LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 1
Canon 12: ASSIST IN SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Rule 12.01 and 18.02
A.M. No. AC 4762 June 28, 2004
LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
On June 9, 1997, Linda Vda. de Espino wrote a
letter-complaint1 with the then Court
Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, charging
respondent Atty. Pepito C. Presquito, a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Misamis Oriental Chapter, for "having employed
fraud, trickery and dishonest means in refusing
to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio
Espino, when he was still alive, the sum of
₱763,060.00." According to complainant,
respondent’s unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics
partly triggered the death of her husband, who
died "disillusioned and embittered."2 The letter-
complaint and affidavit also alleged that
notwithstanding the numerous oral demands by
Mr. Espino and complainant (after the death of
Mr. Espino), respondent still refused to pay the
amount represented by the eight checks which
had all been dishonored. Complainant surmised
that Atty. Presquito’s refusal to pay may be due
to his reliance on the influence of his father-in-
law, a former Executive Judge of the RTC
(Cagayan de Oro), and of his uncle, an RTC
judge (Cagayan de Oro).
The records show that sometime in September
1995, respondent was introduced to
complainant’s late husband, Mr. Virgilio M.
Espino. Mr. Espino, a resident of Davao City,
had sought the assistance of respondent, a
resident of Cagayan de Oro, regarding the sale
of his piece of land with an area of 11,057.59
sq.m. situated in Misamis Oriental. The
discussion between Mr. Espino and the
respondent resulted in the sale of the property to
respondent.3Under the terms of the agreement
between Mr. Espino and respondent,4 the
purchase price of the land was ₱1,437,410.00,
payable on a staggered basis and by
installments.5 Pursuant to the terms of payment
in the agreement, respondent issued eight post-
dated checks, totaling
₱736,060.00.6 Respondent then entered into a
joint venture or partnership agreement with Mrs.
Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land
into home-size lots and its development, with a
portion of the land retained by respondent for his
own use.7 The land was eventually titled in the
name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and
subdivided into 35 to 36 lots.
Meanwhile, the eight post-dated checks issued
by respondent were all dishonored. Mr. Espino
made repeated demands for payment from
respondent but the latter refused. Mr. Espino
died in December 1996. His widow,
complainant, then tried to collect from
respondent the value of the eight checks. When
complainant’s numerous pleas remained
unheeded, she filed the complaint in June 1997.
In his comment dated September 22, 1997,
respondent denied any wrongdoing, and said
that the allegations that he had employed "fraud,
trickery and dishonest means" with the late Mr.
Espino were totally false and baseless. The
complaint, according to respondent, stemmed
from complainant’s lack of knowledge as to "the
real story" of the transaction between
complainant’s husband and respondent. He also
vehemently took exception to the imputation that
he was banking on the influence of his father-in-
law and uncle-in-law.
Respondent does not deny the issuance of the
eight checks. What respondent claims, however,
is that the nonpayment was justified by the
unresolved problems he and Mrs. Ares have
with respect to the right-of-way of the land. He
alleged that Mr. Espino had made assurances
that the land had a right-of-way required for its
development, but respondent later found out that
such road-right-of-way required the consent of
four other land owners, and the expense would
be considerably more than he was made to
believe. According to respondent, he and Mr.
Espino had agreed that the latter would not
encash the checks or demand the equivalent of
the same until the right-of-way problem of the
land had been resolved.8 Respondent’s position
is that until the problem of obtaining a right-of-
way to the land has been resolved, nothing has
yet accrued against him or Mrs. Ares (his
partner), as it would be "very unfair and unjust"

for them to pay Mr. Espino when the land could
not be developed and sold.9
Respondent also alleged that he was entitled to
set-off against the amount he owes Mr. Espino
or his heirs from the purchase of the land, the
advances he made to Mr. Espino, and the cost
he incurred when he defended Mr. Espino’s son
in a criminal case. He later on manifested that he
has fully paid the portion of the land which had
been titled in his name through the same
advances and incurred expenses.10
In a resolution dated November 26, 1997,11 the
case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation/decision, and assigned to the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
In the IBP-CBD report dated November 12,
2002,12 Investigating Commissioner Caesar R.
Dulay found that "the facts and credible
evidence made available in this case indubitably
establish respondent’s failure to live up to the
demands of the Lawyers Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Canons of Professional
Ethics." For having failed to act with candor and
fairness toward complainant, Commissioner
Dulay recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months, and ordered to immediately account
with complainant regarding the sale of the piece
of land which had been subdivided in the name
of respondent and his business partner. On June
21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed a Resolution adopting/approving the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Dulay, finding that "respondent’s lack of fairness
and candor and honesty [was] in violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."
After a careful consideration of the record of the
instant case, we agree that respondent was
wanting in fairness, candor and honesty
demanded of him by the Lawyers’ Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics. We find, however, the
recommended penalty of six (6) months
suspension too light considering respondent’s
gross misconduct.
Complainant’s testimony and exhibits have
clearly established that: (1) there was an
agreement between respondent and
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 2
complainant’s late husband for the sale of the
latter’s land; (2) respondent had issued the eight
checks in connection with said agreement; (3)
these checks were dishonored and remain
unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing
road-right-of-way. Complainant’s exhibits were
formally offered as early as January 6,
1999,13and were admitted without objections
from respondent.14
In the face of these uncontroverted facts, it was
incumbent upon respondent to prove a legal
excuse or defense for nonpayment of the eight
checks.
Respondent utterly failed in this regard.
From the termination of complainant’s
presentation of evidence on December 1998
until Commissioner Dulay’s report on November
12, 2002, the records show that respondent was
unable to present evidence - either testimonial
or documentary - to prove that he had legal
cause to refuse payment, or that he was entitled
to legal compensation. Even respondent’s own
statements - which, without corroborating
evidence, remain mere self-serving allegations -
fall short of testimony, as he failed to submit to
cross-examination by opposing counsel or for
clarificatory questions by the IBP-CBD. Worse,
respondent attached eighteen documents to his
comment, but only went so far as to
mark (without a formal offer) the agreement
between him and Mr. Espino (for the sale of the
land), and the partnership agreement between
him and Mrs. Ares. Thus, respondent had no
evidence other than his own allegations.
Respondent’s failure to present evidence is a
breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,15especially in the light of the
numerous postponements and resettings he
requested for and was granted with, on the
ground that he needed more time to prepare his
evidence. We note that respondent was first
scheduled to present his evidence on December
14, 1998. Two years - five resettings, and three
orders submitting the case for resolution - later,
respondent still had not proffered testimonial or
documentary evidence.
Respondent claims that his failure to present
evidence was due to his financial difficulties, i.e.,
he could not afford to spend for travel expenses
of his witnesses.16 We are not persuaded. First,

it boggles the mind how financial constraints
could have prevented respondent from
presenting the originals of the documents
attached to his comment, proving, among
others, the alleged advances and costs on Mr.
Espino’s behalf. The originals of these
documents are presumably in his possession.
Second, with respect to the absence of
testimony, respondent could have submitted the
affidavits of his witnesses - the taking of which
he could have done himself in Cagayan de Oro
to keep down the cost. The records are clear that
he was allowed this option.17 But he did neither.
All these circumstances lead us to the
ineluctable conclusion that respondent could
not present evidence because there really
was none to justify his nonpayment.18
Even if we were to excuse respondent’s
procedural lapse and consider his written
pleadings as testimony, we agree with
Commissioner Dulay that respondent’s
problems with respect to the right-of-way or his
partnership with Mrs. Ares do not excuse his
nonpayment. As stated in the IBP-CBD report:
[T]he solution to the right-of-way problem
however clearly lies in the hands of
respondent….We note that respondent
has already taken title over the property
together with Guadalupe Ares by making
complainant’s late husband, sign over the
property by way of the Deed of Sale. We
therefore find respondent’s position vis-
à-vis the widowed complainant sneaky
and unfair. We reiterate that respondent
has assumed responsibility for the
negotiations on the road-right-of-way and
was aware of the problem. To [sic] our
mind he has used the alleged road-right-
of-way problem only as an afterthought
and a reason to delay and in fact deny the
complainant payment of what is due her.
Respondent also alleges and blames the
deceased husband of complainant for the
failed project but the facts show
otherwise. They are just bare allegations
and remain unsubstantiated. Besides,
respondent and Ares took risks in the
business venture and are now the titled
owners of the property. The seller cannot
be blamed for any failure in the project.
Respondent’s actuations in the whole
transaction is [sic] not at par with the
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 3
standards demanded of him as a
member of the bar. Respondent is
lacking in fairness and candour [sic] and
honesty. The fact that he has
unreasonably delayed and failed to
account with complainant for a long time
and the fact of his having allowed the
checks he issued to bounce is [sic]
unacceptable and censurable behavior
for a member of the bar.19 [citations
omitted]
Having no legal defense to refuse payment of
the eight dishonored checks, respondent’s
indifference to complainant’s entreaties for
payment was conduct unbecoming of a member
of the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct
towards complainant and her late
20
husband, first by allowing the eight (8) checks
he issued to bounce, then by ignoring the
repeated demands for payment until
complainant was forced to file this complaint,
and finally by deliberately delaying the
disposition of this case with dilatory tactics.
Considering that the property of complainant
and her late husband is already in respondent
and Mrs. Ares’ name, the injustice of
respondent’s different maneuvers to evade
payment of the eight checks - due and unpaid
since 1996 - becomes more manifest.
It should be stressed that respondent issued
eight (8) worthless checks, seemingly without
regard to its deleterious effects to public interest
and public order. We have already declared,
most recently in Lao v. Medel,21 that the
issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer’s moral
character in serious doubt, though it is not
related to his professional duties as a member of
the bar.22 He not only sets himself liable for a
serious criminal offense under B.P. Blg. 22, but
also transgresses the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically the mandate of
Canon 1 to obey the laws of the land and
promote the respect for law.
It behooves respondent to remember that a
lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral character
 LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 4

is not only a good condition precedent to the

practice of law, but a continuing qualification for
all members of the bar.23 A lawyer may be
disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or
private capacity, that renders him unfit to
continue to be an officer of the court.24 Thus, the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in

conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.

Given the foregoing, and in line with

jurisprudence involving lawyers who issued
worthless checks - Lao v. Medel,25Co v.
Bernardino,26 and Ducat v. Villalon, Jr.,27 - we
find respondent’s reprehensible conduct
warrants suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. PEPITO C.

PRESQUITO is found guilty of gross misconduct
and is hereby suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year, and ordered to immediately
account with complainant regarding the sale of
the piece of land, which has been subdivided in
the name of respondent and his business
partner.

Let a copy of this decision be spread in his file at

the Office of the Bar Confidant and of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

RULE 12. 03: NO DELAY CASE
A.C. No. 6273
ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA,
Complainant, vs. ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO,
Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
An Information for Estafa[1] was filed on June 21,
2001 against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-
Fabroa (complainant) along with others based
on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty.
Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and
notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not
indicate the involvement of complainant,
complainant filed a Motion to Quash the
Information which the trial court
granted.[2] Respondents Motion for
Reconsideration of the quashal of the
Information was denied[3]
Respondent also filed six other criminal
complaints against complainant for violation of
Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative
Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a
Motion to Withdraw them.[4]
On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was
Chairperson of the General Mariano Alvarez
Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO),
received a Notice of Special General Assembly
of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider
the removal of four members of the Board of
Directors (the Board), including her and the
General Manager.[5] The notice was signed by
respondent.
At the October 14, 2001 Special General
Assembly presided by respondent and PNP Sr.
Supt. Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who
were not members of the then current
Board,[6] Gerango, complainants predecessor,
as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared
himself Chair, appointed others to replace the
removed directors, and appointed respondent as
Board Secretary.
On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group
took over the GEMASCO office and its
premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and
operations. On even date, respondent sent
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 5
letter-notices to complainant and the four
removed directors informing them of their
removal from the Board and as members of
GEMASCO, and advising them to cease and
desist from further discharging the duties of their
positions.[7]
Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with
the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-
Calamba a complaint for annulment of the
proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001
Special General Assembly.
The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by
Resolution of February 21, 2002, declared the
questioned general assembly null and void for
having been conducted in violation of
GEMASCOs By-Laws and the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines.[8] The RDs Resolution
of February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack
of jurisdiction[9] of CDA.
In her present complainant[10] against
respondent for disbarment, complainant alleged
that respondent:
X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A
GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT,
AND GAVE AID AND CONSENT TO THE
SAME[11]
X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE
LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FOR LAW
AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION[12]
X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH
COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR
TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE
AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS
AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL[13]
X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER
SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW [14]
X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT
ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZ
SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO,
INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING
COMMUNITY AS WELL[15]
Despite the Courts grant,[16] on respondents
motion,[17] of extension of time to file Comment,
respondent never filed any comment. The Court
thus required him to show cause why he should

not be disciplinarily dealt with,[18] but just the
same he failed to comply.[19]
The Court thus referred the complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.[20]
It appears that during the mandatory conference
before the IBP, complainant proposed the
following issues:
1. Whether or not the acts of respondent
constitute violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly the following:
1.1 Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal [processes].
1.2 Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
1.3 Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court.
1.4 Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law.
1.5 Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure
to do so.
2. Whether or not the above acts of
respondent constitute violations of his lawyers
oath, particularly the following:
2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein
2.2 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court
2.3 will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same
2.4 will delay no man for money or malice
3. Whether or not the above acts of
[respondent] complained of are grounds for
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 6
disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the
Supreme Court as provided for in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.[21]
Respondents counsel who represented him
during the conference proposed the issue of
whether, on the basis of the allegations of the
complaint, misconduct was committed by
respondent.[22]
After the conclusion of the conference, both
parties were ordered to submit position
papers.[23] Complainant filed hers,[24] but
respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of
extension of time, did not file any position paper.
In her Report and
[25]
Recommendation, Investigating
Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found
respondent guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath
as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting
that respondent had already been previously
suspended for six months, the Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended
for two years.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
Board of Governors opted for the dismissal of
the complaint, however, for lack of merit.[26]
On Motion for Reconsideration,[27] the IBP-CBD
Board of Governors recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six months.
The Court finds that by conniving
with Gerangco in taking over the Board of
Directors and the GEMASCO facilities,
respondent violated the provisions of the
Cooperative Code of the Philippines and the
GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the
Lawyers Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall
support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless
criminal complaints against complainant, he
violated the Lawyers Oath that a lawyer shall not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or
consent to the same.
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file
comment on the complaint, respondent failed to
file any and ignored this Courts subsequent
 LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 7

show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility, which SO ORDERED.
states that A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure
to do so. Sebastian v. Bajar[28] teaches:

x x x Respondents cavalier attitude in

repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme
Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondents conduct indicates a
high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts
Resolution is not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately, or selectively. Respondents
obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts
orders not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her
character; it also underscores her disrespect of
the Courts lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof.

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders

and processes and respondents deference is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard
thereof will subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary
sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold
the integrity of the courts and to show respect to
their processes.[29] (Citations omitted).

The Court notes that respondent had previously

been suspended from the practice of law for six
months for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[30] he having been found to have
received an acceptance fee and misled the client
into believing that he had filed a case for her
when he had not.[31] It appears, however, that
respondent has not reformed his ways. A more
severe penalty this time is thus called for.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar

P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years from
the practice of law for violation of Canons 1, 8,
10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath, effective
immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the

Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts
in the country for their information and guidance.

A.C. No. 7922 October 1, 2013
MARY ANN T. MATTUS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERT T. VILLASECA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Mary Ann T. Mattus against Atty.
Albert T. Villaseca for gross and inexcusable
negligence in handling Criminal Case No.
10309-02.
Background Facts
The complainant, German Bernardo D. Mattus
and Dexter Aligan were the accused in Criminal
Case No. 10309-02 – a case for estafa thru
falsification of public document filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus,
Cavite. The complainant and her husband,
German, engaged the services of Atty. Villaseca
to represent them in the proceedings. The
complainant maintained that she and German
were convicted due to Atty. Villaseca’s gross
and inexcusable negligence in performing his
duties as their counsel.
In her complaint-affidavit,1 the complainant
alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca: (1)
was often absent during court hearings but still
collected appearance fees; (2) frequently sought
the postponement of trial when he was present;
(3) failed to ask the RTC to direct a National
Bureau of Investigation expert to examine the
signatures of the spouses Leslie and Zuraida
Porter2 in the special power of attorney (SPA);
(4) failed to file a demurrer to evidence despite
having been granted sufficient time by the RTC
to submit one; (5) failed to present evidence on
behalf of the defense, and only filed a
memorandum; (6) did not inform her and
German of the dates of the presentation of
defense evidence and the promulgation of
judgment; and (7) erroneously indicated the
wrong case number in the notice of appeal.
According to the complainant, Atty. Villaseca’s
negligence in handling the case resulted in her
own and her husband’s conviction.
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 8
In the Court’s Resolution3 of July 16, 2008, we
required Atty. Villaseca to comment on the
complaint.
On September 10, 2008, Atty. Villaseca filed his
comment,4 refuting the allegations against him.
Atty. Villaseca explained that he made known to
the complainant that the testimony of a
handwriting expert was necessary only if the
prosecution would be able to produce the
original copy of the SPA. Atty. Villaseca also
claimed that his absences during the hearings,
as well as his numerous motions for
postponement, were justified and were never
intended for delay. He denied having collected
appearance fees when he did not attend the
scheduled hearings, and maintained that the
fees he received were intended to compensate
him for his services in the other cases filed by
the complainant. Atty. Villaseca further claimed
that he immediately corrected the case number
in the notice of appeal when he discovered this
error.
In a Resolution5dated October 15, 2008, we
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs’ Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation6 dated
September 16, 2009,Investigating
Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag
recommended that Atty. Villaseca be suspended
for six (6) months from the practice of law.
Commissioner Hababag ruled that Atty.
Villaseca’s reckless and gross negligence
deprived his clients of due process; his
actuations in the criminal case showed utter
disregard for his clients’ life and liberty.
Commissioner Hababag explained that Atty.
Villaseca failed to file a demurrer to evidence
despite the sufficient length of time that had
been given to him by the RTC to submit this
pleading, and waived his right to present
evidence for the defense, opting instead to file a
memorandum only. Commissioner Hababag
concluded that Atty. Villaseca’s failure to
properly attend to the interests of his clients led
to their conviction.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-2517 dated May 14,
2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and

approved the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, but increased Atty. Villaseca’s
period of suspension from the practice of law
from six (6) months to one (1) year.
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the records, the Court
finds the evidence on record sufficient to support
the IBP’s findings. We, however, increase Atty.
Villaseca’s period of suspension from the
practice of law from one (1) year to five (5) years.
We stress at the outset that a lawyer "is
expected to exert his best efforts and ability to
preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering
loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the
ends of justice."8 Once a lawyer agrees to take
up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity
to such cause and must always be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. He owes
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in maintenance and defense of his client’s
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning
and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. A lawyer who performs his duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client; he also serves the ends of
justice, does honor to the bar, and helps
maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession.9
The records of the present case show that Atty.
Villaseca had been grossly remiss in handling
Criminal Case No. 10309-02. To recall, Atty.
Villaseca requested for time to file demurrer to
evidence after the prosecution had rested its
case. In its order 10 of July 1, 2004, the RTC
gave him 20 days from receipt of the transcript
of stenographic notes within which to file a
demurrer to evidence. Atty. Villaseca, however,
did not file a demurrer to evidence, without
offering any explanation why he failed to do so.
As a result, the RTC issued an order 11 stating
that Atty. Villaseca "is deemed to have waived
his right to file the said pleading."
To our mind, Atty. Villaseca’s failure to submit a
demurrer to evidence to explain such omission
constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed
his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his
clients’ cause. We point out that nine months
had lapsed from the time the RTC granted Atty.
Villaseca 20 days to file the demurrer to the time
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 9
it ruled that he was deemed to have waived his
right to file this pleading. Clearly, Atty.
Villaseca’s actuations violated Rule 12.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that "a lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure
to do so."
The records further disclosed that after Atty.
Villaseca’s failure to file a demurrer to evidence,
the RTC set the initial presentation of defense
evidence on May 9, 2005. However, this hearing
was postponed thrice: the May 9, 2005 hearing
was reset to August 8, 2005 due to Atty.
Villaseca’s failure to appear;12 the August 8,
2005 hearing was reset to November 17, 2005
upon Atty. Villaseca’s motion;13 and the
November 17, 2005 hearing was reset to March
1, 2006 because of Atty. Villaseca’s
manifestation that his intended first witness was
unavailable.14 During the March 1, 2006hearing,
the respondent manifested that the defense
would no longer present any evidence, and
moved that he be given time to file a
memorandum.15
We point out that the prosecution rested its case
on July 1, 2004; yet Atty. Villaseca waited until
March 1, 2006 only to manifest that he would no
longer present any evidence. We are at a loss
why Atty. Villaseca chose not to present any
evidence for the defense, considering that the
accused wanted and were ready to take the
witness stand. As a result, the testimony of the
lone prosecution witness remained
uncontroverted. To make matters worse, Atty.
Villaseca directed German to attend the hearing
on June 6, 2007without informing him that it was
already the date of the promulgation of
judgment.1âwphi1
The Code of Professional Responsibility states
that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him."16 It further
mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence."17 It also states
that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."18
Atty. Villaseca’s failure to present any
testimonial, object or documentary evidence for

the defense reveals his lack of diligence in
performing his duties as an officer of the Court;
it showed his indifference towards the cause of
his clients. Considering that the liberty and
livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty.
Villaseca should have exerted efforts tore but
the presented prosecution evidence. He could
have presented the complainant and/or her
husband to the witness stand, instead of just
opting to file a memorandum. Or, at the very
least, the reason for this move should have been
fully explained to the clients, and later to the IBP
and to this Court. But no such explanation ever
came. We are thus left with the stark reality that
Atty. Villaseca failed to file, despite the promise
made to the lower court, a demurrer to evidence.
After failing in this first line of defense for his
clients, it should have been incumbent upon
Atty. Villaseca to present evidence for the
defense, but again, he unexplainably failed to do
this, leaving the lower court with no evidence to
appreciate except that of the prosecution, to the
detriment of his clients’ cause.
We emphasize that while a lawyer has complete
discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a
case entrusted to him, he must present every
remedy or defense within the authority of the law
to support his client’s cause. A memorandum, no
matter how lengthy, should not be made a
substitute for testimonial, object or documentary
evidence, more so in a criminal case where a
conviction could lead to dire consequences. In
saying so, we are not insinuating that the RTC
decision would have tilted in favor of the defense
had Atty. Villaseca presented evidence; we
simply stress that utmost fidelity and attention
are demanded once counsel agrees to take the
cudgels for his client's cause.
We again remind members of the bar to live up
to the standards and norms expected of the legal
profession by upholding the ideals and principles
embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer engaged to represent a
client bears the responsibility of protecting the
latter's interest with utmost diligence. It is his
duty to serve his client with competence and
diligence, and he should exert his best efforts to
protect, within the bounds of the law, the
interests of his client.19 A lawyer’s diligence and
vigilance is more imperative in criminal cases,
where the life and liberty of an accused is at
stake. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice
law carries with it the corresponding duties, not
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 10
only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar
and to the public. As we explained in Spouses
Bautista v. Atty. Arturo Cefra:20
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess
the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard
of legal proficiency and morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must
perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
"The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer
depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding
facts."21 Under the circumstances, we find that
the IBP’s recommended penalty of one year’s
suspension from the practice of law is not
commensurate to Atty. Villaseca’s
transgressions. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts
and society indicate a high degree of
irresponsibility that casts dishonor on the legal
profession.
The present case finds a close forerunner in
Santeco v. Atty. Avance,22 where we suspended
Atty. Luna B. Avance from the practice of law for
five(5) years for being grossly remiss in the
performance of her duties as counsel. In this
cited case, the civil case entrusted to Atty.
Avance was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
During the pendency of her motion for
reconsideration (which she had filed way beyond
the reglementary period), she told her client that
she would file a petition for certiorari before the
CA to assail the dismissal of the civil case. She
did not file this petition, but failed to inform her
client of this omission. Moreover, Atty. Avance
stopped appearing as counsel for her client
without notifying the latter.
Atty. Villaseca’s negligence in the present case
had much graver implications, as the legal
matter entrusted to him involved not merely
money or property, but the very liberty and
livelihood of his clients. We stress that the
moment Atty. Villaseca agreed to handle the
complainant’s criminal case, he became duty-
bound to serve his clients with competence and
diligence, and to champion their cause with
 LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 11

whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his

clients every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law, Atty. Villaseca fell short of
what is expected of him as an officer of the
Court. We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients.

All told, Atty. Villaseca showed a wanton and

utter disregard to his clients’ cause; his failure to
exercise due diligence in attending to their
interest in the criminal case caused them grave
prejudice. Under the circumstances, we find a
five-year suspension from the practice of law to
be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against
him. The increased penalty serves the purpose
of protecting the interest of the Court, the legal
profession and the public.

WHEREFORE premises considered, we find

Atty. Albert T. Villaseca guilty of negligence, in
violation of Rules 12.03 and 18.03 and Canon 17
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
five (5) years, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision, and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the

Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

RULE 12. 04: NO DELAY OR IMPEDE THE
EXECUTION OF JUDGEMENT/MISUSE
COUNT PROCESS
[G.R. No. 133090. January 19, 2001]
REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL
BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners, vs.
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAOL, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals[1] affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite,
declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring
guilty in direct contempt of court.
The incident subject of the petition occurred
during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of
Civil Case No. 1266-96 entitled Royal
Becthel[2] Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis
Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al., for
Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title,
Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order in the sala of respondent
judge Dolores S. Espaol of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous
counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial
court issued an order on February 27, 1996
directing the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Cavite to annotate at the back of certain
certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite
could comply with said order, the defendant
Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a
motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996,
petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal
Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the
motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16,
1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was
granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was opposed by the
defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on
November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 12
Opposition and a Motion for Contempt of
Court.[3]
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of
court held on December 5, 1996, the following
incident transpired:
ATTY. BUGARING: For the plaintiff, your Honor,
we are ready.
ATTY CORDERO: Same appearance for the
defendant, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, we are
ready with respect to the prosecution of our
motion for contempt, your Honor. May we know
from the record if the Register of Deeds is
properly notified for todays hearing.
COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.
INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion,
He is here, your Honor.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready, your Honor.
COURT: There is a motion for contempt in
connection with the order of this Court which
directed your office to register lis pendens of the
complaint in connection with this case of Royal
Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis
Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor, I just
received this morning at ten o clock [in the
morning] the subpoena.
ATTY. BUGARING: May we put it on record that
as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the
Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy of
our motion, your Honor please, and the record
will bear it out. Until now they did not file any
answer, opposition or pleadings with respect to
this motion.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well I was not informed
because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am
only the Deputy Register of Deeds and I was not
informed by the receiving clerk of our office
regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was
surprised when I received this morning the
subpoena, your Honor.

ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we
put that on record that the manifestation of the
respondent that he was not informed.
COURT: That is recorded. This is a Court of
record and everything that you say here is
recorded.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes your Honor please, we
know that but we want to be specific because we
will be [filing] a case against this receiving clerk
who did not [inform] him your Honor please, with
this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register
of Deeds that is irregularity in the performance
of the official duty of the clerk not to inform the
parties concerned.
COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find
out who this fellow who is taking the video
recording at this proceedings. There is no
permission from this Court that such
proceedings should be taken.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor, my Assistant. I
did not advise him to take a video he just
accompanied me this morning.
COURT: Right, but the video recording is
prepared process and you should secure the
permission of this Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: Actually, I did not instruct
him to take some video tape.
COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if
you did not give him the go signal that shots
should be done.
ATTY. BUGARING: This Court should not
presume that, your Honor please, we just came
from an occasion last night and I am not yet
come home, your Honor please. I could prove
your Honor please, that the contents of that tape
is other matters your Honor please. I was just
surprised why he took video tape your Honor
please, that we ask the apology of this Court if
that offend this Court your Honor please.
COURT: It is not offending because this is a
public proceedings but the necessary authority
or permission should be secured.
ATTY. BUGARING: In fact I instructed him to go
out, your Honor.
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 13
COURT: After the court have noticed that he is
taking a video tape.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, in fact that
is not my personal problem your Honor please,
that is personal to that guy your Honor please if
this representation is being .
COURT: That is very shallow, dont give that
alibi.
ATTY. BUGARING: At any rate, your Honor
please, we are going to mark our documentary
evidence as part of our motion for contempt,
your Honor please.
COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to
say with this matter?
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Well as I have said
before, I have not received any motion regarding
this contempt you are talking. I am willing now to
testify.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor I am still of the
prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This
is a criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings
is a criminal.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Your Honor please, may
I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.
COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the
presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the
Register of Deeds.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: Can I appoint an outside
lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your
Honor.
COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will
consider that you should be amply represented.
ATTY. CONCEPCION: As a matter of fact I have
a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing
ATTY. BARZAGA[4]: Yes, your Honor, I will just
review the records.
ATTY. BUGARING: Anyway your Honor please,
I will not yet present my witness but I will just
mark our documentary exhibits which are part of
the record of the case and thereafter your Honor
please.

COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because
there is a preparation being done by newly
appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty.
Barzaga is considered as the privately hired
counsel of the register of deeds and the
respondent of this contempt proceedings. How
much time do you need to go over the record of
this case so that we can call the other case in
the meanwhile.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor.
-----------------------------------
-----------------------------------
---------
COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well
actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of
the case your Honor, I noticed that the motion for
contempt of Court was filed on November 6,
1966 and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it
is stated that, the record of the case shows up to
the filing of this motion, the Register as well as
the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of
the Office of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite, did not comply with the Court
Orders dated February 27, 1996, March 29,
1996, respectively. However, your Honor, Atty.
Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter
coming from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated
September 18, 1996 addressed to the Register
regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining
to TCT Nos. T-519248, 519249 and 519250 and
this letter request, your Honor for the annotation
of the lis pendens clearly shows that it has been
already entered in the book of primary entry. We
would like also to invite the attention of the Hon.
Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was
filed on November 6, 1996. The letter for the
annotation of the lis pendens was made by the
counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18,
1996, your Honor. However, your Honor, as
early as August 16, 1996 an Order has already
been issued by the Hon. Court reading as
follows, Wherefore in view of the above, the
motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, is
hereby directed to CANCEL the notice of lis
pendens annotated at the back of Certificate of
Title Nos. 519248, 51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 14
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, may we
proceed your Honor, will first mark our
documentary evidence.
COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to
do what you want to do, okay. The counsel has
just made manifestation, he has not prayed for
anything. So let us wait until he is finished and
then wait for the direction of this Court what to
do to have an orderly proceedings in this case.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Considering your Honor, that
the issues appear to be a little bit complicated
your Honor, considering that the order regarding
the annotation of the lis pendens has already
been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we
just request that we be given a period of ten days
from today your Honor, within which to submit
our formal written opposition your Honor.
COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention
to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan
in connection with the refusal of the Register of
Deeds to annotate the lis pendens because of
certain reasons. According to the manifestation
of Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier
part of the record of this case, the reason for that
is because there was a pending subdivision
plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March,
1996. May I have the record please.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened
with respect to that matter.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Well, according to Atty.
Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain
this, your Honor.
COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of
the manifestation so that this court can be
guided accordingly. Because this Court believes
that the root of the matter started from that. After
the submission of the . what are you suppose to
submit?
ATTY. BARZAGA: Comment your Honor, on the
motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in
contempt of Court.
COURT: After the submission of the Comment
and furnishing a copy of the comment to the
counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give

the counsel for the plaintiff an equal time within
which to submit his reply.
ATTY. BUGARING: Your Honor please, it is the
position of this representation your Honor
please, that we will be marking first our
documentary evidence because this is set for
hearing for today, your Honor please.
COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence
and they do not have their comment yet what are
we going to receive as evidence.
ATTY. BUGARING: If your Honor please
COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do
whatever you have to do after the submission of
the comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor
please, but the record will show that the motion
for contempt was copy furnished with the
Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion.
COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you
will get what the Court would want to do. This
should be an orderly proceedings and
considering that this is a Court of record the
comment has to be in first then in your reply you
can submit your evidence to rebut the argument
that is going to be put up by the respondent and
so we will be able to hear the case smoothly.
ATTY. BUGARING: My point here your Honor
please, is that the respondent had been long
time furnished of this contempt
proceedings. With a copy of the motion they
should have filed it in due time in accordance
with the rules and because it is scheduled for
trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and
present to this Court, your Honor.
COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am listening, your Honor.
COURT: And this Court declares that you are
out of order.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well, if that is the contention
of the Court your Honor please, we are all
officers of the Court, your Honor, please, we
have also ---- and we know also our procedure,
your Honor.
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 15
COURT: If you know your procedure then you
follow the procedure of the Court first and then
do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor please,
because we could feel the antagonistic
approach of the Court to this representation ever
since I appeared your Honor please and I put on
record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon.
Court.
COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)
ATTY. BUGARING: Because we could not find
any sort of justice in town.
COURT: Do that right away.
ATTY. BUGARING: We are ready to present our
witness and we are deprive to present our
witness.
COURT: You have presented a witness and it
was an adverse witness that was presented.
ATTY. BUGARING: I did not.
COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of
the Court is for the respondent to file his
comment.
ATTY. BUGARING: Well your Honor please, at
this point in time I dont want to comment on
anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this
Honorable Court before trying this case.
COURT: You can do whatever you want.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, that is our
prerogative your Honor.
COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is
going to follow the rules.
ATTY. BUGARING: Yes, your Honor, we know
all the rules.
COURT: Yes, you know your rules thats why
you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.
ATTY. BUGARING: No your Honor, Ive been
challenged by this Court that I know better than
this Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor

please, Ive been winning in many certiorari
cases, your Honor.
COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going
to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging the
gavel) You call the police and I am going to send
this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)
ATTY. BUGARING: I am just manifesting and
arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.
COURT: You have been given enough time and
you have been abusing the discretion of this
Court.
ATTY. BUGARING: I am very sorry your Honor,
if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is
one way I am protecting my client, your Honor.
COURT: That is not the way to protect your
client that is an abuse of the discretion of this
Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) Will you see to it
that this guy is put in jail. (pp. 29-42. Rollo)
Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996,
Judge Espaol cited petitioner in direct contempt
of court, thus:
During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and
counsel were present together with one (1)
operating a video camera who was taking
pictures of the proceedings of the case while
counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making
manifestation to the effect that he was ready to
mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his
Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy
Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado
Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel
who explained that he did not cause the
appearance of the cameraman to take pictures,
however, he admitted that they came from a
function, and that was the reason why the said
cameraman was in tow with him and the
plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation
given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after
the Court took exception to the fact that although
the proceedings are open to the public and that
it being a court of record, and since its
permission was not sought, such situation was
an abuse of discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds
Concepcion manifested that he needed the
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 16
services of counsel and right then and there
appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to represent
him, the case was allowed to be called again. On
the second call, Atty. Bugaring started to insist
that he be allowed to mark and present his
documentary evidence in spite of the fact that
Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that he be
allowed to submit a written pleading for his client,
considering that the Motion has so many
ramifications and the issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he
be allowed to mark his documentary evidence
and was raring to argue as in fact he was already
perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga
has not yet finished with his manifestation. As
Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly
procedure, the Court directed him to listen and
wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly
proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would
speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus, the
Court declared him out of order, at which point,
Atty. Bugaring flared up and uttered words
insulting the Court; such as: that he knows better
than the latter as he has won all his cases of
certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows
better the Rules of Court; that he was going to
move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for
allegedly being antagonistic to his client, and
other invectives were hurled to the discredit of
the Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared
in direct contempt and order the Courts sheriff to
arrest and place him under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the
fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring committed
an open defiance, even challenging the Court in
a disrespectful, arrogant, and contumacious
manner, he is declared in direct contempt of
Court and is sentenced to three (3) days
imprisonment and payment of a fine
of P3,000.00. His detention shall commence
immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus,
Cavite.[5]
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his
three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal
Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00.[6]
While serving the first day of his sentence on
December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct
contempt of court. The next day, December 6,
1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for
the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration. Both motions were never
resolved and petitioner was released on
December 8, 1996.[7]
To clear his name in the legal circle and the
general public, petitioner filed a petition before
the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment
of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him
in direct contempt of court and the
reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on
grounds that respondent Judge Dolores S.
Espaol had no factual and legal basis in citing
him in direct contempt of court, and that said
Order was null and void for being in violation of
the Constitution and other pertinent laws and
jurisprudence.[8]
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough
reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of
the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was
obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant,
at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the
extent of being disrespectful, annoying and
sarcastic towards the court.[9] It affirmed the
order of the respondent judge, but found that the
fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of
P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of
Court,[10] and ordered the excess of P1,000.00
returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it
rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
order dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial
court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED
RETURNED to the petitioner.
Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of
Appeals this lone error:
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT
WHICH TO PETITIONERS SUBMISSIONS
SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF
AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED
DECISION.[11]
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 17
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of
the transcript of stenographic notes of the
subject proceedings would reveal that the
contempt order issued by respondent judge had
no factual and legal basis. It would also show
that he was polite and respectful towards the
court as he always addressed the court with the
phrase your honor please.
We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95
provides:
Direct contempt punished summarily. - A person
guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive
personalities toward others, or refusal to be
sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe
an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required
to do so, may be summarily adjudged in
contempt by such court or judge and punished
by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or
both, if it be a superior court, or a judge thereof,
or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day, or
both, if it be an inferior court.
We agree with the statement of the Court of
Appeals that petitioners alleged deference to the
trial court in consistently addressing the
respondent judge as your Honor please
throughout the proceedings is belied by his
behavior therein:
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari
against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December
5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule
11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the
respondent judge was partial in favor of the other
party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-
41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which
enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge

motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
3. behaving without due regard to the trial courts
order to maintain order in the proceedings (pp.
9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo)
is in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyers
duty to maintain towards the courts (1) respectful
attitude in order to maintain its importance in the
administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates lawyers to observe and maintain the
respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
4. behaving without due regard or deference to
his fellow counsel who at the time he was
making representations in behalf of the other
party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner
and was not allowed to further put a word in
edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp.
34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and Canon 22 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges
a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and
5. the refusal of the petitioner to allow the
Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite,
through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard
(Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997
Constitution on the right to due process of law,
Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
which mandates a lawyer to always treat an
adverse witness with fairness and due
consideration, and Canon 12 of Code of
Professional Responsibility which insists on a
lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
The Court cannot therefore help but notice the
sarcasm in the petitioners use of the phrase your
honor please. For, after using said phrase he
manifested utter disrespect to the court in his
subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior
from an officer of the Court cannot and should
not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be
observed and maintained during court
proceedings.[12]
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to
have his documentary evidence marked to the
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 18
extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and
the court showed disrespect to said counsel and
the court, was defiant of the courts system for an
orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
administration of justice. The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential
to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court,
and consequently, to the due administration of
justice.[13] Direct contempt is committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the
case at bar, and can be punished summarily
without hearing.[14] Hence, petitioner cannot
claim that there was irregularity in the actuation
of respondent judge in issuing the contempt
order inside her chamber without giving the
petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or
make an immediate reconsideration. The
records show that petitioner was cited in
contempt of court during the hearing in the sala
of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion
for reconsideration of the contempt order on the
same day.[15]
Petitioner argued that while it might appear that
he was carried by his emotions in espousing the
case of his client - by persisting to have his
documentary evidence marked despite the
respondent judges contrary order - he did so in
the honest belief that he was bound to protect
the interest of his client to the best of his ability
and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:
But a lawyer should not be carried away in
espousing his clients cause (Buenaseda v.
Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not
forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to
exert every effort and placed under duty, to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration
of justice pursuant to Canon 12, Canons of
Professional Responsibility (Gomez v. Presiding
Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA
432, 439). He should not , therefore, misuse the
rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice
per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes, in accordance with
Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons
(Ibid).
 LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 19

Lawyers should be reminded that their primary

duty is to assist the courts in the administration
of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay,
impede or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes such lawyers duty.[16]

Although respondent judge was justified in citing

petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred
in imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00
which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-
95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It
was not established that the fine was imposed in
bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly
ordered the return of the excess of
P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days
imprisonment meted out to petitioner was
justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed
in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.

It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the

Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in its assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated

March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to
the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum
of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of P3,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27662 October 29, 1968
MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, ATANACIO A. MARDO, as
Chief Hearing Officer of Regional Officer of
the Department of Labor, CITY SHERIFF OF
MANILA and MARIO ABITRIA, respondents.
Manuel A. Corpuz for petitioner.
Pagano C. Villavieja and Cecilia E. Curso for
public respondent Atanacio A. Mardo.
Hector C. Regino for private respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court, in a resolution of June 21, 1967, was
persuaded, regrettably as it turned out, to give
due course to a certiorari and prohibition
proceeding with a plea for preliminary injunction,
a restraining order being issued, in view of the
rather vehement and earnest protestations of
petitioner Manila Pest ControI, Inc. that it was
denied procedural due process. As will be more
fully explained, such is not the case at all.
More specifically, it was alleged that on February
24, 1967, respondent Workmen's Compensation
Commission, through its referee, considered a
complaint filed against it by the other
respondent, Mario Abitria, for compensation
submitted for decision after he and a physician
had testified, petitioner's counsel having failed to
appear at the hearing of February 24,
1967.1 Then came, according to the petition, a
motion for reconsideration dated March 7, 1967,
petitioner praying that he be allowed to present
evidence on his behalf.2 It was denied in an
order of April 4, 1967, as a decision had already
been rendered against petitioner, as employer,
awarding respondent Abitria P6,000.00 as his
disability compensation benefit. It was also
pointed out in such order that there was no plea
in such motion for reconsideration for such
decision being set aside, as it was limited to
seeking an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses. It could not be granted as the matter
was looked upon as "moot and academic."3 It
was then alleged in the petition that on April 11,
1967, a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order was filed with the averment that
petitioner was not aware of any decision
rendered in the case as no copy of the same had
theretofore been furnished to its counsel.4 After
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 20
a denial of such motion for reconsideration on
April 24, 1967, and a plea for execution on behalf
of respondent Abitria, which was granted on
June 14, 1967, the City Sheriff of Manila,
likewise made a respondent, levied on
petitioner's properties on June 14, 1967, by
virtue of the above writ of execution.5
It is petitioner's contention that in the light of the
above alleged infringement of procedural due
process, the actuation of respondent
Commission was either in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
That was the basis for the relief sought, seeking
a writ of preliminary injunction restraining City
Sheriff of Manila, from proceeding with the sale
at public auction of petitioner's properties and
after hearing, annulling the aforesaid writ of
execution and likewise all the proceedings in
RO4-WC Case No. 5503, thereafter making the
injunction permanent, and ordering respondent
Abitria to pay petitioner the sum of P500.00 as
attorney'sfees. Thus was imparted more than
just a semblance of plausibility to the petition,
deceptive in character, as subsequent pleadings
proved, but nonetheless insufficient to call for its
summary dismissal.
On June 21, 1967, this Court issued a resolution
to this effect: "The respondents in L-27662
(Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, et al.) are required
to file, within 10 days from notice hereof, an
answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition
for prohibition; let temporary restraining order
issue, effective immediately and until further
orders from this Court."
The answer of respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission of July 21, 1967 and
the later pleadings, revealed quite a different
story. It is now quite clear that instead of being
the offended party suffering from a legitimate
grievance, its right to due process having been
summarily disregarded, petitioner was not above
resorting to every technicality the law affords to
evade the performance of an obligation, which
under the law it must fulfill, namely, to
compensate for the serious and debilitating
ailment of tuberculosis acquired in the course of
employment by respondent Abitria. Accordingly,
the petition for certiorari and prohibition should
be, as it is hereby, denied.

The facts as found by respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission, which must be
deemed conclusive, can yield no other
conclusion but the undeniable liability for
compensation to respondent Abitria on the part
of petitioner. Thus: "From the recorded
evidence, it appears that claimant was employed
with the respondent since February 4, 1956,
working six (6) days a week and receiving an
average monthly wage of P180.00 as laborer for
the respondent. He was assigned in the
Research Division which conducted research on
rat traps and other matters regarding
extermination of pests, animals and insects. It
was testified to by the claimant and his
witnesses that in the place of his employment he
was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the
atmosphere was polluted with poisonous
chemical dusts. The working condition of his
place of work was also warm and humid in view
of the products being manufactured by the
respondent. He was not extended any protective
device and he was also made to lift heavy
objects in the painting and soldering. In his
soldering work muriatic acid and soldering paste
[were] used. Sometime in July, 1966 while the
claimant was soldering [he] began to experience
symptoms of pulmonary tuberculosis. Because
of his spitting of blood or hemoptysis, he went to
consult Dr. Felix Tuazon of the Quezon Institute
whose diagnosis was pulmonary tuberculosis,
chronic, active moderately advanced, right:
minimal, left. He was confined at the Quezon
Institute under the care of Dr. Felix Tuazon.
According to the attending physician, he was
admitted in the hospital ward as a hemoptic
patient or one who is bleeding from the lungs.
When he was admitted he was prescribed Vita
K. ampules, bronocal, ablocid, duestrep
injections and other anti-TB drugs. His clinical
history showed that the claimant was diagnosed
with severe coughing followed by expectoration
of fresh blood amounting to two glassful [when]
he was brought to the Philippine General
Hospital and given injection and was X-rayed.
From that hospital he was transferred to the
Quezon Institute where he was subsequently
admitted. The attending physician testified
further that the right lung had bronchogenous
lesions in the upper lobe with honeycomb at 2nd
and 3rd intercostal space, while the left lung had
fibrotic lesion behind the anterior rib II. ... He was
discharged from the Quezon Institute on
September 3, 1966, but the illness was not yet
arrested although there was stopping of the
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 21
hemoptysis. The doctor testified on cross
examination that the nature of work of the
claimant involving strenuous physical exertion
and other factors of work such as the lowering of
his resistance in view of the enormous inhalation
of chemical fumes also brought about the
aggravation of the claimant's present condition.
According to the claimant the respondent was
duly notified of his illness through the general
manager and in view of the respondent's refusal
to pay him disability compensation despite
repeated demands, claimant filed this instant
claim."6
The sole issue then, as accurately set forth in the
above decision, was "to determine in this case ...
whether ... there is sufficient or substantial
evidence in support of the claim for disability
compensation benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Law. The evidence on record is
crystal clear that the claimant had already
substantially proven his case and all indications
point that the illness of moderately advanced,
pulmonary tuberculosis was service connected
in view of his work as laborer involving strenuous
physical exertion which brought about the
lowering of his resistance due to the massive
inhalation of injurious chemical fumes to the
extent that he was made an easy prey to the
contraction of TB bacilli. The fact that there was
no evidence on record that claimant was sick
upon entrance to his employment, it is presumed
that he was normal in every respect during the
first period of his employment and the disease of
pulmonary tuberculosis showed only during the
later part of his employment when he was
assigned in the research division of the
respondent. The attending physician himself
stated that claimant's exposure to his work
aggravated the illness and we believe that the
respondent had failed to dispute the work
connection as there is no showing that
claimant's ailment was due to the lowering of his
resistance by causes other than the nature of his
work as laborer of the respondent."7
It must be a realization that no valid defenses
could be interposed that prompted petitioner to
rely on the alleged deprivation of due process, a
contention, which as will now be shown, is
without basis.
The petition was so worded that the employer's
right to be heard appeared to have been
disregarded. No further attention should be

accorded such an alleged grievance. If it did not
introduce any evidence, it had itself solely to
blame. No fault could be attributed to respondent
Workmen's Compensation Commission. There
must be such a realization on the part of
petitioner for its four-page memorandum
submitted in lieu of oral argument did not bother
to discuss such a matter at all. Accordingly, such
a contention need not detain us further as it
ought never to have been raised in the first
place.
Petitioner would make much however of the
allegation that, as shown in the answer of
respondent Workmen's Compensation
Commission,8 the decision was sent to a certain
Attorney Manuel Camacho but care of
petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel Corpuz.
Petitioner would emphasize that the one
"officially furnished" with a copy of such decision
was not its counsel, who was without any
connection with the aforesaid Attorney
Camacho. It would conclude, therefore, that it
had not received a copy of a decision which
could not thereafter reach the stage of finality
calling for a writ of execution.
This contention was squarely met in the reply-
memorandum of November 6, 1967 of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. Why it
happened thus was explained in an affidavit of
one of its employees, a certain Gerardo
Guzman, included therein.9 As set forth in such
reply memorandum: "As stated in the affidavit of
Mr. Guzman, he went to the office of Atty.
Corpuz, on March 10, 1967 to deliver a copy of
the decision ..., but Atty. Corpuz refused to
receive the said decision alleging that he was no
longer handling the case. Atty. Corpuz, instead
instructed Mr. Guzman to deliver the said
decision to Atty. Camacho since it was already
Atty, Camacho who was handling the case, and
Atty. Camacho, according to Atty. Corpuz, even
had the records of the case."10 In view of such
instruction, it was further noted, Guzman "went
the office of Atty. Camacho, but since Atty.
Camacho was not around he handed the copy of
the decision to the receiving clerk therein, who
received it as evidenced by the stamp pad
bearing the name of the Law Office of Camacho,
Zapa, Andaya & Associates on the attached true
copy of the Notice of Decision, ..."11
From which it could make the apt observation. "It
is indeed sad to note that after the Counsel for
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 22
Petitioner refused to receive the copy of said
decision, he is now impugning the delivery of
said decision to Atty. Camacho and is denying
knowledge of it when in fact and truth the
delivery of said decision to Atty. Camacho was
made per his instruction to Mr. Guzman, as
evidenced by the attached affidavit of Mr.
Guzman."12
In view of the rather persuasive character of
such an affidavit and the understandable
reflection on the actuation of counsel for
petitioner, there was, as could be expected
submitted by petitioner's counsel a rejoinder,
dated November 26, 1967. He would have this
Court believe that the reply-memorandum is
contradicted by what appeared in respondents'
answer, where it was stated that a copy of the
decision was received, not by him but by the law
office of a certain Attorney Camacho. He would
then ask why Guzman did not serve a copy of
the decision to him. He would even assume, for
argument sake, that there was a refusal on his
part to accept a copy of this decision, but he
would argue why did not Guzman, who could be
expected to know the duties of a service officer,
fail "to state said refusal in his official return."
Which of the above conflicting versions is
entitled to credence? That of respondent
Workmen's Compensation Commission would
appear to be more in accordance with the
realities of the situation. It is entitled to belief.
This would not be the first time, in the first place,
where out of excess of zeal and out of a desire
to rely on every conceivable defense that could
delay if not defeat the satisfaction of an
obligation incumbent on one's client, counsel
would attempt to put the most favorable light on
a course of conduct which certainly cannot be
given the stamp of approval. Not that it would
clear counsel of any further responsibility. His
conduct leaves much to be desired. His
responsibility aside, it made evident why, to
repeat the effort to evade liability by petitioner by
invoking the due process guaranty must not be
rewarded with success.
Under the above circumstances, no due process
question arose. What was done satisfied such a
constitutional requirement. An effort was made
to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision;
that such effort failed was attributable to the
conduct of its own counsel. True, there was a

denial; it is far from persuasive, as already
noted. It does not have the ring of truth. There is
no reason why the decision would have been
served on some other counsel if there where no
such misinformation, if there where no such
attempt to mislead.
No benefit would have accrued to respondent
Workmen's Compensation Commission. It was
merely performing its official function. Certainly,
it could be expected to see to it that the law's
beneficiaries were not inconvenienced, much
less frustrated, by its failure to follow the regular
procedure prescribed. It was unlikely that the
employee entrusted with serving a copy of the
decision, in this particular case, and in this
particular case alone, would depart so radically
from what the law requires, if there were no such
intervening cause that resulted in his going
astray. How could petitioner escape
responsibility?
Petitioner, and petitioner alone, could be
expected to furnish such a cause. Who would
benefit thereby? The answer cannot be in doubt.
Through such circumstance, wether intended or
otherwise, a basis was laid for at least a delay of
the fulfillment of a just claim. For it is to be noted
that there is no, as there could not be any, valid
ground for denying compensation to respondent
Abitria on the facts as found. Considering how
great and pressing the laborer's need for the
compensation due him was and the consequent
temptation to settle for less if in the meanwhile,
the money he had the right to expect, was not
forthcoming, petitioner, as the employer liable,
had everything to gain and nothing to lose by
such a turn of events. Even if it were an honest
mistake, the consequences were still deplorable.
It is quite revealing that in not one of the
pleadings filed by petitioner did it ever indicate
how it could validly avoid its liability under the
Workmen's Compensation Commission which
disclosed that the ailment suffered by
respondent Abitria while in its employment was
indeed compensable. Neither in its
memorandum submitted on October 19, 1967
nor rejoinder of November 21, 1967, did it ever
occur to petitioner to allege that if given the
opportunity for hearing it could interpose a
plausible, not to say a valid defense. It did not do
so because it could not do so. Our decisions as
to the undeniable liability of an employer
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 23
similarly situated are impressive for their number
and unanimity.13
It would thus be grimly ironic if the due process
concept, in itself an assurance and a guaranty of
justice and fairness, would be the very vehicle to
visit on a hapless and impoverished litigant
injustice and unfairness. The law itself would
stand in disrepute, if such a gross perversion of
its dictates were allowed. Any other view is
unthinkable. Otherwise, there would be a
stultification of all our efforts to promote social
justice14 and a mockery of the constitutional
ideal of protection to labor.15
Considering the above, it is not enough that
petitioner be required to pay forthwith the sum
due respondent Abitria. The unseemly conduct,
under the above circumstances disclosed, of
petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz
calls for words of reproof.
It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability
to protect the interest of one's client. It is quite
another thing, and this is to put it at its mildest,
to take advantage of any unforeseen turn of
events, if not to create one, to delay if not to
defeat the recovery of what is justly due and
demandable, especially so, when as in this case,
the obligee is a necessitous and poverty-stricken
man suffering from a dreaded disease, that
unfortunately afflicts so many of our countrymen
and even more unfortunately requires an outlay
far beyond the means of our poverty stricken
masses.
The ancient and learned profession of the law
stresses fairness and honor; that must ever be
kept in mind by everyone who is enrolled in its
ranks and who expects to remain a member in
good standing. This Tribunal is rightfully
entrusted with the serious responsibility of
seeing to it that no deviation from such a norm
should be countenanced. If what occurred here
would not be characterized for the shocking
thing it was, then it could be said that the law is
less than fair and far from honorable. What
happens then to the ideal that only he is fit to
belong to such a profession who remains a
faithful votary at the altar of justice? Such an
ideal may be difficult to approximate. That is
true, but let it not be said that when such a
notorious breach of its lofty standard took place,
as unfortunately it did in this case, this Court
exhibited magnificent unconcern.
 LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 24

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and

prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied.
With treble costs against petitioner to be paid by
his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.

[A.C. No. 6289. December 16, 2004]
JULIAN MALONSO, complainant, vs. ATTY.
PETE PRINCIPE, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The duty of courts is not alone to see that
lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is
also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their
just and lawful fees. Certainly, no one, not even
the Court can deny them that right; there is no
law that authorizes them to do so.[1]
In a Complaint[2] for disbarment dated 6 June
2001 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Julian Malonso claimed that
Atty. Pete Principe, without any authority
entered his appearance as Malonsos counsel in
the expropriation proceedings initiated by the
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In
addition, he complained that Atty. Principe, after
illegally representing him in the said case,
claimed forty (40%) of the selling price of his land
to the NAPOCOR by way of attorneys fees and,
further, in a Motion to Intervene, claimed to be a
co-owner of Malonsos property.[3]
In his Answer,[4] respondent replied that the
services of his law office, Principe Villano
Villacorta and Clemente Law Offices, was
engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at
Maapektuhan ng NAPOCOR, Inc. (SANDAMA),
through its President, Danilo Elfa, as embodied
in the Contract of Legal Services executed on 01
April 1997.[5] The Contract states in part:
The parties mutually agree one with the other as
follows:
I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the
FIRST PARTY as their lawyer of the collection,
claim, and/ or payment of just compensation of
its members with the NAPOCOR;
II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both
parties further agree on the following conditions:
A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal
documentation, attendance to court proceedings
and other related activities;
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 25
B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No
acceptance fees, appearance and liaison fees;
C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY:
1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price
between NAPOCOR and the SANDAMA
members; this forty (40%) [percent] is the
maximum rate and may be negotiated
depending on the volume of work involved;
2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover:
i.) Attorneys Fees of FIRST PARTY;
ii.) His representation expenses and
commitment expenses;
iii.) Miscellaneous Expenses, etc.
D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts
to increase or secure the best price from
NAPOCOR.
Respondent claimed that complainant Malonso
is a member of SANDAMA and that said
member executed a special power of
attorney[6] in favor of Elfa, which served as the
latters authority to act in behalf of Malonso. In
the document, Malonso authorized Elfa in the
following manner:
Ako, si JULIAN M. MALONSO, nasa hustong
gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa
92 New York St. Cubao, Q.C., sa pamamagitan
nito ay ITINATALAGA at BINIBIGYANG
KAPANGYARIHAN si G. DANILO V. ELFA,
nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at
naninirahan sa 038 Dulong Bayan, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan, upang gumanap at umakda
para sa akin/amin upang gumawa tulad ng mga
sumusunod:
1. PANGASIWAAN, ISAAYOS at
MAKIPAGKASUNDO (negotiate) para sa
pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa, sa National
Power Corp. (NAPOCOR), na may Titulo Bilang
T-229122, na nasasakupan ng Dulong Bayan,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan;
2. TUMAYONG KINATAWAN O
REPRESENTANTE ko/naming saan man at ano
man maging sa hukuman o alin man sa mga
opisinang may kinalaman hinggil sa aming
nabanggit na pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa;

3. TUMANGGAP AT MAGSUMITE ng mga
papeles na nauukol sa lupang nabanggit sa
Bilang 1;
4. GUMANAP ng ano man sa inaakala ni G.
DANILO V. ELFA na nararapat, matuwid at
makabubuti para sa nabanggit sa Bilang 1;
5. NA sa pamamagitan ng kasunduan at
kapasyahang ito ay binibigyan ng karapatan at
kapangyarihang lumagda sa lahat ng
papeles/dokumento si G. Danilo V. Elfa, ngunit
sa isang pasubali na HINDI KAILAN MAN SIYA
DAPAT AT WALA SIYANG KARAPATANG
LUMAGDA S GANAP NA BENTAHAN
(ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE).
DITOY AKING IGINAGAWAD sa naturan
naming kinatawan ang lahat ng karapatang
kumilos at magsagawa upang isakatuparan ang
kapangyarihang magbili sa bisa ng karapatang
dito ay iginagawad sa kanya nang kahalintulad
nang kung kami, sa ganang aming sarili ang
mismong nagsasagawa, at ditoy AMING
PINAGTITIBAY ang lahat ng kanyang gawin na
nasa aming naman ang lubos na karapatang
siya ay palitan o bawiin ang Gawad na
Karapatang ito.
In his Reply,[7] Malonso reiterated that he did not
authorize Elfa to act in his behalf, considering
that while the Contract of Legal
Services entered into by Atty. Principe and Elfa
was dated 01 April 1997, the special power of
attorney he executed bore a much later date, 27
November 1997. Moreover, he could not have
authorized Elfa to hire a lawyer in his behalf
since he already had his own lawyer in the
person of Atty. Benjamin Mendoza.
To counter this argument, Atty. Principe
commented that the agreement entered into by
SANDAMA and his law firm is a continuing one
and hence, Malonso was within the coverage of
the contract even if he executed the special
power of attorney on a later date. Likewise, as a
member of SANDAMA, Malonso is bound to
honor the organizations commitments.[8]
The Court adopts the chronological order of
events as found by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Julio C. Elamparo:
In the early part of 1997, National Power Corp.
(NPC for brevity) instituted expropriation
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 26
proceedings against several lot owners in
Bulacan including the complainant in this case.
On April 1, 1997, a Contract of Legal Services
was entered into between the law firm Principe
Villano and Clemente Law Offices and
SANDAMA, Inc. (Samahan ng mga Dadaanan
at Maapektuhan ng National Power Corporation)
represented by its President Danilo V. Elfa.
SANDAMA is the organization of lot owners
affected by the expropriation proceedings.
Complainant is a member of this organization.
On November 27, 1997, complainant executed
a Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay Kapangyarihan in
favor of Danilo Elfa appointing the latter as the
attorney-in-fact of the complainant on the matter
of negotiation with the NPC.
On December 21, 1999, NPCs Board of
Directors approved the amicable settlement of
the expropriation cases by paying all the lot
owners the total of One Hundred Three Million
Four Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two
Hundred Pesos (P103,413,200.00).
More that two (2) years after the expropriation
cases were instituted and while complainant was
represented therein by Atty. Benjamin Mendoza,
or on January 18, 2000, respondent filed an Ex-
Parte Motion to Separate Legal Fees From
Selling Price Between Plaintiffs and Defendants.
About ten days after respondent filed his motion
to separate legal fees, respondent filed his
Notice of Entry of Appearance (dated January
28, 2000) claiming that respondent is the legal
counsel of the complainant, a defendant in said
case.
On February 12, 2000, Sixty Nine (69) lot owners
including the complainant wrote a letter to NPC
informing the latter that they have never
authorized Mr. Danilo Elfa to hire the services of
the respondents law firm to represent them in the
expropriation cases.
On February 17, 2000, complainant filed an
Opposition to respondents entry of appearance
and motion to separate legal fees.
On March 7, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of
Attorneys Lien claiming 40% of the selling price
of the properties being expropriated by NPC.

On April 10, 2000, respondent filed a Notice of
Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan claiming 40% of the rights, title and
interest of the lot owners over their lots being
expropriated including that of complainant.
On November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed
a Motion for Leave to Intervene in the
expropriation case claiming to be a co-owner of
the property being expropriated.
On February 26, 2001, respondent filed an
Opposition to the Compromise Agreement
submitted by the lot owners and NPC for court
approval.
Because of the actions taken by the respondent,
the execution of the decision approving the
compromise agreement between the lot owners
and the NPC was delayed.[9]
The Report found that the Contract of Legal
Services is between SANDAMA, a corporate
being, and respondents law firm. SANDAMA is
not a party in all of the expropriation proceedings
instituted by NAPOCOR, neither does it claim
co-ownership of the properties being
expropriated. Furthermore, the power of
attorney was executed by Malonso in favor of
Elfa and not SANDAMA, and that said power of
attorney was executed after SANDAMA entered
into the Contract of Legal Services. Thus, the
Report concluded that the right of co-ownership
could not be derived from the said documents.[10]
Likewise, the Report noted that the right of legal
representation could not be derived from the
above-mentioned documents. A contract for
legal services between a lawyer and his client is
personal in nature and cannot be performed
through intermediaries. Even Elfa, the attorney-
in-fact of Malonso, was never authorized to
engage legal counsels to represent the former in
the expropriation proceedings. Moreover,
SANDAMA is not a party litigant in the
expropriation proceedings and thus Atty.
Principe has no basis to interfere in the court
proceeding involving its members.
The Investigating Commissioner concluded that
from the evidence presented by both parties,
Atty. Principe was guilty of misrepresentation.
Atty. Principe was found to have violated Canon
3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule
12.04.[11] In representing himself as Malonsos
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 27
and the other lot owners legal counsel in the face
of the latters opposition, Atty. Principe was found
to be guilty of gross or serious misconduct.
Likewise, his act of falsely claiming to be the co-
owner of properties being expropriated and his
filing of several actions to frustrate the
implementation of the decision approving the
compromise agreement make his conduct
constitutive of malpractice. The Report
recommended the penalty of two (2) years
suspension from the practice of law. [12]
In its Resolution[13] dated 25 October 2003, the
IBP Board of Governors ordained:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-241
CBD Case No. 01-848
Julian Malonso v.
Atty. Pete Principe
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering respondents
violation of Rule 3.01 of Canon 3, Rule 10.01 of
Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Pedro
Principe is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.
In his Appeal Memorandum,[14] respondent
claims that the Resolution No. XVI-2003-241
has no factual and legal basis, the complaint
having been motivated by pure selfishness and
greed, and the Resolution itself invalid for having
failed to comply with Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.[15] According to the respondent, the
Investigating Commissioner continued to
investigate the instant case despite the lapse of
three months provided under Section 8 of Rule
139-B, without any extension granted by the
Supreme Court.[16] Moreover, in the subsequent
review made by the IBP Board of Governors, no
actual voting took place but a mere consensus,
and the required number of votes provided by
the Rules was not secured considering that
there were only five (5) governors

present.[17] Respondent opines that the actions
of the IBP Board were aimed at preventing him
from pursuing his known intention to run for IBP
National President.[18]
We find for the respondent.
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it
that a lawyer accounts for his behavior towards
the court, his client, his peers in the profession
and the public. However, the duty of the Court is
not limited to disciplining those guilty of
misconduct, but also to protecting the reputation
of those wrongfully charged, much more, those
wrongfully found guilty.
On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the
elevation of the standards of the law profession,
the improvement of the administration of justice,
and the enabling of the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively.[19] Despite
its duty to police the ranks, the IBP is not exempt
from the duty to promote respect for the law and
legal processes and to abstain from activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.[20] Respect for
law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves,
who are supposed to be minions of the law,
engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly
brush aside the very rules formulated for their
observance.[21] For the very same reasons, the
Court cannot accept the explanation[22] of Atty.
Carlos L. Valdez, Jr. on the non-holding of a
formal voting for respondents case that:
Eventually, the Board reached a consensus to
reduce the recommended penalty from two
years to one year suspension. Since there was
already a consensus, the Board did not hold a
formal voting. A formal voting became
unnecessary inasmuch as it was obvious that
the decision of the Board became unanimous.
I assure the Honorable Justices of the Supreme
Court that due process was observed and the
Rules governing the Disbarment and Discipline
of Attorneys were faithfully observed and
complied with by the IBP Board of Governors.
The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant
to ensure that the innocents are spared from the
wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty
are meted out their just due. These rules cannot
be taken lightly.[23]
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 28
This Court underscores the procedural
transgression incurred by the IBP Board when it
issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 which was
reached through a mere consensus, and not
through a formal voting, with the required
number of votes not secured. As to the issue of
the protracted investigation without the requisite
permission from the Supreme Court to extend
the investigation period, we agree with
respondent that no such request was made to
this Court.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B read:
Sec. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or
upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed,
proceed with the investigation of the case. He
shall have the power to issue subpoenas and
administer oaths. The respondent shall be given
full opportunity to defend himself, to present
witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself
and counsel. However, if upon reasonable
notice, the respondent fails to appear, the
investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation
within three (3) months from the date of its
commencement, unless extended for good
cause by the Board of Governors upon prior
application.
...
Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of
Governors. (a)
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its
total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
Relevantly, Sec. 6, Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court provides in part:
Sec. 6. Board of Governors. the Integrated Bar
shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine
Governors shall be elected by the House of
Delegates from the nine Regions on the
representation basis of one Governor from each
Region.

The Board shall meet regularly once every three
months, on such date and at such time and place
as it shall designate. A majority of all the
members of the Board shall constitute a quorum
to do business.
From these provisions, it is clear that before a
lawyer may be suspended from the practice of
law by the IBP, there should be (1) a review of
the investigators report; (2) a formal voting; and
(3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the
Board. The rationale for this rule is simple: a
decision reached by the Board in compliance
with the procedure is the official decision of the
Board as a body and not merely as the collective
view of the individual members thereof. This is in
keeping with the very nature of a collegial body
which arrives at its decisions only after
deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas,
and the concurrence of the required majority
vote.[24] Thus, the vote of the majority would be
necessary for the validity of the Boards
resolution. Without a vote having been taken,
Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 (CBD Case No.
01-848) is void and has no effect.
The Court views with disapproval the fashion by
which the IBP Board of Governors, with a fellow
lawyer and fellow governors reputation and good
name at stake, cavalierly brushed aside the
procedural rules outlined no less by this Court
for the discipline and protection of its members.
The IBP, more than anyone, knows that the
success of a lawyer in his profession depends
almost entirely on his reputation. Anything,
which will harm his good name, is to be
deplored.[25] And yet the IBP Board of
Governors, despite clear evidence to the
contrary, and without any remorse, even
asserted that due process was observed and the
Rules governing the Disbarment and Discipline
of Attorneys were faithfully observed and
complied.
Normally, non-compliance with the procedural
rules would result in the remand of the
case.[26] However, on many occasions, the
Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on
the merits instead of remanding them for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice
would not be subserved by the remand of the
case, or when public interest demands an early
disposition of the case, or where the trial court
had already received all the evidence of the
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 29
parties.[27] In view of the delay in resolving the
instant complaint against the respondent, and in
the interest of justice and speedy disposition of
cases, the Court opts to resolve the same based
on the records before it.[28]
Before delving at length on the merits of the
other aspect of the present proceedings, there is
need to dwell first on a dimension of
expropriation proceedings which is uniquely its
own.
There are two stages in every action for
expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination by the courts of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit. The second phase
is concerned with the determination by the court,
with the assistance of commissioners, of the just
compensation for the property sought to be
taken which relates to the valuation thereof. The
order fixing the just compensation on the basis
of the evidence before, and findings of, the
commissioners would be final and would
dispose of the second stage of the suit, leaving
nothing more to be done by the Court regarding
the issue.[29] During this stage, the main bone of
contention is the valuation of the property
concerned.
The second stage which involves the issue of
just compensation is as important, if not more,
than the first stage which refers to the issue of
public purpose. But as it frequently happens, as
in this case, the public purpose dimension is not
as fiercely contested. Moreover, in their quest to
secure what they believe to be the fair
compensation of their property, the owners seek
inroads to the leverages of executive power
where compensation compromises are
commenced and given imprimatur. In this
dimension, the services of lawyers different from
the ordinary litigator may prove to be handy or
even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of
court and relies, for most part, on the sagacity,
persuasion, patience, persistence and
resourcefulness of the negotiator.
In the instant case, the trial court had already
ruled on the valuation of the properties subject
of the expropriation, the same order which is
subject of the appeal filed by the NAPOCOR.
Aware that it might take a long time before the
said appeal is finally resolved, and in view of the

delay in the adjudication of the case, the
landowners and NAPOCOR negotiated for a
compromise agreement. To assist them, the
landowners, through SANDAMA and its
president, Danilo Elfa, engaged the services of
a lawyer in the person of respondent. It is clear
that respondent was hired precisely for the
negotiation phase of the case.
Now, on to the merits.
As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality
distinct and separate from its individual
stockholders or members and from that of its
officers who manage and run its affairs.[30] The
rule is that obligations incurred by the
corporation, acting through its directors, officers
and employees, are its sole liabilities.[31] Thus,
property belonging to a corporation cannot be
attached to satisfy the debt of a stockholder and
vice versa, the latter having only an indirect
interest in the assets and business of the
former.[32] Thus, as summed by the IBP
investigator, respondent is the lawyer of
SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant
in all of the expropriation cases; thus respondent
had no basis to interfere in the court proceedings
involving the members. But things are not as
simple as that.
A review of the records reveals that respondent
had grounds to believe that he can intervene and
claim from the individual landowners. For one,
the incorporation of the landowners into
SANDAMA was made and initiated by
respondents firm so as to make negotiations
with NAPOCOR easier and more organized.
SANDAMA was a non-stock, non-profit
corporation aimed towards the promotion of the
landowners common interest. It presented a
unified front which was far easier to manage and
represent than the individual owners. In effect,
respondent still dealt with the members, albeit in
a collective manner.
Second, respondent relied on the representation
of Danilo Elfa, former SANDAMA president and
attorney-in-fact of the members, with whom he
entered into a contract for legal services.
Respondent could not have doubted the
authority of Elfa to contract his firms services.
After all, Elfa was armed with a Board Resolution
from SANDAMA, and more importantly,
individual grants of authority from the
SANDAMA members, including Malonso.
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 30
Third, the contract for legal services clearly
indicated a contingent fee of forty percent (40%)
of the selling price of the lands to be
expropriated, the same amount which was
reflected in the deed of assignment made by the
individual members of SANDAMA. Respondent
could have easily and naturally assumed that the
same figure assigned to SANDAMA was the
same amount earmarked for its legal services as
indicated in their service contract. Being a non-
stock, non-profit corporation, where else would
SANDAMA get the funds to pay for the legal fees
due to respondent and his firm but from the
contribution of its members.
Lastly, respondents legal services were
disengaged by SANDAMAs new President
Yolanda Bautista around the same time when
the SANDAMA members abandoned and
disauthorized former SANDAMA president Elfa,
just when the negotiations bore fruit. With all
these circumstances, respondent, rightly or
wrongly, perceived that he was also about to be
deprived of his lawful compensation for the
services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA
and its members. With the prevailing attitude of
the SANDAMA officers and members,
respondent saw the immediate need to protect
his interests in the individual properties of the
landowners. The hairline distinction between
SANDAMA and its individual members interests
and properties, flowing as it does from a legal
fiction which has evolved as a mechanism to
promote business intercourse but not as an
instrument of injustice, is simply too tenuous,
impractical and even unfair in view of the
circumstances.
Thus, the Court cannot hold respondent guilty of
censurable conduct or practice justifying the
penalty recommended. While filing the claim for
attorneys fees against the individual members
may not be the proper remedy for respondent,
the Court believes that he instituted the same out
of his honest belief that it was the best way to
protect his interests. After all, SANDAMA
procured his firms services and was led to
believe that he would be paid for the same.
There is evidence which tend to show that
respondent and his firm rendered legal and even
extra-legal services in order to assist the
landowners get a favorable valuation of their
properties. They facilitated the incorporation of
the landowners to expedite the negotiations
between the owners, the appraisers, and
 LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 31

NAPOCOR. They sought the assistance of
several political personalities to get some
leverage in their bargaining with NAPOCOR.
Suddenly, just after concluding the compromise
price with NAPOCOR and before the
presentation of the compromise agreement for
the courts approval, SANDAMA disengaged the
services of respondents law firm.
With the validity of its contract for services and
its authority disputed, and having rendered legal
service for years without having received
anything in return, and with the prospect of not
getting any compensation for all the services it
has rendered to SANDAMA and its members,
respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved
to protect their interests. They may have been
mistaken in the remedy they sought, but the
mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while
the practice of law is not a business venture, a
lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly
compensated for professional services
rendered.[33] It is but natural that he protect his
interest, most especially when his fee is on a
contingent basis.[34]
The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum
of forty percent (40%) contingent fees does not
make the contract illegal or unacceptable.
Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law.
Its validity depends, in large measure, upon the
reasonableness of the amount fixed as
contingent fee under the circumstances of the
case.[38] Nevertheless, when it is shown that a
contract for a contingent fee was obtained by
undue influence exercised by the attorney upon
his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that
the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court
must, and will protect the aggrieved party.[39]
WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and
considered CLOSED. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is enjoined to comply with the
procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases
involving the disbarment and discipline of
attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA

after a compromise agreement was entered into
by the lot owners and NAPOCOR.[35] Its motions
for separate legal fees as well as for intervention
were dismissed by the trial court. Prescinding
from the ultimate outcome of an independent
action to recover attorneys fees, the Court does
not see any obstacle to respondent filing such
action against SANDAMA or any of its members.
Any counsel, worthy of his hire, is entitled to be
fully recompensed for his services.[36] Such
independent action may be the proper venue to
show entitlement to the attorneys fees he is
claiming, and for his client to refute the
same. [37] If respondent could resort to such
separate action which obviously is more
cumbersome and portends to be more
protracted, there is similarly no rhyme or reason
to preclude him from filing mere motions such as
the ones he resorted to for the purpose of
providing what he perceives to be his legitimate
claim. The bottom line is that respondent is not
proscribed from seeking recovery of attorneys
fees for the services he and his firm rendered to
SANDAMA and its members. As to whether he
would succeed in the quest, that is another story
which obviously does not have to be resolved in
this case.
 LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 32

Rule 12. 05 - Rule 12.07: PROPER date of dismissal until actual reinstatement
BEHAVIOR; LAWYER SHALL NOT computed as follows:
HARASS WITNESS
3. CRISANTO CONOS
A.C. No. 7062 September 26, 2006
Backwages:
[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1355]
Basic Wage:
RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD 2/21/98 – 10/30/99 = 20.30
SAMBAJON, CRISANTO CONOS, and mos.
FREDILYN BACULBAS, complainants, P198.00 x 26 days x 20.30 = P104, 504.40
vs. 10/31/99 - 10/31/00 = 12
ATTY. JOSE A. SUING, respondent. mos.
P223.50 x 26 days x 12 = 69, 732.00
DECISION
11/01/00 - 8/30/01 = 10
CARPIO MORALES, J.: mos.
P250.00 x 26 days x 10 = 65,000.00
Complainants, via a complaint1 filed before the P239,236.40
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have 13th Month Pay:
sought the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing 1/12 of P239,236.40 = 19,936.36
(respondent) on the grounds of deceit,
malpractice, violation of Lawyer's Oath and the SILP
Code of Professional Responsibility.2 2/16/98 - 12/31/98
= 10.33 mos.
Herein complainants were among the P198.00 x 5 days
complainants in NLRC Case No. 00-0403180- x 10.33/ 12 = 852.22
98, "Microplast, Inc. Workers Union, 1/1/99 - 12/31/99
Represented by its Union President Zoilo Ardan, = 12mos.
et al. v. Microplast, Incorporated and/or Johnny P223.50 x 5 days
Rodil and Manuel Rodil," for Unfair Labor x 12/12 = 1,117.50
Practice (ULP) and Illegal Dismissal, while
1/1/00 - 10/30/01
respondent was the counsel for the therein
= 20 mos.
respondents. Said case was consolidated with
P250.00 x 5 days
NLRC Case No. 00-04-03161-98, "Microplast
x 20/12 = 2,083.33 4,053.05
Incorporated v. Vilma Ardan, et al.," for Illegal
Strike. P263,225.81
xxxx
By Decision of August 29, 2001,3 Labor Arbiter
7. RONALD SAMBAJON
Ariel Cadiente Santos dismissed the Illegal
(same as Conos) 263,225.81
Strike case, and declared the employer-clients
of respondent guilty of ULP. Thus, the Labor 8.FREDELYN BACULBAS
Arbiter disposed: (same as Conos) 263,225.81
9. RENEIRO SAMBAJON
WHEREFORE, premises considered, (same as Conos) 263,225.81
the complaint for illegal strike is dismissed for
Total Backwages P2,370,674.38
lack of merit.
Respondents are jointly and severally liable to
Respondents Microplast, Inc., Johnny Rodil and pay the above-mentioned backwages including
Manuel Rodil are hereby declared guilty of the various monetary claims stated in the
Unfair Labor Practice for union busting and that Manifestation dated August 24, 1998 except
the dismissal of the nine (9) complainants are payment of overtime pay and to pay 10%
declared illegal. All the respondents in NLRC attorney's fees of all sums owing to
Case No. 00-04-03161-98 for illegal dismissal complainants.4 (Emphasis and underscoring
are directed to reinstate all the complainants to supplied)
their former position with full backwages from

The Decision having become final and
executory, the Labor Arbiter issued on
September 2, 2003 a Writ of Execution.5
In the meantime, on the basis of individual
Release Waiver and Quitclaims dated February
27, 2004 purportedly signed and sworn to by
seven of the complainants in the ULP and Illegal
Dismissal case before Labor Arbiter Santos in
the presence of respondent, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed said case insofar as the seven
complainants were concerned, by Order dated
March 9, 2004. 6
Herein complainants, four of the seven who
purportedly executed the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to
before the Labor Arbiter the said documents or
having received the considerations therefor.
Hence, spawned the administrative complaint at
bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion
with his clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil,
"frustrated" the implementation of the Writ of
Execution by presenting before the Labor Arbiter
the spurious documents.
In a related move, complainants also filed a
criminal complaint for Falsification against
respondent, together with his clients Johnny and
Manuel Rodil, before the Prosecutor's Office of
Quezon City where it was docketed as I.S. No.
04-5203.7
In his Report and Recommendation8 dated
September 27, 2005, IBP Commissioner
Salvador B. Hababag, who conducted an
investigation of the administrative complaint at
bar, recommended that respondent be faulted
for negligence and that he be reprimanded
therefor with warning, in light of his following
discussion:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not
respondent can be disbarred for his alleged
manipulation of four alleged RELEASE WAIVER
AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who
subsequently disclaimed the same as bogus and
falsified.
A lawyer takes an oath when he is admitted to
the Bar. By doing so he thereby becomes an
Officer of the Court on whose shoulders rests the
grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the
proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration
of justice.
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 33
Mindful of the fact that the present proceedings
involve, on the one hand, the right of a litigant to
seek redress against a member of the Bar who
has, allegedly caused him damaged, either
through malice or negligence, while in the
performance of his duties as his counsel, and,
on the other, the right of that member of the Bar
to protect and preserve his good name and
reputation, we have again gone over and
considered [the] aspects of the case.
All the cases protesting and contesting the
genuineness, veracity and due execution of the
questioned RELEASE WAIVER AND
QUITCLAIM namely: Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Recall, Appeal and Falsification are PENDING
resolution in their respective venues. Arbiter
Ariel Cadiente Santos, who was supposed to
know the identities of the herein complainants is
not impleaded by the complainants when it was
his solemn duty and obligation to ascertain true
and real identities of person executing Release
Waiver with Quitclaim.
The old adage that in the performance of an
official duty there is that presumption of
regularity unless proven otherwise, such was
proven in the January 28, 2005 clarificatory
questioning . . . :
xxxx
. . . In the case at bar, the question of whether or
not respondent actually committed the
despicable act would seem to be fairly debatable
under the circumstances.9 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by
Resolution No. XVII-2005-226, approved and
adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Hababag.
After the records of the case were forwarded to
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), the
Director for Bar Discipline of the
IBP10 transmitted additional records including
a Motion to Amend the Resolution No. XVII-
2005-22611 filed by respondent.
One of the complainants, Renerio Sambajon
(Sambajon), by Petition12 filed before the OBC,
assailed the IBP Board Resolution. The Petition
was filed three days after the 15-day period to
assail the IBP Resolution. Sambajon explains

that while his counsel received the Resolution on
February 27, 2006, he only learned of it when he
visited on March 16, 2006 his counsel who could
not reach him, he (Sambajon) having transferred
from one residence to another.
Giving Sambajon the benefit of the doubt behind
the reason for the 3-day delay in filing the
present petition, in the interest of justice, this
Court gives his petition due course.
In respondent's Motion to Amend the IBP Board
Resolution, he does not deny that those whom
he met face to face before Commissioner
Hababag were not the same persons whom he
saw before Labor Arbiter Santos on February
27, 2004. 13 He hastens to add though that he
was not familiar with the complainants as they
were not attending the hearings before Arbiter
Santos.14 Complainants15 and their former
counsel Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan claim 16
otherwise, however. And the Minutes17 of the
proceedings before the National Conciliation
Mediation Board in a related case, NCMB-NCR-
NS-02-081-98, "Re: Microplast, Inc., Labor
Dispute," which minutes bear respondent's and
complainants' signatures, belie respondent's
claim that he had not met complainants before.
Respondent, who declared that he went to the
Office of the Labor Arbiter on February 27, 2004
on the request of his clients who "told him that
on February 27, 2004 the seven claimants
w[ould] be at the office of Arbiter Santos [to]
submit their respective quitclaims and waivers,"
heaps on the Labor Arbiter the responsibility of
ascertaining the identity of the parties who
executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims.
But respondent himself had the same
responsibility. He was under obligation to protect
his clients' interest, especially given the amount
allegedly given by them in consideration of the
execution of the documents. His answers to the
clarificatory questions of Commissioner
Hababag do not, however, show that he
discharged such obligation.
COMM. HABABAG:
But is it not a fact [that it is] also your duty to ask..
that the money of your client would go to the
deserving employee?
ATTY. SUING:
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 34
I did not do that anymore, Your Honor, because
there was already as you call it before a
precedent in February of 1998 when my client
directly made settlement to the nine or eight of
the seventeen original complainants, Your
Honor, and I did not participate. Hindi po ako
nakialam don sa kanilang usapan because it is
my belief that the best way, Your Honor, to have
a dispute settled between the parties is that we
let them do the discussion, we'll let them do the
settlement because sometimes you know, Your
Honor, sad to say, when lawyers are involved in
a matters [sic] of settlement the dispute does not
terminate as in this case, Your Honor.
xxxx
COMM. HABABAG:
Yes. What made you appear on said date and
time before Arbiter Santos?
ATTY. SUING:
I was called by my client to go to the office of
Arbiter Santos, number one, to witness the
signing of the documents of Quitclaim and
Waiver; number 2, so that according to them
someone as a lawyer will represent them in that
proceedings.
COMM. HABABAG:
My query, did it not surprise you that no money
was given to you and yet there would be a
signing of Quitclaim Receipt and Release?
ATTY. SUING:
I am not, your Honor, because it happened
before and there were no complaints, Your
Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
Just because it happened before you did not
bother to see to it that there is a voucher so you
just rely on your precedent, is that what you
mean?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor, because I always believe that
the parties who are talking and it is my client who
knows them better than I do, Your Honor.
 LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 35

COMM. HABABAG: Honor, is only a single document where all the

So, you just followed the instruction of your client
to be present at Arbiter Cadiente Santos office
because there would be signing of Quitclaim
Receipt and Release, it that clear?
ATTY. SUING:
Yes, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
[You] [d]id not bother to ask your client
where is the money intended for the payment
of these workers?
signatories named are present because my
purpose there really, Your Honor, is that so that
each of them will be there together and they will
identify themselves, see each other para ho
siguradong sila-sila yong magkakasama at
magkakakilanlan. x x x x And when the signing
took place in February of 2004 it was made for
any [sic] individual, Your Honor, no longer the
document that I prepared when all of the
seven will be signing in one document.
COMM. HABABAG:
Okay. You did not inquire from your client whom
[sic] made the changes?

ATTY. SUING: ATTY. SUING:

I did not ask. I did not anymore because, Your Honor, at the
time when I was there, there are already people
COMM. HABABAG: there, the seven complainants plus another
woman.18 (Emphasis and underscoring
You did not asked [sic] your client who will supplied)
prepare the documents?
The Code of Professional Responsibility
ATTY. SUING: provides:

As far as the documents are concerned, Your CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO
Honor. THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
COMM. HABABAG: CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

The Quitclaim Receipt and Release? CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
ATTY. SUING: DILIGENCE.

Yes, Your Honor, I remember this. They asked xxxx

me before February of 1998.
COMM. HABABAG:
When you say they whom are you referring to?
ATTY. SUING:
I'm referring to my client, Your Honor.
COMM. HABABAG:
They asked me attorney can you please prepare
us a document of Quitclaim and Waiver or give
us a simple [sic] of Quitclaim and Waiver. I do
recall that I made one but this document, Your
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
To be sure, respondent's client Manuel Rodil did
not request him to go to the Office of Labor
Arbiter Cadiente to be a mere passive witness to
the signing of the Release Waiver and
Quitclaims. That he was requested to go there
could only mean that he would exert vigilance to
protect his clients' interest. This he conceded
when he acknowledged the purpose of his
presence at the Office of Labor Arbiter Santos,
thus:
ATTY. SUING:
 LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 36

To go there, Your Honor, and represent them
and see that these document[s] are properly
signed and that these people are properly
identified and verified them in front of Arbiter
Ariel Cadiente Santos.19 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
That there was an alleged precedent in 1998
when a group of complainants entered into a
compromise agreement with his clients in which
he "did not participate" and from which no
problem arose did not excuse him from carrying
out the admitted purpose of going to the Labor
Arbiter's office — "that [the complainants] are
properly identified . . . in front of [the] Arbiter."
May pinirmahan dito na Quitclaim Receipt and
Release. Ito ho ba sinong may gawa nitong
Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:
Sila po.
COMM. HABABAG:
Ibig mong sabihin ibinigay sa yo to ng
complainant o sinong nag-abot sa iyo nitong
Receipt Waiver and Quitclaim?
MR. RODIL:

Besides, by respondent's own information, Si Atty. Suing po.

Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on
the true identity of those who executed the ATTY. SUING:
Release Waiver and Quitclaims.20 That should
have alerted him to especially exercise the In fact, ang tanong sa iyo kung ibinigay daw sa
diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients' iyo yong mga dokumentong ito or what?
interest. But he was not and he did not.
COMM. HABABAG:
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a
person in a given situation and is the opposite of Okay, uulitin ko ha, tagalog na ang tanong ko sa
negligence." A lawyer serves his client with iyo ha hindi na English. Ito bang Release Waiver
diligence by adopting that norm of practice and Quitclaim sino ang may gawa nito, sino ang
expected of men of good intentions. He thus nagmakinilya nito?
owes entire devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his
MR. RODIL:
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning,
skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be
Kami yata ang gumawa niyan.
taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of
law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice
of law that the price of success is eternal COMM. HABABAG:
diligence to the cause of the client.
Pag sinabi mong kami yata ang may gawa sino
The practice of law does not require sa inyong mga officer, tauhan o abogado ang
extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) gumawa nito?
or that "extreme measure of care and caution
which persons of unusual prudence and MR. RODIL:
circumspection use for securing and preserving
their rights. All that is required is ordinary Matagal na ho yan eh.
diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance
expected of a bonus pater familias. x x x21 (Italics xxxx
in the original; underscoring supplied)
COMM. HABABAG:
And this Court notes the attempt of respondent
to influence the answers of his client Manuel Okay. Pangalawang gusto kong itanong.
Rodil when the latter testified before Sino ang naghatid nito kay Ariel Cadiente
Commissioner Manuel Hababag: Santos para pirmahan ni Ariel Cadiente Santos?

COMM. HABABAG: MR. RODIL:

 LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 37

Si attorney po. Sabi mo may inabutan kang taong pera?

ATTY. SUING: MR. RODIL:

Wait. I did not bring the documents. The Opo.

Commissioner is asking kung sino ang nagdala
ng mga dokumento? COMM. HABABAG:

MR. RODIL: Ang sagot mo kay attorney. Sinong attorney ang

tinutukoy mo?
Yong mga tao.
MR. RODIL:
xxxx
Atty. Suing po.
COMM. HABABAG:
COMM. HABABAG:
Simple ang tanong ko ha. Intindihin mo
muna. Kanino mo inabot ang bayad sa Okay.
nakalagay dito sa Release waiver and
Quitclaim? ATTY. SUING:

MR. RODIL: Your Honor,…

Kay attorney po. COMM. HABABAG:

COMM. HABABAG: Pabayaan mo muna. I'll come to that. Magkano

kung iyong natatandaan ang perang inabot kay
Pag sinabi mong kay attorney sinong tinutukoy Atty. Suing?
mong attorney?
MR. RODIL:
ATTY. SUING:
Yan ang hindi ko matandaan.
Yong ibinigay na pera pambayad saan, yon ang
tanong. x x x x22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

COMM. HABABAG: Thus, not only did respondent try to coach his
client or influence him to answer questions in an
Sundan mo ang tanong ko ha. Ako ang apparent attempt not to incriminate him
nagtatanong hindi ang abogado mo. (respondent). His client contradicted
respondent's claim that the Release Waiver and
MR. RODIL: Quitclaim which he (respondent) prepared was
not the one presented at the Arbiter's Office, as
Opo. well as his implied claim that he was not involved
in releasing to the complainants the money for
COMM. HABABAG: and in consideration of the execution of the
documents.
Huwag kang tatawa. I'm reminding you serious
tayo dito. As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon
to assist in the administration of justice. He is an
MR. RODIL: instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his
part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes
Opo serious po. the administration of justice constitutes
misconduct.23 While the Commission on Bar
COMM. HABABAG: Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein
 LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 38

are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a

disciplinary action being in reality an
investigation by the Court into the misconduct of
its officers or an examination into his character.24

In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr.25 the respondent

lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for
his attempts to delay and obstruct the
investigation being conducted by the IBP.
Nonetheless, this Court found that a suspension
of one month from the practice of law was
enough to give him "the opportunity to retrace
his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal
profession."

While the disbarment of respondent is, under the

facts and circumstances attendant to the case,
not reasonable, neither is reprimand as
recommended by the IBP. This Court finds that
respondent's suspension from the practice of
law for six months is in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing,

is found GUILTY of negligence and gross
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months,
with WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the

Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.

Rule 12.08: NOT TO TESTIFY ON BEHALF
OF CLIENT
G.R. No. L-35252 October 21, 1932
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee.
Nat. M. Balboa and Dominador J. Endriga for
appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the
defendant from the complaint, without a special
finding as to costs.
The appellant makes the following assignments
of error:
The trial court erred:
1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise
to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone the
balance of the judgment rendered against the
said Uy Teng Piao and in favor of the Philippine
National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the
Court o First Instance of Manila.
2. In finding that merely in selling the property
described in certificate of title No. 11274 situated
at Ronquillo Street, Manila, to Mariano Santos
for P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the appellant had
undoubtedly given the alleged promise of
condonation to appellee Uy Teng Piao.
3. In finding that the consideration of document
Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the balance of the
judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328.
4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that
the latter has actually given such promise to
condone, could bind the appellant corporation.
5. In holding that the absence of demand for
payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for the
balance of the said judgment from February 11,
1925 up to the year 1930 is "una senal
inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the
condonation of the balance of the said judgment.
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 39
6. In finding that by the sale of the said property
to Mariano Santos for the sum of P8,600, the
said judgment in civil case No. 26328 has been
more than fully paid even discounting the sum of
P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest
bidder for the said property.
7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng
Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D-1, reflects
only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao
to avoid having a case with the appellant bank.
8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and
in not sentencing him to pay the amount claimed
in the complaint with costs.
On September 9, 1924, the Court of First
Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor
of the Philippine National Bank and against Uy
Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of
P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum
from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum
amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court
ordered the defendant to deposit said amount
with the clerk of the court within three months
from the date of the judgment, and in case of his
failure to do so that the mortgaged properties
described in transfer certificates of title Nos.
7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction
in accordance with the law and the proceeds
applied to the payment of the judgment.
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of
the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila
sold the two parcels of land at public auction to
the Philippine National Bank on October 14,
1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.
On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National
Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his
right to redeem the property described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the
same date the bank sold said property to
Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net
Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the
bank for P2,700, because the account of the
defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300.
In other words, the bank credited the defendant
with the full amount realized by it when it resold
the two parcels of land.
The bank brought the present action to revive
the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with

interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1,
1930.
In his amended answer the defendant alleged as
a special defense that he waived his right to
redeem the land described in transfer certificate
of title No. 8274 in consideration of an
understanding between him and the bank that
the bank would not collect from him the balance
of the judgment. It was on this ground that the
trial court absolved the defendant from the
complaint.
In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove
any valid agreement on the part of the bank not
to collect from him the remainder of the
judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the
pertinent part of whose testimony on direct
examination was as follows:
P. En este documento aparece que usted, por
consideracion de valor recibido del Banco
Nacional demandante en la presente causa,
renuncia a su derecho de recompra de la
propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica
subasta el catorce de octubre de mil
novecientos veintecuatro a favor del Banco
Nacional; ¿quiere usted explicar al Honorable
Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion de valor?
— R. Si, señor. Esto desde mil novecientos
veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro, no
recuerdo bien, me haba dicho el señor Pecson,
porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos
intereses mensuales. Entonces me dijo Pecson,
"¿como puede usted recibir alquileres y no paga
usted intereses?"
P. ¿Quien es ese señor Pecson? — R. Era
encargado de este asunto.
P. ¿Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe?
— R. Era encargado de estas transacciones.
Cuando tenia necesidad siempre llamaba yo al
señor Pecson. Entonces hable al señor Pecson
que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los
alquileres no pueden cobrarse por anticipado.
Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion
a la pregunta.
Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha
terminado el testigo su contestacion.
JUZGADO. Que la termine.
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 40
TESTIGO. Me dijo el señor Pecson que es cosa
mala para mi "¿por que usted cobra alquileres y
no paga los intereses? Mejor deje usted ya
todos sus bienes para cubrir sus deudas.
P. El señor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje
usted ya todos sus bienes," ¿a que bienes se
referia el ? — R. Al terreno de Ronquillo y al
terreno de Paco.
P. ¿Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el
de Paco, el que se refiere aqui en el Exhibit 1?
— R. Paco, primeramente, los dos ambos.
P. Pero este Exhibit 1, ¿a que se refiere; al de
Paco o al de Ronquillo? — R. Parece que Paco.
P. ¿No recuerda usted muy bien? — R. No
recuerdo.
P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el señor Pecson
mejor que dejara todos sus bienes, ¿le dijo a
usted a favor de quien iba usted a dejar sus
bienes? — R. Al Banco Nacional.
P. ¿Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo
el señor Pecson con respecto al saldo deudor
que usted todavia era en deber a favor del
Banco Nacional? — R. No recuerdo mas; pero
mas o menos de catorce mil pesos.
P. ¿Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo, si el
cobraria todavia o se le condonaria?
Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me
opongo.
JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta.
P. ¿Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una
vez otorgado este Exhibit 1?
SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna
base. Nos openemos.
Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian
vendido todos los terrenos.
JUZGADO. Puede contestar.
Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.
R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre
alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted esos

terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno de Paco para
cubrir ya todas mis deudas. Entonces dije ya, si,
como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta
que al fin yo dije que queria yo comprar.
P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil
novecientos veintecinco este documento Exhibit
1, ¿recibio usted algun centimo de dinero del
Banco? — R. Nada, absolutamente.
When asked on cross-examination if Pecson
was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of
defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, the
defendant answered that he did not know; asked
when Pecson had spoken to him about the
matter, the defendant replied that he did not
remember.
One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that
the defendant renounced his right to redeem the
parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1,
because a friend of the defendant was interested
in buying it.
The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a
witness, or his deposition, if he was not residing
in Manila at the time of the trial.
With respect to the testimony of the bank's
attorney, we should like to observe that although
the law does not forbid an attorney to be a
witness and at the same time an attorney in a
cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not
testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and
that they should withdraw from the active
management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal
Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal
Ethics reads as follows:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except
as to merely formal matters, such as the
attestation or custody of an instrument and the
like, he should leave the trial of the case to other
counsel. Except when essential to the ends of
justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court
in behalf of his client.
Defendant's testimony as to the alleged
agreement is very uncertain. There is no
mention in Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on
the part of the bank. Exhibit 1 relates only to the
land in Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any
such agreement as the defendant claims, it is
reasonable to suppose that he would have
required the defendant to waive his right to
LEGAL ETHICS CANON 12 ACJUCO 41
redeem both parcels of land, and that the
defendant, a Chines business man, would have
insisted upon some evidence of the agreement
in writing. It appears to us that the defendant
waived his right to redeem the land in Calle
Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to
purchase it and was willing to pay therefor
P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the
defendant with the full amount of the sale.
Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was
such an understanding between Pecson and the
defendant as the latter claims, it is not shown
that Pecson was authorized to make any such
agreement for the bank. Only the board of
directors or the persons empowered by the
board of directors could bind the bank by such
an agreement. There is no merit in the
contention that since the bank accepted the
benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the
alleged agreement. The fact that the bank after
having bought the land for P1,000 resold it at the
instance of the defendant for P8,600 and
credited the defendant with the full amount of the
resale was a sufficient consideration for the
execution of defendant's waiver of his right to
redeem.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision
appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is
condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7
per cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and
the costs of both instances.