
because of incomplete or even wrong
information, which could significantly
impact the efficiency of a response
effort.
The lessons learned from current
literature identify the need for commu-
nication across vertical sector-based
boundaries and horizontal same-sector
organizations to minimize the preva-
lent coordination gap apparent within
the current workings of ERNs (Kapucu,
2005; van Scholten et al., 2005). Studies
into the events of Hurricane Katrina
and September 11 illustrate that under
both naturally occurring and man-
made disasters, merely establishing an
ERN (Kapucu, 2005; Stanley, 2006) is
insufficient to allow a resilient society
to overcome extreme disaster in a timely
and efficient manner, and that it is
developing coordination within the
network that facilitates this process.
The network structure outlined in the
National Response Plan (NRP; see
Department of Homeland Security,
2006; Kapucu, 2005) illustrates that in
the event of a crisis, the emergency
agencies involved in consequence
management are to quickly unite and
form a distributed network where all
Page 69
agencies are central to the flow of infor-
mation and are to coordinate them-
selves to respond to any interconnected
set of problems that may arise from
the situation. The reality of this plan,
however, was unable to reproduce the
sophisticated, yet simplistic network as
intended. The research conducted by
Kapucu (2005) looked at the situation
reports of the September 11 crisis,
which represents an “actual” network
as it stood during the event (Figure 1, in
Kapucu, 2005). The network graph dis-
plays a contrast between the planned
and the actual network, with a signifi-
cant lack of interconnectedness and
communication between agencies.
Granovetter (1983) suggested that the
implications of a reduced number of
connections (or network ties) can
potentially lead to reduced coordina-
tion due to actor segregation, which
limits the flow of information. It is
especially important in an ERN to cre-
ate a sense of community and to share
knowledge in order to overcome prob-
lems that require an interdependent
multiagency response. Kapucu’s (2005)
study into ERNs used an exploratory
model to assess the interconnected-
ness of organizational actors within a
network during a crisis. The ability of
Kapucu (2005) to look at actual rather
than perceived data and to interpret
how the network functions during an
actual incident is very useful for inves-
tigating how planned actions present
themselves in live situations. However,
a limitation of Kapucu’s (2005) study is
that it does not allow for an assessment
of coordination within the network as
an outcome of interconnectedness
derived from network planning and
optimization. This means judgment
cannot be made on how successful an
organization was at performing its role
in the network during a crisis.
Distributed Emergency
Response Coordination
As a result of the limitations found
when applying preexisting coordination
models in real emergencies, a new
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
theoretical model is introduced. The
intent of the model is to assess the cur-
rent state of coordination as a product
of the attributes of the network. The
framework for the model is intended
for emergency response coordination
assessment during a noncrisis period in
order to optimize network performance
by creating a heightened state of pre-
paredness. Although subject to investi-
gation, the model could potentially be
applied to any network that is distrib-
uted in nature and requires coordina-
tion to produce better performance. We
provide mechanisms for investigating
coordination preparedness based on
network connectedness (evaluated
through social network analysis). There
is a single moderating variable, defined
as “Tiered Organization,” which places
an organization in one of three ERN
tiers, which then forms the basis for
assessing whether the resulting level of
network involvement and thus the
potential to coordinate the network is
adequate for a given agency. The con-
nectedness of an agency within the
network is measured by the three inde-
pendent social networking variables,
which together produce an organiza-
tional actor’s assessment of network
involvement. The three dependent vari-
ables define the characteristics of an
organization’s current state of coordina-
tion and coordination potential in an
emergency. The aim of applying the
framework to ERNs is to empirically
investigate the relationship between
the network itself and the potential
for coordination. The driving theory for
constructing the model is based on the
view that enhancing network perform-
ance correlates to increasing the capac-
ity for coordination to occur. As a result
of increasing network performance, the
implied coordination gap present in
emergency networks (Kapucu, 2005;
Kettl, 2006; Rathnam, Mahajan, &
Whinston, 1995; Waugh, 2003) may be
reduced.
The first step in the model intro-
duces an organization to assess. An
organization in the model could be any
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Toward a Distributed Behavior Model for Emergency Response Coordination

Figure 1: Graphical representation of organization network—FEMA situation (Kapucu, 2005).

agency for any business sector that is
somehow involved in the emergency
network. Each organization in the ERN
can be assessed to determine its cur-
rent state of coordination preparedness
and be required to alter its network
connectedness level based on where it
should be operating. A clique analysis
is then carried out to assign tier alloca-
tion. A clique can be defined as a subset
of actors within a network that are
more closely tied to create a subgroup.
The analysis technique is used in the
framework to assess which cluster an
organization belongs to. According to
the NRP (Department of Homeland
Security, 2006), each agency involved in
consequence management is responsi-
ble for taking on certain leadership
roles within the ERN. The NRP implies
a loosely based leadership structure
that is assumed to represent three tiers
of responsibilities: federal organiza-
tions represent the first tier, second
are state and local agencies, and third are
all other sectors and organizations. The
clique analysis of an organization is
hypothesized to provide evidence of
tier placement based on an actor’s sub-
group association. The reasoning
behind this theory is, for example, that
if an organization communicates with
significantly more state and local
authorities, it is likely that the agency
being assessed also belongs to that par-
ticular tier. This leads to the first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A prediction of what tier
an organization belongs to can be made
by analyzing an organization for its sub-
group.
A tier level determines an organiza-
tion’s expected level of network con-
nectedness. We use tiered organization
as a moderating variable in this study. A
tiered organization represents an
agency that has been placed in a partic-
ular tier group that determines its
expected level of network involvement.
Based on the literature from the NRP

70 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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(Department of Homeland Security,
2006), an association with a particular
tier retains expectations of network
leadership and coordination facilita-
tion. By this reasoning, an assessment
of coordination preparedness is imbal-
anced across all organizations, as per-
formance expectations are not equal,
and therefore a weighted score based
on tier positioning is required. This
leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The level of network
involvement expected from an organization
is mediated by the tier into which it falls.
We then use network connected-
ness as an independent variable in our
model. A degree centrality analysis is
done to determine aspects of an ego’s
network. Degree as an independent
variable is used to measure connected-
ness, in which we defined the number
of relationships (also known as arcs or
ties) to which a particular node (actor) is
connected. Marsden (2002) mentioned
that the identical degree centrality
measure may be used for an egocentric
analysis, as the principal for defining
relationships remains the same. Ego
betweenness analysis is then done to
determine aspects of an ego’s network,
in which the measure of betweenness
characterizes the extent to which a
node lies in between other nodes in the
network, or the extent to which a node
falls on the shortest path between pairs
of other nodes (Chung, Hossain, &
Davis, 2005). Lastly, a tie strength
analysis is carried out to determine
aspects of an ego’s network.
An analysis of readiness is done to
determine aspects of an actor’s current
state of coordination. We use readiness
as a dependent variable in our study,
which defines readiness as an organi-
zation’s perceived ability to react to a
crisis event should the need arise at
any given moment. The variable is
based on Kapucu (2005), where evi-
dence is provided that simple planning
does not amount to a state of readiness
when the emergency need arises.
Waugh (2003) and Kettl’s (2006)
Page 71
accounts of the ERN in hindsight of
emergency disasters generate discus-
sion on particular agencies’ roles and
the need for a faster response in order
to create resilience. This concept has
been recognized and characterized
here as an actor’s readiness.
An analysis of the quality of informa-
tion received is done to determine
aspects of an actor’s current state of
coordination. In our framework, we
define quality (a dependent variable) in
terms of the quality of information that
is received by the agency being assessed,
in order to examine what coordination
benefits the information can provide.
Van Scholten et al. (2005) mentioned the
coordination benefits of improved qual-
ity of the information disseminating
through the network as an improved
ability for collaboration and decision-
making strategies. We further perform
an analysis of the accessibility (a
dependent variable) of information to
determine aspects of an actor’s current
state of coordination. Accessibility of
information refers to an organization’s
capacity to retrieve information from a
multitude of sources. The importance of
being granted access to information in
an ERN is that regardless of information,
decisions must be made about how the
network will be coordinated to respond
to a crisis. By having access to different
sources, organizations are able to group
disparate pieces of information to devel-
op a more whole understanding of the
problem and be in a more informed
position to make urgent decisions (Van
Scholten et al., 2005). By investigating
the three measures of social networking
theory that combine to represent an
organizational assessment of network
connectedness, it is theorized that
the involvement of an organization in the
ERN has significant implications on
the coordination performance it is able
to achieve. The hypothesis proposed as
a result of this concept is:
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant
relationship between network involvement
and coordination, where an increase in net-
work connectedness produces an increase in
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
organizational coordination within a given
threshold.
The following hypotheses investi-
gate the relationship between attrib-
utes of the network and level of coordi-
nation:
Hypothesis 3a: Degree correlates to
readiness.
Hypothesis 3b: Degree correlates to quality.
Hypothesis 3c: Degree correlates to
accessibility.
Hypothesis 3d: Ego betweenness corre-
lates to readiness.
Hypothesis 3e: Ego betweenness corre-
lates to quality.
Hypothesis 3f: Ego betweenness corre-
lates to accessibility.
Hypothesis 3g: Tie strength correlates to
readiness.
Hypothesis 3h: Tie strength correlates to
quality.
Hypothesis 3i: Tie strength correlates to
accessibility.
In presenting a new model for
assessing coordination, we are able to
build on the theoretical foundations
developed through past research. The
models of Mintzberg (1979) and
Malone and Crowston (1994) provide a
firm understanding of the components
of coordination and structures that
may enable or inhibit them. This
research has focused specifically on
distributed coordination, and although
the preexisting models are unable to be
implemented under these circum-
stances, we are able to use them to
recognize the need for a focus on the
network structure itself to facilitate
coordination when applied under a dis-
tributed system. Social networks theory
provides a basis for examining the net-
work structure and allows for a com-
parison to be made between network
conditions and the state of coordina-
tion. ERNs such as the American
response network can be seen to retain
a real problem with managing effective
communication and implementing
coordination strategies in times of cri-
sis, such as Hurricane Katrina (Kettl,
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Toward a Distributed Behavior Model for Emergency Response Coordination
2006). By conducting research and
assessing organizations of an ERN such
as this with a new model that incorpo-
rates the challenges of a distributed
network, it may be possible to identify
current network shortfalls that may
impact the network’s ability to coordi-
nate in a crisis situation. In optimizing
the interconnectedness of the network
prior to a disaster, the level of prepared-
ness generated by the network can
hopefully mean that the difference
between a planned response and an
actual response in a crisis is not signifi-
cantly different due to a decrease of the
coordination gap previously exhibited.
Coordination Dataset for
Emergency Response
The dataset titled “Domestic Terrorism:
Assessment of State and Local
Preparedness in the United States,
1992” was found at the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR) website (http://
www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/
STUDY/06566.xml). The study was
developed with the purpose to “analyze
states’ and municipalities’ terrorism
preparedness as a means of providing
law enforcement with information
about the prevention and control of
terrorist activities in the United States”
(Riley & Hoffman, 1995, p. ix). The study
was funded by the U.S. Department
of Justice and the National Institute of
Justice. Research investigation was
done by Kevin Jack Riley and Bruce
Hoffman of the RAND Corporation.
The research agenda was to assess
how state and local law enforcement
perceived the threat of terrorism. The
framework for data collection involved
sending each selected agency a pack-
age that included the survey instru-
ment, a letter requesting participation,
a confidentiality agreement, and a
brief overview of the RAND Corpora-
tion (Riley & Hoffman, 1995). The pro-
cedure after the initial invitation was to
follow up with a reminder letter after
10 days. Should the study not be filled
in within 3 weeks, another package was
72 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
re-sent with all the documents in the
original invitation, and was followed
2 weeks later with a phone call to the
agencies that had not yet responded. If
the survey still was not completed and
returned 20 days after the telephone
call, another jurisdiction would be con-
tacted to replace the nonresponding
agency.
The sampling technique used to
invite participants involved a two-part
methodology for local law enforcement
agencies. The first stage required
selecting 12 counties in each census
district, using a population-based
method. Three counties were selected
based on the 1990 U.S. Census estimates
that they were the largest counties in
different states, and the remainder
were chosen by random sample from
each region pool that qualified in the
categories of population exceeding
500,000, between 100,000 and 500,000,
and less than 100,000. An additional
139 locations were also included in the
second stage to supplement the sam-
ple, selected based on targeted sam-
pling in districts that had experienced
or had likely terrorist targets. It is also
mentioned that no sampling method-
ology was used to select state law
enforcement and emergency agencies
(Riley & Hoffman, 1995). The response
rate for the study included 39 state law
enforcement agencies, 37 state emer-
gency agencies, and 148 local law
enforcement agencies (see Table 1). It is
important to note that the study was
begun in 1992 and completed in
Agency Group
State law enforcement
State emergency
Local law enforcement
Local law enforcement (population based)
Local law enforcement (targeted sample)
Table 1: Response rate of research sample.
January 1993, one month before the
1994 World Trade Center bombing.
The significance of the timeliness of
the study presents evidence that the
responses given in the survey were pro-
vided in a noncrisis state and therefore
applicable to preparedness perceptions
rather than lessons learned in hind-
sight. Any events of the terrorist bomb-
ing would therefore not be represented
in the answers given.
Exploring the Data
As noted on the ICPSR website, access
to the research is provided by means of
SPSS data files and supplementary
machine-readable documentation and
data-collection instruments for each
of the three specific agency groups.
Specifics of the included material detail
the following:
• DS1: State law enforcement agency
data
• DS2: State emergency management
organization data
• DS3: Local and municipal law enforce-
ment agency data
• DS4: SAS data definition statements
for state law enforcement agency data
• DS5: SAS data definition statements
for state emergency management
organization data
• DS6: SAS data definition statements
for local and municipal law enforce-
ment agency data
• DS7: User guide
The first stage of preparing the data
required a thorough exploration of the
Number of Number of
Agencies Agencies Response
Invited Participating Rate
52 39 73%
52 37 71%
299 148 49%
160 84 53%
139 64 46%
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survey instrument to identify possible

questions that provided relational data
to assess the respondent’s social net-
work, or questions relevant to an analy-
sis of the current perceptions of its
coordination abilities. In searching for
networking data, two questions were
found that provided information on the
respondent’s perceived interaction
with other agencies (Figures 2 and 3).
These two questions were combined to
form the respondent’s egocentric net- Figure 2: Relational data question (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).
work, which was used to analyze the
social networking measures of ego
betweenness and the degree of agency
interconnectedness, as well as the
respondent’s subgroup structure based
on a clique analysis.
Further investigation of the survey
instrument presented the final meas-
ure for network connectedness as tie
strength by ranking the frequency of
contact between the respondent’s
agency and others of a particular group,
such as municipal or state agencies
(see Figures 4 and 5). These questions
were combined to give a single repre- Figure 3: Relational data question (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).
sentation of tie strength.
Exploration for coordination-based
questions revealed a single item appli-
cable for two independent measures of
coordination. They are represented as
accessibility of information, which is
defined in this question by the number
of sources used, and quality, which is
defined as a rank of usefulness from the
sources used.
The final measure of coordination,
defined as readiness, was extracted
from a question that asked the respon-
dents how prepared they perceive their
agency to be to respond to an incident
such as a terrorist attack (Figure 6).
An examination of the degree, ego
betweenness, and tie strength meas-
ures in SPSS revealed common distri-
butions of all three that follow a non-
normal curve (see Figure 7 for graphical
illustration of nonnormal data curves).
Each graph consists of centralized
scores with a tapered skew to the right.
This distribution is set against a line to Figure 4: Relational frequency of contact question representing tie strength (Riley & Hoffman,
illustrate the scores needed to represent 1995).

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comparison. The other test used in the

NetCord model is correlations, which is
examined by means of a Spearman
Rank Order Correlation. The Spearman
test is a nonparametric alternative to
the Pearson test, which investigates the
relationship between two continuous
scores. We use the Spearman test rather
than a Chi-square analysis because all
of the variables being explored are
created as continuous and, as such,
require tests involving two or more
continuous variables.

Preparing the Data

Figure 5: Coordination-based question representing accessibility and quality of information (Riley &
Hoffman, 1995).
Figure 6: Coordination-based question representing readiness (Riley & Hoffman, 1995).
a bell curve. As a result of the nonnor-
mal distribution, nonparametric statis-
tical testing must be carried out. The
NetCord model uses the Kruskal-Wallis
test to compare the mean ranks of the
interconnectedness scores. This test is
a nonparametric substitute for a one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
A four-phase method for data prepara-
tion and analysis was used to assess our
NetCord model against the survey data
of Riley and Hoffman (1992). The
method is carried out in five cycles for
different network configurations,
including the following:
• organizational network of all agencies
(high level),
• state law enforcement network (SLEN),
• state emergency services network
(SESN),
• local law enforcement network (LLEN),
and
• respondent network of all agencies
(micro level)
Table 2 depicts an overview of the
software used and the purpose of each

Histogram Histogram Histogram

40 120 100

100
80
30
80
Frequency

Frequency

Frequency

60
20 60
40
40
10
20
20

0 0 0
⫺5.00 0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 0.00 50.00 100.00 150.00 200.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
Degree Ego Betweenness Tie Strength

Figure 7: Graphical illustration of nonnormal data curves.

74 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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Software Phase
Microsoft Excel Phase 1
Microsoft Access Phase 2
Ucinet and NetDraw Phase 3
SPSS Phase 4
Table 2: Overview of software and phases of NetCord data preparation.
phase in preparing the data for analysis
in our NetCord model.
The first phase included importing
the data files into Microsoft Excel, then
parsing the variable-length delimited
data into columns representing ques-
tionnaire responses. Once the data was
set up correctly, variables were cleaned
up and invalid responses such as
refusals were removed in order to pre-
vent inaccurate statistical testing. Since
the question for tie strength and readi-
ness had constructed the numerical
response in reverse, where 1 represented
the highest score and 4 the lower score,
an inverse of the scores was taken so
that any statistical analysis carried out,
such as correlations, would also be able
to give an accurate result of the direc-
tion of any correlation. The final step of
Figure 8: CrossTab query of relational data for Ucinet importing.
Page 75
Purpose of Software
Parsing and cleaning raw data files
Create symmetric relational data matrix
Measure and visualize respondents’ network
connectedness
Perform statistical analysis as per NetCord
model
Phase 1 required the creation of a sepa-
rate Microsoft Excel file based on the
data from the original Excel spread-
sheet in order to prepare the specific
relational data questions for Ucinet
analysis. This step is carried out using
Everton’s (2004, pp. 5–20) guide for
preparing network data. The second
phase required the use of Microsoft
Access in order to run a Crosstab Query
to create a symmetric matrix of the
relationships between the respondents
and the other agencies. This step is
again carried out using Everton’s (2004)
guide for preparing network data. Once
the query had been executed, the data
output was slightly modified by remov-
ing the sum field and filling empty cells
with zeroes (Figure 8) as per Everton’s
(2004) directions. At this point, the data
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
file was ready to be imported into
Ucinet and NetDraw for social net-
working analysis.
In the third phase, a clique analysis
is run for each of the five network con-
figurations, as well as the egocentric
measures for degree and ego between-
ness (see Figure 9). The data results
from the tests are then collated with
our other NetCord model variables that
do not require assessment through
Ucinet. The last step in this phase is to
run graphical representations of the
network configurations through
NetDraw in order to visualize the inter-
connectedness structure.
All variables are then imported into
SPSS for the fourth and final phase of the
preparation method (see Figure 10). By
placing the variables into SPSS, we are
able to perform some statistical analyses
for hypothesis testing as defined in our
NetCord model (see Table 3).
Dataset Limitations
When investigating data collected by
means of a survey instrument, it is often
the case that data may be incomplete or
missing due to the nature of the subjec-
tive and voluntary information retrieval
method. For assessing our NetCord
model, this may affect the ability to
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Figure 9: Representation of the data output from Ucinet.

Figure 10: SPSS spreadsheet of variables for analysis.

76 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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Degree
Degree Kruskal-Wallis
Comparison
Ego Betweenness x Kruskal-Wallis
Tie Strength x x
Quality Spearman
Correlation
Accessibility Spearman
Correlation
Readiness Spearman
Correlation
Note. x denotes unnecessary or out-of-scope testing.
Table 3: SPSS test matrix defining the tests to be carried out and which variables to be used.
give a true and accurate account of the
respondent’s ego network due to some
nodes of a network potentially being left
out, or ties between actors being mis-
represented or not included. As men-
tioned, this sort of incompleteness usu-
ally occurs from the collection of survey
data that results in typical problems
identified as boundary specification
problems, nonresponse effect, fixed-
choice design, and perceived networks.
Boundary Specification Problem
The boundary specification problem is
a result of ties being ignored from
researchers, who believe the ties lead
outside the social network and are
therefore of no significance (Marsden,
2002). This type of problem can go
beyond which actors a researcher
decides to include in the network to
which relationships to consider as sig-
nificant or irrelevant. This can cause
problems if data was collected from a
survey instrument developed for a spe-
cific agenda, and a consequent study
with different intentions tries to adapt
the same data for social networking
studies. Evidence of the boundary
specification problem can be seen
above, in the relational questions used
to identify the respondent’s ego network.
Page 77
Ego Betweenness Tie Strength Quality
x x
x x
Comparison
Kruskal-Wallis
Comparison
Spearman Spearman
Correlation Correlation
Spearman Spearman
Correlation Correlation
Spearman Spearman
Correlation Correlation
Both questions reserve a space for the
respondent to mark any “other” agen-
cies with whom they have contact;
however, this information is unfortu-
nately not present in the data files.
Suggestions as to why they are not
included may be derived from the
objectives of the original study and an
interest in only the agencies listed in
the question. This lack of inclusion may
adversely affect the hypothesis testing,
which focuses on properties of the ERN
and also looks at the correlation
between network structure and coordi-
nation potential.
Nonresponse Effect
When collecting survey data from
respondents, there is a high probability
that data will be returned that falls
under the nonresponse problem. From
all the surveys distributed, some will
not be returned, and some will be
returned blank. The effect of this on
the network data may mean that some
actors within the social network might
not be represented, which could have
significant implications on the ability
to assess the network and how its struc-
ture operates. However, some nodes,
although not completing the study
themselves, may still appear in the
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Accessibility Readiness
x x x
x x
x x x
x x x
x x x
x x x
network due to their centrality, which
means other respondents have identi-
fied having a relationship with them.
This problem has been noted by Riley
and Hoffman (1995), under the sam-
pling methodology, that there had been
instances where surveys were not com-
pleted even after the follow-up tactics
had been performed. This instills a real
possibility of respondents in a particu-
lar cluster not being portrayed in the
data. The other effect of this problem is
that by receiving too many nonres-
ponses, a decline in sample size starts
to occur. This has been addressed and
offset by Riley and Hoffman by
approaching the next respondent in
line based on the same sampling tech-
nique to assure completion of the
intended number of surveys.
Fixed-Choice Design
A survey instrument can accept several
types of responses from an actor, and
each of these response types may
potentially affect assessing relational
data to develop a network structure.
Most survey instruments accept single-
response, multiple-response, or verba-
tim questions, depending on what type
of answer is required. If a survey is
designed for a specific purpose and
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Toward a Distributed Behavior Model for Emergency Response Coordination
defines a set list of possible contacts,
such as the following example, the
respondent must select a response
from the list provided:
What are your favorite colors? (mul-
tiple response)
1. Blue
2. Green
3. Red
If the respondent’s favorite color
was purple, that response is not shown.
This type of problem, known as fixed-
choice design, may have implications if
a subsequent study is done using the
same data, but also required additional
responses not present in the list. In
social networking, this could have
severe repercussions on the ability to
construct either an egocentric or socio-
centric network, as there is no guaran-
tee that all nodes have been accounted
for, and an influential node that may
affect network behavior may be omit-
ted (Marsden, 2002). Within Riley and
Hoffman’s (1992) survey instrument, it
has been mentioned that although
there was space for a verbatim
response of “other,” it is unaccounted
for in the data files. This lack of verba-
tim inclusion presents the data as
though it was simply a fixed-choice list,
and therefore exposes any subsequent
studies, such as this one, to the possible
misinterpretations or incompleteness
of use for a social network analysis.
Actual (Objective) Data Versus
Perceived (Subjective) Data
A key point to note about the study by
Riley and Hoffman (1992) is that the
data-collection method was by means
of a survey instrument. Sinclair (1995)
noted that surveys, along with any sort
of questionnaire or interview method-
ology for gathering data, are described
as being subjective. Blyth (1972)
defined subjective data as retaining
personal beliefs and incorporating pre-
judgments rather than simply provid-
ing impartial facts. The relational data
collected for social networking analysis
78 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Page 78
is a subjective perception of the resp-
ondent’s emergency contacts, as it
requires the respondent to remember,
circle, and list all actors with whom
they interact in the ERN. In contrast to
this, the study by Naim Kapucu (2005)
on the ERN of the September 11 disas-
ter is an account of the actual network
as it existed during the crisis. Kapucu’s
(2005) study looked at the situation
reports of the event as collected by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). This data-collection method-
ology retains objective measures as,
according to McClelland (1995), objec-
tive data may be a direct record regis-
tered by an independent observer
in the form of video, audio, or, in this
case, text. The composition of the ques-
tions pertinent to coordination in Riley
and Hoffman’s (1995) study were
devised of rank and ratings scales, both
of which were mentioned by Sinclair
(1995) as common subjective data-
collection methods and therefore open
to the same discrimination as the rela-
tional questions. Blyth (1972) stated
that the most important aspect to
remember when studying subjective
data is that although it is useful to ana-
lyze for a given perspective, a major
disadvantage is that the beliefs or per-
ception of the respondent may be
wrong or only partially inclusive or
accurate. It is assumed that such is
the case with the relational questions
being analyzed and that the egocentric
network only contains partial informa-
tion on alters in the respondent’s
network.
Results and Discussion
We first provide an overview of the
high-level organizational network from
the dataset. Second, we provide
hypothesis testing at both a macro and
micro level of the interactions of actors
and their organizations when respond-
ing to an emergency. Lastly, we provide
analysis that is statistically significant
to validate and justify the relationship
between coordination and the social
network by testing our NetCord model
and the hypotheses developed within.
The high-level representation (Figure 11)
illustrates the organizations involved in
an ERN from an ego perspective. We
first explore the network from a macro
level to determine if any organizations
naturally work together and form closer
relationships. This clustering of agen-
cies is supported through the identifi-
cation and cooperation of individual
actors representing their respective
agencies at a micro level. After examining
interagency integration, the concept of
tier mediation over network involve-
ment is investigated. We first look at
this notion at a macro level by compar-
ing agency networks and then study
this idea more closely at the micro level
by comparing clusters. A final examina-
tion of the relationship between net-
work measures is assessed against
coordination to determine if a correla-
tion exists. A general hypothesis of cor-
relation is investigated, and therefore
this is analyzed at the macro level. To
provide evidence that the same con-
cept can be applied at any level of the
network, the micro-level clusters are
also examined for correlations between
interconnectedness and coordination.
The purpose of this section is to pro-
vide evidence to support the CordNet
model and to generate discussion and
further investigation of the model with
agencies from different business sec-
tors in an effort to increase coordina-
tion preparedness by optimizing ERN
conditions.
The research instrument, Domestic
Terrorism: Assessment of State and Local
Preparedness in the United States (Riley &
Hoffman, 1995), collected relational
and coordination preparedness data,
which focused on the perspective of
three organizational bodies, including
state law enforcement, state emergency
services, and local law enforcement. The
network visualization (see Figure 11)
illustrates the combined respondent
data from all three agencies into one
egocentric network. At first glance, the
network shows a similar level of cen-
trality between all three organizational
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Figure 11: Macro-level representation of the state and local agency ego networks.
actors, which implies that all three
organizations may have a similar level
of network involvement.
It has previously been discussed
that although ERNs follow a distributed
approach to responding to extreme dis-
aster events, there exists a need for
organizational leadership based on a
control or executive order structure,
which is defined in the CordNet
(NetCord) model as tiers (Department
of Homeland Security, 2006; Kettl, 2006).
The NRP (Department of Homeland
Security, 2006) documents decision-
making roles and responsibilities and
control of the network based on this
loose leadership hierarchy (see Figure 12,
Department of Homeland Security,
2006, for evidence of this hierarchy).
Although the NRP does not clearly state
how many tiers this structure has, or a
definitive flow of leadership, it does
provide some evidence to suggest that
Page 79
once a “Presidential disaster or emer-
gency declaration” has been made, the
first-order coordination responsibili-
ties fall to federal government agencies,
such as FEMA. The plan implies that
government agencies other than at the
federal level share an interdependent
role under federal leadership to then
guide organizations from other sectors.
This structure, insinuated in the
response plan frameworks developed
by the Department of Homeland
Security (Figure 12), leads to the theory
of a three-tiered control approach to
emergency coordination within the dis-
tributed network.
As evidence to suggest that local
and state government agencies share
the second tier of network control, a
hypothesis is put forward that states:
Hypothesis 1: A prediction of what tier
an organization belongs to can be made by
analyzing an organization for its subgroup.
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Test 1a—Organizational Clique
Analysis
A clique analysis of Figure 6 reveals that
there are 15 cliques (Figures 13 and 14)
within the perceived ego network of the
three groups, all of which contain state
and local agencies, and some of which
include federal agencies. This overlap
with some federal agencies is natural in
an emergency response network, as
organizations need to exchange infor-
mation and resources to coordinate
through the distributed structure. This
analysis suggests that local and state
agencies do in fact share a common
level of involvement within the ERN,
but for a more definitive confirmation
of this finding, an analysis of agencies
in other tiers would need to be tested.
By examining the combined state
law, state emergency, and local law
enforcement networks at a micro level
(see Figure 15), we can explore the
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Field Level Regional Level National Level

NIMS Framework

Multiagency Coordination Entity

Interagency
Strategic coordination JFO Coordination Incident
Coordination Structures

Prioritization between incidents and Group Management

associated resource allocation Group
Focal point for issue resolution

EOCs/Multiagency
Regional Homeland
Coordination Centers Local Emergency State Emergency Joint Field Response Security
Support and coordination Ops Center Ops Center office Coordination Operations
Identifying resource shortages Center Center
and issues
Gathering and providing information Regional Federal Federal
Implementing multiagency Dept/Agency Dept/Agency
coordination entity decisions Emergency Ops Emergency Ops
Center Center

Incident Command
Command Structures

Directing on-scene Incident

emrergency management Command Post
(Area command option not depicted)

During a Federal-to-Federal support situation, the

JFO provides support to the federally established
ICP (or Area Command if established).

Figure 12: Evidence of hierarchical leadership and coordination in emergency response (Department of Homeland Security, 2006).

clustering of individual actors to pro- driving the ERN. The low-level illustra- Test 1b—Organizational n-Clique
vide further evidence to support the tion (Figure 15) of the organizational Analysis (Micro Level)
first hypothesis that actors from within network in Figure 11 demonstrates the Performing an n-clique analysis (see
the three agency groups are intercon- relationship complexity, once drilled Figure 16) on the low-level network
nected and share responsibilities for down. allows us to dissect the network and

Figure 13: Clique analysis output of respondents from state and local agencies.

80 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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Figure 14: Clique co-membership matrix to determine subgroupings.
investigate network behavior at a micro
level. This discrete perspective uncov-
ers 249 clusters or subgroupings within
the greater network; closer inspection
of the subgroups reveals actors from
each of the three agencies within a dis-
tance of two lengths from each other.
There is an overlap with agencies
between clusters, but for the purpose
of this investigation, identification of
clusters containing actors from both
state and local agencies is sufficient
evidence to support the hypothesis.
An assessment of three clusters
selected at random from the n-clique
analysis allows us to further investigate
our NetCord model and examine the
behavior of cross-sections of the ERN
to support the stated hypotheses. The
three diagrams of each of the clusters
(Figures 17, 18, and 19) provide a visual
representation of the subgroups under
investigation. Note that within the sub-
groups, only organizations from state
law, state emergency services, and local
law enforcement agencies are investi-
gated. The graphs illustrate other agen-
cies in circle that are identified to be
Page 81
within the clusters and assessed in the
NetCord model and compared. At face
value, it is evident that organizations
from each of the three agencies work
closely within the model, as depicted in
Figures 17, 18, and 19.
If we accept the test results above
and assume that a clique analysis of an
organization allows for tier definition, we
can then test the second hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 2: The level of network
involvement expected from an organization
is mediated by the tier it falls into.
Based on the clique results that
state and local agencies share a com-
mon tier, we can perform a simple
comparison to assess whether each
second-tier organization shares similar
network connectedness as defined by
an analysis of degree, ego between-
ness, and tie strength. Graphical data
illustrates the egocentric network of
each of the three organizational actors
and how each individual respondent in
that organization perceives their net-
work (Figures 20, 21, and 22).
Ultimately, testing this hypothesis
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
would need to be carried out with
actual rather than perceived network
data and involve studies of agencies
from other tiers to decipher an accurate
assessment of whether tier placement
(which implies subgroup belonging) is
a factor in how connected an organiza-
tion is. At this point, however, data
restrictions permit only a state and
local assessment of the perceived net-
work of the aforementioned govern-
ment agencies.
Test 2a—Organizational Comparison
to Determine Tier Placement Effect on
Interconnectedness
A Kruskal-Wallis test of the mean rank
of each of the three interconnectedness
measures shows a significant difference
in scores between state law enforcement,
state emergency services, and local law
enforcement for degree and ego
betweenness (Table 4). Mean rank
scores of tie strength show no signifi-
cant difference, implying that each
agency maintains a similar range of
weak and strong ties to organizations
within the network.
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Figure 15: Micro-level representation of the combined state law, state emergency, and local law enforcement networks.

By comparing the mean rank of state law enforcement is within the same mar- although local law enforcement is some-
law enforcement agencies to state emer- gin to state law enforcement as state law what less interconnected than state law
gency services, a difference of 27.66 is is to state emergency. This suggests that and emergency services, it is still within
produced for ego betweenness, and
11.71 for degree. This difference in scores
Degree Ego Betweenness Tie Strength
is assumed to be an acceptable margin
when considering that the NRP (Depart- State law enforcement 61.74 127.26 61.67
ment of Homeland Security, 2006) iden- State emergency services 73.45 154.92 52.57
tifies all state-based organizations as
indifferent from each other and sharing Local law enforcement 51.15 99.63 58.12
common leadership responsibilities and Significance 0.00** 0.01** 0.476
connections within the ERN. When the
**Significant difference in rank mean at the 0.01 level.
mean rank of state and local law enforce-
ment is compared for degree and ego Table 4: Kruskal-Wallis interconnectedness comparison of mean ranks.
betweenness, results indicate that local

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Figure 16: An n-clique analysis of the low-level combined state and local agency networks.

the range of the two state agencies, and
therefore possible to be included in the
same tier. The mean scores of tie strength
produce no significant difference, which
suggests that a similar network of weak
and strong ties exists for each of the three
agencies. This may be due to the tier
structure, as organizations within a spe-
cific subgroup would be likely to associ-
ate with the same agencies and seek
information from similar contacts.
Projection as to why there is a signif-
icant difference between scores of local
law enforcement, state emergency serv-
ices, and state law enforcement may be
a consequence of task-based responsi-
bilities. Each agency, although from the
same tier, still maintains specific func-
tions unique to its organization within
the network. For instance, local agen-
cies, such as law enforcement, fire, and
ambulance services, perform hands-
on tasks at ground zero, while state
agencies provide more assistance and
resource coordination. This requires an
interdependency of government agen-
cies at state and local levels to provide
leadership under the federal govern-
ment for the ERN as a whole.
Test 2b—Cluster Comparison to
Determine Tier Placement Effect on
Interconnectedness
Kruskal-Wallis tests on each of the three
clusters against the interconnectedness
Degree
Cluster 1 99.50
Cluster 2 106.00
Cluster 3 88.52
Significance 0.152
Table 5: Kruskal-Wallis comparison of mean rank.
measures of degree, ego betweenness
and tie strength reveal no significant
difference in scores (Table 5).
The three clusters of state and local
government agencies taken from the
ERN indicate that the level of connected-
ness between all three groups is compa-
rable. The marginal differences in scores
may suggest further evidence for the
idea that although they are not signifi-
cantly different, there is in fact a differ-
ence that may account for a threshold of
Ego Betweenness Tie Strength
99.29 87.78
108.54 94.21
87.10 100.65
0.064 0.435

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Figure 17: First randomly selected cluster from the n-clique analysis.

network involvement that allows for an
amount of variance between agencies, or
in this case, clusters taken from the same
tier. The fact that all three clusters, select-
ed from what is believed to be the second
tier, retain similar scores in the Kruskal-
Wallis comparison is evidence to suggest
that tier placement is a primary candi-
date for determining the level of network
involvement. Although neither of these
tests are definitive proof that an organiza-
tion’s interconnectedness is mediated by
its tier level, they do in fact provide a step
in the right direction by beginning to
explore the possible thresholds within a
given tier of what constitutes adequate
network involvement and interconnect-
edness. It is only through an understand-
ing of this threshold for each of the three
tiers that an analysis can be done to
clearly define whether interconnected-
ness is in fact mediated by the tier
structure. Further analysis of clusters in
different tier allocations would also help
support this hypothesis.
Once an organizational analysis has
been made to determine tier place-
ment, it is proposed that a significant
proportion of the effectiveness of coor-
dination in an ERN is the result of how
involved an organization is within a
network. This level of coordination
based on network interconnection is
arguably then a determining factor in
what distinguishes an organization’s
state of preparedness. By using social
networking theory to assess network
involvement, the hypothesis put for-
ward is:
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant rela-
tionship between network involvement and
coordination, where an increase in network

84 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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Figure 18: Second randomly selected cluster from the n-clique analysis.
connectedness produces an increase in
organizational coordination within a given
threshold.
This hypothesis is investigated by
looking at the subhypotheses of social
network measures correlating to meas-
ures of coordination in order to ascer-
tain the overarching statement. The
tests aim to provide evidence of a posi-
tive relationship between the two vari-
ables; however, literature states that by
being too involved in a network, too
much information exchange can nega-
tively affect coordination and efficiency
(Kapucu, 2005; van Scholten et al., 2005).
Page 85
This section of the hypothesis is for fur-
ther investigation due to a lack of data
for testing a threshold; however, it is
important to recognize the literature
stating that a threshold exists, and that
excessive connectedness under the
premise of network involvement as an
enabler for coordination can be turned
into an inhibitor.
Test 3a—Connectedness Correlates
to Increased Coordination
A Spearman test (see Table 6) is used to
determine if there is a relationship
between the continuous independent
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
connectedness variables of degree, ego
betweenness, and tie strength with the
continuous dependent coordination
variables of readiness, quality, and
accessibility. This test combines the
agency data of all three networks to
provide a general examination of the
social networking measures against
coordination measures.
Increased degree centrality corre-
lates to:
• Hypothesis 3a: Increased coordination
readiness
• Hypothesis 3b: Increased quality of
information
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Figure 19: Third randomly selected cluster from the n-clique analysis.

Degree Ego Betweenness Tie Strength Readiness Quality Accessibility

Degree 1
Ego betweenness x 1
Tie strength x x 1
Readiness 0.263** 0.252** 0.221** 1
Quality 0.231** 0.216** 0.281** x 1
Accessibility 0.321** 0.312** 0.349** x x 1
Note. x signifies correlations not tested.
** Correlations significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

Table 6: Spearman correlations matrix between connectedness and coordination.

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Figure 20: State law enforcement network.
• Hypothesis 3c: Increased information
accessibility
The results of the Spearman test
indicate a positive correlation coeffi-
cient between degree and each of the
three dependent coordination vari-
ables, where an increase in the measure
of degree produces an increase in
Page 87
readiness, information quality, and
accessibility; the tests all show signifi-
cance at the 0.01 level. A positive
increase to an organization’s readiness
for an emergency and ability to be
granted access to information that is
also of a higher standard has shown to
be in part a product of increasing the
number of emergency contacts an
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
organization maintains. This finding
may arguably be a result of the nature
of a distributed network structure.
Kapucu (2005) stated that not all organ-
izations are central in an ERN, which
can have an effect on information as it
disseminates through the network. By
increasing the number of contacts
a given organization maintains, the
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Figure 21: State emergency services network.

network is able to become more con-
nected and distributed as a whole,
which can potentially enable better
flow of information to reduce the coor-
dination gap. From an individual orga-
nization’s perspective, this robustness,
created through increasing each orga-
nizational node’s contacts, produces a
better connected network, which may
be the motivation for the improvement
to aspects of coordination such as qual-
ity and accessibility of information, and
how ready an organization is to
respond in a crisis.
Increased ego betweenness corre-
lates to:
• Hypothesis 3d: Increased coordination
readiness

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Figure 22: Local law enforcement network.

• Hypothesis 3e: Increased quality of The relationship between the three 0.01 significance level. The Spearman
information dependent coordination variables test denotes an increase in each of the
• Hypothesis 3f: Increased information against ego betweenness produces a measures of coordination, including
accessibility positive correlation coefficient to the readiness, quality, and accessibility of

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information, based on an increase in
ego betweenness. The results of these
tests provide evidence that an increase
in an organization’s ability to be in a
controlling position within the ERN
improves its capacity to coordinate in
an emergency. Potentially by being
more central in the network and main-
taining the capability to impede or
enhance the flow of information, an
organization may find itself in a more
empowering position that dictates how
accessible information is to come across,
the quality of that information, and an
overall readiness to coordinate with
other nodes. Malone and Crowston
(1994) stated that the synchronization
of information for coordination effi-
ciency is of significant importance; by
improving ego betweenness, which has
implications on network positioning
and control (Freeman, 1977), an organ-
ization is able to be in a more dominant
state to receive information and coor-
dinate others.
Increased tie strength correlates to:
• Hypothesis 3g: Increased coordination
readiness
• Hypothesis 3h: Increased quality of
information
• Hypothesis 3i: Increased information
accessibility
The Spearman correlation indicates
that an increase in tie strength produces
an increase in the quality of information,
accessibility of information, and how
ready an organization is to coordinate
in an emergency; the results are signifi-
cant to the 0.01 level.
An egocentric analysis of tie
strength against coordination finds
that an increase in the quality of
relationships is able to improve coordi-
nation attributes such as quality and
accessibility of information, and over-
all readiness for an emergency situa-
tion. Speculation as to why such a
correlation exists may be due to the
context of the data itself more than an
overarching statement of tie strength.
The study by Riley and Hoffman (1995)
raised the question on tie strength
based on existing ties from local, state,
and federal departments. Under the
framework of the original research
study, it may be said that when organi-
zations in an emergency network
invest in existing relationships to
strengthen the bond, interorganiza-
tional dependency becomes more effi-
cient as trust is developed and collec-
tive sensemaking can be enhanced.
This in turn may mean that after estab-
lishing better network relationships, an
organization is more likely to have
access to information that is of better
quality due to other organizations being
more forthcoming. This improved
working relationship may then be able
to have a positive effect on sharing,
which may facilitate coordination and
perceived state of readiness to interact
with other organizational nodes in an
emergency.
Test 3b—Connectedness Correlates
to Increased Coordination
A subsequent examination for correla-
tion is carried out to provide support-
ing evidence of the relationship
between network connectedness and
the potential for coordination. The
three randomly selected clusters are
merged to provide enough cases to per-
form a Spearman correlation (see Table 7)
and determine if the correlation that
has been identified to exist at the
macro level of the ERN holds at
the micro level.
As discovered in the previous test,
the cluster examination reveals a
positive correlation between the coor-
dination measures of quality and
accessibility against the network inter-
connectedness measures of degree,
ego betweenness, and tie strength.
This evidence supports the hypothe-
ses that:
• Hypothesis 3b: Increased degree corre-
lates to increased information accessi-
bility.
• Hypothesis 3c: Increased degree corre-
lates to increased quality of informa-
tion.
• Hypothesis 3e: Increased ego between-
ness correlates to increased informa-
tion accessibility.

Degree Ego Betweenness Tie Strength Readiness Quality Accessibility

Degree 1
Ego betweenness x 1
Tie strength x x 1
Readiness 0.112 0.100 0.220 1
Quality 0.292** 0.264** 0.219** x 1
Accessibility 0.226** 0.172* 0.385** x x 1
Note. x signifies correlations not tested.
**Correlations significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

Table 7: Spearman correlations matrix (combined cluster network data).

90 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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• Hypothesis 3f: Increased ego between-
ness correlates to increased quality of
information.
• Hypothesis 3h: Increased tie strength
correlates to increased information
accessibility.
• Hypothesis 3i: Increased tie strength
correlates to increased quality of infor-
mation.
The results for coordination readi-
ness investigated at the micro level
reveal a difference in findings from the
macro-level test. The data suggests a
positive correlation between each of
the three network connectedness
measures to coordination readiness,
none of which were particularly signifi-
cant. Speculation as to why this may
have occurred may be a result of the
clusters selected for analysis. Because
there is evidence to suggest the inter-
connectedness scores of each cluster
are not significantly different from each
other, as discovered while testing H2
(Test 2b), it is plausible that because of
the macro-level correlation between
interconnectedness and coordination
readiness, all three clusters each pro-
vided similar subjective scores of readi-
ness, which, as a result, provided an
insufficient range of readiness scores to
calculate a correlation. To support this
theory, a Kruskal-Wallis test is per-
formed to determine if there is a signif-
icant difference between clusters. The
results indicate that each of the three
clusters are in very close proximity and
therefore supports why no correlation
was found between coordination readi-
ness and interconnectedness at the
micro level (Table 8).
Readiness
Cluster 1 99.52
Cluster 2 95.70
Cluster 3 94.64
Significance 0.868
Table 8: Kruskal-Wallis comparison of
readiness between clusters.
Page 91
Kapucu’s (2005) work on interorga-
nizational connectedness taken from
the situation reports of the September
11 disaster is important for under-
standing the coordination gap that
exists between the current state of
ERNs and where the NRP (Department
of Homeland Security, 2006) requires
the standard of an emergency response
to be. Arguably, the more organized
and coordinated an emergency net-
work is to respond to extreme events,
the more likely a society is to have
greater resilience to any form of disas-
ter. Kettl (2006), Stanley (2006), and van
Scholten et al. (2005) mentioned les-
sons learned in hindsight of recent
natural disasters, such as Hurricane
Katrina, and man-made disasters, such
as the 2001 World Trade Center attacks,
focus on the need for better communi-
cation and coordination. It is stated
that by having better coordination, the
network can facilitate a more fluent
exchange of information to enhance
interorganizational collaboration (Kettl,
2006; Stanley, 2006; van Scholten et al.,
2005). Kapucu’s (2005) exploratory study
of ERN in crisis events highlighted a
significant lack of network connected-
ness when the emergency network is
called on for a real-life response effort.
Kapucu’s (2005) evidence of structural
holes in the network and weak points of
communication, coupled with van
Scholten et al. (2005), Stanley (2006),
and Kettl’s (2006) account of the prob-
lems of an emergency response, shows
a coordination issue most probably
brought about by a lack of network
connectedness.
By presenting a model of coordina-
tion assessment based on network con-
nectedness, an organization can be
reviewed in order to find its current
state of connectedness and therefore
be judged for their potential to coordi-
nate in an emergency. The findings
from Hypothesis 1—that a prediction of
what tier an organization belongs to
can be made by analyzing an organiza-
tion for its subgroup—suggest that
within an ERN, organizations that share
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
common traits form subgroups. These
groupings then form the basis for an
assumption that collective involvement
from organizations that interact and
share a common purpose within the
ERN can be categorized into tiers that
retain certain levels of authority and
control over the network and the
potential to coordinate in an emer-
gency. The importance of this step in
the NetCord model is in making sure
network connectedness acts as an
enabler of coordination efficiency,
rather than an inhibitor by limiting net-
work involvement to the needs of a
given tier and thus preventing the cir-
culation of redundant or unnecessary
information through the network as a
product of excessive ties. The influence
for using a clique analysis for assessing
organizations into tiers is based on the
literature by Falzon ((2000), who stated
that “in any human organization in
which individuals interact . . . groups
emerge quite naturally and often delib-
erately . . . it helps us understand how
information spreads throughout the
organization.”
Although the data used for per-
forming a clique analysis of an organi-
zation into tiers is somewhat limited
due to the fixed-list structure of the
relational data questions in the study
by Riley and Hoffman (1995), and by
only examining organizations from the
same tier, the test itself was able to give
insight on how the theory would be car-
ried out on organizations from all dif-
ferent levels. The results from this test
provide evidence of the usefulness of
tier assignment by means of cliques;
however, validation of this hypothesis
would need to be carried out on a wider
emergency audience.
The same data limitations present
for the first hypothesis apply to the sec-
ond hypothesis, that the level of net-
work involvement expected from an
organization is mediated by the tier
into which it falls. The results of the first
hypothesis provide reasonable analysis
to speculate that the organizations
examined are derived from the same
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Test
T1a/b clique analysis of ERN actors
T2a/b Kruskal-Wallis SNA comparison
T3a/b Spearman correlation of
connectedness to coordination
Table 9: Coordination implications of hypothesis testing.
clique, and therefore represent a single
tier in the ERN. The findings of the sec-
ond hypothesis suggest a range of
interconnectedness scores between
these agencies, which leads to the
assumption that a threshold exists
between organizations within the same
tier. If this is true, then it is reasonable
to assume that since these agencies all
retain network involvement scores
within what is defined as the threshold
of the second tier, then it is possible
that tier allocation is a determining fac-
tor for the level of network involvement
of a given organization.
This threshold may provide a rough
guide for organizations based on their
tier assessment level of how connected
they should be within the ERN and of
how much leadership they should
show. The usefulness of the test results
may account for the spectrum of net-
work control between which nodes in
the second tier currently operate.
However, to validate this statement,
further analysis would need to be done
on organizations in other tiers in order
to provide a comparison.
The third hypothesis, that connect-
edness correlates to increased coordi-
nation, is important for understanding
how a coordination gap can be mini-
mized by establishing a greater con-
nected network. The findings suggest
that in order to investigate coordina-
tion in a distributed network, it is
important to look beyond the task
(Mintzberg, 1979) or relationship alone
(Coordination Theory Model; Malone
& Crowston, 1994) and examine the
92 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Page 92
Implications of Finding
An actor’s subgroup represents tier placement
Actors from a single tier assert SNA scores
within a threshold
Network structure affects coordination
efficiency
network structure and its implications
on a coordination outcome. The analy-
sis provides evidence of this by present-
ing a significant correlation between
the measures of network involvement
and the ability of that network to coordi-
nate among themselves. The usefulness
of these results show how an organiza-
tion’s perceived ability to coordinate is
partially based on the fluency of the
network itself.
By combining these hypotheses,
the model as a whole is able to assess
how prepared an organization is to
coordinate in an emergency based on
how connected it is. Table 9 illustrates
each hypothesis testing and the impli-
cations of each outcome on the model
in order for coordination to occur with
an ERN.
The first hypothesis, that subgroups
help to designate organizations into
tiers, is important to create horizontal
and vertical network awareness and
belonging to help organizations under-
stand their roles in an emergency
response. The second hypothesis, that
an organization’s tier moderates its
connectedness, is a necessary step for
making sure that it is not simply the
creation of a more connected network,
but of a more efficiently connected net-
work, where ties only exist where they
are needed and to optimize informa-
tion flow through the right channels.
The third hypothesis, that connected-
ness correlates to coordination, estab-
lishes that by making a network more
connected, coordination can be
enhanced.
Future Research
Although the tests carried out on the
NetCord model provide an indication
of the usefulness of such an assessment
system, further research is required in
order to develop the model and test all
aspects of its validity.
The second hypothesis, the level of
network involvement expected from an
organization is mediated by the tier
into which it falls, was tested by com-
paring the social network measures of
what is believed to be organizations
from the same tier. As mentioned previ-
ously, this test was able to explore the
range of scores possible for organiza-
tions from a particular tier. However, in
order to carry any weight from this test,
additional testing would need to be
done involving more agencies from the
same clique, and random agencies that
belong to different cliques. By estab-
lishing a control group of agencies from
randomly selected tiers and asses-
sing their interconnectedness range
against three test groups of agencies
believed to be from each of the three
tiers, the results should be able to pro-
vide more insight into this hypothesis.
However to do this test, data would
need to be acquired from a variety of
agencies in different sectors and levels
of government.
The third hypothesis looked at the
possibility that there is a significant
relationship between network involve-
ment and coordination, where an
increase in network connectedness
produces an increase in organiza-
tional coordination within a given
threshold. The test carried out was
able to look at the correlation between
interconnectedness and coordination;
however, because of the data limita-
tions, a threshold for where connect-
edness no longer provides coordination
benefits was unable to be assessed.
Kapucu (2005) and van Scholten et al.
(2005) have stated that connected-
ness can begin to act as an inhibitor
by creating redundant ties and over-
whelming amounts of information
passing through the network. In order
068_094PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:26 PM
to quantify an average threshold that
maintains coordination advantages,
an assessment of organizations at
different levels of network connect-
edness would need to be carried out
to determine their current states of
coordination and define where con-
nectedness begins to inhibit network
efficiency. ■
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Liaquat Hossain is an associate professor and
director of the project management graduate
program in the Faculty of Engineering and IT
at the University of Sydney. She is interested in
the area of social networks theory and analyti-
cal methods, coordination theory, computer-
supported cooperative work, and human and
computer interactions. In particular, she is inter-
ested in exploring (modeling and empirical
investigation) the effects of different types of
social network structures and patterns of
information technology use on group behavior,
coordination, individual and organizational per-
formance from a theoretical and an applied
perspective. She is the director of the Center for
Complex Systems Research at the University of
Sydney. The research group has interest in
studying social, organizational, biological, and
living systems. The Center for Complex Systems
(CCS) focuses on social networks theory and
analytical methods, coordination theory, socio-
biology, complexity theory in organizations,
complex adaptive systems theory, and self-
organization theory. It provides application in
domains such as computer-supported coopera-
tive work; human and computer interactions;
modeling disaster preparedness, exploring safety
and a standard of practice of global mining
teams, modeling complex and dynamic emer-
gency medical coordination teams. We use
methods and analytical techniques from mathe-
matical sociology (i.e., social networks analy-
sis), social anthropology (i.e., interview and
field studies), computer science (i.e., information
93
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PAPERS
Toward a Distributed Behavior Model for Emergency Response Coordination

visualization, graph theoretic approaches, and Sydney under the supervision of Assistant
data-mining techniques such as clustering) to Matthew Kuti completed his undergraduate Professor Hossain. He is currently working as a
explore coordination problems in a dynamic, degree in computer science and master’s business analyst for the Business Consulting
distributed, and complex setting. degree in IT management from the University of Division of IBM Australia.

94 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj

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Analysis of the Front-End Loading of
Alberta Mega Oil Sands Projects
George Jergeas, Civil Engineering, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada
ABSTRACT ■
Recent large capital oil sands construction proj-
ects have all experienced significant cost over-
runs. There are a number of reasons for these
overruns, some of which are listed in this arti-
cle. This article provides a review of recent
experiences and challenges in delivering mega
oil sands projects in Alberta. In addition, this
article focuses on the front-end loading (plan-
ning) phases 1, 2, and 3 and describes the
effort needed to deliver mega projects, provides
schedule comparisons of key engineering mile-
stones, and analyzes scope changes and con-
tingencies.
KEYWORDS: oil and gas; EPC business;
construction; engineering; mega projects; oil
sands; cost overrun; schedule overrun; front-
end loading (planning)
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 95–104
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20080
Background
The Alberta oil sands that represent one of the world’s largest hydrocarbon
deposits are found in three regions in northern Alberta, Canada. These are
the Athabasca sands that surround the town of Fort McMurray, the Peace
River sands to the west, and the Cold Lake sands to the southeast. According
to Alberta government statistics, 1.6 trillion barrels of oil are locked in the
sandy bitumen under the forest and muskeg. Of that, 175 billion barrels are
proven reserves that can be recovered using current technology. Current pro-
duction in Alberta exceeds 1 million barrels per day. It is projected that
production will triple to 3 million barrels a day by 2015 (Dunbar, Strogran,
Chan, & Chan, 2004).
Oil sands are primarily a mixture of sand and other rock material that
contains crude bitumen. Oil sands are composed of approximately 80% to
85% sand, clay, and other mineral matter; 5% to 10% water; and anywhere
between 1% and 18% crude bitumen. In the Athabasca region, the oil sands
are hydrophilic or “water wet.” Each grain of sand is enveloped by a thin film
of water, which is then surrounded by crude bitumen. Crude bitumen is a
thick, viscous crude oil that, at room temperature, is in a near-solid state
(Dunbar et al., 2004). Currently, oil can be extracted from the sands using
two commercial methods: the strip mining and the in situ mining.
Cost Overruns
In general, there is no single cause for cost overruns on construction and
engineering projects. The Construction Industry Institute (CII) has identified
many reasons for cost overruns including but not limited to: front-end plan-
ning, design, procurement, start-up and operations, human resources issues,
organization, project processes, and project control (CII, 1987). Recent stud-
ies of oil sands mega projects in Alberta (Condon, 2006; Jergeas & Ruwanpura,
2008) identified several factors that can cause cost and schedule overruns
including unrealistic or overly optimistic original cost estimates and schedule
and incomplete scope definition.
A study by the Alberta Economic Development Authority (AEDA; 2004)
reported industry concerns about a series of cost overruns associated with
mega projects. AEDA identified many challenges facing industry such as
integration and management of a huge construction labor force, a lengthy
project schedule, and competition for limited resources from international
projects.
According to Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003), many infra-
structure mega projects have strikingly poor performance records in terms
of economy, environment, and public support. The study cited many exam-
ples of infrastructure mega projects that experienced major cost overruns
such as the Channel Tunnel and the Denver International Airport. The
Channel Tunnel, which opened in 1994 at a construction cost of £4.7 billion,
was overrun by 80%, while the cost overrun for Denver’s U.S. $5-billion inter-
national airport was close to 200%. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) identified the main
causes of the mega project overrun as the inadequate deliberation about risk
and the lack of accountability in the project decision-making process.
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 95
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Front-End Loading of Alberta Mega Oil Sands Projects
The cost overruns continue to be a
major challenge facing governments
and organizations in the infrastructure
and mega projects environment. The
latest examples are the new Wembley
Stadium and the London Olympic
Games in 2012. The new Wembley
Stadium, which was opened in March
2007, became the costliest arena ever
built at U.S. $1.54 billion. The bill for
the London Olympic Games rose from
£2.3 billion to £9.35 billion in less than
2 years since the city of London won
the bid to stage the games.
The biggest contributor to cost
overruns is poor front-end planning
and specifically the failure to realisti-
cally plan for project execution in
Phases 2 and 3 of the project life cycle
(Independent Projects Analysis Inc.,
2006). A typical project life cycle will be
explained later and is illustrated in
Table 1.
The Need for the Study
Current and future Alberta oil sands
development projects are mega engi-
neering and construction undertakings
ranging between $8 and $14 billion
(CAD) in capital investment each and
employing thousands of workers, engi-
neers, suppliers, contractors, and sup-
port staff. These oil sands developments
are facing many challenges, including
those associated with environmental
Phase 1 Phase 2
Identify and Assess Generate and
Opportunities Select Alternatives
Determine project Select the preferred
feasibility and alignment project development
with business strategy option
PFD P&ID
Note. AFE
appropriation for expenditure, PFD
process flow diagram, P&ID
piping and instrumentation diagram.
Table 1: Life cycle of an oil sands project.
96 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
impacts, water requirements and sup-
ply, labor availability and construction
productivity, energy requirements,
infrastructure constraints, and market
conditions. It is not uncommon for
these projects to experience cost over-
runs of up to 100% of the original cost
estimates and limited schedule over-
runs.
A study conducted for the govern-
ment of Alberta, Canada (McTague &
Jergeas, 2002), found that cost overruns
and labor productivity losses on large
oil and gas construction projects were
the result of many factors such as
the apparent “management” deficiency
in managing scope, time, quality, cost,
productivity, tools, scaffold, equipment,
materials, and lack of leadership,
among other things. While these proj-
ects are normally successful from an
engineering, operational, and safety
standpoint, the cost and schedule over-
runs are a cause for concern and the
reason for this research work.
Earlier oil sands projects were
designed by hand on Mylar drawings
with plastic models used for design
control, constructability reviews, and
operational reviews. With all the three-
dimensional technological advance-
ment in the Engineering Procurement
Construction (EPC) industry, we should
be experiencing field rework lower than
historical norms. We have not seen any
Phase 3
Develop Preferred
Alternative
Finalize project scope,
cost and schedule and
get the project funded
AFE
evidence of this. In fact, home office
hours as a percent of total installed
costs (TIC) have continued to rise and
field productivity has fallen.
Defining Mega Projects
For the purpose of this study, mega
projects are defined as being over $1
billion (CAD) in total installed cost,
excluding development costs expended
prior to the project being formally
approved. Mega projects are huge in
magnitude and are characterized by a
significant number of interfaces, inter-
dependencies, complexity, and risks,
some of which are strategic and must be
managed at a level above the project
team.
Designing and constructing a mega
oil sands project may involve the
following:
• engineering effort:
• 3.5 million work hours at a cost of $140
(CAD)/hr (current Alberta EPC rates)
• 40,000–50,000 design drawings
• 10,000 –20,000 vendor and shop
drawings
• construction effort:
• construction hours or field labor
approximately 5,000 work hours per
million dollars of capital (i.e., 10–15
million man hours at $120 [CAD] to
$180 [CAD] per hour)
• labor force of 8,000 workers with a
turnover of 300%
Phase 4 Phase 5
Execute Operate and Evaluate
Produce an operating Evaluate asset to ensure
asset consistent with performance to specification
scope cost and and maximum return to the
schedule shareholders
Detailed design
Procurement
Fabrication
Construction
095_104PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:29 PM Page 97
• supported by 500 to 800 staff per-
sonnel
• organize order, store, and retrieve
80,000,000 material items
Constructing a $7 to $8 billion (CAD)
mega project today in Fort McMurray
may require at peak defining and
scheduling work for 7,000 to 8,000 peo-
ple every day with a personnel turnover
that can reach 300% annually. Managing
a craft mix of workers who work in pairs
doing at least two different activities
per day will result in thousands of indi-
vidual jobs during a 10-day shift. Each
job requires a combination of the cor-
rect materials, location, access, tools,
equipment, scaffold, safety, quality, rig-
ging, consumables, welding, X-rays,
and many other inputs to allow the
worker to get the job done. This task
belongs to management, which, since
1995 in Alberta, has not been able to
plan, organize, or execute appropriately,
resulting in lower than historical labor
productivity. If labor is not carefully
managed, budgets double, as has
occurred historically.
There are many aspects in each
mega project that must be done and
completed properly if the overall results
are going to be successful. The engi-
neering and construction efforts illus-
trated previously show the complexity
and huge magnitude of the scope and
the required level of project manage-
ment effort to achieve success.
Research Method
Two methods of research were used to
guide this article’s inquiry. These are the
quantitative and qualitative research
methods. Quantitative research is based
on the systematic collection and quan-
tification of research data into under-
standable paradigms, usually with the
intention of confirming or disproving
hypotheses. The quantitative researcher
traditionally quantifies the data as it is
collected and then analyzes the numer-
ical information (Herzog, 2000).
The intent of the qualitative research
is not to quantify existing data, but to
understand the underlying question of
reality. The researcher attempts to dis-
cover and develop the underlying theory
behind the question. There are several
approaches to investigating a question,
collecting, and codifying information in
qualitative research. The approach the
researcher takes is based on the nature
of the question they are investigating.
Unlike quantitative research, qualitative
research does not attempt to add mean-
ing to the number of times a response
was received, but on observing underly-
ing theory. The type of qualitative
research approach taken depends on
the nature of the question being investi-
gated. There are five basic qualitative
research approaches: (1) biography, (2)
phenomenology, (3) grounded theory,
(4) ethnography, and (5) case study. In
general terms, a key difference in quan-
titative and qualitative research is the
quantitative researchers work with a few
variables and many cases, whereas qual-
itative researchers rely on a few cases
and many variables. A qualitative resear-
cher should be at ease with the ambigu-
ity and decision process involved in a
qualitative study (Creswell, 1998). Case
study researchers need to (Creswell,
1998):
• Consider studying single or multiple
cases. Study of more than one case
often dilutes the analyses. The maxi-
mum number of cases studied is
normally no more than four.
• A rational purposeful sampling strategy
for selecting the case and for gather-
ing information must be determined.
• Sufficient information to present an
in-depth picture of the case.
For the purpose of this research, the
author considers the case study
approach of the qualitative method as
more suitable to explore and under-
stand the phenomena of cost and
schedule overruns on mega oil sands
projects. This approach ensures
detailed and in-depth data collection
and analysis of the complex nature of
the mega oil sands project environ-
ment. The quantitative approach
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
would not be sufficient in this case with
the limited number of mega oil sands
projects.
In addition to studying project
documents, the author sought and
incorporated the opinion of 87 senior
project management professionals—
both owner and EPC contractor—who
have, or had, responsibility for recent
or current major projects, to obtain
their insights and to validate the find-
ings of this research work. They cur-
rently work on wide-ranging projects in
Canada, the United States, the United
Kingdom, Norway, Germany, Spain,
Chile, India, and Australia. These
professionals provided their input
regarding causes for cost and schedule
overruns as well as verifying the find-
ings of the case study approach of this
research.
Three mega projects of a total
value of $10 billion (CAD) in the oil
sands environment were selected. The
research focus is on front-end loading
with special emphasis on the project
sanctioning, early engineering effort,
and change to scope during the early
stages of the project life cycle after the
appropriation for expenditure (AFE).
For three years, the author was provid-
ed with an unrestricted access to
project documents, including project
feasibility study reports, due diligence
reports, benchmarking reports, risk
analysis reports, peer review reports,
cost estimates and updates, schedules
and updates, trends and changes, and
minutes of different meetings. For
confidentiality reasons, the author will
not be able to identify or provide a
description of these projects nor the
identity of the companies or individu-
als involved.
Research Findings
The findings of the 3-year investigation
of the front-end stages of three Alberta
mega projects are presented as follows:
1. Findings of the industry opinion
survey
a. Causes for cost and schedule over-
runs
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Front-End Loading of Alberta Mega Oil Sands Projects
2. Findings of the case study approach
a. Front-end loading
b. Engineering effort
c. Changes and trends
Causes for Cost and Schedule
Overruns
The industry opinion survey of the 87
professionals reveals the following rea-
sons for cost overruns:
• Unrealistic or overly optimistic orig-
inal (AFE) cost estimate and sched-
ules. The underestimation of project
costs may be explained by many
reasons, including:
• Underappreciation of project com-
plexity, interfaces, interdependen-
cies, and risks associated with the
mega project environment. Some
of the risks are outside the control of
the project management team.
• Underestimating the cost to attract
and maintain the labor (craft) work-
force (including camp development
and operations cost and costs to
transport personnel into and out of
the region).
• Underestimating the direct and indi-
rect costs of overtime including
additional premium and loss of pro-
ductivity costs.
• Craft wage increases to attract per-
sonnel to the location that possess
the local governmental requirements
to work in the region. (Craft licensing
and language requirements/limita-
tions result in a smaller qualified
workforce.)
• Regional and national demands on
labor, including that from other
mega projects, restricting the avail-
ability of craft labor.
• Underestimation of the labor produc-
tivity loss associated with working in
cold weather climates and locations
with severely shorter daylight hours
in northern regions. (Weather condi-
tions such as low temperatures, high
winds, precipitation, and reduced
daylight hours can significantly
reduce labor efficiency.)
• Shortages of skilled labor and lower
than anticipated labor productivity
98 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
due to mismanagement of the con-
struction phase.
• High labor turnover mainly due to
the harsh working environment and
competition between employers
attracting labor. This instability on
mega projects can be further aggra-
vated by the senior management
changes on the owner’s side.
• Transportation costs (including cus-
toms cost) are generally underesti-
mated for permanent materials,
construction equipment, personal,
staff, etc.
• Environmental and regulatory compli-
ance costs are not given sufficient con-
sideration during the contract nego-
tiation period by both the client and
engineering firms. Projects often are
not “grandfathered” with respect to
governmental regulations, which can
change with local political and envi-
ronmental specialty group pressure.
• Material cost for both permanent
facilities and temporary facilities are
not sufficiently escalated during the
project budget development phase.
These escalation costs are often
qualified or limited by the EPC con-
tractor or passed along to the client
(i.e., craft labor escalated 20% to 30%
in 2006, and the norm is closer to 3%
to 4% per year. Nickel prices
increased over 100% in the past year
where normal material escalation is
estimated at 2.5% to 4% per year).
• Requirements for local content can
add inefficiency and additional
training cost to staff a project. These
requirements can also eliminate
lower-cost vendors and fabrication
facilities in order to meet the “local
content” requirements.
• Incomplete scope definition or
inadequate front-end loading and
poorly completed front-end deliv-
erables including milestone sched-
ule slippage in front end.
Incomplete scope definition and
inadequate front-end loading are
mainly due to the fast-tracking
nature of mega projects. The current
project delivery timeline is approxi-
mately one year shorter than the tra-
ditional execution timelines a few
decades ago. The ongoing changing
customer requirements resulting in
scope changes and the lack of under-
standing of the cumulative impact of
scope changes on project cost and
schedule add another dimension to
this issue. The clients’ and engineer-
ing firms’ practice of pushing work
to the field early puts construction
under an unrealistic compressed
schedule with increased overtime
requirements and often with little or
no consideration for the field cost.
Engineering firms and clients have
typically used the approach that it is
cheaper to force schedule compres-
sion on the construction work based
on construction labor being less
expensive than engineering cost.
The all-in-craft labor cost including
camp cost is currently in the $120
(CAD) to $180 (CAD) per hour range,
which far outweighs the minimal
cost to work engineering overtime to
maintain or recover the design deliv-
erable schedule.
• Issues with late or incomplete ven-
dor data are having a substantial
negative effect on engineering
progress. Integrated three-dimen-
sional design tools are less effective
when assumptions are made; work
progresses, and then the three-
dimensional models are reworked
with updated vendor data.
• Inappropriate project strategies for
the mega oil sands environment.
Some project strategies deployed do
not properly consider the level of
scope definition, the fast-track nature
of the mega project environment,
market condition, owner participa-
tion, owner control, and owner risk.
Improper or late consideration of the
following project strategies adds to
cost overruns (Eastham, 2002):
• Project management strategies such
as risk management, project control,
change control, communications,
organization, and responsibilities.
Some senior executives and project
095_104PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:29 PM Page 99
managers in both client and EPC
firms attend project reviews and do
not understand what they are look-
ing at. They do not recognize the
early warning signs that are self-
evident to someone with real experi-
ence and knowledge.
• Contract strategies relating to
management, design, construction,
and commissioning services. These
strategies are driven by time rather
than cost, assuming safety and qual-
ity are given requirements.
• Design strategies such as contribu-
tions from client business, opera-
tion, project team, contractors, and
suppliers.
• Procurement strategies including
preferred suppliers (supplier of
choice), progressing, inspection and
expediting, receipt, storage and
management, spares, and documen-
tation. For common equipment
where you want to minimize spare
parts (i.e., control valves, etc.), the
supplier-of-choice approach makes
sense. But for the major project
items such as pipe fittings and the
like, the volumes required in such
a short time would best come from a
number of suppliers for the best
combination of price and delivery.
Top up of shorts can come from a
supplier of choice supplier.
• Construction strategies including
site management and organization,
site layout, power, utilities and
drainage, work breakdown structure,
construction method, off-site pre-
fabrication and assembly, schedule
and milestones, industrial relations,
and precommissioning.
• Commissioning strategies including
responsibilities, schedule and inte-
gration with construction, resources,
training and validation, engineering
and trade support, and provision of
operating materials.
• Mismanagement of the construction
phase. This may be caused by:
• Inadequate field experience in most
home office engineering and pro-
curement personnel, especially in
project managers, project controls,
and key design leads.
• Later-than-anticipated engineering,
vendor data, equipment, and mate-
rial deliveries.
• Poor project controls. Nobody on the
project has single-point responsibility
except the client, who does not con-
trol much of the work. Even if there is
one point head for this, most time
is spent on reporting after the fact
rather than analyzing and forecasting.
• Inadequate plan of execution and
poorly defined tasks and division of
responsibility.
• Lack of knowledgeable leadership in
the engineering, procurement, con-
struction, and start-up of mega/major
facilities.
• Inexperienced or poorly equipped
project management personnel and
supervisors coupled with the inabili-
ty to understand, plan, adapt, and
implement project management
procedures or systems.
• Lack of standardization and fit-for-
purpose including inadequate use
of shop fabrication, modularization
strategy, and constructability reviews.
It is interesting how project execu-
tion strategies default to road-sized
modules. Is this because it’s still the
most cost-effective or is it because
“this is the way we do it”?
• Poor communication, teamwork,
and alignment between the players,
leading to adversarial relationships
and protracted disputes.
• Poor site organization and layout
leading to excessive time wastage
and productivity loss during con-
struction.
• Joint venture (JV) of project part-
ners, contractors, and engineering
firms that are not aligned or not set
up to work effectively due to differ-
ent cultures, internal JV conflicts,
and diverging visions of the way that
the EPC project should be structured
and managed.
Considering these points, industry
professionals, and specifically senior
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
managers of owner organizations, need
to consider the following questions:
• If the full cost was known and
understood at the inception of the
project, would the proposed project
be funded?
• What is the purpose of the cost esti-
mate developed at the AFE gate? Is it
developed to ensure the project
receives sanction or to provide a real-
istic goal for the project team?
• Why, when the EPC firms provide a
qualified cost for a limited scope of
work, does the client take it to be for a
broader scope of work?
• Why, during negotiations with EPC
firms, does the owner insist on bring-
ing the contract amount below the
AFE numbers? Why do EPC firms
accept the owner’s position?
Front-End Loading (Planning)
The front-end loading in the oil sands
project environment is defined as the
period up to the point of official
endorsement (project sanction) to pro-
ceed, when the AFE for full budget
funding occurs, and contract ratifica-
tion with a major EPC contractor or
multiple EPC contractors for project
execution takes place. Table 1 illus-
trates the life cycle of an oil sands proj-
ect and shows that the AFE is reached at
the end of phase 3 (Lavingia, 2006).
Phases 1, 2, and 3 are typically regarded
as the front end of oil sands projects.
The front-end loading (phases 1, 2 and
3) is the focus of this research work.
A decision support document,
sometimes called the feasibility report,
produced at the end of phase 3, is the
key document that concludes with a
recommendation to the clients’ boards
of directors/client decision executive to
approve the project. The feasibility
report usually examines the potential
for a profitable new development and
summarizes the considerable amount
of work to scope the project, select
technologies to be used, and present a
business case. The report describes
what the owner wants to do, how much
it would cost, what the economics of
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Front-End Loading of Alberta Mega Oil Sands Projects
the investment would be, and what the
risks might be.
The feasibility report, therefore, is
an important document, and accord-
ingly the analysis of what it states,
together with a review of third-party
assessments of the conclusions and
projections contained in it, is relevant.
The author used this document to
study the level of risk assessed by
the project owners at the beginning of
their project and to use it as a bench-
mark to measure any changes to the
project risks that occurred after the AFE.
Three types of risk assessments
were conducted at the front-end phas-
es (prior to the AFE) and reported in the
feasibility study. First, these mega proj-
ects underwent an “internal” review
that appeared to focus mainly on the
technical and business aspects of the
projects. A number of risks were identi-
fied that were classified as high, medi-
um, or low, and a number of mitigating
actions were put in place.
Then, independent third-party
(consultant) assessments and bench-
marking studies were conducted on all
three projects. The author noticed that
in general these third-party reviews
were favorable to what was being pro-
posed by the owner. In particular, the
third-party assessments advocated that
the proposed project schedules and
timelines for project execution were
reasonable and within industry norms.
The third assessment was a project
risk analysis, which was also conducted
by a third party. This third party was
asked to carry out a consolidated risk
review and assessment on the entire
project with emphasis on cost contin-
gency levels proposed and the integrat-
ed start-up schedule. A basic conclu-
sion in the latter review was that there
was minimal uncertainty in the base
mechanical completion milestone
dates.
In all risk assessments carried out
before project approval, there were no
issues raised with regard to the attain-
ability of the schedule to mechanical
completion—only with the time to start
100 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
up and early operation. Further, there
were no concerns raised with regard to
the cost estimate or level of contin-
gency proposed. However, in dis-
cussing the largest influences on the
project final costs, the independent risk
analyst (second assessment) indicated
that organizational performance, labor
productivity, and estimating variances
would be the top three. In the case of
schedule performance, the largest
influence identified was the organiza-
tional performance. The author found
no reference in the feasibility study
reports to, or has no discussion of,
these influences. It may be argued that
no one wants to hear bad news and
or no one wants to deliver bad news
either! Third-party auditors and risk
assessors base their opinions on what
they see/observe during their limited
access to project personnel and docu-
ments.
The author also found that a num-
ber of “due diligence” reviews were
conducted at the request of the client,
JV partner, and bankers. The primary
focus of these assessments was
whether the technology selected and
design proposed would lead to facilities
that would produce the intended qual-
ity and quantity of product. However,
there was some limited discussion of
cost estimates and the proposed execu-
tion schedules. All of these studies and
analyses concluded that the original
estimates seemed to be “reasonable,”
“felt” that the claimed accuracy range
was too narrow, and “believed” that the
schedule was achievable.
Third-party risk assessments and
benchmarking studies prior the AFE
must question all project assumptions
regarding the attainability of the pro-
posed schedule within the proposed
budget. Questions also should be
raised regarding the cost estimate and
the level of contingency proposed.
Third-party assessment should focus
on the top three largest influences on
the project final costs: organizational
performance, labor productivity, and
estimating variances. The feasibility
study report must discuss these influ-
ences because differences to the
assumptions made in any of these
would change the project outcomes
significantly. Finally, detailed discus-
sions regarding the accuracy of cost
estimates and the reasonableness of
proposed execution schedules must
also be included by the third-party con-
sultant and project team.
Engineering Effort
Before the production of construction
drawings can be undertaken, a number
of development steps must be complet-
ed. In one of the first stages of engi-
neering, the process design must be
completed (frozen) and associated
process flow diagrams (PFDs) issued.
PFDs show the logic of the various
chemical steps that will be used in the
new facility. The quantities of each of
the process streams will be shown. This
is such a critical step that normally
each PFD is formally reviewed and
accepted by the owner. Then the devel-
opment of the piping and instrument
diagrams (P&IDs) can follow, with tech-
nical input required from the vendors
of the major equipment. P&IDs identify
all the pieces of equipment required for
the process to work. It identifies all pip-
ing required together with identifica-
tion number, size, wall thickness and
metallurgy, valve locations, and type as
well as control logic. Again before the
P&IDs are formally issued for design
(IFD) they are usually reviewed and
accepted by the owner. The release of
issued for quotation requests (IFQs), as
well as the actual placing of purchase
orders (POs), becomes important to get
the technical vendor data needed to
complete P&IDs. P&IDs contain critical
engineering detail that must be agreed
upon before the construction drawings
can be started.
On one of the projects investigated,
it was noticed that the PFDs’ and
P&IDs’ progress was regularly moni-
tored and reported, whereas on the
other two projects, reporting was done
on the release of IFQs and the placing
095_104PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:29 PM Page 101
of POs. Both of these approaches pro-
vide good indication as to whether
expected progress is being realized and
whether future delays might be expected.
There are problems with engineering
progress measurement. Staffing plans
are developed by assigning historical
average hours to deliverables against
scheduled issue dates (EPC’s staff to
plan). This approach is called ensuring
work-hour burnoff. If all the work goes
according to plan, the best an EPC can
do is finish on budget because by
staffing to plan they burn off all the
planned hours. However, projects do
not usually go according to plan, so
home office hours go up. This distorts
the earned progress numbers. Also,
earned progress on irrelevant deliver-
ables can mask slippage in critical
deliverables. We have seen incomplete
deliverables issued to meet progress
milestones, then issued with extensive
revisions shortly after. A better tech-
nique is field quality curves. These are
developed based on what the field
needs, where they need it, and when.
Home office progress is more effectively
measured by meeting these curves. In
reality, as long as the field requirements
are met, the home office just becomes
cost relative to budget.
To further review and evaluate
schedule performance on these three
projects and due to the huge amount
of project information and documenta-
tion and to limit the scope of this
research work to a manageable level,
we chose an 8-month point after the
AFE. This point in time was used to
examine and compare changes that
occurred to the project baseline as
reported in the AFE document and fea-
sibility report.
As an example, looking at one pro-
ject’s engineering progress in the first
eight months, actual progress reported
stood at approximately 25% against the
planned progress of approximately
20%, or some three weeks ahead of the
plans. However, the number of PFDs
issued for design was only 20 against a
plan of 35. Upon further investigation,
Base
Milestone Schedule
PFDs frozen Dec. 31, 2000
Engineering April 30, 2002
substantially
complete
First P&IDs issued March 31, 2001
for design (IFD)
All P&IDs issued August 31, 2001
for construction
(IFC)
Table 2: Schedule comparison.
the author learned that the delay in
issuing these PFDs was due in part to
the late freezing of the process design,
with the result that “these slippages”
have consumed some of the float in the
original AFE schedule. Even though the
reported nominal progress looked
good, there should have been concern
as delays in finalizing the PFDs would
result in delays for the rest of engineer-
ing activities (i.e., delay in developing
the P&IDs), preventing ramping up of
the detailed design work, leading
almost inevitably to late engineering
deliverables, and hence resulting in
more pressure during the construction
phase. In projects as big and complex as
oil sands development, an extensive use
of the earned value analysis should
have been implemented. This progress
monitoring and analysis should be
based on either budget vs. actual vs.
earned hours (by each engineering dis-
cipline and later each construction craft
in the field) or on deliverables complet-
ed (i.e., PFDs).
A comparison of key milestones in
the base schedule with an updated
schedule eight months later on one
project (Project 2) shows the erosion to
schedule within the first eight-month
period. Table 2 illustrates delays associ-
ated with key milestones at an early
stage of the project. These dates are
accurate but have been changed to pro-
tect the identity of Project 2 and teams.
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Updated Schedule
Schedule Erosion
June 15, 2001 5.5 months
June 30, 2002 2 months
June 30, 2001 3 months
August 31, 2001 0 months
Table 2 shows that “PFDs frozen” is
the cause of the expected late comple-
tion of engineering, but it still requires a
“catch up” of some 3.5 months to realize
a delay of only two months in engineer-
ing completion. Some compression of
engineering activities was inevitable,
and if the mechanical completion dates
were to be maintained, then construc-
tion had to be shortened by that same
two months.
For the milestone “All P&ID
approved for construction,” it will be
noted that the first P&ID will now
be issued for design (IFD) on June 30,
2001—some 3 months late—but that all
P&IDs will be issued for construction
(IFC) by the original date of August 30,
2001. This means that in a short period
of 2 months all the P&IDs will be issued
for design and then reissued for con-
struction. This proved to be an extremely
difficult target that was not realized on
one project and caused cost overruns
on all three projects.
Some eight months after project
approval, the schedule for the engineer-
ing phase in Project 2 was being shown
with a two-month delay to complete—
even though the mechanical completion
and start-up dates were unchanged and
engineering was reported in the monthly
report as being ahead of schedule. This
means that all the subsequent activities
would have to be completed in two
months less than originally planned.
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Assuming the original schedule was
optimal, then this compression of activ-
ities would almost inevitably lead to
some inefficiency—leading to further
schedule as well as cost pressures.
For Project 1, actual engineering
performance as measured against the
plan was on track for the first eight
months when the percentages achieved
are considered. However, the monthly
reports continually expressed concern
over the number and cost of trends
(changes). No concern by the project
management team over the growing
cumulative impact of the trends on the
schedule was noticed.
The main schedule concern of a
project manager at this stage, however,
should be over the delay in finalizing/
freezing the process design that in turn
delays the preparation of the PFDs and
subsequently the P&IDs. All these
should be completed and issued before
detailed discipline engineering gets
under way and they tend to be on the
critical path. Hence, the delivery of
construction drawings to the field was
threatened, which in turn would put
pressure on the construction schedule.
The story in the case of Project 3
was quite similar. Here, tracking engi-
neering progress through the first
eight months shows that it was about a
month behind the plan. Again there
were problems in finalizing/freezing
the process design. An important input
to the design process is that of vendor
engineering and data. Monitoring the
number of IFQs issued as well as
the number of actual POs placed in
those first eight months revealed that
progress was way behind the plan.
This would suggest that future progress
would not run to plan, as the required
vendor information would be delayed.
An alarm should have been raised
by the project management teams on
all three projects when the schedule
was being regularly updated. The proj-
ect management team should have
realized that a delay in achieving the
planned mechanical completion and
start-up completion dates was likely
102 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
unless a heavy and expensive accelera-
tion effort was embarked upon. The
reason this was not recognized is that
sadly the project leadership at some
levels do not understand what they are
looking at. Project controls personnel
have evolved into project reporting.
The analysis and forecasting capability
historically available within both EPC
and owner firms have largely been lost.
Changes and Trends
In this article, the author also investi-
gated and analyzed the changes to the
project scope that occurred after
the AFE. For this purpose, we studied the
so-called “trend system,” which is typi-
cally used on these mega oil sands proj-
ects. The purpose of a “trend system” is
to ensure the project management
team is provided with information on
an ongoing basis as to why and by how
much the project costs anticipate vary-
ing from the approved AFE or budget. A
trend is initiated whenever it is antici-
pated that a change (either positive or
negative) from the original estimate/
budget is expected to occur. It is a man-
agement tool to monitor and manage
variations in cost, scope, time, and
quality. The trend process gives the
project manager and his team a series
of snapshots on a monthly basis as to
what extent the cost and schedule tar-
gets may be changing.
All project trends issued during the
first eight months after the AFE were
reviewed and analyzed to assess what
the likely impact on the final cost
would be and also to assess what effect
these trended activities might have on
the project schedule. While the trends
flagged individual activity changes
quite well, they did not give the full
picture. Subsequent total project re-
estimates and assessments on these
projects indicated higher levels of cost
variations than are indicated from the
trend logs.
Trends were initiated by the EPC
contractors doing the work or some-
times by employees of the owner
companies who were assigned to the
project. Once initiated, the cost and
schedule impacts were assessed, and
then the trends were submitted to a rig-
orous approval process. All trends avail-
able were classified in one of four ways.
• design development,
• changes to the estimate,
• estimate omissions, and
• changes in execution strategy.
There are a number of ways in
which the value of trend costs can be
assessed in regards to the project.
One is to look at the cumulative total of
the trend costs with respect to the
approved AFE budget. In one case, we
calculated a 5% increase representing
the extra work that had to be complet-
ed within the time frame of the original
schedule.
Another way of looking at it is to
assess the cost of the trends against the
contingency allowance. For one project,
the contingency was approximately $200
million (CAD), and the trend costs were
approximately $100 million (CAD) or
some 50%. That is to say, only 8 months
into the project after the AFE, half of the
contingency had been used and field
construction had barely started.
Most trends reviewed indicated
that there would be no schedule impact
or were silent on the issue. For example,
on one project only eight trends (out of
300 trends with a total value of $250
million [CAD]) indicated specific
schedule slippage. The individual
delays indicated on these eight trends
ranged from 1 week to 12 weeks, but the
cumulative delay was not assessed by
the project team.
On another project, four trends
were found that added extra hours of
work to the project totaling some 500
person weeks of work. These were not
converted into additional schedule
weeks but could have added some time
to the overall original schedule had
the project team conducted a full
review. These four trends simply stated
“schedule impact to be determined.”
We found no evidence that this impact
was later determined.
095_104PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:29 PM Page 103
On the third project, we found that
one trend in particular had identified a
significant slippage in schedule. This
trend on its own had the potential for
delaying the mechanical completion and
start-up dates. There were a further 10
trends that indicated “yes” or “some” to
the question of schedule impact, and
finally another 14 that required any
schedule impact “to be determined.” The
impacts of these trends were not con-
verted into additional schedule weeks.
The bottom line of the increased
costs and the schedule impacts predict-
ed by the trends was that more engi-
neering and construction work would
have to be done, within the originally
predicted time frame. This is due to the
fact that slippage to completion date
was not acceptable on all three projects.
As indicated earlier, a snapshot on
month eight of one project showed that
the cumulative estimated value of
trends had made considerable inroads
into the project contingencies. As field
construction work had barely started at
this time, the project managers should
have been concerned about the upward
pressure on costs, and this is borne out
by comments in all the monthly
reports. While there may be some com-
fort in the fact that the cumulative costs
of the trends was “only” about 5%, it did
represent a potential increase in the
work to be done of nearly $200 million
(CAD), with engineering at only about
25% complete.
The potential impact on the sched-
ule of the trends alone should also have
been a concern to the project manage-
ment team. Looking at the trends for
“design development” and “estimate
omissions” on one project, they totaled
$150 million (CAD). To keep the
mechanical completion and start-up
dates from changing, this extra work
had to be carried out within the existing
durations. With most of the extra work
being carried out in the engineering
phase, it was likely that the engineering
phase would extend somewhat and put
pressure on the construction phase to
recover the lost ground.
A project-specific and agreed-upon
contingency drawdown curve should
be developed and monitored monthly.
Project management professionals in
the oil and gas industry consulted as
part of this work agree that no more
than 50% of the contingency should be
spent before completing two-thirds of
the construction duration. This is
because most of the surprises and or
undocumented changes will appear
later in the project life cycle. A contin-
gency drawdown curve needs to be pre-
pared specifically for each project to
provide project managers with an early
warning system. If the contingency is
spent early, management needs to
accept the reality that additional con-
tingency will be required and added.
Conclusions
Following the sequence of events for
the three mega projects after approval,
it quickly becomes obvious that few of
the early milestones were being
achieved on time. In particular, the
process designs were not frozen when
they were supposed to be, PFDs were
not being issued on time, P&IDs did not
start or were not issued when originally
planned, vendor information was
delayed, and the critical workforce
buildup could not happen until all
these activities had passed through the
“narrow funnel” at the front end of the
project. Stick to the front-end schedule
milestone dates.
Within the first few months, the
project teams should have had real
concerns over the achievability of the
scheduled completion dates and costs.
While they might have been reluctant
to actually change the dates—after
all there was still over 2 to 3 years to
go—all the signs indicated that major
mitigating actions should have been
undertaken. Create an environment
where there is an integrated review of
all aspects for the project schedule, and
the messenger is not shot for raising
concerns on schedule slippage.
The continuing raising of trends
was steadily adding to the amount of
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
work that had to be done within the
same time frame. Additionally, issuing
cost trends without considering cumu-
lative effects was prevalent. The project
management team should have been
“running down” the allowances and
contingencies in the estimate accord-
ing to some plan, but with the number
and value of trends being raised, this
should have alerted them to the likeli-
hood that costs were rising faster than
the allowances and contingencies were
designed to cover. This in turn would
have acted as a warning that the scope
of the work was increasing, again put-
ting pressure on the schedule.
Recommendations
Mega projects are challenging, com-
plex, and risky, with a large number of
interfaces and interdependencies. Fast
tracking in combination with scope
changes at the front-end stages needs
to be anticipated, monitored, and con-
trolled by project teams. Owners must
implement processes that detect and
curb systematic cost underestimation,
scope changes, and schedule devia-
tions as early as possible and take nec-
essary and timely actions.
In the three case studies, an alarm
should have been raised by the project
management teams just a few months
after the AFE had been approved. The
trend analysis, schedule updates, and
progress reports all indicated deteriora-
tion in the budget and schedule, with
no evidence of a timely decision or
managerial courage to report and recti-
fy the situation. By not sounding the
alarm, the project management teams
did not allow the approvers of the AFE
to reflect on and reconsider their deci-
sion in light of the new forecast. If front
end had been effectively done, prob-
lems would not have shown up eight
months after AFE.
The project management team must
regularly monitor and report on the
progress of the PFDs’ and P&IDs’ per-
formance, as well as reporting on the
release of IFQs and the placing of POs.
Early delays in achieving these key
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Front-End Loading of Alberta Mega Oil Sands Projects
milestones will delay the production
of construction drawings and thereby
affect the construction phase. The
review of the number and status of
POs and contracts already placed and
remaining, an update of the execution
plans, and a review of external factors
and risks that could impact the proj-
ect would have enabled the project
management team to realize that
increases in the cost estimates were
likely and that extension to the sched-
ule would have to be accepted or mit-
igated if possible. All of these
approaches are good indicators as to
whether planned progress is being
realized and whether future delays
might be expected. ■
References
Alberta Economic Development
Authority. (2004). Mega project excel-
lent: Preparing for Alberta’s legacy—An
action plan. Calgary: Alberta Economic
Development Authority.
Condon, E. J. (2006). The project game:
Strategic estimating on major projects.
Calgary: University of Calgary.
Construction Industry Institute (CII).
(1987). Work packaging for project con-
trol, SD-28. Austin, TX: University of
Texas at Austin.
Creswell, J. (1998). Qualitative inquiry
and research design: Choosing among
five traditions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
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Dunbar, R., Strogran, M., Chan, P., &
Chan, K.-S. (2004). Potential supply
and costs of crude bitumen and syn-
thetic oil in Canada 2003–2017.
Calgary: Canadian Energy Research.
Eastham, G. (2002). The fast track
manual: A guide to schedule reduction
for clients and contractors on engineer-
ing and construction projects.
Loughborough, UK: European
Construction Institute.
Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N., &
Rothengatter, W. (2003). Megaprojects
and risk: An anatomy of ambition.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Herzog, L. (2000). Building collaborat-
ing team trust. Unpublished master’s
thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary,
Alberta, Canada.
Independent Project Analysis Inc.
(2006). Retrieved September 23, 2008,
from http://www.ipaglobal.com
Jergeas, G. F., & Ruwanpura, J. Y.
(2008). Why cost and schedule over-
runs on mega oil sands projects?
Manuscript submitted for publication.
Lavingia, N. (2006). How to create a
world class project management organ-
ization. Presented at the AACEI
International 50th Annual Conference,
Las Vegas, NV.
McTague, R., & Jergeas, G. F. (2002).
Productivity improvements on Alberta
major construction projects. Retrieved
September 23, 2008, from http://www.
Alberta-Canada.com/statpub/pdf/
ConprodStudy02.pdf
George Jergeas is a professor of project man-
agement in the Schullich School of Engineering
at the University of Calgary, where since 1994,
he has been involved in both the teaching of
and research into project management. He has
over 30 years of industry experience, princi-
pally in infrastructure projects and claims and
disputes. He is also an active project manage-
ment consultant for both public- and private-
sector organizations in Canada and has provid-
ed extensive project management training to
many Canadian, American, and international
companies. His work focuses on improving
project alignment and building and sustaining
project teams. He also works extensively as a
coach and trainer for managers and execu-
tives. He has worked with project teams in oil
sands development, hospitals, roads and
bridges, tunneling, LRT expansions, and min-
ing projects. As a claims consultant, he investi-
gated numerous construction projects, both in
Canada and the United States, and gained
insight into the fundamental causes of project
success and failure. Through his experience
and research, he has developed a strong inter-
est in improving project success founded upon
improving the effectiveness of project delivery
and teams.
105_113PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:31 PM Page 105
PAPERS
Developing an Effective Project:
Planning and Team Building
Combined
Michael Thomas, Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC, USA
Paul H. Jacques, Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC, USA
John R. Adams, Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC, USA
Julie Kihneman-Wooten, Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC, USA
ABSTRACT ■
In this article, the process of developing the
project plan and the project planning and con-
trol (PP&C) is analyzed and compared to the
process of developing the project team to iden-
tify opportunities for integrating these actions
to produce more successful projects. Results of
structured research across some 137 different
organizations and representing a wide range of
approaches to establishing projects are report-
ed. The results of this cross-organizational
research strongly support the proposed inte-
gration of project planning, PP&C development,
and project team building. A recommended
process for accomplishing this integration is
proposed.
KEYWORDS: team building; project plan
development; project planning and control;
project success
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 105–113
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20079
INTRODUCTION ■
I
t is widely accepted in project management circles that the establishment
of the project involves both project planning and project team building. It
is also recognized that the best of plans can be sabotaged with a poorly
developed team, and that the most effective team cannot overcome a poor
project plan. The most successful projects are characterized as having had a
well-considered and well-developed plan and an outstanding, committed
team. Yet in the development of project management concepts and theory, the
establishment of the project plan has traditionally been identified as the “tech-
nical” aspect of the project, while the development of the project team has tra-
ditionally been considered a “soft” science or skill, which lacks the clear-cut
guidelines that can be developed for establishing a project plan. The integra-
tion of these two general concepts is not directly addressed within the Project
Management Institute’s (PMI’s) A Guide to the Project Management Body of
Knowledge (PMI, 2004). Instead, A Guide to the Project Management Body
of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide) separates team establishment and develop-
ment from the more technical aspects involving the development of the proj-
ect plan. The current PMBOK® Guide discusses the development of the project
planning and control (PP&C) systems in the “Project Scope Management,”
“Project Time Management,” “Project Cost Management,” and “Project Inte-
gration Management” Knowledge Areas. Team development is discussed in
the “Project Human Resources Management” and “Project Communications
Management” Knowledge Areas.
In many projects, the sponsoring organization goes so far as to establish
a “planning team” independent of the team that will be implementing the
project, thus forming a nearly complete separation between project plan-
ning and team building for the implementation group. Yet, it would appear
that project planning and project implementation are so interrelated and
critical to determining the path of the project itself that they should be devel-
oped in an integrated manner, so that the team can support the plan while
planning supports the development of the team. Such an approach, howev-
er, seems almost foreign to the basic concepts of project management as
they are widely known and used today.
This article proposes that in order to achieve project success the project
planning and team development should occur as an integrated process
while the project is being developed and initiated. The process of developing
the project plan and the PP&C is analyzed and compared to the process of
developing the project team to identify opportunities for integrating these
actions to produce more successful projects. Results of structured research
March 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 105
105_113PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:31 PM
PAPERS
Developing an Effective Project
across some 137 different organizations
and representing a wide range of
approaches to establishing projects are
reported. The results of this cross-
organizational research strongly
support the proposed integration of
project planning, PP&C development,
and project team building. A recom-
mended process for accomplishing this
integration is proposed.
Background
Project managers apply knowledge,
skills, tools, and techniques to project
activities in order to meet or exceed
stakeholders’ needs and expectations.
Often these needs include requirements
that have not been identified earlier by
the client. Project managers then
undertake a “temporary endeavor . . . to
create a unique product or service,”
(PMI, 2004, p. 5)—in other words, a
project. The project is “temporary” in
that it has definite beginning and end-
ing points. The end is reached when the
project’s objectives have been achieved,
or when it becomes clear that the proj-
ect objectives will not or cannot be met
and the project is terminated. “Unique”
refers to the fact that every project is dif-
ferent in that the exact same product or
service has not been created before—at
least not within the same specific envi-
ronment. Project planning is therefore
of major significance to project success
because the project involves doing work
that has not been done before, work for
which there are limited historical
records or experiences that point out
how the task was handled the last time
it was accomplished.
Unfortunately, planning alone is
not enough to successfully reach the
project’s objectives. It is the project
team that has to implement, control,
and, when necessary, correct the proj-
ect plan and the project to assure that
the project meets the objectives on
schedule and within budget. Team
development, team effectiveness, and
especially team commitment have to
be established to make this happen.
Numerous books and articles have
106 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Page 106
been written about team development
and team effectiveness. Some of the lit-
erature provides recipes or “cookbook
approaches” for effective team devel-
opment, while others claim to teach
the exact tools and techniques required
to develop the team (Whetten &
Cameron, 2005). There are definitely
general and even perhaps universal
rules applicable to team-building activ-
ities, but few of these sources discuss
the process of developing team
commitment.
Since every project is unique, every
project team and every project envi-
ronment is also unique. Thus, every
project must have a unique project
planning and control process, a process
that is unique to the project and can
provide a useful structure for develop-
ing team commitment. The role of the
PP&C has seldom, if ever, been defined
to include the creation of an effective
and committed project team. To the
extent that this statement is true, the
PP&C’s role has traditionally been given
less importance than it really has. If
the project is to be conducted and
completed successfully, the process of
creating an effective PP&C should be
integrated with the task of building an
effective and committed project team.
Project Success
An effective, committed project team
and an effective, integrated project
plan have long been assumed to be
associated with project success. Project
success, however, is a very difficult vari-
able to define. Definitions of project
success in the project management lit-
erature have varied from Pinto and
Slevin’s work in 1987, which defined
“Ten Critical Success Factors,” to
Shenhar, Levy, and Dvir (1997), who
defined four “Dimensions of Project
Success.” Other definitions have been
as simple as satisfying the client or
completing the project on schedule
and budget (Lewis, 2001). Difficulties
occur when we try to identify which
schedule and which budget are being
referred to: the initial budget and
schedule as approved in the initial plan
or the modified budget and schedule as
approved by the client or owner as the
project progresses through its life cycle.
Difficulties also occur in trying to iden-
tify why a customer is satisfied, and
whether or not there is any correlation
between either the original objectives
of the project, or the final modified
objectives of the project, and the
client’s satisfaction. Examples abound
where the original objectives of the
project are not met, but the client was
highly satisfied. There are other exam-
ples where the initial project objectives
were met, but the client was quite
unhappy with the results. As would be
expected, the measurement of project
success becomes even more complicat-
ed as the process of managing scope
change is examined across the project
life cycle. For this study, content analy-
sis identified words in participant sub-
missions that mentioned or indicated
project success. How the participants
defined project success was not
defined.
Team Building
Teamwork is crucial to project manage-
ment. We must work within teams, and
we must build our teams in such a way
that members can and will work togeth-
er cooperatively to accomplish the work
of the project. An effective team could
be described as any group of people
who must significantly relate with each
other in order to accomplish shared
objectives (PMI, 2004). Extensive
research (Kliem & Anderson, 1996;
Rogers, 1990; Rossy & Archibald, 1992;
Todryk, 1990) exists within the project
management literature describing (1)
the value of having a committed and
effective project team, (2) recommend-
ed processes for developing effective
and committed teams, and (3) the
necessity for continuing active team
building throughout the project, as peo-
ple move on and off the project team
reflecting the current and future needs
of the project. It can therefore be stated
that within the project management
105_113PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:31 PM Page 107

literature, there is a general acceptance
of the processes involved in building an
effective team. It takes time to build
effective teams, and within the hectic
pace of today’s projects, it seems to be
generally understood that team build-
ing should start as early in the project
life cycle as possible.
The well-known team building
process of forming, norming, storming,
and performing (Whetten & Cameron,
2005) can be used to demonstrate
(Table 1) how the team development
process can interact with the develop-
ment of the PP&C process.
In the forming stage, the project
manager needs to provide direction and
clarity toward the team and develop the
respect that will be essential to his/her
ability to lead the project through its life
cycle. Most importantly, the team mem-
bers need to get acquainted with one
another—at a kickoff meeting, for
example. There will be a need for rela-
tionship development. The project pur-
pose needs to be understood, and the
project boundaries need to be estab-
lished. Here, the project manager needs
to identify the project, specifying its
objectives and identifying the major

Forming Planning

Kickoff meeting to get acquainted with one another / Relationship development Agreement on scope and creation of:
Understanding of the project boundaries Scope statement
Project manager needs to provide direction and clarity toward the team Quantify project objectives
Document project deliverables
A work breakdown structure
Project plan:
– Plan resources
– Staff acquisition
– Time baseline
– Cost baseline
– Quality standards
– Communication lines
– Risk responses
– Procurement processes
Norming
Creation of cohesion and unity
Different project members will play different roles
Team member commitment
Project manager needs to make sure that s/he provides supportive
feedback and that s/he fosters commitment to the project vision
Storming Control
Disagreements Scope creep
Counterdependencies Time baseline performance
Managing conflicts Cost baseline performance
Overcome groupthink Quality control
Violations of team norms and unmet expectations Communication checks
Focus on process improvement Risk analysis
Project manager should recognize and reward team achievements and Procurement checks
foster win/win relationships
Performing
Continuous improvement
Innovation
Speed
Capitalizing on core competencies
Project manager should pay special attention to team members’ new
ideas, orchestrating their implementation, and fostering extraordinary
performances.
First column from Whetten and Cameron (2005).

Table 1: The integration process of PP&C and team-building activities.

December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 107

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constraints (budget, due dates, and
other requirements) as defined by sen-
ior management.
During the norming stage, the team
is faced with the challenges associated
with creating cohesion and unity.
Different project members will play dif-
ferent roles, and these roles need to be
well understood and should not create
unrealistically high expectations. It is
within this stage that commitment
from team members is established
through the buy-in technique. The
project manager needs to make sure
that s/he provides supportive feedback
and that s/he fosters commitment to
the project vision.
Later on in the project, during
implementation and when project per-
formances are gathered, it is very likely
that the team will be faced with dis-
agreements, counterdependencies, and
the need to manage conflicts. It is with-
in this storming phase that the team
has to overcome groupthink, violations
of team norms, and unmet expecta-
tions. This is the time to focus on
process improvement. The project
manager should recognize and reward
team achievements and foster win/win
relationships.
The team has reached the most
mature stage within the project life
cycle. It is within this performing stage
that the team is faced with the need for
continuous improvement, innovation,
speed, and capitalizing on core compe-
tencies. The project manager must pay
special attention to team members’
new ideas, orchestrating their imple-
mentation and fostering extraordinary
performances.
Research clearly indicates that
members of a team are committed to
implementing a plan when they have
had the opportunity to contribute to
the development of that plan. Thus, the
project plan should be developed by
the project team, not by the project
manager or some independent “plan-
ning team.” Therefore, the project team
must be developed at the same time
and ideally along with the project itself.
108 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
To test the significance of team build-
ing, two hypotheses have been posited:
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive rela-
tionship between the quality of the team-
building process and the quality of the PP&C.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation-
ship between the quality of the team-building
process and the degree of project success.
PP&C
For today’s professional project man-
agers, correct PP&C processes are now
an essential part of a successful project
(Mahler, 1998b; Thamhain, 1998), with
the investment of time and energy at
the beginning of the project paying off
with a reduction in project time and
cost overruns, therefore reducing the
risk of project failure (Mahler, 1998a).
As Meredith and Mantel (2006) write,
“There is a great deal of research
supporting the view that careful plan-
ning is solidly associated with project
success—and none . . . supporting the
opposite position” (p. 235). Research
Planning
Agreement on scope and creation of:
Scope statement
Quantify project objectives
Document project deliverables
A work breakdown structure
Project plan:
– Plan resources
– Staff acquisition
– Time baseline
– Cost baseline
– Quality standards
– Communication lines
– Risk responses
– Procurement processes
Source: Meredith and Mantel (2006).
Table 2: Illustration of the control process intertwined within the PP&C
has also shown that the main reason
project control tools and techniques
are underused relates to a lack of
understanding on how to use them
properly (Jugdev, Thomas, & Bangay,
1999). The PP&C process exists in two
parts. The first involves planning the
project scope, resources, staff acquisi-
tion, time and cost baselines, quality
standards, communication lines, risk
responses, and procurement processes
that have to be established, after which
the control procedures and guidelines
(part two of PP&C) for each of these
processes can be created. See Table 2
for additional details.
In the present research project,
participants were asked to review the
project planning and control systems
established by their organizations as
compared to the recommended project
planning and control systems con-
tained within the PMI’s PMBOK® Guide
(2004). The term “project planning and
control” does not appear in the
PMBOK® Guide itself but is used here as
Control
Scope creep
Time baseline performance
Cost baseline performance
Quality control
Communication checks
Risk analysis
Procurement checks
105_113PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:31 PM
a summary of the processes recom-
mended by the PMI for creating the
complete project plan and the control
system necessary to track that plan with
the activities of the project, keeping the
plan up to date as the project progress-
es through its life cycle. However, it is
not easy to get organizations to accept
this approach to the extent of putting
the time and energy necessary into the
appropriate project plan.
Project managers are constantly
pressured to “get started with work” or
“make progress” by senior manage-
ment who fail to recognize the value of
planning in a project. These statements
are widely supported by the comments
received from the project managers in
this study when stating how the project
planning and control system was devel-
oped within their organizations. The
comment was frequently made that
“there is no formalized project plan-
ning and control system in our organi-
zation” or “a program has recently been
started to implement a formal project
planning and control system, but we
have yet to see anything of it at the proj-
ect level.” In such situations, it was also
likely to see the comment “there is no
formalized process for developing a
committed team within the project—it
is the responsibility of the project man-
ager to determine how to bring the
team together.” Nevertheless, all proj-
ect managers unanimously indicated
that a formalized approach to develop-
ing the project plan would be greatly
welcomed. The data regarding the
organization’s PP&C system ranged
from there being no recognized system
at all to a requirement for complete and
detailed project planning prior to
approval for implementation, but the
number of complete systems reported
was surprisingly small. It would be log-
ical, therefore, that our third and final
hypothesis examine the relationship of
the development of a quality PP&C sys-
tem and project success:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship
between the development of a quality project
planning and control system and project success.
Page 109
Research Plan
Participants in this study are students
enrolled in an online master of project
management degree program. To enter
this program, participants are required
to be experienced project managers
and be currently employed in the proj-
ect management field managing
projects for their employers. The design
of the program requires participants to
review the processes used within their
organization and compare them with
the standard and recommended proj-
ect management processes being
taught within the program. Participants
are then frequently asked to implement
the specific processes within their proj-
ects and report back to the class the
effectiveness of these techniques with-
in their organization—and to justify the
results, good or bad, that they report.
This instructional methodology pro-
vides an excellent opportunity to gath-
er information regarding how different
organizations implement specific proj-
ect management techniques, and how
effective their implementing tech-
niques seem to be, across a wide variety
of organizations and management
styles. In short, we have the opportunity
to do cross-project, cross-organizational
research into the effectiveness of our
commonly accepted project manage-
ment methods and techniques.
In this study, project managers were
asked to evaluate the effectiveness of
their organization’s processes for devel-
oping their PP&C system, as compared
to the methods being taught within the
program. They were also asked to
evaluate the team-building process
established by their organizations for
developing effective project manage-
PP&C
Team Building
Figure 1: The research model.
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
ment teams, as compared to the
processes being taught (and practiced)
within their courses. Specifically, the
survey question that assessed the nature
of each respondent’s PP&C, team-build-
ing processes, and project success was:
Consider the project you are
involved in at the present time,
specifically the project planning &
control (PP&C) system that is used
in that project and how it affects,
both positively and negatively, the
positive development of teamwork
and commitment within the proj-
ect. Draw a conclusion of how well
the PP&C is being used from the
perspective of building your team.
Analyzing hypothesized relation-
ships between these three variables
across organizations and projects
should indicate the extent to which
these predicted results can be accom-
plished in the practical project man-
agement environment. In this study, a
positive correlation between the use of
an effective project planning and con-
trol system and the use of an effective
process for building a committed proj-
ect team is expected. The research
model in Figure 1 reflects the three
hypotheses discussed earlier and
shows the expected relationships
between the three variables: team
building, PP&C, and project success.
Sample
Data for this study was collected from
161 students enrolled in a master of
project management degree program
during the years 2000–2005 with 9
responses in 2000, 20 in 2001, 15 in
2002, 44 in 2003, 44 in 2004, and 29
Project
Success
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in 2005. The sample included 67
females (41.6%) and 94 males (58.4%).
The average age of the respondents was
36 years. In addition, three records were
discarded as a result of being incom-
plete. Students in the program, and
hence those sampled in the present
study, ensure a diverse representation
of the project management profession
in terms of age, sex, and industry.
Respondents represented a large
cross-section of industries, with 137
individual organizations listed repre-
senting the following industries: acade-
mia, aerospace, automotive, banking,
consulting, electrical/electronic, infor-
mation technology, pharmaceutical,
public administration/government,
telecommunications, and utilities.
Methodology
Data was collected by Content Analysis,
a social science research methodology
developed more than 55 years ago
(Berelson, 1952). Kassarjian (1977) dis-
cusses various definitions of this
methodology that have been attempted
over the years, with Naccarato and
Neuendorf (1998, p. 20) summing up
the technique concisely with this state-
ment: “Content analysis may be
defined as the systematic, objective,
quantitative analysis of message char-
acteristics.”
Content analysis methodology is
typically used in consumer behavior
research involving media advertising,
printed materials, and other verbal
and nonverbal communications
(Kolbe & Burnett, 1991). Validity of the
research using content analysis tech-
niques is achieved by adhering to the
three characteristics of the process:
objective standards by which ratings
are assigned, systematic rating
processes, and the translation of the
inputs into a quantitative output
(Kassarjian, 1977).
The concept of objectivity stipu-
lates that the categories of analysis be
defined so precisely that different ana-
lysts may apply them to the same body
of content and secure the same result
110 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
(Berelson, 1952). Some measures of
objectivity are: whether rules and pro-
cedures were reported, whether judge
training was reported, whether
pretesting of measures was reported,
that the judges are independent of
authors, and that the judges work
independently of each other (Kolbe &
Burnett 1991).
Systematization with respect to
content analysis means that (a) the
inclusion or exclusion of communica-
tion content or analytical categories is
done according to consistently applied
rules (Holsti, 1968) and (b) it is done to
examine scientific problems or
hypotheses (Berelson, 1952). The first
is needed to avoid data being collected
that could support the researcher’s
views and the second to ensure that
the findings have theoretical relevance
and can be generalized (Kassarjian,
1977).
In quantification, we are dealing
with the measurement of the extent or
omission of any category. The implica-
tion being that the data collected
is amenable to statistical methods
for interpretation and inference
(Kassarjian, 1977).
The communication being ana-
lyzed via content analysis in the pres-
ent study was the respondents’ answers
to a question involving project success,
team building, and the PP&C within
their respective organizations.
The project success variable was
coded on a 5-point Likert scale where 1

no response, 2
no success (specific
reference to unsuccessful projects), 3

little success (reference to minor
improvements in a project), 4
some
success (reference to limited success in
project), and 5
success (clear,
acknowledged project success). For an
overall measure of project success,
three independent judges were used to
develop the variable, and the ratings of
these judges were averaged.
The team-building variable meas-
ured the degree of team bonding and
ownership of the project. It was coded
on a 5-point Likert scale where 1
no
team formation, 2
team formation,
3
human resource support to form a
team, 4
team-building activities, and
5
full project ownership by the team.
Project management experts were used
to determine the answers to the vari-
ables PP&C and team building.
The PP&C variable measured the
degree of project planning and control
performed for the project. It was coded
on a 5-point Likert scale where 1
no
PP&C used, 2
some PP&C used,
3
internal PP&C system, 4
PP&C
system without team building (the team
did not develop the PP&C system), and
5
full PP&C system (the team had full
input on the development of the PP&C
system).
Multiple linear regression was per-
formed using AMOS 4.0 (Arbuckle &
Wothke, 1999), and it was chosen
because it allows simultaneous
analysis of effect sizes in the model.
Reliability information for all but rat-
ings of project success is not applicable
due to the nature of the items used for
the scales. The interrater reliability
coefficient (alpha) for project success
was 0.715, a value that is comfortably
above the commonly used minimum
of 0.70 threshold for this kind of
exploratory study (cf. Perreault &
Leigh, 1989).
Results
Means, standard deviations, and corre-
lations for measures used in this study
are shown in Table 3. In support of
Hypotheses 1 and 2, the development
of project teams was positively corre-
lated with ratings of both PP&C (stan-
dardized regression weight
0.66, p 
0.001) and project success (standard-
ized regression weight
0.33, p

0.001). Hypothesis 3 was also support-
ed, with PP&C positively correlating
with project success (standardized
regression weight
0.21, p
0.027).
Squared multiple correlations for the
endogenous variables were 0.43 for
project planning and control and 0.24
for project success. These results are
summarized in Figure 2.
105_113PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:31 PM
Mean
Team Building 2.69
PP&C 2.99
Project Success 3.27
* p < .001.
Table 3: Means, standard deviations, and correlations.
Discussion
Most people consider PP&C and team
building to be foreign to each other.
They are viewed as two opposite ends
within the project management spec-
trum, with PP&C being the theoretical
or “hard” side of the project and team
building being the human or “soft” side.
The analysis shows that those organiza-
tions that had team-building activities
or full project ownership by the teams
generally had full input into the devel-
opment of the PP&C. The results imply
that senior management and project
managers should engage their project
teams early in the project planning
process, which would allow team devel-
opment to occur as an integrated
process while the project is being initi-
ated and planned.
It is widely accepted in project man-
agement circles that the establishment
of the project involves both project
planning and project team building and
that the most successful projects are
.66***
Team Building
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
( ) = Squared multiple correlations
Figure 2: Analysis results showing standardized path coefficients.
Page 111
SD Team Building PP&C
1.387 – –
1.360 .640*
0.803 .405* .464*
almost always characterized as having
had a well-considered and developed
plan and an outstanding, committed
team. The findings of this study confirm
this common notion, with significant
relationships being found between
team building and project success.
Similarly, a significant relationship
was found between PP&C and project
success. In Table 1, the process of devel-
oping the project plan is analyzed and
compared to the process of developing
the project team, to identify opportuni-
ties for integrating these actions to
produce more effective project man-
agement. The results of this study sug-
gest that the planning process when
undertaken by the project team can
become part of the forming stages of
the team-building process, which
include the kickoff meeting, relation-
ship development, and development of
project boundaries, as well as the place
where the project manager begins to
provide direction and clarity to the
(.43)
PP&C .33** (.24)
Project
.21* Success
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
team. At this point, the PP&C process as
well as the other planning aspects of the
project can provide the team-building
exercise for creating an effective project
– management team. For example, the
discussion of what is to be measured for
performance and how, when, and how
often it will be measured can lead to
heated discussion within a team.
This type of discussion (storming)
would already begin the team-building
process as team members learn to
understand each other’s perspectives
and priorities. Clearly, it is better for
these team-building activities to occur
at this early point in the project rather
than during project implementation
when other team stresses are occurring.
The significant relationships between
team building, PP&C, and project suc-
cess are clearly identified in the study
and show that active involvement of the
project team in the early (planning)
stages of the project will lead to more
project success.
Conclusion
The establishment of the project
involves both project planning and
project team building. It is understood
by most practitioners that the best of
plans can be sabotaged with a poorly
developed team, and that the most
effective team cannot overcome a poor
project plan. The most successful proj-
ects are almost always characterized as
having had a well-considered plan,
developed by an outstanding and com-
mitted team. Yet in the development of
project management concepts and the-
ory, the establishment of the project
plan has traditionally been identified as
the “technical” aspect of the project,
while the development of the project
team has traditionally been considered
a “soft” science or skill. Currently very
few in the project management role
seem to have realized or conceptually
established the direct link between
PP&C and team building.
Using the project team to develop
the PP&C is a natural process for giving
team members active participation in
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Developing an Effective Project
creating the project, a process aimed at
developing individual commitment
from team members. In addition, the
process provides team members
with a significantly broader view of
the project, effectively increasing the
team’s ability to develop an integrated
approach toward achieving the owner’s
objectives. Failure to recognize and use
this approach can increase the poten-
tial for interteam conflict, effectively
lengthening the overall planning
process and reducing the potential
effectiveness of the resulting project
plan and, in the end, project success. ■
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Michael Thomas, PhD, MPM, PMP, is an assis-
tant professor of project management at
Western Carolina University. In addition to his
current teaching position, he has over 30 years
of project management experience in the IT
industry, town management, factory manage-
ment, and the iron and steel industry. As such,
he has been responsible for projects dealing
with implementation of quality programs in the
IT industry, the construction and commission-
ing of a continuous pipe coating facility, the
design and installation of hydraulic systems for
the steel industry, and the preservation and
renovation of over 300 eighteenth-century peri-
od homes. He holds a PhD from the Business
School at James Cook University, Australia, a
master of project management (MPM) degree
from Western Carolina University, and a bache-
lor’s degree in town planning from the
University of New South Wales, Australia.
Paul H. Jacques, PhD, is an assistant professor
of management at Western Carolina University
in Cullowhee, NC. Prior to embarking on a career
in higher education, he served as program coor-
dinator for capital improvement projects and
also as a division-level quality manager at a
Fortune 500 company. He earned his PhD in
leadership and organizational behavior from
the State University of New York at Binghamton.
Additionally, he has master’s degrees in busi-
ness administration, instructional technology,
and industrial statistics—all from the Rochester
Institute of Technology. His undergraduate
degree is in mechanical engineering from the
Worcester Polytechnic Institute.
John R. Adams, PhD, is an emeritus professor
of project management at Western Carolina
University in Cullowhee, NC. He is a past presi-
dent and chair of the PMI board of directors, an
honorary lifetime member of the PMI, and a
fellow of the Institute. He served as director for
educational services for over 10 years and later
105_113PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:31 PM Page 113

as vice president technical, for a total of nearly
20 years of service on the board. During this
period, he was instrumental in developing the
Institute’s professional programs, including
A Guide to the Project Management Body of
Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide), the publications
program, and the Standards and Ethics
Committees. Retired from the U.S. Air Force,
he has held project management positions in
operational programs (future systems, plans,
strategic air command), development programs
(launch support facilities for the Titan IIIC space
booster), and research programs (technical
director for the Air Force Human Resources
Laboratory). He developed the first U.S. nation-
ally accredited project management master’s
degree at Western Carolina University, which
was also the first such program to be accredited
by the PMI. He is currently working with the
state of South Carolina to develop a PM certifica-
tion program, a statewide project management
office, and a PM career path for state employ-
ees. He is widely published and quoted in the
field of project management.
Julie Kihneman-Wooten, MPM, PMP, holds a
master of project management degree from
Western Carolina University and professional
certification in project management from the
Project Management Institute. She has more
than 17 years of experience in project and pro-
gram management and is currently employed
by Habitat for Humanity International’s corpo-
rate programs department, implementing
corporate social responsibility, brand aware-
ness, and team-building projects and programs.

Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation

1. Publication Title: Project Management Journal 8. Complete Mailing Address of Headquarters or General 11. Known Bondholders, Mortgages, and Other Security
2. Publication Number: 8756-9728 Business office of the Publisher: Project Management Holders Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of
3. Filing date: 10/01/08 Institute Global Operations Center, Fourteen Campus Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages, or Other
4. Issue Frequency: Quarterly Boulevard, Newtown Square, Pennsylvania Securities: None
5. Number of Issues Published Annually: 5 19073-3299 USA 12. Tax Status (For completion by nonprofit organizations
6. Annual Subscription Price: $14.00 9. Full Names and Complete Mailing Addresses of authorized to mail at nonprofit rates). The purpose,
7. Complete Mailing Address of Known Office of Publisher: Donn Greenberg, Fourteen Campus Boulevard, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and
Publication: Project Management Institute Newtown Square, Pennsylvania 19073-3299 USA the exempt status for federal income tax purposes:
Global Operations Center, Publishing Department, 10. Owner: Project Management Institute, Fourteen Campus Has Not Changed During Preceding 12 Months
Fourteen Campus Boulevard, Newtown Square, Boulevard, Newtown Square, Pennsylvania 13. Publication Title: Project Management Journal
Pennsylvania 19073-3299 USA 19073-3299 USA 14. Issue Date for Circulation Data Below: September 2008

15. Extent and Nature of Circulation Average No. Copies Each Issue No. Copies Single Issue
During Preceding 12 Months Published Nearest to Filing Date

a. Total No. Copies (Net Press Run) 89,169 87,149

b. Paid Circulation
(1) Paid Subscriptions Stated on PS Form 3541 125 125
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(3) Sales through Dealers and Carriers other Paid Distribution 70 70
(4) Requested Copies Distributed by other Mail class N/A N/A
c. Total Paid Distribution (Sum of 15b (1), (2), (3) and (4)) 87,364 85,344
d. Free Distribution by Mail (Samples, Complementary, and Other Free) 500 500
e. Free Distribution Outside the Mail (Carriers or Other Means) N/A N/A
f. Total Distribution (Sum of 15c and 15e) 87,364 85,344
g. Copies not Distributed 1805 1805
h. Total (Sum of 15f and g) 89,169 87,149
i. Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation (15c/15f  100) 98.7% 98.9%
16. This Statement of Ownership will be printed in the December 2008 issue of this publication.
17. Name and Title of Editor, Publisher, Business Manager, or Owner: Donn Greenberg
Date: 12/01/08

December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 113

114PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:33 PM Page 114
Cover to Cover
Kenneth H. Rose, PMP, Book Review Editor
Procurement Systems: A Cross-Industry
Project Management Perspective
by Derek H. T. Walker and Steve Rowlinson, Editors
T
he importance of the procurement
function varies dramatically from one
project arena to another. More proj-
ects are carried out in IT than in any
other area, but unless we are dealing with out-
sourced projects, procurement is not central
to the practice of IT project management.
Similarly, “internal” projects carried out in
organizations—e.g., business process reengi-
neering, software maintenance projects, and
new product development projects—are not
strongly rooted in procurement, unless they
are outsourced efforts.
In contrast, in most industrialized soci-
eties, government projects live and die in
accordance with the effectiveness of the pro-
Taylor and Francis, 2008, ISBN:
curement effort. This is particularly true of
9780415416061, paperback,
defense projects, which can be huge efforts
480 pp., $90.00 list price.
with prime contractors overseeing the work
efforts of hundreds of subcontractors. The
success of construction projects is also heavily dependent on the
effectiveness of the procurement effort.
Procurement Systems: A Cross-Industry Project Management
Perspective emerges from the construction industry. While the
subtitle states that the book presents a cross-industry perspec-
tive, this is not really so. For example, no mention is made about
procurement project issues in pharmaceuticals, aerospace,
manufacturing, IT (not withstanding a discussion of the transfer
of IT technology in construction), and other industries that are
project-based. However, many of the chapters make heavy use of
management theory in the areas of organizations, culture, and
strategic management, so the book goes beyond a narrow con-
struction focus.
In addition to the book’s two editors, it has 14 coauthors.
Most of the coauthors are either doctoral students, recent doc-
toral graduates, or faculty members of RMIT University in
Melbourne. The remaining authors are also affiliated with aca-
demic institutions. Consequently, the book assumes a strong
academic cast. Several of the chapters are literature reviews,
chock full of references to the academic literature. This is a book
written by academics for academics.
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 114
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute
Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20090
114 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
The book’s 14 chapters cover an eclectic
range of topics. They touch on subjects such
as stakeholders and the supply chain, strategy,
innovation, the quest for talent, ethics, cul-
ture, and e-commerce. Anyone looking for
up-to-date literature references on these and
other topics will find a rich listing of perti-
nent scholarly articles in the Reference
section at the end of each chapter.
While the book’s title is Procurement
Systems, a substantial portion of the book’s
content focuses on project management. For
example, Chapter 11—which is informative
and well written—focuses almost entirely on
describing what it takes to establish and main-
tain an effective project management office.
The chapter barely touches on procurement
issues. The chapter “Project Procurement and
the Quest for Talent” relates an interesting
study about HR issues in Australian construc-
tion firms. It does not actually address “the quest for talent” in the
procurement area. The chapter titled “E-Business and Project
Procurement” offers some general principles of e-business at the
outset, then concentrates on discussing how Building Information
Modelling (BIM, a construction/architecture tool) can be viewed
from an electronic data transfer perspective. The discussion does
not investigate the explosive growth in the implementation of
online business transactions to support project and procurement
efforts in other areas (e.g., e-government activities in the world’s
industrial countries).
The book’s principal strength is that it showcases a new gen-
eration of scholarly studies in project management. What we see
here is vastly different from studies carried out 10 or 15 years
ago. Many of those studies tended to be impressionistic and
made little attempt to tie into prior research findings. In con-
trast, the pieces contained in this book go to great lengths to
show how the authors’ findings and opinions are linked to find-
ings and opinions of other scholars.
The book is valuable to students of project management
operating in an academic setting. It is less useful to project man-
agement and procurement management practitioners, who
would grow frustrated with the emphasis on theory and abstrac-
tion typical of scholarly works. ■
Reviewed by J. Davidson Frame, PhD, PMP, Academic Dean,
University of Management and Technology, Arlington, VA, USA.
115PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 3:03 PM Page 115
Cover to Cover
Global Project Management: Communication,
Collaboration and Management Across Borders
by Jean Binder
F
or project professionals working on vir-
tual or geographically dispersed proj-
ects, Global Project Management by Jean
Binder will be a valuable reference. It
could serve as a textbook for universities that
offer programs in project management and wish
to or have a course on the virtual and global envi-
ronment. Much of today’s project work is done
working with teams that may never meet face to
face on a project. If the team has the luxury of a
face-to-face meeting, typically it is held as a kick-
off meeting and not as a routine way of working.
After an interesting introduction describing
projects as traditional, distributed, internation-
al, and virtual, this book is organized in an easy-
to-read fashion, following the Global Project
Gower, 2007, ISBN: 9780566087066,
Management Framework developed by the
hardcover, 308 pp., $109.20 Member,
author. This framework has five areas: global
$114.95 Nonmember.
teams, global communications, global organi-
zations, collaborative tools, and collaborative
techniques. The book includes five chapters for each area. Binder
emphasizes that a critical factor is the challenges of international,
distributed, and virtual projects because so many of them are
global projects. This means it is also necessary to consider the
number of different locations, organizations, cultures, languages,
and time zones involved in a project because, as noted by his
framework, project managers then have different requirements to
consider, and as he says, “there are no universal answers” (p. 10).
Each chapter also includes “real-life experiences” and invites
readers to submit questions about opinions on the recommen-
dations, practices, tools, and techniques described by visiting the
author’s Web site. Readers may look for matters relevant to their
organizations and see if other readers have suggestions for
improvement. This approach shows Binder’s openness to new
ideas and recognition of the changing nature of the project man-
agement profession. He also provides suggestions for further
reading about the concepts presented in each chapter.
In a number of areas, Global Project Management adds to previ-
ously notable work. For example, in his first chapter on cross-cultural
collaboration, Binder expands on many of the 360-degree perform-
ance evaluation methods in use in organizations to consider
the cultural behavior of people from various countries involved in
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 115
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute
Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20085
December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
the project. He provides suggestions for con-
sideration when a new project begins in the
chapter on global project leadership, such as
communications of the vision, goals, and
direction equally to both local and distant team
members, and describes different leadership
theories applicable to the different cultures of
the team members on the project. In Chapter
4, “Conflict Resolution,” Binder discusses the
five standard conflict resolution models in a
way that also considers the cultural perspec-
tives involved.
Chapter 7, “Meeting Rules and Templates,”
provides suggestions of communications
media to use with different types of meetings.
The author extends these concepts in Chapters
22 and 23 with guidelines on hosting and
participating in meetings over a distance.
Chapter 8, “Global Communication Strategy,”
contains examples of global project knowledge
components and templates that could easily be used by a global team
with matrices for communications requirements. Chapter 19,
“Knowledge Sharing,” describes methods to evaluate technologies
for knowledge sharing and ways to best implement a new knowl-
edge-sharing solution effectively. It is followed by a chapter on col-
laborative project management software, with checklists to consider
in identifying the efficiency of the current approaches and potential,
proposed approaches.
It is often easy to overlook the importance of creativity on
global teams, but the author provides methods to consider, such
as asynchronous brainstorming techniques. Binder also focuses
in two chapters on the importance of emotional intelligence,
including guidelines for consideration, and the need to continu-
ally emphasize organizational change management strategies.
This leads to ways of increasing the maturity level of an organi-
zation in the five areas of his framework, and a final section on
an action research cycle with eight phases, each to be repeated
until the framework can be validated by all participants.
A shortcoming, however, to this easy-to-read work, is the
extensive mention of the author’s Web site throughout this
book—at the end of each chapter and before a new section of his
framework is introduced. ■
Reviewed by Dr. Ginger Levin, CAPM, PMP, PgMP, Project Management
Consultant and Educator, Lighthouse Point, FL, USA.
115
116PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 2:58 PM Page 116
Cover to Cover
Managing Global Development Risk
by James M. Hussey and Steven E. Hall
I
n today’s the-world-is-flat environment, a
keen sense of the benefits and challenges
associated with global outsourcing
is paramount to business success.
Managing Global Development Risk by James
M. Hussey and Steven E. Hall provides this
insight by first offering an overview of the
business trends in global outsourcing and then
laying down the foundation for working in a
global environment. The benefits and chal-
lenges of working in this environment are
illustrated by walking through the Project
Management Institute’s A Guide to the Project
Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK®
Guide)—Third Edition process groups—
Initiating, Planning, Executing, Monitoring Auerbach Publications, 2008,
and Controlling, and Closing—with a separate ISBN: 9781420055207, hardcover
chapter dedicated to each. Finally, the book w/CD-ROM, 256 pp., $66.45 Member,
pulls it all together with a chapter on “Thinking $69.95 Nonmember.
Globally,” which gives some excellent ideas as
to how to handle the team side of the equation.
So what’s driving this emphasis on global outsourcing?
Primarily it is customer demand for less expensive and shorter
development cycles, yielding high-quality deliverables. Offshore
options are quite attractive in helping to lower overall cost but
must be considered in conjunction with the associated risks inher-
ent with a globally dispersed team. The authors make the reader
aware of these potential pitfalls while also providing insights and
suggestions to facilitate the management of these risks.
The book starts off with an overview of the various global
trends and the dynamics behind the drive for offshoring. The ben-
efits and challenges of various operating models are discussed, as
well as some key aspects of pricing strategies and dynamics.
This section also addresses some of the concerns that onshore
managers might have regarding using offshore resources. One main
focus is on communication, not just with speaking and under-
standing English, but also in determining and agreeing on staff
capabilities (education levels, skills, and experience levels). This
plays very heavily into the contractual and pricing models described
later in this section. Also of interest are the discussions around the
specific cultural aspects and issues for selected outsource countries
such as India, China, and Russia, among others. This insight should
prove useful to better understanding the communication dynamics
that are essential to working with global teams.
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 116
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute
Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20087
116 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
One key point is that the responsibilities
and skills of the global development manager
are much broader and more strategic in nature
than most onshore project management roles.
Part of this is because of the need for estab-
lishing the direction (vision and strategy) and
aligning very diverse team components.
Understanding cultural and interpersonal
dynamics is crucial to team motivation and
the ultimate success of the project.
Additionally, there is a listing of core
competencies for project managers, cou-
pled with the suggested core competencies
for global delivery. These tables serve to
highlight and emphasize the strong need for
visionary and strategic thinking for anyone
in the global delivery management role.
In the later sections, the authors guide the
reader through the PMBOK® Guide process
groups and the subsequent project manage-
ment activities in light of working in the global/offshore environ-
ment. There is a lot of very useful information here. However, as with
any attempt to provide a thorough project walk-through, the con-
tent varies from basic to more advanced concepts. It is up to readers
to extract the tidbits that are appropriate for their experience level.
The project walk-through is done assuming a waterfall soft-
ware development approach. Where appropriate, references to
agile and iterative methodologies and principles are made—
specifically, the concept of a deliverables-centric work break-
down structure and “time-boxed” schedules in order to better
control the deliverables expected from offshore teams.
The final section provides a good summary to “Think
Globally,” adding tips and suggestions to help the global delivery
manager successfully integrate and “gel” the team. One excellent
suggestion to help pull this all together is the establishment of a
global development playbook. The playbook, along with the proj-
ect manager’s standard planning workbook, will serve to estab-
lish the project strategy and tactics and to help ensure a clear
communication of the project and expectations of the team.
The book includes a companion CD-ROM that provides
readers with useful templates and tools prealigned to the topics
addressed in the book. For those new to working in a global envi-
ronment, or for those who want to find some fresh ideas,
Managing Global Development Risk is a synthesis of lessons
learned from seasoned individuals. ■
Reviewed by Greg Indelicato, PMP, Program/Project Manager, Plano, TX, USA.
117PMJ1112.qxd 11/12/08 2:58 PM Page 117

Cover to Cover

Things Your PMO Is Doing Wrong

by Michael Hatfield
any project management books drilled into my skull as I pursued my

M profess to tell readers what to do

to achieve project success.
Things Your PMO Is Doing Wrong
by Michael Hatfield takes the opposite
approach. It tells readers what to avoid.
MBA . . .”). It includes frequent unsub-
stantiated generalities, such as, “The
use of this tactic is almost always fur-
thered by. . . .” Part 2 takes a different
tack by appending pronouncements
The book comprises three parts. Each with limiting caveats like, “. . . in my
part is composed of several brief chapters experience.” Some readers may wel-
that address a specific point. Part 1, come the testimonial aspects of the
“Tactics That Don’t Work,” describes seven text. Others may be less appreciative of
practices that are commonly encountered the relentless self-referencing.
in project work. They seem sensible and The central point of Part 2, and of the
enjoy broad support—but in the end, they whole book, is that readers should use
just don’t work. an earned value management system
Hatfield’s presentation is blunt, bold, (EVMS). Hatfield lays a good need foun-
and entirely refreshing—no sacred cows Project Management Institute, 2008, dation and follows with practical guid-
here and no bowing to time-honored tra- ISBN: 9781933890555, paperback, ance for implementing a basic system.
ditions. His take on training and certifica- 74 pp., $27.95 Member, $34.95 Part 3, “Hazards Along the Way,”
tions reveals a great but often overlooked Nonmember. consists of four chapters of warning flags.
truth: neither offers intrinsic value. Hatfield anticipates opposition to imple-
Training is only useful if it is subsequently applied to make menting the new-and-better way of EVMS. He guides read-
a difference. Certifications may be indicators of capability, ers through the corporate jungle where projects reside,
but it’s what the credential holder really does that matters. pointing out the pitfalls and describing how to avoid them
Consultants don’t get a break, either. They can be a so that projects may blossom and thrive. Corporate politics,
positive or negative force in project organizations. rival systems, active opposition, and debilitating consensus
Consultants can bring new ideas, unencumbered by the all get the candid review that is the hallmark of his style.
old ways, and can bring a level of objectivity that may be Hatfield is a good storyteller. His casual, conversa-
impossible to obtain within the organization. They can tional prose draws readers in and makes them seem a
just as easily bring a lack of concern for the long-term part of the story. He could have been more judicious in
health of an organization in which they have no stake. his use of nouns and adjectives. Referring to people
They can become mired in their own ways of doing things as “nitwits” and “pseudo-intellectual buffoons” may rub
in times past that are no longer relevant in contemporary some readers the wrong way, especially those who see
contexts. And worst of all, consultants can bring a “blame themselves described by the antecedent text.
yourself” mentality that seeks to find fault within the Some readers will see Hatfield as a sage and embrace
organization, not with their own solutions. his views. Others may be more skeptical and take things
The book is not one long whine. Part 2, “Things That with the proverbial grain of salt but still find much value.
Work,” includes five chapters on techniques that have And others will view his writing as ungrounded opinion
been successful in project execution, at least in the and dismiss it all without seeing the benefit that lies within.
author’s experience. People learn in different ways. Things Your PMO Is
Readers may notice a modification of style in Part 2. Doing Wrong responds to one of those ways. It is not a
Overall, the book is a first-person narrative—a chronicle of textbook for academic application. It is a story—an
the author’s personal journey to enlightenment. Part 1 is engaging and compelling story that delivers helpful
fraught with first-person references (“As my professors information to those who will read it for what it is. ■

Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 117 Reviewed by Kenneth H. Rose, PMP, Director, Peninsula Center for
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute Project Management in Hampton, VA, USA, and winner of the 2006 PMI
Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20088 David I. Cleland Project Management Literature Award.

December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj 117

118_120PMJ1112.qxd 11/11/08 3:37 PM Page 118
Index of 2008
Project Management Journal
Papers and Authors
1. A Project Portfolio Risk-Opportunity Identification
Framework. Hynuk Sanchez, Benoît Robert, and Robert
Pellerin. September, 97–109.
2. An Empirical Assessment of IT Project Selection
and Evaluation Methods in State Government. Kirsten
M. Rosacker and David L. Olson. March, 49–58.
3. An Empirically Grounded Search for a Typology
of Project Management Offices. Brian Hobbs and
Monique Aubry. August Supplement, S69–S82.
4. An Investigation Into Successfully Managing and
Sustaining the Project Sponsor–Project Manager
Relationship Using Soft Systems Methodology. Kosheek
Sewchurran and Michelle Barron. August Supplement,
S56–S68.
5. Analysis of the Front-End Loading of Alberta Mega
Oil Sands Projects. George Jergeas. December, 108–117.
6. Best Project Management and Systems
Engineering Practices in the Preacquisition Phase for
Federal Intelligence and Defense Agencies. Steven R.
Meier. March, 59–71.
7. Blending Service Provider–Client Project Teams
to Achieve Client Trust: Implications for Project Team
Trust, Cohesion, and Performance. Sheila Simsarian
Webber. June, 72–81.
8. CordNet: Toward a Distributed Behavior Model
for Emergency Response Coordination. Liaquat Hossain
and Matthew Kuti. December, 81–107.
9. Decision Making Within Distributed Project
Teams: An Exploration of Formalization and Autonomy
as Determinants of Success. Mario Bourgault, Nathalie
Drouin, and Émilie Hamel. August Supplement,
S97–S110.
10. Developing an Effective Project: Planning and
Team Building Combined. Michael Thomas, Paul H.
Jacques, John R. Adams, and Julie Kihneman-Wooten.
December, 118–126.
11. Development of a Project Management Model for
a Government Research and Development Organization.
Andrew E. Procca. December, 33–57.
12. Discriminating Contexts and Project Management
Best Practices on Innovative and Noninnovative
Project Management Journal, Vol. 39, No. 4, 118–119
© 2008 by the Project Management Institute
Published online in Wiley InterScience
(www.interscience.wiley.com)
DOI: 10.1002/pmj.20092
118 December 2008 ■ Project Management Journal ■ DOI: 10.1002/pmj
Projects. Claude Besner and Brian Hobbs. August
Supplement, S123–S134.
13. Do Project Managers’ Leadership Competencies
Contribute to Project Success? Linda Geoghegan and
Victor Dulewicz. December, 58–67.
14. Does Our Literature Support Sectors Newer to
Project Management? The Search for Quality Publications
Relevant to Nontraditional Industries. Lila Carden and
Toby Egan. September, 6–27.
15. Formulation of Financial Valuation Methodologies
for NASA’s Human Spaceflight Projects. W. Michael
Hawes and Michael R. Duffey. March, 85–94.
16. Governance and Support in the Sponsoring of
Projects and Programs. Lynn Crawford, Terry Cooke-
Davies, Brian Hobbs, Les Labuschagne, Kaye Remington,
and Ping Chen. August Supplement, S43–S55.
17. Governance Frameworks for Public Project
Development and Estimation. Ole Jonny Klakegg, Terry
Williams, Ole Morten Magnussen, and Helene
Glasspool. August Supplement, S27–S42.
18. How Project Management Office Leaders
Facilitate Cross-Project Learning and Continuous
Improvement. Jerry Julian. September, 43–58.
19. Impact of Organizational and Project Factors on
Acceptance and Usage of Project Management Software
and Perceived Project Success. Abdullah Saeed Bani Ali,
Frank T. Anbari, and William H. Money. June, 5–33.
20. Information Systems Project Management Decision
Making: The Influence of Experience and Risk Propensity.
Richard A. Huff and Victor R. Prybutok. June, 34–47.
21. Knowledge Transfer in Project-Based
Organizations: An Organizational Culture Perspective.
Mian M. Ajmal and Kaj U. Koskinen. March, 7–15.
22. Lagomizing, Organic Integration, and Systems
Emergency Wards: Innovative Practices in Managing
Complex Systems Development Projects. Christian
Berggren, Jack Järkvik, and Jonas Söderlund. August
Supplement, S111–S122.
23. Managerial Complexity in Project-Based
Operations: A Grounded Model and Its Implications for
Practice. Harvey Maylor, Richard Vidgen, and Stephen
Carver. August Supplement, S15–S26.
24. Managerial Perceptions of Project Stability.
Stephen M. Swartz. December, 17–32.
25. Modeling the Knowledge Perspective of IT
Projects. Blaize Horner Reich, Andrew Gemino, and
Chris Sauer. August Supplement, S4–S14.
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INDEX

26. Modern Virtual Project Management: The Effects of
a Centralized and Decentralized Project Management
Office. Wanda Curlee. August Supplement, S83–S96.
27. Motivation in Project Management: The Project
Manager’s Perspective. Bernhard Schmid and Jonathan
Adams. June, 60–71.
28. Project Management for New Product Development.
Dirk Pons. June, 82–97.
29. Project Management Practice, Generic or Contextual: A
Reality Check. Claude Besner and Brian Hobbs. March, 16–33.
30. Project Portfolio Control and Portfolio Management
Performance in Different Contexts. Ralf Müller, Miia
Martinsuo, and Tomas Blomquist. September, 28–42.
31. Protecting Software Development Projects Against
Underestimation. Eduardo Miranda and Alain Abran.
September, 75–85.
32. Public-Private Partnership: Elements for a Project-
Based Management Typology. Bachir Mazouz, Joseph Facal,
and Jean-Michel Viola. June, 98–110.
33. Six Sigma and Information Systems Project
Management: A Revised Theoretical Model. Weiyong Zhang
and Xiaobo Xu. September, 59–74.
34. Success Criteria and Factors for International
Development Projects: A Life-Cycle-Based Framework. Do
Ba Khang and Tun Lin Moe. March, 72–84.
35. Systematic Biases and Culture in Project Failures.
Barry Shore. December, 5–16.
36. The Impact of Project Managers’ Communication
Competencies: Validation and Extension of a Research
Model for Virtuality, Satisfaction, and Productivity on
Project Teams. Linda S. Henderson. June, 48–59.
37. The Pathogen Construct in Risk Analysis. Jerry S.
Busby and Hongliang Zhang. September, 86–96.
38. The Role of Technology in the Project Manager
Performance Model. Vittal S. Anantatmula. March, 34–48.
39. Value Stream Mapping in Project Management: A
Case Study. Maurizio Bevilacqua, Filippo E. Ciarapica, and
Giancarlo Giacchetta. September, 110–124.

Abran, Alain (31) Geoghegan, Linda (13) Olson, David L. (2)

Adams, John R. (10) Giacchetta, Giancarlo (39) Pellerin, Robert (1)
Adams, Jonathan (27) Glasspool, Helene (17) Pons, Dirk (28)
Ajmal, Mian M. (21) Hamel, Émilie (9) Procca, Andrew E. (11)
Ali, Abdullah Saeed Bani (19) Hawes, W. Michael (15) Prybutok, Victor R. (20)
Anantatmula, Vittal S. (38) Henderson, Linda S. (36) Reich, Blaize Horner (25)
Anbari, Frank T. (19) Hobbs, Brian (3), (12), (16), (29) Remington, Kaye (16)
Aubry, Monique (3) Hossain, Liaquat (8) Robert, Benoît (1)
Barron, Michelle (4) Huff, Richard A. (20) Rosacker, Kirsten M. (2)
Berggren, Christian (22) Jacques, Paul H. (10) Sanchez, Hynuk (1)
Besner, Claude (12), (29) Järkvik, Jack (22) Sauer, Chris (25)
Bevilacqua, Maurizio (39) Jergeas, George (5) Schmid, Bernhard (27)
Blomquist, Tomas (30) Julian, Jerry (18) Sewchurran, Kosheek (4)
Bourgault, Mario (9) Khang, Do Ba (34) Shore, Barry (35)
Busby, Jerry S. (37) Kihneman-Wooten, Julie (10) Söderlund, Jonas (22)
Carden, Lila (14) Klakegg, Ole Jonny (17) Swartz, Stephen M. (24)
Carver, Stephen (23) Koskinen, Kaj U. (21) Thomas, Michael (10)
Chen, Ping (16) Kuti, Matthew (8) Vidgen, Richard (23)
Ciarapica, Filippo E. (39) Labuschagne, Les (16) Viola, Jean-Michel (32)
Cooke-Davies, Terry (16) Magnussen, Ole Morten (17) Webber, Sheila Simsarian (7)
Crawford, Lynn (16) Martinsuo, Miia (30) Williams, Terry (17)
Curlee, Wanda (26) Maylor, Harvey (23) Xu, Xiaobo (33)
Drouin, Nathalie (9) Mazouz, Bachir (32) Zhang, Hongliang (37)
Duffey, Michael R. (15) Meier, Steven R. (6) Zhang, Weiyong (33)
Dulewicz, Victor (13) Miranda, Eduardo (31)
Egan, Toby (14) Moe, Tun Lin (34)
Facal, Joseph (32) Money, William H. (19)
Gemino, Andrew (25) Müller, Ralf (30)

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Guidelines for Project Management
Journal Book Reviews
Selecting Books for Review
Project Management Journal welcomes recommenda-
tions from project managers and others regarding books
that may be of professional value to fellow PMI associ-
ates. Areas of potential interest include: new ideas about
the theory, concepts, and techniques of project manage-
ment; new approaches to technology and management;
getting business results; competing in today’s complex
workplace; and global changes. Recommendations
should include the title, author, and publisher, and a
brief statement as to why the book should be considered
for review. The Journal will select books for review and
identify a reviewer. Individuals recommending books
for review may also volunteer to write the review.
However, individuals should not submit a review before
the Journal has selected the book. The Journal receives
many books from publishers and authors and cannot
review them all.
Guidelines for Writers
Reviews should begin with a strong, brief opening para-
graph that identifies the book and author, and tells the
reader why the book is important. The review should
not only describe the content of the book, but also what
the content means; that is, why it is a contribution to the
project management body of knowledge.
Reviewers may include the following elements:
• A summary of key or unique concepts
• Favorite quote, graphic, chart, etc.
• Important tips or guidelines
• New terms or phrases, such as “knowbots” or
“teamocracy”
• Message from the book that should be remem-
bered for future use, or should have been
disclosed years ago.
Reviews should include the book’s strong points and
any weak points if this information will be useful to the
reader. Reviews should be written in a conversational
style that maintains academic rigor. Reviewers should
avoid use of the first person (“I”) and focus on the book
and its contents. Reviewers should also avoid use of
extensive lists as a means of describing or duplicating
content. Instead, focus on what the content means to
readers. Reviews should be no longer than 750 words
(please use your computer word count to verify length
of the review).
Reviews should include complete publishing infor-
mation, if possible: title, author(s), publisher (city and
state), year published, ISBN number, total pages, and
price in U.S. dollars. The Journal will add any informa-
tion that is not available to reviewers.
Reviews should be prepared using MSWord and
should be submitted by e-mail. Submissions should
include the name, title, company, address, phone/fax/e-
mail, and brief (one or two sentence) biosketch of the
reviewer.
Reviews should be submitted to pmjournal@pmi.org.
Any additional questions about book reviews for
Project Management Journal may be directed to
natasha.pollard@pmi.org.
PMI reserves the right to edit all material submitted
for publication.
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Notes for Authors
SCOPE
Project Management Journal is the profession-
al journal of the Project Management Institute.
The mission of the Journal is to advance the
state of the art of the knowledge of project and
program management. The Journal presents
useful information on both theory and practice
in the field of project management. Authors are
encouraged to submit the following types of
original manuscripts: descriptions of innova-
tive practices; summaries of research results;
reviews of current literature; surveys of current
practices; critical analyses of concepts, theo-
ries, or practices; developments of concepts,
theories, or practices; analyses of failure.
Manuscript length should not exceed 12,000
words. The selection of manuscripts for publi-
cation is based on the extent to which they
advance the knowledge and understanding of
project management. PMI neither approves
nor disapproves of any data, claims, opinions,
or conclusions presented.
MANUSCRIPT REVIEW
Project Management Journal uses a double-
blind review process. The first review of every
manuscript is performed by two anonymous
referees (usually members of the Editorial
Review Board). The manuscript is then either
accepted, rejected, or returned to the author for
revision (with reviewer comments furnished to
the author). Revised manuscripts are sent to the
Editor, who makes a final disposition in consul-
tation with the Publisher. The Journal strives to
respond to all authors within three months of
the date the manuscript is received at the PMI
Publishing Department. Accepted manuscripts
are subject to editorial changes. The author is
solely responsible for all statements made in the
manuscript, including editorial changes.
ORIGINAL PUBLICATION
It is the policy of PMI to be the sole, original
publisher of manuscripts. Manuscripts that
have been submitted simultaneously to other
magazines or journals will be rejected outright
and will not be reconsidered. Republication of
a manuscript, possibly revised, that has been
disseminated via conference proceedings or
newsletter is permitted if the Editor judges
there are significant benefits to be gained from
publication.
COPYRIGHT
Upon acceptance of a manuscript, authors will
be asked to transfer copyright of the article to
the publisher. This transfer will ensure the
widest possible dissemination of information.
This transfer of copyright enables PMI to pro-
tect the copyrighted material for the authors,
but does not relinquish the author’s proprietary
rights. The copyright transfer gives PMI the
exclusive rights to republish or reprint the
manuscript in any form or medium as well as to
grant or refuse permission to third parties to
republish all or parts of the manuscript.
SHORT ITEMS
Short items do not need rigorous academic
scrutiny and are not refereed. Upon receipt,
however, these items become the copyright
property of PMI.
■ Opinion presents thoughtful discussion
of project management issues.
■ Correspondence pertains to the project
and program management profession, includ-
ing references to literature, practice, and schol-
arship as well as discussion and replies related
to articles published in the Journal.
■ Book Reviews express opinions about
books related to the project management pro-
fession, or about general management or tech-
nical books that cover topics of particular value
to the project manager.
■ Calendar of Events offers notices of
forthcoming meetings and calls for papers.
SUBMISSIONS
All manuscripts must be submitted electronical-
ly either by e-mail to natasha.pollard@pmi.org or
on CD and sent to: Project Management Journal,
Attn: Natasha Pollard, 4 Campus Blvd., Newtown
Square, PA 19073 USA. If you submit your manu-
script on CD, please include a printout of the
manuscript, including all tables and figures, on
8-1/2 x 11 inch paper, double spaced throughout,
and printed on one side only. Manuscripts
should include the following in the order listed:
■ A title page that includes the title of the
manuscript and each author’s name, affiliation,
mailing address, and phone, fax, and e-mail
address. Correspondence will be directed only
to the first author listed.
■ An abstract of 100 words or less that out-
lines the purpose, scope and conclusions of the
manuscript, and selected keywords.
■ Text (use headings and no more than two
levels of subheadings). To permit objective
reviews by two referees, the abstract and first
page of the text should not reveal the authors
and/or affiliations, but only the manuscript title.
■ References.
■ Illustrations and Tables. These should be
titled, numbered (in arabic numerals and cap-
tions), and each on a separate sheet, and the
preferred location indicated within the body of
the text.
■ Biographical details of each author.
Upon manuscript acceptance, authors must
also provide a black-and-white passport-style
photograph and a signed copyright agreement.
COMPUTER-GENERATED
TEXT AND ILLUSTRATIONS
Authors are requested to submit the final text
and illustrations via e-mail or on CD. As with the
requirements for manuscript submission, the
main text, list of references, table and illustra-
tion captions, and author biographies should be
stored in separate text files with clearly identifi-
able file names. Keep the layout of the text as
simple as possible and save text in its original
applications and/or Rich Text Format (RTF). It is
essential that the name and version of the word
processing program and format of the text files
are clearly indicated (example: Word for
Windows 2000 doc). The electronic version
should only be sent with the final accepted ver-
sion of the paper to the Editor. NOTE: The hard
copy and electronic files must match exactly.
Upon acceptance of the manuscript for pub-
lishing, authors will also be asked to provide illus-
trations placed or embedded within their chosen
word processing program. If this isn’t possible,
please submit illustrations in their native pro-
grams. Be sure to include a hard copy as well. PMI
now recreates all illustrations, figures and tables
electronically for publication. By doing so, the
publication is ensured a consistent look though-
out. Although this makes electronic versions of
illustrations less important, a hard copy becomes
crucial for re-creation purposes. Contact PMI’s
Publishing Department for further details.
STYLE OF TEXT
You should write in clear and concise English.
Spelling should follow Webster’s New World
Dictionary. Authors whose native language is
not English are assured that in-house editorial
attention to their manuscript will improve clar-
ity and acceptability to readers. For questions
regarding style and format of text, refer to the
Publication Manual of the American
Psychological Association, Fifth Edition.
REFERENCES
For questions regarding reference format, refer
to the Publication Manual of the American
Psychological Association, Fifth Edition.
References used in the text should be identified
by author name and publication date in paren-
theses, e.g., (Cleland & King, 1983), and listed
alphabetically at the end of the manuscript.
Page numbers should be cited for all quota-
tions. Follow the format example shown below:
Baker, Bud. (1993). The project man-
ager and the media: Some lessons from
the stealth bomber program. Project
Management Journal, 24 (3), 11-14.
Cleland, David I., & King, William R.
(1983). Systems analysis and project
management. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hartley, John R. (1992). Concurrent
engineering. Cambridge, MA:
Productivity Press.
Please ensure that references are complete, that
they include, where relevant, author’s name,
article or book title, volume and issue number,
publisher, date and page reference. The use of
page footnotes should be kept to a minimum.
Footnotes should be numbered consecutively
and listed at the end of the text.
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